SUMMONING THE NECESSARY POLITICAL WILL FOR PROTECTING CIVILIANS IN AFRICA

"With the united and determined will, mountains can be moved"

By Joseph Yav Katshung

1. Introduction

In September 2005, world leaders at the United Nations endorsed a historic declaration that the international community has a “responsibility… to help protect populations from genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes and crimes against humanity” and expressed a willingness to take timely and decisive action when states “manifestly fail” to protect their own populations from these threats.i

Member states of the African Union have been even more categorical in their support for humanitarian intervention in the context of their own continent. The AU Constitutive Act declares “the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity”.ii

However, the statements of some African leaders have suggested very different interpretations of their commitment to protect vulnerable civilians. For instance, President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe has declared that:

The vision that we must present for a future United Nations should not be one filled with vague concepts that provide an opportunity for those states that seek to interfere in the internal affairs of other states. Concepts such as “humanitarian intervention” and the “responsibility to protect” need careful scrutiny in order to test the motives of their proponents.” iii

Yet President Paul Kagame of Rwanda has asserted:

Never again should the international community’s response to these crimes be found wanting. Let us resolve to take collective actions in a timely and decisive manner. Let us

also commit to put in place early warning mechanisms and ensure that preventive interventions are the rule rather and the exception. iv

Clearly, the current circumstances and recent experiences of these respective countries have a major influence on their leaders’ approaches to Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Nevertheless, these conflicting attitudes raise serious questions over African leaders’ willingness to fulfil their responsibilities to protect endangered civilians in practice. Ultimately, the proof of the pudding is in the eating and the AU will be judged on its responses to humanitarian crises on its watch.

This paper assesses the level of support among African leaders to follow through on their commitment to R2P in practice and makes recommendations on how to enhance the will to act where it is seen to be lacking. Generating the political will to protect civilians remains a priority in Africa. The emerging African peace and security architecture provides a structure for African efforts to implement R2P in practice. This paper traces the evolution of Africa’s peace and security capability within a continental political context, focusing on shifting approaches to civilian protection. Yet the involvement of the international community – and of African states in particular – in seeking to promote peace and security remains ad hoc and inconsistent. One of the challenges is the gap between the commitment of governments to respond to humanitarian crises and the embodiment of this commitment into national foreign and defense policy. Given political realities in the world, intervention on humanitarian grounds in Africa will in all likelihood still depend on the political will of key member states that dominate both the decision to intervene and the decision to make funds, troops, and equipment available, whether to the UN or an ad hoc multinational or regional force. Therefore, as there is a link between the political will to intervene and capacity to deploy, this paper relates political will and capacity to the continental preparedness to intervene for humanitarian purposes. It is notable that having a more robust, at-the-ready capacity to intervene would affect the political equation by removing the lack-of-capacity obstacle and excuse, thereby unambiguously testing political will: whether member states would still say “no” in the face of a humanitarian disaster.

2. The Responsibility to Protect Civilian Populations in African Crises

Conflict, violence and religious radicalism continue to undermine the maintenance of peace and security and the promotion of human rights in Africa. Generating the political will to protect civilians remains a priority in Africa. Yet the involvement of the international community – and of African states in particular – in seeking to promote peace and security remains ad hoc and inconsistent.

Dictated by realpolitik, the timing and nature of appropriate collective security action remains contentious. As the ICISS report stressed, controversy over intervention relates both to inactionv and actionvi (ICISS 2001). However, in recent years, many stakeholders in Africa and in the broader international community have recognised that serious questions of principle and practice relating to civilian protection need to be confronted in a much more comprehensive way.

