Polyarchy, Pluralism and Scale

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17/11/2014 Polyarchy, Pluralism, and Scale* | A. Dahl | Scandinavian Political Studies

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Startside> Scandinavian Political Studies, Bind 7 (New Series)(1984) - 4>A. Dahl

Scandinavian Political Studies, Bind(1984) 4

Polyarchy, Pluralism, and Sc

Robert A. Dahl, Yale University

In developing my ideas about the relations of polyarchy, pluralism,special debts to a number of close collaborators, but to none do I oRokkan. I first met Stein Rokkan at an international meeting in RoLike virtually everyone who knew him I was at once impressed by rknowledge, and remain so to the present day. As acquaintance ripefriendship I also came to appreciate, as once again every one who kappreciated, his exceptional human qualities. He was a rare scholar,rare friend, whose presence immeasurably enriched our lives andknew him, and many others who did not, immeasurably poorer.

Within a few years after Rokkan and I first met, I undertook to edipolitical oppositions in western Europe, to which Rokkan contribuextraordinary knowledge, his seemingly unbounded energies, and h

but also an essay on corporate pluralism that was I believe the first

important and now widely discussed subject and truly was of semincourse of that collaboration,, Rokkan took the leadership in a projedemocracies, a dozen countries whose experience had until then bepolitical science. Although the volumes we projected on each of thedemocracies did not materialize, it is not too much to say, I think,Rokkan's unflagging efforts in others, contributed notably to the ra

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on the political systems of the smaller European countries.1It wasthat, on Rokkan's strong encouragement, Edward Tufte and I undetopic of size and democracy.2

* The Rokkan Memorial Lecture, Bergen, May 16, 1984.

Side 226

Consequences of the HistoriScale

As we pointed out, the shift in the practical and theoretical locus ofcity-state to the large and even giant nation state brought with it impractical and theoretical, although theory failed to keep pace with peighteenth century the city-state, which for over two millenia had band even exclusive setting for a democratic order, a view still mainSocial Contract (1762), had become almost everywhere so subordindemocratic efforts, ideas, and ideology inevitably shifted their focus

democratizing the government of the nation-state. The consequenchowever, were not clearly foreseen. I want to mention seven impo

1. Representation. Because of the practical impossibility of having acitizens, or even a significant proportion of them, representation,Rousseau in the Social Contract3became an unavoidable consequethe political system.

2. Unlimited Extension. Once representation was accepted as a solof a democratic unit set by the limits of an assembly in a democratiand representative democracy could be extended virtually without l

3. Limits on Participation. As a direct consequence of increasing sipolitical participation necessarily became more limited. Just as a sucitizens in a nation state cannot possibly discuss political matters dtoo only a comparatively small percentage can possibly engage in drepresentatives. Even if spatial barriers to communication can in pelectronic means, the limits set by time are inexorable. You can easlimits are by a simple arithmetic exercise. You need only to multiplhigly participatory process could reasonably be expected to produceassume a meaningful political message requires.

4. Diversity. Although the relation between scale and diversity is lesincreases in size, its inhabitants will tend to exhibit greater diversit

life: local and regional, ethnic, racial, religious, ideological, occupatrelatively homogeneous population of citizens united by common arace, history, myth, and religion that was so conspicuous a part of tof democracy now becomes for all practical purposes impossible.

5. Conflict. As a consequence, political cleavages are multiplied, pol

Side 227

conflict is an inevitable aspect of political life, and political thoughtconflict as a normal and not aberrant feature of politics.. In contrain which a relatively homogeneous body of citizens could be expect

same beliefs about the common good, and to act on those beliefs, tgood is stretched much more thinly in order to encompass the heteloyalties, and beliefs formed among a body of diverse citizens withand conflicts. A striking symbol of the change is James Madison, wconstitutional convention in 1787, and later in his defense of it inthe historical view, which was still reflected in anti-Federalist objec


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iniquity of the attempt to form a democratic republic on such a groStates. In a brilliant polemic, Madison contended that because connature of man and society, and the expression of these conflicts co

without suppressing freedom, the best cure for the mischiefs of facAs he of course intended, it followed that, contrary to the traditionof republican government in the nation state was that political conlikely to produce acute civil strife than in the tighter compass of the

The sixth and seventh consequences of the shift in the locus of dem

from the city state to the nation state, from small-scale to large scalwere polyarchy and organizational pluralism, to which I now turn.

