Political Law New Cases Finals

8/22/2019 Political Law New Cases Finals

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- versus -

HON. OSCAR PIMENTEL, SR.,IN HIS CAPACITY ASPRESIDING JUDGE,REGIONAL TRIAL COURT-BRANCH 148, MAKATI CITY;GEN. HERMOGENES

ESPERON, VICE ADM.ROGELIO I. CALUNSAG,MGEN. BENJAMINDOLORFINO, AND LT. COL.LUCIARDO OBEA,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 179817

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,QUISUMBING,YNARES-SANTIAGO,CARPIO,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

AZCUNA,TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,NACHURA,REYES,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, andBRION,JJ.

Promulgated:

June 27, 2008

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:At the wee hours of July 27, 2003, a group of more than 300 heavily armed

soldiers led by junior officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)

stormed into the Oakwood Premier Apartments in Makati City and publicly

demanded the resignation of the President and key national officials.

Later in the day, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Proclamation

No. 427 and General Order No. 4 declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the


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Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion.[1] A series of negotiations quelled the

teeming tension and eventually resolved the impasse with the surrender of the

militant soldiers that evening.

In the aftermath of this eventful episode dubbed as the Oakwood Incident,petitioner Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged, along with his comrades,

with coup detatdefined under Article 134-A of the Revised Penal Code before the

Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati. The case was docketed as Criminal Case

No. 03-2784, People v. Capt. Milo D. Maestrecampo, et al.

Close to four years later, petitioner, who has remained in detention,[2]threw

his hat in the political arena and won a seat in the Senate with a six-year term

commencing atnoon on June 30, 2007.

[3]

Before the commencement of his term or on June 22, 2007, petitioner filed

with the RTC, Makati City, Branch 148, an Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court

to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests [4](Omnibus

Motion). Among his requests were:

(a) To be allowed to go to the Senate to attend all official functions of the

Senate (whether at the Senate or elsewhere) particularly when the

Senate is in session, and to attend the regular and plenary sessions of

the Senate, committee hearings, committee meetings, consultations,

investigations and hearings in aid of legislation, caucuses, staff

meetings, etc., which are normally held at the Senate of the

Philippines located at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City (usually

from Mondays to Thursdays from 8:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m.);

(b) To be allowed to set up a working area at his place of detention at the

Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila, Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City,

with a personal desktop computer and the appropriatecommunications equipment (i.e., a telephone line and internet access)

in order that he may be able to work there when there are no sessions,

meetings or hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is not in

session. The costs of setting up the said working area and the related

equipment and utility costs can be charged against the

budget/allocation of the Office of the accused from the Senate;
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(c) To be allowed to receive members of his staff at the said working area

at his place of detention at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila,

Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, at reasonable times of the day

particularly during working days for purposes of meetings, briefings,

consultations and/or coordination, so that the latter may be able toassists (sic) him in the performance and discharge of his duties as a

Senator of the Republic;

(d) To be allowed to give interviews and to air his comments, reactions

and/or opinions to the press or the media regarding the important

issues affecting the country and the public while at the Senate or

elsewhere in the performance of his duties as Senator to help shape

public policy and in the light of the important role of the Senate in

maintaining the system of checks and balance between the three (3)

co-equal branches of Government;

(e) With prior notice to the Honorable Court and to the accused and his

custodians, to be allowed to receive, on Tuesdays and

Fridays, reporters and other members of the media who may wish to

interview him and/or to get his comments, reactions and/or opinion at

his place of confinement at the Marine Brig, Marine Barracks Manila,

Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, particularly when there are no sessions,

meetings or hearings at the Senate or when the Senate is not in

session; and

(f) To be allowed to attend the organizational meeting and election of

officers of the Senate and related activities scheduled in the morning

(9:00 or 10:00 a.m.) of 23 July 2007 at the Senate of

the Philippineslocated at the GSIS Financial Center, Pasay City.[5]

By Order of July 25, 2007,[6]the trial court denied all the requests in the

Omnibus Motion. Petitioner moved for reconsideration in which he waived his

requests in paragraphs (b), (c) and (f) to thus trim them down to three .[7] The trial

court just the same denied the motion by Order of September 18, 2007.[8]

Hence, the present petition forcertiorari to set aside the two Orders of the

trial court, and forprohibition and mandamus to (i) enjoin respondents from

banning the Senate staff, resource persons and guests from meeting with him or
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transacting business with him in his capacity as Senator; and (ii) direct

respondents to allow him access to the Senate staff, resource persons and guests

and permit him to attend all sessions and official functions of the

Senate. Petitioner preliminarily prayed for the maintenance of thestatus quo

ante of having been able hitherto to convene his staff, resource persons andguests[9]at the Marine Brig.

Impleaded as co-respondents of Judge Oscar Pimentel, Sr. are AFP Chief of

Staff, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon (Esperon); Philippine Navys Flag Officer-in-

Command, Vice Admiral Rogelio Calunsag; Philippine Marines Commandant,

Major Gen. Benjamin Dolorfino; and Marine Barracks Manila Commanding

Officer, Lt. Col. Luciardo Obea (Obea).

Petitioner later manifested, in his Reply of February 26, 2008, that he has,

since November 30, 2007, been in the custody of the Philippine National Police

(PNP) CustodialCenter following the foiled take-over of the Manila Peninsula

Hotel[10] the day before or on November 29, 2007.

Such change in circumstances thus dictates the discontinuation of the action

as against the above-named military officers-respondents. The issues raised in

relation to them had ceased to present a justiciable controversy, so that a

determination thereof would be without practical value and use. Meanwhile,against those not made parties to the case, petitioner cannot ask for reliefs from this

Court.[11] Petitioner did not, by way of substitution, implead the police officers

currently exercising custodial responsibility over him; and he did not satisfactorily

show that they have adopted or continued the assailed actions of the former

custodians.[12]

Petitioner reiterates the following grounds which mirror those previously

raised in his Motion for Reconsideration filed with the trial court:

I.

