Political Psychology, Cognition, and Foreign Policy Analysis

Jerel Rosati and Colleen E. Miller

Subject International Studies » Foreign Policy AnalysisPsychology » Political Psychology

Key-Topics decision making, interdisciplinary research

DOI: 10.1111/b.9781444336597.2010.x

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Introduction

The last few decades have witnessed major developments and scholarly advances in understanding the dynamics of cognition. This scholarship reflects an explosion in the literature on cognition over the last decade in the fields of psychology, political science, and political psychology; hence, a need for it to be reviewed and integrated within the larger study of foreign policy and international relations. Yet, the literature has become so large and extensive that a comprehensive review of the vast body of cognitive-oriented scholarship in foreign policy accumulated over the years makes it a very difficult if not virtually impossible undertaking (see Rosati 2004).

In an article published in International Studies Review, Rosati (2000) reviewed the literature on human cognition and policy-maker beliefs, especially as applied to the study of foreign policy and world politics. This essay is intended to be read as a supplement to the 2000 ISR article to see to what extent progress has been made toward a new generation of scholarship.

The two articles can be recapped as follows. The first (Rosati 2000) cites and reviews the literature extensively in terms of how beliefs and cognition matter for foreign policy and world politics. We found that upon reviewing and citing the literature, a major contribution has been made in five basic/substantive/theoretical ways (or patterns): (1) through the content of policy-maker beliefs; (2) through the organization and structure of policy-maker beliefs; (3) through common patterns of perception and misperception; (4) through cognitive rigidity and flexibility; and (5) through its impact on policy.

This essay serves as a supplement to the previous one, focusing on the evolution of the study of political psychology and cognition and addressing to what extent contemporary literature has moved things forward, resulting in a new generation. Our answer is that it has not; that it is for the most part a continuation and fine tuning of the research reviewed in the 2000 ISR article. Hence, the essay recommends that six things need to occur to result in a real new generation of scholarship.

This essay takes a complimentary but different approach to the literature from the Rosati (2000) article. It does not simply update works of literatures that have already been cited. Instead, it addresses three basic questions:

1 What is the basic thrust of a cognitive approach? 2 How has the study of political psychology and cognition, and its application to foreign

policy, evolved? 3 Most importantly, what would it take for there to be a new generation of scholarship?

This should provide the basis for clarifying and improving the foundation that political psychology, and in particular a cognitive approach, has for contributing to a better understanding of the dynamics of not only foreign policy, but also the larger study of world politics.

To be clear, there have been terrific advancements within political psychology and the study of cognition over the years (and the first two generations of scholarship), together with increased sophistication, but there is little evidence that – over the past decade – there has been much that has been truly new or unique, or different from previous scholarship. It has now become a mature and established field, where much of the work of the third generation is not substantially different from earlier scholarship and more classic works. What once was a “revolutionary science” has become increasingly “normal science” as Thomas Kuhn (1962) so powerfully explained in The Structures of Scientific Revolutions. While the assertion that much contemporary scholarship is “old wine [or refined wine] in new bottles” is controversial and provocative, hopefully it also recognizes the great advances that have been made and will spur a thoughtful and constructive dialogue with respect to the question of where we go from here.

More specifically, the essay arrives at the following conclusions:

• It may be that the literature is simply getting to be overwhelming in quantity (number of articles, chapters, books, diverse outlets, etc.).

• It is probably increasingly difficult to be consistently “creative,” both within the same scholar over time, as well as across generalizations.

• Much that may appear new may simply be “fashionable,” where scholarship has become more precise (sliced and diced?) and nuanced, where concepts and words – such as “framing” – change in popularity to give it the appearance of freshness and newness.

• Maybe there should be a growing recognition that most findings do not result in simple, broad, and consistent generalizations, and that we need to learn to live and work with scholarly contradictions that coexist (as it does within the mind).

• It may be time to move beyond the heavily state-centric and national security-centric nature of most scholarship – numerous of other types of actors have foreign policies across a variety of issue-areas, most obviously involving the international political economy and globalization.

• It may be an important time to pause and reflect on the considerable accumulation of knowledge to become better aware of what we do and what we do not know, and engage in greater synthesis within political psychology as well as with other fields and levels of analysis, as Kenneth Waltz (1954) originally understood in his true classic entitled Man, State & War.

Over 60 years and two generations of scholarship, the political psychological study of “man” is no longer scientifically undeveloped (or underdeveloped) as it has been over the millennia and it needs to become part of multi-level and multi-causal explanations of human and world politics.

All of this may complicate the study of cognition, political psychology, and world politics, but it may also better represent the “psychological environment” and the “objective environment” that we and the world must operate.

The remainder of the essay is organized along the following lines. First, the essay briefly reviews what is the essence of a cognitive approach. Second, an overview is provided as to how political psychology, cognition, and the study of world politics has evolved as a theoretically oriented discipline over the course of basically two generations of scholarship. Finally, the essay discusses the six elements that are believed to be necessary to provide the foundation for a new generation of scholarship.

The Cognitive Approach

A cognitive approach assumes a complex and realistic psychology about human reasoning and decision-making (see Boulding 1956; Simon 1957; Snyder et al. 1962; Steinbruner 1974; Holsti 1976; Jervis 1976; George 1980; Tetlock 1998). Where a rational process has tended to assume individual awareness, open-mindedness, and adaptability relative to the “objective” environment, a cognitive approach posits that individuals tend to simplify and be much more closed-minded due to their beliefs and the way they process information; thus, they are not fully aware of, and are much less adaptable to, changes in the objective environment. A cognitive perspective emphasizes the importance of examining the individuals involved within the policy-making process, for they are likely to view their environment differently – to operate within their own “psychological environment” (see Sprout and Sprout 1965). Such a cognitive approach has grown in visibility, prominence, and sophistication since the 1950s, as social scientists have attempted to be more systematic in identifying and explaining major patterns of foreign policy.

In fact, one may even speak of a cognitive paradigm – Steinbruner (1974) and Tetlock (1998) suggest the term “cognitivism.” Human beings and human thought are not simply random and idiosyncratic. Human beings are creatures of habit, and general patterns exist in their images and thought processes. A cognitive approach, as Robert Jervis (1976:3) has stated in Perception and Misperception in International Politics, assumes that “perceptions of the world and of other actors diverge from reality in patterns that we can detect and for reasons that we can understand.” At the same time, it must be understood that “specific” cognitive dynamics are heavily influenced by the time and the situation (as is the case within a more rational/analytic-oriented paradigm as well).

