Political Law Review Notes

8/12/2019 Political Law Review Notes

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POLITICAL LAW REVIEW NOTES1

THE BILL OF RIGHTS

Right against taking of priat! prop!rt" #itho$t %$st &o'p!nsation

Th! (an) o#n!r is !ntit(!) to 1*+ int!r!st on th! a($! of th! prop!rt", &o'p$t!) fro' th!

ti'! of th! taking $p to th! ti'! &o'p!nsation is a&t$a((" pai)

Constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum equivalent to the market value of the property.

However, compensation, to be "just," must also be made without delay. The owners loss is not only his

property but also its income!eneratin! potential. Thus, if property is taken for public use before

compensation is deposited with the court havin! jurisdiction over the case, the final compensation must

include interests# on its just value to be computed from the time the property is taken to the time when

compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court.

$ust compensation due to the landowners for their e%propriated property amounted to an

effective forbearance on the part of the &tate. 'pplyin! the (astern &hippin! )ines rulin!, the applicable

interest rate is *+ per annum, computed from the time the property was taken until the full amount of

just compensation was paid. -'po ruits Corporation v. )and /ank of the 0hilippines, 1.2. 3o. *45*67,

8ctober *+, +9*9: 'pril 7, +9**, /rion: )and /ank of the 0hilippines v. &antia!o, 1.2. 3o. *;++96,

8ctober


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inverse condemnation proceedin!s within five years from the time the transmission lines were

constructed. -3ational 0ower Corporation v. &pouses &aludares, 1.2. 3o. *;6*+?, 'pril +7, +9*+=

Th! right against $nr!asona-(! s!ar&h!s an) s!i.$r!s

Stopping or f(agging )o#n a 'otorist for a traffi& io(ation is not n!&!ssari(" an arr!st that

%$stifi!s a s$-s!/$!nt s!ar&h

Ander )and Transportation and Traffic Code, the !eneral procedure for dealin! with a traffic

violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the drivers license of the latter. 't the

time that he was waitin! for 08< 'lteBa to write his citation ticket, petitioner could not be said to have

been "under arrest." There was no intention on the part of 08< 'lteBa to arrest him, deprive him of his

liberty, or take him into custody. 0rior to the issuance of the ticket, the period durin! which petitioner

was at the police station may be characteriBed merely as waitin! time.

The A.&. &upreme Court has ruled that the roadside questionin! of a motorist detained pursuantto a routine traffic stop does not fall under custodial interro!ation, nor can it be considered a formal

arrest.

However, when there is intent on the part of the police officer to deprive the motorist of liberty,

or to take the latter into custody, the former may be deemed to have arrested the motorist. @n this case,

however, the officers issuance -or intent to issue= a traffic citation ticket ne!ates the possibility of an

arrest for the same violation. There bein! no valid arrest, the warrantless search that results from this

will be ille!al. -)uB v. 0eople, 1.2. 3o. *6??;;, ebruary +6, +9*+=

C$sto's s!ar&h!s0 No s!ar&h #arrant is r!/$ir!), !&!pt #h!n th! s!ar&h is at a )#!((ing

' law enforcement officer deputiBed in writin! by the Commissioner of Customs, can, for the

purposes of the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws, effect searches, seiBures, and arrests, and it is

his duty to make seiBure, amon! others, of any car!o, articles or other movable property when the same

may be subject to forfeiture or liable for any fine imposed under customs and tariff laws. He can lawfully

open and e%amine any bo%, trunk, envelope or other container wherever found when he has reasonable

cause to suspect the presence therein of dutiable articles introduced into the 0hilippines contrary to law:

and likewise to stop, search and e%amine any vehicle, beast or person reasonably suspected of holdin! or

conveyin! such article.

