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POLITICAL RISK
POLITICAL RISK
ARISES FROM THE UNCERTAINTY OVER THE
CONTINUATION OF A GOVERNMENT AND POLICIES
THAT IMPACT FOREIGN INVESTORS’ PROFITABILITY.
Moreover...
POLCIES, THAT ARE UNPLEASANT, DO NOT
CONSTITUTE RISK AS LONG AS THEY ARE TRANSPARENT
AND ENFORCED WITH CONSISTENCY.
POLITICAL RISKS
INSTABILITY RISK
OWNERSHIP RISK
OPERATIONS RISK
TRANSFER RISK
INSTABILITY RISK
ARISES FROM THE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT
STABILITY OF A GOVERNMENT.
OWNERSHIP RISK
ARISES FROM THE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT A GOVERNMENT’S DECISION
TO REDUCE FOREIGN INVESTORS’ OWNERSHIP IN THEIR INVESTMENTS
IN THE COUNTRY.
CONFISCATION
IMPOUNDING OF THE PROPERTY OF FOREIGN INVESTORS BY THE HOST
GOVERNMENT WITHOUT COPENSATION.
EXPROPRIATION
PURCHASE OF PROPERTY FROM FOREIGN INVESTORS.
NATIONALIZATION
PURCHASE OF PRIVATE BUSINESSES BY HOST GOVERNMENT.
DOMESTICATION
PLANNED REDUCTION OF EQUITY HELD BY FOREIGN INVESTORS.
OPERATIONS RISK
ARISES FROM THE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT HOST GOVERNMENT’S
POLICIES THAT MAY CONSTRAIN FOREIGN INVESTORS’ OPERATIONS
IN THE COUNTRY.
They can change policies regarding...
• PRICES
• TERMS OF COMPETITION
• TAXATION
• PRODUCT SPECIFICATIONS
MEASURES CAN BE HIGHLY VARIED AND UNLIMITED
AND
THEY CAN BE AS DEVASTATING AS EXPROPRIATION
TRANSFER RISK
ARISES FROM THE UNCERTAINTY ABOUT GOVERNMENT POLICIES THAT MAY RESTRICT FOREIGN
INVESTORS’ ABILITY TO TRANSFER PROFITS OR CAPITAL OUT OF THE
COUNTRY.
HOW TO ANALYZE POLITICAL RISKS
POLITICAL
SOCIAL
ECONOMIC
EXTERNAL THREAT
QUESTION:
HOW LIKELY IS IT THAT AN OUTSIDE FORCE WILL DESTABILIZE THE GOVERNMENT OF A COUNTRY?
THINGS TO LOOK FOR:
THE WORDS AND ACTIONS OF THE LEADERS OF THE ENEMY
COUNTRIES
INTERNAL THREAT
QUESTION:
HOW LIKELY IS IT THAT THE GOVERNMENT WILL REMAIN
STABLE (ASSUMING THERE IS NO EXTERNAL THREAT)?
A COUNTRY WHERE TRANSITION OF POWER FOLLOWS A FIXED
SCHEDULE AND IS PEACEFUL IS MORE STABLE .
SUCH A COUNTRY ALLOW ITS PEOPLE TO CHOOSE THEIR RULERS AND
SPEAK THEIR MINDS.
POLITICAL FREEDOM(ACCORDING TO FREEDOM HOUSE-99)
FREE PARTLY FREE NOT FREE
Argentina Armenia China
Bulgaria Brazil Egypt
Czech Rep Ghana Indonesia
Hungary Malaysia Nigeria
Taiwan Russia Saudi Arab
S. Africa Turkey Vietnam
EXISTENCE OF DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL PROCESS DOES NOT
ALWAYS ENSURE POLITICAL STABILITY.
OTHER EXAMPLES INCLUDE:
INDIA, ISRAEL, ITALY, TURKEY
LIKEWISE, EXISTENCE OF AN AUTOCRATIC GOVERNMENT DOES
NOT NECESSARILY IMPLY INSTABILITY.
LOOK AT THE SIX ASIAN TIGERS
• CHINA IS A COMMUNIST COUNTRY.
• INDONESIA HAD MILITARY DICTATORSHIP & ONE PARTY RULE UNTIL RECENTLY.
• TAIWAN & SOUTH KOREAWERE AUTHORITARIAN STATES UNTIL RECENTLY.
• SINGAPORE HAS ELECTED AUTHORITARIAN GOVERNMENT
HONG KONG’S COLONIAL GOVERNMENT WAS
UNDEMOCRATIC.
