Politics, Primordialism and Orientalism -Arisotle and the Myth of the Gemeinschaft -Patricia Springborg

7/27/2019 Politics, Primordialism and Orientalism -Arisotle and the Myth of the Gemeinschaft -Patricia Springborg

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Politics, Primordialism, and Orientalism: Marx, Aristotle, and the Myth of the Gemeinschaft

Author(s): Patricia SpringborgReviewed work(s):Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 80, No. 1 (Mar., 1986), pp. 185-211Published by: American Political Science AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1957090 .

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POLITICS,PRIMORDIALISM,ANDORIENTALISM:MARX,ARISTOTLE,AND THEMYTHOF THEGEMEINSCHAFT

PATRICIA SPRINGBORGUniversityof Sydney

Iineteenth-century evolutionaryhistorical chemas ormulatedin Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft,r status to contractterms,which underpin heoriesofmodernization nddevelopment nthecontemporaryocialsciences,arenow called ntoseriousquestion.Recent archaeologicaldiscoveriesshow ancientsociety to have beenpreeminently ontractual;and anthropological tudiesof family, clan, and triberevealthemto be morethanprimordial elics n modernizingystems.A carefulreadingof theancient writers-particularly Aristotle, who was read as lending support to theGemeinschaft-Gesellschaftistinction-yields a very differentpicture,as Marxin factappreciated.Family,clan, tribe, patron-client,friendship,and otheraffinalsets wereconstitutiveof theancientsociety of thepolis, and haveshown extraordinary urabilityin the modern politicalsociety of the Mediterranean asin. In the small-scale,urban,entrepreneurial,and commercialsociety of the Mediterraneanpolis, ancient andmodern,which was characterizedby a high degreeof face-to-faceinteraction,peoplelearnedparticipationn theplethoraof little-incorporatedocieties-familial, religious,cultic,and recreational.

uchof Westernthinking about politics from the earlynineteenthcenturyon hasbeenconductedin termsof a basic three-phase chemati-zationthatmeetswithwide generalagree-ment. The evolution of Western socialformsand institutions s seen as a transi-tion from (1) initiallyprimordial ociety,characterized y ruleof family, clan, andtribe, to (2) political society, markedbyemergenceof the city-state, and then to(3) advanced industrial society basedupon the modernnation-state.On reflec-

tion, one notesa quitegeneralacceptanceof this schemafrom the inceptionof themodern social sciences in the nineteenthcentury, and virtuallyacross theirentirerange. The work of nineteenth-centuryanthropologists in uncovering hithertoundiscovered ribaland primordial ocie-ties in Africa and Melanesiaencouragedthem to draw the lines more firmlybetweenthe politicaland the primordial,and vast numbers of social scientistshave since become interested in pro-moting strategies of "development" oAMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCEREVIEW

VOL. 80 NO. 1 MARCH, 1986


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AmericanPoliticalScience ReviewVol. 80assist "underdeveloped"societies thatfall within the Westernsphereof influence in order to make the move tomodernization.sThe canon for theoriesof moderniza-tion was set, as we know, by MaxWeber'saccountof the rationalizationofauthority, the differentiationof bureau-craticstructuresand institutions,and themobilizationof resources hat definethisprocess.Weber,followingMarx, gave thedistinction between homo politicos andhomo oeconomicusdefinitionin a bodyof theorythat accountsfor the transitionfrom the secondto the thirdstagesof theschema, or from political to modemindustrial society.2 But the theories ofMarx and Weber,like those of theirlongline of predecessorswho reflectedon theorigins of civil society (Hobbes, Locke,Rousseau,AdamSmith,AdamFerguson,and others) were predicatedon certaincommonassumptions boutthe transitionfrom primordialto political society, orabout the transitionbetweenthe firsttwophases of our schema. This transitionreceived considerablerefinementin thehandsof nineteenth-centuryhinkerswithwhom Weber was more directly associ-ated: Lewis Henry Morgan, who in hisAncient Society (1877)characterized hetransition as a shift from societas tocivitas;HenrySumnerMaine,who in TheAncient Law (1861)characterizedt as ashiftfrom statusto contract;andWeber'sassociate in the Vereinfar Sozialpolitik,FerdinandTdnnies, who characterizedtas a shift from Gemeinschaft o Gesell-schaft, in the book of that title (1955).There is, however, much confusionamong these thinkersabout what transi-tion they are in fact explaining.Are theyreally describing the shift from pre-political to political society, or are theydescribing,rather, the emergenceof themodem industrialstate that has claimed(mistakenly,as I shalltry to show) exclu-sive rightsto the mantleof politics in itsclassical form? This perpetual ambiva-lence is obvious in Tonnies' distinctionbetweencommunityandassociation,andit is even evident n Marx.Marx,Thnnies,

and also Morgan, see the community,Gemeinschaft, s the idealform,of whichthe characteristicallymodern form ofassociation, Gesellschaft-exemplifiedbybourgeois,and subsequentlymass, indus-trial society-is a corruption. However,they do not see primordial ociety, wherepropertywas held in common among thetribal orders, to have been the perfectform of community. It is rather theancient commune of the polis, alreadyadmitting private property, patronage,and class politics, that they consider tohave been the most perfect communalform of the past, from which modemmass society has deviated.The matter is furtherconfusedby thefact that the studyof ancienthistoryitselffell under the shadow of Maine, Morgan,and their followers(fromwhich it is onlybeginningto emerge)so that there wereconscious-and less conscious-attemptsto force the transitionfrom Homeric topolis society into the status-to-contractmold. Other scholars saw in the tribalinstitutionsof classicalGreece and Romeevidence of primordialism eventuallysloughed off as the political stateconsolidated.3Developmentsin recent decades haveconspired to cast doubt on the tripartitehistorical schema of primordial topoliticalto modem industrial ociety.Notleastamongthese have beenthedramaticarchaeological inds of the past century,which have turnedup whole librariesofpublicandprivatedocumentsandliteraryand religiousworks that give a detailedaccount of daily life in ancient societiesfor which, a hundredyears ago, our onlysources were Herodotus, second-handreportsof otherclassicalwriters, and theOld Testament.4A secondfactorsuggestinga reapprai-sal of the conventional macrohistoricalschema is the recent analysis of tribalsociety, particularlyn the Mediterraneanbasin, suggesting that a dichotomybetweentribal/primordialomparedwithpolitical (i.e., polis-based) society isunfounded. Indeed, in the case ofMediterranean nd Near Eastern ocieties

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1986 Politics, Primordialism,and Orientalismone can arguethe oppositecase: that forthemostpartthere s in factan identifica-tion between tribal and political societythat demonstrates a continuity fromancient Greek and Semitic culturesthrough classicalRome and the modemMiddle East. This does not rule out thepossibilitythat a distinction s warrantedbetween the primitivetribalsocietiesof,for instance, Africa and Melanesia,andthe "political"(polis-based)societies ofthe Mediterraneanand Near East, butsuggests, rather, that tribalism s itself aheterogeneous phenomenon, and thatperhaps the more apt distinction isbetween urban/centralized and rural/nomadicdecentralizedocieties.A thirdfactor suggestingthe inappro-priateness of the tripartite historicalschema is recent work by comparativeanthropologists, sociologists, andpolitical scientists. Their efforts encom-pass networksystems, familism,patron-client relations, and other affective,affinal, and traditionalsocial structuresand systemsof power which exist along-sidemodem "rational"nstitutions,or forwhich in many cases apparentlyrationalbureaucratic structures are surrogates.The persistence f familialandtraditionalassociational groups-or their modernsubstitutes n the form of tribaland kin-ship networks, spiritualgodparents,andthe peculiarrole of religiousand sportingclubs and professional syndicates inGreece,Italy, and the MiddleEast-war-rants seriousconsiderationas more thanprimordialrelicsin modernizing ystems.The tripartite volutionaryschema hatspells out the transitionfrom primordialsocietyto theclassicalpolis, andfromthecity-state o themodemindustrialnation-state as the cursus honorum of socialdevelopment,was first called into ques-tion seriouslyby Weber. He rejectedastactfully as possible the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaftdistinction of his associateFerdinandTonnies,althoughhe acceptedMaine'sconceptof a shift from status tocontract.Generallyspeaking,Weberwasdisinclined to accept evolutionary his-

torical schematizations,which put dis-tancebetweenhimandMarx-who was aconvincedevolutionisteven to the pointof embracing he theoriesof CharlesDar-win as an historicalmodel. But Weber'srejectionof evolutionarymodels, partlydue to a certainethnocentrismhatposeda cultural blinder, was not radicalenough. He still tendedto see the signifi-cant landmarksbetween differentformsof society as watersheds n the historyofGermanicculture-witness the emphasison the Burgertum s the vehicleof transi-tion from traditionalto modem society(Weber,1958).A moreradicalrevisionof the conven-tionalhistorical chema,andthe one pro-posed here, would see the differencesbetween the societies of homo politicosand homo oeconomicus, that is to say,between"traditional"nd modem indus-trial society, not as chronological ordevelopmental,but as primarilyregionaldifferences.Thesocietiesof Greece,Italy,and the Near East have been politicalfromtimeimmemorial,by whichismeantthey are urban, polis-based,and charac-terizedby tribal,family, cultic, religious,andoccupationalnstitutionsas networksof politicalpower.Thepoliteia,orrepub-lic, is thus a more or less successfulaggregateof thelittlesocietiesthatconsti-tute it whichenjoya life of theirown anda fair degreeof autonomy.Evidence hatwe now have for the ancient city fromsecondmilleniumBabyloniansites of theperiodof the HammurabiCodepoints toa composite entity within which tribalgroupings,the courtandits bureaucracy,and therentierclassof urbannotables-a"closely intermarryingpool of judges,merchantsand scribes" Adams,1969, p.189)-had theirseparate ocales. Foreigntraderswerelocatedoutsidethecityat theharbour, and enjoyed an "autarchiceconomic"climate(Oppenheim,1969, p.6) now considered ypicalof NearEasternsociety. Documentary evidence, in theform of innumerableprivate contractswitnessedby city and royal officials, aswell as by priests,professionalmen, and

