Journal of Applied Philosophy, Vol. 5, No. 1, 1988 27

Poverty: absolute or relative?

BEVERLEY SHAW

ABSTRACT In recent decades poverty has been defined as a relative rather than absolute notion. Those in poverty have been seen as poor relative to a level of income, or social condition, accepted as average or normal for a society. Poverty has been redefined as Yelative deprivation’. This paper argues, first, that the redefinition of poverty as relative to social norms is a radical departure from the traditional notion of poverty. Secondly, it considers whether such a redefinition gives support to the view that the claims of those in poverty (relative) may be considered as morally equivalent to the claims of those in poverty (absolute). The paper concludes by arguing that the notion of relative poverty is advanced to give support to social and economic policies whose primary aim is equality rather than the relief of poverty.

In the last three years TV screens have presented to us pictures of starvation and death in Ethiopia, and in other African societies. Such societies have untold numbers of people living in poverty. Their peoples lack food, fuel and shelter. They have barely enough for the maintenance of life. Their plight gives rise to compassion, with the consequence that many in Western, richer societies try to help to relieve this poverty, however difficult this is in practice.

What here is being relieved is poverty conceived as an existence all but consumed in keeping alive. The poor live on a narrow edge, one side of which slips down to death by starvation and exposure.

This view of the poor and of poverty has, however, been challenged in recent decades. For example, Professor Peter Townsend, in the opening sentence of his monumental work, Poverty in the United Kingdom: a survey of household resources and standards of living, declares that: “Poverty can be defined objectively and applied consistently only in terms of the concept of relative deprivation” [ 11. Townsend provides a gloss on the concept of relative deprivation, for he informs us that: “Individuals, families and groups in the population can be said to be in poverty when they lack the resources to obtain the types of diet, participate in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are customary, or at least widely encouraged or approved, in the societies to which they belong” [2].

Relative Deprivation: a radical redescription of poverty?

Townsend’s redefinition of poverty had been anticipated by the American economist, John Kenneth Galbraith, who in his best selling book, The AfPuent Society, famously constrasted private affluence with public squalor. From the perspective of the 1980s it is of interest to note that he thought poverty to be a matter of little economic importance in affluent western societies. For this reason the poor had been forgot- ten-a forgetfulness Galbraith regretted from the moral point of view.

28 B. Shaw

Galbraith saw no need for a precise definition of poverty, claiming that: “In part it is a physical matter; those afflicted have such limited and insufficient food, such poor clothing, such crowded, cold, and dirty shelter that life is painful as well as compara- tively brief ’’ [3]. Yet Galbraith could sufficiently depart from this time-honoured notion of poverty to add in the very same paragraph: “People are poverty-stricken when their income, even if adequate for survival, falls markedly behind that of the community” [4].

What we have here, in this latter definition, is a radical redescription of poverty. On the one hand poverty is a matter of starvation rations, clothing that fails to protect its wearer from the elements, inadequate heating and shelter. On the other hand, poverty is, as with Townsend, marked by a failure to enjoy that which is customary in a society, or encouraged or approved of in that society. Those in this form of poverty may, as Galbraith remarks, have an income adequate for survival, but not an income that enables them ‘to keep up with the Joneses’, to use a phrase less current than it once was, and one that both pithily described and satirised those whose main aim in life is to live up to the expectations created by the largely self-appointed standard- bearers of the affluent society.

Townsend had good reason to believe that his more recently formulated definition of poverty was not one widely accepted, for he had conducted a survey of opinion on this very issue. On the crucial point that poverty is a matter of relative deprivation, of a failure to match up to a commonly accepted standard of living, he found most of his respondents unwilling to agree. As Townsend notes: “Only a tiny percentage of the sample saw poverty as a condition relative to standards which were or were becoming widespread in contemporary society” [5]. Indeed Townsend points out that, and generalising from his sample: ‘ I . . . a substantial percentage of the population adopts a conception of poverty as being a standard below subsistence” [6].

Townsend thus found himself differing radically from his respondents on what is meant by poverty. T o many of his respondents, poverty was living below or just at the level of subsistence. Thus the subjects of his survey were in substantial agreement with Seebohm Rowntree who, in his seminal book, Poverry: a study of town life, defined families whose “total earnings are insufficient to obtain the minimum necessaries for the maintainence of merely physical efficiency as being in primary poverty” [7]. As Townsend rightly notes: “Previous operational definitions of poverty have not been expressed in thoroughgoing relativist terms, not founded comprehensively on the key concepts of resources and standards of living” [8].