SIGNALS TO LOOK FOR:
• SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS
• POLITICAL MOVEMENTS
• RADICAL MOVEMENTS
• ETHNIC TENSIONS
• DISCONTENT
OWNERSHIP RISKS
QUESTION:
WILL THE GOVERNMENT ACT IN A WAY THAT WILL DEPRIVE A
FOREIGN FIRM FROM CONTINUING ITS OWNERSHIP IN THE COUNTRY?
Pay attention to the attitude of the leaders.
• And what they have to say about specific countries.
• Anger of the labor toward foreign policies…
• toward foreign firms of specific countries
• or firms.
OPERATIONS RISK
QUESTION:
WHAT IS THE LIKELIHOOD THAT A GOVERNMENT WILL CHANGE
POLICIES THAT IMPACT ON FOREIGN FIRMS’ PROFITABILITY.
THINGS TO LOOK FOR.
DEBT SERVICE RATIO
EXTERNAL DEPENDENCE
LIQUIDITY
DEBT SERVICE RATIO
A COUNTRY’S ANNUAL DEBT INTEREST AND PRINCIPAL LIABILITY
AS A PERCENT OF EXPORTS OF GOODS AND SERVICES
How do countries score?ACCEPTABLE <20%
Poland, Malaysia, Thailand
PRECAUTIONARY >20% BUT <30%
Chile, India, Mexico, Turkey
DANGEROUS >30%
Argentina, Brazil, Hungary, Indonesia
(Data is from 1995)
It may be all right if a country:
• Has highly diversified export base.– Both products and markets.
• Can reduce imports in a crisis.– Fraction of total imports that comprise of oil
and food (over 35% is alarming).
• Has long-term capacity to repay debt.– Total debt/GDP (over 40% is alarming)
How do these measure up?
Oil& Food Total Debt
Ratio-94 to GNP-97
• Argentina 07% 38%
• Brazil 26% 23%
• Hungary 19% 52%
• Indonesia Low 62%
EXTERNAL DEPENDENCEA COUNTRY’S TOTAL EXPORT &
IMPORT BILL AS A PERCENTAGE OF ITS GNP (1998)
• Argentina 18%
• Brazil 15%
• Hungary 107%
• Indonesia 55%
LIQUIDITY
LENGTH OF TIME A COUNTRY CAN CONTINUE TO IMPORT AT THE PRESENT LEVEL BY DRAWING
DOWN ITS FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES.
2-3 MONTHS IS PRECAUTIONARYLESS THAN 2 MONTHS IS ALARMING
(Data for 1998)
• Argentina 8.5 Months
• Brazil 6.5 Months
• Hungary 4.5 Months
• Indonesia 4.5 Months
ECONOMIC POLICY
• IS THE COUNTRY INVESTING IN EDUCATION & INFRASTRUCTURE?
• IS IT OPEN TO TRADE?
• IS IT LETTING THE MARKET HAVE ITS WAY?
INTERVENTION BY GOVERNMENT
BREEDS BUREAUCRACY THAT PULLS THE COUNTRY BACKWARDS.
IT BREEDS CORRUPTION AND INEFFICIENCY.
POLITICAL RISK SCORES
LOW
Switzerland
Norway
Austria
Germany
Netherlands
Brunei
Japan
HIGH
Liberia
Somalia
Sudan
Iraq
Myanmar
Uganda
Ethiopia
HOW TO COPE WITH POLITICAL RISK
Avoidance Approach
Insurance Approach
Negotiation Approach
Insurance Approach
Political Risk Insurance
– Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC)
– American International Group
– Lloyds of London
Bargaining Approach
WHEN THE BARGAINING POWER POSITION OF A FIRM RELATIVE TO
THAT OF THE HOST GOVERNMENT IS STRONG, THE FIRM WILL
EXPERIENCE LOW LEVEL OF INTERVENTION IN ITS OPERATIONS.
BARGAINING POWER OF MNCs
• Access to Technology
• Integration in Global Production
• Access to Global Markets
• Access to Foreign Exchange
• Provider of Jobs & Capital
BARGAINING POWER OF COUNTRIES
• Market Size and Growth Potential
• Attractive Resource Base
• Attractive & Efficient Infrastructure
• History of Consistent , Flexible, and Fair Relations with Foreign Investors
BARGAINING POWER FRAMEWORK
RELATIVE BARGAINING POSITION OF THE FIRM
AND
OUTCOME STAKE FOR THE FIRM
Low Outcome Stake
Walk Away
If Charged, Avoid the Charge
High Outcome Stake/Low Bargaining Position
Accede to Demands
High Outcome Stake/High Bargaining Position
Negotiate