PORK RULES! BUDGETING FOR EFFICIENT OUTCOMES1

Ernesto E. Tomas Jr.

UP-National College of Public Administration and Governance October 20, 2008

INTRODUCTION

The pork barrel system in public sector budgeting has earned the right alongside

patronage in the administration- politics nexus studies. The phenomenon, despite notoriety, has

proven resilient to reform and remains impervious to the popularity of new public management

and good governance movements. This resiliency is due to its efficacy in facilitating

particularistic interests, both satisfying the local populations demand for public goods, and

elected officials agenda. In the way that the practice defied economic sense, so it appeared

efficient politically.

Most literature on the pork barrel, empirical and otherwise, and on pork barreling for that

matter, have regarded the phenomenon in almost the same manner, that it is inefficient, graft and

corruption- ridden, and wasteful in all aspects (Vidallion- Cario, 1966; Weingast, et.al.,1981;

Wildavski, 1992; Coronel, et.al., 1998, 2003). The judgment was, when politicians (but

legislators in particular) get their way, tendencies toward particularistic interest takes over and

distort the budgets direction. Essentially, scarce public funds are redirected to pet projects for

favored clients. In the analytical plane, narrow interests and short- run gains are substituted for

social- developmental outcomes originally aspired by the budget framers.

But even the practice of patronage saw its decline in history, and its purpose and use (as

advanced by functionalists) reduced. The pork barrel system, it is shown, have met the same fate,

or at the least, pork barreling has submitted to some tweaking, i.e. rules that reduce the discretion

given to politicians. The barrage of criticisms directed to the practice did have results, only not as

great or as far reaching as critics would like.

1 Paper submitted to Prof. J. Prospero de Vera III, in partial fulfillment of the course PA 208.

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The paper is basically an account of the recent changes concerning the pork barrel in the

Philippines. The author examined pork barrel expenditures of Senators over a 5-year period,

specifically for fiscal years 2002-2006 when rules have changed as a result of pressure to

rationalize expenditures. Owing to the Asian crisis, the countrys precarious fiscal situation, and

then newly elected and popular President Joseph Ejercito Estrada, pork as known before

underwent change that undermined legislators power and effective control of the purse.

This paper skips the many stories on pork barrel, from the seminal study by Cario (1966)

on the dynamics of pork practice (The Politics and Administration of the Pork Barrel), to the

horrific accounts of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (Pork and Other Perks,

1998 and The Rule Makers, 2004). The author emphasizes that the mentioned works were

instrumental to establishing the present negative perception. The reader is advised to consult

these texts.

The report is presented as follows: first, budgeting theory and the preferred dominance

of the executive over the legislative branch on matters of planning and spending; second, the

introduction by the Executive Branch of National Budget Circular No. 476 (s.2001) and No. 479

(s.2002) that gave the menu of projects to be funded under the Priority Development Assistance

Fund (PDAF), in the process severely constraining legislative decision on the choice of project;

and finally, discussion on the benefit and costs of such arrangement, and some development

concerns.

PLANNING AND BUDGETING FOR DEVELOPMENT

A vital role of government is to improve its capacity to respond to the needs of the people

it governs. This role relates to the ability of government to adjust its structures and functions

according to the ever-changing needs of society. Governments existence, therefore, is justified

by its ability to give an efficient, effective and responsive machinery for the implementation of

programs and services that would directly promote the welfare of the people. One way to

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effectively carry out this role is through the budget. The budget, as an instrument of policy, is the

concrete manifestation of governments priorities. What was once a word that originally meant a

pouch for carrying money has, through the years, taken on a larger meaning. Today, we hear

frequently about the budget package put together by Congress and the President.

Unfortunately, with the lack of transparency in the process of making it, its meaning has become

rather obscure and its implications, tedious.

No single document completely represents "the Philippine Budget". The only document

that resembles a formal budget is a book representing the President's preferences --- her wish list,

so to speak. When we hear that the budget is "unrealistic", we learn that many of these

preferences conflict with those of others.

Other documents comprising the budget are the House and Senate budget resolutions

specifying how much should be spent on programs, as well as how much revenue should be

raised. However, these too are incomplete. In the end, we are left with a variety of pieces of

legislation--- spending through appropriations, subsidies, debt, tax preferences, and more--- that,

taken together, constitute the budget.