The Tariff and Customs Code authoriBes persons havin! police authority under &ection ++9< to

enter, pass throu!h or search any land, enclosures, warehouse, store or buildin!, not bein! a dwellin!

house: and also to inspect, search and e%amine any vessel or aircraft and any trunk, packa!e, or

envelope or any person on board, or to stop and search and e%amine any vehicle, beast or person

suspected of holdin! or conveyin! any dutiable or prohibited article introduced into the 0hilippines

contrary to law, without mentionin! the need of a search warrant in said cases. /ut in the search of a

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dwellin! house, the Code provides that said "dwellin! house may be entered and searched only upon

warrant issued by a jud!e or justice of the peace." -0apa v. a!o 1.2. 3o. )+?


4/19

sure, the ri!ht to enroll is not absolute: it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.

-&ocial $ustice &ociety v. Fan!erous Fru!s /oard, 1.2. 3o. *7?;?9, 3ovember


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their lawyers, the detention officials should not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection

in the presence of the detainees.

That a law is required before an e%ecutive officer could intrude on a citiBens privacy ri!hts is a

!uarantee that is available only to the public at lar!e but not to persons who are detained or imprisoned.

The ri!ht to privacy of those detained is subject to &ection 5 of 2' ?5hat it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. 3either is it a writ

that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain !rounds. -asan!kay v. Fel 2osario, 1.2. 3o. *;+5;5,

$une *?, +99;, /rion, underscorin! supplied=

5ir!&t !i)!n&! of !nfor&!) )isapp!aran&! not r!/$ir!) for th! writ of amparoto iss$!

>e continue to adhere to the substantial evidence rule that the 2ule on the >rit of 'mparo

requires, with some adjustments for fle%ibility in considerin! the evidence presented. >hen we ruled thathearsay evidence -usually considered inadmissible under the !eneral rules of evidence= may be admitted

as the circumstances of the case may require, we did not thereby dispense with the substantial evidence

rule: we merely rela%ed the evidentiary rule on the admissibility of evidence, maintainin! all the time the

standards of reason and relevance that underlie every evidentiary situation. This, we did, by considerin!

the totality of the obtainin! situation and the consistency of the hearsay evidence with the other available

evidence in the case.

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T#he burden of proof must be lowered or rela%ed -either throu!h the use of circumstantial or

indirect evidence or even by lo!ical inference=: the requirement for direct evidence to establish that an

enforced disappearance occurred as the petitioners effectively su!!est would render it e%tremely

difficult, if not impossible, to prove that an individual has been made to disappear. @n these li!hts, we

emphasiBed in our Fecember


7/19

dan!er. -@!lesia 3i Cristo v. Court of 'ppeals, 1.2. 3o. **64?


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' jud!ment of acquittal is final and is no lon!er reviewable. The &tate may not seek its review

without placin! the accused in double jeopardy. The underlyin! idea is that the &tate with all its

resources and power should not be allowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an

alle!ed offense, thereby subjectin! him to embarrassment, e%pense and ordeal and compellin! him to live

in a continuin! state of an%iety and insecurity, as well as enhancin! the possibility that even thou!hinnocent, he may be found !uilty.

8n the basis of humanity, fairness and justice, an acquitted defendant is entitled to the ri!ht of

repose as a direct consequence of the finality of his acquittal.

The Constitution has adopted the double jeopardy policy and thus bars multiple criminal trials,

thereby conclusively presumin! that a second trial would be unfair if the innocence of the accused has

been confirmed by a previous final jud!ment. urther prosecution via an appeal from a jud!ment of

acquittal is likewise barred because the !overnment has already been afforded a complete opportunity to

prove the criminal defendants culpability. -0eople v. 3aBareno, 1.2. 3o. *4;6;+, 'u!ust 7, +996, /rion=

Rights $n)!r &$sto)ia( in!stigation

4iran)a rights )o not app(" in &as!s of &onf!ssions to priat! p!rsons, s$&h as a ra)io

r!port!r

The accusedappellants confession to the radio reporter, Celso anuel is admissible. @n 0eople

vs. 'ndan, the accused in a rape with homicide case confessed to the crime durin! interviews with the

media. @n holdin! the confession admissible, despite the fact that the accused !ave his answers without

the assistance of counsel, this court saidE

'ppellants confessions to the newsmen are not covered by &ection *+-*= and -


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0olitical questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by

the people in their soverei!n capacity, or in re!ard to which full discretionary authority has been

dele!ated to the le!islative or e%ecutive branch of !overnment."