THE JURISPRUDENCE CITED BY THE HONORABLE COURT A

QUO IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO THE INSTANT CASE

BECAUSE OF THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
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A.

UNLIKE IN THIS CASE, THE ACCUSED IN THE

JALOSJOS CASE WAS ALREADY CONVICTED AT

THE TIME HE FILED HIS MOTION. IN THE INSTANTCASE, ACCUSED/PETITIONER HAS NOT BEEN

CONVICTED AND, THEREFORE, STILL ENJOYS THE

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE;

B.

THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOJOS (SIC) CASE WAS

CHARGED WITH TWO (2) COUNTS OF STATUTORY

RAPE AND SIX (6) COUNTS OF ACTS OF

LASCIVIOUSNESS, CRIMES INVOLVING MORAL

TURPITUDE. HEREIN ACCUSED/PETITIONER IS

CHARGED WITH THE OFFENSE OF COUP DETAT,

A CHARGE WHICH IS COMMONLY REGARDED AS A

POLITICAL OFFENSE;

C.

THE ACCUSED IN THE JALOSJOS CASE

ATTEMPTED TO FLEE PRIOR TO BEINGARRESTED. THE ACCUSED/ PETITIONER

VOLUNTARILY SURRENDERED TO THE

AUTHORITIES AND AGREED TO TAKE

RESPONSIBILITY FOR HIS ACTS AT OAKWOOD;

II.

GEN. ESPERON DID NOT OVERRULE THE

RECOMMENDATION OF THE MARINE BRIGS COMMANDING

OFFICER TO ALLOW PETITIONER TO ATTEND THE SENATESESSIONS;

III.

ACCUSED/PETITIONER SUBMITS THAT THE FACT THAT THE

PEOPLE, IN THEIR SOVEREIGN CAPACITY, ELECTED HIM TO


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THE POSITION OF SENATOR OF THE REPUBLIC PROVIDES

THE PROPER LEGAL JUSTIFICATION TO ALLOW HIM TO

WORK AND SERVE HIS MANDATE AS A SENATOR;

- AND -

IV.

MOREOVER, THERE ARE ENOUGH PRECEDENTS TO ALLOW

LIBERAL TREATMENT OF DETENTION PRISONERS WHO ARE

HELD WITHOUT BAIL AS IN THE CASE OF FORMER

PRESIDENT JOSEPH ERAP ESTRADA AND FORMER ARMM

GOV. NUR MISUARI.[13]

The petition is bereft of merit.

In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos,

petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos)

was already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he filed a

motion similar to petitioners Omnibus Motion, whereas he (petitioner) is a mere

detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to enjoy civil and political rights

since the presumption of innocence is still in his favor.

Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes involving

moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six counts of acts of

lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted forcoup detatwhich is regarded as a

political offense.

Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes in

expressing legitimate grievances against the rampant and institutionalized practice

of graft and corruption in the AFP.

In sum, petitionersfirstground posits that there is a world of difference

between his case and that of Jalosjos respecting the type of offense involved, the

stage of filing of the motion, and other circumstances which demonstrate the

inapplicability ofJalosjos.[14]
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A plain reading of. Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.

The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the pronouncement

inJalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminallaw enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not substantial

distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom

and restricted in liberty of movement.[15]

It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into custody

for purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the Constitution

provides:

All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion

perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be

bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be

provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the

privilege of the writ ofhabeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall

not be required.[16](Underscoring supplied)

The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense,[17]or an

offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted tobail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal

action.[18]

That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup detatcases, both

being punishable by reclusion perpetua,[19]is beyond cavil. Within the class of

offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties, there is clearly no

distinction as to the political complexion of or moral turpitude involved in the

crime charged.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioners application for bail

and for release on recognizance was denied.[20] The determination that

the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an application

for bail[21]or imported from a trial courts judgment of conviction,[22]justifies the

detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to provisional
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liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right to bail in such

cases is regardless of the stage of the criminal action. Such justification for

confinement with its underlying rationale of public self-defense[23]applies equally

to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners-appellants like

Jalosjos.

As the Court observed inAlejano v. Cabuay,[24]it is impractical to draw a

line between convicted prisoners and pre-trial detainees for the purpose of

maintaining jail security; and while pre-trial detainees do not forfeit their

constitutional rights upon confinement, the fact of their detention makes their

rights more limited than those of the public.

The Court was more emphatic inPeople v. Hon. Maceda:

[25]

As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is

arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody of the law. He is placed

in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for

the commission of the offense. He must be detained in jail during the

pendency of the case against him, unless he is authorized by the court to

be released on bail or on recognizance. Let it be stressed that all

prisoners whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence

can not practice their profession nor engage in any business or

occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while indetention. This is a necessary consequence of arrest and

detention.[26](Underscoring supplied)

These inherent limitations, however, must be taken into account only to the

extent that confinement restrains the power of locomotion or actual physical

movement. It bears noting that inJalosjos, which was decided en banc one month

afterMaceda, the Court recognized that the accused could somehow accomplish

legislative results.

[27]

The trial court thus correctly concluded that the presumption of innocence

does not carry with it the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
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Petitioner is similarly situated with Jalosjos with respect to the application of

the presumption of innocence during the period material to the resolution of their

respective motions. The Court inJalosjos did not mention that the presumption of

innocence no longer operates in favor of the accused pending the review on appeal

of the judgment of conviction. The rule stands that until a promulgation of finalconviction is made, the constitutional mandate of presumption of innocence

prevails.[28]

In addition to the inherent restraints, the Court notes that petitioner neither

denied nor disputed his agreeing to a consensus with the prosecution that media

access to him should cease after his proclamation by the Commission on

Elections.[29]

Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade trial,

he is not a flight risk since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper authorities and

such can be proven by the numerous times he was allowed to travel outside his

place of detention.

Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders

augured well when on November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security detail for

some reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel to issue certain

statements. The account, dubbed this time as the Manila Pen Incident,[30]provesthat petitioners argument bites the dust. The risk that he would escape ceased to

be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the cause for foreboding became real.

Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a

factor in ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in canceling a

discretionary grant of bail.[31] In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what is

controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong. Once it

is established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is neither a matter of right norof discretion.[32]

Petitioner cannot find solace inMontano v. Ocampo[33]to buttress his plea

for leeway because unlike petitioner, the therein petitioner, then Senator Justiniano

Montano, who was charged with multiple murder and multiple frustrated

murder,[34]was able to rebut the strong evidence for the
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prosecution. Notatu dignum is this Courts pronouncement therein that if denial

of bail is authorized in capital cases, it is only on the theory that the proof being

strong, the defendant would flee, if he has the opportunity, rather than face the

verdict of the jury.[35] At the time Montano was indicted, when only capital

offenses were non-bailable where evidence of guilt is strong,[36]the Court noted theobvious reason that one who faces a probable death sentence has a particularly

strong temptation to flee.[37] Petitioners petition for bail having earlier been

denied, he cannot rely onMontano to reiterate his requests which are akin to

bailing him out.

Second, petitioner posits that, contrary to the trial courts findings, Esperon

did not overrule Obeas recommendation to allow him to attend Senate

sessions. Petitioner cites the Comment

[38]

of Obea that he interposed no objectionto such request but recommended that he be transported by the Senate Sergeant-at-

Arms with adequate Senate security. And petitioner faults the trial court for

deeming that Esperon, despite professing non-obstruction to the performance of

petitioners duties, flatly rejected all his requests, when what Esperon only

disallowed was the setting up of a political office inside a military installation

owing to AFPs apolitical nature.[39]

The effective management of the detention facility has been recognized as a

valid objective that may justify the imposition of conditions and restrictions of pre-trial detention.[40] The officer with custodial responsibility over a detainee may

undertake such reasonable measures as may be necessary to secure the safety and

prevent the escape of the detainee.[41]Nevertheless, while the comments of the

detention officers provide guidance on security concerns, they are not binding

on the trial court in the same manner that pleadings are not impositions upon a

court.

Third, petitioner posits that his election provides the legal justification toallow him to serve his mandate, after the people, in their sovereign capacity,

elected him as Senator. He argues that denying his Omnibus Motion is tantamount

to removing him from office, depriving the people of proper representation,

denying the peoples will, repudiating the peoples choice, and overruling the

mandate of the people.
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Petitioners contention hinges on the doctrine in administrative law that apublic official can not be removed foradministrative misconduct committedduring a priorterm, since his re-election to office operates as a condonation of theofficers previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the right to remove him

therefor.[42]

The assertion is unavailing. The case against petitioner is not administrative

in nature. And there is no prior term to speak of. In a plethora of cases,[43]the

Court categorically held that the doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal

cases. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not obliterate a

criminal charge. Petitioners electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when

the voters elected him to the Senate, they did so with full awareness of the

limitations on his freedom of action [and] x x x with the knowledge that he couldachieve only such legislative results which he could accomplish within the

confines of prison.[44]

In once more debunking the disenfranchisement argument,[45]it is opportune

to wipe out the lingering misimpression that the call of duty conferred by the voice

of the people is louder than the litany of lawful restraints articulated in the

Constitution and echoed by jurisprudence. The apparent discord may be

harmonized by the overarching tenet that the mandate of the people yields to the

Constitution which the people themselves ordained to govern all under the rule oflaw.

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public

officers has never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The

duties imposed by the mandate of the people are multifarious. The

accused-appellant asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the

hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250

members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24

members
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of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation. Congress continues

to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. x

x x Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different

classification from those others who are validly restrained by

law.[46](Underscoring supplied)

Lastly, petitioner pleads for the same liberal treatment accorded certain

detention prisoners who have also been charged with non-bailable offenses, like

former President Joseph Estrada and former Governor Nur Misuari who were

allowed to attend social functions. Finding no rhyme and reason in the denial of

the more serious request to perform the duties of a Senator, petitioner harps on an

alleged violation of the equal protection clause.

In arguing against maintaining double standards in the treatment of detention

prisoners, petitioner expressly admits that he intentionally did not seek preferential

treatment in the form of being placed under Senate custody or house arrest,[47]yet

he at the same time, gripes about the granting of house arrest to others.

Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from imprisonment are allowed

to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities or upon court orders .[48] That

this discretion was gravely abused, petitioner failed to establish. In fact, the trial

court previously allowed petitioner to register as a voter in December 2006, file his

certificate of candidacy in February 2007, cast his vote on May 14, 2007, be

proclaimed as senator-elect, and take his oath of office[49]on June 29, 2007. In a

seeming attempt to bind or twist the hands of the trial court lest it be accused of

taking a complete turn-around,[50]petitioner largely banks on these prior grants to

him and insists on unending concessions and blanket authorizations.

Petitioners position fails. On the generality and permanence of his requests

alone, petitioners case fails to compare with the species of allowableleaves. Jaloslossuccinctly expounds:

x x x Allowing accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions

and committee meetings for five (5) days or more in a week will virtually

make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant to his

position. Such an aberrant situation not only elevates accused-appellants
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status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of the

purposes of the correction system.[51]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-48224 September 23, 1942

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff.

