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POST SEMINAR REPORT
Institute for Strategic Studies; Research and Analysis (ISSRA)
National Defence University
Islamabad
Seminar Titled
“Afghanistan Endgame: Quest for Peace and Stability”
National Defence University Islamabad
(27th June 2012)
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Sponsor Ambassador Arif Kamal Director Global Studies
Compilation is based on minutes recorded by a team of Researchers at ISSRA;
� RA Ms Afifa Kiran � RA Ms Beenish Sultan � RA Mr. Muhammad Shabbir � RA Mr. Abdul Rauf � RA Ms Mahroona Syed � RA Ms Asma Sana � RA Mr Usman Asghar
Seminar Titled
“Afghanistan Endgame: Quest for Peace and Stability”
National Defence University Islamabad
(27th June 2012)
3
Seminar Titled
“Afghanistan Endgame: Quest for Peace and Stability” (27th June 2012)
POST SEMINAR REPORT
CONTENTS
• An overview of the seminar: Executive Summary P 1-7
- Thematic Focus
- Participation and Profile
- Summary Record of Proceedings
- Findings
- Recommendations
• Theme P 8
• Record of Proceedings: P 10-31
- Inauguration
- Thematic Session – One
Passage Through Transition
- Thematic Session – Two Perspectives on Post-2014 Scenarios
• Annexes P I-VIII
- Programme
- Profiles
- Participants
- Keynote Address by President NDU
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An Overview of the Seminar Post-Seminar Report
Seminar Titled
“Afghanistan Endgame: Quest for Peace and Stability”
A day-long seminar titled: ‘Afghanistan Endgame: Quest for Peace and Stability’
was held at NDU on 27th June’ 2012. The seminar was geared to brain-storming on the
contemporary Afghan scenario amidst projected U.S. withdrawals and reflecting on
possible post-2014 scenarios. In essence, it was an exercise to identify the emerging
challenges and therefore, policy-relevant options for Pakistan. An impetus to hold the
seminar had come from JSHQ.
Discussion on the overarching theme was indeed bi-focal in terms of treatment of
the emerging situation in Afghanistan and its fallout. It was carried out in two thematic
sessions: each having 3/2 speakers, an interactive discussion amongst the participants,
and a wrap up by the session chair.
The format of seminar and focal points of presentations are outlined below:
Session-1:
Passage Through Transition Chair: Amb Najmmuddin Shaikh
Afghanistan in the Course of Transition: Costs and Risks Speaker: Amb Rustam Shah Mohmand ‘Responsible End to the War’: Wither Reconciliation Process? Speaker: Mr. Rahimullah Yousafzai Role of International and Regional Players in the Transition: Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan Speaker: Dr. Rasul Bakhsh Rais
Session-2:
Perspectives on Post-2014 Scenarios Chair: Dr. Riffat Hussain
Economic and Security Outlook of Afghanistan Beyond 2014: Pressures and Options for Pakistan Speaker: Amb Najmmuddin Shaikh
“Neutral Afghanistan”: Reflections on the Post Drawdown Scenario Speaker: Amb Inam ul Haque
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THEMATIC FOCUS
The deliberative exercise was built on premise that ‘transition’ in Afghanistan
carries the potential of unfolding different scenarios and outcomes. Thus, the concept of
an ‘endgame’ is fixated to uncertainty. The year 2014 may signify a new chapter in the
continuing conflict rather than mark a milestone in an ‘irreversible transition’ or an
‘endgame’. The pronounced U.S. objectives in Afghanistan are related to various forms
and phases of transition, power sharing within the ambit of political dispensation in
Kabul and ‘responsible end to war’. However parameters of this vision and its
implementability remain blurred.
There are divergent views regarding the concept of reconciliation amongst
various stake-holders in the Afghan situation. The linkage between a ’responsible
drawdown’ and ‘safe power sharing mechanism’ is indeed very weak. If key
stakeholders are not taken on board, the security apparatus of Afghanistan is likely to
collapse from within. The resistance which is in control of more than half of the country,
may pose grave security threat to the entire process of transition and to the
neighborhood, more specifically Pakistan.
PARTICIPATION AND PROFILE
The seminar served as a convergence point for policy-relevant experts and
academia, corresponding to the critical importance of the overarching theme. The
professional standing of session chairs (two) and presenters (five) in the two thematic
sessions is quite remarkable (Profiles at Anx B). Concurrently, the audience
represented a broad spectrum of policy relevant circles, think tanks, academia, NDU
faculty and students (Attendance Roll at Anx C). The interaction amongst presenters
and the audience provided a stimulant for discussion on the occasion.
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A SUMMARY RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
At the inaugural, President NDU spoke of the critical importance of the subject in
terms of shared quest for peace and stability in Afghanistan, as the arena moves
towards the beginning of a ‘new game’. In this context, he underlined the need for a
focused and result-oriented intellectual discourse which may unfold policy options for
Pakistan.
While flagging significance of the overarching theme, President NDU outlined
the following aspects: (a) foreign interference only offers a recipe for disorder, (b) peace
or conflict in Afghanistan both carry an inevitable impact on the neighborhood and (c) a
peaceful and stable Afghanistan, friendly to all, holds the promise of progress in a trans-
regional setting. In addition, he wished that this reunion of experts and academia, would
provide a good forum to check on the veracity of the aforementioned assumptions.
Session- One
The first session flagged the critical importance of projected U.S. drawdowns
for Afghanistan and the neighborhood. Transition from US control, it was opined,
entailed a four-fold scenario: Firstly, that it should be considered only ‘fractional’ as the
full control of security apparatus will not be transferred to Afghan security forces,
Secondly, the fighting would not diminish in intensity as the drawdown approaches.
Thirdly, the rate of attrition, now 20 per cent that will rise dramatically as the coalition
forces withdraw. And fourthly, there are two ground realities that are likely to impact on
the scenario: The resistance and Afghan National Army that also serves as an umbrella
for warlords.
Beyond this, lack of clarity on the ultimate U.S. objectives adds to complexity of
the situation, and thus calls for treatment in a regional framework. Despite claimed
readiness of achieving a political solution to the Afghan issue by all sides, there are still
no serious efforts to pursue a viable reconciliation process. Thus, the way out of a
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messy and an unwinnable war in Afghanistan appears to be more difficult than the hasty
decision to attack the country nearly ten years back.
Session- Two
The second session highlighted the outlook of post- 2014 which appears
desolate. This is so because firstly, there is an expected economic downturn with
foreign aid drying up and no infrastructure to support the economy of Afghanistan.
Secondly, the security situation appears to remain burdened even if progress is made
towards reconciliation. Thirdly, the political dispensation in Afghanistan after 2014 in the
context of US- Afghan partnership agreement of May 2012 appears vague. The ethnic
and tribal rivalries, war lords, drug trafficking and economic development of the country
in the wake of shrinking resources in the post 2014 era, the role and interests of
regional players all lead to uncertainties in achieving peace and stability in Afghanistan
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FINDINGS
Key findings unfolded in the deliberative exercise are itemized below:
• The notion of an ‘endgame’ in Afghanistan, in fact, corresponds with the start of a
‘new game’. Given the transforming nature of conflict, specter of three alternate
scenarios is being unfolded in that setting: Taliban take over, a virtual division
between north-west and south-east or a protracted conflict.
• The US intentions in Afghanistan in the wake of drawdowns do not transmit a
uniform image. Therefore, different views emerge, ranging from the U.S.
departure from the scene to a withdrawal in tandem with a focused permanent
presence to oversee a larger region.