In 2000, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) was established to help shake the world out of its indifference and political paralysis. The ICISS report released in 2001 advocated a duty upon the international community to protect populations when the government of a country fails to do that for themselves. It argued that:

…there are exceptional circumstances in which the interest that all states have in maintaining a stable international order requires them to react when all order within a state has broken down. Also when civil conflict and repression are so violent that civilians are threatened with massacre, genocide or ethnic cleansing on a large scale...' vii

This emerging doctrine of the responsibility to protect was reflected in the UN’s High-Level Panel Report on Threats, Challenges and Change, which called for a recognition of the international community’s legitimate right to intervene in internal conflicts to prevent the loss of life and further deterioration of the situation. Thus:

…history teaches us all too clearly that it cannot be assumed that every state will always be able, or willing, to meet its responsibilities to protect its own people and avoid harming its neighbours. And in those circumstances, the principles of collective security mean that some portion of those responsibilities should be taken up by the international community...viii

At the 2005 Millennium Review Summit at the United Nations, the proposal to enforce a clear framework for humanitarian intervention and a clear duty to act was highly controversial.ix After protracted negotiations, the declaration from the Millennium Review Summit did include specific reference to this duty to act, stating that:

‘Each individual state has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity… The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help states to exercise this responsibility.’x

The African Union (AU), having deliberated at length on the Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, adopted a Common African Position (known as “The Ezulwini Consensus”), stating that:

‘ … It is important to reiterate the obligation of states to protect their citizens, but this should not be used as a pretext to undermine the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of states.’xi

Africa has a mixed record on humanitarian intervention. Efforts to prevent the escalation of nascent conflict, including crisis diplomacy and the imposition of sanctions, have often proved inadequate or ineffective. And once a crisis has escalated to the point of imminent or outright disaster, the impulse of many African states to provide troops to intervene to stop the suffering has often been deflected by resort to the norm of ‘non-interference’.

Recent efforts to move forward to a culture of ‘non-indifference’ in Africa have focused on the development of the various components of the African peace and security architecture. This is a difficult process for Africa, where the experiences of colonialism and subsequent weakness of many states have made issues of sovereignty and non-interference particularly sensitive. The next section outlines continental and regional efforts to develop its peace and security capacity.

3. Towards Africa’s Responsibility to Protect

The African Union and the various sub-regional organisations have adopted an ambitious peace and security agenda and are establishing a bold new architecture designed to take the continent more proactive and effective in preventing and responding to serious crises both within and between African states.

3.1. The OAU principle of ‘non-interference’

From its inception, and as stated in article 2 of its Charter, the OAU was guided by two main principles: the ‘sovereign equality of all member states’ and ‘non-interference in the internal affairs of member states’. Further more, the member -states agreed to maintain and respect inherited colonial borders.

While these principles aimed to enhance stability in Africa and to deter superpower adventurism, they also had a negative implications. Principles of non-interference were exploited by many African leaders and their allies to bolster the position of elites against the consequences of dissent among their populations. The OAU was often criticised as a ‘Heads of State club’ as it tended to focus more on protecting Africa’s leaders from its

citizens rather the other way round.xii The organisation’s adherence to the cardinal principle of ‘non-interference in internal affairs’ led to a failure to act aggressively in the face of egregious violations within states, most famously in the cases of Uganda, Equatorial Guinea and the Central African Republic.

More progressive approaches to peace and security that have emerged since the end of the Cold War and have sought to shift focus from protecting states’ security to protecting their citizens (i.e. human security) continued to be resisted by the OAU under the guise of ’non–interference’. It developed conflict resolution mechanisms that privileged the use of soft power and presented less of a threat to sovereignty, such as its Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration in 1964 and subsequently the Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution Mechanism in 1993.xiii

Between 1963 and 2002, the OAU was faced with many occurrences of border disputes, inter-state aggression or subversion, separatist movements, and in extreme cases, state collapse. The OAU’s Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration lacked the capacity and commitment to manage and resolve conflict and protect civilians. In general, this structure remained largely ineffective in protecting civilians and quelling conflicts in Africa.