NATIVIDAD FLORENDO, complaint-appellant,vs.GENEROSO MACEDA and CORAZON MACEDA, defendants-appellees.

Constancio E. Castaeda for appellant.Estanislao A. Fernandez for appellees.

MORAN, J.:

This is a criminal action for slight slander instituted in the justice of the peace court of Pasig, Rizal,against defendants Generoso Maceda and Corazon Maceda and which was dismissed on theground that the offense had already prescribed. The offense was allegedly committed on July 21,

1940, and the action was filed on October 22, 1940, that is three months and one day after thesupposed commission thereof. The appeal of the private prosecutor to the Court of First Instancehaving been dismissed on the same ground on motion of the fiscal, the complainant appealed to thisCourt.

The first question here raised is: May the offended party appeal from the order of dismissal renderedupon petition of the fiscal to that effect? This question inevitably leads to the inquiry as to whetherthe offended party may intervene in the prosecution of a criminal action and, in the affirmative case,the instances where intervention is proper. This is so because, obviously where there is no right tointervene, there is no right to appeal.

Rule 106, section 15, of the Rules of Court, provides:

Unless the offended party has waived the civil action or expressly reserved the right toinstitute it after the termination of the criminal case, and subject to the provisions of section 4hereof, he may intervene, personally or by attorney, in the prosecution of the offense.

This provision was taken from section 107 of General Orders, No. 58, which recites:

The privileges now secured by law to the person claiming to be injured by commission of anoffense to take part in the prosecution of the offense and to recover damages for the injury
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sustained by reason of the same shall not be held to be abridged by the provision of thisorder; but such person may appear and shall be heard either individually or by attorney at allstages of the case, and the court upon conviction of the accused may enter judgment againsthim for the damages occasioned by his wrongful act. It shall, however, be the duty of thepromoter fiscal to direct the prosecution, subject to the right of the person injured to appealfrom any decision of the court denying him a legal right.

The late Chief Justice Arellano, one of the members of the commission which drafted GeneralOrders, No. 58, commenting on the right of the offended party to intervene in the prosecution of thecriminal action as provided for in section 107 aforequoted, said:

... La accion penal privada del ofendido mismo era necessario mantener como consecuenciade la vigencia del Codigo Penal por dos razones; primera porque, en principio, con elpronunciamiento principal acerca de la responsabilidad criminal suele ir el relativo a laresponsabilidad civil; y segunda, porque hay delitos que no pueden perseguirse de otromodo que por medio de instancia formal de la persona ofendida. Por estas razones, bajo elepigrafe "derechos de la persona agraviada por el delito"; se dicto la section 107, segun lacual, "los derechos hasta ahora asegurados por la Ley a la persona que alega haber sidoagraviada por la comision de un delito, para tomar parte en su persecucion y exigir laresponsabilidad civil nacida del delito, no quedan restringidos por las disposiciones de estaorden. (Estados Unidos contra Malabon, 1 Jur. Fil., 760, 762.)

In a resolution, upon a motion for reconsideration in the case ofPeople vs. Orais (38 Off. Gaz.,2434), this Court had occasion to explain the specific import of the above-quoted observations of thelate Chief Justice, thus:

... No pudo haber sido la intencion del legislador el permitir al particular lesionado por lacomision de un delito tomar parte en sun persecucion haya o no sufrido daos y perjuiciosen su persona o en sus intereses. La frase "tomar parte en su persecucion y exigir laresponsabilidad civil nacida del delito limita esta intervencion a los casos en que el ofendidoparticular haya surfrido daos y perjuicios provenientes del hecho delictivo.

And in Gonzalez vs. Court of First Instance of Bulacan (63 Phil., 846, 857), this Court reaffirmedthese observations as follows:

Some of the rights secured by the Spanish law to the person claiming to be injured by thecommission of the offense and conserved by section 107 of General Orders, No. 58, are totake part in the prosecution of the offense, to recover damages for the injury sustained byreason of the same and to appeal only in matters affecting restitutions, reparations andindemnities claimed by them, but not with regard to the criminal action. (Emphasis ours.)

It is thus evident, in the light of the history of the enactment of section 107 of General Orders, No.58, as reflected in the observations of one of its framers and the explanatory decisions of this Court,

that the offended party may, as of right, intervene in the prosecution of a criminal action, but thenonly when, from the nature of the offense, he is entitled to indemnity and his action therefor has notby him been waived or expressly reserved. This is the rule we have now embodied in section 15 ofRule 106 of the new Rules of Court, elsewhere quoted. But, as expressly provided in this samesection, this right of intervention in appropriate cases is subject to the provision of section 4 of thesame Rule which reads as follows:

All criminal actions either commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted underthe direction and control of the fiscal.


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As a necessary corollary to this provision, we laid down the principle that even if the offense is onewhere civil indemnity might rightly be claimed, if the criminal action is dismissed by the court, onmotion of the fiscal, on the ground of insufficiency of the evidence, the offended party cannot appealfrom the order of dismissal because otherwise the prosecution of the offense would, in the lastanalysis, be thrown beyond the direction and control of the fiscal. (Gonzalez vs. Court of FirstInstance of Bulacan, supra; People vs. Orais, supra; People vs. Moll, 40 Off,. Gaz., 2d Sup., p. 231;

People vs. Lipana, 40 Off. Gaz., 3456.) In the case cited, statements were, however, made by thisCourt importing a grant right to the offended party to appeal upon a question of law. We reaffirmthese statements as a correct qualification of the rule, it being understood, however, that such rightto appeal upon a question of law presupposes the existence of a rightful claim to civil indemnity andthe offended party has neither waived nor reserved expressly his action therefor.