• Reconciliation amongst warring Afghan factions and power sharing amongst
them remain a remote possibility. The chances of a political solution involving the
Taliban through peace talks have been further reduced after the strategic
partnership agreement between Afghan Government and the US.
Implementability of the process of safe withdrawals and a stable political
dispensation in Kabul, in the absence of a credible reconciliation process,
remains questionable
• The security situation in Afghanistan will remain fraught even if progress is made
towards reconciliation. There are warlords and drug traffickers and power brokers
who thrive on Afghan instability and will thwart efforts at reconciliation or use their
influence to slow the process down. The tempo of fighting which had decreased
is now on the rise.
• The outlook for post 2014 appears bleak. The economic downturn that will come
with the reduction of aid and the retrenchment of local employees by various
foreign aid organizations and NGOs is likely to have a profound impact on the
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overall scenario. Unemployment might rise to 40%. Pakistan should be prepared
to receive more migrants, with or without the success of reconciliation.
• Pakistan’s core interests viz-a-viz Afghanistan relate to a stable, peaceful
Afghanistan- friendly to all. This will be best served if the Pushtoons (more than
half of the population) find an equitable representation in the political
dispensation, reconciliation process is placed on a firm footing, and spillover
effect including the TTP phenomenon is thwarted.
• The newer friction in Pak-US relations is a serious turnoff for bringing peace and
stability in Afghanistan. The two states are in need of finding point of
convergence while taking into consideration persisting dichotomy of views.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
The discussion revealed an array of salient points that ought to be viewed for future
course of action.
• First, after the so called drawdown, the responsibility of the Afghan institutions
should be handed over to the Afghan people. In order to tackle the challenges of
the ‘new game’ power sharing in Afghanistan should be facilitated. If the power
continues to rest with the U.S. the entire idea of an ‘endgame’ becomes vague.
• Second, Pakistan should vigorously pursue the process of reconciliation within
Afghanistan, directly or indirectly, so as to serve its core interest of stabilizing
Afghanistan internally and to thwart the TTP phenomenon.
• Third, in order to show lead in Afghanistan, Pakistan should formulate policy
options which strengthens the connectivity and ties between the two countries.
By levering its contacts, Pakistan should keep in view not only the border but
also trans-regional projects which may cross Afghanistan, such as electricity from
Tajikistan and gas from Turkmenistan. It needs to realize the risks and costs.
Pakistan should be taking the lead; if not then other countries would come and
take its place.
• Fourth, the resistance and political parties in Afghanistan should come to a
consensus. The ultimate formula may entail exclusion of Al Qaeda, recognition of
a pluralistic system and also commitment that the Afghan soil will not be used
against any country.
• Fifth, the U.S. needs to realize the importance of Pakistan in the entire process of
transition. The declining Pak-US relations are required to improve by engaging in
a political dialogue. Pakistan has a compulsion to stay connected with the super
power and the U.S. is in need of Pakistan for achieving the goal of safe military
drawdown.
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THEME
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THEME
Prevailing and projected Afghan situation, with its intricate and historical
linkages, has direct bearing on Pakistan and the region. The announcement by
President Obama on US drawdown from Afghanistan in his June 22 2011 speech
marked the beginning of another 'end game' in Afghanistan. The transition aims at
bringing the exit strategy to fruition incrementally by 2014. The withdrawal scenario is
particularly linked-up with the need for political engagement with insurgents and a
‘concord’ with neighbors. However, Pakistan, the country that has been caught up in
Afghanistan imbroglio for more than thirty years is seen now as part of the problem and
not the solution.
In this backdrop Pakistan needs to carefully evaluate the current and emerging
situation in Afghanistan; chalk out its future strategy to deal with the transitional phase
in Afghanistan and after transition (supposedly independent) Afghanistan in line with its
national interests and world peace.
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RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
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INAUGURATION
The inaugural ceremony of the seminar titled: “Afghanistan Endgame: Quest for
Peace and Stability” (27 June 2012: ISSRA/NDU) catered for opening remarks by
President NDU Lt Gen Agha Muhammad Umer Farooq. The brief ceremony over 15
minutes, flagged significance of the day-long discourse and set the pace and direction
of the two thematic sessions in the exercise.
Significance of the Seminar
President NDU first made a two-fold comment regarding importance of
discourse: It reflected our shared quest for peace and stability in Afghanistan as the
contemporary scenario there moves closer to an endgame (which indeed is
synonymous with the start of a ‘new game’). Concurrently, the bonds of kinship and
neighborhood inter-twin Pakistani and Afghan interests, whether in conflict situation or
in search of peace. The participants should, therefore, carry a clinical review of the
Afghan transition and see how the challenges in the contemporary phase and beyond
ought to be addressed.
Salient Features of the Remarks
While delivering the address, President NDU made the following essential points:
� It is important to learn from unmistakable lessons of history which depict a
paradoxical situation:
• Firstly, foreign interference only offers a recipe for disorder.
• Secondly, conflict or peace in Afghanistan carry an inevitable impact on the
neighborhood. It is therefore, important that all stakeholders in the region
contribute towards ending the conflict and building structures of peace.
• Thirdly, a peaceful and stable Afghanistan, friendly to all, holds the promise
of progress in a trans-regional setting.
� The Afghan transition without a sustainable political settlement unfolds the specter
of intensification of conflict on our borderline and a reenactment of the post 1979
scenario. A broad reconciliation in Afghanistan should serve the core interests of
both US and Pakistan, besides that of the Afghan people.
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� The transition now underway entails both costs and risks. It is important for us to
find best ways of reducing the risks and to enlarge gains for the Afghan people
and therefore for all those in the neighborhood.
� The US decision to carry military withdrawals by 2014 was intertwined with the
vision to bring a ‘responsible end to the war’. (Incidentally, it also implies ‘creative
chaos’ as an effective tool of ‘statecraft’). Hence the importance of enlarging
reconciliation process
� The regional players, besides other in the International community should come of
age to promote peace and stability in Afghanistan so as to effectively deal with the
post drawdown situation.
Turning challenges in to opportunity
Furthermore, President NDU spoke of the convergence of Pakistan and
Afghanistan at the crossroads of regions. This geographic disposition must be
turned into opportunities for greater security and economic development. This
landmass should be a connector rather than a point of conflict, for economic
boom beneficial to various regions.
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Session-1:
Passage Through Transition
Chair: Amb Najmmuddin Shaikh
Afghanistan in the Course of Transition: Costs and Risks
Speaker: Amb Rustam Shah Mohmand
‘Responsible End to the War’: Wither Reconciliation Process?
Speaker: Mr. Rahimullah Yousafzai
Role of International and Regional Players in the Transition: Challenges
and Opportunities for Pakistan
Speaker: Dr. Rasul Bakhsh Rais
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SESSION ONE
PASSAGE THROUGH TRANSITION
Introduction
The first thematic session was chaired by Ambassador Najmmuddin Shaikh,
former Pakistani diplomat who also served as Foreign Secretary of Pakistan. The
deliberations offered key dimensions and analysis of the emerging situation in
Afghanistan through transition up till 2014. The exercise aimed at identification of policy
options for Pakistan.
The presenters at the session were Amb Rustam Shah Mohmand (focusing on
Afghanistan in the Course of Transition: Costs and Risks), Mr. Rahimullah
Yousafzai (highlighting the Responsible End to the War’: Wither Reconciliation
Process) and Dr. Rasul Bakhsh Rais (identifying Role of International and Regional
Players in the Transition: Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan).