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American Political Science Review Vol. 80other citizens of high standing listedaccordingto rank, suggestsa fair degreeof autonomy for the city as a corporateentity, such that it couldbuy and sell realestate, decide legal cases, petition thecourt, and be held accountable for itsactions. Otherfeaturesreminiscentof theclassicalpolis of antiquityand its legacyin the Islamiccities of the Mediterraneanregion are the election of eponymousofficialsfor a one-yearterm,allowingtherotation of officeamong a smallgroupofisonomouspeers;thecooption of wealthycitizens to privately underwrite costlypublicfunctions reminiscent f the Greekliturgy n latertimes);and thecommercialdevelopment of agricultureby a slave-owning rentierclass, with control of thehinterland from the city (Oppenheim,1969, pp. 9-15). These are, indeed, theoldest urban, entrepreneurial, nd com-mercial societies for which we haverecords, and their social structure hasshown a surprisingdurabilityover somefive millennia.Thus we may fairly char-acterize them as the habitat of homopolitics.By contrast, Northern Europe, as itemerged from the decentralized ruralcommunitiesof the Germanicand Celtictribes,constitutes,alongwith its colonialempires,the locus of homo oeconomicus.Characterized by a separation fromearliest times of military, political, andeconomic functions, this was a form ofsociety which gave no real experienceofpolitical power to the majority of thepopulation.Weber, in his comparisonofMediterraneanand oriental cities withthose of medieval Europe, pointed outthat whereas the former enjoyed rela-tively autonomous existences as fort-resses, marketcenters, and viable socialcommunities, hemedievalcities of north-ernEurope ackedautonomy, or enjoyedwhat autonomy they had as a dispensa-tion of nobles with a monopoly ofcoercive force who lived in the country-side (Weber,1968,vol. 3, ch. 16). Only inthe relatively densely populated, heter-ogeneous, and contiguouscommunity of

the city was competition or power possi-ble, in whichfamily andtribalstructures,cultic, recreational, and occupationalforms of association played such animportant role. In their typical form asscattered and isolated household units,the familial structuresof the Germanicand Celtic tribes were unserviceable aspolitical vehicles. The cities of medievalNorthernEuropearosenot as poleis, butas extensions of the essentially feudalsociety out of which they emerged, inwhich the only public person was theking. The revival of RomanLaw in theCeltic and Germanic cities saw, para-doxicallyenough, the transfer o thekingof the ancient rights of corporateimmunity, rights to property, etc. onceenjoyed by the cultic collegia, the uni-versitates, and other forms of popularsociety. This process reached its apogeewith Englishtheories of sovereignty, inwhich the Kingis definedas a "corpora-tion sole," enjoyinga publicright to sueand be suedwhile possessingprivateandpersonal mmunityunder the principalof"the king can do no wrong" (whichremains the basis of municipal mmunityin the tort systems of English andAmericancommon law). Medieval andearly modern theories of sovereignty,which laid the basis for the absolutemonarchiesof northernEurope,typicallyappliedRoman aw-specifically corpora-tion theory, which had been initiallydeveloped to define the rights of subor-dinategroupsvis-a-vistheimperialpower-in this manner.5Thegreatmystery thathaspreoccupiedmacrohistorians ince Marx, and Weberin particular-why capitalism, charac-terizedby homo oeconomicus,developedin theWestand not in theEast, despite heabilityof the ancient monetarizedecono-mies of Sumeria, Babylon, PharaonicEgypt,and theGreekand RomanEmpiresto develop wealth on a largescale-maybe explainednegatively in the followingway. The rise of capitalismin the Westmay be attributedto a number of inter-related factors: the general absence of

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1986 Politics, Primordialism,and Orientalismindigenouspolitical structures apableofobstructingor competingfor the righttoeconomic accumulationon the part of afew; the role of the monarchies n grant-ing royal patents and commercial onces-sions, as well as land, on graceand favourterms; he complete ack of the experienceof political power on the part of themajority, who merely shifted status fromindentured erf to that of wage-labourer;and the absence of indigenous familial,tribal, cultic, and occupationalclubswithrelative autonomy which-in the urban,entrepreneurial, nd political societies ofthe Mediterranean and Orient-haveenjoyed intermittently he experienceofpower for millennia.Not least among the factors differen-tiatingthe society of homopoliticosfromthat of homo oeconomicus o thatcapital-ism as we know it was peculiar o the lat-ter, werethereligiousprohibitionsagainstthe lending of capital at interest(specifically among coreligionists, butalso more generally) perpetuatedfromtheir pagan predecessors by Judaism,Christianity,and Islam. Indicativeof theaspirations of the autocephalous com-munitiesof ancientand orientalcities topreserve their time-honoureddemocraticand fraternal spirit against large-scalemonopolists,theseprohibitionsed to theperpetuationof ancientforms of associa-tion for businesspurposes.The economicimperativewithin a citizenrydominatedby merchantsto keep one's capital cir-culatingat all times while spreadingtherisk as widely as possible (Goitein,1967-1983, vol. 1, pp. 154-5, 203, 263) waspursued through the instrumentalityofpartnershipsof various kinds, and thecommenda,or limitedjoint venture.Forthese purposes, friendshipbecame for-malizedas an associationof trust hatper-mitted economic diversificationbeyondthe traditionaleconomicunits of family,clan, and religiousconfession.Indeed,asthe superb collection of medieval docu-ments, sacred, secular, and communal,for the Jewishcommunitiesof the Islamicworld serves to demonstrate, "friend-

ships," as the foundation of economicactivity, and partnershipswere as com-mon between confessional communitiesas within them.Partnerships happily accommodatedthe mutualinterestsof the investor,whosupplied capital to the venture inexchange for labour, and the non-propertiedpartner, who participatedasan equal, thereby avoiding the dreadedemployer-employee relation too easilymistaken or thatof masterandslave(andthese wereall slave societies). Among theplethoraof forms of contractualassocia-tion, partnershipsin the form of themutual loan (capital and labour), thecommenda, as the Europeancounterpartof this Islamic form of partnership ameto be known (much discussed by MaxWeber as of economicsignificance n thedevelopment of the Italian city states),weremostnicelytailored o the needs of asociety of urban notableswho must dis-tance themselvesfrom "work"and treadthe finelinebetween nvestmentof wealthand profits from capital (Weber, 1968,vol. 3, chap. 16, pp. 1216, 1294-95).An economybased on networksof vol-untarycooperationexpressed n partner-ships, commendas, and family trusts,fitted the exigencies of social systemswhere economic enterprisewas not con-sidered the normal businessof the state,and where economic intervention waslimited to sporadic revenue raising anddirectbuying(Goitein,1967-1983,vol. 1,pp. 66, 266-72). Thelegaland contractualform that these partnershipstook fol-lowed widerpatternsof contractualrela-tions in entrepreneurial ommunitiesinwhich "freedomof contract"was sacro-sanct, and where all contracts,includingmarriage, were individually tailoreddocuments rather than ritualistic sym-bols. For instance, marriage contractswould enumerate he materialgoods andchattels brought to the arrangement,aswell as theexpectationsand desiresof thefuture partners(some includingstipula-tions that the husband not remove hiswife to the provinceswithout herexpress189


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American Political Science Review Vol. 80

permission (Goitein, 1969, pp. 83-84])and provisions for divorce and demise,inheritance, he rightsof the wife in thecase of subsequentmarriages,etc. In thesameway commercialpartnershipspeci-fiedin detailthenumberandstatusof thepartners o the contract; he objectsof thecontract(partnerswerenot above statingas an express aim the desire to benefitfromthegreaterprestigeof one'sassociate[Goitein, 1967-1983, vol. 1, p. 174]); thenatureandextentof the contribution hateach -partner made (capital, goods,labour,premises,etc.); thepartners'harein profitand loss and conditionsgovern-ing expenditureand disbursement; on-flict of interestand whether or not thepartners ouldenterotherventures n thesamefield;thedurationof thepartnership-normally for a yearunlessrenewed; heaccountingperiod, and so on (Goitein,1967-1983, vol. 1, pp. 171-2).Although apparently individualisticandpotentiallyunstable, hese ndividual-ly contractedarrangementsworked wellin the relativelysmall-scale ociety of thecity, wherethe referencegroupwas finiteand members nteractedpersonally.Theindividual reedomthusaffordedand thescope for individual enterprise, longmasked by stereotypes of "orientaldespotism" and "underdevelopment"have only recently been publicized(Goitein, 1967-1983, vols. 1, 2, 3;Goitein, 1969; Lapidus, 1967, 1969;Lewis, 1937; Morony, 1984). As PaulVeyne (1976) has demonstratedin hissuperbwork on the ancienteconomy, ahigh level of regionalautonomywas notinconsistentwitha strong mperialpower,for the ancient and oriental imperiumscontrolled their subjects at a distance,through the agency of the tax farmer,police, andthe smattering f bureaucraticofficials,who wereusually,if not always,contentto allow indigenouscommunitiesto conducttheirbusiness npeace,so longas theypaidtheirtaxesanddidtheirmili-taryservice.An indicationof the low pro-file maintainedby the imperialpower isthe relativeabsenceof governmentbuild-

ings (Goitein, 1969, p. 90). Apart fromthe Mint and the Exchange, the policestation,theprison,andthevariousofficeswhich dispensed icensesfor certainpur-poses, most of the public buildingsandthevolumeof activitythey represented-sugar factories, flour mills, oil presses,abattoirs, granaries,bourses, shops andbath-houses-belonged to the municipal-ity, not the government. An equallyimpressive angeof publicbuildingswerethe preserveof confessionalcommunitieswithin the city: synagogues, churches,andmosques,as wellas schools,conventsand monasteries,universities, aw courts,and hospices.In fact, landholdingby thereligious communities as corporatebodies,through he"community hest"orin the form of benefices and waqfs,rivalled the individual and corporateholdings of the big merchants andnotables.The funding and administration ofthese communalorganizations s a storyin itself (see Veyne, 1976;Goitein,1967-1983, vol. 2; Morony, 1984), bestsummedup in theconceptof 6vergetisme,a neologism derivedby Frenchscholarsfrom the termused in Greekinscriptionsto honour those notables who throughtheir wealth and good works benefitedtheircity (evergetein en polin), and cor-respondingto the Latin term used byCicero, beneficia,ratherunsatisfactorilytranslated into English as "services."Briefly, kvergetisme accounts for thesystem of liturgiesprevalentthroughoutthe ancientand orientalworlds (andstillpresent in the Islamic in the form ofwaqfs), wherebya floatingclass of nota-bles, the political and economic elite ofmunicipalities and their subgroups,undertookto fund public services,bene-fits, buildings,etc., at theirown expensein exchange or publichonours,prestige,and the rightto rule.