Where the organisation decided to act to defend member states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity, civilian protection was seldom a priority. During the 1967-70 Civil War in Nigeria, the OAU created an ad hoc Consultative Committee that helped to prevent Biafra's secession. When Portugal attempted the re-conquest of Guinea in 1970, the OAU rendered financial and military aid to Guinea, declared war on mercenaries in Africa and waged a reasonably successful information campaign that galvanised international opinion against the aggression. In Equatorial Guinea, OAU support enabled the young republic in 1977 to reinforce its newly-won independence.

The magnitude of instability that continued to plague Africa and the political circumstances of the post-Cold War continent led to a re-evaluation of the mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution, and – ultimately – the establishment of the African Union.

3.2 The African Union and the ‘non-indifference’ principle

The AU, inaugurated to replace the OAU in 2001, was designed to explicitly confront both the central weaknesses of the OAU and the need for a reinvigorated African ‘ownership’ of the challenges facing the continent. Importantly, the first objective of the Union is to ‘achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the peoples of

Africa’. This recognition of the fundamental importance of peoples, rather than just states, in continental affairs is indicative of the drafters’ determination to replace the OAU’s ‘Heads of State Club’ with an institution aimed at overcoming the challenges faced by people and their communities.

Moreover, a major aspect of the AU is a new spirit of “non-indifference” towards massive crimes against humanity and genocide in Africa, as opposed to a policy of non-interference. Collective security innovations of the AU Constitutive Act include: the establishment of a Common African Security and Defence Policyxiv; affirmation of the right of the Union to intervene in a member state to restore peace and security in respect of grave circumstances such as war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanityxv; and respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governancexvi. Encouragingly, the new AU has put in place a number of important mechanisms to support its bold new mandate to confront the continent’s serious peace and security problems. These include a standing African Peace and Security Council, an advisory ‘Panel of the Wise’ made up of eminent former statespersons, a Continental Early Warning System, an African Standby Force to provide for quick and effective ‘humanitarian intervention’ in extreme circumstances.

The establishment of these new African means of preventing and responding to crises on the continent represent a bold step forward and offer the hope of a new era of collective African responsibility to the most vulnerable. These provisions are a radical departure from the peace and security arrangements of the OAU, and reflect an emerging recognition of the “responsibility to protect”, resulting in the transformation of the absolute right of state sovereignty that dominated the era of the OAU.xvii However, seasoned observers of African affairs know that, on both fronts, the gap between rhetoric and action can often be overwhelming.

3.3 The Ezulwini Consensus and the use of force

In February 2005, 15 African foreign ministers gathered in Swaziland to forge an African Common Position on the UN reform. Having deliberated at length on the Report of the High- level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, they adopted “The Ezulwini Consensus”, which contains the following elements:

Collective security and the challenge of prevention; Collective security and the use of force and; Institutional reform.

On the legality of the use of force in order to protect civilians, the Ezulwini Consensus reiterates that it is important to comply scrupulously with the provisions of Article 51 of the UN Charter, which authorises the use of force only in cases of legitimate self-defence. Additionally, Article 4(h) of the AU Constitutive Act authorises intervention in grave circumstances such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Consequently, any recourse to force outside the provisions of these treaties should be prohibited.

However, since the General Assembly and the Security Council are often far from the scenes of conflicts and may not be in a position to accurately evaluate the nature of crisis situations, it is imperative that Regional Organisations are empowered to take action in certain circumstances. The African Union agreed with the High- level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change that the intervention of Regional Organisations should be done with the approval of the UN Security Council; although in certain situations such approval could be granted “after the fact” where urgent action is required. In such cases, the UN should assume responsibility for financing such operations.xviii

IV. From Rwanda to Darfur: Lessons for Political Will to Protect Civilians in Africa

Civilians in Africa bear the heaviest brunt of acts of terror, civil wars, violent suppression of political opponents and criminal violence. The most heinous examples of the failure of civilian protection in Africa were the genocide in Rwanda in 1994 resulted in the deaths of an estimated 800,000 people, mostly women and children,xix and the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) between 1998 and 2003, resulted in one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises, with over 3.4 million persons displaced from their homes and an estimated 4 million killed.xx Those are a tragic part of Africa’s contemporary history.