Skepticism surrounding the budget is disturbing, considering that it is, as many have

pointed out, the most important tool for the improvement of social and economic well-being of

the public. Taken as a whole, the budget is a representation, in monetary terms, of government

activity. If politics is regarded in part as conflict over whose preferences shall prevail, then the

budget records the outcomes of this struggle. V.O. Keys famous words, "Who gets what of

scarce resources and by how much" is one question whose answer lies in the budget.

In the most integral sense, budgeting attempts to allocate scarce financial resources

through political processes in order to realize different visions of the "good life". That these

visions of good life conflict mean that not all promises can be kept. However, this should not be

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the reason for disbelief in the instrument and the process. Rather, in this paper, we treat it as a

cause for renewed vigilance.

Budgeting practice holds that the Executive Department (Article VII- Sec. 22, 1987

Constitution) takes the lead in the crafting of the budget, while the principle of checks-and-

balance placed the power of the purse, i.e. of authorizing the appropriation of all public funds to

Congress (Article VI- Sec. 24-25, 1987 Constitution).

The Executive branch basically has six months to prepare the budget, from January to

June of each year. With its vast amount of resources, i.e. professionals, experts, and frontline

employees, it is expected to have a solid plan responding to the many demands of the people. The

Development Budget Coordination Committee (DBCC) composed of the DBM, NEDA, BSP and

DOF, is in aid of the President in coming up with the full blown budget proposal, contained in 4

documents namely the Presidents Budget Message (PBM), the Budget of Expenditures and

Sources of Financing (BESF), the National Expenditure Program (NEP), and Government

Staffing Summary (GS).

Herein lies the problem. Although with enough time to formulate, the Executive

committee in its 6-month preparation of the financial document goes without consulting

Congress, not until submission as prescribed by the Constitution. And while deferring to the

DBCC and respective national government agencies (NGA) mandate and perceived competence

in determining the needs of the nation, the reality is many national and regional programs and

projects are actually local in scope and application. Furthermore, substantial functions and

services have already been devolved to local government units which complicate matters in that

the financing and supply of services between national and local units simply do not add up.

Bottom line, the determination of projects and activities are made by central agencies who

want to maintain control over public funds and despite the devolution trend, much of public

resources still rest with the national government . Service needs can be best met with local

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offices providing front line and many other services. Local government units are in the best

position to identify and implement projects deemed local in scope.

Congress and the pork barrel system, the focus of this paper, rest at the center. Subject to

constant criticism, and hereby presented is but an undeniable truth: Legislative pork spending

serves a political and not a developmental objective (Chua and Cruz, 2004; Parreno, 1998;

Gutierrez, 1998, Rocamora, 1998). In most extreme terms, it was referred as a fountain of evil

by the late Senator Gaudencio Antonino in a privilege speech in 1925. Senator Panfilo Lacson,

early this 2008, had the same picture in his mind when he exclaimed moral ascendancy

sacrificed in exchange for billions in commissions while commenting on pork funds shared

between the executive and legislative branches contained in the 2008 National Budget.

Yet if truly determined to tip the scale, reformers can do so tilt the balance: exercising

restraint and imposing rules transforming the practice into a progressive one. And it may have

been already, to wit: the pork barrel that was condemned decades ago is not the same as the

discretional PDAF that exists now.

PDAFS PREDECESSORS: DARK SHADOWS

Pork barrel funds, as they are commonly known, are allocations for who-knows-what

projects our legislators want to be known for. In the past these included the CDF and the

Congressional Initiative Allocation (CIA), the legal name given to insertions made during the

budget deliberation. Considering they are not even in the governments public investment

program (MTPDP and MTPIP), such projects have priority and protection. Despite not having

much impact on the economy, their allocation is a priority in the sense that its one most sought

by legislators whenever the DBCC and different NGAs present their budget proposals. Most

protected in the manner in which NGAs make advances, i.e. headroom in their budgets on

expectations of requests coming from legislators. Thus, the pork barrel issue continues to agitate

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everyone, and denunciations of the fund have become a yearly exercise. Anti-pork barrel

advocates have achieved much with their exposes but not one elected official has really taken

serious action on the issue. So why is Congress bent on holding on to the practice?

Pork barrel practice or the politicians use of discretionary funds traces back to the

(American- Southern) practice of bringing home the bacon to servants, the bacon now referring

to funds and projects which legislators take back to their constituencies. Although denounced by

many, it remains true that many voters also want their representatives to bring home the projects.