The relative economic and politicalautonomythat such a systemyieldedformunicipalitiesunderthe various empiresof the ancient Near East-Hellenistic,Roman, Byzantine,Umayyad, Abbasid,190


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1986 Politics, Primordialism,and OrientalismFatimid, Mamluk, and Ottoman-hasbeen nicely describedby Veyne in hisaccount of conditions under the RomanEmpire:

Independent r simplyautonomousn relation othe centralpower, the city was the ultimateframe of referencefor social life just as theEmpirewas the ultimate rameworkof politicallife. For t was thecenter ordecisionsn mattersconcerning veryday ife, the reference oint forsocial distance,comparisonsbeing made fromcity to city. It was in the city that thekvergbtesshone by theirmunificence;t was theircity thatthey wished to dazzleat the expenseof neigh-bouring cities, raisingin it the most beautifulmonuments"adaemulationem lteriuscivitatis"as [Justinian's]igestputit [50,10, 31.Socially,psychologically, nd,not least,administratively,the city was self-sufficient:t was autarchic nAristotle'ssense, When a Romanor a Greek,subjectsof the RomanEmperor,spoke of his"country"his word, patria,designatedhis city,never the Empire.Therewas no suchthingas aRomanbourgeoisie,buta Pompeian,Athenian,or Ephesian ourgeoisie.Theartisans nlisted nthe professionalassociationswere not membersof an internationalor a syndicate:therewereonly local associations nd onewas a memberofthe"college"f carpenters f Lyonsor thebakersof S~tif. . . . One's country was visible to theeyes, for one was able physicallyto gather ittogethern onepublicplace(inclassicalGreeceteven happened that the whole city literallyturnedout). At thattime it was in thetown that"everyoneknew one another"as we say of thevillage.Suchwerethesesocietieswhereeveryoneknew one another,at leastby sightor by name,whereeveryonewas engagedwith the samepre-occupations-and everywhere around them,thanks to the evergetes was an air of grandarchitecture. (Veyne, 1976, pp. 107-8, mytranslation.)Such a romanticpicture of civility isnot too far from the truth in the greatoriental cities where, as they becameincreasinglyargeconurbations, heframeof reference hiftedfrom the city as suchto the neighbourhood.

Marxon the Ancientand OrientalCommunesThe nineteenth-centurymyth of theGemeinschaft rises,as I have suggested,on the one handfrom an ignoranceof thehighly contractual nature, revealed bysubsequentarchaeologicaldiscoveries,of

the ancientorientalsociety that long pre-datedGreeceand Rome(its continuationandculminationn so manyrespects),andon the other hand from a misinterpreta-tion of thenatureandfunctionof family,clan, and tribalstructuresn antiquity.Acarefulreadingof the ancient authors-Aristotle in particular-on the relationbetween the polis (city), and the oikos(family) might have raised suspicionsfrom the beginningabout the efficacyofthe distinction.Marx,for instance,was inno doubtthat thetribesof classicalGreecewere inherentlypolitical, familial formsconstituting ntegral inks in the networkof power-sharing roupsthatmadeuptheparticipatorystructureof the polis. Hecontrasted the city-state, based on thetwin principles of kinship and landedproperty,with the decentralized,apoliti-cal society of the Germanictribes that,lacking any on-going communalinstitu-tions, andspecifically hecorporate truc-turesof a city, remaineda merecollectionof isolatedhouseholds.However,the ideaof progress, a nineteenth-centurypre-occupation,stoodin theway of his admit-ting the implicationsof this insight.As itturned out, Morganlater won him overrather easily to the view that classicalantiquity was in effect a primordialsociety in which the gens (clan)was themost significantsocial form. Neverthe-less, this representsa changeof heartonthepartof Marx,whose understanding fthe politicalforms of classicalGreece,ifnot those of the Orient, showed cus-tomary perspicacity.In the Grundrisse,n whichMarxsub-mits communal forms, and especiallythose of antiquity,to theirclosest exam-ination,a theory sproducedwithstrikingparallels to Aristotle's.6Like Aristotle,Marx has no anti-urbanbias, and herefrains from glorifyingthe prepolitical,tribalsociety of the Mycenaean,or evenof theHomericage asgemeinschaftlichncomparison to the polis society of theclassicalperiod.Quiteto the contrary,heconsidersthe polis, with its rudimentaryseparation of communal and privateproperty, and the incipient duality of

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individualism ndcommunismo whichitgives rise-and which is the eventualsource of its destruction-to be theauthentic,and perhapsthe highest, formof commune among historical forms ofthepast. Indeed, t is a curiosityof Marx'sthought that the standpointfrom whichhejudgedWesternEuropeanocietyof hisday was that of the polis and its virtues.One could even dareto suggest that thephenomenonof "alienation,"which umsup that judgment,is more a product ofMarx's propensity to hold homo oeco-nomicus to account by the standardsofhomo politicos than it is a reflectionoffundamental dislocations within thecapitalistsystem.The agonisticvirtuesorwarriorexcellencesof the polis, and therough democracy of the all-male gym-nasia and political clubs which con-stituted it, were perhaps mirrored forMarxin thestrugglesbetweentherevolu-tionarypartiesand the fraternalsocialistsocietiesand syndicatesof his own politi-cal world, social forms otherwiselost intheblandand depersonalizedtructures fthe modernstate.Marxanalyzesthe communal orms ofthe pre-modernperiodinto threegroups:(1) the oriental commune, (2) the polistype, and (3) the communityof the Ger-manic tribes.He betraysa general gnor-ance of oriental society, which we nowknow to have includedcity-statesof themost highly developed type, by charac-terizing it as exclusively nomadic. Inoriental society he sees the primordialtype of spontaneous clan organizationthat he imaginesto be the archetypeforall forms of primitivesociety, and overwhichthecity-statestructuresof thepoliswere seen to represent a significantadvance. He maintains that in orientalsociety, commonality(Gemeinschaftlich-keit) is accidental, a mere function ofcommon land ownership and ethnicity.

The polis communitymarksa watershedin the evolution of communal formsbecauseof thevery factof thecoexistenceof communalandprivateproperty.7Marxspeculated hat the classicalpolis evolved

graduallyfrom the clan-dominated ribalcommune, for which he believed theoriental city was the model: an "initialnaturallyarisen spontaneouscommunity(naturwiichsigesGemeinwesen),"consti-tutedof "thefamily, the familyextendedas a clan (Stamm), or through inter-marriagebetween families, or combina-tionsof clans" Marx,1953,p. 375;1973,p. 472).Onceitbecamesettled n theformof the polis "this original community(urspriinglicheGemeinschaft)" as modi-fied by "removal of the clan from itsoriginal seat," the "occupationof alienground,"and "newconditionsof labour"which permitted the individual to"becomea privateproprietorof land andsoil-of a particularplot-whose par-ticular cultivation falls to him and hisfamily"(Marx,1953, pp. 378-9; 1973, p.475). Thus two factors distinguish thesecondtype of commune,the polis, fromthe first type, the oriental:(1) the separa-tion of communaland privateproperty nthe more highly developedform;and (2)the urbannatureof the polis as opposedto the characteristically astoralorientalcommune. "The history of classicalantiquity is the history of cities," Marxmaintains, "but of cities founded onlanded property and agriculture"1953,p. 382; 1973, p. 479).Here, of course, he was quite wrong.Far from being antithetical,all the evi-dence suggests a direct parallelbetweenthe ancientorientalcity and the classicalpolis. Babylonian and Assyrian citiesfromthe secondmilleniumB.C. werenotpastoral communities,but farmed theirfields(whetherattached o themunicipal-ity or outlying), as commercialventuresunderwritten by rentiers, either indi-vidually or in partnerships,using riskcapital, mechanization, and employingprofessional managers and slaves. Theproduce was stored in state granariesunder the supervision of municipalofficials, and the proceeds disbursedunder an elaborate accounting system,once taxes had been collected (Oppen-heim, 1969, pp. 13-15). Control of the

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1986 Politics, Primordialism,and Orientalismcountrysideby the city has continuedtobe a featureof Middle Eastern ociety, ashas the mix of publicand privateowner-ship along theselines. Goiteinpointsoutthat in the medieval period, whileorchardswereprivatelyowned,fieldsandvineyards-which wereclassedasfields-werelegallythepropertyof the stateandits officials(Goitein,1967-1983,vol. 1, p.123). Even underNasseritesocialismthesame division prevailed, the privateownershipof orchardswas often in theformof partnershipswhereblocksof treeswere apportioned according to shares,while fields were farmedas state collec-tives and worked by the fellahin.The classical commune, the secondform in Marx's series, is distinguishedfrom the commune of the Germanictribes,the third,by the samecharacteris-tics thatdistinguishedt fromthe orientalcommune:by virtueof the separationofprivateand communalpropertyand byvirtueof beinga city-factors which aremutuallyrelated. It is "with its coming-togetherin the city"that "thecommune(die Gemeinde) possesses an economicexistence as such," Marx argues: "thecity's mere presence, as such, distin-guished it from a mere multiplicityofindependenthouses."In other words"thewhole, here, consists not merely of itsparts; it is a kind of independentorganism"1953, p. 382; 1973, p. 483).It is clearthatMarxconsidersGermanictribalsocietyas suchas not properlycor-poratein theway that the city-statewas.He refers to the tribal chiefs, scatteredthrough the Germanic forests in theirpatriarchalhouseholds,andtheirperiodicassemblies as a "coming-together(Vereinigung) . . not a being-together(Verein);as a unification made up ofindependent ubjects, andedproprietors,andnot as a unity" 1953,p. 383;1973, p.483). More specifically, "the commune(dieGemeinde) hereforedoesnot exist asa state or politicalbody," as in classicalantiquity,becauseit does not "existas acity."This meansthat "for the communeto come into real existence, the free

landed proprietorshave to hold a meet-ing, whereas e.g. in Rome it exists evenapart from these assembliesin the exis-tenceof the city itselfand of the officialspresidingover it. . ." (1953,p. 383;1973,p. 483). Tribal society, like the orientalcommune,is superficiallycommunaldueto gentilitianties and familial forms inwhich the unity of the clan system "isrepresentedn a chief of the clan family,or as the relation of the patriarchs(Familienvdter) among one another"(1953, p. 377; 1973, p. 473). Only withthe polis, however, does the communepossess "aneconomic existenceas such"(1953, p. 383; 1973, p. 483). The differ-ence betweenthe classicalcommuneandthat of the Germanic ribesis for all theworld like that between polis andHomeric oikos society made up of in-dependent, self-sufficient households(oikoi):