4.1. Darfur and political will in Africa

Despite African leaders’ pledge to never let another Rwanda happen again, they have not demonstrated the will to exercise the African Union’s right to intervene to stem gross human rights violations in either a concerted or consistent manner.

In the Darfur conflict that started in 2003, estimates of numbers killed range from 180,000 to 400,000. At least two million people have been forced to flee from their homes and are displaced in Sudan or in camps in neighbouring Chad.xxi Significantly, Rwanda was the first African country to deploy a protection force to Darfur as part of the AU mission. However, it is clear that the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS) has – despite its best efforts – clearly not been able to provide effective protection or prevent massive human rights abuses.

AMIS’ role in Darfur has been a critical test case for the AU’s capacity and willingness to protect civilians on the continent. Its mission has been an enormously difficult and complex

one. AMIS has been tasked to monitor, as far as possible, the humanitarian ceasefire agreement of April 2004 and to report on violations; remain in touch with local authorities to build confidence and increase dialogue; monitor humanitarian convoys (these are often attacked); and establish police stations in various locations to reduce attacks. Despite some limited achievements, AMIS has largely been unable to provide effective protection to most of the population of Darfur.xxii

Effective civilian protection is also hampered by a lack of will to implement and comply with existing standards and principles. For instance, despite the AU being the only international organisation that has given itself the right to intervene for human protection purposes,xxiii it is increasingly becoming clear that its good intentions need the political will to see them through. Unfortunately, the on-going crisis in Darfur has shown that few African countries can be counted upon to answer calls for civilian assistance.

Political will for intervention is a major concern for the protection of civilians especially in Africa. General Romeo Dallaire, UN force commander during the Rwandan genocide, has recently argued that “Darfur, is a ‘perfect example’ of a ‘lack of political will’ to prevent crises developing”.xxiv Meanwhile, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan has observed that “everybody is looking to see if world leaders will make good on their World Summit pledge last September to protect vulnerable communities…. A certain political will is required for action - and I don’t think we have the kind of political will that is required to drive things home… African leaders…will have to work collectively with the Sudanese government to convince them that it is in their interest to cooperate with the international community."xxv

4.2. Darfur and international political will

Political will to resolve African crises is lacking more generally at the international level. A recent report from Action Africa argues that in 1994, the Clinton Administration refused to name the unfolding genocide in Rwanda and failed to act decisively to stop it. It blocked international intervention in Rwanda, claiming that there was neither domestic constituency nor compelling foreign policy interest to support U.S. action.xxvi

In Darfur, the Bush Administration is the first government to have publicly acknowledged that what is happening constitutes genocide. There is controversy on this notion of genocide in Darfur and one could support the position of the then President Olusegun Obasanjo of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, who noted, there is little doubt that, despite the hair-splitting of the proper description of the unfolding tragedy, there is a developing genocide in Darfur.xxvii

Yet although the U.S. has contributed diplomatically and financially to the peace process in Sudan, it has not implemented a comprehensive strategy to protect the people of Darfur from the ongoing crise.

The Action Africa report concludes that despite some key differences in the domestic and international dynamics today compared to twelve years ago during the Rwandan genocide, the U.S. response on Darfur reveals that important lessons remain unlearned. The U.S. is the most powerful country in the world, with an unmatched capacity to respond to crises and to mobilize a broader international response. If the U.S. were to do everything it could to stop genocide, it is certain that it would succeed in doing so. However, in the realm of U.S. foreign policy priorities, Africa is most often absent or marginalised, and the human cost of this myopia is most clear in the death toll of these two genocides.xxviii

In Rwanda in 1994, the Clinton Administration was more focused on the crisis in the former Yugoslavia, and was still reeling from the disastrous intervention in Somalia the previous year. In Darfur at present, the U.S. is focused more on the crisis in the Middle East, on the war in Iraq and on the so-called “War on Terrorism”, which are estimated to be more pressing policy priorities than genocide in Africa.xxix It is hard to imagine another part of the world where killings would be left to continue, and where the loss of hundreds of thousands of lives would be tolerated.

