Power is Alwyas in Fashion

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Power is Always in Fashion: State-CentricRealism and the European Security andDefence Policyjcms_2057 397..416

ZACHARY SELDENUniversity of Florida

Abstract

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is in large part a product of the

institutional development of the EU and the consolidation of its authority over

internal issues. This parallels the development of the United States as a global actor

shortly after the federal government consolidated power over domestic affairs in the

1890s.

Introduction

The European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) is evolving into a con-crete structure with a significantly improved means of projecting influence inthe international environment. Under the framework of ESDP, Europe has notonly developed new military structures and capabilities; it is using them insmall but significant missions. Much has been written on the intricacies ofthose developments, their effects on the relations between members of theEuropean Union (EU) and on the transatlantic relationship (Howorth, 2004;Menon, 2004; Geigerich and Wallace, 2004; Deighton, 2002). The purpose ofthis article, however, is to return to a more fundamental question: why is theEU developing a capability to project power in the distinct absence of anysignificant military threat to Europe?

International relations theory for the most part does not offer a goodanswer to this question. Those in the offensive realist camp argue that states

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develop military power and the capability to influence international affairs

through its use to balance the power of other states regardless of whetheror not they pose a threat (Mearshimer, 2001). In this view, states seekto ensure their security by expanding their influence whenever they can(Waltz, 1979; Gilpin, 1981). They do not act reflexively, but rather exploitthe opportunities presented by the international environment to theirmaximum advantage (Labs, 1997). Others in the defensive realist campclaim that states engage in expansive behaviour to counter specific threats(Walt, 1987). When states perceive a threat to their security, they seek toexpand their capability to influence events beyond their borders. Within thisframework, states are seen as expanding their power only when necessaryrather than whenever they can.

But neither of those paradigms fully explains the development of ESDP.The EU clearly has no intention of trying to balance against the militarypower of the United States in a traditional sense. Even assuming all of thegoals of ESDP were fulfilled, the deployable military power of the EU wouldbe a fraction of that of the US Marine Corps, the smallest of the US ArmedForces. The development of ESDP also fails to fit the defensive realist

paradigm. In fact, the EU began to develop ESDP in earnest just after theSoviet Union the one state that could pose a significant threat to Europe collapsed.

Offensive realism, however, does offer a starting point: the EU is devel-oping its power to influence international events because it can. The post-coldwar international environment provides a unique opportunity in which thereis no military threat to Europe and the one remaining superpower is officiallyencouraging (with some ambivalence) the development of an independentEuropean military capability. But such developments take more than an

opening in the international environment to bring them to fruition; they alsorequire that the entity in question has the institutional ability to project powerand influence. This combination of realist international relations theoryand domestic institutional development is known as state-centric realism

(Zakaria, 1998).State-centric realism provides a more complete answer to the puzzle of

why the EU is developing its capabilities to influence international events,including deployable military force, at this particular juncture. Considerable

governing authority and bureaucratic capacity has shifted to the EU from theMember States, particularly since the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987.This occurred contemporaneously with the end of the cold war and therestrictions it placed on the development of a foreign and security policyindependent from that of the United States. Thus, the European Unionsdevelopment of a greater capacity to influence events beyond its borders is the

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product of a permissive environment, but more importantly, it is also a

product of its institutional development.Since the end of the cold war, the EU has progressively assumed powers

delegated by the national governments of its Member States that are tradi-tionally associated with sovereign states such as control over borders and theability to mint currency. It increasingly sets the regulations that govern theeveryday life of European citizens over a range of health, safety and otherissues. After achieving a degree of authority over significant internal issues, itis now developing the means, including military power, to have a greaterinfluence over the international environment.

This is actually a familiar pattern in the development of states, and in someways it parallels the history of the United States as the federal governmentbecame a more powerful institution relative to the individual states. FareedZakaria charts this development in detail in From Wealth to Power, seeking toexplain why the United States experienced an approximate 40-year time lagbetween becoming a major economic power and becoming a military andpolitical power capable of pursuing the federal governments interests abroad.Until the end of the 19th century, the United states featured relatively weak

federal institutions, including a presidency that was usually outmatched onforeign policy issues by the representatives of the states, particularly in theSenate (Zakaria, 1998, p. 55). Despite its formidable economic power andsize, the United States of the mid-19th century lacked the ability to projectpower and influence, in part because the individual states had little interest increating a stronger federal authority at their own expense. But following aseries of changes that shifted increasingly more power to the federal govern-ment and the presidency in the 1890s, the United States rapidly began todevelop the bureaucratic capability to govern effectively from the centre and,

in turn, developed its military and other capabilities to influence the interna-tional environment in the distinct absence of any significant territorial threat(Zakaria, 1998, p. 126).