In the worldof antiquity,thecity with its terri-tory is the economictotality;in the Germanicworld, the totality is the individualresidence,which itselfappearsas only a small dot on thelandbelonging o it, and whichis not a concen-trationof many proprietors,but the familyasindependent unit.. . . In the Germanic form, theagriculturalistis] not [a] citizenof a state;i.e.not an inhabitant f a city; [the]basis[is]rathertheisolated, ndependentamilyresidence, uar-anteedby the bondwith othersuchfamilyresi-dences of the same tribe(Stamm),and by theiroccasional coming-together (Zusammenkom-men) to pledgeeach others'allegiance n war,religion, adjudication,etc. (Marx, 1953, pp.383-4; 1973, p. 484)Marx believes that in the case of theGermanic tribes, like the oriental com-mune, initiallysocialformsof appropria-tion representedby common "language,blood," and land are not translated ntoan incorporatedcommunity: "the com-mune (die Gemeinde)exists only in theinterrelations among . . . individual

landed proprietorsas such; communalproperty dasGemeindeeigentum)s suchappears only as a communal accessory(gemeinschaftliches ubehb5r)o the indi-vidual tribalseats (Stammsitzen) nd the

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land they appropriate(Bodenaneignun-gen)"(1953, p. 384; 1973, p. 484).The significanceof landedpropertyinclassicalantiquityunderthe polis formisthat, althoughmediatedby thecommune,it can be owned privately, thus allowingindividual self-determinationwithin thebounds of communal interests. Reapingthe advantagesof a qualifiedindividual-ism and greaterdevelopmentof humanpowers and capacities through privateproperty,"thecommune(Gemeinde)-asstate [i.e. as polisi-is, on the one side,therelationof thesefreeandequalprivateproprietorsto one another, their bondagainst the outside, and is at the sametime their safeguard" Marx, 1953, pp.378-9; 1973, p. 475).Marxcharacterizesheeconomicactiv-ity of the classical commune in Aris-totelian terms: it is properly directedtoward the self-sufficiency(autarkia)ofthe communityas such, and not the pro-duction of wealth. For this reason thepolis as an affinal entity transcendingfamily, clan, and tribe, which charac-terizedorientaland Germanic ocieties,issuperior to the spontaneous primordialformsof associationthatbecomeits sub-units: "it is not cooperation in wealth-producing abourby meansof which thecommune member reproduces himself,but rathercooperation n labourfor com-munal interests (gemeinschaftlichenInteressen)(imaginaryand real) for theupholding of the association (des Ver-bandes)inwardlyand outwardly" 1953,p. 380; 1973, p. 476).Such a highly romanticizedview ofpublic-spiritednessn the polis is hardlyconsistentwith thefacts.Oneispromptedto wonder why, indeed, Marx everreferred to the classical polis-alreadyshowing the signs of the tensionbetweenprivate and communal property thatwould ultimately be the source of itsdestruction-as the most highly devel-oped form of commune in historicalexperience.Butone mighthave posed thesamequestionto Aristotle,aristocraticnhis predilections,and in many respects

still wedded to the Homericcode. Why,sincehe hopedto banretailtradeandcur-tail commerce,makingno provisionsforthe new rich to participate n power, didhe not, therefore,recommendthe oikossociety of the Homericperiod-as a col-lection of households bound by pri-mordial ties-over the polis, potentiallydivided by class and threatened byindividualismand acquisitiveness?Aristotle's response is similar toMarx's."It s manifest," he formermain-tains, "thata state is not merelythe shar-ing of a commonlocalityfor the purposeof preventingmutual njuryandexchang-ing goods." "These are necessary pre-conditions of a state's existence," henotes, but "even f all these conditionsarepresent, that does not thereforemake astate (polis)."The city is "a partnership(koinonia)of familiesandof clans" orthepurposeof "livingwell, and its object s afullandindependentautarkous)ife."Forthis to be realized,membersof the com-munity must "inhabitone and the samelocality and practice intermarriage."This, Aristotleargues, s "thereasonwhyfamilyrelationshipshave arisenthrough-out the states, and brotherhoods andclubsfor sacrificial ites andsocialrecrea-tion."The root of such forms of associa-tion is "thefeelingof friendship philia),"or love; for "friendships the motive ofsocial life," and "while the object of astate is the good life, these things aremeansto thatend."Insum:"a stateis thepartnershipof clansand villagesin a fulland independent ife, which in our viewconstitutes a happy and noble life; thepoliticalfellowship(politikonkoinonian)must thereforebe deemedto exist for thesake of noble actions, not merelyfor liv-ing in common" (Politics, 3.5.13-14.1280b30-1281a15, Loeb ed., pp.217-219).8Ironically,no descriptioncould bet-ter fit the oriental city, a federationofautocephalous communities, each resi-dent in its separate ocalityandgovernedby kinship, confessional and fraternalorganizations,and by forms of mutual

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1986 Politics, Primordialism,and Orientalismassociation through which politics andbusinesswere transacted.In ignoranceofthe documentary videncenow available,anddue in no smallpart, one suspects,toa certain ethnocentrism, nineteenth-century European scholars consistentlymisinterpreted he oriental city and itsrelation to the polis. For instance, MaxWeber (1968, vol. 3, chap. 16, pp.1285-93)concedesthattheMediterraneanpoleis (which would surely feature theoriental cities) were spontaneous syno-ecisms of ethnicallydiversecommunitiesthat contracted to live peacefullytogether, and that maintaineda roughequality among themselves, developingan increasinglydemocraticpolitics. TheNorthern Europeanmedieval cities, onthe other hand, lived on the grace andfavour of a landednobility whose inter-ests were served by the developmentofmarketandmanufacturingowns only solong as the political aspirationsof thetownsmenwereconfinedto policingtheiroccupations through the guilds. At thesame time, Weber quite arbitrarilyattributes o the Europeanmedievalcity acorporateidentity and charterof rightsandimmunitiesabsentin the orientalcity(1968,vol. 3, chap.16, p. 1220).Not onlyis this far frombeing the case-in Sipparof the second milleniumB.C. a parallelstructureof municipalofficials vis-a-visthe court defended just such corporaterights-but it reflectsthe typicallystatistassumptionsof most nineteenth-centuryscholars-and plenty of twentieth-century ones too. Marx himself wasamong them. So preoccupiedare theywith the centralized authority of themodern state that the past is read backsystematically romthe present.Thus thestruggleof theNorthernEuropean opoloagainst despotic sovereign authoritiesisconsideredan historicaladvanceover thedecentralized,pluralistic,Mediterranean,and oriental communities that hadalreadywon theirconcessions,orperhapsneverneededto. In Marx'scase thisviewsits uneasilywith his generalglorificationof the polis as a social form.

The extraordinarily speculative andundocumentedview of oriental societywhich Marx and Weber represent,andwhich we now know to be false, hasneverthelessbeen quite pervasive in itsinfluence.It found its possible source inthe mythology of Islam,which saw itselfas a purifying orcethat purgedthe deca-dent "sedentary" civilizations of theLevant with the values of conqueringBedouintribes romthehinterland.How-ever, the self-perpetuatedmythology ofIslam as a tribal religiousculture in itsdesertfastnesseswas not even truein thetime of IbnKhaldun 1958),who bearsamajor responsibilityfor propagatingit.Mohammedwas the productof a sophis-ticatedmerchant ity, andtheearlylitera-tureandthe legal,educational,and philo-sophical traditions of Islam bear thestamp of a merchantclass that played aformativerole in its development Cook,1974, pp. 226-7). Orientalists haveargued or sometimenow thatthe Islamicconquestgave rise to cities in which thenewcomerswere soon assimilatedto theways of the old, and where tribalismrapidlybecamea notional entity-a col-lectivebadgeanda link with thepast thattied together the Islamic urban elite,whichdisplacedan olderclassof notablesat the municipallevel, and at the sametime provided neighbourhoodsan iden-tity reinforcedby the tiesof family,clien-tage, commonvillageorigin,and the fullrange of fraternal organizations-Sufiorders,youth gangs,etc.-so reminiscentof the Athenian cults, fraternities(phratries),and often thuggish politicalclubs (hetaireiai) (Calhoun, 1913;Lapidus,1969, pp. 49ff).One can see time and againthe confu-sion that Marx's (and Weber's) thesisabouttheunincorporated atureof orien-tal society still produces. For instance,Nadav Safran,addressingWeber's hesisdirectly, maintainsthat the reason why"theMuslim city did not develop a cor-poratepoliticalentity"or "strong nterestgroups,"like those of medievalWesternburgher-groups, s because cities in theorientalworld, unlike those of medieval

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AmericanPolitical ScienceReviewVol. 80Europe, were seats of government, and"the governmentas the dominanturbaninterest did not allow other intereststo develop" (Safran, 1969, pp. 76-77).Therefore, "no independent societyemerged," witnessed by the fact that"there were no autonomous laws andregulationsin Muslim cities, and hencethere were no corporateinterestgroupschallenging he caliphateand forcingthedevelopment of' constitutional law, astook placein theWest" Safran,1969,pp.76-77).