To sum up, one could say that the failure of the international community to intervene in the 1994 Rwandan genocide provided many lessons for the AU’s current mission in Sudan. The AU’s intervention in Darfur has revealed the limitations in the current peace and security structures both at its headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia and on the ground. While the AU’s deployment of a force in the region demonstrates a strong commitment to the protection of citizens across borders, logistical problems as well as the lack of political will to challenge the government in Khartoum make the situation stark. This highlights the need to strengthen continental capacity in such scenarios and call for the international community to intervene effectively in conflict situations in Africa.xxx

V. Lessons from the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in garnering the political will to protect civilians

Created primarily to forge regional economic partnerships, RECs have, over time, embraced peace and security mandates and developed mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution These mechanisms form part of the overall security architecture of the AU, and are tasked with adapting continental visions and policies to their regions, and providing guidelines for implementation of various activities by national governments. Africa’s sub-regional organisations such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), are often touted as the pillars of development, yet real development and stability remain elusive.

Increasingly, both the UN and the AU are looking to regional organisations as the initial respondents in preventing, managing and resolving conflicts occurring in their backyards. Among the comparative advantages of regional organisations is their ability to intervene in situations where there are political constraints to UN action; their speed of response; flexibility or improvisation; and their familiarity with issues on the ground.

Examples of African regional intervention include IGAD has been central in the negotiations that sought settlement of two of the most delicate peace agreements on the continent, namely the Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM, and the agreement that led to the formation of the Somali Transitional Federal Government in Kenya, both in 2005. Meanwhile, ECOWAS has been involved in numerous complex peacekeeping missions, such as the ECOMIL operation in Liberia in 2003. The collaboration with the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) helped to restore peace in Liberia and protect civilians. This is a model of cooperation that could usefully be applied to other situations

Yet in other circumstances where forced intervention has occurred, results have been mixed. The capacity of African regional organisations to conduct peacekeeping missions is substantially affected by the political and social environment of the region. For instance, the weakness of ECCAS is reflective of the instability in the Central African region and the lack of a strong state that can chaperone the peace and security agenda. SADC’s ability to act in concert is hampered by distrust and lack of a common normative framework for dealing with security issues in Southern Africa. And in the Horn of Africa, IGAD is a cautious and frequently paralysed regional organisation.

If the RECs are to play their role as the building blocks for the AU Peace and Security architecture, their capacity must be developed and sustained. Increased training opportunities are necessary to meet the enormous demand for peacebuilding that is being placed on these organisations. There is also a need for stronger ties and better information-sharing between the AU, UN and RECs in addition to enhanced co–operation between RECs themselves.

However, one should not draw the conclusion that such responsibilities can henceforth be delegated solely to regional organisations, either in Africa or elsewhere. Regional organisations can face political, structural, financial or planning limitations. At times the impartiality or neutrality of their member states might not be assured, for a variety of historical, political or economic reasons. Furthermore, the AU and the RECs can only be as efficient and effective as the states that comprise them. Therefore, the political will for intervention must first be generated in states themselves.

VI. Challenges for Responsibility to Protect in Africa

6.1. States ‘interests’ as barrier for intervention in Africa

One might conclude from the evidence above that states prefer not to intervene unless there are compelling reasons for doing so. Experience shows that states will not usually intervene against allies, friendly governments, major powers, or states within major powers’ immediate sphere of influence, however badly their governments may behave. The situation in Darfur is illustrative of this fact. Aaron Tesfaye notes that Sudan has so far rejected the UN resolution authorising the replacement of the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) by a stronger UN force. Pointing out that Khartoum has been able to block this development because it has powerful allies on the UN Security Council, namely China and Russia.xxxi There are economic and political reasons behind Russian and Chinese support of Sudanese sovereignty. Russia is a major arms supplier for Sudan and therefore lacks incentive to assist in resolving the Darfur crisis.xxxii Meanwhile, China’s demand for natural resources and extensive investment in Sudan’s oil industry has prevented it from taking a firmer stance on the conflict.

