-
7/31/2019 Porphyry 01
1/5
On Abst inence f rom Animal Food*
PORPHYRY
The Rat ionalit y of Animals
In the two preceding books, O Firmus Castr icius, we have
demonstrated that animal food doesnot contr ibute e i ther to
temperance and f rugal i ty , or to the p ie ty which especia l ly
g ivescomplet ion to t he theoret ic l i fe , but is ra ther host i
le t o i t . Since, however , t he most beaut i fu lpart of j ust
ice consist s in piet y t o t he Gods, and this is pr incipal ly
acquired t hrough abst inence,there is no occasion to fear that we
shal l violate justice towards men, whi le we preserve pietyt
owards the Gods. Socrates theref ore says, in opposit ion t o t
hose who cont end t hat pl easure ist he supreme good, t hat t
hough al l swine and goat s should accord in t his opinion, yet he
shouldnever be persuaded that our fel ici ty was placed in the
enjoyment of corporeal del ight, as longas intel lect has dominion
over al l th ings. And we also say, that though al l wolves and vul
turesshould praise the eating of f lesh, we should not admit that
they spoke justly, as long as man isby nature innoxious, and ought
to abstain from procuring pleasure for himself by injur ingothers.
We shal l pass on, therefore, to the discussion of justice; and
since our opponents saythat this ought only to be extended to those
of simi lar species, and on this account deny thati r ra t iona l
an imals can be in jured by men, le t us exh ib i t the t rue, and
at the same t imePyt hagoric opinion, and demonstrat e t hat every
soul which part icipates of sense and memory i srational. For this
being demonstrated, we may extend, as our opponents wi l l a lso
admit,j ust ice t o eve ry an imal . . . .
Since, however, with respect to reason, one kind, according to
the doctr ine of the Stoics, isin terna l , but the ot her externa
l , and again , one k ind be ing r ight , but t he other er
roneous, i t isrequisi te to explain of which of these two,
animals, according to them, are deprived. Are theytherefore
deprived of r ight reason alone? Or are they enti rely desti tute
both of internal andexternal ly proceeding reason? They appear,
indeed, to ascr ibe to brutes an enti re pr ivation ofreason, and
not a pr ivation of r ight r eason alone. For i f t hey merely
denied t hat brut es possessr ight r eason, animals would not be i
rrat ional, but rat i onal beings, i n t he same manner as nearlyal
l men are according to them. For, according to their opinion, one
or two wise men may be
found in whom alone r ight reason prevai ls, but al l the rest
of mankind are depraved; thoughsome of these make a certain
proficiency, but others are profoundly depraved, and yet, at
thesame t im e, a l l o f t hem are simi lar ly ra t iona l . . . .
I f , however , i t be requisi te t o speak the t ru th ,not only
reason may plainly be perceived in al l animals, but in many of t
hem i t is so great as t oapproximate t o per fect ion.
Since, t herefore, reason is t wof old, one kind consist ing in
external speech, but t he other in t hedisposit ion of the soul, we
shal l begin from that which is external, and which is
arrangedaccording to the voice. But i f external reason is voice,
which through the tongue is signi f icantof the internal passions
of the soul. . .if this be the case, in what pertaining to this are
suchanimals as have a voice deficient? Do they not discursively
perceive the manner in which theyare inwardly affected, before i t
is vocal ly enunciated by them? By a discursive perception,however,
I mean t he percepti on produced by the si lent discourse which t
akes place in t he soul.
Since, therefore, that which is vocal ly expressed by the tongue
isreason, in whatever manneri t may be expressed, whether in a
barbarous or a Grecian, a canine or a bovine mode, otheranimals
also part icipate of i t that are vocal; men, indeed, speaking
conformably to the humanlaws, but other animals conformably to the
laws which they received from the Gods andnature. But i f we do not
understand what they say, what is this to the purpose? For the
Greeksdo not understand what is said by the Indians, nor those who
are educated in Att ica thelanguage of the Scythians, or Thracians,
or Syrians; but the sound of the one falls on the ears ofthe other
l ike the clangor of cranes, though by others their vocal sounds
can be wri t ten and
*Translated by Thomas Taylor.