This is a veiled thesis of orientaldespotism Wittfogel,1957).Moreover, tis implausibleon its face.Thestruggle ora singlecorporate dentityenshrined n acentralizedbody of law was unnecessary(1) becausethe state was only one of thesalient administrativeelements in thesesocieties; (2) because government wasindeed located in the city and accom-modatedthe interestsof its variouscom-munities;and (3)becausethesecommuni-tiesenjoyedseverallya level of rightsandimmunities,economicindependence,andintercommunaloleration,thatis remark-able even by today's standards.Goiteinand othersemphasize he last point overand over for Egypt(Goitein,1967-1983,vol. 1, pp. 66ff., 266-72; Goitein, 1969,pp. 93-95; Goitein, 1967-1983, vol. 2;Lewis,1937;Lapidus,1967, 1969);and itwas trueeven for Iraq,whose citieswerethe seats of those successive empiresofincreasingmagnitudeand evermoretight-ly controlled bureaucraticapparatuses:the Babylonian,Assyrian, Achaemenid,Parthian,and Sassanian Morony,1984).In a parallelkindof argument, nformalforms of association, craft, and profes-sion, as well as confessional, amilial,andfraternal orms,arefrequently orced ntothe mold of the European guild-ordeemedinferior f they do not fit. How-ever, as Goitein categoricallystates, atleast until the fourteenthcentury therewasno suchinstitution,because herewasno need of it: "the classicIslamicsocietywas a free enterprisesociety, the veryopposite of a community organized inrigid guilds and tight professional cor-

porations" Goitein,1969,p. 94). Moslemcorporations with characteristicrightsand immunities abound, frequentlyadopting the ritualisticpractices of theSufi orders and brotherhoods.However,supervision of the work of artisans wasnot typically one of their functions, butwas a duty placed "in the hands of thestate police, which availed itself of theservices of trustworthyand expert assis-tants"(Goitein, 1969, p. 94).9Aristotleon the

Contractual atureof the PolisAristotle maintained, and Marxaffirmed,that the polis better realizes hehumantelos, formanisby naturea politi-cal animal (zoon politikon), and thismeans simply that he is a city (polis)dweller. Only the proximityand multi-faceted communalties producedby con-tiguous existencepermit the objectifica-tion of communal orms in everyday life,and, at the same time, the full floweringof the many-sided individual. Aristotlesuggested,and recentscholarsaffirm,thatthe formsof association o whichhe refers-family (oikia), clans (gene), tribes(phyle), brotherhoods(phratriai),clubs(hetaireiai), and cultic organizations(thysigi)-were always political, and notprimordial,as far back as the historicalrecord goes.10 Although in the Laws(680D-E)Platogives a geneticaccountofthe emergenceof political society out ofthe primordial-a collection of scatteredhouseholdsandpatriarchal lans of whichMarx'sGermanic ribesare reminiscent-it is difficult to separate act from myth.Aristotle'saccount lends support to theidea that, although political society wasorganizedalong apparently amilial ines,the link of consanguinity between theclans and tribes, into which the city wasorganized for administrativepurposes,was more fictional than real. Moreover,quite apartfrom the havoc to blood lineswrought by migration, on which bothMarxand Aristotle comment, the delib-erate policy of reformers ike Solon andCleistheneshad been to "mix t all up"by

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1986 Politics, Primordialism,and Orientalismencouraging mmigration,by the enfran-chisementof aliens,by realigning heclassstructure o reward he upwardlymobile,and by reconstituting he tribalstructureon a regional basis to destroy the powerbase of some familiesand strengthen hatof others, in particularthe urban tribes(Aristotle, Politics 6.2.11.1319b20-5,Loebtrans., p. 507).Thusany simpleassociationof Gemein-schaft, as the ideal type of organiccom-munity, with primordialsociety, wherepropertywas exclusivelycommunal,andof Gesellschaftwith urban, contractual,exchange-based ociety falls wide of themark. Marx, following Aristotle, locatedthe most highly developed form of thecommunity n the polis, which was gearednot merely to subsistence,but to "livingwell." His theory of exchange borrowsexplicitly romAristotle's,andit is only inhis last works, the so-called EthnologicalNotebooks, that Marx, under the influ-ence of Morgan,changes his mind, lean-ing toward a primitivistaccount of theGemeinschaft taken up by Thomson,Godelier,Terray,and others today.In Tonnies' version of theGemeinschaft-Gesellschaft theory theuse-value/exchange-value istinctionwasa crucialfactor in distinguishing etweenthe two forms. Invoking Hegelian, andsubsequentlyMarxist,concepts of labouras a medium or the objectification f thehuman subject, he saw in the Gemein-schaft the appropriatesocial setting forthisworkingout of humanpowersin theexternalworld of objects. "Wheresuchactivity [labour]serves to maintain,fur-ther, or give joy to a Gemeinschaft,as isthe case in natural and originalrelation-ships, it can be conceivedof as a functionof this Gemeinschaft," e declares(Tbn-nies, 1955, p. 92). By contrast,the Gesell-schaft is gearedto commerce,and "com-merce,as the skill to makeprofits, is theopposite of all such art"(Thnnies,1955,p. 92).Muchhas been madeby economichis-torians and classicists of Aristotle'sdistinction between oikonomia and

chrematistike as forerunners of thedistinctions between use-value andexchange-value n Marx, and some haveeven given these concepts in Aristotle areadingthatwould suggestan earlyformof the Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaftistinc-tion. We may summarizeAristotle'sargu-ments briefly in order to make two dif-ferent points: (1) that Aristotle'srecom-mendationsconcerning conomicactivityhavebeenmisinterpreteds statementsoffact, leadingto a seriousunderestimate fthe significanceof commerceandtrade nantiquity;and (2) that the applicationofthe Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaftistinctionto the polis fails on all counts. The ten-dency to characterizethe polis as theGemeinschaft takes no account ofAristotle'sexplicitargument hat all com-munitiesrest on exchange-"if therewereno exchangethere would be no associa-tion (koinonia)" (Nicomachean Ethics5.5.14.1133bl7-18, Loeb ed., p. 287)-orof the highlycontractualnatureof socialrelationshipsn the ancientworld, wheremembership n subordinatekinship andstatus groups (tribes, phratries, gene,orgeone)-not to speak of marriage,friendship, citizenship, adoption, andeven tribal affiliation-was a closely cir-cumscribedand explicitlyregulatedcon-tractualarrangementealedby ceremonyand ritual. However, those theorists,includingMarxin his last writingswhenhe came underMorgan's nfluence,whosee pre-polis, primordialsociety as theGemeinschaftmissa differentmark.Theirapplication of the distinction takes noaccountof the degreeto which so-calledprimordialforms were in fact political,assumingas organic,formsof social rela-tionship that in recorded history havebornea tenuousrelation o realbloodlinesorsystemsof consanguinitywitha geneticbasis.The highly contractualnatureof rela-tions in the polis could not be betterdemonstratedhanby the finedistinctionsAristotle makes between the differentformsof transactionand the principlesofjustice (equality or proportionality, as

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they are translated into legal/juridicalterms)appropriateo them.They includethe private contracts between partiestermed"voluntary ransactions," ut alsoincluderelationshipsbetween"friends"ngeneral,friendshipbeingunderstoodas acontractual relationship with finelygraduatedscales of benefits and duties,dependingon the degreeof the relation-ship. There is, indeed, an analoguebetween the exchange relationship andthatbetweenprivatecitizensthatemergeswhen disputesarise.Whendisagreementsarise between friends, or when partiesturn to a judge for rectification ofdamagesthat arisefrom a breachof con-tract, essentially the same process isinvolved. What has to be achieved isagreementon compensationfor gain orloss thatis acceptable o bothpartieswhoconstrue their needs from diametricallyopposed positions. The result, as in theact of exchangeitself, is to achieve theimpossible: an essentially asymmetricalrelationship is converted into a sym-metricalone by an exchangein value inwhich the gain and loss are equalized.Aristotle in fact admits that "the terms'loss' and 'gain' in these cases areborrowedfrom the operationsof volun-tary [economic] exchange . . . as forinstance in buying and selling, and allother transactions sanctioned by law"(NicomacheanEthics 5.4.13.1132blO-15,p. 279).Aristotleon Friendshipsand Partnerships

Not only is Aristotle's onceptof justicespecificallytailored to the need for faircontractsand equityin the distributionofgoods and services that an exchange-based economy produces, but even hisconcept of "friendship"resupposescon-tractual obligations that an economybasedon informalassociationdemanded.Indeed, the point of Aristotle'stypologyof forms of social relationship in the

Politics-husband/wife, father/child,master/slave,householder/household-isnot so muchto emphasize heir nequality(a fact taken for grantedin the ancientworld) as it is to show that the polis, as"the largercommunity," s an aggregateof subordinate forms of association,qualitativelydifferentandirreducible, uteach of which describes a schedule ofgoods and benefitssharedand received.In the two chaptersthat he devotes tofriendship n the NicomacheanEthics(amore extensive treatmenteven than thatgiven justice), he deals systematicallywith the affinalgroupsout of which thecity is constituted. "All friendshipinvolves community or partnership(koinonia),"he says (NicomacheanEthics8.9.1.1159b25-30, and 8.2.1.1161b10-15), but some relationships aredefinitely more contractualthan others.Relationshipsbetween the membersof afamily, and of comradeships hetaireiai)andbrotherhoods phratriai),he says, are"less n thenatureof partnershipshan arethe relationshipsbetween fellow citizens(politikai),fellow tribesmen phyletikai),shipmates,and the like; since theseseemto be foundedas it wereon a definitecom-pact" (NicomacheanEthics 8.12.2.1161b10-15, pp. 497-99).All forms of friendshipare partnershipsor associations for the exchange ofbenefits, Aristotle maintains, referringunder the umbrellaof friendshipto thewhole array of diverse associations inantiquity: tribes (phyletai), demes(demotai), cultic associations (gennetai),religious guilds (thiasotai), dining clubs(synousias) (NicomacheanEthics 8.9.5.1160a15-25).Since it is bound to be thecasein someof theseassociations hatoneor other of the parties feels it has notgottenwhatit contracted or, theproblemthen arises of rectifyingthe damages n acase wheregainand loss areassessed romthe differentpoints of view of the twoparties. ClearlyAristotle does not meanby friendshipa primarilyemotionalrela-