In short, the United States became a significant power because it could.The lack of a threat in the late 19th century provided an opportunity, butthe state had to develop institutions capable of channelling resources to theexpanding interests of the federal government. It was the process of transfer-ring power from the individual states to the central government that allowed

the US to go from global weakling to global power in a short period of timeat the end of the 19th century.But can we use a similar framework to think about the current European

effort to become a global player in its own right? Clearly direct comparisonsto the US can be misleading, but there is no denying that the power amassedby the EU over the past two decades puts its capacity to govern well beyond

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the reach of any international organization. It may not be evolving into a state

in the Westphalian sense, but it is certainly acquiring many of the powers andattributes traditionally associated with statehood.

This article begins with an examination of the rise of the United Statesbased on Zakarias study that demonstrates the importance of institutionalcapacity in the development of power projection capabilities. Second, itargues that state-centric realism can be applied to the EU because it hasadopted many of the characteristics and powers traditionally associated withstates. Third, it details the growth of ESDP and other tools of power projec-tion, arguing that the timing of this development is consistent with thepredictions of state-centric realism.

I. State-Centric Realism and the Rise of the United States

The United States experienced a massive transition in the 30 years after theend of the Civil War. In both relative and absolute terms, the United Stateseconomy boomed in that period, several depressions notwithstanding.Between 1865 and 1898, agricultural production grew by more than 200 per

cent, coal production by 800 per cent and railway track construction by closeto 600 per cent (Kennedy, 1987, pp. 2424). The population doubled between1865 and 1900 as wave after wave of European immigrants moved to theUnited States. By 1885, the US had passed the UK as the single largestmanufacturer. In relative terms, the annual GDP growth of the United Statesduring this period is even more striking, growing at a rate of approximately 5per cent per year compared to 1.5 per cent for Great Britain (Zakaria, 1998,p. 45).

Yet, despite this extraordinary growth relative to other countries, the USremained a minor player in international affairs. The Department of Statewas miniscule and diplomatic representation was generally limited to honor-ary consuls and a handful of true diplomatic postings (Sterner, 1982). Othercountries limited their representation to the United States, sometimes shuttingembassies in what was regarded as the diplomatic backwater of Washington,DC. Most did not bother to send their best diplomats; in fact until 1892 therewere no foreign representatives of ambassadorial rank in the United States(May, 1961, p. 4).

The US military was similarly limited in the 30 years following the CivilWar. The navy, the main tool of power projection at the time, was a fractionof the size of the fleets of European powers with much smaller economies(Kennedy, 1987, p. 203). The US Army was even less significant with anauthorized end strength of 27,000 that was in practice considerably fewer.

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Enlisted men were poorly paid and desertion rates were high: nearly one-third

of the Army deserted in 1871 (Weigley, 1984, p. 270). Much of the militarystrength of the United States was in the hands of the individual states, whichprovided militias of generally poor quality and training to national efforts.

Yet, by the first decade of the 20th century, the situation was radicallydifferent. The United States had defeated Spain in the SpanishAmericanwar, taking possession of strategic islands and coaling stations from thePacific to the Caribbean in rapid succession. The United States Navy had beentransformed from a small and ageing fleet to being one of the most modernand potent in the world. The United States was no longer a bit player ininternational affairs as demonstrated by the role it played in ending theRussoJapanese war, and this was only a precursor to the decisive rolethe United States would play in ending World War I and shaping the subse-quent map of Europe. In a span of less than 40 years, the United States wastransformed from a minor player outside of its immediate region into asignificant global actor.

This transformation took place in part because of the massive expansion ofthe American economy following the Civil War. Based on that alone, many

observers at the time expected that the United States would become a majorpower in global affairs in the 1870s. Benjamin Disraeli predicted that theoutcome of the American Civil War would be, a different America from thatwhich was known to our fathers and even from that which this generation hashad so much experience. It will be an America of armies, of diplomacy [. . .]and probably of frequent wars (Disraeli, quoted in Sideman and Friedman,1960, p. 233). Although Britain was most concerned about the emergence ofa potential rival and a new naval power, other European states also believedthat they could expect the United States to play a significantly larger role in

international affairs (Zakaria, 1998, p. 52).Yet, it took nearly 30 additional years for the United States to begin to

fulfil those predictions. Disraeli was correct in his analysis; the United Stateshad the material power to become a major player in international affairs in the1870s and 1880s. But it failed to live up to its predicted role because it lackedthe institutional capacity in the federal government to harness the nations

strength for expanding its interests in global affairs until the end of the

century. A series of changes between 1865 and 1900, however, gradually

shifted power away from the individual states to the federal government. Atthe same time power also shifted within Washington from the legislative tothe executive branch. This combination of events created a central govern-ment that was not only more capable of extracting resources, but moreimportantly, capable of using them in the interests of the national government(Zakaria, 1998, p. 92).