>hat petitioner 1arcia raises as an issue is the propriety of immediately and fully dere!ulatin!

the oil industry. &uch determination essentially dwells on the soundness or wisdom of the timin! and

manner of the dere!ulation Con!ress wants to implement throu!h 2.'. 3o. ;56?. The issue is not for us

to resolve: we cannot rule on when and to what e%tent dere!ulation should take place without passin!

upon the wisdom of the policy of dere!ulation that Con!ress has decided upon. -1arcia v. (%ecutive

&ecretary, 1.2. 3o. *7?7;5, 'pril +, +996, /rion=

Po#!rs of Congr!ss

Th! 2pork -arr!(3 s"st!', #h!r!in 4!'-!rs of Congr!ss propos!, i)!ntif" an) r!&o''!n)

pro%!&ts, #hi&h ar! th!n i'p(!'!nt!) -" th! E!&$ti! Bran&h, is a(i)

0etitioners claim that the power !iven to the members of Con!ress to propose and identify the

projects and activities to be funded by the Countrywide Fevelopment und is an encroachment by the

le!islature on e%ecutive power.

Ander the Constitution, the spendin! power or "the power of the purse," belon!s to Con!ress,

subject only to the veto power of the 0resident. The power of appropriation carries with it the power to

specify the project or activity to be funded under the appropriation law. @t can be as detailed and as

broad as Con!ress wants it to be.

The Countrywide Fevelopment und is e%plicit that it shall be used "for infrastructure, purchaseof ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities and credit facilities to qualified

beneficiaries." @t was Con!ress itself that determined the purposes for the appropriation.

(%ecutive function under the Countrywide Fevelopment und involves implementation of the

priority projects specified in the law. The authority !iven to the members of Con!ress is only to propose

and identify projects to be implemented by the 0resident. Ander 'rticle K)@ of the 1'' of *665, the

0resident must perforce e%amine whether the proposals submitted by the members of Con!ress fall within

the specific items of e%penditures for which the und was set up. Thereafter, if the proposed projects

qualify for fundin! under the und, it is the 0resident who shall implement them. @n short, the proposals

and identifications made by the members of Con!ress are merely recommendatory. -0hilippine

Constitutional 'ssociation v. (nriqueB, 1.2. 3o. **


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Ander &ection *?, 'rticle J@@, the 0resident Lshall ensure that the laws be faithfully e%ecuted.M

The 0residents power to conduct investi!ations to aid him in ensurin! the faithful e%ecution of laws is

inherent in the 0residents powers as the Chief (%ecutive. That the authority of the 0resident to conduct

investi!ations and to create bodies to e%ecute this power is not e%plicitly mentioned in the Constitution or

in statutes does not mean that he is bereft of such authority. -/irao!o v. 0hilippine Truth Commission,

1.2. 3o. *6+6


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The privile!ed character of diplomatic ne!otiations has been reco!niBed in this jurisdiction. 'n

essential characteristic of diplomacy is its confidential nature.

@n this vast e%ternal realm -of diplomacy=, the 0resident alone has the power to speak or listen as

a representative of the nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the &enate: but he alone

ne!otiates. @nto the field of ne!otiation the &enate cannot intrude: and Con!ress itself is powerless to

invade it. The 0resident is the sole or!an of the nation in its e%ternal relations, and its sole representative

with forei!n nations.

@t is clear that while the final te%t of the $0(0' may not be kept perpetually confidential I since

there should be "ample opportunity for discussion before a treaty# is approved" I the offers e%chan!ed

by the parties durin! the ne!otiations continue to be privile!ed even after the $0(0' is published. @t is

reasonable to conclude that the $apanese representatives submitted their offers with the understandin!

that "historic confidentiality" would !overn the same. Fisclosin! these offers could impair the ability of

the 0hilippines to deal not only with $apan but with other forei!n !overnments in future ne!otiations.