-
7/31/2019 Porphyry 01
2/5
art iculated, in the same manner as ours can by us. . . . The l
ike also takes place in the vocalsounds of other animals. For the
several species of these understand the language which isadapted to
them, but we only hear a sound, of the signi f ication of which we
are ignorant,because no one who has learnt our language is able to
teach us through ours the meaning ofwhat is said by brutes. . .
.
But i t is now requisi te to show that brutes have internal
reason. The di fference, indeed,between our reason and theirs,
appears to consist, as Aristotle somewhere says, not in essence,but
in the more and the less; just as many are o f op in ion, that the
d i f ference between theGods and us is not essential , but
consists in this, that in them there is a greater, and in us aless
accuracy, of the reasoning power. And, indeed, so far as pertains
to sense and theremaining organization, according to the sensoria
and the f lesh, every one nearly wi l l grantthat these are simi
lar ly disposed in us, as they are in brutes. For they not only
simi lar lypart icipate with us of natural passions, and the
motions produced through these, but we mayalso survey in them such
affections as are preternatural and morbid. No one, however, of
asound mind, wi l l say that brutes are unreceptive of the
reasoning power, on account of thedifference between their habit of
body and ours, when he sees that there is a great var iety ofhabit
in man, according to their race, and the nations to which they
belong and yet, at thesame t ime, i t is granted that a l l o f t
hem are rat iona l . . . .
I t does not fol low, i f we have more intel l igence than other
animals, that on this account theyare to be deprived of intel l
igence; as neither must i t be said, that partr idges do not f
ly,because hawks f ly higher. . . . Some one, therefore, may admit
that the soul is copassive withthe body, and that t he former suf
fers someth ing f rom t he la t ter . . .
I t must be demonstra ted, therefore, that there is a ra t iona
l power in an imals, and that theyare not deprived of prudence. And
in the f i rst place, indeed, each of them knows whether i t
isimbeci le or strong, and, in consequence of this, i t defends
some parts of i tsel f, but attackswith others. Thus the panther
uses i ts teeth, the l ion i ts nai ls and teeth, the horse i ts
hoofs,the ox i ts horns, the cock i ts spurs, and the scorpion i ts
st ing; but the serpents in Egypt usetheir spi tt le (whence also
they are cal led pt uades, i .e . sp i t ters) , and wi th th is
they b l ind theeyes of those that approach them: and thus a di
fferent animal uses a di fferent part of i tsel f forattack, in
order to save i tsel f. . . . They l ikewise change their places of
abode at certain t imes,
and know every thing which contr ibutes to their advantage. In a
simi lar manner, in f ishes andin birds, a reasoning energy of t
his kind may be perceived. . . .
But he who says that these things are natural ly present with
animals is ignorant in assert ingthis, that they are by nature
rational; or, i f th is is not admitted, nei ther does reason
subsist inus natural ly, nor with the perfection of i t receive an
increase, so far as we -are natural lyadapted to receive i t . A
divine nature, indeed, does not become rational through learning,
forthere never was a t ime in which he was irrat ional; but rat
ional i ty is consubsistent with hisexistence, and he is not
prevented from being rational, because he did not receive
reasonthrough discipl ine: though, with respect to other animals,
in the same manner as with respectto men, many things are taught
them by nature, and some things are imparted by discipl ine.Brutes,
however, learn some things from each other, but are taught others
.. . by men. Theyalso have memory, which is a most pr incipal thing
in the resumption of reasoning and
prudence. They l ikewise have vices, and are envious; though
their bad qual i t ies are not sowidely extended as in men: for
their vices are of a l ighter nature than those of men.
This,indeed, is evident; for the bui lder of a house wi l l never
be able to lay the foundation of i t ,unless he is sober; nor can a
shipwright properly place the keel of a ship, unless he is in
health;nor a husbandman plant a vine, unless he appl ies his mind
to i t ; yet nearly al l men, when theyare intoxicated, can beget
chi ldren. This, however, is not the case with other animals; for
theypropagate for the sake of offspr ing, and for the most part,
when the males have made thefemale pregnant, they no longer a t t
empt to be connected w i th her ; nor , i f they should a t t empti
t , would the female permit them. But the magnitude of the
lascivious insolence and
-
7/31/2019 Porphyry 01
3/5
int emperance of men in t hese things, is evident . . . .