Afghanistan in the Course of Transition: Costs and Risks
Speaker: Amb Rustam Shah
Although transition is going to take place in Afghanistan, however, US is going to
stay there in any case. The decisions on security and strategy will still be made by the
US. Thus, there is no change envisaged as such in the current environment. It is a fact
that no development can justify occupation; nevertheless, one should not ignore that
development has taken place in Afghanistan. $15.7 billion have been spent on various
schemes related with IT, irrigation schemes, and trainings of thousands of Afghans.
There is growth and increase in the number of schools and hospitals also. However, on
the negative side, opium production has increased from 50 tons before 2010 to
thousands of tons today and contributes to, not less than one-third of the total Afghan
National Exchequer. At this point, Afghan government requires roughly $4.1 billion for
security and is able to generate only $1 billion in tax revenue. Therefore, in order to
sustain its forces, such a huge gap means the country will be dependent on external
sources for income and will eventually have to reduce strength of the forces.
Two significant successes that the US has achieved over the years are; the night
raids which is now a routine in Afghanistan. These are carried out by the soldiers from
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coalition forces, on the perceived supporters of the Resistance movement. The local
Afghan militias, known as Arbakies, provide funds and manpower to conduct raids too in
many areas like Kundus and Baghlan. The resistance is now completely wiped out.
However, about 62% area of Afghanistan still continues to be under the direct control or
influence of the Resistance. Whereas the Resistance has suffered considerable losses,
but it is still sustaining and constantly improving its capabilities especially as evident in
Panjsher, Ghazni and three other Southern provinces. Along with the above, there are
12 prisons set up by the US in Afghanistan which are marked for the inhuman
techniques of torture, physical and sexual abuses and excessive beating without any
documentary evidence. The evidence that has surfaced about such incidents is
collected due to a network of human intelligence. However, the US has also built up its
own, very large network of human intelligence in which each informer possesses a
satellite phone, thus making this network fairly effective. There is no questioning the fact
that the crimes committed against the jail mates are actually crimes against humanity
whereby more than 1, 60, 000 human beings have been killed brutally and twice as
much injured.
On the other hand, killing for fun is also very common. Dead bodies are
dismembered by the trigger-happy Allied soldiers and the body parts are taken as
trophies with videos happily taken of such events. The recent desecration of the Holy
Quran created a lot of hatred among the public too. However, it must be noted that quite
paradoxically, the killing of 16 Afghans by US soldiers did not arouse as much public
outcry and hatred as the desecration of the Holy Quran.
The long term objectives of US are; the energy deposits, containment of China,
encirclement of Iran or keeping an eye on Paki nukes, the fact is, that too much money
is being spent on expanding the facilities at the US Embassy at Kabul. Contrary to the
common misconception, the number of US casualties in Afghanistan is very low. The
night raids cost them nothing. Only 1900 soldiers have been killed as compared to the
58000 in Vietnam. However, it is obvious that maintaining 40000-50000 soldiers in
Afghanistan is going to be a costly affair for the US. Considering all that, it seems as if
the US is thinking of keeping Afghanistan as a foothold and is looking for a long haul
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whereby it would maintain and increase its influence not only on Iran, Pakistan and
China but also the CARs.
Strong lobby within Afghanistan is supportive of the Coalition forces’ presence
that consists of mostly the beneficiaries of the US like contractors, businessmen,
traders, Governors and NGOs. At the same time, the perception that the complete
withdrawal of the US would lead to factional fighting in Afghanistan is also
fundamentally fallacious. Once the US leaves, only the Afghan National Army and the
Resistance will be left. The immediate fall out will be that the rate of attrition, now at 15-
20%, will go up and people will defect and desert in large numbers. Therefore, no long
spells of factional fighting will take place.
The other scenario could be, that before coalition forces withdrawal, the
Resistance and the Afghan National Army will strike an agreement or compromise for
which no major constitutional amendments are needed at all. Afghanistan will follow a
pluralistic system and will interact politically with the rest of the world. In such a case,
Pakistan has a major role to play as its stakes are involved in either of these scenarios.
Presently, Pakistan is only reacting to the situations as they arise and not coming up
with concrete future plans. Pakistan is right now facing a threat of losing the gas
pipeline project, the hydro-electric projects and cheap electricity projects as long as
Afghanistan is not peaceful. No other country is so directly linked with the Afghanistan
situation as Pakistan; therefore it needs to adopt a more proactive approach. For this, a
rapprochement needs to be carried out. If Pakistan doesn’t learn a lesson, others will
take lead. The Qatar process has failed as US did not fulfill his demands of release of
prisoners, continuance of blacklisting of supporting groups and non-recognition of
resistance. Therefore, a regional framework for peace that binds the countries of the
region to Afghanistan’s neutrality and to non-interference, offers the best hope for
peace. It is here that Pakistan can jump in and play a decisive role, which unfortunately
it hasn’t done before.
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Responsible End to the War’: Wither Reconciliation Process
Speaker: Mr. Rahimullah Yousafzai
The world community is talking about the peace in Afghanistan but it has been
observed that no serious efforts have been made for political solution of the Afghan
issue despite claims of readiness by all sides. The US-Taliban talks in Qatar have
broken down even though the agenda was restricted to possible swapping of prisoners.
It happened because of the differences in the Taliban ranks on opening an office in
Qatar and holding talks with the US. Also, the Obama administration was cautious
enough on releasing five Taliban prisoners in exchange for the American soldier Bowe
Bergdahl. Taliban refused to talk to the Afghan government and even the less rigid
Hezb-i-Islami ended its contacts with Kabul to protest the US-Afghan Strategic
Partnership agreement. The High Council for Peace has yet to make any headway.
Instead, it has suffered setbacks due to the assassination of Prof Burhanuddin Rabbani
and Maulvi Arsala Rahmani. No new peace initiative is expected until early next year
once the US presidential election is held and the new president is installed. Even if such
an initiative is made, the chances of its success are bleak due to the stress on military
instead of political means to try and end the Afghan conflict. The US policymaker worry
that NATO pullout would increase Pakistan’s influence in Afghanistan and they want to
make sure to use this influence to combat terrorism. Hilary Clinton said there was no
other alternative with the US to protect its national interest except sustaining the difficult
relationship with Pakistan. Kabul feels that Pakistan is keeping Taliban from talking to
the Afghan government.
Taliban and the US appeared to have different expectations from Qatar talks.
Taliban are hoping to wait out the withdrawal of NATO forces. But, chances of a political
solution involving the Taliban through peace talks have been reduced after the strategic
partnership agreement between Afghanistan and the US. Permanent US military bases
in Afghanistan could mean permanent war, meaning a destabilized Afghanistan having
negative fallout on Pakistan. Peace talks between the US and Taliban became possible
after both sides gave up their reluctance in accepting each other’s position and
conditions. Pakistan apparently played a crucial role in persuading Taliban to agree to
the talks in Qatar. Taliban pulled out of the talks following the burning of the holy Quran
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by NATO soldiers and the killing of 17 Afghan civilians by US soldiers in Kandahar’s
Panjwai district. Taliban suspended the Qatar talks instead of ending the process,
meaning that the doors for resumption of the talks have been kept open. Power-sharing
as a solution for ending the Afghan conflict appears unlikely as far as Taliban are
concerned. In their case, such a solution has to be on Taliban terms. They would be
willing to co-opt opposition parties/figures, but would want to remain in control.