-'kbayan CitiBens 'ction 0arty v. 'quino, 1.2. 3o. *?97*4, $uly *4, +99;, underscorin! supplied=

E(!&tion La#

Th! 2s!&on);p(a&!r3 sho$() -! pro&(ai'!) #inn!r, if th! &!rtifi&at! of &an)i)a&" of th! first

p(a&!r is oi) )$! to in!(igi-i(it"

' void certificate of candidacy on the !round of ineli!ibility that e%isted at the time of the filin!

of the certificate of candidacy can never !ive rise to a valid candidacy, and much less to valid votes.

$alosjos certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was ineli!ible from the start to run for

ayor. >hether his certificate of candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial

because the cancellation on such !round means he was never a valid candidate from the very be!innin!,

his certificate of candidacy bein! void ab initio. Thus, Cardino ran unopposed. There was only one

qualified candidate for ayor in the ay +9*9 elections I Cardino I who received the hi!hest number of

votes.

Fecisions of this Court holdin! that the secondplacer cannot be proclaimed winner if the first

placer is disqualified or declared ineli!ible should be limited to situations where the certificate of

candidacy of the firstplacer was valid at the time of filin! but subsequently had to be cancelled because

of a violation of law that took place, or a le!al impediment that took effect, after the filin! of the

certificate of candidacy. @f the certificate of candidacy is void ab initio, then le!ally the person who filed

such void certificate of candidacy was never a candidate in the elections at any time. 'll votes for such

noncandidate are stray votes and should not be counted. Thus, such noncandidate can never be a first

placer in the elections. @f a certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled on the day, or before the

day, of the election, prevailin! jurisprudence holds that all votes for that candidate are stray votes. @f a

certificate of candidacy void ab initio is cancelled one day or more after the elections, all votes for such

candidate should also be stray votes because the certificate of candidacy is void from the very be!innin!.

-$alosjos v. Commission on (lections, 1.2. 3o. *6


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Fai($r! to /$a(if" for a part";(ist s!at in t#o pr!&!)ing !(!&tions is a gro$n) for &an&!((ation

of part" (ist r!gistration

C8()(C may motu proprio or upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or

cancel, after due notice and hearin!, the re!istration of any national, re!ional or sectoral party,

or!aniBation or coalition if itE -a= fails to participate in the last two -+= precedin! elections: or -b= fails to

obtain at least two per centum -+= of the votes cast under the partylist system in the two -+= precedin!

elections for the constituency in which it has re!istered.

&ection 4-;= of 2' ?65* provides for two separate !rounds for delistin!: these !rounds cannot be

mi%ed or combined to support delistin!: and the disqualification for failure to !arner + partylist votes

in two precedin! elections should now be understood, in li!ht of the /anat rulin!, to mean failure to

qualify for a partylist seat in two precedin! elections for the constituency in which it has re!istered.

-0hilippine 1uardians /rotherhood v. Commission on (lections, 1.2. 3o. *697+6, 'pril +6, +9*9,

/rion, underscorin! supplied=

Pr!!nti! s$sp!nsion is not an !ff!&ti! int!rr$ption of a t!r' for p$rpos!s of th!

app(i&ation of th! thr!!;t!r' (i'it r$(!

The "interruption" of a term e%emptin! an elective official from the threeterm limit rule is one

that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. 8n the other hand, temporary inability or

disqualification to e%ercise the functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered

an effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to office or at least an

effective break from holdin! office: the office holder, while retainin! title, is simply barred from

e%ercisin! the functions of his office for a reason provided by law.

/ecause the preventive suspension of an elective local official does not involve loss of title tooffice but only bars him from e%ercisin! his functions or leads to a temporary cessation of the e%ercise of

power or authority, there is no effective interruption in his service of three terms. Thus, the three term

limit applies to him. -'ldovino v. Commission on (lecions, 1.2. 3o. *;5;


13/19

"'utomatic release" of approved annual appropriations to petitioner, a constitutional

commission which is vested with fiscal autonomy, should thus be construed to mean that no condition to

fund releases to it may be imposed. -Civil &ervice Commission v. Fepartment of /ud!et and

ana!ement, 1.2. 3o. *7;?6*, $uly ++, +997=

E)$&ation

A&a)!'i& fr!!)o' of instit$tions of high!r (!arning in&($)!s th! po#!r to )is&ip(in! an)

!!n !p!( st$)!nts

&ection 7 -+=, 'rticle K@J of the Constitution !uarantees all institutions of hi!her learnin!

academic freedom. The essential freedoms subsumed in the term "academic freedom" encompasses the

freedom to determine for itself on academic !roundsE -*= >ho may teach, -+= >hat may be tau!ht, -ho may be admitted to study.