It seems that the unwillingness of states to intervene on other states’ territories is connected to governments’ political uncertainty about actions that do not directly serve their national interests.xxxiii This reluctance is all the greater when the crisis is taking place in an area that is geographically remote or of little interest to the media. Conversely, it seems that the closer the crisis is to home, the greater the pressure to intervene. This was a key reason for NATO's involvement in Kosovo. The effects of such crises are clearly visible and may, moreover, undermine regional security. Such considerations almost inevitably result in a selectiveness which in itself is difficult to reconcile with the collective responsibility to protect endangered civilians.

6.2. The question of State sovereignty

Like President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, many Africans believe that the principles of “responsibility to protect” and “use of force” pose potential threats to the sovereign independence and security of less powerful African states. This is regrettable in a period where the entire community is looking for ways to prevent further human rights abuses in Africa. Pillay suggests that “the protection of human rights of all people is unquestionable, but there has to be a clearer, more sensitive and careful articulation of a collective responsibility to protect. Unless this principle is open to debate and negotiation, African and other developing states, will likely perceive the idea of collective security as an instrument of coercion and intervention, rather than of global co-operation".xxxiv

The deteriorating situation in Darfur demonstrates how urgent it is for African leaders and communities to resolve this debate over semantics and to reach a consensus on when a

defence of 'state sovereignty' is patently unacceptable. From the outset, the AU’s involvement in Darfur was conditional upon receiving consent from Khartoum. Surely this is not the “last resort” type of intervention that is envisioned in the ICISS report and the AU’s Constitutive Act.xxxv How can intervention be subject to the consent of a state which is incapable of protecting its own citizens, or is committing human rights abuses itself? This example of conditional intervention is illustrative of the lack of political will to implement the Responsibility to Protect principles.

The situation in Zimbabwe is another case of a state oppressing its own people but hiding behind the shield of sovereignty. According to the ICISS report, sovereignty is responsibility. This implies that the primary duty of the state is to ensure the well-being and safety of all people under its jurisdiction.xxxvi This includes taking into account their actions towards their own citizens and towards the rest of the world. These responsibilities are clearly not being fulfilled in countries such as Sudan and Zimbabwe.

VII. The way forward

Despite the collective shame and regret expressed over the genocide in Rwanda, gross violations of human rights, and mass killings continue. It is a failure of governments, international organisations and the UN Security Council to generate the necessary political will to protect the world’s citizens.

In Africa, the development of law, norms and political mechanisms to allow collective intervention in crisis situations is of little more than academic value if it is not accompanied by a strengthening of the practical means of carrying out such interventions. In certain cases, this ‘capacity gap’ is one of the most significant challenge facing the implementation of the “responsibility to protect” in Africa. That is true as there is a link between the political will to intervene and capacity to deploy. It is notable that having a more robust, at-the-ready capacity to intervene would affect the political equation by removing the lack-of-capacity obstacle and excuse, thereby unambiguously testing political will: whether member states would still say “no” in the face of a humanitarian disaster.

The AU should, in the name of non-indifference, make efficient use of its Peace and Security Council (PSC) to interfere in the internal affairs of member states in the event of an imminent threat to peace, security and stability. As Musifiky Mwanasali has observed, the AU’s 15-member PSC is legally empowered to implement the “responsibility to protect” in Africa. The Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Unionxxxvii confers to the PSC with “the authority to use its discretion to intervene” or “entry into” and “take appropriate action to address potential or actual conflict situations”.xxxviii This is an unambiguous legal framework with which to operationalise the “responsibility to protect” in Africa. Yet in both Rwanda and Darfur several African states were willing to deploy men and material, but most lacked the military capability to be fully

effective and the financial and logistical wherewithal to sustain their forces for the long term. To strengthen African states engaged in humanitarian interventions, more thought must be given to the challenge of developing regional capacities to act.