Cario (1966:10), in her systemic analyses of the phenomena, gives us the details of the process:

The pork barrel process in the Philippines starts when local government councils, civic groups and or interested individuals petition their legislators for a certain portion of their pork barrel fund. These are in the form of either formal resolutions or verbal communications which legislators either accommodate or refuse. Petitions that are accommodated form part of a solons allocation, a certain sum of money which he may consider as his for distribution purposes. The amount each one gets is determined in the majority caucus in the congressional chamber to which he belongs; the set amount usually corresponds to the minimum a legislator may obtain. These items are added to the administration bill prepared by the Department of Public Works and Highways, which leaves the pork barrel sections unfilled but for the words To be inserted in the House ... (see the Pork Barrel Process Map, ANNEX-A).

The finalization and approval of the Appropriations Bill do not stop in Congress. The

President may exercise his veto powers on provisions that she considers less important and or

uncalled for. Furthermore, the Office of the Chief Executive in its final act, can reassert the

governments spending priorities when it releases the funds. It has always been understood that if

money were appropriated for a purpose that turned out to be unnecessary, or if the funds could

not be spent usefully and immediately, the executive does not have to spend it and can impound

it.

Through the Department of Budget and Management, the President lords over the

allotment advice which is needed for the funds release. Looking at the process, one sees the

interaction among legislators, other elected officials and their constituencies. Like a good drama,

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roles are played accordingly: groups of sponsors are identified, they are the elected officials who

are instrumental in including the pork barrel item in the budget. Local officials and constituents

act as clientele - recipients of goods and services who put pressure on the sponsors. The object of

struggle is the nations purse and the unwieldy process to access public funds provides much

opportunity for politicization.

The terms of the trade are also known to the sponsor: he must secure a strategic position

(i.e. membership in the appropriations committee, high office in political party or relationship

with someone in high office) to get the most pork. It was already been established in the works of

Cario (1966) and Gutierrez (1998) that the chairpersons of the Senate Committee on Finance

and his counterpart at the Lower House, the Committee on Appropriations, get the most.

Accordingly, the President (with numerous special purpose funds, e.g. Calamity Fund, Pole

Vaulting Strategy Fund, Contingency Fund, Kalayaan Fund, etc.) is considered the biggest pork-

eater in the land.

For the citizens as clientele, the larger the force it can mobilize (votes), the more likely

that it will be accommodated. Since visibility is a key factor in obtaining political clout, sponsors

therefore take seriously those projects that serve the greatest number of clientele: roads,

bridges, covered courts and waiting sheds. Never mind that the services provided do not

correspond with the more pressing needs of the clientele, as long as they are highly visible and

tangible.

In the final analysis, neither planning nor feasibility counts while politics govern the

Presidents relation to Congress, legislators with one another, and between legislators and

bureaucrats. The underside is, politicization of the budget process completely undermines the

technical and developmental considerations of allotting public funds. With such a criterion, no

wonder that pork projects end up as wasteful endeavors, neither economically benefiting nor

growth-enhancing.

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THE PDAF OF 2002: MENU AS BINDING CONSTRAINT

The DBM owe to former President Estrada the momentum of reeling over legislators on

the pork issue. Upon Estradas election and announced as part of his SONA in 1998 was the

abolition of the practice, which he depicted as if reading directly the PCIJ reports. Given his high

popularity, he butted head with Congress but the risks proved too much even for Erap. Luckily,

DBM Secretary Benjamin Diokno was able to sell a reformed version of the notorious CDF and

CIA, which was called PDAF, which stands for Priority Development Assistance Fund. On

hindsight, this may be considered the first effort to modify the legislator- controlled fund by

prescribing rules that limit the choice of projects a legislator can charge against his pork barrel

account.

Compared to the guidelines governing the Public Works Act of 1995 and the CDF, the

PDAF have a more specific list of projects that are allowed to be funded. The former pork fund

had general guidelines, i.e. referred to infrastructure projects and livelihood projects, with all-

purpose statements that read projects that shall contribute to the development thrusts

geared towards improving the health, social and economic conditions of a community(NBC no.

444, s.1995- Sections 3.1-3.3). The PDAF guidelines on the other hand prepared project menu,

which is divided into 2 parts: Annex A- Listing of Programs and Projects with NGA

Implementors to be funded under the PDAF, and Annex B- Listing of Programs and Projects to

be funded from the DPWH Lumpsum Appropriation, i.e. a continuing Public Works allocation

(NBC no. 476 -s.2001 and no.479 -s.2002).