The ri!ht of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in the third freedom, i.e.,

"how it shall be tau!ht." oreover, the school has an interest in teachin! the student discipline, a

necessary, if not indispensable, value in any field of learnin!. 'ccordin!ly, the ri!ht to discipline the

student likewise finds basis in the freedom "what to teach." inally, nowhere in the above formulation is

the ri!ht to discipline more evident than in "who may be admitted to study." @f a school has the freedom

to determine whom to admit, lo!ic dictates that it also has the ri!ht to determine whom to e%clude or

e%pel, as well as upon whom to impose lesser sanctions such as suspension and the withholdin! of

!raduation privile!es. The power of the school to investi!ate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or

e%pel. -irriam Colle!e oundation v. Court of 'ppeals, 1.2. 3o. *+?6


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Ho()ing of for!ign passport an) r!gist!ring as an a(i!n )o not a'o$nt to !pr!ss

r!n$n&iation of &iti.!nship

@n order that citiBenship may be lost by renunciation, such renunciation must be e%press. The mere

fact that private respondent 2osalind Obasco )opeB was a holder of an 'ustralian passport and had an

alien certificate of re!istration are not acts constitutin! an effective renunciation of citiBenship and do

not militate a!ainst her claim of ilipino citiBenship. or renunciation to effectively result in the loss of

citiBenship, the same must be e%press. 's held by this court in 'Bnar, an application for an alien

certificate of re!istration does not amount to an e%press renunciation or repudiation of ones citiBenship.

The application of the herein private respondent for an alien certificate of re!istration, and her holdin!

of an 'ustralian passport, as in the case of ercado vs. anBano, were mere acts of assertion of her

'ustralian citiBenship before she effectively renounced the same. Thus, at the most, private respondent

had dual citiBenship she was an 'ustralian and a ilipino, as well. -Jalles v. Comelec, 1.2. 3o.

*


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LG


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findin! of fact, respondent performed a function partakin! of a quasijudicial character, the valid

e%ercise of which demands previous notice and hearin!.

>here the function of the administrative body is le!islative, notice of hearin! is not required by

due process of law. @f the nature of the administrative a!ency is essentially le!islative, the requirements

of notice and hearin! are not necessary. 3otice and hearin! are not essential to the validity of

administrative action where the administrative body acts in the e%ercise of e%ecutive, administrative, or

le!islative functions: but where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasijudicial matter,

and its acts are particular and immediate rather than !eneral and prospective, the person whose ri!hts

or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice and hearin!. -0hilippine Communications

&atellite Corporation v. 'lcuaB, 1.2. 3o. ;5;*;, *; Fecember *6;6=

P$-(i& Offi&!rs

Prohi-ition on )$a( positions an) )o$-(! &o'p!nsation7 an ex officio position is not

2anoth!r offi&!3 an) )o!s not !ntit(! an offi&ia( to a))itiona( &o'p!nsation

&ection *


17/19

or a petition for quo warranto to be successful, the suin! private individual must show a clear

ri!ht to the contested office. His failure to establish this ri!ht warrants the dismissal of the suit for lack of

cause of action.

&ince the petitioner merely holds an actin! appointment -and an e%pired one at that=, he clearly

does not have a cause of action to maintain the present petition. The essence of an actin! appointment is

its temporariness and its consequent revocability at any time by the appointin! authority. The petitioner

in a quo warranto proceedin! who seeks reinstatement to an office, on the !round of usurpation or ille!al

deprivation, must prove his clear ri!ht to the office for his suit to succeed: otherwise, his petition must

fail. -1eneral v. Arro, 1.2. 3o. *6*749, arch +6, +9**, /rion=

Th! O'-$)s'an6s po#!rs in&($)! th! po#!r to in!stigat! an) th! po#!r to i'pos!