Given the propensity of his respondents to cling to previous, and one presumes subjective and unscientific operational definitions of poverty, it is not surprising that those defined as poor by Townsend, by reference to the key concepts of resources and standards of living, have in his words “come to conclude that poverty does not exist” [9]. This non-existence of poverty, it is important to note, is a state of affairs in Britain rather than in the world generally. The consequence is that people defined as poor by Townsend reject this categorisation and deny also that they feel deprived [lo]. This Townsend described as a ‘genuine problem’ [ 111.

It may be remarked at this point that I have unduly sharpened the distinction between poverty (to be described from now on as absolute or subsistence) and relative poverty, as defined by Townsend. For in contrast consider the view taken by the collective authorship of the Report of the Archbishop of Canterbury’s Commission on Urban Priority Areas, Faith in the City: a call for action by church and nation. In that report it is written:

Poverty 29

Poor people in Britain are not of course as poor as those in the Third World. But their poverty is real enough nevertheless. For poverty is a relative, as well as an absolute concept. It exists, even in a relatively rich western society, if people are denied access to what is generally regarded as a reasonable standard and quality of life in that society [12].

What we might question in this passage is whether there is therein one notion of poverty or two. For judged by the notion of absolute poverty there are no or few people in poverty in Britain. If poverty is relative the number can turn upon whatever is conceived to be a reasonable standard and quality of life in that society: a matter, to say the least, of some contention.

Judged by the “standards and quality of life” set out by Townsend, of course many people in Britain must be seen as relatively poor. By his ‘deprivation index’ [ 131 people are in poverty if, amongst other deprivations, they have “not had a cooked breakfast most days of the week”; or they live in a “Household [that] does not usually have a Sunday joint (three in four times)”; and also is one that: “Does not have fresh meat (including meals out) as many as four days a week” [14]. In a less schematic way, Paul Harrison, in his study [ 151 of the London borough of Hackney, attempts a description of relative poverty which requires a statement of what is required for a socially acceptable life. Harrison found in 1980-81 that what his informants saw as necessary for such a life included “a three piece suite, wall units, carpets, a fridge, washing machine and colour television, an annual holiday away from home plus several day trips a year; and at least one night out a week for teenagers” [16].

No doubt precisely delimiting the notion of absolute poverty is not without its difficulties-yet the facts of starvation in Ethiopia are straightforward enough. Such cases are paradigmatic; and there is much poverty not dissimilar in many parts of the world, though not perhaps so well publicised as that in Ethiopia and the Sudan. Sadly enough poverty remains endemic in the world; and this despite the fact that the industrialised countries have managed to pull most, if not quite all, of their citizens to a standard of living above that of bare subsistence, as that is understood inter- nationally. As already noted, such absolute poverty is seen as including a nutritionally inadequate diet, and not one inadequate in terms of some socially approved standard that may be influenced by fashion and culture. Rather a poverty-stricken diet is one inadequate to sustain life, or sustains life only, leaving little in reserve for work, never mind the positive enjoyment of life. Clothing and shelter are also necessities for the maintenance of life, as we in the affluent west are reminded of when we venture forth on mountains, deserts, and oceans. Our biological nature requires warmth; therefore, fuel supplies are an additional necessity for life.

It may be remarked that these aspects of poverty are a matter of degree. For example, it may be said that the diet required to sustain life cannot be determined with precision and may vary between individuals, as what is needed for people of differing physique, age and sex will vary; and also, more food, better shelter and clothing, and far more fuel may be necessary in cold climates than in hot. Many distinctions we make, however, are matters of degree. Such distinctions are not thereby unimportant or cannot be made, despite there being disputes on the border.

A major distinction between absolute and relative poverty is not that both are matters of degree, but that with the former the judgement as to poverty is made with reference to man as such. In contrast relative poverty is seen with reference to a specific society or culture: as in Townsend’s definition of relative poverty, noted above, by which people are poor “when they lack the resources to obtain the type of

30 B. Shaw

diet, participate in the activities and have the living conditions and amenities which are customary, or at least widely encouraged and approved, in the societies to which they belong” [ 171.