The project menu can be considered a binding constraint on legislators discretion in the

nature of their projects. It will not be possible then under these new directives to purchase

services and goods not in the list, and consequently took both legislators and constituents to a

narrower but hopefully higher level of relationship. Also, unlike the projects and pork purchases

in the past, i.e. KBL services, waiting sheds, basketball courts, useless name-bearing landmarks,

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etc., reformed pork definitely has a higher economic value and potential. (Please see ANNEX B-

National Budget Circular no. 479, dated March 1, 2002, Listing of Programs and Projects with

NGA Implementors to be funded under the PDAF, and Annex B- Listing of Programs and

Projects to be funded from the DPWH Lumpsum Appropriation).

PDAF RULES AND OUTCOMES

The issuance of a project menu concerning PDAF and DPWH Lumpsums have certainly

made pork access more manageable for the DBM, the agency in charge of consolidating pork

requests and release. The projects spent on by the Senators are remarkably (predictably and

understandably) in keeping with the list. Monitoring has also become easier since 2001 when the

DBM under Secretary Boncodin (2001-2006) began publishing the list of PDAF and DPWH

funded pork projects.

For the period under study, expenditure data showed that the Senates PDAF have

reached Php 0.57 billion in 2002, Php 1.65 billion in 2003, Php 1.53 billion in 2004, Php 0.92

billion in 2005, and Php 0.23 billion (partial mid-2006). Altogether, this is Php 4.9 billion during

the period. On the nature of PDAF expenses, almost all were given as financial assistance to

LGUs, LGUs that otherwise will have little or no capacity on its own to fund development

activities.

TABLE 1. PDAF AND DPWH LUMPSUM ALLOCATIONS, 2002-2006.

SENATE PDAF DPWH Total FY 2002 576,085,393 2,280,478,200 2,856,563,593 FY 2003 1,651,700,000 2,308,081,000 3,959,781,000 FY 2004 1,529,800,000 2,314,711,000 3,844,511,000 FY 2005 919,700,000 683,000,000 1,602,700,000 FY 2006 230,000,000 - 230,000,000

5-yr Total 4,907,285,393 7,586,270,200 12,493,555,593 Source: DBM website, http://www.dbm.gov.ph/pdaf.php.

The Senate DPWH Lumpsum Allocation makes the bigger part of the pork and from 2002

to 2005, Senators accessed Php2.28 billion, 2.30 billion, 2.31 billion, and 0.68 billion

respectively. The data for 2006 is partial, and it will be until 2008 to get the full access picture.

Nonetheless, the figures give us an idea of how much pork is used (or given) to the Senate. A

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partial total of Php12.49 billion for the 5-year duration, or an average of Php 2.5 billion annually.

Now Php2.5 billion annually is minuscule as a proportion of the total national budget (FY2006

National Budget is Php 907 billion), but broken down and handed to local governments makes a

large difference.

On the kinds of projects funded under the DPWH appropriation, the data showed the

following:

a. That the Senators projects fall on five (5) main categories, namely: (1) road and

bridges, (2) flood control infrastructures, including aqueducts, and canal and river

rehabilitation, (3) water supply systems, (4) school buildings, and (5)

multipurpose buildings.

b. Of the 5 categories, roads and bridges is by far the favorite choice, followed by

multipurpose buildings, school-buildings, and flood control, with water supply

systems at bottom.

c. The statement above was based on the 5-year average allocation data, but the

choice of project varies greatly with respect to each Senator, regardless of the

amount accessed. To illustrate, a full FY2003 accounting of DPWH allocated pork

will show on average that 60.93% of it went to Roads and Bridges, and a far

second with 17.56% are Multipurpose buildings. However, specific to a legislator,

Senator Honasan, for example used all his Php120 million for improving and

rehabilitating roads along the NCR, Regions 3, 4-A, and 13; while Senator Drilon

spent around 31% of his Php126 million in building classrooms and rehabilitating

school buildings.

d. Finally, on a per- item basis, the largest single item expenses are Php 50 million

for the construction of a wing at the Baguio City General Hospital (Senator

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Flavier), Php 27 million for the construction of a road in Las Pinas (Senator

Villar). On average, most senators make a spread of their allocation in Php5

million, 1 million, and 500 thousand denominations (see ANNEX C1-C3 and

links). The least expense recorded was for a dug well in Camalaniugan, Cagayan

(Senator Jaworski).