The most likely scenario would be Taliban making a military push once the NATO
forces withdraw and trying to capture power in eastern and southern Afghanistan before
attempting to overrun Herat and Kabul as they did in 1995-1996. Afghanistan could
again have different centers of power with Taliban in control in the east and south and
their rivals with support from the US, India and even Russia in the north. In this premise,
a weakened Afghan government could hold out in Kabul for a while depending on the
amount of military and monetary support made available by the US and its allies.
Taliban seem to be undergoing some change in terms of their policies on girls’
education, interaction with the media, relationship with al-Qaeda which is becoming
weak, and not allowing Afghanistan’s soil for attacks against other countries. Still they
haven’t really repented their past mistakes or promised anything concrete and
substantial with regard to their policies and behavior in case they are back in power fully
or partially in southern and eastern Afghanistan. They have proved to be good fighters,
but they weren’t good rulers in the past and appear unlikely to be so in future.
All these developments pose serious challenges and opportunities for Pakistan in
post 2014. Increasingly, Pakistan is seen as an ally and protector of Taliban and is
being accused of playing double-game. By offering to bring Taliban to the negotiation
table and having facilitated some talks between the US and Mulla Mohammad Omar’s
Taliban and also the Haqqani network, Islamabad has strengthened this impression. On
the other hand, Taliban have proved to be an unpredictable and not a very dependable
ally in the past even though they were friendlier to Pakistan compared with other Afghan
groups. They refused to expel wanted Pakistani militants and did not listen to Islamabad
on the question of Osama bin Laden and for not destroying the Bamiyan Buddhas. Even
now Pakistan sometimes uses coercive methods to keep them in line. It is going to be a
struggle to ensure that Pakistan is not left all alone in a corner as a supporter of Taliban
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while the whole world is in the opposite camp. This would be negative fallout of the exit
of NATO forces. On the positive side, as Taliban would emerge stronger than their
existing status after the exit of NATO forces, Pakistan as a friend of the Taliban would
gain more leverage in Afghanistan compared to its present position. Pakistan would
continue to be burdened by almost three million Afghan refugees and more could
migrate if a civil war breaks out in Afghanistan and Taliban try to recapture power once
the NATO withdrawal is completed.
The issue of Durand Line/Pakhtunistan would continue to be unresolved and
remain an irritant in Pak-Afghan relations whosoever is in power in Afghanistan.
However, Taliban in power would be a lesser problem for Pakistan compared to the
other Afghan groups. Other present-day challenges for Pakistan including Baloch
separatists finding sanctuaries in Afghanistan could end if Taliban are back in position
of power in provinces bordering Pakistan once NATO forces are gone. Pakistani Taliban
using Afghan soil to launch attacks in Pakistan is a tricky issue, but it is more likely that
Afghan Taliban following NATO exit would hold them back instead of letting them
damage their ties with Islamabad. It is feared that Pakistani Taliban would be
emboldened if Afghan Taliban gain an upper hand following withdrawal of NATO forces
from Afghanistan. The NATO exit may not mean the end of troubles for Pakistan
because Afghanistan without a political settlement would remain destabilized. As the US
would have some military presence in Afghanistan and the region, its enemies too
would continue efforts to remain in this theatre of war. Taliban for sure would continue
the fight and even the depleted al-Qaeda would strive to remain relevant to the situation
in the region.
Role of International and Regional Players in the Transition: Challenges and
Opportunities for Pakistan
Speaker: Dr. Rasul Bakhsh Rais
Afghanistan is the most unfortunate country which suffered from three cycles of
wars within last 23 years. Fatefully, Pakistan has been greatly affected by these three
cycles too. Regarding the endgame, rational analysis would say that one objective could
20
be to secure the post-Taliban political arrangements, though with some modifications
and changes and some kind of adjustment out of necessity. The other objective could
be to secure and maintain the integrity of the state of Afghanistan, its constitution,
government and its vital institutions. It may not happen in 2014 but in many areas the
process has already taken place. The US has finally realized that it can no more pursue
a go–alone policy. It has to share some responsibility with the regional powers,
preceded by a transfer of responsibility and power to the Afghan government in a
gradual and graduated fashion. For this purpose, the US will have to seek international
and regional stakes and assistance for stability in Afghanistan.
It seems that the US has devised a multi-pronged strategy to deal with the
transition in 2014. State and nation building is thus the new Afghan Project. The US is
now concentrating on building up Afghan security forces, providing long-term and
sustained support for the Afghan project, and training of the Afghan forces. The US has
also realized that it will have to ultimately strike a negotiated settlement with the Taliban
because the US and NATO have completely failed to defeat the Taliban, or what many
call, the Resistance forces. Interestingly, this realization is bi-directional, as the Taliban
also know that they cannot have a run over on Kabul as well. So in the wake of the
looming stalemate, there is no win-win situation for any party to the conflict, though
relative power of the negotiating parties would matter in a give and take manner when
the US decides to negotiate with the Taliban in its attempt for reconciliation. In that
scenario, the US role will be largely residual yet significant, seeing the current situation.
The US will definitely try to build strategic partnership with the Afghan government in
terms of maintaining its bases, air support, drones and intelligence.
The dilemma that the US faces today is whether to save face, or to save
Afghanistan. Both of these are conflicting impulses. There is no doubt that the Afghan
war is the most unpopular and ill-timed war (specially economically, owing to the world –
wide economic recession being witnessed for the past few years). By all means, the
Americans want the boys home, cut losses and run; and run fast but at the same time,
they fear losing gains which include primarily the destruction of Al-Qaeda. The US is
financing the Afghan security at the cost of $ 4 billion, supporting the reconstruction with
a cost of $ 3-4 billons. According to the current estimates, the US is incurring a cost of $
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120 billion on military operations annually. Thus, the changing mission of US seems to
be; to train, advise and assist the Afghans, which practically means adoption of a
residual security role over the horizon. At this point, Pakistan must think that the border
regions are very much volatile and undeclared war may be underway which could be
deemed as a Low Intensity Conflict situation. In this backdrop, one of the regional
powers, i-e India has adopted a ‘look Central Asia’ strategy. It is also looking forward to
form an Afghanistan-India strategic partnership. The constraints on India will although
influence its policy, yet, Afghanistan somehow fits into its regional role. One must
consider how the US is going to transfer power to regional players and then we will
come to know the multi-faceted role of India in Afghanistan, in terms of security,
intelligence and economic reconstruction. This is precisely the reason behind deliberate
portrayal of India’s soft image in Afghanistan through media and diplomacy. There is
thus complete Indian alignment with the American interests and strategy. India is
therefore, planning to invest around $6 billion and opening up a steel mill in Afghanistan
which shows that the Indians are planning to enter into competition over Afghan mineral
resources and together with the US , they will do their utmost to defend the post-Taliban
order in Afghanistan.
As far as China as a regional power is concerned; it is pursuing its pragmatic
interests, which includes eyeing the trillion- dollar mineral wealth in Afghanistan and
defeating extremism and separatism. Beijing shares American view of transition and is
cementing it by showing a keen interest in reconstruction and providing soft security
assistance in this connection. In case of Iran too, somehow the US and Iranian interests
coincide when it comes to defeating the Taliban. Iran has no serious issue with the
American war and is least interested in the Taliban insurgency. Iranians would like to
improve state to state relations with all the regional players, including the US, with a
focus on NF interests. It is already pursuing close partnership with India on
communication links, though it is not in favour of American bases in the region.