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1986 Politics, Primordialism,and Orientalismtionship. These are forms of associationentered on explicitly contractual termswithproceduresorarbitrating isputes nwhich one or other party feels that theconditionsof the friendshipwere not met.Modern classicists such as Adkins(1960, 1963), Long (1970), Finley (1954),Ehrenberg (1943), and others haveemphasized he extentto which conceptsof friendship n antiquity describequasi-juridical relations between individuals,and only secondarilyas a consequenceofmutual interaction, bonds of affection.They point out that in the Homericperiod,andto some extent n the classical,human beings as such had only thoserights that derive from relationsof birth,marriage, philotes, etc. Outside kinshiprelationships all relations of mutualreliance fell under the category of"friendship."In the absence of a strong state toguarantee personal security, such net-works were essential o theautonomyandself-sufficiencyof the family (oikos) andits members. Adkins (1963) points out,for instance, that despitean apparentdis-tinction between friendships based onutilityand thosebased on virtue,all threeformsof friendshipdescribedby Aristotle-the hedonic, the utilitarian,andthe vir-tuous-are in fact pragmatic. Friendshipfor another agathon (noble), on accountof virtue(arete),andfriendshipora com-rade(hetairos)orequal,were asnecessaryas any other form of friendship or self-sufficiency and survival. Thus the con-ventional definitionof friendship hatwefind in Plato of "helpingone's friendsandharming one's enemies" (Crito 45c5ff.,Meno 41e2ff., Republic 332D) takes onsignificanceas a formulafor one's duty,or protectingone's interestsand preserv-ing the in-group against the out-group(Adkins, 1960, pp. 228ff.).Philologically the verb philein, tolove, the noun philotes, friend, and theadjective philos, are interesting: philosbeing translatedas "dear,""beloved," n

the emotive sense, or "one'sown," in thequasi-juridicalsense. Thus, as Adkinspoints out, "the Homeric agathos(warrior-chieftain n charge of his ownoikos) usesphilosof his variousfaculties,possessions,and fellowmen,beginningasnear as possible to the man himself andworking steadily outwards" (Adkins,1963, p. 30). So intimately is the termrelated to conceptsof properties,posses-sions, and rightsthatit is usedin Homer'sIliad and Odyssey, for instance, to referto one's own (philos)limbsor one's own(phila)clothesorbed, respectively,whereto translate he termphilos in an emotivesense with "dear"or "beloved"would beinappropriateAdkins, 1963, p. 30).It has been shown, indeed, that thehistory of concepts of friendship andaffinity n the ancientworldtook the formof the gradualextension of concepts ofkinship (oikeiotes) to ever larger affinalgroups(Baldry,1965, pp. 42, 142-3, 178).Fromoikos, kinshipconstrued n its nar-rowest terms,was derived more abstractconcepts of likeness (oikeiosis) that, byvirtue of a Stoic preoccupationwith acommon human nature transcendingnaturalboundaries, gave rise eventuallyto the conceptionof the inhabitedworldas theoikoumene,thefamilyof man withits natural divisions of family, clan, andtribe.The intimateconnectionsbetween kin-ship, ownership,and love in antiquityarevery likely the basis for Aristotle'sbracketingof the twin sentiments"this smy own" (property) and "this I love"(affinity) in his critiqueof Plato's com-munism in the Republic (Politics 2.1.8-12.1261bl5-1262a25).Aristotlepoints tothe extremeunity of the Republic,whichignorestheplethoraof relationships asedon affinity, consanguinity,and marriagethathold thecity together.Whatwould itmean under communismto call a boy"myson" when he may be sharedby anynumberof people from two to ten thou-sand? Better he were "one's private

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nephew than one's son in the waydescribed"(Politics 2.1.12.1262alO-15).Parenthoodcreatesa special"belonging,"and Aristotle leaves no doubt that hismajor objectionto Plato'sreconstitutionof social and political forms in theRepublic is Plato's substitution of anabstract and arithmetical relation ofequalityand solidarityundercommunismfor thespecificand historicallydevelopedforms that have a real life in the every-day Greek world. Creatingcommunity(koinonia)does not come from wateringdown subordinate groups, but ratherfrom creating "a partnershipout of amultitude through education (paideiankoine)" (Politics 2.2.10.1263b35-40, p.91). "The tate s a partnership f families,living well in their clans, brotherhoods,clubsforworshipandrecreation"Politics3.5.14.1280b35-1281a5).And the reasonwhy all these subordinatesocial formscannot be collapsed to a unity in com-munism is that community is built onsocial solidarity or "friendliness,"asAristotleputit simply,andthe experienceof socialsolidarity, ikemost virtues,canonlybe learnedby doingit (NicomacheanEthics3.5.21.1114b25-30,Loebtrans.,p.153). Participationin the plethora ofsmall scale social groups, familial,local,cultic,andreligious,thatmadeup every-day life in ancient Greece(as they con-tinue to do in Mediterraneansocietytoday)providedthatexperience.Politicalsociety is not antithetical to the clan-based, cultic community, but is a con-tinuationof it.Aristotle'sdissertationon friendship nbooks eightandnineof theNicomacheanEthics, treating the varous forms offriendship, the expectationsattached tothem, their relativedurability,and howto arbitrate n casesof breakdownwhereexpectationshave not been fulfilled, istestimonyto the degree o whichthepolisas a community s basedon a networkoflittle societieswhose bonds are affectivebut whose status is quasi-juridical.The

highly contractualnature of friendshipand the textureof Aristotle'sargumentshave beenmissedby thosecommentatorsfrom the analytic school of philosophywhose earis not attunedto historicalandcultural nuance. They have also beenoverlooked by proponents of theGemeinschaft-Gesellschaft distinctionwho haveseeninprimordialormsof kin-ship and friendship,relations based on"love"antithetical o thecontractual ela-tions of modernsociety. In general, therelationthatAristotle'sanalysisof friend-ship and the bonding virtues of love,magnanimity,honour, and justicein theNicomacheanEthics bks.4-5, 8-9) bearsto social groups in their legally con-stituted ormin thePolitics(bks.1-3) hasbeen underestimated.

Homo PoliticusandHomo OeconomicusThe Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaftistinc-tion needsat the very least to be revised.The more appropriatedistinction,hintedat by Marx,is between properlypoliticalsociety-small-scale, urban, highly par-ticipatoryand entrepreneurial, onfinedin Europenow, as in ancient times, tothe Mediterraneanbasin-and northernEuropean society, whose ancestry isfeudal, rural,and decentralized. n theselattersystems(excludingnorthernItalian

city statesand thefreecitiesof the HansaLeague)participation n free and equalinstitutions is only a recent part ofhistory, and absolutism,where the onlypublicpersonwas the king, was once thedominantmode.The political community of antiquitywas an urban phenomenonbased on acoastalentrepreneurialconomygenerat-ing considerablewealth,whose life-bloodwas an elaborate network of forms ofassociation-familial, religious,regional,occupational,recreational, ndclass.Thesuccessof fifth-centurydemocracywas inmany respectsa functionof the habit of200


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1986 Politics, Primordialism,and Orientalismassociating ogether n a multitudeof littlesocieties. Polis society is characterized ythe fact that kinship and tribe havebecome modified constructs tailored tothe religious calendar and rotation ofoffices of the city (Veyne, 1976; Connor,1971; Davies, 1981). Religious cults andthe monopolyof exchange or publicpur-poses through a system of liturgies bywhich private citizens underwrote theexpenses of financingthe fleet, the army,choral and dramatic performances,games,athleticcontests,andfestivals, puta brake on private accumulation n thepolis. Concepts of friendship, com-munity, obligation, and justice have ahigh degreeof specificityand describeaway of life (politeia), and not abstractvalues or duty for duty'ssake. However,as against Thnnies, the relationshipsbetween members of these fellowships(koinonia)are not simply organic,basedon love, but are properlycontractual-sealed by ritual compacts, blood cove-nants, etc. For thisreason t is possibletodistinguishdifferentdegreesof relation-ship which, althoughbased on the modelof differentdegreesof consanguinity,arenot necessarilybased on blood relation-ships at all.The mix of publicand privatein theserelationshipsparallelsthat of family andfriend. Thus demes, phratries, and so-called clans (gene) were semi-officialorganizations, but under the control ofprivate resources. The highly influentialmale clubs-hetaireiai (political), sym-posia (drinking), and gymnasia (wrestl-ing)-had equality, if not precedence,over relations through marriage thatwould unduly elevate the status ofwomen,and werein many respectspublicin function in a society based more on"fraternal" han patriarchal social rela-tions.""Only the oikos itself was definedas the exclusively private sphere. Aris-totle'saccountof the socialconstitutionofthe polis (Politicsbks. 1-2) is consistentwith this analysis. For Aristotle saw the

city as the aggregate forms of partner-ship or association (koinonia), some ofwhich werebasedon realor fictionalcon-ceptsof consanguinity,othersbeingbasedon sharedreligious,ethnic,orculticback-ground. But the koinonia politike is awholegreater hanthesum of itsparts, sothatto ruleover "a argehouseholdandasmall city" is not the same thing, butinvolves a difference in kind (Politics1.1.2.1252alO-15,p. 3). "Thepartnershipthat comes about in the courseof naturefor everyday purposes, is the oikos,"Aristotle observes, and as the extendedrather han smallfamily it includes"food-sharers,""hearthsharers,"nd "sharers fthe mother'smilk"(homogalaktas),noneof whichaccording o modem authoritiesare necessarily blood relations. "Theprimarypartnershipmade up of severalhouseholds for the satisfaction of . . .needs is the village" (Politics 1.1.6-7.1252blO-20,p. 7), while"thatpartnershipwhich is composedof severalvillages isthecity-state,"whichhas "at astattainedthe virtual self-sufficiency"which fits itfor the good life (Politics1.1.8.1252blO-35, pp. 7-9).Aristotle refuses any distinctionbetween natural, primordial forms ofassociationand thecityas a productof artor convention: "Henceevery city-stateexists by nature, inasmuch as the firstpartnershipso exist,"he maintains, "forthe city-state s the end of the other part-nerships,andnature s an end." It is fromthis point of view that "thecity-state isa natural growth and that man is bynature a political animal." As a conse-quence,"a man that is by natureand notmerely by fortune citiless (apolis), iseither low in the scale of humanity oraboveit (likethe 'clanless aphretorJ,aw-less [athemistosi, hearthless [anestiosl'manreviledby Homer)," or ". . . man isa politicalanimal(politikonho anthroposzoon) in a greatermanner hananybee orgregarious animal" (Politics 1.1.8-9.1252b30-1253alO,pp. 9-11). (We are

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remindedof Marx'sseveralasideson theAristotelian definition zoon politikonproperlyreferringo manas a city orpolisdweller,as well as his famousdistinctionbetween the architect and the bee, theformer a social being whose productionrepresentsheneedsandpurposesof a liv-ing community, the latter a creaturewhose gregariousnessand productivityare instinctively driven.) Aristotle'svariousreferenceso subordinateormsofassociation make it plain that he con-ceives these now to be units of urbanadministration,whatever their originalfunction may have been. So when hespeaks of voting "by tribes (phylas), ordemes demonss), or brotherhoods(phratrias)"Politics4.12.11.1309alO-15,p. 363), these are clearly alternativejuridicalunits. Whenhe recommends heauditingof publicfundsbe carriedout by"brotherhoods (phratrias), companies(lochous) and tribes (phylas)" (Politics5.7.11.1309alO-15,p. 429),he is referringto the administrativefunction of theseforms of association.Certainfertile remarksin the Grund-risseandCapitalsuggest n fact thatMarxmight have formed a comprehensivetheory of ancientsociety much closer toAristotle's-and one in which theGemeinschaft-Gesellschaft distinctionwould not have figured-had they beendeveloped.For instance,Marxnotesboththat "thehistory of classicalantiquityisthe historyof cities,"and that "therewasin antiquity no more general institutionthan that of kin groups" (1973, pp.478-9). His references o zoon politikonemphasizenot only that man is a towndwellerby nature,butalso thatpoliticsasan urban phenomenon is, as Aristotleinsisted, characteristically"rule of thefree." By contrast, the society of theGermanic tribes, typifying NorthernEuropean ociety fromwhich the capital-ist nation-statesultimatelydeveloped, isrural, decentralized,and tribal in a dif-ferentsense:

TheMiddleAges (Germanic eriod)beginswiththe land as the seat of history, whose furtherdevelopment hen movesforward n thecontra-diction between town and countryside; themodem age is the urbanization f the country-side, not the ruralizationof the city as inantiquity.(Marx,1973,p. 479)

Marx is hinting, perhaps, that theprimordial/political distinction is aregionalratherthan a chronologicalone,and that while "political" ocieties (liter-ally poleis) of the Mediterraneanbasinhave neverchangedessentially n charac-ter, northern European society is anextension of primordialismwhich grewout of Franco-Germanicribalsocietyandits feudallegacy.The Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaftistinc-tion postulates an original primordialcommunity ruled by family, clan, andtribe, out of which political societyemerges. This proposition has beenseriouslycalledinto questionby modemclassical scholars, who show that con-cepts of genos and clan are reconstruc-tions of nineteenth-century scholarsdrawing on contemporary anthropo-logicalconceptionsof tribalism n Africa,Melanesia, and Australia that are inap-propriate o urbanMediterraneanocietyin antiquity.12Marxfell underthe influ-ence of these nineteenth-centurycholars-Morgan, Maine, Fustelde Coulanges,etc.-in his last years. So while hisaccount of the polis in relationto othercommunal forms in the Grundrisseismuch closer to the appraisalof Aristotleand those modern scholars who haveturnedback to his account, Marx'sposi-tion in the EthnologicalNotebooks repre-sentsanunfortunatebreakwith thistradi-tion. We have in this, his last work,evidence that he became an adherentofthe Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft myth,believing with Morgan that the ancientgentes(clans)providedtheoriginalmodelof the democraticand fraternalGemein-schaft that constitutedthe polis (Krader,1974, p. 3).13Political society, as we have used that

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1986 Politics, Primordialism,and Orientalismterm-i.e., polis based, urban, entre-preneurial,highly participatory,and insome cases even democratic-was typi-fied by contractualrelationsof the mosthighly specifiedsort. It is significant, orinstance, that the earliestGreekpapyrusthat we possess is a marriagecontractof311 B.C. from Assuan in Upper Egypt.We also have Aristotle'sauthority or thehomologybetween social relationsof thepolis and partners o a businesstransac-tion. Even forms of friendshipwere con-ceived of contractually,concernedwiththe mutual exchange of goods andservices, as Aristotle attests. The city-state in antiquitywas itself more in theorder of a voluntaryassociation,and notcoextensivewiththeinhabitants f a terri-tory. One contractedin and out of thepolis insofar as qualificationfor citizen-shipand formaladmissionby ratificationof the phratrypermitted;departurewasmarkedby ostracism,voluntary exile, ordeath. As such, the polis constitutedanaggregate f subordinateormsof associa-tion entered into by way of initiationrites, pacts, sealsof blood covenant, etc.,whichenjoyedsecretrites, privatefestivi-ties, and legal immunity.As orientalistsand classicists now concur, kinship ortribal organizations were, in the lastanalysis, voluntaryforms of associationrather than primordialnetworks.Recentwork on tribalism in both classicalantiquity and the modern Middle Eastsuggests that tribe and clan are sociallyconstructedentities that bear a tenuousrelation to real blood lines, while tradingoff the moral resources of family andother forms of in-group oyalties.14Thusthedesignationof the tribe,namedafteraheroized ancestor, a mythical historicalhomeland,or an ancient totemisticsign,usually representsat the same time ter-ritorialclaims, ethnic identification,andstatus, financial,or other aspirationsonthe part of the living association. In arelativelydenselypopulated,commercial-ly oriented city-state (as most Mediter-

raneanand Middle Eastern ocieties havebeen from time immemorial)economicand social viability depend on a con-siderable volume of successful transac-tions of all kinds thatis less significant na decentralizedagrarian society lackingthe features of contiguousand mutuallydependent existence. Oaths, pledges,promises,pacts, covenants, and contractsin a plethoraof formulationsand with allsorts of sanctionsseem to have providedtheguarantees n whichsuchtransactionsdepended, as witnessed by such docu-mentary evidence as the OxyrhynchusPapyri, oriental inscriptions, the Ham-murabicode, etc. (Springborg,1985).The conclusionof this argument, hen,is that homo politicos and homo oeco-nomicus representnot two phases in aprocess of social evolution, but ratheralternativeandcontemporaneousways oflife with distinctive tructures ndinstitu-tions,differentiatedegionallyrather hanchronologically. Moreover, these tworegionshave shown an amazingdegreeofcontinuity in their historical form. Forinstance, the sectarian warfare, institu-tionalizedin the cultic, clan, and ethnicforms of associationof modern Lebanonis reminiscentof the ancient skirmishingof Phoenicia, ts historicalparentstate,ofthe agonistic strugglesof ancientGreece,andof thecivilwars of Rome,all of whichLebanonexperiencedhistoricallymoreorless directly (Khuri, 1976). The ancientclass, clan, and culticforms of organiza-tion, the nobleclubs, phratries,hetairies,and gymnasia, have their modern coun-terparts n thebrotherhoods,professionalsyndicates, clans, and the religiousandsportingclubs of modernMediterraneansociety.15Where family and clan net-works have provedto be ineffectivetheyhave been replaced by functionalsubstitutes-for instance, reconstructedvillage associationsthat hark back to anoriginal homeland, several generationsand sometimes even countriesremoved;and associationsformedby membership

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in the same graduatingclass of a highschool, university, or military college(Gellner and Waterbury,1977; Spring-borg, 1975, 1979, 1982; Khuri, 1975,1980).The renowned features of Mediter-ranean society as a shame culture harkback to a code of honourand protectionof the in-groupbasedon affinalnetworksagainst the out-group that have theircounterpart n antiquity(Peristiany,ed.,1965, 1968, 1976).Theretoo theagon, orcontest for honour, was a constitutivefeature. Performing the same functionwas an elaborateset of distinctionsdefin-ing relations of social proximity, fromimmediateto extendedfamily relations,friendship,and guest friendship, to thestranger, and backed up by privatemilitiasand blood feuds.It has been said of ancientsociety thatwhereasmodernlife may be analyzedintermsof its publicversusprivatedimen-sions, antiquityrequiresa tripartitedivi-sion: public, private, and cultic. Theelements which, when assembled, con-stituted the foundations of politicalsociety-family, clan, tribe, and villageforms of subordinateassociation-wereall religiously defined. This means thattheywere eachassociatedwith culticritesand practiceswhich created a differen-tiatedset of commonbonds for differentpurposes.

The substantivecontent of these cultswas, curiouslyenough, providedlargelyfromthe NearEast.Thereis a continuityof mysteryandmiraclecults,magicprac-tices, forms of table worship, omen-taking, astrological lore, cultic incanta-tions, and initiationrites that go back insome cases to Pharaonicand Babylonianpractices of the third millenniumB.C.,andwhichwere takenover andfaithfullyincorporated into their own religiouspractices by successive Semitic, Greek,and Romaninvaders (Hooke, 1953). Wehave in the twentiethcenturyseen inves-tigations of some of the relics of these

cults and practices,includingthe CopticGnostic gospels (Robinson,1977;Pagels,1979), the rituals of the Gnostic anti-ChristianMandaeansof the marshlandsof modern Iraq (Rudolf, 1978), and theancientsecret rites of the Druzes, influ-enced as they were by neo-Pythagoreanpractices,as a direct inkbetweenancientpagan orientalcults and theirHellenistictransmission Makarem,1974).Becauseof the way in which the culticdimension of social life influencedpoliticaland economicdevelopments, hisreligiouscontinuity n the Graeco-orientalworld is of much more general signifi-cance. One of the distinctivefeaturesofancient capitalism, as Weber observed,was the role of the notable in under-writing public works through liturgies(the fundingof the army, the navy, andgames and contests in ancient Greece),and the foundation of religious institu-tions (temples and mosques, funeralassociations, and shrines for saints ormartyrs,or Waqfs,as they areknown inthe Islamic world) (Veyne, 1976, pp.232-79; Khuri, 1980, ch. 8). Becausetheurban, commercial,entrepreneurialoci-ety of the Mediterranean asinsupporteda wealthy class of notables more or lessthroughoutits history who served localkingsand emperorsand foreignoccupiersas municipal functionaries, and whounderwrote public works at their ownexpense as the quid pro quo for socialprestige, herewas no need,andno room,for modern northern European post-IndustrialRevolutioncapitalismto takeroot.The relativelysmall-scale nterprisesof a relatively argeclassof notablesshutit out. For this and other historicalreasons, "modernization" nd "develop-ment,"where they have occurred,couldonly be undertakenby the state or therevolutionaryparty, because only theyhad the political and militarymuscle tooverride the indigenous commercialestablishment.Evenso, indigenoussocialformshave showna characteristicngenu-

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1986 Politics, Primordialism,and Orientalism

ity and durability n beingable to honey-comb so-called"modern"mported nsti-tutions and structures with traditionalaffinal networks (Khuri, 1975; Moore,1977;Springborg,1975, 1979, 1982).It isthe very durability of these ancientpolitical forms, in the Middle East ingeneralandin Lebanon n particular, hathas presented to Western powers of asomewhat differenthistoricalexperiencesome of their greatest challengesin thefield of foreignpolicy.