It is argued that in People vs. Baes (38 Off. Gaz., 2319), wherein the crime charged is that ofoffending religious feelings which obviously precludes any idea of civil indemnity, we ruled that theoffended party may appeal upon a question of law from the dismissal of the case ordered by theCourt of First Instance. The contention rests on an erroneous predicate regarding the true offensealleged to have been committed. In our resolution rendered upon a motion for a reconsiderationin People vs. Orais (38 Gac. Off., pag. 2434), we explained our ruling thus:

... Existe, pues, una distincion fundamental entre la cuestion envuelta en la causa de Baes yla envuelta en la de Gonzales.

Aunque en la primera causa los hechos denunciados constituyen mas bien delito deallanamiento de una propieda, previsto y penado por el articulo 281 del Codigo PenalRevisado, que lleva consigo responsabilidad civil, no habiendose alegado en la denunciaque el denunciante particular hubiese sufrido algun dao, hubiera sido mas propio el quehubiesemos considerado la solicitud de mandamus como si se hubiese presentado paraobligar al Juzgado inferior a admitir no la apelacion, sino la denuncia en la que los hechosdenunciados constituian el delito de allanamiento de una propiedad, y no el de "ofensa a lossentimientos religiosos", ya que la calificacion que el Ministerio Fiscal da en una querella aun delito no es la que determina su naturaleza, sino los hechos delictivos alegados en la

denuncia y probados en el juicio; puesto que, no teniendo el particular agraviado por lacomision de un delito derecho de tomar parte en su presecucion y de apelar, a menos quereclamase daos y perjuicious o el delito enjuiciado fuese de los que necesariamenteproducen responsabilidad civil, al unico remedio que le queda es el de mandamus paraobligar al Ministerio Fiscal a presentar la querella correspondiente con vista de la denunciaque alega hechos constitutivos de delito, probados en la investigacion preliminar, y al Juezque sobreseyo la denuncia a mocion del Ministerio Fiscal a reponer la causa, si se ve queuno y otro cometieron abuso de discrecion.

In the instant case, the civil action for damages arising from the oral defamation charged does notappear to have been waived or expressly reserved by the supposed offended party. And since,according to Rule 107, section 1, paragraph (a) "when a criminal action is instituted the civil actionfor recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminalaction," we believe, and so hold, that the offended party may rightly intervene by interposing anappeal from the order dismissing the action upon a question of law.

An admission is imputed to the attorney for the offended party to the effect that no damages hadbeen sustained by the latter arising from the offense charged, but this supposed admission isdenied. Besides, no attorney can waive his client's cause of action unless with the consent of theclient (7 C. J. S., 922), and, in the instance case, the admission attributed to the private prosecutingattorney is not alleged to have been made with the offended party's consent.


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The next question is: Has the offense of slight slander charged in the complaint prescribed?

Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua orreclusion temporalshall prescribe intwenty years.

Crimes punishable by other afflicted penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.

Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception ofthose punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.

The crime of libel or other similar offense shall prescribe in two years.

The offenses of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.

Light offenses prescribe in two months.

When the penalty fixed by law is a compound one the highest penalty shall be made thebasis of the application of the rules contained in the first, second and third paragraphs of thisarticle.

This provision fixes the different prescriptive periods for grave felonies. Thus, a grave felonyprescribes in 20 years if it is punishable by death, reclusion perpetualorreclusion temporal, or in 15years if it is punishable by other afflictive penalty. Less grave felonies prescribe in 10 years if theyare punishable by correctional penalty, or 15 years if punishable by arresto mayor, except theoffense of libel or other similar offenses which shall prescribe in 2 years, or the offense of oraldefamation and slander by deed which shall prescribe in 6 months. All light offense prescribe in 2months. As the offense charged in the instant case is a light offense, the prescriptive period of 2months applies thereto. The case, therefore, was rightly dismissed.

It is contended by complainant-appellant that all offenses of oral defamation, whether light orserious, prescribe in six months because the second to the last paragraph of article 90 above quotedapparently so implies. We cannot uphold such interpretation. The very fact that the prescriptiveperiod for serious oral defamation was expressly excepted from the general rule by lowering it fromten years to six months argues against the supposition that the lawmaker intended to raise theprescriptive period for light oral defamation from two months (as that of all other light offenses) to sixmonths, i. e, on the same level with serious oral defamation. The obvious reason for shortening theperiod of limitation for the prosecution of serious oral defamation namely, that a verbal insult isforgotten as soon as the heat of passion subsides applies with equal, if not greater, force to lightoral defamation. Hence, there is no reason to suppose that the lawmaker intended to raise theprescriptive period for light oral defamation above that of other light offenses. Indeed, that was thesame law under the old Penal Code, and there has been no reason or occasion for any change.

The order of dismissal is affirmed with costs against appellant.

Yulo, C.J., Paras, Bocobo, and Generoso, JJ., concur.


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EN BANC

[G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaint i f f-appellee, vs . ROMEO G.

JALOSJOS, accused-appellant.

R E S O L U T I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member ofCongress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his convictionfor statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts[1]ispending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be

allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendanceat legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having beenconvicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

The issue raised is one of first impression.

Does membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and ruleswhich apply to validly incarcerated persons in general? In answering thequery, we are called upon to balance relevant and conflicting factors in the

judicial interpretation of legislative privilege in the context of penal law.

The accused-appellants "Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate AsMember of House of Representatives" was filed on the grounds that

1. Accused-appellants reelection being an expression of popularwill cannot be rendered inutile by any ruling, giving priority to anyright or interest not even the police power of the State.

2. To deprive the electorate of their elected representativeamounts to taxation without representation.

3. To bar accused-appellant from performing his duties amountsto his suspension/removal and mocks the renewed mandateentrusted to him by the people.