The prospects of a stable, peaceful Afghanistan are better than ever before. If
lessons have been learnt, Pakistan shares regional and global interests in Afghanistan.
It can be part of regional and international coalition to stabilize Afghanistan and all its
primary interests will be served with ending the war. Even the destruction of Al-Qaeda
22
and weakening of Taliban serves Pakistan’s interests. However, the opportunities do
not come without challenges. Pakistan faces the challenges of undergoing a paradigm
shift on Afghanistan from exercising influence to forging partnership. It will have to
balance out long-term interests with partnership with the United States. We cannot have
peace in for example Balochistan, unless there is peace in Afghanistan. A fundamental
shift in relationship with India will be needed and Afghanistan can be a meeting point. It
is in India’s interest too because then they can collectively, along with Pakistan, have
access to vast mineral resources of Afghanistan as any trade route through Iran will be
very costly for India. On the other hand, another challenge for Pakistan is the eviction of
the trans-border militant groups and delinking national security from private armed
groups.
On a final note, Afghanistan wars have been a little too costly for Pakistan.
Therefore, there should be an end to playing the ‘great game’. Pakistan can save
Afghan order, and also save itself from Afghan troubles. For this, Pakistan should have
firm belief and must realize that Taliban are no friends of Pakistan. It also needs to work
through regional and international coalitions instead of going alone.
Interactive Discussion
During the interactive session, the participants were keen in deliberating on
the costs and risks of the transition in Afghanistan. In this regard, it was opined that the
US game plan would shift to a descriptive approach from a military one. They would be
revisiting the approach to ‘lily pads’ and reviewing further policy options. In addition, in
order to achieve a considerable transition, the Americans cannot undermine the
importance of Pakistan’s role. Pakistan is suitably placed in this strategically important
region and without its involvement in the mediation process, results would not be
favorable. The US needs to focus on the outcome of its long term military presence in
Afghanistan. It also needs to revisit costs and risks which the regional states had to pay
due to this presence.
Pakistan and Iran have been suffering from a constant flow of Afghan refugees;
in the disguise of which insurgents have also been pouring in through the borders. For
example currently 300 Baloch fighters are residing in Afghanistan who may easily enter
23
into Pakistan and cause serious security threats. Thus, if the US and coalition forces
have not been able to defeat them in 11years they need to reconsider their idea of
leaving back a surge. This presence would end up in the partitioning of Afghanistan
which is not favorable in any case.
Furthermore, contrary to the American belief, the Afghan National Army is not up
for the task of defending their country against miscreants. It is a weak force which still
requires rigorous training and support from the international community. If the
Americans want an ‘end to war’ which is very unlikely, their strategy should be
according to the popular dispositions. They need to understand the sensitivity of the
situation. It is evident that Al-Qaeda is no more a vital force in Afghanistan but the
presence of Taliban poses a grave security threat after the transition. In addition, it is
high time for the Americans to admit their defeat in Afghanistan. They may not consider
it as a massive defeat candidly, but serious realization is present in-house. They have
been ignoring the fact that there is no military solution to Afghanistan. US imperialist
and expansionist approach to the issues should now be revisited. Pakistan being the
front line ally has also suffered dramatically. Currently, Indian’s are being helped in
playing a greater role in Afghanistan by the US. Resultantly, Pakistan has serious
reservations in the entire process. It should not be ignored that Pakistan has suffered
due to the intrinsic connectivity with Afghanistan. The entire feasible solution rests upon
involving the all stake-holders including the Taliban in a political process where transfer
of power is according to the prescribed rules.
Summing up by the Session Chair
The chair while summing up the session opined that drawdown does not mean
that American forces will not continue their counterterrorism operations within and
outside Afghanistan. The target will probably be the border between Afghanistan and
Pakistan where the Americans are convinced that Al Qaeda and its local allies who
endorse its global agenda are located. The American intervention in Vietnam was
justified by the ‘domino theory’ — if the communists won in Vietnam then all of East
Asia would go ‘red’. When public opinion so dictated, this theory was discarded and
American allies in South Vietnam were abandoned but only after millions of bombs had
24
devastated neighboring Laos and Cambodia to destroy the Ho Chi Minh trail. For
Pakistan it would be prudent to assume that this pattern could be repeated in
Afghanistan where it can be argued that what remained of the terrorism threat could be
controlled through other means.
It is time that Pakistan stop worrying about interests of other countries and focus
on our own welfare. The kind of facilities America has build in Afghanistan seems to
suggest a long term planning of US presence in Afghanistan. However, to the ire of
corporate sector in America, US has not created investment opportunities for
themselves in Afghanistan. It hints towards the fact that perhaps US is looking at
Afghanistan as transit route to Central Asian States. We need to dispassionately look at
the US presence in Afghanistan, its interests in Iran and post-2014 scenarios to protect
our own interests.
25
Session-2:
Perspectives on Post-2014 Scenarios
Chair: Dr. Riffat Hussain
Economic and Security Outlook of Afghanistan Beyond 2014: Pressures
and Options for Pakistan
Speaker: Amb Najmmuddin Shaikh
“Neutral Afghanistan”: Reflections on the Post Drawdown Scenario
Speaker: Amb Inam ul Haque
26
SESSION TWO
PERSPECTIVES ON POST-2014 SCENARIOS
Introduction
The second thematic session was chaired by Dr. Riffat Hussain, Professor of
Peace and Conflict Studies at FCS-NDU. The focus of the session was to evaluate the
post 2014 environment and identify the possible outcomes and their implications/ policy
options for Pakistan. Amb Najmmuddin Shaikh’s presentation was aimed at identifying
Economic and Security Outlook of Afghanistan beyond 2014: Pressures and
Options for Pakistan and presentation of Amb Inam ul Haque was focusing on
“Neutral Afghanistan”: Reflections on the Post Drawdown Scenario followed by an
interactive Q&A.
Economic and Security Outlook of Afghanistan Beyond 2014: Pressures and
Options for Pakistan
Speaker: Ambassador Najamuddin A. Shaikh
Afghanistan’s outlook seems very bleak in the post 2014 context. The economic
downturn that will come with the reduction of foreign aid, the retrenchment of local
employees of the various foreign aid organizations and NGOs will cause serious
consequences to the Afghan economy. According to the documents, from 2014 to 2017
Afghan forces will be reduced to 230,000 from 352,000. There are 37,000 employed
security personals by the security companies to guard the multiple organizations in
Afghanistan. World Bank estimated in a report that 90% of the economic activity was
generated by the foreign presence and aid. There are 62 aid agencies working in
Afghanistan which provide a major share in employment and income for Afghans.
The Afghan issue can be well understood by analyzing it in three dimensions
namely economic, security and political. In Economic terms, The GDP growth rate was
recorded 9% whereas all this has been due to the services sector in the Afghan
economy. There will be a demand of $10 billion as loan for next decade for the smooth
running of Afghan economy. An amount of $6 billion will be needed to support the
functionality of the state. In Afghan budget, $4.5 billion is for the public spending
whereas 35% comes from Afghan resources. Afghanistan is a mineral rich country
27
blessed with natural resources worth of $1 trillion. India has also pledged to invest
massively in Afghanistan. As a matter of fact, there will be 60% decline in Afghan
economy’s volume if the coalition forces withdraw. The constructions will be stopped
due to the withdrawal which contributes major share to the labor. The transport
department will also suffer accordingly. As matter of externalities for Afghan neighbors,
there will extra 2 million Afghan refugees which will seek refuge in Pakistan. Pakistan
already houses Afghan refugees being neighbor. This new lot of refugees in the
aftermath of any resurgence in Afghanistan will pose a serious threat to Pakistan
economy as well.