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

From the perspective of an impoverished local government, the Municipality of Adams in

Ilocos Norte for example, with an annual income of Php 20 million (BLGF, 2006), a financial

assistance of Php 1 million already is a big help. Add to it a multipurpose building and a 2-km.

road, Php 1 million and 2 million respectively. Altogether, Adams would have received Php 4

million, or equivalently, 20% addition to the municipalitys income.

The above example may be hypothetical, but the fiscal as well as many other problems of

municipalities and provinces especially in the countryside, are real. The analyses offered here is

this: if allocation and the identification of needs are left with the national (central) government

alone, then the status quo of inequity and the problems we now face can only continue.

Pork barreling can be seen as an alternative to the current system of gaps and discrepancy

in a nationally governed spending. While it may be true that the national government agencies

have experts and consultants and agents spread across the country, it can be argued just the same

that the setup will never be enough, and their information not complete, and some pockets are

bound to be missed.

Aside from the disrepute of Congress, and the pork systems dark past, there is nothing

essentially wrong with legislators having a hand in identifying government projects. Legislators

are elected representatives. Each member of the House of Representatives have around 250,000

constituents, while the Senators have the nation as a whole.

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It is also true that the pork barrel system is a political tool, but a mechanism that turns

both ways. Evans (2004) has documented the use of the pork to convince legislators to align

with the Presidents agenda. The author also argued that the use of pork was instrumental in

passing laws of general interest and wider significance, something that may not be possible if

pork had not grease the system.

What is left in this exposition is the assertion that the pork barrel system has several

elements changed in the duration of existence post EDSA that make it different and less

contemptible. Compared to the Congressional Initiative Allocation (CIA) and Countryside

Development Fund of the 90s, more ex ante rules (control) are in place. Legislators are now

limited to a project menu, to be negotiated and planned with national government implementors.

The PDAF Soft was also designed to resemble a block grant for local government units, even

though it passes Congress hands, it remains a source of finance that is available to local units.

Almost all projects identified and funded from PDAF Soft and the DPWH Lumpsum are local

projects, i.e. local in scope and benefits.

The counterfactual question that needed answering and the discussion throughout ran on

this is: In the absence of the pork barrel system, will the same expenses be made? Could the

Baguio City General Hospital have received funding (from the DoH) for their much needed wing

if not for Senator Flavier? How about the measly Php 50,000 for the dug well in Cagayan as

granted by Senator Jaworski? The answer is obvious.

If economy and efficiency considerations are key to development, then the following

criteria are non-negotiable. By all means, let the President and the executive departments identify

the requirements for national development, and plan and allocate resources as they see fit. But

their scope is naturally limited to the nation as a whole, the citizens in the aggregate. This

severely clouds their lenses. The President and the NGAs may have longer and wider horizons

but looses view of the immediate, short-term demands. The economist Keynes was famous for

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making the remark, In the long- run, we are all dead, a comment directed to economists

obsession with averages and long-term planning for efficiency and growth but lost sight of

domestic sentiments, with the Great Depression of 1929 driving the point.

The Presidential- Unitary system that we have may be defective, but it is all that we have

(or at least, up until a constitutional change to parliamentary and federal system). The setup

prescribes a top-down planning and budgeting system, with the President and executive

departments in the drawing boards. A century of central planning with little participation from

other stakeholders have shown great gaps, one that was recognized with the passage of the Local

Government Code of 1991, empowering local units, communities and citizen stakeholders in

matters of government and governance. Decentralization is not enough, not with the central

agencies holding on to financial resources.

The checks and balance principle between branches of government was under a

Madisonian tradition whose orientation is based on confrontation (the famous quote, ambition

must be countered with ambition). It can be reinterpreted and practiced the other way, that of

cooperation and complementation. Applied to budgeting, the President and executive agencies

are expected to plan and allocate with economy, efficiency and long term objectives in mind;

theirs is to lift the welfare of the nation as a whole. Again, not all segments of society will be

pleased. Members of Congress on the other hand are elected for the following purpose: parochial

and personal. It is part of the duty, as district representatives to cater to their constituencies.

Under a presidential-unitary setup, the local unit can be the link to national government, but only

to a certain degree. It remains a part that is under the national government. District

representatives or legislators are different for the reason that it is a coequal branch of

government. But unlike the President and central agencies, it has mandate and license to spend

and respond to its constituency. The pork barrel system is the financial mechanism that makes

this possible under the current setup.

