POPPER AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY

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POPPER AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY

Fred Eidlin

Department of Political StudiesUniversity of GuelphGuelph, Ontario, Canada N1G 2W1


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POPPER AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY

Popper's Ardent Advocacy of Democracy

There is no question that Karl Popper is an ardent advocate of democracy, not

only on ethical grounds, but also on grounds of effectiveness.

Democracy as the only ethically-defensible regime

Democracy is, for Popper, the only ethically defensible kind of regime. In his

view, the state exists for its individual citizens. Moreover, according to the

"humanitarian theory of justice," which he endorses, its principal purpose should be to

protect their freedom.1 The humanitarian theory recognizes no 'natural' privileges.

"[B]irth, family connection, or wealth must not influence those who administer the law."2

It also affirms that the laws must guarantee equal justice to all alike in their private

disputes. This means that justice pertains to individual persons.3

1By "freedom," Popper does not mean a policy of strict non-interventionism, or

"laissez-faire," on the part of the state, since he recognizes that individuals may not be

able to defend their freedom if, for example, they have not had the necessary education,or do not possess the economic means. The Open Society and Its Enemies I: TheSpell of Plato (Princeton, N.J .: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 94, 111-113.

2Ibid., pp. 94-95.

If justice is

understood in this way, it is free and equal individuals who must bear the costs and

benefits of citizenship and of any state action or policy.

3Ibid., pp. 94, 101-102.


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For Popper, democracy is, by definition, that type of government by which the

rulers can be dismissed by the ruled. Tyranny is the type of government in which the

ruled cannot get rid of their rulers without bloodshed.4

Popper's view of democracy is radical and uncompromising. It leaves the

decision when to dismiss the rulers absolutely and categorically in the hands of the

ruled. "A consistent democratic constitution," Popper writes, "should exclude only one

type of change in the legal system, namely a change which would endanger its

democratic character."

Popper's main political proposal

is to avoid and resist tyranny. Tyranny is evil since it violates the humanitarian theory

of justice. Democracy is good since it allows those affected by injustice the opportunity

to remove the rulers who perpetrate it.

5

Unlike many who have reflected on problems of democracy, the Framers of the

American Constitution, for example, Popper does not show much concern about the

possibility that the people might make bad decisions. He does not even shy away from

the possibility that the people may democratically choose tyranny. Such a choice

would not, in his view, discredit democracy. It would only show that there are no

foolproof human institutions.

He stresses the importance of building institutions to protect

against bad rulers.

6 Since Popper understands freedom individualistically,7

4Ibid., p. 124.

5 The Open Society and Its Enemies II: The High Tide of Prophesy: Hegel andMarx (Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press, 1966), p.161.

6Popper, Open Society: I, p.125.

it

7Ibid., pp.111-112.



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is hard to see how he could place restraints on the freedom of individual citizens to

decide when and for what reasons it is time to dismiss the rulers.8

Some people defend democracy on ethical grounds, only to qualify their

commitment on practical grounds.

Those troubled by

the standard arguments against democracy will find Popper uncompromising. He does

not, for example, view Socrates's execution by a democratic polis or Hitler's coming to

power in a democracy as arguments against democracy. Again, they only show that

there are no foolproof institutions. Nor, I believe, is there anything in Popper's political

writings that would justify denying any citizen, no matter how lowly and ignorant, an

equal voice in determining whether the rulers should stay in power or go.

Democracy as the most efficacious regime

9

Growth of knowledge in science, in Popper's view, is not due to obedience to

authorities or adherence to established routines. Scientific knowledge grows through a

This is not true of Popper, however, who defends

democracy, not only as a means to justice, but also as the most efficacious kind of

regime. His arguments for this point of view are similar to his explanation of the

efficacy of scientific method.

8He does state that majorities should be prevented from ruling tyrannically (i.e.,from infringing upon the rights of minorities), and does insist that the men in power

"safeguard those institutions which secure to the minority the possibility of working forpeaceful change." These minimal restrictions are the only ones he stipulates. Theyare, moreover, consistent with his individualistic premises. Open Society II,pp.160-161.

9See, for example, J ohn Dunn, Western Political Theory in the Face of the Future(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), esp. pp. 3-10.



process in which every scientist's hypotheses, criticisms, and experimental results stand

on an equal par with those of all other scientists. The scientist with a distinguished

reputation may one day find his pet theory overturned by the experimental results of a

novice. Conversely, the novice may make a discovery that revolutionizes his entire

discipline. This, of course, provided that the discovery stands up to the tests and

critical scrutiny of the scientific community.

