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POSITI VISM AND LEGAL ETHICS ARGUMENTS Profe ssional Respons ibili ty Bill Simon 1. The Peppe r Pr inci pl e: Lawye rs shoul d ta ke ever y re asona bl y avai la bl e ac ti on to adva nce the cli ent s goals unl ess it is pl ainly prohibite d by law. a. Three premi ses: i. Lawyer s owe fid eli ty to la w ii. La w is strongly dif fer ent iat ed from mor als (= Positivism) iii. Other tha n i, the la wye r's onl y important dut y is t o the clie nt' s aut onomy. b. Two cr it iques: Lub an's cr it ique focuses on iii , but we fi rst consi der a cr it ique focused on ii. 2. Positivism Pos iti vis m (for our pur pose s) is the doct rin e tha t law is st rong ly dif ferent iat ed from mor als . How is law dif fer ent iat ed from moral s? a. Law =commands and prohibiti ons bac ked by st ate sanc tio ns (Holme s). b. Law =norms enacte d in accordance wi th law ma ki ng pr ocedur es recognized as legi timat e (H.L.A. Hart) . 3. Cr it ique of Positivism (as use d in the Pe ppe r principle): a. The gener al cla im: Law is n ot strong ly separa ted from mor als . i. As a descr ipti ve matt er, people do not view law this way. ii . As a norma ti ve matter, the et hi c that re sul ts when we combine the Pos it ivist de fi nition of law wi th th e pr of essional duty of fidelity to la w is unconvinci ngly narrow. Refl ecti ve pr of essi ona ls coul d not achie ve self -respect or soci al re spe ct on the basi s of suc h an ethic. b. The sanct ions ('bad man") per spe cti ve: i. Amibguit y: Does the "bad man" recogniz e a duty to acce pt sanctions, or is his only d ut y to accept the conseque nc es of wha te ve r he can't get away wi th? (Luban's "low realism") ii . Most pe ople (bad and good) see import ant di st in ct io ns be twee n ta x- type s an c ti o ns (p ar ki ng, "e ff ici ent br ea ch " of contra ct ) and pe na lty- ty pe s an ctions (e .g., punishment for murder) . iii. Con sider NLRB, Google cas es c. The procedur al perspec tive i. Pr oblem: Only the text get s enacted, but our unde rsta ndi ng (of bot h wha t la w is and wha t make s it binding) inc ludes the under lyi ng pur pose s and values. ii. Compare the fornicati on and serial kille r cas es. 4. Lu ban's cri ti que: Law is not enough Non-l egal mora li ty is a suff ic ie nt basi s for lawyer deci si on- ma ki ng; compet ing values should be weighte d aga ins t cli ent int ere sts. a. Val ues shared widely thr ough out soc iet y b. Lawyer 's idi osyn cra tic val ues

Positivism and Legal Ethics Arguments

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POSITIVISM AND LEGAL ETHICS ARGUMENTS

Professional Responsibility

Bill Simon

1. The Pepper Principle: Lawyers should take every reasonably available action to

advance the clients goals unless it is plainly prohibited by law.

a. Three premises:

i. Lawyers owe fidelity to law

ii. Law is strongly differentiated from morals (= Positivism)

iii. Other than i, the lawyer's only important duty is to the client's autonomy.

b. Two critiques: Luban's critique focuses on iii, but we first consider a critique

focused on ii.

2. Positivism

Positivism (for our purposes) is the doctrine that law is strongly differentiated from

morals. How is law differentiated from morals?

a. Law =commands and prohibitions backed by state sanctions (Holmes).

b. Law =norms enacted in accordance with law making procedures recognized as

legitimate (H.L.A. Hart).

3. Critique of Positivism (as used in the Pepper principle):

a. The general claim: Law is not strongly separated from morals.

i. As a descriptive matter, people do not view law this way.

ii. As a normative matter, the ethic that results when we combine the Positivist

definition of law with the professional duty of fidelity to law is unconvincingly narrow.

Reflective professionals could not achieve self-respect or social respect on the basis of such

an ethic.

b. The sanctions ('bad man") perspective:

i. Amibguity: Does the "bad man" recognize a duty to accept sanctions, or is his

only duty to accept the consequences of whatever he can't get away with? (Luban's "low

realism")

ii. Most people (bad and good) see important distinctions between tax-type

sanctions (parking, "efficient breach" of contract) and penalty-type sanctions (e.g.,

punishment for murder).

iii. Consider NLRB, Google cases

c. The procedural perspective

i. Problem: Only the text gets enacted, but our understanding (of both what law

is and what makes it binding) includes the underlying purposes and values.

ii. Compare the fornication and serial killer cases.

4. Luban's critique: Law is not enough

Non-legal morality is a sufficient basis for lawyer decision-making; competing

values should be weighted against client interests.

a. Values shared widely throughout society

b. Lawyer's idiosyncratic values