4. The electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Nortewants their voice to be heard.
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5. A precedent-setting U.S. ruling allowed a detained lawmaker toattend sessions of the U.S. Congress.

6. The House treats accused-appellant as a bona fide memberthereof and urges a co-equal branch of government to respect its

mandate.

7. The concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtailthe duty of accused-appellant to discharge his mandate.

8. Accused-appellant has always complied with theconditions/restrictions when allowed to leave jail.

The primary argument of the movant is the "mandate of sovereign will." Hestates that the sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del

Norte chose him as their representative in Congress. Having been re-electedby his constituents, he has the duty to perform the functions of aCongressman. He calls this a covenant with his constituents made possible bythe intervention of the State. He adds that it cannot be defeated byinsuperable procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases.

True, election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people. In theexercise of suffrage, a free people expects to achieve the continuity ofgovernment and the perpetuation of its benefits. However, inspite of itsimportance, the privileges and rights arising from having been elected may be

enlarged or restricted by law. Our first task is to ascertain the applicable law.

We start with the incontestable proposition that all top officials of Government-executive, legislative, and judicial are subject to the majesty of law. There isan unfortunate misimpression in the public mind that election or appointmentto high government office, by itself, frees the official from the commonrestraints of general law. Privilege has to be granted by law, not inferred fromthe duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the greater is therequirement of obedience rather than exemption.

The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the Houseof Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arisesfrom a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows thatthe privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provisiongranting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond theordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment,implication or equitable considerations.


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The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department:

Sec. 15. The Senators and Members of the House ofRepresentatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, andbreach of the peace be privileged from arrest during their

attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in going to andreturning from the same; xxx.

Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, theexemption applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could notclaim parliamentary immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same generallaws governing all persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pendingappeal.

The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:

Article VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, inall offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment,be privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions andin going to and returning from the same.

For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was noimmunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and the intentto confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated by the concluding

portion of the provision, to wit:

xxx but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the memberinvolved to the custody of the law within twenty four hours after itsadjournment for a recess or for its next session, otherwise suchprivilege shall cease upon its failure to do so.

The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus theobligation of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custodyof the law. The requirement that he should be attending sessions or

committee meetings has also been removed. For relatively minor offenses, itis enough that Congress is in session.

The accused-appellant argues that a member of Congress function to attendsessions is underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution whichstates that


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(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to dobusiness, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day andmay compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner,and under such penalties, as such House may provide.

However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should beexempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. Themembers of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions ifthe reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of aCongressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more thansix months is not merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.

Accused-appellants reliance on the ruling in Aguinaldo v. Santos[2], whichstates, inter alia, that

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done priorto his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to deprivethe people of their right to elect their officers. When a people haveelected a man to office, it must be assumed that they did this withthe knowledge of his life and character, and that they disregardedor forgave his fault or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. Itis not for the Court, by reason of such fault or misconduct, topractically overrule the will of the people.

will not extricate him from his predicament. It can be readily seen in the

above-quoted ruling that theAguinaldo case involves the administrativeremoval of a public officer for acts donepriorto his present term of office. Itdoes not apply to imprisonment arising from the enforcement of criminal law.Moreover, in the same way that preventive suspension is not removal,confinement pending appeal is not removal. He remains a congressmanunless expelled by Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.

One rationale behind confinement, whether pending appeal or after finalconviction, is public self-defense. Society must protect itself. It also serves asan example and warning to others.

A person charged with crime is taken into custody for purposes of theadministration of justice. As stated in United States v. Gustilo,[3]it is the injuryto the public which State action in criminal law seeks to redress. It is not theinjury to the complainant. After conviction in the Regional Trial Court, theaccused may be denied bail and thus subjected to incarceration if there is riskof his absconding.[4]
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The accused-appellant states that the plea of the electorate which voted himinto office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escapeeventual punishment if permitted to perform congressional duties outside hisregular place of confinement.

It will be recalled that when a warrant for accused-appellants arrest wasissued, he fled and evaded capture despite a call from his colleagues in theHouse of Representatives for him to attend the sessions and to surrendervoluntarily to the authorities. Ironically, it is now the same body whose call heinitially spurned which accused-appellant is invoking to justify his presentmotion. This can not be countenanced because, to reiterate, aside from itsbeing contrary to well-defined Constitutional restrains, it would be a mockeryof the aims of the States penal system.

Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions, the Regional Trial Court

of Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the MakatiCity Jail, for official or medical reasons, to wit:

a) to attend hearings of the House Committee on Ethics held atthe Batasan Complex, Quezon City, on the issue of whether toexpel/suspend him from the House of Representatives;

b) to undergo dental examination and treatment at the clinic of hisdentist in Makati City;

c) to undergo a thorough medical check-up at the Makati MedicalCenter, Makati City;

d) to register as a voter at his hometown in Dapitan City. In thiscase, accused-appellant commuted by chartered plane andprivate vehicle.

He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the NewBilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted toleave the prison premises, to wit:

a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for thepurpose of 1) establishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2)planting mahogany trees, at the NBP reservation. For thispurpose, he was assigned one guard and allowed to use his ownvehicle and driver in going to and from the project area and hisplace of confinement.


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b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentistin Makati City.

c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City forhis heart condition.

There is no showing that the above privileges are peculiar to him or to amember of Congress. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves fromimprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the discretion of the authorities orupon court orders.