Security is the second sensitive area in Afghan context where militia has not
disappeared completely. There are warlords and drug traffickers and power brokers
who thrive on Afghan instability and will thwart efforts at reconciliation or use their
influence to slow the process down. Punjsher valley has more weapons as ever before
in past. Ethnic tension may continue to be a factor of Afghan conflict. Afghan army is not
well prepared yet US forces has built 6 corps headquarters in Afghanistan.
Politics is the third and important aspect, President Karzai plays key role in this
whole story of Afghan politics. President Karzai has said that he will not run for the
upcoming elections. If he resigns, it is perceived that Marshal Muhammad Qasim Fahim
will be the next president. In Afghan politics, there are certain US interests and goals,
one of them and most important is to keep Taliban away from power structure of
Afghanistan. Pakistan has its own stance on the Afghan issue. Pakistan can avail the
opportunity to be a window for trade to central Asia through Afghanistan. Pakistan
cannot sit passively by saying that reconciliation is going on in Afghanistan but it has to
do more to safeguard its national interests. Pakistan must make every effort to promote
reconciliation.
“Neutral Afghanistan”: Reflections on the Post Drawdown Scenario
Speaker: Amb Inam ul Haque
Year 2014 will merely mark a change in American strategy. The new strategy will
be aimed at cutting down expenditure which is $1billion per year for one soldier and
also reducing American loss of life. After the drawdown of NATO forces from
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Afghanistan, the international focus on this country will diminish, similar to what has
happened in Iraq and Libya. These countries are more devastated and disorganized as
they were under the previous regimes. Nevertheless, the flow of resources in
Afghanistan will gradually dry up. Thus, there will be a serious threat to the internal
stability of the country. It is unlikely for the US to leave the Afghan soil due to its long
time strategic interests in the region viz-a-viz China, Central Asia and Pakistan.
Therefore, there is probably no end game which promises to bring peace and stability in
the country.
The present American strategy in Afghanistan in the wake of strategic
partnership signed in 2012 and Chicago summit amounts to the following: no nation
building, weaken Taliban by eliminating the mid level commanders, fast paced
operations, responsibility of ground fighting being shifted to the Afghan National Forces,
string the Taliban along and eliminate them. This also entails impact of the defoliating
Pak-US relations. Hilary Clinton’s accusations on Pakistan on her visit to India, the
Silala attack, 2nd May unilateral operation against Osama Bin Laden, Panetta’s
culmination and Bruce Riddels recent interview all pay heed to the current hostility in
their relations. Thus, Afghanistan has become a base for American counter terrorism
missions in Pakistan. In addition, the snub administered to Pakistan at the Chicago
summit concludes that the U.S. expects no demands, is not ready to apologize, requires
the ground lines of communications to be opened and remains consistent on drone
attacks. This clearly amounts to coercion and not diplomacy.
Nevertheless, the possible scenarios post-2014 is limited to two possible
outcomes: firstly, emergence of a broad based national unity government in
Afghanistan, which is also supported by the international community and regional
players. Secondly, due to the resistance of the Taliban against a national government
overseen by the Americans, a stalemate may also emerge which is the most likely
scenario. Thus, the U.S. led central government may be able to control limited areas
and the writ of the Taliban may run in the southern and eastern parts of the country. The
country would be divided from the north-west and south-east axis. In the wake of weak
Afghan National Army, war lords and private militias may take over small pockets of the
country. The crisis of Afghan refugees will also re-emerge in Pakistan and Iran. The
29
international community may lose interest in the country particularly when the
American’s are shifting their defence posture to the Asia-Pacific.
In the wake of the aforementioned scenarios the desire of ‘neutrality’ may only be
underwritten by the regional states. Afghanistan cannot be considered as a neutral state
as long as there are foreign forces stationed on its soil. This also becomes difficult when
they are engaged in internal conflict and attacking the neighboring states. The are
following essential conditions for a neutral Afghanistan as reconciliation between the
Taliban and other ethnic groups of the country particularly the Tajiks, acquirable power
sharing, withdrawal/closure of all foreign bases, a formal declaration by the Afghan
government of its desire to be considered as a neutral state, impel not be used as a
base of attacking any third country, formal acceptance of Afghanistan’s international
borders which paves way for no claim on the territory of any other state, a small army
financed by Afghan resources and finally support by the neighbors, regional powers and
the United Nations.
For achieving this aim of neutrality the regional states may play a role within their
capacities but not force themselves inside the country which may result again in conflict.
However, there are various avenues which may be explored by the regional players.
These may include: commitment to non-interference, respect for borders and territorial
integrity, a joint declaration to eradicate violence and extremism, interdicting drug
trafficking, enhancing trade and economic cooperation, helping Afghan refugees to
return to their country, establishment of infrastructure projects, development of
Afghanistan’s natural and mineral resources, and strengthening regional resources like
SAARC and SCO. However, these avenues also are questionable in the presence of
US forces and insurgency within Afghanistan. However, the fundamental obstacle to
reconciliation comes from within. The Taliban mostly pashtoons may oppose the
process. They may not be comfortable in sharing power once the foreign forces have
left. This may result in redemption of a civil war in the country.
30
Interactive session
In the interactive session, participants deliberated on: Indo-Pak convergences
and divergences in Afghanistan, possible role of SCO in Afghanistan, future Pak-
Afghan relations, American interests and scenarios in Afghanistan after 2014. It was
noted that there is an effort to build peace between India and Pakistan and to create
integration in the region through trade. So the ideas such as New Silk Route have
emerged, but unfortunately, enhancing trade does not solve the fundamental problems
such as Kashmir and Siachin between India and Pakistan. Such issues have kept the
two nations separated for decades. People of Pakistan want peace with India but the
underlying realities are different. It should be clear that India seeks to settle all its
problems with Pakistan in its own interest. Major political problems are not resolved
between nations to the satisfaction of the two countries, measures as trade, transit
facilities Silk Route etc would be of no use. Convergence in Afghanistan can only come
after a bilateral dialogue between India and Pakistan where the Indian role in
Afghanistan should be clearly defined which will also be acceptable to Pakistan.
Regarding the role of regional players in Afghanistan, it was argued that though,
China, Russia and other SCO countries have interests in Afghanistan, what role, at
what stage or under what conditions they would play is not clear till US presence? On
the other hand, Russians are critical of ISF leaving after 2014. In their view, ISF should
stay in Afghanistan under the mandate of UN until they have completed their task
(elimination of all terrorists from Afghanistan and building peace). Afghan issue may be
solved if neighbors sign an agreement of good neighborhood. In the same way, an
agreement is also needed among Afghans to endorse peaceful coexistence.
It was stressed that Pakistan needs to review her own national goals.
Afghanistan has its own set of problems and priorities. Pakistan should abstain from
intervening in Afghanistan’s internal conflict and let them resolve it among themselves.
Pakistan has IDPs in FATA whose number rival to the flux which it had from
Afghanistan. Karachi is one of the world’s most weaponised cities. All this happened
because Pakistan turned a blind eye to Mujahideen getting arms inside. Pakistan had
not been able to afford the devastating effects since Jihad. Hence being a big player in
31
great game is not in Pakistan’s interests. Pakistan’s sectarian conflicts are not similar to
Afghanistan’s. Pakistan has to stay away to the maximum level from Afghan problem
because our internal political and economic structure does not allow us.