Progress in science does not occur through patient gathering of facts, which

trickle together inductively into theories. It takes place, rather, by a process of bold

guessing at the truth and elimination of errors. Severe tests and criticisms control the

freedom to guess boldly. In science, there is nothing wrong with being wrong. No

harm is done by entertaining an hypothesis that later turn out to be false. Yet, no

progress, no learning can take place when hypotheses are suppressed. Both

individual learning and growth of knowledge in science take place through trial and

error. Without errors, there can be neither learning, nor growth of knowledge. Thus,

stifling guessing and criticism hinders the growth and improvement of knowledge.

All human knowledge is fallible. Even experts are fallible and even the most

ignorant are potential sources of truth. Hence, the only truly rational attitude is to treat

all knowledge claims as possibly true, possibly mistaken, regardless of source. To be

sure, the experts in any give field are likely to have better track records than novices in

producing successful guesses. However, these very experts may also be dogmatically

defending seriously erroneous assumptions that are blocking growth of knowledge.

Their very professional "expertise" thus contains an element of "professional ignorance."



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The novice, unencumbered by this professional ignorance may sometimes be even

better poised than the experts to discover the truth. Thus, far from being a hindrance,

democracy is one of the keys to the success of the advanced sciences.

What is the implication of Popper's theory of knowledge for politics? It is that

democracy is not only the most just form of government, but also the most successful.

Democracy is likely to be successful for reasons similar to those accounting for the

growth and improvement of knowledge in science. J ust as there can be no privileged

sources of knowledge in science, there can be no privileged sources of knowledge

about politics. In politics as in science, any theory, any person may lead into error, no

matter what his-her-its reputation for insight, truthfulness, and reliability. Conversely,

any proposal, coming even from the simplest, the most ignorant of citizens, may be just

the right solution to some long intractable political dilemma. It may be the experiment

or criticism of a novice that overturns the theory of the most prestigious scientist in the

field. So may the proposal or criticism of the simplest or most ignorant of citizens show

previously unrecognized flaws in a respected leader or widely-accepted policy. Thus,

in addition to his arguments that regimes should be democratic to be just, Popper

argues that they should also be democratic to be successful. Since good ideas can

come even from simple and ignorant people, it is important to listen to them. Since any

policy may be mistaken, regardless of who made it, it is important to see even simple

and ignorant citizens as potential sources of valuable criticism of policy.



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Some Incongruities in Popper's Democratic Theory

Despite Popper's ardent advocacy of democracy, several aspects of his views

set them apart from the mainstream of democratic theory. To put it bluntly, Popper is

simply indifferent to most of the problems usually discussed by those interested in

democratic theory. Readers will search Popper's main political writings, The Open

Society and Its Enemies and The Poverty of Historicism10 in vain for discussion of

many, if not most, of the standard problems usually discussed by specialists in

democratic theory. Popper does not, for example, seem concerned about such

problems as low voter turnout, the low level of knowledge voters have about their

elected representatives, what they do, and what positions they hold on current issues

facing government. He shows no concern for such standard problems as

Gerrymandering, "wasted votes" and underrepresentation of minorities in two-party,

single-member district, first-past-the-post electoral systems, such as England, Canada,

and the United States.11 He concedes, even insists, that the people do not really rule

themselves. They are, he writes, ruled by governments and bureaucrats, "our civil

servants or uncivil masters ... whom it is difficult, if not impossible, to make accountable

for their actions."12

10(New York and Evanston: The Academy Library, 1964).

11Lund, J acob, Letter in The Economist, May 21 1988.

12"Popper on Democracy: the open society and its enemies revisited," TheEconomist, p.20.

However, he shows little interest in the concrete practical and

theoretical problems of how to get these "uncivil masters" under democratic control.



7

More generally, Popper has not addressed the various conceptual and practical

problems of determining what "the people" want and how to bring their wishes to bear

upon government. These include, among others, how to conceptualize and implement

the notion of democratic consensus.13

At least since completion of his doctoral dissertation in 1928,1

How to conceptualize public opinion, read it and

bring it to bear upon public policy? What to do when elections result in conflicting

mandates from the same electorates, such as a President elected to cut the budget and

a Congress elected to vote more money for federal programs?

Part of the explanation of these striking gaps in the democratic theory of such an

ardent democrat has to do with why Popper came to write about politics and democracy

in the first place. His main scholarly interests have never been in the domain of

political philosophy. Moreover, unlike most who have written about political philosophy,

he did not set to work out a theory of politics that would address the standard range of

questions political philosophers usually feel obliged to address.

4

13As, for example, Werner Becker, in his Elemente der Demokratie (Stuttgart:

Philipp Reclam jun., 1985), pp. 60-73.