Who likewise is ignorant how much gregarious animals preserve
justice towards each other? Fort his is preserved by ants, by bees,
and by other animals of t he l ike kind. And who is ignorant ofthe
chasti ty of female r ing-doves towards the males with whom they
associate? For theydestroy those who are found by them to have
committed adultery. Or who has not heard of thej ust ice of st or
ks t ow ar ds t he i r par en t s? For in t he sever al spe cies of
an imal s, a pec ul iar vi r t ueis eminent, to which al l species
is natural ly adapted; nor because this vir tue is natural andst
able, is i t f i t to deny that t hey are rati onal? For i t m ight
be requisi t e to deprive them ofra t iona l i ty , i f the i r w
orks were not t he proper e f f ects of v i r t ue and ra t iona l
sagaci ty ; but i f w edo not understand how these works are
effected, because we are unable to penetrate into thereasoning
which they use, we are not on this account to accuse them of i r
rat ional i ty; forne i ther is anyone ab le to penetra te in to
the in te l lect o f that d iv in i ty the sun, but f rom h isworks
we assent t o t hose who demonstrat e him t o be an intel l ectual
and rat ional essence.
But someone may very properly w onder at t hose who admi t t hat
j ust ice derives i ts subsist encefrom the rational part, and who
cal l those animals that have no association with men, savageand
unjust, and yet do not extend justice as far as to those that do
associate with us; andwhich, in the same manner as men, would be
deprived of l i fe, i f they were deprived of humansociety. Birds,
therefore, and dogs, and many quadrupeds, such as goats, horses,
sheep, asses,and mules, would perish, i f deprived of an
association with mankind. Nature, also, thefabricator of their
frame, consti tuted them so as to be in want of men, and fashioned
men soas to require their assistance; thus producing an innate
justice in them towards us, and in ustow ards them. But i t is not
a t a l l wonder fu l , i f some of t hem are savage towards men; f
or whatAristotle says is true, that i f a l l animals had an
abundance of nutr iment, they would not actferociously, ei ther
towards each other, or towards men. For on account of food,
thoughnecessary and slender, enmities and friendships are produced
among animals, and also onaccount of the places which they occupy;
but i f men were reduced to such strai ts as brutesare, how much
more savage would they become than those animals that appear to be
wi ld.War and famine are ind icat ions of the t ru th o f th is ;
for then men do not absta in f rom eat ingeach other ; and even wi
thout war and famine, they eat an imals that are nur tured wi th
them,and are per fect l y tame. . . .
The Inj ust ice of Carni vori sm
Through these arguments, therefore . . . , i t is demonstrated
that brutes are rational animals,reason in most of them being
indeed imperfect, of which, nevertheless, they are not enti
relydeprived. Since, however, justice pertains to rational beings,
as our opponents say, how is i tpossible not to admit, that we
should also act justly towards brutes? For we do not extendj ust
ice t o plan t s, beca use t he re ap pea rs t o be m uc h in t he
m w hi ch is u nc on ne ct ed w i t h rea son ;though of these, we
are accustomed to use the f ru i ts , but not together wi th the f
ru i ts to cutoff the trunks. We col lect, however, corn and
leguminous substances, when, beingeff lorescent, t hey have fal l
en on the eart h, and are dead. But no one uses for f ood the f
lesh ofdead animals, that of f ish being excepted, ^unless they
have been destroyed by violence. Sothat in these things there is
much injustice. As Plutarch also says, i t does not fol low
that
because our nature is indigent of certain things, and we use
these, we should therefore actun just ly towards a l l th ings. For
we are a l lowed to in jure o ther th ings to a cer ta in extent ,
inorder to procure the necessary means of subsistence ( i f to take
any thing from plants, evenwhi le t hey are l iv ing, is an in jury
to them); but to destr oy o ther t h ings through luxury, and
forthe enjoyment of pleasure, is perfectly savage and unjust. And
the abstinence from theseneither diminishes our l i fe nor our l
iving happi ly. For i t , indeed, the destruction of animals andthe
eating of f lesh were as requisi te as air and water, plants and
frui ts, without which i t isimpossible to l ive, this in justice