A cognitive approach is ultimately premised on a mind that “constantly struggles to impose clear, coherent meaning on events” (Steinbruner 1974:112). “The mind reveals itself in all its activity as a mechanism for resolving ambiguity, as an inference machine which actively manipulates the information it receives” (Steinbruner 1974:90). Or as stated by Jack Snyder (1978:363), who applied a cognitive approach to failures of deterrence during the Cuban Missile Crisis, “Cognitive theory argues that the mind craves certainty and will work to establish it even when it is unwarranted by objective conditions.” The process of “cognition” – the dynamics of the mind – produces the “beliefs” and constructs (such as “images” and “schemas”) that allow humans to make sense of their environment.

While the rational paradigm has tended to assume a “deep, conscious, thoughtful” thinker, the reality is that much of the mental operations of the mind are relatively automatic and much more subconscious. In fact, not only is this a necessary cognitive trait, it is also a very efficient and powerful way of efficiently processing information and making decisions. Clearly, as one

becomes more expert or skilled, the less one has to consciously “think” and the more one can operate automatically and intuitively based on certain cognitive processes – such is the power of the mind (Steinbruner 1974:92–4).

The Evolution of Political Psychology, Cognition, and the Study of World Politics

It was during the 1930s, with the development of psychology as a discipline of study, that efforts to apply psychological (and cognitive) approaches to the study of international relations – that is, to explicitly and systematically be informed by psychological theory and research – really began. Three periods of inquiry involving psychological approaches and their relevance to foreign policy and international relations have evolved:

• an early and largely failed effort prior to the 1950s; • a first generation of scholarship beginning in the 1950s; and • a second generation of scholarship beginning in the 1970s.

With each new period, the political psychological study of human beings and cognition has grown tremendously in quantity and sophistication, impacting an understanding of the dynamics of foreign policy and world politics.

Philosophers and individuals throughout the ages have been interested in understanding the “enigma of the human mind.” But as Howard Gardner makes clear in The Mind's New Science: A History of the Cognitive Revolution, it was not until the middle of the twentieth century that contributions from a variety of fields – especially philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics, anthropology, and neuroscience – produced a cognitive revolution and the development of a cognitive science. As Gardner (1985:4–5, 9) states, “Armed with tools and concepts unimaginable even a century ago, a new cadre of thinkers called cognitive scientists has been investigating many of the same issues that first possessed the Greeks some twenty-five hundred years ago.” In fact, “One might say that cognitive science has a very long past but a relatively short history” (on the history of cognitive psychology, see also Markus and Zajonc 1985; Anderson 2004).

The evolution of the political psychological study of international relations naturally has been heavily influenced by developments in psychology. In Social Cognition, Susan Fiske and Shelley Taylor (1991, ch. 1) highlight four general views of “the thinker” that have evolved within the cognitive literature in psychology over the years:

1 The consistency seeker (people are motivated to maintain consistency and reduce discrepancies among their beliefs).

2 The naive scientist (people are capable of making attributions about the causes of behavior in a relatively sensible and fairly rational way).

3 The cognitive miser (people are limited in their capacity to process information, so they tend to take shortcuts and simplify).

4 The motivated tactician (people have multiple cognitive strategies available and choose among them based on their goals, motives, and needs – sometimes wisely, sometimes defensively).

Where the first generation of scholarship (which dominated the 1950s and 1960s) depicted a relatively “simple” cognitive process based on people being consistency seekers, the second generation of scholarship (basically since the 1970s) describes a much more “sophisticated” cognitive process based on developments in cognitive psychology and social cognition, where the human being acts more as a naive scientist and, in particular, cognitive miser. Given the inevitability of time lags when it comes to cross-disciplinary fertilization, the motivated tactician perspective is only beginning to be felt within the study of foreign policy and world politics. A brief historical overview – broken down into three time periods reflecting the growing sophistication of the scholarship – should allow us to have a discourse on what would be the key characteristics for a new and third generation of scholarship (see Rosati 2000: see also Kelman 1965a; De Rivera 1968; Knutson 1973; Holsti 1976; Hermann 1977; 1986; Falkowski 1979; Hopple 1982; Deutsch 1983; Tetlock and McGuire 1985; White 1986; Vertzberger 1990; Glad 1991; Singer and Hudson 1992; Rosati 1995).

Early Systematic Efforts

Early efforts were made beginning in the 1930s and continuing through the early 1950s to employ explicitly psychological concepts so as to better understand the world of politics, especially the nature of war and peace. Most of this research focused on national stereotypes, attitudes toward war, and public opinion on foreign policy issues. Unfortunately, while most of these early efforts were made by scholars and individuals who were well-versed in psychology, they usually lacked an equally strong foundation in the study of international relations and world politics. This was best exemplified by the work on individual irregularities and pathologies which were directly projected on to the nation-state, the “war begins in the minds of men” approach, and national character studies of the war-proneness of different societies (for an overview of this early literature, see Klineberg 1950; Pear 1950; Kelman 1965b).

This well-intentioned effort by many psychologists to apply different psychological concepts and knowledge about the individual directly to the complex arena of the state and world politics was not well received by students of international relations (see Holsti 1976:19–26; Jervis 1976:3–10). Most international relations scholars found these studies were not realistic and believed that they were not relevant to the study of foreign policy and world politics. As Robert Jervis (1976:4) cogently put it, this literature was guilty of “over-psychologizing.” Failure to address the levels of analysis problem was clearly stated by Herbert Kelman (1965b:6) in International Behavior: A Social–Psychological Analysis: “Only if we know where and how these individuals fit into the larger process, and under what circumstances they operate, are we able to offer a relevant psychological analysis.” Clearly, until political psychology was well grounded in politics and international relations, such studies would likely remain naive and simplistic.

The First Generation of Scholarship

Despite the fact that the initial effort to incorporate psychological approaches into the analysis of international behavior failed to influence the field, a number of scholars increasingly questioned the lack of psychological input into the study of international relations and foreign policy. And beginning in the mid-1950s, the contribution of psychological approaches to the study of international relations grew in importance due to the interaction of the “peace research” movement and the development of the “behavioral” revolution in the social sciences (see Kelman 1965b; Kelman and Bloom 1973). A number of psychologists, sociologists, economists, anthropologists, and other scientists became interested in applying the knowledge and techniques of their disciplines to the problems of war and peace. At the same time, many international

relations scholars became interested in making their field more empirical and scientific. Nowhere was this interaction greater than among those who advocated a decision-making approach to the study of foreign policy (see Snyder et al. 1962).

In comparison to the early efforts by psychologists, the late 1950s and 1960s represented the beginning of a qualitative leap forward for psychological and cognitive approaches to the study of international relations. Psychological approaches increasingly were applied from an international relations and political perspective:

Writings have shown increasing theoretical and methodological sophistication, with greater awareness of the complexities one encounters in moving across different levels of analysis. And, most important, two groups of specialists have emerged and interacted closely with one another: students of international relations, with a political science background, who are thoroughly grounded in social–psychological concepts and methods; and social psychologists (as well as students of other disciplines outside of political science) who have systematically educated themselves in the field of international relations.