Popper's main

scholarly interests have centred on problems in the theory of knowledge, especially in

the philosophy of physics. Had Western liberal democracy not been subjected to

mortal threat from fascist and communist totalitarianisms, Popper would probably not

have turned his attention professionally to political philosophy. Popper was long

14Up to that time, he had been working in the on the psychology of thought anddiscovery. However, after completing his Ph.D., he reports having turned away frompsychology, leaving his work in there unfinished (Popper, Unended Quest (La Salle, IL:1976), p. 78. See also William Berkson and John Wettersten, Lernen aus dem Irrtum:Die Bedutung von Karl Popper's Lerntheorie f ür die Psychologie und die Philosophie derWissenschaft (Hamburg: Hoffmann und Campe, 1982).



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interested and involved in politics, and in the methods of the social sciences. However,

not until Hitler's occupation of Austria in March 1938, did he come to the conclusion that

he could "no longer hold back whatever knowledge of political problems [he] had

acquired since 1919."15 He, himself, refers to The Open Society and The Poverty as

his "war effort,"16 and considers them as a digression transcending his professional

interests.17

Popper's aim in writing these books was to combat certain influential ideas about

politics and society in the Western political tradition which he, as a theorist of knowledge

considered to be mistaken and pernicious.

1

8

He believed that, after the war, "freedom

might become a central problem again, especially under the renewed influence of

Marxism." These books are therefore intended as "a defence of freedom against

totalitarian and authoritarian ideas, and a warning against the dangers of historicist

superstitions."19

Both the tone and substance of his writings on politics suggest that Popper is by

The Marxists claimed that scientific authority backed the theory

guiding their political action. Popper thus believed it to be his obligation to use what he

had learned about the status of knowledge claims in the advanced sciences to expose

Marxism as pseudo-science.

15Popper, Unended Quest (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1976), p. 113).

16Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies II: The High Tide of Prophecy: Hegel,Marx, and the Aftermath (Princeton, N.J .: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 393;

Idem. Unended Quest (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1976), p. 115.

17Popper, Open Society, pp.395-396.

18Popper, Open Society I, p. vii.

19Popper, Unended Quest (La Salle, IL: 1976), p. 115.



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no means unaware of serious flaws in Western liberal democratic regimes.

Nevertheless, he does not think it should be necessary to defend democracy.20

To sum up, Popper did not approach political theory troubled by either the theory

or practice of democracy. It was the dangers to democratic regimes posed by

totalitarian theories that moved him to write about politics. His principal aim is to

combat the anti-democratic propaganda of these regimes and their sympathizers by

criticizing various philosophical doctrines from which they derive intellectual support.

Although his writings are full of keen insights into various weaknesses of democracy, he

believes the virtues of existing liberal democratic regimes to be self-evident. He also

thinks such regimes are fully capable of correcting themselves without any particular

assistance from philosophers. He seems rather disinterested in those theoretical and

practical difficulties that preoccupy scholars in democratic theory and occasionally

So, Popper's aims in writing about politics in general and democracy in particular,

were narrower than those of most philosophers of politics. He has made no attempt to

address anything like the full range of problems that have preoccupied political thinkers.

Nor does he consider democracy to be especially problematic. On the contrary, he

takes for granted its basic soundness. While not idealizing Western liberal democracy,

like Winston Churchill, he considers it the best and most just form of government that

has ever existed in a world which will always remain imperfect. He also regards it as

the kind of system most likely to improve itself.

20 This is most obvious in his interview with the French magazine, L'Express ("Leschemins de la vérité: L'Express va plus loin avec Karl Popper," 19-25 f évrier 1982, pp.152. Here, he praises our liberal-democratic society as being the best that everyexisted, and says that "not to admit it is a crime."



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become objects of debate in the political arena. Popper's views on democracy thus lie,

to some extent outside the main traditions of reflection on democratic theory. They are

incomplete and contain serious gaps and flaws. Nevertheless, I will argue that they

represent an interesting and potentially valuable contribution to democratic theory.

What Sets Popper's Views on Democratic Theory Apart from the Mainstream?

There has been much praise for The Open Society as a powerful defence of

liberal democracy. Nevertheless, I long suspected that the radical difference between

Popper's views on democracy and those of the mainstream of democratic theory had

not been much noticed or appreciated. My suspicion was confirmed by Popper,

himself, in an article published in The Economist. There he contends that, although his

theory of democracy is "very simple and easy to understand," its "fundamental problem

is so different from the age-old theory of democracy which everybody takes for granted

that it seems that this difference has not been grasped." He suggests that it is just

because of the simplicity of the theory that it has not been grasped.21

The principal difference between Popper's theory of democracy and the theory

everybody takes for granted is the same feature that distinguishes Popper's theory of

politics more generally from other theories of politics. This is his outright rejection of

I believe he is right on the first count, but not on the second. The difference has

indeed not been noticed, or grasped, but not just because of its simplicity.