Historically, Pakistan US relations have remained volatile. Currently, sixty nine
percent of Pakistani public is anti US and seventy three percent of Americans do not
trust Pakistanis. Pak US partnership in the war on terror need not pursue reforms to an
alliance from most allied ally to most sanctioned ally; rather we need a relationship
which is more balanced. In this context, opening of ground lines of supply, the current
discord between US and Pakistan should have been handled purely on commercial
lines from 2001 onwards. Our geo-strategic location requires us to use this transition as
an earning resource as Turkey did in 1973. Turkey charged $800 per loaded container
to pass through and $200 for the empty one. So there are many things which are
commercial and economic in nature rather only political. Economic potential needs to be
exploited to its maximum.
Perceptions and realities are two different things but in the Afghan context,
Pakistan can benefit from favorable scenarios being created according to the Pakistan’s
interests. This situation poses like that a Messiha is being awaited to settle the disputes
but this is not going to happen in reality. In simple words, good deeds will yield good
outputs and that will be the best scenario. There are reports that American plan to stay
beyond 2014 as a food agreement was quoted but the facts may be different. No doubt,
USA intends to stay in Afghanistan whereas the number may vary from 15,000 to
25,000 deployed on 4 bases with specialized roles. In fact, US supremacy is expanding
not shrinking. In short, basic challenge for Pakistan is preventive defensive approach in
the Afghan context.
Summing up by the Session Chair
In his wrap up remarks, the chair emphasized on the post-2014 scenarios in
Afghanistan and highlighted the challenges for Pakistan in the entire situation; firstly, if
the NATO forces are not able to achieve their goals in Afghanistan, this means that they
have lost. On the other hand, Taliban are also unlikely to come in power and will require
help of the entire institutions to run a government. Thus, the international community
32
needs to come in this very concern. There is a dire need of continuous flow of foreign
help and aid. This is important for strengthening the Afghani institutions. In addition, a
complete withdrawal of the foreign forces will ultimately prove fruitful for fuelling
confidence in the people of Afghanistan. In this regard, if neutral Afghanistan is the most
likely outcome, it will have to be paved intelligently by taking the entire stake-holders on
board.
Secondly, with regards to Pakistan the chair opined that evidently we have failed in
providing a clear vision of Pakistan’s goals in the drawdown scenario. What Pakistan
needs to do is to adopt a preventive defence approach. We are required to undergo a
drill of the ‘worst come worst get’ scenario. This is the case because a blowback in
Afghanistan may have serious implications for the security situation in Pakistan.
Nevertheless, a friendly to all and good enough Afghanistan is in the outmost favor of
Pakistan and the entire region. In this regard, Pakistan is required to be vigilant to play
its role in any step taken by the international community to achieve peace and stability
in Afghanistan.
33
ANNEXES
i
Anx ‘A’ Seminar on:
‘Afghanistan Endgame: Quest for Peace and Stability’
27 June 2012
Program
Welcome 09:00-09:30 Registration 09:30-10:00 • Recitation from Holy Quran
• Welcome Remarks 10:00-10:30 Tea/Coffee
Session-1: Passage Through Transition
Chair: Amb Najmmuddin Shaikh 10:30-10:50 Afghanistan in the Course of Transition: Costs and Risks
Speaker: Amb Rustam Shah Mohmand 10:50-11:10 ‘Responsible End to the War’: Wither Reconciliation Process?
Speaker: Mr. Rahimullah Yousafzai 11:10-11:15 Stretch Break (05 min) 11:15-11:35 Role of International and Regional Players in the Transition:
Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan Speaker: Dr. Rasul Bakhsh Rais
11:35-12:45 Interactive Discussion 12:45-12:55 Chair’s Comments/Wrap up
13:00-13:55 Lunch (Banquet Hall)
Session-2: Perspectives on Post-2014 Scenarios
Chair: Dr. Riffat Hussain 14:00-14:20 Economic and Security Outlook of Afghanistan Beyond 2014:
Pressures and Options for Pakistan Speaker: Amb Najmmuddin Shaikh
14:20-14:40 “Neutral Afghanistan”: Reflections on the Post Drawdown Scenario Speaker: Amb Inam ul Haque
14:40-14:45 Stretch Break (05 min) 14:45-15:55 Interactive Discussion 15:55-16:05 Chair’s Comments/Wrap up
ii
Anx ‘B’
Profiles
AMBASSADOR NAJMMUDDIN SHAIKH
Ambassador Najmuddin Shaikh is a former Pakistani diplomat who served as
Foreign Secretary of Pakistan from 1994 to 1997. He currently writes a weekly
column for Daily Times. Amb Shaikh, joined the Foreign Service of Pakistan in
1961. He is a graduate of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (1962).
During his 38 years of service, he served as Pakistan's ambassador to Canada
(1987-1989), ambassador to West Germany (1989-1990), ambassador to the
United States (1990-1991) and ambassador to Iran (1992-1994).
AMBASSADOR RUSTAM SHAH MOHMAND
Rustam Shah Mohmand is specialist of Afghanistan and Central Asian affairs
and a renowned security analyst. He served as Ambassador of Pakistan to
Afghanistan and held position of Chief Commissioner Refugees for around ten
years.
MR. RAHIMULLAH YOUSAFZAI
Rahimullah Yusufzai is Executive Editor of the Jang group's The NEWS
international at Peshawar bureau and is op-ed writer for the monthly Newsline. He
also served as Time Magazine's Pakistan journalist and correspondent of BBC's
Pushto and Urdu services in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan.
Mr. Yousafzai is considered a commanding authority on Afghan affairs and on
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Acknowledging his
iii
achievements in Journalism, the government of Pakistan awarded him with
Tamgha-e-Imtiaz in August 2004 and Sitara-e- Imtiaz in August 2009. He got
Sitara-e-Imtiaz for his achievement in the field of journalism for another time on 23
March 2010.
DR. RASUL BAKHSH RAIS
Dr. Rasul is presently Professor of Political Science at LUMS Lahore. He holds
his Ph.D degree in political science from University of California Santa Barbara.
Dr. Rais has been Professor at Quaid-e-Azam University Islamabad, Columbia
University USA and Fullbright Fellow at Wake Forest University. He has published
widely in professional journals on political and security issues pertaining to South
Asia, Indian Ocean and Afghanistan.
DR. RIFFAT HUSSAIN
Dr. Riffat Hussain is currently professor in Peace and Conflict Studies at FCS-
NDU. Previously he has worked as Chairman of DSS department at Quaid-e-
Azam University; Executive Director, Regional Center for Strategic Studies
(RCSS) in Sri Lanka, DG and Senior Research Fellow, NDC in Pakistan and as
Minister (Information) at Embassy of Pakistan, in Washington. In addition, he has
been visiting professor in the Department of Political Science and visiting faculty
member in the Center for International Security and Cooperation, (CISAC) at
Stanford University U.S.A. He has written hundreds of quality articles, chapters of
the books and other research material on Pakistan's foreign policy, South Asia and
international relations.
iv
AMBASSADOR INAM UL HAQUE
Ambassador Inam-ul-Haque is a Pakistani career diplomat who served as the
Foreign Minister of Pakistan in the winter of 2007-2008. He also remained State
Minister for Foreign Affairs from June 2002 till November 2002, and Foreign
Secretary, the highest post of Ministry of Foreign Affairs, after he replaced Mr.