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The Senate is in a slightly different level. They are nationally elected officials, but remain

faithful to the practice of grant making and pork barreling. Their pork barrel exist more so as part

of the political balance, but can also be instrumental as conduit of funds between national

government and constituents. Non-access does not affect the Senators standing (Senator Lacson

is a case in point), but access of the same can make certain constituents happy (Senator Recto for

example spent his 2003 DPWH Lumpsum all in Batangas where his wife, then Lipa City Mayor

and now Governor Vilma Santos- Recto ran).

In conclusion, at the Senate level (the focus of the study), the pork barrel system remain

in effect. And although there is no account and evidence of malfeasance in the use of the pork

since it was made infamous by the media (i.e. PCIJ) in the 1990s, many still call for its abolition.

But as shown, the practice has changed. Rules handed down by the DBM in 2001 and 2002 have

firmly restricted the porks allotment and use. Many of the projects spent on are needs that, in the

point of view of the locality, are very much needed. And as argued, budget rules can bind the

pork barrel system. If access can be limited to a given project menu, the same rules can cause that

menu to be equitable and progressive. A small procedural alteration, such as the one used on the

pork barrel system, when continued and enhanced, presents a simple way of making pork

palatable in the future.

-END-

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REFERENCES

Books, Journals, Manuscripts

Carino, Ledivina (1966). The Politics and Administration of the Pork Barrel, Local Government Studies No.3, UPCPA: Manila. Chua, Y. and Booma Cruz (2004). For the Love of Pork, in Coronel, S. et. al. (2004). The Rulemakers: How the Wealth and Well- Born Dominate Congress, PCIJ: Quezon City.

Coronel, Sheila, ed. (1998). Pork and Other Perks, PCIJ: Quezon City. Coronel, S. et. al. (2004). The Rulemakers: How the Wealth and Well- Born Dominate Congress, PCIJ: Quezon City. De Vera, J. Prospero (2004). In Defense of the Pork, in the column Yellow Pad- Business World, September 13, 2004. Evans, Diana (2004). Greasing the Wheels: Using Pork Barrel Projects to Build Majority Coalitions in Congress, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. Gutierrez, Eric (1998). The Public Purse, in Coronel, Sheila, ed. (1998) Pork and Other Perks, PCIJ: Quezon City.

Parenno, Earl (1998). Pork, in Coronel, Sheila, ed. (1998) Pork and Other Perks, PCIJ: Quezon City.

Rocamora, Joel (1998). Introduction- Corruption in the Philippines: A Beginners Guide, in Coronel, Sheila, ed. (1998) Pork and Other Perks, PCIJ: Quezon City

Statutes, Promulgations, Circulars

The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Rex Publishing.

Executive Order No. 182 (s. 1987) Rationalizing Public Works Measures, Appropriating Funds For Public Works, and For Other Purposes. Republic Act No. 7160 The Local Government Code of 1991.

Republic Act No. 8150 Public Highways and Infrastructure Act of 1995.

DBM National Budget Circular No. 437-A (s. 1995). Supplemental Rules and Regulations in the Release of CY 1995 Infrastructure Funds, January 13, 1995. DBM National Budget Circular No. 444 (s.1995). Guidelines on the Release and Monitoring of Funds Chargeable Against the Countryside Developmen Fund, July 1, 1995. DBM National Budget Circular No. 477 (s. 2001). Listing of Programs and Projects with NGA Implementors to be funded under the PDAF, and from the DPWH Lumpsum Appropriation, September 20, 2001 . DBM National Budget Circular No. 479 (s. 2002). Listing of Programs and Projects with NGA Implementors to be funded under the PDAF, and from the DPWH Lumpsum Appropriation, March 1, 2002. DBM National Budget Circular No. 493 (s. 2004). Clarrification on Certain Provision of National Budget Circular No. 479 (s. 2002), March 16, 2004.

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ANNEX A. THE PORK BARREL PROCESS MAP

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ANNEX B. LISTING OF PROGRAMS/ PROJECTS TO BE FUNDED FROM THE PDAF LUMP-SUM APPROPRIATIONS UNDER THE DPWH BUDGET (DBM National Budget Circular No. 477 (s.2001) and No. 479 (s.2002). LISTING OF PROGRAMS/ PROJECTS TO BE FUNDED FROM THE PDAF

I. Financial Assistance to the following

a. Education

i. State Universities and Colleges (SUCs)

ii. Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA)

iii. Commission on Higher Education (CHED)

iv. National Commission on Indigenous People (NCIP)

b. Health Regional/ Specialty Hospital and Medical Centers

c. Social Welfare

i. Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the

implementation of the following:

1. Comprehensive Integrated Delivery of Social Services (CIDDS)

2. Social protection and promotion of rights and welfare of the poor and the disadvantaged

ii. National Food Authority (NFA)

d. Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization (AFMA) Department of Agriculture (DA)

and Corporations implementing AFMA

e. Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG)

f. LGUs Provinces/ Cities. Municipalities/ Barangays

II. Livelihood and Employment Generation

a. Livelihood Program

i. Technology and Livelihood Resource Center (TLRC)

ii. NCIP

iii. Office of Muslim Affairs (OMA)

b. Emergency Employment Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE)

III. Science Technology and Information/ Communications Equipment

a. Department of Education (DepEd)

b. Department of Science and Technology (DOST)

c. Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC)

IV. Social and Economic Infrastructures

a. Construction/ Repair/ Rehabilitation of the following

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i. Roads and Bridges/ Farm to Market Roads Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)

ii. Flood Control DPWH

iii. Water Supply DPWH

iv. School Buildings DPWH/DepEd

v. Post Harvest Facilities (Food Terminal, Market, warehouse and Solar Dryer) DPWH

vi. Day Care Centers, Senior Citizen Centers DPWH

vii. Police, Jail and Fire Stations DPWH, DILG

viii. Multi-Purpose Buildings DPWH

ix. Court Houses DPWH, Department of Justice (DOJ)

x. Pier, Ports and Airports DOTC

b. Rural Electrification National Electrification Administration (NEA)

c. Irrigation DA/ National Irrigation Administration (NIA)

d. Resettlement/ Housing - National Housing Authority

e. Acquisition of Infrastructure Equipment DPWH

LISTING OF PROJECTS TO BE FNDED FROM THE LUMP-SUM APPROPRIATIONS UNDER THE DPWH BUDGET

A. Construction / Repair, Rehabilitation of the following:

1. Roads and Bridges/ Farm to Market Roads

2. Flood Control (Dredging, etc.)

3. Water Supply

4. Multi-Purpose Buildings (Day Care Center, Senior Citizen Center, Police, Jail and Fire Stations and Other Public Buildings)

5. School Buildings

B. Acquisition of Infrastructure Equipment

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ANNEX C-1. COMPLETE PDAF AND DPWH LUMPSUM ALLOATIONS IN 2003 -2005

FY 2003 Congressional Allocation Chargeable

Against

PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT

ASSISTANCE FUND (PDAF-Soft + DPWH) and

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS

(DPWH) APPROPRIATIONS

SENATOR PDAF DPWH TOTAL

Edgardo J. Angara 80,000,000 120,000,000 200,000,000 Robert Z. Barbers 79,999,000 120,001,000 200,000,000 Rodolfo G. Biazon 79,550,000 120,450,000 200,000,000 Renato L. Cayetano 74,500,000 55,500,000 130,000,000 Noli L. De Castro 80,000,000 120,000,000 200,000,000 Franklin M. Drilon 71,000,000 126,850,000 197,850,000 Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada 53,500,000 146,500,000 200,000,000 Juan M. Flavier 30,000,000 100,000,000 130,000,000 Gregorio B. Honasan 80,000,000 120,000,000 200,000,000 Robert S. Jaworski, Sr. 59,000,000 100,000,000 159,000,000 Loren Legarda-Leviste 80,000,000 120,000,000 200,000,000 Panfilo M. Lacson Blas F. Ople John Henry R. Osmea 172,681,000 172,681,000 Teresa Aquino-Oreta 80,000,000 120,000,000 200,000,000 Sergio R. Osmea, III 37,970,000 148,780,000 186,750,000 Francis N. Pangilinan 69,500,000 110,000,000 179,500,000 Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. 109,000,000 60,000,000 169,000,000 Ralph G. Recto 40,000,000 160,000,000 200,000,000 Ramon B. Revilla, Sr. 70,000,000 120,000,000 190,000,000 Vicente C. Sotto, III 80,000,000 120,000,000 200,000,000 Manuel B. Villar, Jr. 80,000,000 120,000,000 200,000,000 Joker P. Arroyo 80,000,000 80,000,000 Ramon B. Magsaysay, Jr. 65,000,000 100,000,000 165,000,000

TOTAL, Senate 1,651,700,000 2,308,081,000 3,959,781,000 Source: DBM website, http://www.dbm.gov.ph/pdaf.php.