21"Popper on Democracy."



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the question 'Who should rule' as the fundamental problem of politics. In The Open

Society, Popper holds Plato responsible for creating a lasting confusion in political

philosophy by expressing the problem of politics in the form 'Who should rule?' or

'Whose will should be supreme?' etc. Writing against the background of Nazi and

Stalinist totalitarianism, he proposes, first of all, that since we cannot be sure of getting

good rulers, we should replace the question "Who should rule" with the entirely different

question: "How can we minimize the damage bad rulers can do?" Instead of dwelling

on the question of who the best rulers might be, we should plan for the worst rulers.

We should do this by creating institutions that minimize the damage they can do.

22

This aspect of Popper's democratic theory, the negativism it shares with his

theory of knowledge, has not gone unnoticed. It is widely known that Popper

advocates negative aims like fighting tyranny and eliminating avoidable human suffering

rather than positive aims like trying to do good (however this may be understood). One

might criticize this aspect of his political theory for its refusal even to look at the positive

uses of state power. One might also criticize it for ignoring the positive contributions

good rulers can make, and the problems of improving the recruitment and training of

good rulers and public administrators.

This aim is, of course the practical corollary of Popper's recommendation that tyranny

should be avoided and resisted. It is impossible to prevent people with tyrannical

aspirations from becoming rulers from time to time. Therefore, it is an important part of

the fight against tyranny to build institutions that prevent these people from doing too

much damage when they succeed in coming to power.

22Open Society, pp.120-121.



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Nevertheless, it is not here that Popper departs radically from mainstream

democratic theory. In fact, Popper's concerns and proposals here are closely related to

those of the Framers of the American Constitution, whose central aim, like his, was to

establish institutions insuring that power would check power and ambition would check

ambition.. Where Popper radically parts company with the mainstream is in his refusal

recognize the problem of getting power in the right hands as fundamental.

Popper criticizes all interpretations of politics that place emphasis on the locus of

sovereignty, including popular sovereignty.23 He is strikingly disinterested in such

issues as whether "the people" actually rule themselves. For the question "Who

rules?" to be fundamental, we would have to assume that political power is essentially

unchecked. We would further have to assume that someone has the power, and that

whoever has the power can do nearly what he wills. In fact, Popper argues, since

there are always enormous constraints on the exercise of political power, nobody really

rules in the sense of the theory of unchecked sovereignty. Since those who hold power

cannot do whatever they want, it is not sufficient to get the "right people" into power.24

There is also a moral dimension to Popper's objection. No person, no group, no

class ought to be recognized as sovereign. No one should be given the right to

exercise power as he wills. This is so, not only because all theories of sovereignty are

paradoxical, and not only because any sovereign will be fallible. It is also because no

such sovereign should have the right to do anything he/she/it wants to do. Popper

explicitly rejects any view of democracy that imputes any particular wisdom or infallibility

23Ibid., pp.124-125.

24Ibid., pp.121-122.



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to the "voice of the people."25

Popper is of course right to point out that it is governments, not the people which

actually rule. However, to put the matter this way is to trivialize the concerns of many

Popper's disinterest in so many of the standard problems of democratic theory

can be partly explained by the fact that many of these problems in some way assume

the theory of unchecked sovereignty. So, for example, he would agree with the

empirical observations of many students of democracy suggesting, that "the people" are

not actually determining public policy, not actually participating in government.

However, the fact that the people are not actually ruling simply does not trouble him.

As long as the people can get rid of their rulers, government can be said to be of the

people. This power should be sufficient to ensure that government will act for the

people.

Problems with Popper's Views on Democracy

We have already noted several gaps in Popper's views on democracy. In this

section we will assess some of the consequences of these lacunae. We will see that

Popper ignores or misconstrues several very important problems of democratic theory.

His theory of democracy is therefore flawed and incomplete.

Does Popper really mean to abandon the ideal of government by the people?

25Ibid., p.125.



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political thinkers and activists who take seriously the ideal that the people actually

should rule. Moreover, even if it is empirically ascertained that the people are not, in

fact, ruling, it would not mean they should not be ruling.26

"Government" includes many types of social process; the bureaus are

hierarchical, some of them operate within a price system, and bargaining

among hierarchical leaders is common. [Even] [t]he demand for

populistic democracy does not entail a demand for the elimination of these

alternative control processes. ... [W]ithin government the processes that

allow a more or less final or decisive voice on policy are crucial.2

Few if any who believe in the importance of "the people" ruling themselves would

argue that all citizens should be involved in making all decisions. As Robert Dahl, for

example, points out,

7

It would, of course, be possible to interpret Popper's vague definition of

democracy as identical to what is usually meant by the terms democracy and popular

The ideal of rule by the people usually assumes that citizens should be able to influence

public policy if and when they wish. It means that the makers of public policy,

bureaucrats and elected officials alike, should regard themselves as servants of the

people and behave accordingly. It also means that laws and government policies

should reflect the values, wishes and preferences of the majority and respect the rights

of minorities.