(Kelman and Bloom 1973:263)

The result was that the systematic study of the beliefs and images of foreign policy makers grew in popularity and significance during the 1960s and 1970s. The working assumption was that the “beliefs” held by policy makers in general and the “images” that they formed relative to some aspect of the environment affected the foreign policymaking process. Policy-maker images “may be partial or general. They may be subconscious or may be consciously stated. They may be based on carefully thought-out assumptions about the world or they may flow from instinctive perceptions and judgments. Regardless, all decision makers may be said to possess a set of images and to be conditioned by them in their behavior on foreign policy” (Brecher et al. 1969:86–7).

Much of this psychologically oriented research on foreign policy was influenced by the study of attitudes and attitudinal change in psychology (see Calder and Ross 1973; Oskamp 1977). Most of the work on attitudes and attitudinal change in psychology during this time was based upon theories of cognitive consistency, especially cognitive dissonance and balance theory (see Festinger 1957; Abelson et al. 1968; McGuire 1969; Oskamp 1977). The assumption behind cognitive consistency is that individuals make sense of the world by relying on key attitudes (or beliefs) and strive to maintain consistency between their attitudes (and beliefs). Under cognitive consistency, individuals maintain coherent belief systems and attempt to avoid the acquisition of information that is inconsistent or incompatible with their beliefs, especially their most central beliefs. In other words, the argument is that “individuals do not merely subscribe to random collections of beliefs but rather they maintain coherent systems of beliefs which are internally consistent” (Bem 1970:13). It is interesting to note that psychologists, unlike political and social scientists, were much more optimistic about the likelihood that people would change their beliefs in response to discrepant information, which was often supported by laboratory (as opposed to field research) studies – which is why it was referred to as “attitudinal change” literature in psychology (see Oskamp 1977; Milburn 1991).

The study of the impact of propaganda and communications on individuals reinforced the earlier work on cognitive consistency (McGuire 1969; Sears and Whitney 1973; Oskamp 1977). The literature on persuasive communications at the time indicated that most individuals are indifferent to persuasive appeals, especially political propaganda, and when they are attuned they tend to be

surrounded by people and communications with which they sympathize. “Even when a political communicator breaks the barriers of low absolute exposure and de facto selectivity, he runs into yet another and most formidable obstacle: resistance to change based on partisan evaluation of information” (Sears and Whitney 1973:8). Incoming information typically gets interpreted in accordance with an individual's existing central beliefs and predispositions. Again, as with the attitudinal change literature, the initial interest in the impact of propaganda and communications, by social scientists and the government, was based on the assumption that people were highly vulnerable to persuasive appeals, especially in light of the experience of Nazi Germany and the rise of Adolf Hitler –hence the nomenclature “persuasive communications” (see Sears and Whitney 1973; Simpson 1994; Jones 1998).

The prevalence of cognitive consistency and the reinforcement tendency of most communications found in the first generation of political psychological research provided the foundation for many studies of foreign policy decision-making since the 1960s. This psychological literature and its relevance for the study of foreign policy was brought together in Perception and Misperception in International Politics by Robert Jervis (1976; an excellent earlier overview can be found in de Rivera 1968). Jervis provided a significant service to the advancement of a cognitive approach to foreign policy by providing a rich survey of the processes of perception for foreign policy makers, including a discussion of how cognitive consistency affects decision makers, how decision makers learn from history, and how beliefs change, and an analysis of common patterns of misperception among policy makers. Not only did he illustrate the relevance of a cognitive approach for foreign policy and international relations; he also used such a perspective to critique the simplistic assumptions of both deterrence theory and a spiral model of state interaction to better understand international conflict and US–Soviet Cold War relations. As Jervis (1976:28) concluded, “It is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision makers' beliefs about the world and their images of others.”

Second-Generation Scholarship

Beginning in the 1970s, psychology underwent what has been referred to as a “cognitive revolution,” resulting in a renewed emphasis in the study of attitudes and a close examination of how individuals process information. According to Simon (1985:295), “Cognitive psychology, in the past 30 years, has undergone a radical restructuring, from a severe Behaviorism to a framework that views thinking as information processing.” It should be pointed out that such a perspective was much less revolutionary within social psychology, which “has consistently leaned on cognitive concepts, even when most psychology was behaviorist” (Fiske and Taylor 1991:9: see also Markus and Zajonc 1985; Eagly and Chaiken 1993).

The so-called cognitive revolution involved a different conception of the individual and his/her interaction with the environment: away from a more “passive agent who merely responds to environmental stimuli” to a conception of the individual as more likely to selectively respond to and actively interpret his environment; away from a simple-minded individual who “strives for consistency” toward an individual viewed as a thinking organism who is more likely to act as a “naive problem solver” (or naive scientist), if even a poor problem solver, in order to make sense of a complex environment involving great uncertainty (George 1980:56: see also Lau and Sears 1986c; Fiske and Taylor 1991:9–14; 2007). According to Fiske and Taylor (1991:12), the naive scientist model assumes that “people are fairly rational in distinguishing among various potential causes,” whereas political scientists, unlike social psychologists, have tended to be much quicker in assuming the role of cognitive impediments to rational analysis.

Due to these developments in cognitive psychology, attitudinal research increasingly moved beyond the study of cognitive consistency to a more sophisticated study of attitudes and information processing now commonly referred to as social cognition. According to Richard Lau and David Sears (1986a:7), “Social cognition began to dominate the study of attitudes in social psychology only by the late 1970s, the central journal had incorporated the term by 1980, and the first major textbook in the area had appeared by 1984” (Fiske and Taylor 1984).

“The study of social cognition entails a fine-grained analysis of how people think about themselves and others, and it leans heavily on the theory and method of cognitive psychology” (Fiske and Taylor 1991:2). But as Fiske and Taylor (1991:18) point out, cognitive psychology is more concerned with individuals qua individual processing information “about inanimate objects and abstract concepts,” whereas social psychology is more concerned with how individuals process information “about people and social experience” as part of a larger social environment. Therefore, “those who study social cognition must adapt the ideas of cognitive psychology” accordingly (Fiske and Taylor 1991:20). Or as Milburn and Billings (1976:111) state, “Psychologists have less to tell political scientists about political decision-making because the model of decision-making used by most psychologists is so simple.” Therefore, a “cautionary note is that although it is appropriate for political scientists to learn the latest findings and arguments of psychology, they should not be too quick to assume that older ideas are invalid” (Jervis 1976:321).