Townsend is eager to pursue the notion that poverty is relative to living conditions and amenities which are customary, encouraged and approved in any given society. This logically enough leads him to argue that “a different definition of poverty is required for every society, or indeed every relatively autonomous community” [ 181. It is commonly argued today, following Disraeli, that Britain is made up of two nations. It is said that we are divided into the affluent South and the socially deprived North. If this is true, do we require two definitions of poverty so that those living in (say) Surrey are in poverty if they fail to possess a Volvo and are denied access to at least a week’s ski-holiday a year in Liechtenstein? In contrast, are those living in (say) Durham in poverty only if they are denied access to an inside lavatory, and lack a three piece suite and colour TV?

Townsend knows well where the logic of the notion of relative poverty leads. He points out that “research studies might find more poverty, according to this definition [relative], in certain wealthy than in less wealthy societies.. .” [19]. This is true enough and scarcely requires research studies. Society A is poorer than Society B. In A subsistence may be taken for granted as the poverty line, yet many people or perhaps the majority may be for most of their lives just somewhat above it. In contrast in society B there is more wealth and no one is living below the subsistence line or even on it, at least judged by international standards. Yet in society B many people may come to believe they are poor if they cannot match up to a socially approved standard of living. Thus we arrive at the paradox that wealthy societies are more poverty- stricken than poor societies, for as Townsend has remarked there is more relative poverty in wealthy than in less wealthy societies.

The notion of relative poverty also rules out the possibility that increasing wealth will eliminate poverty. As Townsend points out: “despite continued economic growth over a period of years the proportion found to be in poverty might rise” [20]. So that just as a wealthy society is likely to be more poverty-stricken than a poorer society, so in the same way an increase in wealth, that leads to an improvement in general living standards, will lead to an increase in relative poverty. An example of increasing wealth’s increasing poverty (relative) is afforded by the USA. For in that country: “the assumption that the prevalence of poverty has been steadily reduced since 1959 may have to be abandoned, principally because the definition upon which prevalence is measured is rooted in the conceptions of a particular movement in time and not sufficiently related to the needs and demands of a changing society” [21].

The Morality of Poverty

There are no grounds in reason to condemn those who wish to change-even radically change-the meaning of words. T o believe otherwise would be to commit the fallacy of essentialism, to employ a term popularised by Karl Popper. That is, we would have to believe that for every word or term we use there is a corresponding unchanging essence. From the essentialist point of view language is not so much a human invention devised for the multifarious purposes of human life but rather a source of knowledge of the unchanging essences which language embodies.

In contrast we can view language as serving our human purposes. We can agree to change the meaning of words and to accept those changes of meaning that arise from

Poverty 31

changes in the character of human life. Sometimes changes in meaning are quite dramatic and arise from the activities of a small community of language users. Thus the term ‘atom’ until recent times meant ‘body too small to be divided’ (as defined in the Concise Oxford Dictionary, 4th edn, 1951). Modern physicists use the term for quite other purposes without any qualms or difficulties.

If, therefore, I am correct in arguing that Townsend, and other social scientists and policy makers, are offering a radical re-definition of poverty, then that in itself cannot be condemned. There is no harm in anyone making the attempt to persuade us to change our understanding of whatever term or word is in common or uncommon usage. Nevertheless we can ask why the change is required or necessary, and what benefits will follow from a change in some standard or traditional usage.

One consequence of a radical change in usage is that what was formerly named by the radically revised term is no longer so described. Thus if poverty is now redefined as relative deprivation, a deprivation relative to whatever may be said to be the normal living conditions in a society, then the word ‘poverty’, as such, no longer means that condition endured only by those living at or below subsistence level. For this condition we have coined the expression ‘absolute poverty’, when once ‘poverty’ was enough.

Perhaps we can hold the two quite dissimilar notions of absolute poverty and relative poverty separate. Yet is there not a danger that important distinctions will be overlooked, and the moral appeal that is invoked by absolute poverty be transferred by association to the radically different notion of relative poverty? Or indeed that relative poverty ceases to be spoken of as such, but as poverty per se, thus gathering to those said to be relatively deprived in wealthy western societies, the degree of sympathy and compassion felt, along with the urge to charity and to help and assist, for those multitudes in poverty (absolute) in the Third World?

