comm 4403 – political economy of media

Distribution is King

Implications in the Canadian Media Landscape

Matthew Handy

12/18/2013SN: 100820716

Introduction

The Canadian media landscape is, at the very least, one of the most interesting markets in

the country to study. From high levels of concentration to coopetition disguised as competition,

media giants in Canada are part of one of the most notorious oligopolies in the media universe.

The small amount of players in the wireless, ISP and television markets allow for not only high

concentration levels but an abundance of vertical, horizontal, and diagonal integration as well.

The issues surrounding concentration, coopetition and integration can all be contextualized

within the framework of distribution methods such as wireless networks, internet service, and

television channels. Although they are most certainly not the culprit of many of these negative

side-effects of the Canadian media landscape, new technologies have an important role to play in

how the media landscape works, most importantly in terms of distribution methods. Some recent

changes in the landscape like the Bell-Astral deal or the NHL broadcasting rights deal can also

exemplify how distribution plays a very important role in business decisions. This pattern of

distribution becoming very important throughout the Canadian media landscape is a significant

one because it can allow for predictions and indications of future trends and directions in the

market. Robert Babe states that it is important to “detect, describe, and analyse patterns” because

they “may be expected to continue resurfacing” (Babe, 1993, p. 4). With the advent of new

technologies paired with the high concentration of the Canadian media landscape, distribution

methods play an unparalleled role in the political economy of Canadian media. In fact,“The

media infrastructure industries (i.e. mobile, fixed telecoms and internet access) increasingly

constitute the centre of gravity around which the rest of the media universe revolves” (Winseck,

2012, p. 1). Compared to content, distribution is much more important because content “is

perceived as driving the evolution of telecom networks. Yet content is not king […] it has never

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spurred as much willingness to spend as simple connectivity. The $170 billion in 2011 wireless

revenues in the US comes overwhelmingly from voice and texting” (Odlyzko, 2012, p. 3888).

Bandwidth, networks, and distribution methods are part of the most important sector in the

Canadian media landscape. Power in the Canadian media landscape is defined by who holds the

keys to the distribution and dissemination of content.

Definitions

The Canadian media ‘landscape,’ will be used in lieu of using many different synonyms

(market, industry, etc.) in order to sacrifice variety for consistency. The ‘landscape’ includes the

entire Canadian media market, including all the industries and markets studied in the CMCR

Project, again for the sake of consistency. When looking at one sector specifically, it will be

stated outright beforehand. Otherwise, assume that ‘landscape’ is the placeholder for the entire

Canadian media industry as a whole. It is also prudent to underscore exactly what the Canadian

media landscape is in terms of the industries and markets that are part of it. The definition of the

landscape is very important because it determines the levels of concentration. The more

industries and corporations one includes in a definition of a media landscape, the less

concentrated it will seem. The media landscape defined in this paper will follow Noam’s

definition of the media landscape, which groups about 100 media industries into four larger

sectors: mass media, telecommunications, internet and ICTs (Noam, 2009). These four sectors

and their containing markets and firms form a fair and well-rounded definition of the media

landscape.

Coopetition is a portmanteau of cooperation and competition. It is a very important

concept to utilize when studying the highly concentrated Canadian media landscape because

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many corporations are dependent upon each other. According to Wikipedia, “coopetition occurs

when companies interact with partial congruence of interests. They cooperate with each other to

reach a higher value creation if compared to the value created without interaction, and struggle to

achieve competitive advantage” (Wikipedia, n.d.) Coopetition is very important in terms of

network sharing, a trend throughout the Canadian media landscape. For example, Bell and Telus

have a network sharing agreement which, according to Bell allows for: “reciprocal coverage for

both companies” and, “rapid introduction of wireless competition in rural areas” (Bell, 2001).

Since this information is taken from Bell, the deal is inevitably shown in the most positive light

possible, but it speaks to how network sharing deals are an important part of coopetition in the

Canadian media landscape.

Distribution methods are defined in this paper as any type of network or infrastructure

that media companies use to deliver content to audiences. Distribution is important because

spending has been consistently higher on networks as opposed to content since as early as 1984

(Appendix A). With the rise of the internet, networks have become very important for companies

because they can leverage economies of scale to their benefit. By charging consumers high

prices for connectivity as well as instilling data caps, companies like Bell and Rogers can

influence which distribution networks get traffic as well as increase profits for their ISP services.

Network infrastructure is invaluable because: “all parts of the network – telephone transmission

systems, computers, switches, and television sets – are merging into a single unified machine.

The faster this development takes place in any particular country, the better its infrastructure will

be, and the better it will be able to compete” (Babe, 1993, p. 242). Access to infrastructure is

essential in a market that is so dependent on it for delivering content over a multitude of

platforms. The most important concept to remember in terms of distribution methods in media

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markets is that information is a non-rivalrous good, and economies of scale play a very

significant role. It costs next to nothing to disseminate multiple copies of the same message,

making distribution in the media landscape a very profitable sector.

The Landscape I – Concentration

Concentration is an ever-apparent problem in the Canadian media landscape. The CRTC

(Canadian Radio-Television & Telecommunications Commission) and Competition Bureau exist

in order to attempt to curb this problem, but it has remained rampant despite their efforts. These

‘efforts’ are not always in the best interests of the overall market, or consumers either. For

example, when Bell and Astral were allowed to merge last year, the CRTC forced Bell to sell off

some of Astral’s holdings in the radio and television sectors. This may seem to be curbing

concentration on paper, however, the company that was poised to pick up those stations was

Corus Entertainment, another Canadian media giant. This exemplifies that even though the

CRTC imposes conditions on mergers like this one, it does not necessarily make the mergers any

more desirable in terms of market concentration.

Canadian media concentration woes are in part due to these types of policy decisions, but

these woes also persist because of the lack of consistent and reliable empirical research on the

Canadian media landscape. Arguments surrounding competition and concentration largely hinge

on empirical evidence, and without consistent and reliable evidence, it is difficult to make the

case that concentration is a problem. That being said, projects like the CMCR project in Canada

and the larger parent study, the IMCR run by Eli Noam are invaluable in providing necessary

evidence for these arguments. The CRTC also provides empirical evidence through its

Communications Monitoring Report, although this evidence has been proven to be somewhat

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inconsistent in terms of measures of revenues. As of 2012, HHI levels in nearly every Canadian

media sector were well over 1000, with many over 1800, meaning that most were mildly to

heavily concentrated (CMCRP, 2012). This is not an ideal situation and poses many problems for

consumers as well as small businesses. Consumers are negatively affected because large

companies are able to influence the market in self-serving ways, such as inflating prices or

leveraging their own content on their networks. One corporation guilty of these types of practices

is BCE, or Bell in Canada. As of 2011, Bell had over 25% of the television market, over 8% of

the radio market, and over 21% of the Internet Service Provider market (CMCR Project, 2011).

After the deal was closed with Astral, Bell's market share in both the television and radio sectors

increased significantly.

Concentration has been proven to be detrimental to the public as well as other businesses,

but can also have negative effects for the large conglomerates. For example, Bell’s

“capitalization soared from $15 billion in 1995 to $89 billion in 1999 but plunged to $26 billion

3 years later” (Winseck, 2012, p. 159). This plunge was largely due to Bell’s acquisition and

subsequent floundering of CTVGlobemedia, which they sold off in 2006 when it was worth

about half of what they originally bought it for (Winseck, 2012, p. 159). Even though

corporations may have the public believe that concentration is a good way to keep Canadian

businesses competitive in a global market, it can have detrimental impacts on the corporations

that are concentrated if they are not wary of the problems that come with concentration. In this

case, Bell 'bit off more than they could chew' and it ended up costing them dearly and forcing

them to sell off some of their holdings.

Other arguments can be made against concentration in terms of democratic ideas about

media ownership dispersal. Robert Babe states that: "information permeates and transforms

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societies [...] the process of modernization of economies and cultures is viewed by some as being

highly dependent upon, and interrelated with, the flow in high volume of communication which

extols and facilitates market transactions" (Babe, 1995, p. 17). Since information is such an

important part of the economy as well as democracy, it is important to ensure that there is

maximum dispersal of media ownership, as outlined by Baker in his book Media Concentration

and Democracy: Why Ownership Matters. In fact, Baker believed that empirical evidence was

misleading because “the high number of peer-reviewed studies that overtly misinterpret their

own data is disappointing” (Baker, 2007, p. 24) and “the relevance of factual information is

limited” (Baker, 2007, p. 20). This is in line with statements earlier about the problems with

empirical data being inconsistent or interpreted in ways that serve the best interests of those

presenting the data.

Concentration & Distribution – Implications

Concentration has many important implications in terms of how it affects distribution

channels and how they are utilized. First and foremost, high levels of concentration simply mean

that Canadians have limited choice when it comes to choosing service providers for their

wireless, internet, telephone and television services. This is especially apparent in the northern

Territories such as Yukon, where residents only have one service provider (Bell) and thus Bell is

able to essentially hold a monopoly in the wireless carrier market. According to Cameron Zubko,

COO at Ice Wireless, “the pricing, historically, in Northern Canada, has been very high and in

our opinion unnecessarily high” (LaSalle, 2013). Ice Wireless is one of the first companies to

take on Bell in the North, and this added competition for Bell will (hopefully) drive prices down

and quality up for those living in Northern Canada.

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Overall, the wireless sector in Canada is by far the most profitable, with the wireline,

internet and television network sectors following respectively (CMCRP, 2012). The fact that

these four sectors are the most profitable would suggest that connectivity and distribution are

much more important in terms of profits and market power than the content that flows over those

networks. For example, “the fact that spending on content and cultural goods in 2008 was the

same as it was in 1982 (2.4 percent) suggests that people are using ‘bandwidth’ and

‘connectivity’ for their own purposes rather than consuming more commercial media content. If

so, bandwidth, not content, may be king in the network media ecology” (Winseck, 2012, p. 149).

This statement shows that distribution or bandwidth is the most important for consumers as well

as businesses.

The Landscape II – Coopetition

As stated earlier, coopetition is a very integral part of the Canadian media landscape. The

small number of large players in Canada means that each company needs to ‘work together’ to

some degree. Network sharing is a very important kind of coopetition because it gives the

companies that own the infrastructure unparalleled power in terms of who can use the

infrastructure and what content flows through those networks. The most prevalent network

sharing agreement was the wireless network sharing agreement between Telus and Bell that

allowed them to roll out a 3G service in Canada and compete against Rogers in the smartphone

market. According to an article in the Financial Post, Bob McFarlane, the CFO of Telus stated:

“we got Canada built out in less than one year — 98% covered — by basically splitting up the

country and making it economical to do [...] That’s the benefit of having network sharing”

(Sturgeon, 2012). Network sharing like this creates a somewhat problematic relationship

between large media companies, in that they are working together in one sector (network) while

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they are competing in others (retail). Relationships like this can greatly influence how vertically

integrated companies like Bell act with regards to how much they charge for access to their

networks.

Bell and Rogers also share many holdings and interests in the Canadian media landscape.

For example, the two both own a shared 75% stake in MLSE (Maple Leafs Sports and

Entertainment). This coopetition is problematic for the basic reason that Rogers and Bell are the

two largest media companies in Canada and they compete head-to-head at many different levels

of the market. Specifically, since Rogers owns Sportsnet and Bell owns TSN, with this deal they

acquire LeafsTV and effectively create a virtual oligopoly in terms of sports broadcasting and

sports content distribution both through physical networks as well as sports networks.

Coopetition & Distribution – Implications

Coopetition has resounding impacts in distribution channels because it allows for

incumbent companies like Bell and Telus, with their shared network, to gain an unfair advantage

over other players in the market. In an article in the Financial Post, Sturgeon mentions the

conditions of the wireless network sharing deal and quotes an anonymous person close to

regulatory matters at Globalive: "Competitors argue the conditions lack teeth, while the auction’s

unique bidding structure gives an unfair advantage to the two incumbents. 'I don’t understand

why competing at the retail level would act as a ‘get out of jail free card’. We’re talking about

one entity sharing spectrum and a network. Why should competing at the retail level have

anything to do with [allowing Bell and Telus to share spectrum]? It seems to me artificial,” said a

person close to regulatory matters at Globalive who spoke on condition of anonymity"

(Sturgeon, 2012). The deal was OK’d by Industry Canada on the condition that Bell and Telus

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continued to compete at the retail level, but the real issue is not mitigated by the two companies

competing in another sector. Distribution is power, and when two large players like Bell and

Telus both have access to a shared network, it gives them a major advantage over other players

and makes the barriers to enter the market extremely high. This is just another way in which the

Canadian media landscape is continuing to become more and more concentrated over time.

The Landscape III – Integration

Vertical, Horizontal, and Diagonal integration are important factors in the Canadian

media landscape. Vertical integration occurs when companies in a supply chain are linked by a

common owner (Wikipedia, n.d.). An example of this is Bell’s ownership in mobile networks as

well as the content that is streamed over those networks. Horizontal integration is when a

company occurs when a company holds multiple firms in the same industry, at the same stage of

production (Wikipedia, n.d.). Finally, diagonal integration occurs when firms use various

information technologies to combine services logically, for greatest profit-ability and best

productivity (Ask.com, n.d.). These types of integration all exist in order to achieve economies

of scale and scope, effectively reducing costs and maximizing profits for companies in the

Canadian media landscape. Integration, namely vertical integration, is a commonality in the

Canadian media landscape, with companies such as Bell and Rogers owning many links

(sometimes every link) in a media supply chain. This creates all types of issues surrounding

accountability and competition, and has many important implications in terms of distribution and

networks.

Integration & Distribution - Implications

All of the top media firms in Canada are integrated in some way, and any type of

integration has implications for networks and distribution avenues. Vertical integration is likely

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the most important out of the three different types of integration when it comes to distribution.

There is a clear incentive for vertically integrated companies to leverage their distribution

holdings to ensure their content is watched by audiences.

Vertical integration also poses an issue because companies may attempt to leverage

certain types of distribution methods above others, such as television instead of internet. This

discriminatory practice against the internet in relation to television is problematic because it is

essentially companies using their power in order to keep distribution channels alive. Whatever

the reasoning behind it, this artificial demand for television: “has been to prevent the rise of the

internet as an alternative medium for television. To this end, telecom and cable providers restrict

peer-to-peer traffic and regulate their networks with a heavy hand, as the CBC discovered when

Bell hobbled its attempt to use BitTorrent to distribute an episode of ‘Canada’s Next Great Prime

Minister’ in 2008” (Winseck, 2012). In this example, it is clear that Bell favours its television

distribution method in order to attempt to keep it competitive in a market where consumers have

changed their habits of consumption. This is mainly seen through users switching to using the

internet to watch television, so Bell’s plan seems to be that if they can make the internet

experience frustrating or not ideal for consumers, they will continue to use Bell’s television

service as well. This shows Bell’s immense power due to its holdings in both television and

internet distribution avenues, and it is a problem because it allows Bell to force consumers into

doing what they want them to do. It is also problematic because it allows them to ‘buff up’ their

market share since, given the choice, many Canadians would likely opt for only having an

internet connection if they could legally acquire all of the content that is on television through

the internet instead. One more issue it presents is that it allows Bell to charge more for these

services than would normally be accepted by consumers, especially ones that have no choice in

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the matter (e.g. in places where Bell holds a monopoly, like the north). Bell is no stranger to

price fixing, for example: “in 1978, CNCP Telecommunications filed evidence with the CRTC

showing that price increases by Bell Canada in monopolized service categories far outstripped

price increases in competitive (private-line) services (Babe, 1993, p. 153). Companies like Bell

have been abusing their power through concentration, coopetition and integration, using their

distribution and networks as the main players in their schemes.