VIII. Conclusion

On a continent where gross human rights abuses and violence are rampant, it is more critical than ever to protect civilians. African conflicts not only kill more civilians than soldiers but also deliberately target civilians and use children as combatants. With sufficient political will - on the part of Africa and on the part of the international community – to protect civilians in Africa can be enhanced. Governments must not wait to act until images of death and destruction are shown on TV screens. With political will, rhetoric can be transformed into reality. Without it, not even the noblest sentiments will have a chance of success. Political will is also needed from the international community. Whenever the international community is committed to making a difference, it has proved that significant and rapid transformation can be achieved. Yet significant progress will require sustained international attention at the highest political levels over a period of years.

The responses to protect civilians would immensely benefit from Vaclev Havel’s sagacious words, “we live in a new world, in which all of us must begin to bear responsibility for everything that occurs.”xxxix This means that civilian protection is not just a responsibility of the government, armed forces, and other security apparatus but rather a collective and shared responsibility of the state, civil society groups and the international community. Besides a strong commitment, effective protection of civilian requires resources. Over time, civilian protection must not only become a norm but also a practice. Its success as a norm will rightly be judged on whether it has reduced the vulnerability of civilian populations to armed conflict, and on the extent to which human rights and humanitarian obligations are observed and enforced. Successful implementation of protection strategies requires the development of a comprehensive and holistic approach to security combined with the necessary political will.

i Expressed in the United Nation Resolution A/60/L.1 referred to as the 2005 World Summit Document (or, simply, the Outcome Document)

ii African Union (2002), Consitutive Act of the African Union, Article 4(h)

iii 2005 World Summit Excerpts on Responsibility to Protect, at : www.reformtheun.org

iv Idem

v Cases where states lack the political will to intervene such as in Rwanda

vi Cases where the Security Council is deadlocked in the face of a humanitarian crises: Kosovo

vii International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty, The Responsibility to Protect, Ottawa, Canada: IDRC, 2001, para. 4.13.

viii Report of the Secretary-General’s High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More Secure World: Our shared Responsibility, New York: United Nations, 2004.

ix The Economist, ‘The United Nations – Can its creditability be repaired?’, 8 September 2005.

x United Nations, ‘Declaration of World Summit’, New York: United Nations, 2005, para 138.

xi African Union, The Common African Position on the Proposed Reform of the United Nations: The Ezulwini Consensus, Seventh Extraordinary Session of the Executive Council, Ext/EC.CL/2 (VII), Addis Ababa: African Union, 7 and 8 March 2005, p.6

xii See Ben Kioko, “ The right of intervention under the African Union’s Constitutive Act: From non-interference to non-intervention” in International Review of the Red Cross (IRRC), December 2003, Vol. 85 No 852, p. 810

xiii Rachel Murray, Human Rights in Africa: From the OAU to the African Union, (Cambridge University Press, 2004).

xiv Article 4 d of the AU Constitutive Act

xv Articles 4 j and 4 h of the AU Constitutive Act

xvi Article 4 m of the AU Constitutive Act

xvii See Musifiky Mwanasali, “The AU and the Responsibility to Protect”, paper presented at the Centre for Conflict Resolution (CCR) policy seminar, Building an African Union (AU) for the 21st Century: Relations with Regional Economic Communities (RECs), the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) and Civil Society, Cape Town, South Africa, 20-22 August 2005.

xviii The Ezulwini Consensus, p.6

xix See Mugwanya,G. “Introduction to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)” in Heyns, Ch. (ed) 1 Human Rights Law in Africa (2004) Leiden: Nijhoff 60; See also: PBS, Frontline, “The Triumph of Evil: 100 Days of Slaughter”