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II. The Centralization of Power in the United States

It is often assumed that the United States of the 20th and 21st century issimply an expanded version of what existed previously, but the strength ofthe federal government and the presidency is a relatively new phenomenonin the history of the nation (Bensel, 1990). Throughout most of the 19thcentury it was clear that the bulk of power rested in the individual statesand their representatives in the Congress. The federal government was onewith only, a token administrative presence in most of the nation [. . .]whose sovereignty was interpreted by the central administration as contin-

gent on the consent of the individual states (Bensel, 1990, p. ix). TheSenate, which had a particularly powerful influence over foreign policy, wasdesigned to give equal representation to the individual states. Until 1913senators were elected by the individual state legislatures, which made themvery much the representatives of their states interests. The Senate used itsprerogatives to the full extent, leading Henry Adams to quip that the UnitedStates had a government, of the people, by the people, for the Senate(Adams, quoted in Beisner, 1986, p. 6).

Throughout the 19th century the Congress was far more powerful than theexecutive branch, which lacked the staff, funding and administrative capacityto govern effectively. The individual states also had considerably moreauthority and autonomy in the 1870s and 1880s than they would have at theturn of the century. States controlled much of the regulatory structure thatexisted and the federal government did not gain control over immigrationuntil 1882 (Zakaria, 1998, p. 101). The Congress was dominant in most areasand the individual bureaucracies of the federal government were in practiceresponsible to the Congressional committees rather than the president. This

extended into foreign affairs to the point that British diplomats in the 1870swere convinced that the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committeewas the director of foreign policy in the United States, not the Secretary ofState (Zakaria, 1998, p. 70). Given the state of affairs, this was a reasonableconclusion.

The states through their representatives in the Senate were able to frustratemost plans of the executive to use the material power of the United States toplay a larger role in international affairs in the 1870s and 1880s. Throughoutthe period immediately following the Civil War, the Senate simply refused to

take under consideration treaties that would have expanded the reach andinfluence of the United States such as the treaty for the annexation of theDanish West Indies. The Senate rejected outright the Reciprocation Treatywith Hawaii, which was seen as a first step towards annexation. Many otheraccords, treaties and trade agreements that would have extended the influence

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of the United States died in the Senate or were never submitted for approval

because of the certainty of a Senate rejection (Beisner, 1986, p. 6).Part of this was owed to the reluctance of the Congress to assume the

expense of expansion, but much of it was tied to the ongoing battles betweenthe states and the executive for authority over domestic affairs. Greaterinvolvement in foreign affairs would necessarily increase the power of thefederal government relative to that of the individual states. Becomingembroiled in world affairs was consistently opposed by many in the UnitedStates because it was feared that this would necessitate a large standingmilitary and, in turn, increased taxes and demands on the citizens and indi-vidual states (Selden, 2004, p. 32; Kupchan, 2002). This concern, first articu-lated by Thomas Jefferson in the earliest days of the republic, was a constantin American political discourse and it was particularly salient in the aftermathof the Civil War and the subsequent military occupation of the south.

The balance of power, however, between the states and Congress on theone hand, and the federal government and the executive branch on the other,began to shift rapidly with a series of reforms that began in the 1880s(Zakaria, 1998, p. 92). Those changes occurred in response to the rapid

industrialization of the country. In particular, the rapid growth of the railwayscreated a continental market for goods that required national-level regulation.The expansion of the rail system was subsidized by the federal government,and with subsidization came government regulation (Angevine, 2004). TheSupreme Court strengthened the idea of federal supremacy over interstatecommerce and the railroads when it ruled repeatedly in this period thatthe federal government had responsibility for the regulation of interstatebusiness.