NotesI wish to thankCarolePateman,HenryMayer,Michael Jackson, Gian Poggi, John Burnheim,Gyorgy Markus and Maria Shevtsova, my col-leagues,and RobertSpringborg,my husband,fortheir commentson this paper and for discussionsfrom which I have learnedmuch. I owe a specialdebtof gratitude o John Pocock, whosecommentsran to a small essay, LeszekKolakowski,PrestonKing,PhilipRieffandClementHenry,whosegener-osityin readingpapersandoffering cholarlyadviceon this and otheroccasions s greatlyappreciated.Thanks are also due to GabrielAlmond, DavidKopf,PhilipPettit,andOliverWilliams.Myinterestin Mesopotamian ulturewas rekindledduringmytime at the University of Pennsylvania,whichfinancedmany of the greatexcavations, ncludingthoseof WilliamFlinders etrie,and whichhousesamagnificent ollectionof cuneiform exts,includingcopiesof theEpicof Gilgamish.1. The sameis true,of course,for Sovietpolicymakers assisting third world countries that fallwithintheirorbitto make the transitiono socialismas the third phase in the Marxistversion of theubiquitous three-phase macrohistoricalschema.Marxwas as convincedan historical volutionistasany of his nineteenth-centuryontemporaryocialscientists,and orthodox communismhaspromoted"modernization" y way of industrializationasardentlyas the West.2. Max Weber'saccountof the distinctiveness fmodern industrial society, the locus of homooeconomicus,comparedwith the society of homopoliticos, the ancientpolis, is still the most con-vincingand is remarkablyunbiasedby nineteenth-century omanticismwhichcharacterizeshedistinc-tions of Morgan, Marx, and Tonnies. Observingthat "whereasn Antiquitythe hoplitearmyanditstraining,and thus military interests,increasinglycameto constitute he pivot of all urbanorganiza-tion,"Webernotes that "inthe MiddleAges mostburgherprivilegesbeganwith the limitationof theburgher'smilitarydutiesto garrisonservice."As a

consequence, "the economic interests of themedieval townsmenlay in peacefulgain throughcommerceand the trades,and this was most pro-nouncedly so for the lower strata of the urbancitizenry."Thus,he concludes,"Thepoliticalsitua-tionof the medieval ownsmandetermined is pathwhichwas thatof a homooeconomicus,whereas nAntiquitythe polis preservedduring ts heyday itscharacter s the technicallymost advancedmilitaryassociation: the ancient townsmanwas a homopolitics" (Weber, 1968, vol. 3, chap. 16, pp.1353-4).Weber's heory,and indeed hebulk of hisearlierwritings,constitutean interesting ommen-tary on Marx'sepigrammaticbservation hat "themode in which they gaineda livelihood"explainswhy "for Athens and Rome . . . politics reignedsupreme,"but "notfor the MiddleAges,"in which"Catholicismlayedthe chiefpart" Marx,n.d., vol.1, p. 86n).3. HenrySumnerMaine (1861),datesthe statusto contract shift to the transitionfrom tribal toagriculturalociety; Tonnies (1955, p. 274) to thetransition from Graeco-Roman to NorthernEuropeanculturaldominance;Marx, Weber, andmodernsociologists o the transition romfeudaltonationstatein Europe on the distinctionsn Marx,Morgan,and Mainesee Krader 1974,pp. 21, 36,49ff.]).TheclassicistSirMosesFinley 1955,p. 194),however,datesit to the transition romHomeric oclassicalpolissociety nGreece, eeing n theshiftingmarriage atternsof the Homericworld "merely neelement n a muchmoregeneral ransition rom anoikos-kinshipworld of statusrelationsto the polisworld of transactions onsummated nderthe ruleof law."4. On thelibraryof Ashurbanipaln NinevehseeHooke (1953), Pritchard (1950), and Thompson(1928);on the Tell el Amarna etters,Petrie(1894),Mercer (1939), and Campbell (1964); on theOxyrhynchusPapyri,see GrenfellandHunt (1848-1967),andthetwo volumesof selectedpapyri n theLoebClassicalLibrary Huntand Edgar,1932-34)whichcontain egalandother non-literaryexts forthe Hellenisticperiod;the firstvolume comprisingprivate, the second, public documents.The Ham-murabiCode-which is in fact lessin the natureof acode thana set of amendmentso thirdmillenniumBabyloniancommon law which the king promul-gated n hisown name-has now receiveddefinitivetranslationand legal commentaryby Driver andMiles(1952-55),the latterof whom is a jurist.Onthe gnosticgospelssee Robinson 1977)and Pagels(1979);on the Genizadocuments ee Goitein(1967-1983);on the Arabictextsof otherwise ost classicalGreekand Hellenisticworksof philosophy,science,medicine,etc., see Walzer(1962)and King (1978,1980);on Sipparsee Oppenheim 1969); inally,ontheEblatablets,seeBermant nd Weitzman 1979),andMatthiae 1980).5. Thisremarkablehaptern the historyof juris-

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AmericanPoliticalScienceReviewVol. 80prudence s documented n the neglectedstudy ofGierke,Das DeutscheGenossenschaftsrechtGierke,1900, 1934).Arguingthat "on thewhole, the theo-ristsof NaturalLawwere drivenby the tendencyoftheirtime to deny that local communities nd cor-porate bodies [i.e., the collegiaand universitatesjhad a socialexistenceof theirown"as autonomousvoluntarysocieties,Gierkeconcludes hat "sofarasit movedin this direction, he natural-lawheoryofassociationswas farless favourable o suchbodies,on the fundamental ssue at stake, than was thepositive-law heoryof Corporations"xpoundedbytheorists of Roman civil law. Gierke saw in thesocialcontract heoriesofHobbes,Locke,and Bodinthe logical outcome of this process by virtue ofwhich"the overeignStatewas directlybasedon theconclusionof a [fictitious]contract betweenindi-viduals.... TheFamilyand the Statewere thereforeregardedas the only societies which possessedabasis n NaturalLaw," hefamily-societas, private,or domestica-being subdivided into the "threesocietiesof husbandandwife, parentsandchildren,and masterand slaves,"over which these theorists"hastenedo set ... at once the societaspolitical rcivilis, a communityarmedwith sovereignpower.... [Thus]ocalcommunities ndcorporate odies,as distinctfromthe Family,wereregarded s onlyarisingafter the constitutionof a systemof politicalorder" Gierke,1934, pp. 62-3). Gierkeargues hatthis interpretationof the relationof subordinateformsof association o the statewas based npartona readingof the developmentof the classicalpols,and probablyAristotle thereon,as a "progressivewidening of the original family-community,irstinto the local community,then into the city, andfinally nto thegreaterkingdom .. whichmadethelocal communitymerelya preliminary tageof thecivic community,and treated he civic communityas the perfect realisation of the idea of State"(Gierke, 1934, p. 63). A readingthat it is mypurposenthispaper o correct.On Hobbesand cor-poration heoryseeSpringborg1976).On the culticcollegiaand universitatesee Cumont(1956),Nock(1935,1936,1944),andNilsson (1972).On thekingas "corporationole"see Maitland 1936,1900),thelatter comprisingexcellentessays on corporationtheory and its ramifications in early modemthought, and also Kantorowicz 1957). On somepeculiaritiesf socialcontract heoryas it developedalongtheselines, see Gauthier 1977)and Pateman(1984a).6. References o Marx'sGrundrisseist first thepage numbers of the German edition (1953) andsecondof theEnglishranslation1973)unlessother-wise noted. On the formative influenceof theclassicson Marx ee Ste. Croix 1983,pp. 19-85)andSpringborg1984a,1984b, 1984c).7. Max Weber also considered the corporatenatureof communal ife to be the definingcharac-teristicof thecity as such. Buthebelieved hiscom-

munity to be a feature of Western rather thanEastern cities. "Not every 'city' in the economicsense, nor every garrison whose inhabitants hada special status in the political-administrativesense, has in the past constituted a 'commune'(Gemeinde)," he maintained. "The city-commune inthe full meaning of the word appeared as a massphenomenon only in the Occident; the Near East(Syria, Phoenicia, and perhaps Mesopotamia) alsoknew it, but only as a temporary structure"(Weber,1968, vol. 3, chap. 16, p. 1227). Weber goes on toargue, ratherarbitrarily, that in the oriental city-inantiquity, and in particular under the great terri-torial kingdoms-"the associational characterof thecity and the concept of a burgher (as contrasted tothe man from the countryside) never developed at allor existed only in rudiments." The "special status ofthe town dweller as a 'citizen,' in the ancientmedieval sense, did not exist, and a corporatecharacter of the city was unknown" (Weber, 1968,vol. 3, pp. 1227-8). He appears to make exceptionsof those cities of Mesopotamia, Syria, and Phoeniciathat grew up along the caravan route, which saw the"rising power of the patrician families in the 'cityhall,' " for which he cites the Tell el Amarna tablets(Weber, 1968, vol. 3, p. 1230). But, because of itsclan character, he completely misunderstood thecharacter of Mecca, one of the most economicallydiverse and sophisticated oriental cities, observingthat "all safely founded information about Asianand Oriental settlements which had the economiccharacteristics of 'cities' seems to indicate that nor-mally only the clan associations, and sometimes alsothe occupational associations, were the vehicles oforganized action (Verbandshandeln), but never thecollective or urban citizens as such" (Weber, 1968,vol. 3, p. 1233).8. Citations from classical authors, Plato, Aris-totle and Herodotus, follow the standard form withpage references to translations where they are notmy own.9. In this respect Islamic cities far exceeded thelevels of economic development achieved by Greeceand Rome. Goitein observes that the Cairo Genizadocuments list "about 265 manual occupations ...90 types of persons engaged in banking and com-merce and approximately the same number of pro-fessionals, officials, religious functionaries andeducators" (Goitein, 1967-1983, vo

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Politics, Primordialism and Orientalism -Arisotle and the Myth of the Gemeinschaft -Patricia Springborg