would be necessari ly connected with our nature. But i f
manypriests of the Gods, and many kings of the barbarians, being
attentive to pur i ty, and i f ,
-
7/31/2019 Porphyry 01
4/5
l ikewise, inf in i te species of animals never taste food of
this kind, yet l ive, and obtain theirproper end according to
nature, is not he absurd who orders us, because we are compel led
towage war with certain animals, not to l ive peaceably with those
with whom i t is possible to doso, but thinks, ei ther that we
ought to l ive without exercising justice towards any thing,
orthat, by exercising i t towards al l th ings, we should not
continue in existence? As, therefore,among men, he who, for the
sake of his own safety, or that of his chi ldren or country, ei
therseizes the wealth of certain persons, or oppresses some region
of ci ty, has necessi ty for thepretext of his in justice; but he
who acts in this manner through the acquisi t ion of wealth,
orthrough satiety or luxur ious pleasure, and for the purpose of
satisfying desires which are notnecessary, appears t o be inhospit
able, int emperat e, and depraved;t hus t oo, divini t y pardonsthe
injur ies which are done to plants, the consumption of f i re and
water, the shearing ofsheep, the mi lking of cows, and the taming
of oxen, and subjugating them to the yoke, for thesafety and
continuance in l i fe of those that use them. But to del iver
animals to be slaughteredand cooked, and thus be f i l led with
murder, not for the sake of nutr iment and satisfying thewants of
nature, but making pleasure and gluttony the end of such conduct,
is transcendentlyiniqui t ous and dire. For i t is suff icient that
we use, for laborious purposes, t hough t hey have nooccasion t o
labor t hemselves, t he pr ogeny of h orses, and asses, and bul ls,
as Aeschylus says, asour subst i t utes who, by being tamed and
subj ugat ed to t he yoke, al leviate our toi l .[T]o compare
plants, however, with animals, is doing violence to the order of
things. For thela t ter are natura l ly sensi t ive, and adapted to
fee l pa in , to be ter r i f ied and hur t ; on whichaccount also
they may be injured. But the former are enti rely desti tute of
sensation, and inconsequence of this, nothing foreign, or evi l ,
or hurtful , or in jur ious, can befal l them. . . . Andis i t not
absurd, since we see that many of our own species l ive from sense
alone, but do notpossess intellect and reason, and since we also
see, that many of them surpass the mostterr ible of wi ld beasts in
cruelty, anger, and rapine, being murderous of their chi ldren
andtheir parents, and also being tyrants, and the tools of kings,
to fancy that we ought to actj ust l y t ow ar ds t he se, but t ha
t no j ust ice is due f r om us t o t he ox t ha t plou ghs, t he
dog t hat isfed with us, and the animals that nourish us with their
mi lk, and adorn our bodies with theirwool? Is not such an opinion
most irrational and absurd?
But, by Jupiter, the assert ion of Chrysippus is considered by
our opponents to be veryprobable, that the Gods made us for the
sake of themselves, and for the sake of each other,and that they
made animals for the sake of us. . . . Let him, however, to whom
[this assert ion
appears] to possess a certain probabi l i ty, and to part
icipate in something worthy of dei ty,consider what he wi l l reply
to the saying of Carneades, that every thing which is produced
bynature, is benef i ted when i t obta ins the end to which i t is
adapted, and for which i t wasgenerated. But benefi t is t o be
underst ood in a more general way, as signi fying what t he St
oicscal l useful . The hog, however, [says Carneades] was produced
by nature for the purpose ofbeing slaughtered and used for food;
and when i t suffers this, i t obtains the end for which i t
isadapted, and is benefi ted. But i f God fashioned animals for the
use of men, in what do we usefl ies, l ice, bats, beetles,
scorpions, and vipers? Of which some are odious to the sight, defi
lethe touch, are intolerable to the smel l , and in their voice
dire and unpleasant; and others, onthe contrary, are destruct ive
to those that meet wi th them. . . . And i f our opponents
shouldadmit that al l th ings are not generated for us, and with a
view to our advantage, in addit ion tothe dist inction which they
make being very confused and obscure, we shal l not avoid
actingunjustl y, i n att acking and noxiously using t hose animals
which were not p roduced for our sake.