Shamshad Ahmad Khan in February 2000.
v
Anx ‘C’
Seminar on: “Afghanistan Endgame: Quest for Peace and Stability” (27 June, Wed 2012)
Participants
Sr. Name Designation NDU Command
1. Lt Gen Agha Muhammad Umer Farooq
President NDU
2. Maj Gen Ziauddin Najam DG ISSRA 3. Maj Gen Noel Israel CI A Div 4. Dr. P.I. Cheema Dean FCS
Session Chairs/Speakers 5. Dr. Riffat Hussain Department of PCS,
FCS, NDU 0300-5246646 (c)
6. Amb Rustam Shah Mohmand House # 124, Hayauddin Road, New Shami Road Colony, Peshawar 0300-8599877 (c)
7. Mr. Rahimullah Yousafzai Flat 29B, Army Officers Colony, Barah Road, Peshawar Cantt 0314-9022425 (c) 091-5286477
8. Dr. Rasul Bakhsh Rais H # 392, St # 34, F-11/2 Islamabad (r) 0333-4331444 (c)
9. Mr. Najmmudin Shaikh House No A-30, West wind Estates, Clifton, Block-2 Karachi 0314-2085599 (m)
10. Amb Inam ul Haque House # 14, Park Road, Sector I-8/3, Islamabad 051-4435061 (r) 0300-5060149 (m)
Other Eminent Persons relevant to Afghanistan 11. Amb Ayaz Wazir Ex-Ambassador to Afghanistan
214 street 18 F 10/2 Islamabad [email protected]
12. AVM (R) Shehzad Chaudary House # 7, Street # 17-D, Fazaia Colony, Islamabad Highway, Rawalpindi 0321-5163776
13. Mr. Ahmed Qureshi 514-A, Askari Road, Chaklala III, RWP. / PO BOX # 431 GPO RWP 03335555515
14. Mr. Ejaz Haider Senior Advisor Policy Outreach & Peace and Conflict Programme (SDPI)
vi
38 Embassy Road, G-6/3 Islamabad Tel: 051-2278134
15. Amb Asif Ezdi Shah House #187,Street # 18 F-10/2 Islamabad Tel: 051-2298041 Mob: 03004022667
18. Amb Tariq Osman Hyder House#18 Khyaban-e-Iqbal, F-7/3, Islamabad
Faculty Advicers (FAs) 19. 20. AM (R) Massod Akhter House# 6, Street#7, Safri Villas 1,
Rawalpindi Tel: 051-5706996 Mob: 0321-5063331
21. V/Admiral (R) Iftikhar Ahmed Rao
House #16, Street # 27, F8/1 Islamabad Tel: 051-2851627 Mob: 0302-8271388
ISSRA Faculty/RAs x 12 22. Amb Arif Kamal Dir GS/RS 23. Brig Amir Yaqub Dir C&C 24. Brig Masroor Ahmed Dir DS 25. Brig M. Khursheed Dir IS &R P 26. Col Khush M. Khan DD Lib 27. Lt Col Dr. M. Saif ur Rehman DD IS &R P 28. Lt Col Asif Raza DD KC&PP/CEPS 29. Lt Col Manzoor Ahmed Abbasi DD N&MH 30. RA GS/RS 31. RA GS/RS
FCS Faculty x 10 32. Dr. Muhammad Khan HOD IR 33. Brig (R) Tahir ul Mulk Kahlon Asst Prof GPP 34. Ms Arshi Saleem Hashmi Asst Prof PCS 35. Syed M. Ali Lecturer IR 36. Lt Col Nasir Hafeez Lecturer S&NS 37. Mr. Aqab Mehmood Malik Lecturer S& NS 38. Syed Ameer Ali Lecturer LMS 39. Dr. Noman O Sattar HOD PCS 40. Dr. Abdur Rehman
A Div x 02 41. Brig Zia Ur Rehman 42. Brig Muhammad Zafar Iqbal
B Div x 04 43. Air Cdre Ahsan M. Khan 44. Cdre Sajid Mahmood 45. Air Cdre Wasim Hussain 46. Cdre Zain Zulfiqar
vii
FCS Students x 15 47. Laila Ikram Mp.Phil IR 48. Naeem Ullah “ 49. Shahzadi Tooba “ 50. Maj Shams-uz-Zaman M.Phil S&NS 51. Ahmad Khan “ 52. Anzar Ahmed “ 53. Mariam Shah M.Phil PCS 54. Muhammad Rehan Zafar “ 55. Mohid Iftikhar “ 56. Wahab Qureshi 57. Sobia Hanif 58. Anam Niazi 59. Sara Batool 60. Ali Mustafa 61. Hassan Hakim 62. M. Imran Khan
Think Tanks 63. Mr. Raza Ahmad Roomi Executive Director, Jinnah Institute
House # 4, Street # 36, Sector F-6/1, Islamabad Tel: 051-2814161-3 Fax: 051-2814164
64. Dr. Maqsud ul Hassan Nuri Acting President IPRI H # 6, St # 63, F-8/4, Islamabad 051-9261348-50
65. Ms Humaira Iqbal IRS H # 12 , St # 84, Ataturk Avenue, G-6/4, Islamabad 051-9204934 / 051-9204865 Ext:105
66. Dr Shaheen Akhtar Research Fellow, IRS H # 12 , St # 84, Ataturk Avenue, G-6/4, Islamabad 051-9204934 / 051-9204865 Ext:105
67. Ms. Maria Sultan Director General SASSI H # 427, St # 1, F-11/1, Islamabad 051-2290917, 2291061
68. Mr. Tahir Nazir Research Fellow SASSI H # 427, St # 1, F-11/1, Islamabad 051-2290917, 2291061
69. Mr. Khalid Rahman DG, Institute of Policy Studies (IPS) House 1, Street 8, F-6/3, Islamabad Tel: 051-8438391-93
70. Mr. Najam Rafique, Director Americas at the Institute of Strategic Studies Islamabad (ISSI),
viii
71. Ambassador Ali Sarwar Naqvi, Executive Director Center for International Strategic Studies (CISS), House # 01; Street # 02; Kohistan Road F-8/3 Islamabad Tel: 051-2286863, 8315410-423
Universities 72. Maj Gen (R) Ali Baz National University of Sciences and
Technology, NUST Campus, H-12, Islamabad Tel: 051-90851001
73. Ms Salma Malik Department of IR, QAU Islamabad 0300-8501590
74. Dr. Z.A. Qureshi National University of Modern Languages (NUML), Sector H-9, Islamabad 051-9257646-50
75. Ms Yusra Mushtaq Department of Defence & Diplomatic Studies, Fatima Jinnah Women University, The Mall, Old Presidency, Rawalpindi Tel: 051-9270050
Policy Relevant Officials
MOFA 76. Mr. Tariq Wazir Dir Afghanistan , MOFA
051-9219801, 9056631 JSHQ
77. Lt Col Tahir Hussain JW&Trg Dte
79. Sqdn Ldr M. Johryab Baig “
80. Col Moosa Bin Naseer Ops and Plan Dte 81 Lt Col Emaad Ashad “
GHQ 82. Maj Gen Shahid Hashmat DG PA, GHQ
AHQ 83. Designated rep
NHQ 84. Designated rep
ISI 85. Mr. Khalid Mehmood DD G
86. Lt Col Jehnagir Others
87. Ms Asma Bukhari Visiting scholar from UK