Polyarchy

Origin of the Term

Since the term polyarchy does not appear to have a standard meanidoubtless contributed to the confusion of usage, let me say somethi

best of my knowledge the word was first introduced in modern pol

and me in Politics,, Economics, and Welfare in 1953, where we ref

Considering it as a process was in keeping with the theoretical oriesubtitle of which was: 'Planning and Politico-Economic Systems ReProcesses'. In Part IV we described 'Four Central Sociopolitical Procontrol of and by leaders; hierarchy, or control by leaders; polyarc

bargaining, or control among leaders. 'In some societies', we assert

the democratic goal is still roughly and crudely approximated, in thexercise a relatively high degree of control over leaders. The constelthat makes this possible we call polyarchy.

Side 228What we were searching for was a distinction between two sometiterms 'democracy': one to describe a goal or ideal, an end perhapsnot even fully achievable in actuality, and the other to describe theactual political systems commonly called 'democratic' or 'democrac

According to the authoritative Oxford English Dictionary, for whichad been completed in 1909, polyarchy is 'the government of a stat

with monarchy'. The word had fallen into disuse, and seemed to us

We also set out some six 'criteria' that were meant to give 'operatiosignificance' to the expression 'a high degree of control'. The first, f

was that

Most adults in the organization have the opportunity to vote in elecrewards and penalties directly attached either to the act of voting ocandidates.

Although the six 'criteria', as we called them there, have altered somthe later 'criteria', now seven, are little more than a refinement of tlater I came to believe that to think of polyarchy as a process is lessa set of institutions.^

Five Interpretations

Like democracy, polyarchy can be viewed from several different pe


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s a type of regime

To begin with, polyarchy can be seen as simply a distinctive kind ofmodern state a regime with characteristics that distinguish it preprior to the nineteenth century, and also from most regimes existinthe world today.

Its distinctiveness arises from the combination of two general feattolerance for oppositions those who oppose the conduct of the grelatively widespread opportunities for participating in influencinggovernment, including removal of incumbent governing officials bspecifically, polyarchies can be distinguished from other regimes bysense of seven institutions: a widespread and nowadays nearly univcoextensive with the right to run for public office; fairly conductednegligible or no coercion; extensive protection of free expression, igovernment, the regime, society, the dominant ideology, and so on;and often competing sources ofinformation and persuasion not ungovernment;

Side 229

a high degree of freedom to form relatively autonomous organizatiovariety, including, most crucially, opposition political parties; and rresponsiveness of the government to voters and election outcomes.

It is this set of institutions, taken together, that make a polyarchal rfrom the centralized or feudal monarchies, the Roman Empire, theand Japan, and even the regimes of the democratic city states of clRepublic, or the Italian city-state republics. In the contemporary wthese seven institutions are, in a realistic sense, present to a high deof approximately 160 nominally independent countries.

s a product of democratizing natio

Polyarchy can also be understood historically, or developmental^,evolved in large part, though not exclusively, as a product of effortsthe political institutions of nation states. In this perspective, polyarconditioned set of modern institutions in particular the complexmentioned resulting primarily from attempts since the eighteentdemocratic ideas and practices to the large scale of the modern natunique complex of political institutions has tended to acquire the n

institutions have largely superseded the distinctive political institutior republican city-states. In democratic Athens, for example, the ciprimary importance whereas organized political parties were unknother autonomous interest organizations common in polyarchies. Idemocrat would be totally bewildered by the political institutions othe notion that they were entitled to be called democratic.

s necessary to the democratic proc

Thirdly, polyarchy can be understood as a set of political institution

provide a satisfactory approximation to the democratic process whethat process on a large scale, for example, on the scale of the natioperspective, our democratic predecessors were not fools: they kneinsisting on the suffrage, the right to run for public office, free andform political parties, the responsibility of the executive to parliame


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on.