26Fred Eidlin, "Popper's Fact-Standard Dualism Contra the Fact-Value Distinction,"Social Science Quarterly 64(1), pp.1-18.

27A Preface to Democratic Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956),p.49.



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sovereignty. If no one can tell citizens how to vote, then they really are sovereign.

They can dismiss their rulers for whatever reason they choose. They can make us of

this right to dismiss their rulers and replace them with rulers who allow greater

participation in the processes of government. Popper may protest that he never meant

anything different from this. However, one might then wonder about the significance of

his sweeping dismissals of all concern with the people actually exercising control over

their governments.

Problems with Popper's democracy-tyranny dichotomy

As we have seen, Popper defines democracy as a system in which the rulers can

be changed without bloodshed. He defines tyranny as a system in which the rulers

cannot be changed without bloodshed. "In a non-democratic state," he writes, "the only

way to achieve reasonable reforms is by violent overthrow of the government, and

introduction of a democratic framework."28

There have been non-democratic (by Popper's definition) regimes in which

considerable reforms have been made without "violent overthrow of the government."

Again, he is either wrong, or has expressed

himself so vaguely that it is impossible to take issue with him. With Hitler and Stalin in

view, the matter may have appeared to be so clear and simple. Yet Popper's definition

turns out to be far less satisfying when applied to most regimes existing in the world

today.

28Open Society I, p.127; Open Society II, p.161.



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De-stalinization was carried out in the USSR. Hungary developed its goulash (reform)

communism. The "Prague Spring" of 1968, changes in the Polish regime after the

imposition of martial law in 1981, and Perestroika" in the USSR are additional examples

of significant reform programs which came about without violent overthrow of the

regimes in question.

Moreover, it isn't clear that violent overthrow would even have been the best way

to bring about "reasonable reforms" of the Communist regime in the USSR or in the

countries of Eastern Europe. Moreover, there are many examples of countries without

free elections, in which the rulers have been changed without bloodshed. For example,

several leaders of communist regimes were replaced without bloodshed--e.g., Malenkov

and Khrushchev in the USSR, Novotny in Czechoslovakia, Ulbricht, in East Germany,

Ochab, Gomulka, Gierek, Kania and J aruzelski in Poland.

One might object that the reforms carried out under "tyrannies" are not

"reasonable reforms." One might argue that peaceful removals from power under

"tyrannies" are affairs of the ruling elites of those countries. Since they do not involve

the broad masses of the people, the people never get to choose the kind of regime they

want.

On the other hand, one can also argue that, even in democracies, citizens only

get to choose among candidates selected by powerful elites who control the nomination

processes. Moreover, despite their having some choice of their leaders, citizens of

democracies, like people living under tyrannies, are ruled also ruled largely by

bureaucrats who are not removed by democratic elections. Also like the people living



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under tyrannies, they rarely get an opportunity to make choices about the kind of regime

under which they will live. Furthermore, "reasonable reforms" are often impossible

under "democratic" regimes. This may be due to such factors as bureaucratic

sabotage and inertia, vetoes by powerful minorities and private organizations, paralysis

inherent in the structure of democratic institutions, themselves, etc.

My point is not to trivialize the differences between democracy and tyranny. It is

to show that, once again, Popper has proposed a bold, simple definition which turns out

to be vague and difficult to apply. It is not clear what he means in saying that, in a

democracy, we can change our rulers." Moreover, the literature on tyranny and on

democracy suggests that neither of these phenomena are as simple as Popper's

definition would lead us to believe.

What does it mean to "build institutions"?

Popper often refers to the need for "building and defending institutions."

"Democracy," he writes, ... "provides the institutional framework for the reform of

political institutions. It makes possible the reform of institutions without using violence,

and thereby the use of reason in the designing of new institutions and the adjusting of

old ones.29

29Open Society I, p.126.

As already noted, democracy does not necessarily produce an institutional

framework that is conducive to reform. On the contrary, it is easy to find examples of

democracies being incapable of carrying out needed reforms.



18

Nor does democracy necessarily make possible the reform of institutions without

using violence. Many important reforms were achieved under democratic regimes only

by those who favoured them going outside established democratic institutions. They

were sometimes achieved only after resort to violence. Some examples would be

various extensions of the suffrage and abolition of legislation prohibiting labour unions.

Nor is it clear that democracy particularly favours the use of reason in the designing of

new institutions and the adjusting of old ones better than, say an enlightened

dictatorship like Napoleon's or Gorbachev's.