Consider, again, the point of view found in Faith in the City [22]. This work is, as its subtitle proclaims, A Call for Action by Church and Nation. We are called to act on behalf of the relative poor to be found in our inner-cities. No doubt there is much to be done to improve our inner-cities. Yet as the Report points out, and as I have already quoted: “Poor people in Britain are not of course as poor as those in the Third World” [23]. In the Third World the poor are starving and dying for lack of the most basic shelter, clothing and medical care. In Britain, as in other western societies, the relative poor are those people “denied access to what is generally regarded as a reasonable standard and quality of life in that society’’ [24]. Denied access, that is: to three piece suites, Sunday joints of meat for three out of four weeks, a week’s annual holiday and colour TV [25].

How can we justify a greater concern for those in relative poverty on our doorsteps than for those in absolute poverty overseas? From the secular viewpoint this does seem difficult whether one adopts a utilitarian or a rights-based stance to moral justification. From a Christian point of view, surely things are even simpler. From the perspective of a universalistic Christian ethic, that proclaims that brotherhood of mankind, geographical distance and cultural difference are immaterial. The moral claim of the absolute poor must take precedence over that of the relative poor.

To say that some people are poor, or that they are in poverty, is to describe their condition, but it is also to make a moral claim on their behalf. Traditionally, :he poor have been thought deserving of succour. In the words of the old carol: “Good King Wenceslas look’d out/On the Feast of Stephen;/. . . . When a poor man came in sight,/Gath’ring winter fuel”. We all know the consequences of that sighting. The good king there and then set out in search of the poor man, followed by his faithful

32 B. Shaw

page. Would we be too far wrong in believing that what the good king saw was a suffering human being: a poor man gathering his firewood whilst others were feasting? Therefore the king and saint calls out to his page: “Bring me flesh and bring me wine/Bring me pine-logs hither;/Thou and I will see him dinelwhen we bear them thither”.

This moral claim on behalf of the poor is made of those that, in Galbraith’s words already quoted, “have such limited and insufficient food, such poor clothing, such crowded, cold and dirty shelter that life is painful as well as comparatively brief’ [26]. Can such a claim be made of those people whose income is below average for people in Britain, yet cannot be said to be in poverty as defined by Galbraith?

A response to this may be that the absolute poor are in far-off countries; and that we cannot be certain that our aid is genuinely effective. In contrast, our relative poor are members of our society. They may not be anywhere near as poor as the absolute poor elsewhere: but they are our poor and therefore demand a moral response from us, those of average wealth and income in our society. Surely this sort of moral thinking inspires Faith in the City [27] whose capitalised and singular City is no universal city, but the mundane inner-cities of Britain’s London, Birmingham, Bradford, etc.

Yet this response begs a number of questions. For example: Is aid to the relative poor in affluent western societies any more effective than that provided for those absolutely poor in poverty-stricken, badly organised countries with possibly corrupt governments? The evidence from the USA, with its 1960s Great Society crusade, initiated by President Johnson, does not support the thesis that it is easy to raise those in relative poverty to some higher level of income and affluence. Perhaps more fundamentally, the question remains: Can the claims of those in relative poverty in wealthy, western countries be as great to the more affluent majority as the claims of those in absolute poverty in the Third World?

Faith in the City argues that poverty is more than shortage of money. It is also “about rights and relationships, about how people are treated and how they regard themselves; about powerlessness, exclusion, and loss of dignity” [ 281. These are certainly important matters: but surely their relationship to poverty, at any rate as traditionally conceived, is questionable? And Faith in the City itself follows the sentence quoted above, and concludes the paragraph, by remarking: “Yet the lack of an adequate income is at its heart” [29], the heart, that is, of poverty.

Consider here the issue of unemployment. Faith in the City quotes Archbishop William Temple in the 1930s as saying: “Unemployment is the most hideous of our social evils” [30]. There may be an element of rhetorical exaggeration here, but as the report points out, unemployment destroys dignity and erodes self-respect. Neverthe- less unemployment in Britain, as in other wealthy countries, may be endured at an income adequate enough to raise the unemployed out of poverty as the OECD defined it [31]. Indeed, it is more than possible, that were the unemployed to be paid an income considered adequate by the authors of the report, those unemployed would still lack dignity, and have less self-respect than those in employment. Part of the indignity of unemployment is being in receipt of an income not seen as properly earned: however false this view may be in some actuarial way.

Thus the goal of an adequate income for all, an income adequate to provide “access to what is generally regarded as a reasonable standard and quality of life in that society” [32], even if achieved cannot guarantee that which the Archbishop of Canterbury’s report rightly believed to be commendable: dignity and self esteem, rights

Poverty 33

and relationships. The goal that might be achieved is income equality. Is this intended as the major consequence of the doctrine of relative poverty?

Poverty and Equality

The ideal of eliminating or reducing poverty (absolute) for mankind is widely held. It presumably underpins all those agencies and voluntary bodies to be found in wealthy western societies whose aim is to aid and assist Third World countries to better themselves. Whether the total elimination of such poverty is practically possible is a matter of conjecture. Nevertheless it is a goal that, in principle, is possible of achievement.

On the other hand, the abolition of relative poverty seems, in principle, incapable of achievement. For as Townsend has argued, even if societies become wealthier and living standards rise accordingly, the relative poor will always be with us. Rising living standards will increase the proportion of the relative poor whose income does not permit access to all the goodies an affluent society can provide for its citizenry.

To be absolutely poor is a condition too many endure but most would never wish to endure. Responses to relative poverty can presumably vary: recall that many of Townsend’s respondents failed to recognise their condition of relative poverty and felt undiminished by it. This Townsend describes as a problem, perhaps one-to borrow a Marxist phrase-of ‘false consciousness’, to be remedied by a more general acceptance of his persuasive definition of poverty. The relatively deprived will thus be encouraged to see their condition as an injustice requiring a remedy. How unlike the Cynic philosopher Diogenes, of whom by legend it is said that when asked, by the world- conquering Alexander, what most he wanted, replied from the interior of his famous tub, “For you to get out of my light”.

It is worthy of note that the proponents of relative poverty are uneasy or ambivalent about those acceptable living standards in wealthy societies by which relative poverty is measured. For example, in Faith in the City it is claimed that there “is a profound unease which a Christian is bound to feel about the moral and spiritual effects of the modern consumer economy, depending as it does on the continual stimulation of all attainable desire” [33]. Secular versions of this unease are expressed by Galbraith [34]; and by Townsend [35], who writes of the extent and severity of poverty (relative) as being in part a function “of style or styles of living which are constantly being defined and redefined and which the population feels compelled, or is compelled, to emulate”

There are, of course, strong philosophical and religious traditions that have, over the ages, rejected whatever modest degree of affluence or consumerism their societies have generated. Such affluence has been seen as a snare and a delusion-holding out the illusion of genuine happiness in this life, and acting as an obstacle to salvation in the after-life. But if one sincerely holds these views, ought one to be arguing, first, that the absence of the trappings and symbols of the consumer society is to be considered a genuine deprivation? For example: that to be without a colour TV is an indicator of poverty, either material or spiritual. And second, that without question collective action should ensure that all so deprived be brought up to the standard of the rest-as argued in Faith in the City? The goodies of the affluent society are either good for all or they are not. If they are not, why should they be seen as that which to lack is to be poor and deprived?

The notion of relative poverty leads with a certain inevitability to the notion of

~361.

34 B. Shaw

equality, for it is only when we are equal at whatever given standard of living that the relative poor are eliminated. (Indeed, in a society so miserably poor that everyone was absolutely poor there might be some pride that at least relative poverty was no problem.) The relationship is well observed in Faith in the City, where not only is it an assumption of the work itself that inequality is always synonymous with injustice, but that poverty and inequality are both sides of the same coin, as in its collective authorship’s insistence “that there is collective responsibility for the problems of poverty and inequality that we have described” [37]. Note here, first, the absence of any qualification to the term ‘poverty’ so we do not know whether poverty (absolute) or poverty (relative) is that for which we are collectively responsible; and secondly, the assumption that poverty and inequality are problems that go together like a horse and buggy.

Yet this assumption can be questioned. The abolition of poverty (absolute) and the abolition of inequality are two separate enterprises and there is no necessary connec- tion. There is no incompatibility in a world where the scourge of poverty has gone, or been greatly reduced, and yet there remains a considerable degree of inequality of (say) income and wealth between those who are now raised above poverty and those who are indisputably wealthy. Indeed that is what we find in those wealthy western societies where there is little absolute poverty, and yet such societies are, as egalitar- ians often remark, profoundly unequal, and this is by them without dispute to be deplored. Thus whilst absolute poverty is not a marked feature of wealthy western and unequal societies, a society may be profoundly equal, but the equality may be one of poverty with many people living at a subsistence level and below.

Nothing distinguishes relative from absolute poverty more than in their relationship to equality. Whilst there is clearly no necessary relationship between absolute poverty and equality: their abolition remains separable policy goals requiring also different justifications, this cannot be said of the relationship between relative poverty and equality. Only in conditions of equality of income and wealth can such poverty be eliminated. To be committed wholeheartedly to the abolition of relative poverty is to be committed also to income egalitarianism, and possibly other forms of egalitarianism as well, for those who are committed to raising up all those conceived to be below a certain acceptable standard of living cannot stop short below it, saying ‘enough is enough’. And what of those whose style of life is even more materialistically lavish than some acceptable social norm? Will not this style of life have to be reduced in opulence and scale for fear that it would provide a standard to be sought by those below it?-once, that is, relative poverty appeared to be abolished. Recall again the opinion of the authors of Faith in the City that the lack of an adequate income is at the heart of poverty, and again that this adequacy is not to be measured by what is sufficient to mankind as such, but to whatever is, in any given society, regarded as “a reasonable standard and quality of life in that society” [38].

Given his notion of poverty, it is not surprising that Townsend should advocate, for what he calls an “effective assault on poverty” [39], such measures as the abolition of excessive incomes. This would lead to a scheme whereby we would all be paid a tax- free income “according to a publicly agreed and controlled schedule by occupational category and skill, but also by need or dependency-which would cover a relatively narrow span of variability” [40]. There are many economic, political and moral objections to this proposal that there is here no space to press [41]; but for one consider how this “publicly agreed and controlled schedule” might be drawn up and by whom. And what if there was little public agreement on how one group of workers

Poverty 35

should be paid as opposed to another: how would such disputes be decided and in whose interests? Perhaps we may take heart from Townsend’s comment on his own list of proposals to abolish relative poverty: “it would be wrong to suggest that any of this is easy or even likely” [42].

Can poverty be both relative and absolute as Faith in the City suggests? Only, I have argued, if we accept that poverty has two meanings. The first is the traditional and widely accepted definition of poverty as living at and below the level of subsistence. In the second definition, poverty is relative to some acceptable social norm. Thus this redefined poverty is relative to the living-standards prevailing in a society. Paradoxi- cally, as we have seen, there is then more poverty in wealthy societies than in poor ones; and, also, it seems to follow, more poverty in the better-off regions in wealthy societies than in their poorer, inner-city areas.

I suggest that the persuasive definition of poverty as relative poverty serves two major purposes and policies. One is that of egalitarianism, as in Professor Townsend’s [43] proposal that we should all be paid a tax-free income “which would cover a relatively narrow span of variability”. By this Townsend presumably means that, despite individual differences in effort and merit, never mind ‘need or dependency’, such incomes would as nearly approach equality as makes no difference. The second policy consequence is that concern for the relatively poor in our inner and outer cities will seem to transcend concern for the absolutely poor elsewhere. Both these policies are eminently questionable. The danger is that we may be the more ready to accept these doubtful and debatable policies if we fail to distinguish between the two notions of poverty now current and come to believe, falsely in my view, that there is but poverty as such, and that this can be both absolute and relative.

Beverley Shaw, School of Education, University of Durham, Leazes Road, Durham DHI I TA, United Kingdom.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

[I] PETER TOWNSEND (1979) Poverty in the United Kingdom: a suwey of household resources and standards

[2] Ibid., p. 31. [3] J. K. GALBRAITH (1962) The Afluent Society, p. 261 (London, Penguin). [4] Ibid., p. 261. Galbraith, writing in The Afluent Society, first published in 1958, saw poverty as a special

rather than a general case in modern society. Increased output in the USA had “reduced poverty from the problem of a majority to that of a minority” (p. 260). Indeed Galbraith suggested two causes of poverty. One, he described as ‘case poverty’: “related to some characteristic of the individuals so afflicted” (p. 262); on his list were such characteristics as: mental deficiency, alcohol, insufficient education, bad health, excessive procreation (cf. p. 262). And second: insular poverty caused by a reluctance to move from a poverty-stricken environment or economically unproductive area, classically in the USA, the Appalachian plateau.

[5] PETER TOWNSEND (1979) op. cit., p. 27. [a] Ibid., p. 241. Elsewhere in his book Townsend notes, presumably with regret, that “the majority [of

people in the UK] take the view that poverty is a condition under which people are unable to obtain subsistence, or the basic necessities of life or is a condition which applies to particular low-income minorities, such as pensioners or the unemployed” (p. 914).

[7] SEEBOHM ROWNTREE (1901) Powerty: a study of town life, quoted in PETER TOWNSEND (1979) op. cit.,

[8] PETER TOWNSEND (1979) op. cit., p. 33. [9] Ibid., p. 429. Townsend quotes (p. 38) an international review (OECD) as an illustration of just such a

suspect operational definition of poverty. The OECD review defined poverty “in terms of some

of living, p. 31 (London, Penguin).

p. 33.

36 B. Shaw

absolute level of minimum needs, below which people are regarded as being poor, for purpose of social and government concern, and which does not change through time”.

[lo] PETER TOWNSEND (1979) op. cit., p. 426. [ l l ] Ibid., p. 426. [12] The Report of the Archbishop of Canterbury’s Commission on Urban Priority Areas (1985) Faith in

the City: a call for action by church and nation, p. 195 (London, Church House). [13] The deprivation index has 12 items or characteristics, and this is merely a summary. A more complete

index contains 60 items, including: “Works mainly or entirely outdoors”, “Fewer than three pints of milk per person per week”, “At least one day without cooked meal in last two weeks”, “Health poor or fair”, “No meals paid or subsidized by employer”, “Moved house at least twice in last two years” (TOWNSEND, op. cit., pp. 1173-6).

[ 141 PETER TOWNSEND ( 1 979) op. cit., Table 6.3, p. 250. [15] PAUL HARRISON (1983) Inside the Inner City (London, Penguin). [ la] Ibid., p. 425. [17] PETER TOWNSEND (1979) op. cit., p. 31. [ la] Ibid., p. 53. [19] Ibid., p. 31. [20] Ibid. [21] Ibid. [22] The Report of the Archbishop of Canterbury’s Commission on Urban Priority Areas (1985), op. cit. [23] Ibid., p. 195. (241 Ibid. [25] Townsend takes a strongly functionalist view of society, and sees those in relative poverty as not in the

same sense full citizens because their level of consumption is not as high as others’ (see p. 922). [26] J. K. GALBRAITH (1962) op. cit., p. 261. [27] The Report of the Archbishop of Canterbury’s Commission on Urban Priority Areas (1985), op. cit. [28] Ibid., p. 195. [29] Ibid. [30] Ibid., p. 207. [31] See Note [9]. [32] The Report of the Archbishop of Canterbury’s Commission on Urban Priority Areas (1985), op. cit.,

p. 195. [33] Ibid., p. 55. [34] J. K. GALBRAITH (1962) op. cit. [35] PETER TOWNSEND (1979) op. cit. [36] Ibid., p. 922. [37] The Report of the Archbishop of Canterbury’s Commission on Urban Priority Areas (1985), op. cit.,

[38] Ibid., p. 195. [39] PETER TOWNSEND (1979) op. cit., p. 926. [40] Ibid. [41] See for challenges to this viewpoint: WILLIAM LETWIN (Ed.) (1983) Against Equality: readings on

economic and social policy (Basingstoke, Macmillan); and ANTONY FLEW (1981) The Politics of Procrustes (London, Temple Smith).

[42] PETER TOWNSEND (1979) op. cit., p. 926. Reality does occasionally break through; as in Townsend’s comment that: “There is bound to be some kind of limit which they [taxpayers] will seek to set on the amount that they will allow governments to extract in taxes, whether directly or indirectly, so that the needs of the poor may be met’ (p. 924).

[43] Ibid., p. 926. Faith in the City (1985) similarly argues that “there is merit in further thought being given to a ‘basic income’ scheme’’ (p. 224). Its authors advocate the establishment of a ‘major independent review’ to examine this option, along with other radical alternatives to current modes of income distribution.

p. 24.