Rapid industrialization also led to the birth of federal agencies such as the

Civil Service Commission in 1883, the Bureau of Labor in 1884 and theInterstate Commerce Commission in 1887. At the same time, the rapid growthin cities required new forms of regulation over the new technologies provid-ing public services over large areas such as gas, electricity and telecom-munications (Zakaria, 1998, p. 95). Reformers of the time successfullycampaigned to expand the power of the federal government to regulate anincreasingly large number of issues such as health and safety standards thathad previously been in the hands of the individual states or local authorities

(Sproat, 1968). This led to the creation of new bureaucracies under the controlof the federal government that gradually gained the expertise and competencyto expand its powers at the expense of the sovereignty of the individual states.This power was centralized in the executive branch because most reformers atthe time saw the Congress as too parochial to cope effectively with suchchallenges (Keller, 1977).




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This broad centralization of authority built up new bureaucracies that

made the executive the head of a growing, and more powerful, administrativeapparatus. A need for efficient central control less oriented around the patron-age politics that dominated Congressional appointments to the bureaucracyled to a series of reforms designed to create more professional institutions. Inturn, institutions such as the Civil Service Commission and the PresidentialCommission on Economy and Efficiency became, visible symbols not onlyof a transfer of initiative for administrative reform from the legislative to theexecutive branch, but also of the tipping of the constitutional balance fromCongress to the president (White, 1958, p. 364).

Civil service reform was a particularly significant development. The driveto create more efficient institutions led to competitive exams and other pro-cesses that resulted in increasing numbers of competent civil servants fillingpositions that were previously occupied by individuals whose main qualifi-cations were close ties to a political party or Member of Congress. All of thisstarted as a means to cope with the domestic challenges of industrialization,but it soon spilled over into international affairs as successful reforms ofdomestic bureaucratic institutions prompted a re-evaluation of the State

Department and the military.The American diplomatic corps in the 19th century was a source of more

embarrassment than diplomatic achievement. In the 1870s the Americanminister to Ecuador attempted to kill the British ambassador, while theAmerican representative in Tokyo amused himself by careening through thestreets in a carriage and terrifying pedestrians with cracks of his bullwhip(Beisner, 1986, p. 29). But starting in the 1880s, the State Department beganto become an increasingly more professional organization whose consuls andsecretaries were the product of exams and merit-based promotions. Although

many top-level postings remained political appointments, the most importantofficers just below them were now competent professionals whose numberdoubled in the last two decades of the 19th century (Werking, 1977).

The civil service reform process also drove some reformers to considerhow the military could be managed more efficiently. The militia-based systemwas increasingly seen as chaotic and inefficient in the late 19th century. Therewere few clear lines of responsibility and the chiefs of the separate army andnavy bureaus had independent relationships with Congress that bypassed the

president (Skowronek, 1982). Sweeping reforms proved impossible to imple-ment because the states were determined to retain their control over themilitias, but a professional military education system and naval intelligenceoffice were established in the 1880s. Competitive examinations for thepromotion of officers introduced in the same period helped to establish aprofessional officer corps, and the bureaucracy expanded to include new

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Assistant Secretary positions in the Department of War and the Department of

the Navy.Thus, the process of centralizing authority to cope better with domestic

challenges ultimately gave the executive branch the authority and bureau-

cratic resources to develop improved tools of exerting more influence over

international affairs as well. The central state could extract more resources,and the federal budget more than doubled between 1877 and 1900 (Kendrick,1955). More importantly, however, it could use those resources to expand theinternational influence of the United States because the more centralized andcapable administrative structure allowed it to respond more effectively tointernational opportunities and pressures.

Once this process of centralizing power in the federal government and inthe executive was firmly ensconced, the United States began to develop apower projection capability that reflected its economic strength. The navy wasexpanded dramatically at the end of the 19th century. What was a low-to-middling power projection force at best during the 1880s became the thirdlargest in the world at the start of the 20th century (Kennedy, 1987, p. 247).It is important to note that this took place in the distinct absence of any serious

threat to the United States. Relations with Britain were significantly betterthan they had been in recent memory, and no other European power, with theexception of Spain, held significant overseas territory close to the UnitedStates.

As the state became more centralized and the tools of power projectionwere developed, that power was used in a variety of ways to expand Americaninfluence in the international environment. American foreign policy becamemuch more assertive over the course of the 1890s, seizing three times as manyopportunities to expand its influence between 1889 and 1908 compared to

the 186589 period (Zakaria, 1998, p. 130). The expansion of Americaninfluence did not rely solely, or even primarily, on military interventions; theUnited States began to play a larger role in diplomacy, international confer-ences and treaties, a role that was previously hampered by a strong Congressthat reflected the more restricted interests of the individual states. The sameUnited States that was absent from international negotiations in the 1870s wasnow playing a central role in ending border disputes between Britain andVenezuela, securing a route for the Panama Canal, negotiating with the

European powers in naval conferences and guaranteeing western tradinginterests in Asia by the end of the century.Presidents and Secretaries of State attempted to expand the reach of the

United States in the decades following the Civil War, and the massive expan-sion of the navy in the 1890s was preceded by several attempts to give theUnited States a navy that reflected its economic and territorial strength. Yet,




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those previous attempts to do so failed when blocked by the representatives of

the individual states in the Congress. It took the emergence of a more potentfederal government and a strengthened executive relative to the legislature toallow the United States to pursue a broader conception of its interests abroad.But that strengthened central authority emerged in response to the need todevelop better regulatory structures for the increasingly interconnectedcontinent-wide market of the United States, not in response to an externalthreat. In broad strokes this pattern should be familiar to students of theEuropean Union.

III. Applying State-Centric Realism to the European Union

A number of parallels can be drawn between the current state of the devel-opment of the EU and the emergence of the United States as a more signifi-cant actor in the international arena. The United States in the late 19th centurywas a massive economic power but lacked the tools of power projection, inlarge part because the federal government was a weak entity and the indi-vidual states did not want to authorize activities that would lead to a stronger

central government at the expense of their autonomy. But the economic needto regulate markets and standardize regulations across the American continentled to an accretion of power at the level of the federal government, particu-larly the executive branch and its administrative agencies. This in turn drovethe creation of more efficient administrative structures for domestic affairsthat soon spilled into the State Department and the military, making themmore capable as well. The federal government used this new-found institu-tional capacity to expand its influence in the international environment, in partthrough the acquisition of the tools of power projection. What started asessentially an economically driven intergovernmental process between rep-resentatives of the individual states in Congress led to a transfer of authorityfrom the states to the federal government and the creation of institutions in thefederal government that allowed it to pursue a more active role in interna-tional affairs.

In a similar manner, the EU is often portrayed as an economic giant witha disproportionately small degree of influence in international affairs. Likethe US, Europes process of integration was driven in large part by the

demands of continent-wide common economic space and, particularly sincethe Single European Act of 1987, the EU has developed new institutions andmore effective decision-making structures. The Maastricht, Amsterdam andNice summits have all created new bureaucratic structures and expanded thebreath and depth of expertise within the EU bureaucracy. The result is an EU

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that has far more authority and competency over core issues in domestic

affairs such as fiscal policy and regulatory policy. This leads to the final butincomplete parallel between the two cases: shortly following its consolidationof authority over internal affairs, the EU is now expanding its capacity toinfluence international events.

Despite the parallels, can we apply a theory of state-centric realism to theEU, which, of course, is not a state in the traditional sense? But beforeaddressing that question it is worthwhile to reconsider what constitutes a statein the current international environment. It is a simple matter to demonstratethat the EU is not a state in the Westphalian sense, but there are different typesof state, and sovereignty is rarely absolute (Caporaso, 1996; Krasner, 2004).The EU has also been described as a normative power whose influence andactions are civilizing international relations (Hill, 1990; Nicolaidis andHowse, 2002; Sjursen, 2006). This normative power allows it to have state-like influence in a variety of ways, most notably in international environmen-tal regulation where the EU has played a leading role (Vogler, 2005; Voglerand Bretherton, 2006). Nonetheless, the lack of sovereign state institutionsposes a challenge for realist analysis of the EU given the state-centric nature

of realism (Hyde-Price, 2006).It is true that the EU lacks powers associated with sovereign states, but this

critique also could be applied to the United States in the 19th century. The EUhas no direct power to tax the citizenry, for example, but neither did theUnited States federal government until World War I. The EU does not controlimmigration policy, but as noted above, the United States federal governmentdid not gain control of this issue until 1882. The EU does not control anindependent military, but for much of its history the US Army was heavilydependent on state militias for its manpower (Weigley, 1984). What the EU

increasingly provides, however, is a common regulatory structure acrossEurope that has a direct impact on matters that were previously the exclusivecompetency of the Member States. If not a state in the traditional sense, thenthe EU is an institution that has taken on many of the characteristics of a state.

But if state-centric realism is an appropriate means of explaining thedevelopment of ESDP, we would expect to see a certain chain of events. First,an increased consolidation of EU authority over internal affairs that had beenpreviously under the sovereign control of the Member States, as well as an

expansion of the bureaucratic capacity to exercise that authority. In the caseof the EU, we would expect that authority and capacity to increase primarilyin the Commission, which can be likened to an executive and a federaladministration, rather than the Council, where the Member States have indi-vidual representation. To some extent, the analogy can be made between theCouncil and the US Senate in the 19th century when it was a potent chamber




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for the representation of the interests of the Member States. Second, follow-

ing this consolidation, we would expect to see the development of institu-tional and power projection capabilities that allow the EU to expand itsinfluence in international affairs.

There is little doubt that the EU has increased its authority over domesticaffairs, particularly since the Single European Act (SEA) of 1987. The SEAwas built around the idea of creating a single economic space across the EU,but doing so pushed greater authority to the Commission. In a burst of activityfollowing the SEA, the Commission initiated more than 300 new pieces oflegislation covering common environmental, health and safety standards(Hix, 2005, p. 33). The Treaty on European Union (TEU), which entered intoforce in 1993, further consolidated the authority of the Commission to initiatelegislation over internal affairs to include transportation regulation and con-sumer protection (Sandholtz, 1993). The Amsterdam Treaty of 1999 pushedmore power toward the Commission by allowing it to initiate legislation onmatters of justice and home affairs, an area which had been previously theexclusive domain of the Member States acting within the framework of theCouncil. The basic pattern since 1987, therefore, has been an upward ratch-

eting of the authority of the EU over domestic affairs. In particular, theauthority and competency of the Commission has increased to meet thedemands placed on it by the Member States. Meeting the self-imposed dead-lines for economic and monetary union, for example, pushed the MemberStates to delegate more agenda-setting authority to the Commission in theearly 1990s (Hix, 2005, p. 34).

Thus, the Member States have increasingly delegated authority to the EUover a range of domestic affairs from health and safety regulation to fiscal andmonetary policy. Those who approach the study of the EU from an intergov-

ernmental perspective argue that it is one thing for the EU to assume greaterauthority over the low politics of economic affairs, but quite another to bedelegated greater authority over the high politics of defence and securityissues (Moravcsik, 1998). Yet, the Schengen Agreement that allows for freemovement across borders represents a significant delegation of authority fromthe Member States to the European Union that affects their national security,despite the fact that it was conceived to facilitate the movement of goodsacross the common economic space. As the European Security Strategy

states, the main threats to Europe today are generally seen to be emanatingfrom trans-national terrorist organizations and criminal syndicates.1 Unlikethe cold war, the current security threats do not mass on the border with

1 The European Security Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World, December 2003. Available at:http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsupload/78367.pdf.

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armoured divisions; instead they enter stealthily in small numbers. Determin-

ing who and what enters the national territory is a vital component of guard-ing against current security threats, but Schengen considerably limits theability of national authorities to do so in favour of a community-wideapproach.

The implications of this shift regarding border control are far-reaching. Itis not too far a step to imagine, for example, a common customs and borderpatrol force at some point in the future. In fact, there is already some move-ment in this direction with the creation of FRONTEX in 2004, an EU bodythat co-ordinates border security among the members and promotes the devel-opment of integrated border security. FRONTEX also has an operationalaspect and manages the European Patrol Network that monitors the southernmaritime frontier. In addition, it is responsible for establishing agreementsand memorandums of understanding with third party countries on controllingillegal immigration.2 Although it is still a nascent institution, the growth ofFRONTEX could be a significant step forward in the EUs growing powerover issues that blur the line between high and low politics.

Thus, an aspect of integration driven by economic factors has led to

further integration on a core security issue. Such spillover was envisionedto some extent by the original neofunctionalists who argued that agreementon relatively small and technical issues would lead to ever deeper integrationon larger issues (Deutsch et al., 1957; Haas, 1958; Schmitter, 2005). Theneofunctionalist approach has enjoyed something of a revival in recent years,focusing on spillover into specific aspects of integration such as healthpolicy and financial assistance programmes (Green, 2006; Niemann, 1998) aswell as studies of why defence and security policy prove resistant to comu-nitarization (Risse, 2005; Koenig-Archibugi, 2004; Biersteker, 2002). Such

approaches, however, have not yet taken into account the potential for spill-over between high and low politics. But the end of the cold war and the shiftin emphasis to new and non-traditional security concerns has led to a blurringof the boundaries between the two, which increases the potential for spilloverfrom economic into security issues. As the Schengen example illustrates,integration undertaken for economic reasons can create a need for greaterintegration on issues that are central to security and defence policy, thusspurring the creation of new institutions that can exercise the power delegated

to them by the Member States. The process is undoubtedly intergovernmentalat first, but the unintended consequences of economic integration can createa logic of integration that drives Member States to delegate authority to theEU over issues that extend into security and defence.

2 See http://www.frontex.europa.eu.




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Spillover from low to high politics can also be seen in the de facto

diplomatic role played by Commission delegations abroad. As the economicpower of the EU increases, third parties seek a consistent point of contact whocan speak for Europe. Yet, the lack of an EU diplomatic service means thatthe state holding the Presidency shoulders much of the burden of representingEU policy in the rest of the world through its embassies. That is both awkwardfor third parties as the Presidency rotates every six months and difficult forsmaller EU Member States with limited diplomatic representation around theworld. The Commission delegations, therefore, act as, quasi-diplomatic ser-vices, represent[ing] the Commission but primarily for Community tasks(Duke, 2002, p. 855). Third party states may prefer to work with Commissiondelegations, which they see as an, element of constancy compared to thecomplicated rotating presidency system (Duke, 2002, p. 855). As the EUenlarges and adds more small states with limited diplomatic representation,complementary pressures build to push more competency toward the Com-mission delegations as representatives of the EU abroad. Most EU MemberStates have diplomatic representation in less than 90 countries, and only fourhave representation in more than 100 of the nearly 200 countries that

compose the international community. For most Member States of the EU, amore centralized diplomatic representation in the form of the Commissiondelegations represents a way to stretch limited resources (Holland, 1997,p. 10).

Thus, economic integration has not only dramatically increased theauthority of the EU relative to the Member States over internal affairs, it alsoappears to be driving more authority toward the EU on international affairs.If the parallel with the United States holds, state-centric realism predicts thatthe EU would develop institutional and power projection capabilities to have

greater influence in the international arena shortly following the consolidationof power over internal affairs in the central authority. Although the EUscapabilities in this regard are still in the formative stages, the rapid develop-ment of new structures and capabilities demonstrates considerable movementin this direction. Above all, the timing of those developments following closeon the heels of the EUs growth in authority over internal affairs fits with thepredictions of state-centric realism.

The development of ESDP from raw idea to burgeoning institution in a

very brief period is impressive given the weight of the issues and the generallyslow pace of developments in the EU. ESDP became a concrete issue at theMaastricht summit in 1993, but in the intervening years, and particularlysince 1998, ESDP began to crystallize with increasing speed. It now has apermanent bureaucracy in the form of the EU military committee and militarystaff, a framework for conducting operations and securing force goals from

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the Member States, the beginnings of an agency for defence and armaments

co-operation, and a security strategy that puts forth the political mechanismsand conceptual reasons for how and when this force would be used.

The EU, however, is not just developing the institutional mechanisms; itis using them in small but significant operations in the Balkans and Africa.The EU has conducted approximately 20 missions since 2003 (Keohane andValasek, 2008. p. 1). From an initial mission in 2003 in Macedonia, the list ofmissions has grown to include peace-keeping, border monitoring, rule of lawassistance and humanitarian relief. There is reason to be sceptical about someof those operations which are short-lived and are of dubious effectiveness(Haine and Giegerich, 2006). But at the same time, the general trend in EUoperations has been toward larger and longer missions, which demonstratesan increased logistical capability and willingness to engage.

What is apparent from this experience is that European military resourcesare stretched to provide the forces and logistical support for limited opera-tions. Yet, there are signs that European militaries are developing the abilityto deploy and sustain small military forces in challenging environments. Thestark contrast between the inability of European militaries to cope with

the demands of the Balkan wars of the 1990s and their ability to operate in thedistant and unforgiving environment of Afghanistan is a clear illustration ofthis trend. But ongoing progress in strategic air and sea lift could giveEuropean militaries the ability to move their forces with progressively lessdirect support from the US over the next decade. European countries are alsoinvesting considerable amounts into Command, Control, Communications,Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems(Flournoy et al., 2005; Shimkus, 2005). If properly leveraged, those devel-opments could allow European states as individuals, or the EU as a collective,

to project a larger amount of sustainable military force in the near future.In addition, the Member States have formed a network of asset sharing

arrangements and co-ordination mechanisms within an EU framework towring more effectiveness out of their existing strategic lift assets. The SealiftCo-ordination Centre at Windhaven, the Netherlands, which arranges forships that would otherwise be travelling empty or only partially loaded onreturn trips to carry the material of other partner countries, is one suchco-ordination cell (Shimkus, 2005). Another co-operative project that is

showing some signs of success is the European Airlift Co-ordination Centrein Eindhoven, the Netherlands. This centre co-ordinates the airlift and refu-elling assets of Germany, Belgium, Italy, the United Kingdom, France and theNetherlands. Its initial success has led to a combined approach for air andsealift operations that could maximize the utility of all strategic transportationequipment.




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Although many analysts have focused on the top-line numbers of Euro-

pean defence budgets and concluded that little has changed in recent years, amore detailed look shows that there is some progress in using availableresources in a more cost-effective and militarily efficient manner. It is truethat many countries in Europe spend less than 2 per cent of GDP on defence,but there is a mild trend in shifting expenditures to equipment procurementfrom other budget accounts. After falling to an average of 13 per cent of thedefence budget for much of the post-cold war period, the percentage ofdefence spending devoted to equipment purchases in EU Member States hasrebounded to just over 16 per cent, comparable to the 198589 average of15.5 per cent.3

The developments outlined above should not be interpreted as an attemptto build a European army as they are still national militaries under thecontrol of national authorities. But the EU is developing the institutionalmechanisms to co-ordinate better those assets for missions under an EU flag.Those co-ordination and planning cells represent an adaptive response todemonstrated shortfalls within realistic budgetary constraints, but they alsoput in place the mechanisms to allow the EU to project power and influence

in the international environment. The timing of those developments is sig-nificant: all of this has occurred in a relatively brief period following the EUsgrowth in authority over domestic affairs and the development of the institu-tional means to exercise it since the SEA.

Sceptics of the potential for integration on issues of high politics argue thatthere are distinct limits as to the degree of integration that is likely to occurthrough an intergovernmental process (Moravcsik, 1998). But the post-coldwar security environment is one in which the line between high and lowpolitics is increasingly blurred. This allows for functional spillover between

integration related to the economic issues that comprise low politics and thesecurity and defence issues that comprise high politics. Opening the bordersbetween the Member States was done for economic reasons, but the impli-cations for security and national defence are significant in the current inter-national environment. The end result has been to push more authority over acritical security issue toward the EU. We should not, therefore, dismiss thedirection and progress of European integration on defence and securitymatters as something doomed to founder on the immutable rocks of national

sovereignty.

3 Calculated from the NatoRussia Comependium of Financial and Economic Data Relating to Defence,NATO Press Release (2007) 141, 20 December 2007. Available at: http://www.nato-otan.org/docu/pr/2007/p07-141e.html.

412 ZACHARY SELDEN



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Conclusion

State-centric realism predicts that states develop their capabilities to exertgreater influence in the international environment when the state itself devel-ops the institutional capability to channel national resources in that direction.In a federal system such as the United States, this meant that the federalgovernment first needed to consolidate authority over internal affairs, whichgave it the bureaucratic capability and authority to expand its influence in theinternational environment. The individual states were reluctant to allow thefederal government to amass power at the expense of their autonomy, but

the process was driven by economic necessity and the demands of acontinent-wide market.

To a large extent, this parallels the EUs development of ESDP in the wakeof its increased authority over internal affairs. It is important to note, however,why the EU is moving in this direction in the absence of a significant threatto Europe. It is the result of an organic process related to how federal systemsevolve as they consolidate power across their Member States and then seek tohave greater influence beyond their borders. It is not a product of balancing

against a specific threat or against power in general: those basic paradigms ofinternational relations do not offer a satisfactory explanation because they failto consider the effect of institutional development. From a realist perspective,states want to have as much power and influence in the international envi-ronment as they can, but that is conditioned by their institutional capability.

The development of ESDP may have reflexive effects on the EU itself. Ifinterests expand with capabilities, then it is likely that the EUs interests willgrow to take on progressively larger and more difficult missions under ESDP.Some of those will inevitably require rapid decisions, which could be a driver

for more streamlined decision-making structures in the EU. It is possible tohave a complex process of consultation between Member States and the EUinstitutions on a range of issues that, while significant, are not immediatecrises. But adding a harder security dimension to the EU means that somematters may need rapid and firm action requiring a more centralized decision-making process (Howorth, 2001). Thus, there could be a self-reinforcingcycle in which the increased authority of the EU leads to more internationalengagement, which in turn drives even more decision-making power towardBrussels.

Regardless of the implications for the future, the relatively rapid progressof ESDP in the absence of a military threat to Europe begs the question, whynow? The short answer is that the EU has the ability to do so now becauseof a permissive international environment and internal developments thatrender it more capable of projecting power to gain greater influence over




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international events. The parallels with the US in the late 19th century are

striking as it went through a similar developmental pattern that transformedit from a minor player in international affairs to a significant actor in a spanof approximately 40 years. What we are witnessing today in the developmentof the EU as an international actor may be a product of the interna-tional environment, but more important, the product of its own institutionaldevelopment.

Correspondence:

Zachary Selden

University of FloridaTel +32 2 513 2865

email [email protected]

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