What the accused-appellant seeks is not of an emergency nature. Allowingaccused-appellant to attend congressional sessions and committee meetingsfor five (5) days or more in a week will virtually make him a free man with allthe privileges appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation not only

elevates accused-appellants status to that of a special class, it also would bea mockery of the purposes of the correction system. Of particular relevance inthis regard are the following observations of the Court in Martinez v. Morfe:[5]

The above conclusion reached by this Court is bolstered andfortified by policy considerations. There is, to be sure, a fullrecognition of the necessity to have members of Congress, andlikewise delegates to the Constitutional Convention, entitled to theutmost freedom to enable them to discharge their vitalresponsibilities, bowing to no other force except the dictates of

their conscience. Necessarily the utmost latitude in free speechshould be accorded them. When it comes to freedom from arrest,however, it would amount to the creation of a privileged class,without justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for acriminal offense, they would be considered immune during theirattendance in Congress and in going to and returning from thesame. There is likely to be no dissent from the proposition that alegislator or a delegate can perform his functions efficiently andwell, without the need for any transgression of the criminal law.Should such an unfortunate event come to pass, he is to betreated like any other citizen considering that there is a strongpublic interest in seeing to it that crime should not go unpunished.To the fear that may be expressed that the prosecuting arm of thegovernment might unjustly go after legislators belonging to theminority, it suffices to answer that precisely all the safeguardsthrown around an accused by the Constitution, solicitous of therights of an individual, would constitute an obstacle to such an
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attempt at abuse of power. The presumption of course is that thejudiciary would remain independent. It is trite to say that in eachand every manifestation of judicial endeavor, such a virtue is ofthe essence.

The accused-appellant avers that his constituents in the First District ofZamboanga del Norte want their voices to be heard and that since he istreated as bona fide member of the House of Representatives, the latter urgesa co-equal branch of government to respect his mandate. He also claims thatthe concept of temporary detention does not necessarily curtail his duty todischarge his mandate and that he has always complied with theconditions/restrictions when he is allowed to leave jail.

We remain unpersuaded.

No less than accused-appellant himself admits that like any other member ofthe House of Representatives "[h]e is provided with a congressional officesituated at Room N-214, North Wing Building, House of RepresentativesComplex, Batasan Hills, Quezon City, manned by a full complement of staffpaid for by Congress. Through [an] inter-department coordination, he is also

provided with an office at the Administration Building, New Bilibid Prison,Muntinlupa City, where he attends to his constituents." Accused-appellantfurther admits that while under detention, he has filed several bills andresolutions. It also appears that he has been receiving his salaries and othermonetary benefits. Succinctly stated, accused-appellant has been discharginghis mandate as a member of the House of Representative consistent with therestraints upon one who is presently under detention. Being a detainee,accused-appellant should not even have been allowed by the prisonauthorities at the National Pentientiary to perform these acts.

When the voters of his district elected the accused-appellant to Congress,they did so with full awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action.They did so with the knowledge that he could achieve only such legislativeresults which he could accomplish within the confines of prison. To give amore drastic illustration, if voters elect a person with full knowledge that he issuffering from a terminal illness, they do so knowing that at any time, he mayno longer serve his full term in office.

In the ultimate analysis, the issue before us boils down to a question ofconstitutional equal protection.


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The Constitution guarantees: "x x x nor shall any person be denied the equalprotection of laws."[6]This simply means that all persons similarly situated shallbe treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed.[7]Theorgans of government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to anyperson. Neither partiality nor prejudice shall be displayed.

Does being an elective official result in a substantial distinction that allowsdifferent treatment? Is being a Congressman a substantial differentiationwhich removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as allpersons validly confined under law?

The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers hasnever been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposedby the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellantasserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government.

The accused-appellant is only one of 250 members of the House ofRepresentatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged withthe duties of legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physicalabsence of one or a few of its members. Depending on the exigency ofGovernment that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Courtcan also be deemed the highest for that particular duty. The importance of afunction depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother to nurseher infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with uniqueskills has the duty to save the lives of those with a particular affliction. Anelective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer mustmaintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted aprisoner into a different classification from those others who are validlyrestrained by law.

A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise,insidious discriminations are made in favor of or against groups or types ofindividuals.[8]

The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed bypublic welfare may justify exercise of government authority to regulate even ifthereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests aredisregarded.[9]

We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not areasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions andduties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the classof prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement.
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Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law andapply to all those belonging to the same class.[10]

Imprisonment is the restraint of a mans personal liberty; coercion exercisedupon a person to prevent the free exercise of his power of locomotion.[11]

More explicitly, "imprisonment" in its general sense, is the restraint of onesliberty. As a punishment, it is restraint by judgment of a court or lawful tribunal,and is personal to the accused.[12]The term refers to the restraint on thepersonal liberty of another; any prevention of his movements from place toplace, or of his free action according to his own pleasure andwill.[13]Imprisonment is the detention of another against his will depriving him ofhis power of locomotion[14]and it "[is] something more than mere loss offreedom. It includes the notion ofrestraint within limits defined by wall or anyexterior barrier."[15]

It can be seen from the foregoing that incarceration, by its nature, changes anindividuals status in society.[16]Prison officials have the difficult and oftenthankless job of preserving the security in a potentially explosive setting, aswell as of attempting to provide rehabilitation that prepares inmates for re-entry into the social mainstream. Necessarily, both these demands require thecurtailment and elimination of certain rights.[17]

Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellants claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other right

or interest, including the police power of the State.

WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 175352

DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO, and SALVADOR M. VIARI, Petitioners,vs.RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondent.

D E C I S I O N
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CARPIO, J .:

The Case

This is a petition to declare Senator Richard J. Gordon (respondent) as having forfeited his seat inthe Senate.

The Facts

Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari (petitioners) filed with thisCourt a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate.Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter whilerespondent is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.