Social cognition theory assumes that individuals are not only active agents, but they tend to be “cognitive misers,” who rely on existing beliefs and schemas for interpreting and processing information. Schema (or schemas) refers to mental constructs that represent different clumps of knowledge (or comprehension) about various facets of the environment. Although schemas necessarily simplify and structure the external environment, they are the basis from which individuals are able to absorb new information and intelligibly make sense of the world around them. Attention and encoding, categorization and memory, and attribution and inference are the cognitive processes that individuals necessarily employ as they perceive, learn, and reason. The more complex and uncertain the environment, the more likely individuals will rely on schemas and cognitive heuristics – shortcuts in information processing – to make sense of the world and the situation at hand (Rokeach 1968; Bem 1970; Lau and Sears 1986b; Fiske and Taylor 1991; 2007; Milburn 1991; Oskamp 1991).

The social cognition and schema approach to attitudes and beliefs builds upon and extends the previous work on cognitive consistency, but is based on a more complex and sophisticated understanding of the nature of attitudes and how information is processed by the mind. Social cognition and schema theory emphasize the dominant role of preexisting beliefs in interpreting new information, much like cognitive consistency theory. Yet, where the theory of cognitive consistency assumes the existence of a belief system with a high degree of coherence and interdependence between beliefs which are extremely resistant to change, a social cognition perspective depicts individual belief systems as much more fragmented internally, with different beliefs or schemas being evoked under different situations for making sense of the environment, suggesting a greater likelihood that some beliefs may change over time. From this perspective, although the beliefs held by an individual may appear inconsistent and contradictory to an outside observer, the overall belief system is likely to make plenty of sense and be quite functional within the mind of the individual of concern, suggesting a rather complex and messy cognitive process.

More sophisticated than cognitive consistency theory about the workings of the human mind, cognitive psychology and social cognition, despite some of the initial optimism within

psychology about the individual as naive scientist, nevertheless continued to represent an alternative to the “more rational views of human perception on the grounds that they are too calculating, too precise” (Lau and Sears 1986c:359). The two major works, already discussed, by Robert Jervis (1976) and John Steinbruner (1974) that were published in the 1970s anticipated many of these developments in the area of social cognition and schemas theory, integrating them into the contemporary study of foreign policy and world politics.

How do images and cognition matter? How do they impact world politics? The literature suggests at least five basic ways in which this occurs: first, through the content of policy-maker beliefs (from general to specific images); second, through the organization and structure of policy-maker beliefs (resulting in coherent versus fragmented images); third, through common patterns of perception and misperception (such as the tendency to categorize and stereotype, simplify causal inferences, and use historical analogies); fourth, through cognitive rigidity and flexibility (and its impact for change and learning); and, finally, through its impact on policy (agenda-setting and framing, formulation and choice, behavior and implementation). (See Table 1 for an overview.) As discussed in the introduction, this literature has been extensively reviewed and analyzed by others, including Rosati (2000), and there seems to be simply no need to further update the literature with more current sites just for the sake of updating. Instead, given the evolution, advancements, and maturity of the field as discussed above, this essay focuses on what a “new generation” of scholarship would look like.

Table 1 The impact of cognition on foreign policy

Source: Rosati (2000).I. Through the content of policy-maker beliefs Especially central beliefs    Identifying general images and foreign policy orientations For example, operational code studies Identifying specific images and beliefs    For example, cognitive mapping and cognitive complexity studiesII. Through the organization and structure of policy-maker beliefs    Central beliefs are most consequential    Coherent versus fragmented images        Consistency theory versus schema theory    Key factors:        Level of knowledge and expertise        Role occupied        Situation and expectations involvedIII. Through common patterns of perception (and misperception)    1 Tendency to categorize and stereotype        Such as through images of the enemy and mirror images    2 Tendency to simplify causal inferences:      • To overestimate or underestimate dispositional or situational causes of behavior      • To overestimate or underestimate one's importance      • To overestimate the degree to which the behavior of others is planned and centralized      • To overindulge in pessimistic and wishful thinking      • Based on attribution theory

    3 Tendency to use historical analogies      Depending on personal experiences, the times, and major events      Based on cognitive heuristics (shortcuts)IV. Through cognitive rigidity and flexibility (and its impact for change and learning)   Cognitive consistency theory (and coherent images) versus schema theory (and fragmented images)   Instrumental and constrained learning most likelyV. Through impact on policy-making    1 Agenda-setting and the framing (and priming) of issues Especially during crises    2 Formulation and choice Impact of crises and stress    3 Implementation and behavior        Process-tracing and congruence techniques        Importance of self-perception theory (and the impact of behavior on beliefs)        Bureaucratic constraints and slippage

What Would a New Generation of Scholarship Look Like?

In common with Margaret Hermann and Robert Woyach (1994:3), this essay shares the editorial philosophy for the new journal International Studies Review, which highlights that “the isolation of the different specialties in international studies limits the cross-fertilization that could lead to more integrative and synthetic perspectives.” There are at least six areas that should receive greater attention and need to be more explicitly addressed to fully capture the potential and richness of the interplay of cognition and foreign policy for better understanding the dynamics of world politics (see Table 2):

Table 2 Prerequisites for a new generation of scholarship

I Synthesize and integrate different cognitive theories    Tendency to highlight one cognitive theory (over others)    Cognitive theories often complementary and mutually reinforcingII. Integrate affect and motivation with the study of cognition    The cognitive–affective–motivational nexus    The individual as motivated tacticianIII. Sensitivity to context and multilevel explanations    Overcoming charges of reductionism    Policy-maker beliefs as a causal nexusIV. Integrate individual cognition and within group decision-making    Through a predominant leader or policy maker    Through shared beliefs and images    Through collective decision-makingV. Communicate beyond academia and have policy relevanceVI. Sensitivity to cognition across individuals and cultures    Most of the cognitive literature Western, especially    American-oriented Variation in cognitive dynamics versus shared cognitive tendencies

• the need to synthesize and integrate different cognitive theories; • the need to integrate cognition and motivation; • greater sensitivity to context and multilevel explanations; • the need to integrate individual cognition and policy-maker beliefs within political

decision-making; • the need to communicate beyond the scholarly community and for policy relevance; and • greater sensitivity to cognition across cultures.

This essay relies heavily on what are considered to be among the more significant works during the first and second generations of scholarship (for an overview of the more contemporary literature, see Hill 2003; Cottam et al. 2004; Breuning 2007; Fiske and Taylor 2007; Hudson 2007; Houghton 2008; Neack 2008).