. . . I omi t to ment ion, that i f we def ine, by u t i l i ty
, th ings which per ta in to us, we shal l not beprevented f rom
admi t t ing, that we were generated for the sake of the most
destruct iveanimals, such as crocodi les . . . and dragons. For '
we are not in the least benefi ted by them;but they seize and
destroy men that fal l in their way, and use them for food; in so
doing actingnot a t a l l more crue l ly than we do, except ing
that t hey commit th is inj ust ice t hrough want andhunger, but we
through insolent wantonness, and for the sake of luxury, frequently
sport ing intheatres, and in hunting slaughter the greater part of
animals. And by thus acting, indeed, amurderous disposit ion and a
brut al nat ure become st rengthened in us, and render us
insensibleto p i t y : t o which we may add, t hat t hose who f i
rs t dared to do th is, b lunt ed the greatest par t
-
7/31/2019 Porphyry 01
5/5
of leni ty, and rendered i t ineff icacious. The Pythagoreans,
however, made leni ty towardsbeasts to be an exercise of phi
lanthropy and commiseration. So that, how is i t possible
theyshould not in a greater degree exci te us to justice, than
those who assert that, by notslaught er ing animals, t he j ust ice
w hich is usual ly exercised tow ards men w i l l be corrupt ed?
Forcustom is most powerful in increasing those passions in man
which were gradual ly introducedin to h is nature. . . .
Hence, since animals are al l ied to us, i f i t should appear,
according to Pythagoras, that theyare al lotted the same soul that
we are, he may justly be considered as impious who does notabst ain
fr om act ing unjustly t owards his kindred. Nor because some
animals are savage, is theirall iance to us to be on this account
abscinded. For some men may be found who are no less,and even more
malefic than savage animals to their neighbors, and who are impel
led to injureany one they may meet with, as i f they were dr iven
by a certain blast of their own nature anddepravi ty . Hence, a
lso, w e destr oy such men; yet we do not cut t hem of f f rom an
al l iance t oanimals of a mi l d natur e. Thus, t herefore, i f l
ikew ise some animals are savage, t hese, as such,are to be
destroyed, in the same manner as men that are savage; but our
habitude or al l ianceto o ther and wi lder an imals isnot on this
account to be abandoned. But nei ther tame norsavage animals are to
be eat en; as neit her are unj ust m en. Now, however, w e act m
ostunjustl y, dest roying, indeed, and feeding on such as are tame.
With respect t o tame animals,however , we act wi th a twofo ld in
just ice, because though they are tame, we s lay them, andalso,
because we eat t hem. And, in short , t he death of t hese has a
reference t o the assumpt ionof them f or food.
To these, also, such arguments as the fol lowing may be added.
For he who says that the manwho extends the just as far asto
brutes, corrupts the just, is ignorant that he does not
himselfpreserve justice, but increases pleasure, which is hosti le
to justice. By admitt ing, therefore,that pleasure is the end,
justice is evidently destroyed. For to whom is i t not manifest
thatj ust i ce is i nc rea sed t hr ou gh ab st ine nce ? For he
who ab st ai ns f rom ev er y t hing an imat ed , t ho ughhe may
abstain from such animals as do not contr ibute to the benefi t of
society, wi l l be muchmore careful not to injure those of his own
species. For he who loves the genus, wi l l not hateany species of
animals; and by how much the greater his love of the genus is, by
so much themore wi l l he preserve justice towards a part of the
genus, and that to which he is al l ied. He,therefore, who admi ts
that he is a l l ied to a l l an imals, wi l l not in jure any an
imal . But he who
confines justice to man alone, is prepared, l ike one enclosed
in a narrow space, to hur l fromhim the prohibi t ion of in
justice. . . . Hence, therefore, since justice consists in not in
jur ing anything, i t must be extended as far as to every animated
nature. On this account, also, theessence of justice consists in
the rational rul ing over the i rrat ional, and in the i rrat ional
beingobedient to the rational part. For when reason governs, and
the i rrat ional part is obedient toi ts mandates, i t fo l lows,
by the greatest necessi ty, that man wi l l be innoxious towards
everything. For the passions being restrained, and desire and anger
wasting away, but reasonpossessing i ts proper empire, a simi l i
tude to a more excel lent nature immediately fol lows. Butthe more
excel lent nature in the universe is enti rely innoxious, and,
through possessing apower w hich preserves and benefi t s al l t h
ings, i s i t sel f not in want of any thi ng. . . .
Do you therefore ask, O man, what we should do? We should
imitate those that l ived in thegolden age, we should imitate those
of that per iod who were free. For with them modesty,
Nemesis, and Just ice associated, because t hey were satisf ied
wi t h t he fr ui t s of t he earth.