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ANNEX C-2. COMPLETE PDAF AND DPWH LUMPSUM ALLOATIONS IN 2003 -2005

FY 2004 Congressional Allocation Chargeable Against PDAF-Soft + DPWH DPWH APPROPRIATIONS

SENATOR PDAF DPWH TOTAL

Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada 80,000,000 120,000,000 200,000,000 Ramon B. Magsaysay, Jr. 75,400,000 93,100,000 168,500,000 Blas F. Ople John Henry R. Osmea 40,000,000 40,000,000 Francis N. Pangilinan 93,400,000 95,000,000 188,400,000 Loren Legarda-Leviste 40,000,000 40,000,000 Manuel B. Villar, Jr. 82,000,000 118,000,000 200,000,000 Cayetano, Pia S. 40,000,000 40,000,000 Gordon, Richard J. 200,000 200,000 Lim, Alfredo 200,000 200,000 Madrigal, Jamby A.S. 40,000,000 60,000,000 100,000,000 Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. 87,000,000 110,000,000 197,000,000 Rodolfo G. Biazon 40,000,000 160,000,000 200,000,000 Edgardo J. Angara 80,000,000 120,000,000 200,000,000 Joker P. Arroyo 100,000,000 100,000,000 200,000,000 Robert Z. Barbers 100,000,000 100,000,000 Revilla, Ramon Jr. 40,000,000 60,000,000 100,000,000 Noli L. De Castro 55,064,000 44,936,000 100,000,000 Franklin M. Drilon 128,296,000 50,000,000 178,296,000 Enrile, Juan Ponce 40,000,000 60,000,000 100,000,000 Juan M. Flavier 150,000,000 50,000,000 200,000,000 Ejercito Estrada, Jinggoy 40,000,000 60,000,000 100,000,000 Lapid, Manuel M. 40,000,000 60,000,000 100,000,000 Gregorio B. Honasan 100,000,000 100,000,000 Ramon B. Revilla, Sr. 90,000,000 90,000,000 Vicente C. Sotto, III 100,000,000 100,000,000 Ralph G. Recto 40,000,000 160,000,000 200,000,000 Santiago, Miriam Defensor 40,000,000 60,000,000 100,000,000 Roxas, Manuel A. 100,000,000 100,000,000 Renato L. Cayetano 32,500,000 32,500,000 Panfilo M. Lacson Sergio R. Osmea, III 55,740,000 113,675,000 169,415,000 Teresa Aquino-Oreta 10,000,000 90,000,000 100,000,000 Robert S. Jaworski, Sr. 100,000,000 100,000,000

TOTAL, Senate 1,529,800,000 2,314,711,000 3,844,511,000 Source: DBM website, http://www.dbm.gov.ph/pdaf.php.

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ANNEX C-3. COMPLETE PDAF AND DPWH LUMPSUM ALLOATIONS IN 2003 -2005

FY 2005 Congressional Allocation Chargeable Against

PRIORITY DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE FUND (PDAF-

Soft + DPWH) and

DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS

(DPWH) APPROPRIATIONS

SENATOR PDAF DPWH TOTAL Aquilino Q. Pimentel 10,000,000 10,000,000 Edgardo J. Angara 60,000,000 60,000,000 Francis N. Pangilinan 60,000,000 60,000,000 120,000,000 Jinggoy Ejercito-Estrada 60,000,000 30,000,000 90,000,000 Joker P. Arroyo 95,000,000 25,000,000 120,000,000 Juan Flavier 60,000,000 60,000,000 Juan Ponce Enrile 60,000,000 60,000,000 120,000,000 Luisa P. Ejercito-Estrada 60,000,000 30,000,000 90,000,000 Manuel M. Lapid 60,000,000 42,000,000 102,000,000 Manuel Villar 60,000,000 60,000,000 Miriam Defensor-Santiago 60,000,000 60,000,000 120,000,000 Pia S. Cayetano 30,000,000 30,000,000 Ralph G. Recto 60,000,000 60,000,000 120,000,000 Ramon B. Magsaysay, Jr. 60,000,000 60,000,000 Ramon Revilla, Jr. 45,000,000 75,000,000 120,000,000 Rodolfo G. Biazon 60,000,000 60,000,000 120,000,000 M.A "Jamby" Madrigal 19,700,000 60,000,000 79,700,000 Robert Z. Barbers 94,000,000 94,000,000 Vicente C. Sotto, III 27,000,000 27,000,000

TOTAL, Senate 919,700,000 683,000,000 1,602,700,000 Source: DBM website, http://www.dbm.gov.ph/pdaf.php.

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