New Technologies

Mobile networks have become extremely important for many of Canada’s top media

corporations. Along with the internet, companies like Bell and Rogers have embraced mobile

technology in order to take advantage of the growing mobile market in Canada. The mobile

market is a force to be reckoned with in terms of concentration scores. The CR4 of the Canadian

wireless market is 94.3% and the HHI is 2873, which are both far above the recommended

thresholds for healthy competition. Of the CR4 percentage, Rogers holds 35.8% of the market

share and Bell holds 27.4%. This means that the top 2 mobile providers in Canada hold over

63% of the market share, which means the mobile market is virtually an oligopoly. As stated

earlier, in Northern Canada this is augmented further, with many regions subject to a Bell

monopoly or something close to it.

In a recent complaint filed to the CRTC, Ben Klass speaks to a growing issue in Canada

in the form of corporations privileging their own content on their wireless networks. "Treating

Bell content differently than content from other sources is just another form of traffic shaping,

the complaint alleges, and violates CRTC regulations that require internet service providers to

treat all internet traffic equally, including over mobile networks. It also violates the

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Telecommunications Act, which prohibits carriers from giving their own services "undue

preference," the complaint claims." (CBC, 2013). This instance of Bell being caught violating

CRTC regulations and the Telecommunications Act is a direct result of them taking advantage of

new technologies. There are also wider implications for the internet in terms of how distribution

plays a role in the very nature of the internet.

Odlyzko states in his piece Content is not King, “…that point-to-point communication

network is often said, by Metcalfe's Law, to have value proportional to the square of the number

of members […] if point-to-point communications were to dominate [instead of content], and if

Metcalfe's Law were to hold, there would be strong economic incentives to a unified network

without barriers” (Odlyzko, 2001). Odlyzko is underscoring the importance of distribution in

terms of the open and free nature of the internet, saying that if distribution truly is king, there are

many incentives to keep the internet open and free rather than a closed network for things like

broadcasting. This means that in addition to being powerful in terms of markets and economies,

distribution is also a significant part of technological change and notions of a free and open

internet ecology.

The Real World - NHL Deal

Distribution avenues proved to be instrumental in the recent NHL broadcasting deal that

saw Rogers gain exclusive rights to nationally broadcast NHL games (CBC, 2013). This

broadcasting deal has implications for the public as well as for other media companies in

Canada. There are many reasons for why this deal could have been struck in favour of Rogers,

but there are some key points about distribution that seem to put Rogers ahead of Bell in terms of

sports broadcasting. For example, Rogers owns multiple (360, one, west, east, Ontario, etc.)

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regional distribution methods, while TSN, which has developed itself as a national broadcaster,

does not. Distribution came into play as part of the deal because of the many different networks

Rogers owns to distribute NHL content. They have many regional networks under their

'Sportsnet' sports channel based on regions in Canada, such as West, East, and Ontario. They also

have Sportsnet One a supplementary channel, and Sportsnet 360, the 24-hour sports news

channel which they acquired recently. Sportsnet 360 was originally called 'The Score,' until

Rogers bought the station in August of 2012 (Ladurantaye, 2013). Altogether Rogers owns 7

sports channels compared to Bell's 2 (TSN and TSN2) and because of the multitude of

distribution networks Rogers holds, they were awarded the national broadcasting rights for the

NHL. TSN retains some regional broadcasting rights for certain Canadian teams, but Rogers and

its Sportnet network will broadcast the majority of games. Even CBC's Hockey Night in Canada

will be under Rogers control, while the broadcast will remain on the CBC network for at least

four more years. This deal once again outlines the importance of networks in relation to content.