To say that polyarchal institutions are necessary to the democraticon a large scale is not to saiy, of course, that they are also sufficientsuppose that few of us believe them to be so.

Side 230

s a system of control by competitioFourthly, polyarchy can be understood as a system of political contconsequence of the set of institutions mentioned earlier, the highesof the state face the prospect of their own displacement by means ohence tend to have strong incentives to modify their conduct in sucin political competition with other candidates, parties, and groups.is of course very close to that of Schumpeter, the most distinctive fopen competition among political elites for office. This competitiomeasure of mutual influence between elites and masses, rather tha

by elites that Michels' iron law of oligarchy would lead one to expec

s a system of rights

Finally, polyarchy can be interpreted as a system of rights in whichinstitutionally guaranteed and protected. Each of the seven instituticertain rights that are necessary to the existence and functioning oself-evidently so with suffrage or freedom of expression. To institutexample, citizens must possess a legally enforceable claim, an entitlfreely on political matters, and it must be an obligation of officialsclaim, if need be by punishing violators. It is obvious, too, that in oexist, the right cannot be merely abstract or theoretical, like most o

Soviet Constitution. The right must be actually enforceable in courtcomplex, the other institutions must also necessarily generate a bolacking these actually enforceable rights the institution cannot be s

To one who believes that polyarchy is desirable, the political rights isimply because they are necessary to the institutions of polyarchy.right entailed in polyarchy because that right is thought to be good inecessary to freedom and equality, or to the democratic process. Fto organize a political party to oppose the government might be valpolyarchy, a right to freedom of expression might be valued as alsopersonal freedom.

No doubt polyarchy can be interpreted in still other ways. A Marxisinterpret it simply as 'bourgeois democracy'. But the point I wish tofive ways of thinking about polyarchy that I have just described areanother. On the contrary, they complement one another. They simaspects or consequences of the institutions that serve to distinguishnonpolyarchal regimes.

Side 231

Pluralism

Origins

Like polyarchy, pluralism., at least as we tend to use the term nowaneologism in political science. It is interesting to take note of the d


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Oxford English Dictionary. The section of Volume VII containing toriginally published in 1907. Pluralism, we learn from that magister

The character of being plural; the condition or fact of being a pluraor practice of more than one benefice being held at the same timeholding of two or more offices of any kind at one time. ... 2. Philos.of thought which recognizes more than one ultimate principle: opp

A pluralist, then, is

1. Eccl. One who holds two or more benefices at the same time. ...combines two or more offices, professions, or conditions. ... 2. (Phthe theory of pluralism.

The eccelesiastical usage was old, the earliest reference being 1362.propriety of pluralism in the Church of England had flared up againrecall encountering the term, and implications of that dispute, in othink Barchester Towers.

What is interesting about all this is the absence of any reference toattributed to the term by contemporary political scientists and in t

ournalists, politicians, and ideologues. The explanation is simple:were completed about a decade before the appearance of Laski's atwhich he explicitly posited pluralism as an alternative to the dominattack on monism, and his preference for a pluralist interpretationcourse, entirely original. It had antecedents in the works of the Fre

whose writings Laski was familiar, as well as those by Laski's fellowand F. W. Maitland, and the still earlier writings of the German jurideas about state and society were also advanced by Guild SocialistsSocialism had been formulated by A.J. Penty as early as 1906, it waparticularly G.D.H. Cole, writing about the same time as Laski, whoimpact. Pluralist notions about the state and society were quite pronot only in Britain but also in the United States, where several well

scientists analyzed them in considerable detail in the pages of theira decade of attention, however, interest in pluralism rapidly waned

Side 232

Nonetheless, the term, and the essential ideas behind it, maintainereadily available, for example, when Lindblom and I were writing P

Welfare from 1950 to 1952. We were familiar with the British andpluralism as well as the term itself,11and made use of the word in othought to be a requirement of polyarchy:l2

Polyarchy requires a considerable degree of social pluralism thatorganization with a large measure of autonomy with respect to one

Later, however, the concept took on a life of its own. 'Pluralist theostrange melange of ideas. In fact, a good deal of the 'theory' consisthostile critics who sometimes constructed a compound of straw me

work of assorted writers who by no means held the same views. Fr'theory' that probably no competent political theorist pluralist orplausible.l3

Nevertheless, a concept along the lines set out in Politics, Economiutility. Whatever word we may prefer, some such concept appears tdescribe countries governed by polyarchal regimes, and thus to graconsequences of the change in scale from city-state to nation-state.

The Change in Perspective

Just as the development of polyarchy represented a new way of thi


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institutions, so too the gradual acceptance of pluralism as an inheredesirable aspect of democracy meant a radical break with classicaldominant assumption for nearly two millenia had been that the pro

was a small and compact unit like the ideal city-state, so too the prethe citizen body should be fairly homogeneous in race, ethnicity,

wealth, and knowledge. It was understood, of course, that some funecessary. But the notion that citizens might worship different godlanguages, or retain diverse ethnic affiliations, or differ markedly intend to generate a diversity of conflicting interests, was anathema.

of a common good, and therefore to avoid the diversities that woulfrom perceiving or having common interests, in the dominant viewstate republics and democracies, little sympathy and much hostilitysubgroups of citizens might properly pursue their special interests ithemselves into an explicitly political association. Of course, as Aris

Side 233

recognized and, centuries later, was reaffirmed in the conception oby the Italian civic humanists, citizens would be members of varioupurposes, such as families, or economic organizations like the guildof these associations need not conflict with the purposes of others

by fulfilling their purposes they would contribute to the common gthe only proper association in political life was the city itself. To bealways correspond to the ideal. In practice, factions were often raparticularly in the Italian citystates. But the idea that citizens mightthemselves, for example., in the kind of competitive and conflict asparties was completely alien.

The Legitimation of Organizational Pluralism

With the change of scale that accompanied the shift of locus from corganizational pluralism became not merely inevitable but also gainsocial and economic life but also in political life. The change is dradifference between Rousseau and Tocqueville. Rousseau, here follofinds associations more or less inevitable, but troublesome and everemarkable passage in Political Economy, he wrote:

All political societies are composed of other, smaller societies of difhas its interests and maxims. But these societies that everyone percexternal, authorized from, are not the only ones that really exist inindividuals united by a common interest constitute as many others,

whose force is no less real for being less apparent, and whose varioobserved, are the true knowledge of mores. It is all these tacit or fomodify in so many ways the appearance of the public will by the in

of these particular societies always has two relations: for the membgeneral will: for the large society, it is a private will, which is very othe first respect and vicious in the latter. ... A given deliberation casmall community and pernicious to the large one.

Seventy years later, Tocqueville, who knew Rousseau's views well, tAlthough he was not unmindful of the dangers of associations 16cothe scale of the United States, whose seeming vastness even then dmuch influenced Rousseau's thought, and greatly preoccupied withtyranny that he believed was inherent in a situation of equality likeTocqueville concluded that

At the present time, the liberty of association is become a necessartyranny of the majority. ... There are no countries in which associato prevent the despotism of faction or the arbitrary power of a prindemocratically constituted.1717

Side 234


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Several years later in the second volume of Democracy in the UniteTocqueville returned to the theme of associations, extending now hto include civil as well as political associations.

If men are to remain civilized, or to become so, that art of associatiand improve, in the same ratio in which the equality of conditions i

Pluralism and Polyarchy

The advantage of another century and a half of experience helps usrelationship between pluralism and democracy. A monistic view likContract arguably might be applicable to democracy on the smallerpredominantly commercial or agricultural economy. In a small anassociation the presence of other associations that compete for loycohesion and consensus, and stimulate conflict may be less desirabcontended, downright undesirable, and to be avoided so far as posspossibly the adversarial institutions and practices of large scale demand undesirable.19However that may be, whenever an effort has bedemocratic idea on the scale of the nation state and the institutionsexist, relatively independent associations and organizations of cons

have also developed. Following Tocqueville we might describe thembut the distinction is far from sharp since as we all know a civil asspolitical role.

It is not of course an historical accident that polyarchy and organizcoexist. For while organizational pluralism may not be a sufficientinstitutions of polyarchy are everywhere sufficient to insure that orof considerable independence, variety, and number will play an imlife of a country. The advantages of organized cooperation make orIndeed, the existence of relatively autonomous political organizatiopractice of democracy on a large scale. Finally, the rights necessarymake independent organizations legally possible. That they are desi

them inevitable. It takes only the first feeble flickerings of freedomorganizations to spring to life when the controls of an authoritarianItaly, Austria, Germany, and Japan after their regimes collapsed atCzechoslovakia in 1968, Poland during the rise of Solidarity, ArgenIndependent organizations can be suppressed only by suppressingJust as it is no accident that pluralism and polyarchy go together, s

Side 235

among the first acts following a seizure of power by authoritarian lethe suppression of autonomous political organizations: witness ChilUruguay in 1973.

et this strict connection, the relation between polyarchy and plurleast two reasons. First, it would be a profound mistake to assumeto be alike in all democratic countries. Organizational pluralism ispolitical life in both Norway and the United States, for example; buof organizations in Norway is significantly different from that of thconsequences for political life are different. One has only to look aunions in the two countries to see how different they are, and howtheir consequences. As we are all aware, party systems vary enormcountries. Let me add in passing that no one contributed more thaknowledge of these differences and our understanding of how they

These differences in the morphology of organizational life bear oncomplicates the relation between pluralism and polyarchy. If pluraland desirable in a system of polyarchy, it may also have undesirableif some interests have ready access to organizations and their resousuch a pattern may help to maintain inequalities among citizens, anmight be unjust. Or consider Rousseau's concern. Associations ma


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protect or advance the interests of their members. They may also sparticular aspects of a citizen's interests as against other, perhaps bconcerns, and interests, and in this way help to produce and maintconsciousness. When organizational pluralism helps to produce thementioned, it may also distort the public agenda by focussing the palternatives that promise visible short-run benefits to a small minorather than on alternatives that would provide significant long-runnumber of unorganized citizens.

Finally, relatively autonomous organizations or, more commonl may take on what are essentially public functions. However distaadvocate of monistic democracy like Rousseau, in itself it need notit does alert us to some possibilities that must give concern even toinherent relation of organizational pluralism to large scale democrathat control over some important public matters will be transferrenot themselves controllable, as a practical matter, by the demos anparliament and the executive.

Side 236

This transfer of control then becomes much more than mere deleg

to an organization that it controls, as at least formally is the case wby parliament to a bureaucratic agency of government. If in practicadequate control, then what occurs is not delegation but alienation

That something of this kind may indeed have taken place in many cpart for the numerous attempts in recent years to understand the easpects of what has been variously called corporatism, democratic cpluralism, and so on. The seminal work, published nearly twenty yeRokkan on Norway, the thesis of which may be summed up in his oDemocracy and Corporate Pluralism: Votes Count but Resources D

wrote, 'stands at the top of the electoral hierarchy but it is only onethe bargaining table'. The other three he had in mind were, of cour

farmers. He went on to say:

The Cabinet has increasingly had to take on the role of mediator beinterests in the national community. At least in matters of internalforce through decisions solely on the basic of its electoral power bucomplex consultations and bargains with the major interest organiz

That systems combining numerical democracy with corporate plurseems to me undeniable; but it is also undeniable that they raise pedemocratic theory and institutions. It is not difficult to justify corpthe kind Rokkan described for Norway, on pragmatic and utilitariathat it allows control over crucial public matters to be alienated, it

democratic criteria. It may be that our understanding of democracto practice, but at present no satisfactory reformulation seems to hgive democratic legitimacy to corporatism.

et corporatism in the Scandinavian manner is only one manifestaUnited States, for example, lacks the rather centralized national or

business, and farmers that make the structure of democratic corpoNorway, the Netherlands, and Austria. There the problem appears ifor example, the famous 'iron triangles' of Congressional committeinterest organizations that exercise great influence over policy-makthat takes place in corporate systems has more dramatically decisivsteady working of the iron triangles may be no less decisive in the l

concealed from public view.

Side 237


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Conclusion

The shift in the scale of democracy from city-state to nation-state hfrom monistic toward pluralist democracy. The transformation of

brought about by the enormous change of scale is dramatic and fartheory, too, has altered. The Social Contract required a state and ainexorable changes had made impossible. In that sense, it was a reait has remained so revolutionary in its implications. Writing only sehas already accepted the idea that the large nation state, not the smappropriate locus for democracy in the modern world, and anotherMill takes it utterly for granted.

et democratic theory, originally formulated as a vision of a small ssociety, is by no means wholly at ease with large scale democracy.classical democratic vision clashes with the pluralistic actuality of latheory, straddling both, often seems inadequate both descriptively

In order to take the inherent connection between polyarchy and placcount, it might be useful to suggest yet a sixth interpretation of pdescribed earlier. In this perspective, polyarchy is a kind of regimein which power and authority over public matters are distributed aorganizations and associations that are relatively autonomous in relmany cases in relation to the government of the state as well. Thesinclude rot only organizations that are, legally and sometimes consthe government of the state but also organizations that legally areconnection may often seem singularly inapt 'private': that is legaextent realistically , they are independent, or mainly independent,

Among other ways, polyarchy is distinguished from classical monissalience, power, and legitimacy of autonomous organizations in polpublic matters. Polyarchy is also distinguished from authoritarian rthe institutions of polyarchy which, by definition, no authoritarianand which provide much more scope to the democratic process thacan provide, lacking as it does one or more of the crucial institutiosufficient for, large-scale democracy; (2) By the scope of organizatidistinguishes polyarchy at one extreme from monistic authoritariantotalitarian systems and at the other extreme from authoritarianto use Juan Linz's expression, where a plurality of relatively autonoexample, does not exist.21

Side 238

Compared against the ideal of monistic democracy the dominant

Athens to Rousseau the power and authority of the organizationasubgovernments, they have sometimes been called is nothing lesthe democratic vision. Paradoxically, however or perhaps not soour world the theory and practice of monism is best exhibited in aumost relevant and likely alternative to polyarchy in the modem wordemocracy but an authoritarian regime, then even from a democrasystems of polyarchy and pluralism begin to look much more char

with the ideal monistic democracy the subsystems often are outragcomparison with the monism or limited pluralism of authoritarianthe limits of their power. They are limited by the existence and legipolyarchy, and by the existence and legitimacy of the system of righinstitutions.

That the power and authority of organizations are limited in this wthese relatively powerful organizations are permitted to retain as msecond reason, at least for some of them, is that they are, as we havscale democracy. In addition, however, the claims made by the earlGierke to Laski and Cole, are today widely accepted: relatively auto


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necessary to a good life and a decent sociopolitical order, and withicarefully specified their existence is as justifiable, morally and practitself. Furthermore, the complex system of making decisions aboutparticipate is often seen to be advantageous on purely utilitarian grleast, with any alternative that appears to be available. Yet there is aunlikely that any government in a polyarchy could effectively enforeither the autonomy of many important organizations or their authdecision-making.

Nonetheless, I do not believe we have yet found an altogether satisftensions, which exist both in theory and practice, between pluralisanomaly of democratic pluralism that Stein Rokkan remarked ondecades ago still remains with us: votes count, but often organizati

NOTES

1. The project did result in the distinguished work of Basil Chubb's,Politics of Ireland, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970.

2. Size and Democracy, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 197

3. However, Richard Fralin has shown, conclusively I think, that Rrepresentation in the Social Contract was contrary to views he exprand after that work. Rousseau and Representation, New York: Colu

Side 239

3. However, Richard Fralin has shown, conclusively I think, that Rrepresentation in the Social Contract was contrary to views he expr

and after that work. Rousseau and Representation, New York: Colu

4. Although we were unaware of it, Ernest Barker had used the ter1914 in an essay later published in Church, State, and Study (Londodiscovery to Susan Gross Solomon, ' "Pluralism" in Political sciencin the volume edited by her, Pluralism in the Soviet Union, Londonfootnote 51. However, she in turn attributes the discovery to ClaudTheory of Pluralist Democracy', Western Political Quarterly, 21 (De

5. Along with the adjective polyarchal or (rare, and avoided by Lindlater), polyarchical. The term polyarchist was also available for 'onepolyarchy' such as Lindblom or myself. The first usage listed is 1

Polyarchy as Anarchy', and the last, in 1890 by J.H. Stirling in the'Polyarchy is anarchy'. Much later, Arendt Lijphart called my attent

who treated it as one type of 'supreme magistrate': 'a polyarchic suwhich those who are furnished by the subjects with equal or the saand administer the rights of sovereignty. That is to say, the successicommunicated among a number of persons. ... This polyarchic maor democratic'. The Politics of Johannes Althusius, F.S. Carney, tra1964, p. 200.

6. In A Preface to Democratic Theory (1955), where polyarchy is agactuality, as distinguished from the ideal of democracy, I defined it(eight) conditions exist to a relatively high degree'. The 'conditions'that Lindblom and I had specified earlier, but transmogrified into tconditions of democracy. My sketch of an attempt 'to measure polassuming that each of the eight conditions could be scaled, then ledpolyarchies as 'organizations in which all eight conditions are scalethan 0.5', further distinguishing 'egalitarian polyarchies' as 'polyarc


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conditions are scaled at values equal to or greater than 0.75'. (pp. 8surprisingly, misunderstood my intentions and assumed that in mydistinguishable from perfected democracy. In later work I wholly aconfusing, achievement of pseudo-quantitative scholasticism represpages of a chapter appendix.

7. In The Problem of Sovereignty, New Haven: Yale University PreModern State, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1919.

8. He and Frida Laski translated Duguit's Transformation du Droitpublished in 1919 as Law in the Modern State.

9. For example, Francis W. Coker, 'The Technique of the PluralisticSabine, 'Pluralism: A Point of View', The American Political Scienc34-50; W.Y. JElliot, 'Sovereign State or Sovereign Group', America(August 1925) 475-499.

10. F. W. Coker's widely read text, Recent Political Thought, publischapter on 'The Pluralists' Attack on State Sovereignty'. He publishsubject the following year in a volume edited by Charles Merriam aTheory, Recent Times.

11. In 1936-7 I had taken F. W. Coker's year-long seminar at Yale owhich, though somewhat critical, he gave considerable attention toBecause I found the ideas attractive, I read, or at least dipped into,mentioned above. By coincidence, as an undergraduate at the Univread Duguit's Law in the Modern State in a course on jurisprudencstill possess, is well marked, I did not grasp much of what Duguit w

year or two later.

Side 240

12. Politics, Economics, and Welfare, p. 302. The sentence is italici

13. Since one of the sources of the 'theory' was Who Governs?, proresponsibility for the confusion. I described New Haven as having cfrom oligarchy to pluralism, a judgment I believe to be correct. In sto New Haven as a 'pluralist democracy'. But I did not attempt to dany rigor, nor to distinguish sharply between the generic features oaspects of New Haven political life that it might or might not shareThus some readers were tempted to over-interpret the meaning ofinterpretations, the book was not written to advance a general 'plufact, 'pluralism' and 'pluralist democracy' are not included in the in

have been better to have set out a more explicit theory. But perhaps14. J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment. Princeton: Princet66-80.

15. On the Social Contract with Geneva Manuscript and Political EMasters, New York: St. Martin's, 1978, pp. 212-13. Italics added.

16. In Vol. 2he repeated the warning of the first, ' "that the unrestrfor political purposes is the last degree of liberty which a people is fthem into anarchy, it perpetually brings them, as it were, to the verthat a nation is always at liberty to invest its citizens with an absolu

association for political purposes; and I doubt whether, in any couto set no limits to freedom of association'. Vol. 2, p. 143. The quota222; there, however, the translator (Henry Reeve) rendered the pas

17. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, Volume 1. New Ypp. 220-221.


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18. Ibid., Volume 2, p. 133.

19. Cf. Jane Mansbridge, Beyond Adversarial Democracy.

20. 'Norway: Numerical Democracy and Corporate Pluralism', in DWestern Europe, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966, pp. 105,

21. Juan Linz, 'Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes', in Fred I.Polsby, Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 3, Macropolitical Theo

Wesley, 1975, pp. 175-411.

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Polyarchy, Pluralism and Scale