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/etc/slaughter.html

xx A report from the International Rescue Committee found that 3.5 million people had died in the DRC since 1998 from direct and direct violence, making this the most deadly war in the world in terms of a civilian death toll since the World War II. See International Rescue Committee “Mortality in the DRC: Results from a Nationwide Survey”, April 2003. See also Joseph Yav Katshung, “Prosecution of Grave Violations of Human Rights in Light of Challenges of National Courts and the International Criminal Court: The Congolese Dilemma” in Human Rights Review (Transaction Periodicals Consortium, Rutgers, the State University of new Jersey), Volume 7, Number 3, April-June 2006, p. 6

xxi Although, the Africa Action report estimates that some 500,000 lives have already been lost in Darfur. See, Ann-Louise Colgan: "A Tale of Two Genocides: The FailedU.S. Response to Rwanda and Darfur", Africa Action Report release on 9 September 2006, available for download at http://www.africaaction.org/

xxii Stephen Baranyi and David Mepham, Report from a high-level symposium on “Enhancing Capacities to Protect Civilians and Build Sustainable Peace in Africa”, Addis Ababa, 16 March 2006, p.10

xxiii The norms underpinning the AU’s emerging peace and security agenda draw on elements of a protection framework as articulated in the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) document The Responsibility to Protect. The AU, like The Responsibility to Protect, clearly lays out provisions for intervention in the internal affairs of a member state through military force, if necessary, to protect vulnerable populations from egregious human rights abuses… See, Kristiana Powell, The African Union’s Emerging Peace and Security Regime: Opportunities and Challenges for Delivering on the Responsibility to Protect, ISS Monograph series, Number 119, May 2005, p.1

xxiv Quoted in Business Day (Johannesburg), 25 February 2005.

xxv See “Annan decries lack of political will on Darfur”, Sudan Tribune, 01 July 2006.

xxvi Ann-Louise Colgan: "A Tale of Two Genocides: The FailedU.S. Response to Rwanda and Darfur", Africa Action Report release on 9 September 2006, available for download at http://www.africaaction.org/

xxvii Agence France Presse (AFP), Nigeria's president says 'genocide' developing in Darfur, at: www.afp/20061010/wl_afp/sudandarfurnigeria (Accessed on 10 October 2007)

xxviii Ann-Louise Colgan, op .cit . p. 9

xxix Ibid. p. 9

xxx Adebajo, A. & Scanlon, H (eds.): A Dialogue of the Deaf: Essays on Africa and the United Nations (Fanele, South Africa, 2006, p. 278)

xxxi Eric Reeves, "China in Sudan: Underwriting Genocide" Testimony by Eric Reeves before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission: "China's Role in the World: Is China a Responsible Stakeholder?" Aug 3, 2006

xxxii See Amnesty International, "Sudan: Arming the Perpetrators of Grave Abuses in Darfur," Nov. 16, 2004.

xxxiii

Freedman, L., ‘The Changing Forms of Military Conflict’, in: Survival, Vol. 40, No. 4 (Winter 1998-1999), p. 41

xxxiv See, Vaneshri Pillay, Reflections on the UN Secretary-General’s Reform Report and its Implications for Africa’s Peace & Security Agenda (PDF Document)

xxxv See, Kristiana Powell, The African Union’s Emerging Peace and Security Regime: Opportunities and Challenges for Delivering on the Responsibility to Protect, ISS Monograph series, Number 119, May, 2005, p.4

xxxvi ICISS report, op.cit. p. 12-13

xxxvii AU Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union, 1st Ordinary Session of the Assembly of Heads of State, Durban, South Africa, 9 July 2002.

xxxviii Musifiky Mwanasali, “The AU and the Responsibility to Protect”, op.cit.

xxxix Memorable Quotes and quotations from Vaclev Havel, at http://www.memorable-quotes.com/vaclev+havel,a2181.html (Accessed on 15 August 2007)

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