The Real World II - Bell/Astral

It would be unjust to not mention the following deal in a paper on the Canadian media

landscape, and another way distribution channels have come into play in a recent media merger

is the Bell Astral deal of 2012. The obvious implication of this deal in terms of networks is that

with this deal, Bell becomes even more powerful because it gains access to the broadcast and

distribution methods held by Astral. Bell is Canada's largest national satellite direct-to-home

television distribution undertaking, Canada’s second largest national wireless carrier, Canada’s

largest ISP and operates a growing regional IPTV television distribution service, (Telus

Submission to CRTC, 2012) and all of this paired with the gains it made from the deal makes it

even more powerful. The deal is closely related to distribution because the content Bell acquired

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through the transaction gives it more ammunition to sell its own services. Although content may

not be king, it is important to remember that content is still important in terms of making their

own networks more viable for consumers.

Conclusions

Distribution is certainly not the only important part of the Canadian media landscape, but

it is a significant jumping-off point for arguments against many of the glaring problems with the

landscape. Distribution methods are important when looking at issues like concentration,

coopetition, and integration, all of which have been recently addressed by the CRTC and in fact

are a very ongoing problem with many regulatory and industry players. Historically, large

players in the market have always leveraged distribution networks to their advantage, and Bell

continues to be a thorn in the side of scholars, regulators, and industry players. Back in 1987,

“the Canadian telephone industry [was] composed of 81 systems, of which merely 16 received

more than 98 per cent of industry revenues. Bell Canada, by far the largest, accounted for more

than 55 per cent of industry revenues.” (Babe, 1993, p. 29). The situation Babe describes here

has really only gotten worse, with things like the wireless sector having 98 per cent of industry

revenues go to the top 4 players in the sector. There is something wrong with this number, and

the longer it continues, the more Canadians will be subject to predatory business practices by

large players like Bell.

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Appendix A

Source: cmcrp.org

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Appendix B – Some Final Thoughts

I just wanted to write a little note here and say thanks again Dwayne for a really

great class. I feel like I learn more in your classes than any others, and I think there are a

couple of different reasons for that. First off, you mix the real world with the classroom

very, very well. I know I’ve said this in the past but I believe it bears repeating because you

are one of the only professors I’ve had who even does it, let alone does it so well. Second,

your passion for the material is apparent and it’s driven me to have a passion for this stuff

as well. Obviously you’ve given my classmates and I ample opportunity to get involved,

whether it be through inviting us places, letting us be part of the CMCR goings-on, or just

bringing your own experiences into the classroom and explaining how the industry really

works to us. All of these opportunities for learning ‘outside the textbook’ really make for a

great classroom experience.

I wanted to take this opportunity to also apologize formally for my corporate profile

– I don’t want to make excuses for it and I won’t, but I want you to know that I’m sorry for

how it turned out and I really hope this paper restores some of your faith in me. I’ve tried

hard to demonstrate that I really do have a grasp on the Canadian media industry and I feel

like the idea of connectivity and distribution being the key factor in where power resides

really has some important and lasting implications. I’m excited for the international

communication regulations class next semester and think it will be a nice change from the

focus on Bell, Rogers and friends. Thanks again Dwayne, and have a great holiday.

- Matthew

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References

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Babe, R. E. (1995) Communication and the Transformation of Economics. Colorado & the UK: Westview Press. Retrieved from: https://libares01.carleton.ca/ares.dll?SessionID=S023450950C&Action=10&Type=10&Value=63535

Baker, C. E. (2007). Media Concentration and Democracy: Why Ownership Matters. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. Print.

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Ladurantaye, S. (2013). Rogers unveils new name, new plans for recently acquired The Score. The Globe and Mail, June 4. Retrieved from:http://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/rogers-unveils-new-name-new-plans-for-recently-acquired-the-score/article12335335/

LaSalle, L. (2013). Ice Wireless takes on big telcos in the North. Global News, November 22. Retrieved from: http://globalnews.ca/news/984012/ice-wireless-takes-on-big-telcos-in-the-north/

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Sturgeon, J. (2012). Telus and Bell's wireless partnership still a sore spot for competitors. Financial Post, December 6. Retrieved from: http://business.financialpost.com/2012/06/12/telus-and-bells-wireless-partnership-still-a-sore-spot-for-competitors/?__lsa=3169-7626

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Wikipedia. Pages for: Coopetition, Vertical Integration, Horizontal Integration. Retrieved from: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Main_Page

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