)is&ip(in! on !(!&ti! an) appointi! offi&ia(s in go!rn'!nt

&ection +*. 8fficial &ubject to Fisciplinary 'uthority: (%ceptions. D The 8ffice of the

8mbudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the 1overnment

and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and a!encies, includin! embers of the Cabinet, local

!overnment, !overnmentowned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, e%cept over officials

who may be removed only by impeachment or over embers of Con!ress, and the $udiciary.

&ection ++. @nvesti!atory 0ower. D The 8ffice of the 8mbudsman shall have the power to

investi!ate any serious misconduct in office alle!edly committed by officials removable by impeachment,

for the purpose of filin! a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted. (Republic Act 6770)

The 8mbudsman has the power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine,

censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee, in the e%ercise of its administrative disciplinary

authority. The challen!e to the 8mbudsmans power to impose these penalties, on the alle!ation that the

Constitution only !rants it recommendatory powers, had already been rejected by this Court. -8ffice of

the 8mbudsman v. 'polonio, 1.2. 3o. *47*


18/19

Int!rnationa( La#

An !&hang! of not!s is a for' of !!&$ti! agr!!'!nt an) )o!s not n!!) S!nat!

&on&$rr!n&! to -! a(i) an) -in)ing

'n "e%chan!e of notes" is similar to a private law contract. The a!reement consists of the

e%chan!e of two documents, each of the parties bein! in the possession of the one si!ned by the

representative of the other. The terms "e%chan!e of notes" and "e%ecutive a!reements" have been used

interchan!eably, e%chan!e of notes bein! considered a form of e%ecutive a!reement.

oreover, &enate concurrence is not required for an e%chan!e of notes to be bindin! on the

0hilippines and the A&. @nternational a!reements may be in the form of -*= treaties that require

le!islative concurrence after e%ecutive ratification: or -+= e%ecutive a!reements that are similar to

treaties, e%cept that they do not require le!islative concurrence and are usually less formal and deal with

a narrower ran!e of subject matters than treaties.

@nternational a!reements involvin! political issues or chan!es of national policy and those

involvin! international arran!ements of a permanent character usually take the form of treaties while#

those embodyin! adjustments of detail carryin! out well established national policies and traditions and

those involvin! arran!ements of a more or less temporary nature take the form of e%ecutive a!reements.

Ander international law, there is no difference between treaties and e%ecutive a!reements in terms of

their bindin! effects on the contractin! states concerned. -/ayan una v. 2omulo, 1.2. 3o. *764*;,

ebruary *, +9**=

Nationa( E&ono'"

2Capita(3 for p$rpos!s of )!t!r'ining Fi(ipino o#n!rship of a p$-(i& $ti(it" '!ans shar!s#ith oting rights

or a corporation to be !ranted authority to operate a public utility, at least 49 percent of its

"capital" must be owned by ilipino citiBens. Considerin! that common shares have votin! ri!hts which

translate to control, as opposed to preferred shares which usually have no votin! ri!hts, the term

"capital" in &ection **, 'rticle K@@ of the Constitution refers only to common shares.

However, if the preferred shares also have the ri!ht to vote in the election of directors, then the

term "capital" shall include such preferred shares, because the ri!ht to participate in the control or

mana!ement of the corporation is e%ercised throu!h the ri!ht to vote in the election of directors. @n short,

the term "capital" in &ection **, 'rticle K@@ of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can votein the election of directors.

This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the Constitution to place in the

hands of ilipino citiBens the control and mana!ement of public utilities. The ri!ht to vote in the election

of directors, coupled with full beneficial ownership of stocks, translates to effective control of a

corporation. -1amboa v. Teves, 1.2. 3o. *?47?6, $une +;, +9**: 8ctober 6, +9*+=

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Documents

Political Law Review Notes