Popper isn't clear about what he means by "building" or "defending" democratic

institutions, or about the role democratic institutions might play in preventing tyranny.

As Popper, himself argues, very few institutions are consciously-designed. Most of

them just grow.30

Also, many political theorists have strongly emphasized the role of social

indoctrination and habituation in creating attitudes and personality types that favour the

survival and success of democracy. Even a hard-headed realist like Machiavelli

believed that the basic check on tyranny was networks of habits and attitudes inculcated

throughout society, rather than legal formulas or institutions providing for checks on the

exercise of power. Contemporary social scientists too have stressed the importance of

such factors as family structure, belief systems, myths, heroes, legitimate types of

behaviour in primary groups, prevailing or modal personality types. These and other

Second, the call to defend democratic institutions easily lends itself

to becoming mere rationalization of an institutional status quo that shores up some

particular distribution of power and privilege.

30Open Society II, Ch.14.



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similar factors are crucial in determining the probable responses of leaders and

non-leaders, and thus in determining the likelihood of emergence of tyranny or survival

of democracy.31

Another problem in Popper's views on democracy is, I believe, his categorical

rejection of what he calls the "vicious" principle of legitimacy.3

On the one hand, there have been many dictatorial regimes with democratic

constitutions and institutions faithfully emulating the American or British model. On the

other hand, there have been many examples of where democratic attitudes and

practices have pre-existed and perhaps been prerequisite to the adoption of democratic

constitutions and institutions.

The Problem of Legitimacy

2

Governments routinely make decisions that are binding on all, despite conflicting

The problem of

legitimacy is, of course, widely recognized as a central problem in political theory. If

the state is to command voluntary obedience, both the normative question of why

people should, accept its authority and the explanation of why they do in fact accept it

are crucial. Governments routinely take actions that would be considered criminal if

performed by other institutions or individuals. Taxation, imprisonment, execution, and

expropriation, for example, are considered rightful due to the legitimacy of the existing

regime.

31Dahl, Preface to Democratic Theory, pp.17-18.

32"Popper on Democracy," p.20.



20

aims, values and interests among the citizenry. Sometimes, governments have to take

actions that a majority of citizens intensely dislike. They may do so to protect the

interests of future generation, the rights of minorities, or the foundations of the state as

an institution. Again, it is the legitimacy of the regime that justifies such actions.

Moreover, every regime needs reservoirs of support and good feeling order effectively

to pursue even the limited aims Popper ascribes to the state.

In his principal political writings, Popper does not directly address the problem of

legitimacy. He does, however, attack various historicist, racialist, and holistic doctrines

which various regimes have used to legitimate their rule. More recently, however, in

his Economist, article he mounts a frontal attack on the very concern with legitimation.

Why is Popper so troubled by the very concern with the problem of legitimation of

the authority of the state? It appears that he uses the term "legitimacy" not as it is

usually understood in political theory, that is, in the sense suggested above. Rather,

he seems to confuse legitimacy with holding dogmatically to some abstract moral

principle justifying an exercise unchecked sovereignty. Since, according to Popper,

everyone makes mistakes, no one should have a right to unchecked sovereignty. He

sees the fundamental theological and ideological struggles throughout European history

about who should rule as leading only to catastrophe. Since the "Glorious Revolution,"

however, he contends that the British "became dubious about abstract principles; and

the Platonic problem "Who should rule?" was no longer seriously raised in Britain until

our own days."33

Popper may be right in arguing that Western political thought has been too much

33Ibid., pp.19-20.



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preoccupied the question "Who should rule?" However, he is surely mistaken to

contend that a concern with legitimacy necessarily assumes the search for an abstract

principle justifying an unchecked sovereignty. As Robert Dahl puts it, "So far as I am

aware, no one has ever advocated, and no one except its enemies has ever defined

democracy to mean, that a majority would or should do anything it felt an impulse to

do."34

To be sure, the English may have stopped quarrelling about exclusive principles

of legitimacy. Moreover, their regime enjoys considerable stability. This does not,

however, mean that legitimacy is of no importance in England. It means only that

legitimacy is not a current political problem in England. As in most regimes, there is a

wide variety of sources of legitimacy underlying the regime. Sometimes they logically

contradict one another. Nevertheless, they can and do comfortably coexist and

mutually reinforce each other in actual political life. Somehow, the Queen, whose

image appears on British coins, surrounded by the inscription "D.G. Regina,"

contributes to the legitimacy of the regime along with the seemingly contradictory

doctrine of popular sovereignty.

Certainly, a concern for democratic legitimacy does not imply this.

The search for legitimacy in several Communist regimes after the death of Stalin

illustrate this very nicely. Lack of authority due to lack of legitimacy prevented the

power holders from taking many difficult decisions necessary to address many of the

urgent problems facing the countries they governed. The search for legitimation was a

process of seeking out those individuals, groups and principles which together could

produce the authority necessary to govern effectively.