During respondents incumbency as a member of the Senate of the Philippines,1he was electedChairman of the PNRC during the 23 February 2006 meeting of the PNRC Board of Governors.Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors, respondenthas ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution,

which reads:

SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office oremployment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, includinggovernment-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeitinghis seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or theemoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.

Petitioners cite Camporedondo v. NLRC,2which held that the PNRC is a government-owned orcontrolled corporation. Petitioners claim that in accepting and holding the position of Chairman of thePNRC Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate, pursuantto Flores v. Drilon,3which held that incumbent national legislators lose their elective posts upon their

appointment to another government office.

In his Comment, respondent asserts that petitioners have no standing to file this petition whichappears to be an action for quo warranto, since the petition alleges that respondent committed anact which, by provision of law, constitutes a ground for forfeiture of his public office. Petitioners donot claim to be entitled to the Senate office of respondent. Under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules ofCivil Procedure, only a person claiming to be entitled to a public office usurped or unlawfully held byanother may bring an action for quo warranto in his own name. If the petition is one for quo warranto,it is already barred by prescription since under Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of Civil Procedure,the action should be commenced within one year after the cause of the public officers forfeiture ofoffice. In this case, respondent has been working as a Red Cross volunteer for the past 40 years.Respondent was already Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors when he was elected Senatorin May 2004, having been elected Chairman in 2003 and re-elected in 2005.

Respondent contends that even if the present petition is treated as a taxpayers suit, petitionerscannot be allowed to raise a constitutional question in the absence of any claim that they sufferedsome actual damage or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal act of respondent.Furthermore, taxpayers are allowed to sue only when there is a claim of illegal disbursement ofpublic funds, or that public money is being diverted to any improper purpose, or where petitionersseek to restrain respondent from enforcing an invalid law that results in wastage of public funds.
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Respondent also maintains that if the petition is treated as one for declaratory relief, this Court wouldhave no jurisdiction since original jurisdiction for declaratory relief lies with the Regional Trial Court.

Respondent further insists that the PNRC is not a government-owned or controlled corporation andthat the prohibition under Section 13, Article VI of the Constitution does not apply in the present casesince volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an office nor an employment.

In their Reply, petitioners claim that their petition is neither an action for quo warranto nor an actionfor declaratory relief. Petitioners maintain that the present petition is a taxpayers suit questioning theunlawful disbursement of funds, considering that respondent has been drawing his salaries andother compensation as a Senator even if he is no longer entitled to his office. Petitioners point outthat this Court has jurisdiction over this petition since it involves a legal or constitutional issue whichis of transcendental importance.

The Issues

Petitioners raise the following issues:

1. Whether the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) is a government- owned or controlledcorporation;

2. Whether Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution applies to the case ofrespondent who is Chairman of the PNRC and at the same time a Member of the Senate;

3. Whether respondent should be automatically removed as a Senator pursuant to Section13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution; and

4. Whether petitioners may legally institute this petition against respondent.4

The substantial issue boils down to whether the office of the PNRC Chairman is a government office

or an office in a government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the prohibition inSection 13, Article VI of the Constitution.

The Courts Ruling

We find the petition without merit.

Petit ioners Have No Standing to File this Peti t ion

A careful reading of the petition reveals that it is an action for quo warranto. Section 1, Rule 66 of theRules of Court provides:

Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. An action for the usurpation of a public office,position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republicof the Philippines against:

(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office,position or franchise;

(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which by provision of law, constitutes a groundfor the forfeiture of his office; or
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(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being legallyincorporated or without lawful authority so to act. (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioners allege in their petition that:

4. Respondent became the Chairman of the PNRC when he was elected as such during the

First Regular Luncheon-Meeting of the Board of Governors of the PNRC held on February23, 2006, the minutes of which is hereto attached and made integral part hereof as Annex"A."

5. Respondent was elected as Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, during hisincumbency as a Member of the House of Senate of the Congress of the Philippines, havingbeen elected as such during the national elections last May 2004.

6. Since his election as Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors, which position he dulyaccepted, respondent has been exercising the powers and discharging the functions andduties of said office, despite the fact that he is still a senator.

7. It is the respectful submission of the petitioner[s] that by accepting the chairmanship of theBoard of Governors of the PNRC, respondent has ceased to be a Member of the House ofSenate as provided in Section 13, Article VI of the Philippine Constitution, x x x

x x x x

10. It is respectfully submitted that in accepting the position of Chairman of the Board ofGovernors of the PNRC on February 23, 2006, respondent has automatically forfeited hisseat in the House of Senate and, therefore, has long ceased to be a Senator, pursuant to theruling of this Honorable Court in the case of FLORES, ET AL. VS. DRILON AND GORDON,G.R. No. 104732, x x x

11. Despite the fact that he is no longer a senator, respondent continues to act as such andstill performs the powers, functions and duties of a senator, contrary to the constitution, lawand jurisprudence.

12. Unless restrained, therefore, respondent will continue to falsely act and represent himselfas a senator or member of the House of Senate, collecting the salaries, emoluments andother compensations, benefits and privileges appertaining and due only to the legitimatesenators, to the damage, great and irreparable injury of the Government and the Filipinopeople.5(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board ofGovernors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short, petitioners filedan action for usurpation of public office against respondent, a public officer who allegedly committedan act which constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of his public office. Clearly, such an action is forquo warranto, specifically under Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.

Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper party plaintiff. However,under Section 5, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, an individual may commence such an action if heclaims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another, in which case he can bring theaction in his own name. The person instituting quo warranto proceedings in his own behalf mustclaim and be able to show that he is entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be
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dismissed at any stage.6In the present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senateoffice of respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the present petition.

Even if the Court disregards the infirmities of the petition and treats it as a taxpayers suit, thepetition would still fail on the merits.

P

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