Synthesize and Integrate Different Cognitive Theories

The tendency over the years in systematically studying human cognition and beliefs has been to focus on one predominant cognitive theory or explanation (to the exclusion of others), or to present (and test) multiple cognitive theories in a competitive format in order to find the “best” theoretical explanation. For example, Deborah Larson (1985), in her study of the development of policy-makers' Cold War beliefs, set up a research design where she attempted to test five “rival” theories of attitude change: the Hovland attitude change approach (involving persuasive communications), cognitive dissonance theory (the classic cognitive consistency approach), attribution theory, self-perception theory (which makes the unique argument that individual beliefs are derived from observing one's own behavior), and schema theory.

These, however, are not mutually exclusive cognitive theories. Despite her best efforts throughout the book to demonstrate the prevalence of one theory of attitude change for each policy maker (self-perception theory in particular), she nonetheless concluded that “No one social psychological theory, then explains the origins of American leaders' Cold War belief system” and that “U.S. policymakers used different types of cognitive processes to interpret information about Soviet behavior” (Larson 1985:342). Ultimately, she found that self-perception theory, attribution theory, and schema theory were the most important overall in explaining the change and acquisition of strong Cold War beliefs by Truman, Acheson, Harriman, and Byrnes during the late 1940s.

This is clearly consistent with a more sophisticated understanding of the attitudinal change literature and cognition. As Eagly and Chaiken (1993:500) state in their monumental review of the literature in The Psychology of Attitudes, “Investigators often behaved as if one theory was right and the others were wrong. This combative atmosphere surely attracted attention and inspired research. Nonetheless, proceeding in a largely competitive mode, researchers have devoted too little effort to discerning the conditions under which various theories are valid,” for they “illuminate different modes of processing.” Or, in the recent view of Fiske and Taylor (2007:557), “No area of social psychology […] profits from being tied down to a single theoretical perspective.” In other words, more emphasis on determining under what conditions different cognitive theories apply, and the complementarity of different theories, will produce greater theoretical synthesis and coherence, and contribute to more powerful explanations of policy-maker beliefs and behavior (see also Rosati 1987; 2000).

Integrate Affect and Motivation within the Study of Cognition

Lau and Sears (1986c:359, 365) have noted that “the inability of information-processing theories to handle affect with as much sophistication as they offer for memory and perception is, however, the biggest shortcoming of political and social cognition […]. It takes us into a realm for which cognitive psychology” does not appear to be “well suited.” Fortunately, as Fiske and Taylor (1991:13) point out, views of the social thinker are coming full cycle, “back to appreciating the importance of motivation.” In fact, Fiske and Taylor (1991:13) argue in their overview of social cognition, that “as the cognitive miser viewpoint has matured, the importance of motivations and emotions has again become evident. Having developed considerable sophistication about people's cognitive processes, researchers are beginning to appreciate anew the interesting and important influences of motivation on cognition.” They believe that “the emerging view of the social perceiver, then, might best be termed the motivated tactician, a fully engaged thinker who has multiple cognitive strategies available and chooses among them based on goals, motives, and needs. Sometimes the motivated tactician chooses wisely, in the interests of adaptability and accuracy, and sometimes the motivated tactician chooses defensively, in the interests of speed or self-esteem.” The motivated tactician perspective integrates the “importance of motivation, but with increased sophistication about cognitive structure and process.”

The first generation of scholarship in political psychology and attitudinal research recognized, and integrated, the “affective” side of attitudes – beliefs involving likes and dislikes – as well as the importance of motivation in the study of “hot” cognition (see Markus and Zajonc 1985; Fiske and Taylor 1991; 2007; Eagly and Chaiken 1993). That the existence of enduring commitments – highly intense beliefs – was a function of the needs that the beliefs fulfill was initially popularized by psychoanalytic theorists such as Freud (1930), Lasswell (1930), and Fromm (1941), culminating in The Authoritarian Personality (Adorno et al. 1950), which argued that beliefs were dependent on ego-defensive needs. Developmental psychologists and other scholars such as Piaget (1932), Erikson (1950), and Maslow (1954) have emphasized that beliefs also fulfill more positive needs of individuals. The classic work highlighting the motivational foundation of political beliefs and behavior was Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study, by Alexander and Juliette George (1956), which distinguished between the “power-seeker” and “power-holder” in their personality study. In Wilson's efforts to gain power in order to overcome his low self-esteem from his childhood days, he conformed to the dominant beliefs of individuals who could significantly influence his rise. However, once Wilson successfully gained a position of power, he would demonstrate incredible rigidity and closed-mindedness after he took a stand.

The attitudinal change literature revolved around the study of cognitive consistency, which assumed that “once inconsistency is perceived, the person is presumed to feel uncomfortable (a negative drive state) and to be motivated to reduce the inconsistency.” Hence, “motivation and cognition both were central to the consistency theories,” for “reducing the aversive drive state is a pleasant relief, rewarding in itself” (Fiske and Taylor 1991:11). Holsti (1967:13), for example, integrated the role of personality in examining Dulles's image of the enemy, recognizing that “certain personality types can be more easily persuaded than others to change their attitudes.” Individuals “also appear to differ in their tolerance for dissonance and tend to use different means to re-establish stable attitudes.” Nevertheless, as explained by Vamik Volkan (1985), the “need to have enemies and allies” appears to be quite powerful among the human species.

Although much of the second generation of cognitive scholarship has tended to be more focused on “cold” cognition, a number of works have demonstrated the importance of integrating a motivational perspective along with a more cognitive approach to better understand human behavior and interaction. Walker (1990; 1995) reviewed how the operational code originally had

a broad conceptualization that included the integral role of personality, which, he argues, needs to be reintegrated in future research. Janis and Mann's (1977) study of Decision Making: A Psychological Analysis of Conflict, Choice, and Commitment is a classic in this regard on the pervasiveness of “defensive avoidance” among decision makers, as is Lebow's (1981) study of how the management of brinkmanship crises is heavily affected by both cognitive and motivational characteristics of policy makers. Rosati (1987; 1990) explained the stability and change of Carter's, Brzezinski's, and Vance's images over time by examining each individual's personality and the needs that their beliefs fulfilled through a “functional approach” to attitudinal change – “that both attitude formation and change must be understood in terms of the needs they serve and that as these motivational processes differ, so too will the conditions and techniques for attitude change” (Katz 1960;167: for more on a functional approach to attitudes which was prominent during the first generation and its recent revival in social cognition, see Sarnoff and Katz 1954; Smith et al. 1956; Smith 1958; Tetlock and Levi 1982; Fiske and Taylor 1991:503–7; Eagly and Chaiken 1993:479–90; 1998). Finally, studies of crises have noted that stressful situations are particularly likely to trigger psychic discomfort and motivated biases.

Hopefully, as Fiske and Taylor (2007; see also Crawford 2000) concluded in their review of the literature, the future will likely see the integration of cognitive and motivational explanations. Mel Laucella (2004) provides a particularly powerful example of the cognitive–psychodynamic foundation (emphasizing upbringing and the developmental process inside and outside of government) for understanding Secretary of State Cyrus Vance's Worldview. Likewise, Jerold Post's (2005) edited volume has made some headway for better understanding Bill Clinton and Saddam Hussein. Clearly, efforts to explore the cognitive–affective–motivational nexus of motivated tacticians should be encouraged in order to more powerfully understand the human mind and human behavior in foreign policy and world politics.

Contextual Sensitivity and Multilevel Explanations

If a cognitive approach is to provide a powerful understanding of foreign policy, the scholar also must remain sensitive to the role of other causal factors – that is, non-psychological dynamics – on the psychological predispositions of policy makers. This is especially important because during the late 1960s and the 1970s, political psychologists became increasingly specialized and systematic in their work in an effort to make a “scientific” contribution to knowledge, where the context and the larger environment were increasingly ignored and unexamined. As Ben-Zvi (1976–7:90) has observed, the cognitive literature in foreign policy has tended to “de-emphasize the multitude of interwoven factors.”

Such a narrow perspective and specialized focus, although necessary to the creation of new knowledge, makes psychological and cognitive studies vulnerable to the charge of reductionism and irrelevance to world politics (see, e.g., Ferguson and Mansbach 1988, esp. ch. 7). Although experienced early on, this would be based on a “fundamental” misperception and misunderstanding of the power of a cognitive approach. This is why “synthetic” scholarship is so important and why there is a need for periodic reflection and review as to what has been learned and how it fits in the larger scope of foreign policy and world politics (see, e.g., Stein 1988; Farnham 1997; 2004; Hudson 2007; Neack 2008).

Fortunately, a sensitivity to the need to integrate other relevant factors to better explain foreign policy within a cognitive perspective has grown over the years. Jervis (1976), for instance, relied upon a “two-step” model in which perceptions and beliefs served as the “proximate” cause of foreign policy decision-making which was impacted by the role of bureaucracy, domestic

determinants, and the international environment. Likewise, Larson (1985:326) provided a “multilevel explanation” in which “theories at different levels of analysis – systemic, domestic political, and individual cognitive processes – were applied to historical case material” to provide a rich explanation of the origins of American Cold War policies. Similarly, Rosati (1987) examined how the role of personality, external events, and domestic forces impacted the beliefs of Carter administration officials.

Such multi-causal approaches to the study of cognition are consistent with Waltz's (1954) classic argument in Man, State and War that all three images must be integrated to explain war, or in Lebow's (1981) language, that one must consider both “immediate” and “underlying” causes of war. This also allows one to address where human images and cognitive style come from and how they develop. Literatures on the importance of socialization and personal/professional/intellectual development are particularly relevant in this regard (as they are relative to the relationship between motivation and cognition).

In fact, one of the promises of a cognitive approach is that policy-maker beliefs are naturally positioned between the environment (international and domestic) and behavior. In other words, beliefs act as a causal nexus – that is, as a filter – through which other factors pass (see Rosati 1987:168–70). Gordon Allport (1931:173), one of the founders of attitudinal research in psychology, long ago recognized the potential of beliefs to serve as a causal nexus: “Background factors never directly cause behavior, they cause attitudes (and other mental sets) and the latter in turn determine behavior.” Or according to Rokeach (1973:3), attitudes “more than any other concept […] are an intervening variable that shows promise of being able to unify the apparently diverse interests of all the sciences concerned with human behavior.” It is, after all, humans who act in a variety of domains throughout life, for “presumably there is no one who would seriously contest that the human brain is the ultimate locus of decision-making. When we speak of such things as organizational process, political bargaining, and rational calculation, we tacitly know that in the final analysis the phenomena involved are based upon human mental operations” (Steinbruner 1974:91).

But human beings also tend to be part of groups and organizations that operate in a larger environment. Hence, in order to understand human action (and interaction) within a global setting, a psychological and cognitive perspective must be embedded within an institutional and decision-making context and be sensitive to the larger environment – as Richard Snyder consistently argued throughout his work on foreign policy decision-making (Snyder 1958; Snyder et al. 1962; Robinson and Snyder 1965). In this way, human images and cognition can be treated as a causal nexus for bringing together environmental, institutional, and psychological factors for understanding foreign policy. And since the focus of a cognitive approach is on the “psychological environment” of the policy maker, the scholar must remain sensitive to integrating the direct influence of the “objective environment” to insure a more comprehensive and powerful understanding of foreign policy and the dynamics of world politics (Sprout and Sprout 1965).

Integrate Individual Cognition and Policy-Maker Beliefs within Groups and Collective Decision-Making

More work needs to be done on small group and collective decision-making to overcome the “logical gap between the individual level and the collective level of decision making which is decidedly problematic to rigorous analytic models” (Steinbruner 1974:36–7).

As stated above, countries (or international actors) do not act, people act. Hence, as Steinbruner (1974:7) has stated, “If an outcome of some consequence is being analyzed – the outbreak of a war […] etc. – it is usually necessary to understand the interactions of a variety of men, institutions, and basic social forces. The decision process then assumes unusual importance because it is through such a process that many of the various causal factors exert their influence on an outcome.” But when do cognition and beliefs matter? The literature on decision-making and foreign policy suggests in three basic ways (see Snyder et al. 1962; Allison 1971; Halperin 1974; Krasner 1978; Rosati 1981; 1984; Hermann et al. 1987; Stern and Verbeek 1998; Hermann 2001): (1) through a predominant leader or policy maker; (2) through shared images, or (3) through collective decision-making.

First, most scholars who have systematically studied the foreign policy perceptions and beliefs of political leaders from a cognitive perspective have tended to focus on one key leader, such as Holsti's (1967) study of John Foster Dulles or Walker's (1977) study of Henry Kissinger. The assumption or argument has been that a key leader or policy maker tends to dominate, or have ultimate responsibility for, the policy-making process. For example, according to Morton Halperin (1974:17), in Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, “the President stands at the center of the foreign policy process in the United States. His role and influence over decisions are qualitatively different from those of any other participant. In any foreign policy decision widely believed at the time to be important, the President will almost always be the principal figure determining the general direction of actions.” At the same time, it must be recognized that “although the President is the principal decision maker on important foreign policy matters, he does not act alone. He is surrounded by a large number of participants with whom he consults, partly at his pleasure and partly by obligation. These other participants are arrayed around the President at varying distances determined by the probability that they will be consulted by him.”

Basically, this perspective assumes that the policy-making process tends to be relatively centralized. This may be the case for a government (or nonstate actor) in general, or for a particular situation. During a time of crisis, for example, “the highest level of government officials will make the decision(s)” (Hermann 1969:416). Crises, in fact, tend to be times of high stress when an individual's ability to cope with complex and ambiguous problems tends to erode in favor of various psychological and cognitive predispositions (see Holsti 1971; 1990; Janis and Mann 1977; Lebow 1981; Oneal 1988).

Second, sometimes the government, even the society, has been treated as a single actor – such as in the operational code of the Soviet politburo (Leites 1951; George 1969), White's (1968) general discussion of mirror images during a time of war, or Heradstveit's (1979) analysis of the Arab–Israeli conflict. Such an approach usually assumes the existence of shared images or the development of a political consensus among policy makers. “When participants share a set of global images, these will decisively shape stands taken on particular issues,” according to Morton Halperin (1974:11). For example, “from the onset of the cold war until quite recently, a majority of American officials (as well as the American public) have held a set of widely shared images.” In addition, Janis (1982) has described how groupthink can occur in small groups that develop a high esprit de corps, with the result being a high degree of individual conformity and group consensus in thought and image. Another possibility is when an issue, usually less salient, becomes localized or dominated by a bureaucratic organization with a strong, internal subculture (Rosati 1981). In these ways, the resolution of a collective decision is handled by assuming “that the decision-making entity, whether a small bureau, a cabinet department, the executive branch, or the entire government, acts as if it were a single person” (Steinbruner 1974:37; see also Allison 1971).

Finally, foreign policy-making also involves multiple policy makers (from multiple organizations) – none of which may dominate – who may not share similar images or arrive at consensus. The literature on bureaucratic politics – emphasizing competing interests, coalition building, and bargaining – highlights this perspective (Allison 1971; Allison and Halperin 1972; Steinbruner 1974, esp. ch. 5). Such collective decision-making complicates the problem for a psychological–cognitive approach, for under such conditions “it will not suffice to assume that foreign policy decisions merely reflect the beliefs of any given leader, or even group of leaders. Hence, research on belief systems must be embedded in a broader context” (Holsti 1976:53).

Some of the more recent cognitive work has attempted to be more sophisticated in operating within a collective decision-making context and examining the role of multiple policy makers, such as Larson's (1985) study of Harriman, Truman, Byrnes, and Acheson within the Truman administration, Rosati's (1987) study of Carter, Brzezinski, and Vance (and Muskie) within the Carter administration, and Khong's (1992) study of Lyndon Johnson and his major advisers during the Vietnam policy-making process. Such a perspective attempts to identify the “prevailing image,” as well as competing images, within the collectivity (see Herrmann 1985; Rosati 1987:17–21). As suggested by Snyder and Diesing (1977:526), “the operative values and perceptions of the decision-making unit will depend on the balance of influence among its constituent members […]. If one or two persons are in complete control, the operational ‘interests’ of the state will reflect their perspectives” (see De Rivera 1968; Bem 1970; Baron and Byrne 1981; Vertzberger 1990; Sears et al. 1991; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; Levine and Resnick 1993; Fiske and Taylor 1991; 2007).

More efforts along these lines are necessary in order to advance our understanding of the role of individual and collective images (see, e.g., Bonham and Shapiro 1982; Shapiro et al. 1988; Schraeder 1994; Kaarbo 1996; 't Hart et al. 1997). The special issues on “Whither the Study of Bureaucratic Politics” (Stern and Verbeek 1998) and “Leaders, Groups, and Coalitions” (Hermann 2001) are particularly important steps in the right direction. Recent scholarship has taken this research further, as in the work of Jean Garrison (1999; 2001; 2007) on policy framing and the inner circle of advisers.

In sum, more studies need to identify the key individuals within the decision-making process, examine their images, and the dynamics between them so as to better understand the making and conduct of foreign policy. Yet, what George (1980:11) stated 30 years ago still applies: “Despite advances in relevant portions of theories of individual psychology, small group dynamics, and organizational behavior, the linkage and synthesis of these three theories is still primitive.” This has been particularly the case with regard to the collective nature of decision-making, as opposed to highlighting a predominant leader or a shared image orientation. One must determine the distribution of influence and authority among the players, the roles that they play in the process, and the intra-group dynamics.

Communicate beyond the Scholarly Community and Have Policy Relevance

Although this topic has been recognized for some time, not much has been accomplished (see, e.g., Smoke and George 1973; Hicks et al. 1982; Herspring 1992; Lepgold 1998). Alexander George, especially in Bridging the Gap: Theory & Practice in Foreign Policy (1993), has most consistently and best addressed this problem, especially the cultural gap that exists between academia and the policy world. Ironically, the study of cognition and beliefs is particularly useful

and relevant to those involved and interested (including students, observers, and the public) in foreign policy and world politics.

According to William Fox (1986:36), “We are not simply tourists on this planet […] Our collective job is not to whisper in the ear of today's dictator, but it is to help those in and out of government with present or future influence on the policy process understand some of the expected middle-run and long-run consequences of alternative policy choices.” Hermann and Hagan (1998) provide a recent illustration of the type of broader communication that could be accomplished, especially from theorists to practitioners. Yet, as Joseph Nye (2009) has recently argued, “scholars” tend to stay on the “sidelines,” while Walt (2005) points out the gap between theory and policy will only be narrowed if the academic community puts greater emphasis on policy-relevant theoretical work. The importance of broader communication and policy relevance deserve serious consideration by students of political psychology and cognition.

Considering Cognition across Individuals and Cultures

Considerable knowledge has accumulated over the years, and been reviewed, for the existence of a powerful cognitive approach that results in certain cognitive predispositions and tendencies that apply to most individuals most of the time. This having been said and highlighted throughout, at the same time it must be understood that there will be individual variation in cognitive styles. Although certain cognitive predispositions and tendencies are likely, similar cognitive patterns for individuals do not automatically trigger similar outcomes and different individuals may not rely on the same cognitive patterns. The likelihood of such idiosyncratic “individual” cognitive dynamics is heavily a function of the characteristics of the individual, the times, and the situation. Hence, there remains a need to be sensitive to variations in cognitive dynamics and styles across individuals within the same culture.

More importantly, however, is the fact that the literature on cognition that has been reviewed has been based predominantly on the study of the Western – and, in particular, the American – mind. Therefore, one also must be sensitive to the implications of applying a Western, especially American-oriented, cognitive orientation to different societies with different cultures. This is consistent with a broader interdisciplinary approach to human behavior known as “cultural psychology” that is growing in popularity (see Price-Williams 1985; Pye 1986; Shweder and Sullivan 1993; Fiske et al. 1998). However, given that most of the scholarship being done in this area is undertaken by American academics, this is both unsurprising and unlikely to be overcome.

Clearly, variations in content – in other words, the beliefs and images held – are likely to be heavily impacted by cultural (and language) differences, as would be expected from a cognitive perspective. As Steinbruner (1974:95) recognized, “In terms of substantive content, the perceptions, opinions, attitudes, beliefs, and assumptions of human beings vary so enormously over both individuals and cultural conditions that empirical generalizations are simply overwhelmed.” In a fascinating cross-cultural study of crises, for example, Bobrow et al. (1977; 1979) found that whereas Americans tended to view crises as fundamentally dangerous times of great risk, the Chinese were more likely to view crises as times of opportunity as well as risk. Post (2008) has analyzed the mind of terrorists (from different cultures and parts of the world). If anything, cultural differences accentuate the likelihood for misperception and mis-communication discussed above (see also Dower 1987; Schafer 1997).

But what impact do cultural differences have on cognitive structures and predispositions? The cognitive paradigm is premised on the basis that “the structure of human beliefs is far less varied

over individuals and cultures than is the fantastically diverse content of those beliefs” (Steinbruner 1974:14). Yet, as Fiske and Taylor (1991:177) acknowledge, “There are cultural differences in schema use.” For example, in more traditional and non-Western societies that tend to be less individualistic, people do not make trait attributions in the same way as in Western society (see Miller 1984; Markus and Kitayama 1991; Heradstveit and Bonham 1996). Therefore, some variation in patterns of perception and cognitive dynamics across cultures (and subcultures) occur, as one would expect (see Hudson 1997; Fiske et al. 1998; Sampson and Hudson 1999).

Clearly, such variations in cognitive patterns across cultures need to be addressed if we are to better understand the dynamics of foreign policy throughout the world, especially beyond the US and the West. But this does not alter the fundamental reality that the human mind craves certainty and actively provides meaning to the environment that makes sense to the individual, in accordance with the cognitive paradigm. The paradigmatic assumption, supported by considerable empirical reality across cultures, is that human beings acquire cognitive structures of beliefs which tend to remain stable through selective memory, perception, and causal inference. Although some specific cognitive dynamics may vary across individuals and cultures, people nevertheless share basic cognitive predispositions and habits: images are acquired that may be more coherent or fragmented; common perceptual patterns are acquired involving the tendency to categorize and stereotype, simplify causal inferences, and use historical analogies; and limited learning occurs due to cognitive rigidity and closure. Such is the nature of human beings and the workings of the human mind, which has a consequential impact on foreign policy and world politics.

The Future Study of Cognition and World Politics

It is time for international relations scholars to seriously examine and integrate a psychological and cognitive perspective within their work – to have theories be realistically grounded in the realities of the nature of human beings and the regularized habits of the mind. As related by James Goldgeier (1997:164–5; see also Goldgeier and Tetlock 2001):

Because the existence of threats depends on the perceptions of individuals and societies, we need to incorporate the psychological dimension of threat perception and identity formation into our more structural analyses […] The growing attention given by neorealists to perceptual variables, the examination by neoliberals of the role of ideas, and the focus of constructivists on identity, all suggest, however, that models operating at other levels of analysis could be strengthened by incorporating work operating at the psychological level.

It also allows one to transcend the “level of analysis” problem that has been endemic between those who study foreign policy and those who theorize and operate more at the global systemic level.

Maybe international relations theorists need to develop a phrase – such as “cognitivism” – that will embody the cognitive paradigm that has been so well established over the decades to lay a more realistic and powerful foundation for describing, explaining, and understanding the foreign policies of individuals, states, and nonstate actors (replacing the old but still heavily used rational actor model as the key working assumption). As Morgenthau (1978:7) realized, “the contingent demands of personality, prejudice, and subjective preference, and of all the weakness of intellect and will which flesh is heir to, are bound to deflect foreign policies from their rational course.” Or as Verba (1961:93) stated long ago, if “models of the international system that either ignore or make grossly simplifying assumptions about individual decision-making can explain international

relations only imperfectly, it may well be worth the additional effort to build variables about individual decision-making into them.”

At the same time, students of political psychology and of cognition and foreign policy need to broaden their study and move increasingly to a third and more powerful generation of scholarship. The last 60 years of scholarship has been impressive, but this essay takes the view that political psychologists and students of foreign policy should be more explicit in order to fully capture the potential and richness of the interplay of cognition and foreign policy for better understanding the dynamics of world politics: through synthesize and integration of different cognitive theories; through integration of cognition and motivation; by greater sensitivity to context and multilevel explanations; by integration of individual cognition and policy-maker beliefs within a political, decision-making environment; by the need to communicate beyond the scholarly community for greater policy relevance; and through greater sensitivity to cognition across cultures. This is a challenging (and controversial) agenda, but one that will hopefully result in much greater cross-fertilization between scholars of foreign policy and international relations.

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About the Authors

Jerel Rosati is a Professor of political science and international studies at the University of South Carolina. He has been a Fulbright Senior Specialist at the University of San Andreas in Buenos Aires, a Visiting Scholar at China's Foreign Affairs College in Beijing, and a Visiting Professor at Somalia National University in Mogadishu. He is the author of over 40 articles and chapters, as well as five books, including The Carter Administration's Quest for Global Community: Beliefs and Their Impact on Behavior, Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change, and The Politics of United States Foreign Policy (4th edn. and translated into Mandarin Chinese, German, and Russian). In 2002, he was the original Program Director and Academic Director of a six-week U.S. Department of State Fulbright American Studies Institute on U.S. Foreign Policy for 18 scholars–practitioners from all over the world (which completed its sixth and final year in 2007).

Colleen E. Miller is a PhD candidate in Political Science at the University of Minnesota and a research fellow at the Army Research Institute for Behavioral and Social Sciences in Arlington, Virginia. She received her BA from Carleton College in 2004. Miss Miller's areas of specialization include foreign policy analysis, international security, political psychology and elite decision-making, and terrorism studies. She was a 2005–6 recipient of the US Department of Education's Foreign Language and Area Studies fellowship for Modern Standard Arabic, and was selected as a participant for the 2007 Summer Workshop on Teaching about Terrorism (SWOTT).

 

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Cite this articleRosati, Jerel and Colleen E. Miller. "Political Psychology, Cognition, and Foreign Policy Analysis." The International Studies Encyclopedia. Denemark, Robert A. Blackwell Publishing, 2010. Blackwell Reference Online. 04 March 2010 <http://www.isacompendium.com/subscriber/tocnode?id=g9781444336597_chunk_g978144433659716_ss1-10>