34Preface to Democratic Theory, p.36.



22

Popper's anti-irrationalism, anti-emotionalism

Popper's insensitivity to the problem of political legitimation in general and of

democratic legitimacy in particular has deeper roots. It reflects his deep distaste for the

emotional, the irrational, aspects of politics more generally.

It would not be entirely correct to say that he fails to grasp their importance. In

many places, he explicitly recognizes such emotional aspects, not only of politics, but

even of science. He often shows penetrating insight into them. For example, he

writes, "Everyone who has an inkling of the history of the natural sciences" "is aware of

the passionate tenacity which characterizes many of its quarrels.

No amount of political partiality can influence political theories more

strongly than the partiality shown by some natural scientists in favour of

their intellectual offspring."35

Popper credits Plato with deep sociological insight into the "severe strain under which

his contemporaries were suffering due to the social revolution which had begun with the

rise of democracy and individualism." He follows with a perceptive analysis of this

"strain of civilization."3

6

35Popper, Open Society II, p.217.

36Popper, Open Society I, pp.171-189.

He also characterizes the social situation of our time as a

situation "influenced to a large extent by the decline of authoritarian religion [which] has

led to a widespread relativism and nihilism: to the decline of all beliefs, even the belief in



23

human reason, and thus in ourselves."37 He even admits that the "new way of

knowing" which he is advocating may be "too abstract, and too sophisticated to replace

the loss of authoritarian religion."38

As these characteristic examples show, one cannot fault Popper for not

recognizing the important influence of irrational factors in social life, or that such factors

frequently triumph over reason. They represent, for him, enemies of freedom and

reason and the main aim of his political writings is to defend rationalism against their

influence. Nationalism, racialism, holism, collectivism, romanticism, tribalism,

historicism are all dangers to the open society in Popper's view. He draws no

distinctions between mild and pernicious strains of these various aspects of

irrationalism. He does not even raise the empirical question of whether such

"irrationalist" doctrines can or have ever existed in benign forms. He does not ask if

they can be benign if tempered by other ideas in a balanced political culture. Nor, most

importantly, does he argue with such ideas at the level where they have their greatest

influence, namely, at the level of ideology. He sees ideology as opposed to reason and

opposes reason to ideology. The Open Society is an plea for to readers to bear "the

strain of personal responsibility, of carrying the cross of being human."3

9

Once we begin to rely upon our reason, he writes, and to use our powers

of criticism, once we feel the call of personal responsibilities, and with it,

the responsibility of helping to advance knowledge, we cannot return to a

37Popper, Open Society II p.381.

38Ibid.

39 Ibid., p.200.



2

state of implicit submission to tribal magic.""

"For those who have eaten of the tree of knowledge," he writes, paradise is lost.".

The more we try to return to the heroic age of tribalism, the more surely do

we arrive at the Inquisition, at the Secret Police, and at a romanticized

gangsterism. beginning with the suppression of reason and truth, we

must end with the most brutal and violent destruction of all that is human.

There is no return to a harmonious state of nature. If we turn back, then

we must go the whole way--we must return to the beasts.40

Protectionism: Popper's theory of democratic legitimation

In other words, Popper scorns the emotional aspects of political life and rejects

the doctrines he characterizes as irrationalist doctrines rather than exploring the

conditions under which they become dangerous. He does not inquire into possibilities

for taming them and putting them at the service of liberal-democracy. Many of these

doctrines, in tamed form play an important part in the political life of the

liberal-democratic regimes which Popper admires. Moreover, these regimes all make

use of ideology, propaganda (or information policy), rhetoric, myth, indoctrination

(education for citizenship) etc. Winston Churchill, for whom Popper has frequently

expressed the greatest respect and admiration, was a master in the use of many of the

political instruments for which Popper expresses contempt.

40Popper, Open Society I, pp.200-201.



25

Popper does address in fact address the problem of democratic legitimacy in The

Open Society. In elaborating his theory of political protectionism he defends a

non-historicist variant of social contract theory. This view of the social contract offers

an answer to the question of why citizens should accept the authority of the state. The

authority of the state should derive from the principle that the state provides equal

protection to all its citizens. Popper's understanding of "equal protection" recognizes

that not all citizens are equally equipped to defend their freedom. His position is thus

not as vulnerable as those of some advocates of equality before the law who do not

recognize that social and economic inequality can result in real inequalities before the

law. Protectionism is Popper's proposed solution to the problem of legitimacy. It is his

answer to the question why citizens should obey the law, why they should accept the

burdens of citizenship.

Although protectionism is a good argument, it does not go nearly far enough in

addressing the problem of legitimacy. Popper wants to insure that all the people,

regardless of how lowly and ignorant, have an equal voice in determining when the

rulers should stay or go. In order for protectionism is to work as a legitimating principle,

it has to be understood and accepted. All the merits of his arguments for protectionism

notwithstanding, if they are not understood and accepted they not be worth much. As

Walter Bagehot puts it in his defence of monarchy, "The best reason why monarchy is a

strong government is, that it is an intelligible government: the mass of mankind

understand it, and they hardly anywhere in the world understand any other."41

41 The English Constitution "The Monarchy," (1872), in Bartlett's Familiar

In other



26

words, if a government adheres rigorously to a protectionist policy, but the people do

not like it (whether or not they have taken the trouble to understand it) they would have

the right to dismiss their rulers for pursuing it.

As Popper, himself, points out, "the strength of the laws does not lie in the

sanctions, in the protective power of the state which enforces them, but in the

individual's readiness to obey them, i.e. in the individual's moral will."42

However, is the "moral will" of citizens, even combined with sanctions, enough to

give the law sufficient strength? What if a significant number of citizens do not have

sufficient moral will and fear of sanctions to make them to obey the law? What if they

manage to rally a majority of citizens to the view that protecting the weak from being

bullied by the strong is bad for the country, and bring about dismissal of the rulers who

have promoted this policy? Is this not democracy? Popper certainly would have the

right try to persuade them to show more moral will. However, following his own

principles, it is hard to see what right he would have to compel them to do so? What is

to be done about democratically ruled publics who do not exhibit sufficient moral will?

What is to be done about states full of individuals unprepared for democratic citizenship,

etc. Since Popper refuses to look at anything that smacks of citizenship education,

inculcation of myths, ideologies and doctrines, one may wonder what he would propose

He is certainly

right to deny that this moral will need be selfish, as many have assumed. The demand

to "protect the weak from being bullied by the strong," he notes, has been raised not

only by the weak, but often by the strong.

Quotations, Fourteenth Edition (Boston: Little, Brown, 1968), p. 726.

42Popper, Open Society I p.115.



27

to do about such problems.

Popper's Contribution to Democratic Theory

Popper has often argued that "words do not matter." Yet it is probably in part

because he defines regimes in which the people can get rid of their rulers without

bloodshed "democracy," that many readers have failed to see how radical is his

departure from what is usually called democracy. His arguments for democracy and

about democracy represent an attempt to show, not only that what is usually thought of

as democracy is utopian, but that democracy, as usually understood, is a mistaken ideal

anyway. Since the word "democracy" is usually taken to mean rule by the people, it

might have been better if Popper had chosen some other word to label his views.

Although Popper may be right that words shouldn't matter, words and concepts actually

have considerable influence on thinking. Popper uses the word "democracy" and

represents himself as its ardent advocate. This tends to obscure the fact that he does

not consider democracy, as the word is usually used, to be either possible or desirable.

Nevertheless, flawed though they may be, whether called democracy or not,

Popper's views are well worth thinking about, and represent an important contribution to

democratic theory. Ample experience suggests that Popper is right in arguing that it is

mistaken to see the solution to political problems in putting power in "the right hands."

How many times, for example, have nationalist movements viewed national



28

liberation in terms of replacing foreign rulers by their own nationals, only to end up

under a far more oppressive regime of their own nationals? The same can be said

about those Marxist "successes" which have replaced oppression by the bourgeoisie

with oppression by the proletariat.

Whatever can be said about the desirability of having a particular kind of person

or point of view present, even dominant, in the governing councils of the state, this is

not enough to insure either justice or sound policy. Moreover, justice and sound policy

can prevail without particular kinds of person or points of view being actually present in

the governing councils of the state. Ample experience also suggests that Popper is

right about attempts to put "the people" (however this may be understood) in control.

"The people" in power have often turned out to be tyrannical rulers. "The people" in

power have often been incompetent.

Student representation in the governing councils of universities often results in

the students learning to think like university bureaucrats or becoming manipulable tools

of experienced university politicians. Proletarian rulers in Soviet-type regimes may

have continued to list their profession as "worker." However, they quickly adopted the

mentality of apparatchiks once placed in positions of power. Something like this also

often happens to workers' representatives in the governing councils of industrial

enterprises.

This is by no means to denigrate the demand for representation of student and

worker interests in decision making bodies that affect their lives. It does, however, lend

support Popper's argument that such problems are not necessarily solved merely by



29

putting these people or their representatives in the decision making councils,

themselves. Clear recognition of this important point, that is, elimination of the

prejudice that giving power to the people is the solution to all kinds of problems, frees

the mind to think about more adequate solutions to these problems.

Documents

POPPER AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY