CRITICAL STUDIES OF THE ASIA-PACIFICSERIES EDITOR: MARK BEESON

Japan’s Asian Diplomacy

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu

Power Transition, Domestic Politics, and Diffusion of Ideas

Critical Studies of the Asia-Pacific

Series EditorMark Beeson

Political Science & International RelationsUniversity of Western Australia

Crawley, WA, Australia

Critical Studies of the Asia Pacific showcases new research and scholar-ship on what is arguably the most important region in the world in thetwenty-first century. The rise of China and the continuing strategic impor-tance of this dynamic economic area to the United States mean that theAsia-Pacific will remain crucially important to policymakers and scholarsalike. The unifying theme of the series is a desire to publish the besttheoretically-informed, original research on the region. Titles in the seriescover the politics, economics and security of the region, as well as focusingon its institutional processes, individual countries, issues and leaders. Thebook series is Scopus Indexed.

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Hidetaka Yoshimatsu

Japan’s AsianDiplomacy

Power Transition, Domestic Politics,and Diffusion of Ideas

Hidetaka YoshimatsuGraduate School of Asia Pacific StudiesRitsumeikan Asia Pacific UniversityBeppu, Oita, Japan

ISSN 2662-222X ISSN 2662-2238 (electronic)Critical Studies of the Asia-PacificISBN 978-981-15-8337-7 ISBN 978-981-15-8338-4 (eBook)https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8338-4

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to SpringerNature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by thePublisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rightsof translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction onmicrofilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage andretrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodologynow known or hereafter developed.The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that suchnames are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free forgeneral use.The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neitherthe publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, withrespect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have beenmade. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published mapsand institutional affiliations.

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer NatureSingapore Pte Ltd.The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore189721, Singapore

For my parents, Yoshimatsu Hajime & Kimi,my mother-in-law, Kuroki Kuniko,

and my father-in-law, the late Kuroki Eizaburo

Prologue

My research interest in Japan’s diplomatic policy towards Asia was firstsummarised in a monograph, Japan and East Asia in Transition, whichwas published by Palgrave Macmillan in 2003. Afterwards, my mainresearch concern shifted to regionalism in East Asia and the Asia-Pacificwith a particular interest in the building of regional institutions. Yet,Japan’s regional policy and relations remained a key ingredient of thestudy of regionalism in East Asia and the Asia-Pacific, and I have contin-uously deepened my insights on Japan’s strategic policies and relations inevolving Asian politics.

This monograph is a product of my explicit revisit to Japan’s Asiandiplomacy, and this revisit was urged by Prime Minister Abe Shinzo whoformed the second administration in December 2012. The Abe adminis-tration is important as it was formed after the Liberal Democratic Party’s(LDP) gaining power from the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), andhas undertaken its diplomacy in evolving great power politics betweenthe U.S. and China. Abe is a unique prime minister. Not only is he a‘thoroughbred’ politician with Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke as a grand-father and Abe Shintaro, Foreign Minister and a faction leader of theLDP, as the father, but he is also the first prime minister who achieveda comeback in the post-war Japanese politics. Indeed, Abe is generallyregarded as a conservative politician who has a strong desire to maintainJapan’s tradition, culture, and international prestige even pursuing therevision of the Japanese Constitution. However, Abe’s personal attributes

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viii PROLOGUE

go beyond this simple characterisation, and his public policy surely incor-porates an evolving nature between the first administration in 2006–2007,the second in 2012–2014, and the period after the second administration.

The foreign policy has been a key policy field to which the Abe adminis-tration has paid keen attention. As of January 2020, Abe made 81 foreignvisits, which was by far the largest number compared to previous primeministers. Abe has managed, through this intensive summit diplomacy,complicated diplomatic relations with the U.S., China, India, Australia,and other countries across the Asia-Pacific and Indo-Pacific, and forgedrelatively stable relations with many of these countries. Abe’s diplomacy isimportant both in current politics to maintain regional order in Asia andin the long trajectory of Japan’s external policy and relations. I hope thatthis monograph makes some contributions to elucidate details and keyfeatures of the Abe administration’s foreign and security policy towardsAsia.

It is a pleasure to acknowledge my debt to those who have providedsignificant assistance to the completion of this volume. In the process ofpreparing for this book, many scholars have become a source of inspirationand support. I am particularly thankful to H. D. P. Envall, Kai He, AmyKing, Michal Kolmaš, Philippe De Lombaerde, Aurelia George Mulgan,Stephen Nagy, Sato Yoichiro, Dennis D. Trinidad, and Vyas Utpal. I alsowish to express my deep gratitude to my current affiliation, GraduateSchool of Asia Pacific Studies, Ritsumeikan Asia Pacific University (APU).Although APU is a relatively small and young university with a 20-yearhistory, its internationally oriented academic environments have providedme with valuable intellectual stimulus through participation in interna-tional conferences and daily discussions with other colleagues. I also thankthe Asia-Pacific College of Diplomacy, Australian National University. Icould deepen my thought on this book project during a visiting researchfellowship at the college, and appreciate Greg Fry and Lauren Richardsonwho realised this visiting research fellowship. Moreover, some parts of thebook were presented at the ISA Asia-Pacific Conference Singapore in July2019, and some parts in Chapter 3 have appeared in High-Standard Rulesand Leadership Capacity in Japan’s Mega-FTA Strategy, Asian Survey,60:4 (2020): 733–54. I also would like to express my gratitude to VishalDaryanomel and his colleagues at Palgrave Macmillan for their sinceresupport through the process of turning the manuscript into the presentbook.

PROLOGUE ix

Finally, I express my deep gratitude to my wife, Mutsumi, and ourson, Satoshi. While Mutsumi has offered her willing sacrifices and contin-uous support, Satoshi has shown keen interest in my research and offeredpractical assistance in the process of preparing this monograph. My lifeas a researcher has been sustained by their understanding of my career,allowing me to spend considerable time for research by sacrificing timefrom family.

Hidetaka Yoshimatsu

Praise for Japan’s AsianDiplomacy

“This book systematically and innovatively examines Japan’s diplomacytoward Asia under the Abe administration in five distinctive issue areas,including trade, infrastructure investment, maritime security, outer space,and foreign aid. It is an exemplar work that integrates the in-depth knowl-edge of International Relations theory and rich empirics of area studies inthe study of Japan’s foreign Policy. It is a must-read for both scholars andpolicymakers who are interested in making sense of Japan’s foreign policyin particular and the dynamics of Asian international relations in general.”

—Kai He, Professor of International Relations, Griffith University

“Combining International Relations theory with key case studies coveringtrade, investment, security including outer space and foreign aid, Yoshi-matsu Hidetaka has brilliantly crafted a systematic analysis of Japan’sforeign policy in Asia. This book is a must read for anyone interestedin a deep understanding of Japan’s contemporary policy towards Asia,especially under Abe Shinzo, Japan’s longest-serving prime minister.”

—Purnendra Jain, Adjunct Professor in Japanese Studies, University ofAdelaide

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xii PRAISE FOR JAPAN’S ASIAN DIPLOMACY

“Hidetaka Yoshimatsu has written a comprehensive account on the Abeadministration’s response to China’s rise in Asia, by taking in considera-tion Japan’s ideational and material leverage. This book is an importantaddition to the academic literature on Japan’s international relations andwill be required reading for scholars and practitioners alike.”

—Giulio Pugliese, Nissan Institute, Oxford University

Contents

1 Introduction 1

2 The Analytical Framework for Japan’s DiplomaticPolicy Towards Asia 21

3 Trade Policy in the Mega-FTA Age 57

4 Purposeful Commitment to Infrastructure Investmentin Asia 87

5 Growing Maritime Security in Ocean Policy 119

6 Outer Space Policy with a Stronger SecurityOrientation 151

7 The Reformulation of Foreign Aid in DevelopmentCooperation 185

8 Reflections and Prospects 217

Epilogue 247

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xiv CONTENTS

Bibliography 251

Index 281

Abbreviations

AAGC Asia-Africa Growth CorridorADB Asian Development BankADIZ Air Defence Identification ZoneAIIB Asian Infrastructure Investment BankAPEC Asia-Pacific Economic CooperationAPRSAF Asia-Pacific Regional Space Agency ForumAPSCO Asia-Pacific Space Cooperation OrganisationARF ASEAN Regional ForumASAT Anti-SatelliteASDF Air Self-Defence ForceASEAN Association of Southeast Asian NationsASEAN+3 ASEAN Plus ThreeASEM Asia-Europe MeetingATLA Acquisition, Technology and Logistics AgencyBRI Belt and Road InitiativeCARICOM Caribbean CommunityCDB China Development BankCEFP Council on Economic and Fiscal PolicyCELAC Forum of China and the Community of Latin American

and Caribbean StatesCEPEA Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement in East AsiaCNSP Committee on National Space PolicyCOPUOS Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer SpaceCPTPP Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific

PartnershipCSO Civil Society Organisation

xv

xvi ABBREVIATIONS

CSpOC Combined Space Operations CentreDCC Development Cooperation CharterDPJ Democratic Party of JapanEAC East Asian CommunityEAFTA East Asia Free Trade AreaEAS East Asia SummitEEZ Exclusive Economic ZoneEU European UnionFOCAC Forum on China-Africa CooperationFOIP Free and Open Indo-PacificFTA Free Trade AgreementG7 Group of SevenG20 Group of TwentyGATT General Agreement on Tariffs and TradeGDP Gross Domestic ProductGPS Global Positioning SystemHOP Headquarters for Ocean PolicyIADC Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination CommitteeICoC International Code of Conduct for Outer Space ActivitiesICT Information and Communications TechnologyIGS Information Gathering SatelliteIMF International Monetary FundISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and ReconnaissanceISRO Indian Space Research OrganisationITLOS International Tribunal for the Law of the SeaJA Japan Agricultural CooperativesJAXA Japan Aerospace Exploration AgencyJBIC Japan Bank for International CooperationJCG Japan Coast GuardJEEPA Japan-EU Economic Partnership AgreementJICA Japan International Cooperation AgencyJIIA Japan Institute of International AffairsJRS Japan Revitalisation StrategyJSpOC Joint Space Operations CentreLCC Life-Cycle CostLDP Liberal Democratic PartyLMC Lancang-Mekong CooperationLNG Liquefied Natural GasMAFF Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and FisheriesMDA Maritime Domain AwarenessMETI Ministry of Economy, Trade and IndustryMEXT Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and TechnologyMIC Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications

ABBREVIATIONS xvii

MLIT Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and TourismMOD Ministry of DefenceMOF Ministry of FinanceMOFA Ministry of Foreign AffairsMOU Memorandum of UnderstandingMSDF Maritime Self-Defence ForceNAFTA North American Free Trade AgreementNEXI Nippon Export and Investment InsuranceNGO Non-Governmental OrganisationNOPS National Ocean Policy SecretariatNSC National Security CouncilNSPS National Space Policy SecretariatNSS National Security StrategyODA Official Development AssistanceOECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and DevelopmentOECD-DAC Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development-

Development Assistance CommitteeONSP Office of National Space PolicyOOF other official flowPALM Pacific Islands Leaders MeetingPARC Policy Affairs Research CouncilPKO Peacekeeping OperationPQI Partnership for Quality InfrastructureQZSS Quasi-Zenith Satellite SystemRCEP Regional Comprehensive Economic PartnershipROOs Rules of OriginS&T Science and TechnologySCO Shanghai Cooperation OrganisationSDF Self-Defence ForceSHNSP Strategic Headquarters for National Space PolicySLOC Sea Lines of CommunicationSMEs Small- and Medium-Sized EnterprisesSSA Space Situational AwarenessTICAD Tokyo International Conference on African DevelopmentTPP Trans-Pacific Partnership AgreementTRIPS Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property RightsUNIDO United Nations Industrial Development OrganisationWTO World Trade Organisation

List of Figures

Fig. 3.1 The policymaking structure for the TPP 77Fig. 5.1 The policymaking structure for ocean policy 122Fig. 6.1 The policymaking structure for outer space policy 168Fig. 7.1 The trend of the general account ODA budget

(1985–2019) 193

xix

List of Tables

Table 3.1 Japan-involved key FTAs 64Table 4.1 The order value of overseas infrastructure projects

(trillion yen) 95Table 6.1 The ministerial allocation of space-related budget, 2012

and 2019 (billion yen: %) 169

xxi

Conventions

Japanese personal names follow Japanese convention: family name(surname) followed by given name.

xxiii

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Japan’s position in Asia is evolving in the development of geopoliticaland geo-economic conditions in the region. For a long time, Japan asthe world’s second-largest economy assumed a crucial regional positionby providing capital, technologies, and foreign aid that contributed tosustaining the economic growth and industrial upgrading of the countriesin Asia. Japan’s relative regional position declined due to its long-termlow economic growth and the advent of other countries, particularlyChina. Yet, Japan remains a crucial country in Asia as it can assist theeconomic and infrastructure development of other countries and providepolitical support for the development of multilateral institutions that offerregional public goods. Japan’s security stance also matters as it assumesa crucial middle-power position in intensive great power politics betweenthe U.S. and China, and Japan-related maritime territorial disputes havea significant influence on the evolution of regional security environments.

Japan’s unstable conditions in domestic politics ended in late 2012with the formation of the second Abe Shinzo administration. The admin-istration is of great importance for Japanese diplomacy because it hascreated a solid domestic political base by lasting for more than sevenyears and because this longevity has been sustained partially by thepeople’s satisfaction with outcomes that the administration has producedin foreign and security policy. The administration, which raises ‘proactive

© The Author(s) 2021H. Yoshimatsu, Japan’s Asian Diplomacy,Critical Studies of the Asia-Pacific,https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-8338-4_1

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2 H. YOSHIMATSU

contribution to peace’ as the fundamental diplomatic slogan, has under-taken constructive diplomacy by combining material resources andideational means in various policy areas that cover the economy andsecurity.

This chapter presents the overall background of the Abe admin-istration’s Asian diplomacy. The following section briefly explains theimplications of the Abe administration’s diplomacy towards Asia, followedby a section to overview the development of Japan’s Asian diplomacy. Itthen reviews past literature on the Abe administration’s Asian diplomacyand elucidates the limitations of past literature. This chapter also offers abrief argument and plan of the book.

The Abe Administration and ItsDiplomacy Towards Asia

In the new millennium, the presence of Asia in the global economy andworld politics has risen significantly. The region as a group has achievedimpressive economic growth, being a major source of manufacturingproducts and dynamic services. Such economic prowess has transformedinto political representation, which is typically seen in the large member-ship of Asian nations in the Group of Twenty (G20) forum. Despiteprominent performance in the economy, Asia remains a region of securityconcern with various inter-state conflicts. While North Korea has jeopar-dised the stability of Northeast Asia with the continuous developmentof nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, Japan has territorial disputeswith China, South Korea, and Russia. The border disputes between Indiaon the one hand and Pakistan and China on the other have provokedsporadic skirmishes.

Political uncertainty in Asia is seen in terms of great power poli-tics. The relative presence of the U.S. has gradually declined in Asia.U.S. President Obama’s announcement that America was no longer theworld’s policeman led to security instability in Asia. The subsequentTrump administration adopted the ‘America-first’ approach, pursuingprotectionist trade policy and anti-multilateralism. Not only did suchinward-looking diplomacy deteriorate the liberal intentional economicregime but also undermined stable political relations with major U.S.partners in Asia. In contrast, China has steadily raised its political,economic, and military presence in Asia through proactive diplomacy,continuous economic growth, and strength in military capabilities. WhileChina’s diplomatic assertiveness and military offensive became salient in

1 INTRODUCTION 3

maritime affairs, which have raised tensions particularly in the SouthChina Sea, its regional presence rose in the economic domain throughthe launching of new regional initiatives such as the Asian Infrastruc-ture Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).The rise of China in the geopolitical and geo-economic domains has acrucial impact on power politics with the U.S. and the foreign and securitypolicies of other states including Japan.

Japan’s position in such a dynamic Asia exhibited significant evolu-tions. Its economic power, the main source of external influence, shrankgradually due to the long-term stagnation from the 1990s. Japan’s ratioin the world gross domestic product (GDP) halved in fifteen years from17.6 percent in 1995 to 8.6 percent in 2010. The domestic polit-ical turmoils after the 1990s produced an unfavourable influence onits foreign and security policy as short-lived administrations particu-larly after the Koizumi administration in 2001–2006 disturbed Japanfrom formulating diplomatic strategies from the cohesive and long-termperspective.

The second Abe administration, which was formed in December 2012,drastically changed Japan’s diplomatic profile. The administration hassecured a long-term reign—more than seven years—thanks to successivevictories in national elections. This political stability is particularly salientbecause the previous six cabinets including his own first cabinet lasted forless than 16 months each, leaving little or no significant legacy in Japanesediplomacy. The solid domestic political base and a long-term reign haveprovided the Abe administration with considerable leeway to undertakeAsian diplomacy from the long-term perspective. Diplomatic performancehas become the source of domestic support for the Abe administration assuccessful results in external policy, coupled with positive outcomes fromAbenomics—the administration’s economic policy package—underpinnedthe nation’s satisfaction with the administration.

The Abe administration has undertaken prudent diplomacy in evolvinggeopolitical environments in Asia. The administration has maintained aclose partnership with the U.S., Japan’s sole ally. While most of thepolitical leaders have been struggling to forge stable relations with U.S.President Donald Trump, Abe developed trustworthy relations with himby becoming the first foreign leader to meet him after his election victoryin November 2016 (Terada 2019: 1055). Japan under Abe has developedclose partnerships with other countries such as the Association of South-east Asian Nations (ASEAN) members, Australia, and India. While Abe

4 H. YOSHIMATSU

visited all ten ASEAN countries within the first year of the second admin-istration, he has been one of the key leaders engaging proactively in thedevelopment of the quadrilateral forum among the U.S., Japan, Australiaand India. Diplomatic tensions with China rose in two years after the startof the Abe administration partly due to a visit to the Yasukuni Shrine inDecember 2013. However, Japan–China relations gained stability after2017 particularly through summit diplomacy between Abe and Chinesetop leaders. The Abe administration’s diplomacy has been unique in theadvocacy of diplomatic ideas. The administration raises, as the funda-mental foreign policy tenet, ‘proactive contribution to peace’, which waspositioned as the key idea behind the National Security Strategy (NSS),based on the principles of international cooperation (Kitaoka 2014). TheDevelopment Cooperation Charter also proclaimed the positive use offoreign aid for peacebuilding operations even opening a chance to givesupport to foreign armed forces that undertake non-military activities.Furthermore, Abe has made a deep impression by presenting crucialdiplomatic slogans such as the Democratic Security Diamond and the Freeand Open Indo-Pacific.

In general, the Abe administration has forged stable diplomatic rela-tions with major countries in Asia except for South Korea with whichthe administration has serious diplomatic tensions over historical issuessuch as the comfort women problem. The Abe administration’s foreignand security policy towards Asia doubtlessly has particular uniqueness inJapan’s diplomatic history in the post-World War II period. The adminis-tration’s active engagements in political, economic, and security affairs inintensive interactions with the U.S., China, India, Australia, ASEAN, andso on have a significant influence on the international relations of Asia.

The Brief Overview of Japan’s Asian Diplomacy

During the Cold War era, Japan was tightly embedded in the Russo-U.S.confrontation. Japan as a key U.S. partner in East Asia functioned as abulwark against the communist threat. Under the Japan–U.S. SecurityTreaty, which was signed in 1951 and was revised in 1960, Tokyo hasprovided bases in Okinawa and other parts for Washington to use for theprojection of its military power. Under the American nuclear umbrella,Japan pursued economic growth, following the ‘Yoshida Doctrine’.1

After a high economic boom in the 1950s through the 1970s, Japaneseenterprises gradually penetrated the East Asian market. The relocation

1 INTRODUCTION 5

of production bases to East Asia was accelerated by the Plaza Accordin September 1985, which led to the high appreciation of the yen.The formation of plural manufacturing bases in East Asian countriesconstituted the foundation of regional production networks and growingintra-regional trade. Japan also propped up the industrialisation of EastAsian countries through the provision of foreign aid, which was used forthe development of infrastructure. Japan’s foreign aid policy had distinc-tive features compared with other western nations by emphasising the‘self-help’ principle and giving priority on loan rather than grant.

Compared with Europe, Asia was underdeveloped in the advance ofmultilateral institutions for regional cooperation. The European nationshave developed various regional institutions on the basis of the EuropeanCoal and Steel Community in 1952. Asia did not have inter-governmentalinstitutions for a long time except for ASEAN. Japan took the initiativein founding the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) whose firstministerial meeting was held in Canberra in 1989. The APEC has devel-oped into the key regional institution that discusses economic affairs inthe Asia-Pacific by organising the summit meeting and other commit-tees. Then, ASEAN-centred institutions were created successively such asthe ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994, the Asia-Europe Meeting(ASEM) in 1996, and the ASEAN Plus Three (ASEAN+3) in 1997.Japan positively supported ASEAN’s multilateral initiative. While JapaneseForeign Minister Nakayama’s proposal in 1991 to develop the ASEANPost-Ministerial Conference (PMC) into a forum for political dialoguedesigned to improve the sense of mutual security constituted one basefor the creation of the ARF (Hook et al. 2011: 242–43), Prime MinisterHashimoto Ryutaro’s proposal in January 1997 to hold a regular top-levelmeeting between Japan and ASEAN led to the creation of the ASEAN+3.When the Asian economies were hit by the Asian financial crisis in 1997–1998, Japan showed leadership in overcoming this sudden setback. Notonly did it hold an international conference to discuss rescue packages forThailand in August 1997, but it also provided huge funds under the NewMiyazawa Initiative, support packages of US$30 billion for the crisis-hitcountries. While Japan’s initiative to create the Asian Monetary Fund wasnot realised, an alternative network of swap agreements developed intothe Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM), a representativefull-fledged form of regionalism under the ASEAN+3.

The U.S.–Japan alliance was ‘political’ first and strategic second.Because of its overall importance in Japan’s external policies and internal

6 H. YOSHIMATSU

politics, the end of the Cold War did not lead to the termination ofthe Japan–U.S. Security Treaty whose prime objective was to defendJapan from the communist threat. Tokyo and Washington sought toredefine their security partnership. The new National Defence ProgramOutline, formulated in November 1995, reaffirmed the centrality of theJapan–U.S. Security Treaty to Japan’s security policy. The Japanese andAmerican leaders confirmed, in the 1996 Japan–U.S. Joint Declarationon Security, that the Japan–U.S. relationship would remain the corner-stone for achieving common security objectives and for maintaining astable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region. Underthis new orientation, the geographic scope of the Japan–U.S. securityalliance expanded from the previous ‘Far East’ to ‘Asia-Pacific’ (Hooket al. 2011: 140). The revised Guidelines for Japan–U.S. Defence Coop-eration from September 1997 onwards refers especially to ‘situations inareas surrounding Japan will have an important influence on Japan’s peaceand security’.2

In the 2000s, the Koizumi administration, which lasted for five anda half years from April 2001 to September 2006, showed a distinctivepresence in foreign and security policy. The administration tightened upan alliance with the U.S. by providing unequivocal support for the Bushadministration’s war against terrorism. In October 2001, one month afterthe 9.11 terrorist attacks, the Koizumi administration enacted the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law, which enabled the Self-Defence Forces’(SDF) refuelling mission in the Indian Ocean, as Japan’s contribution tothe war in Afghanistan as an American ally. When the Bush administrationbegan the Iraq War in March 2003, Prime Minister Koizumi Jun’ichiroimmediately declared support for Washington, and his cabinet enactedthe Iraq Special Measures Law in July 2003, which authorised the SDFto provide humanitarian relief in Iraq. The Koizumi administration alsoundertook proactive diplomacy towards East Asia. Koizumi proposed anidea to develop a ‘community that acts together and advances together’during his visit to Southeast Asia in January 2002. Koizumi’s idea envi-sioned the building of community on the basis of sincere and openpartners between Japan and ASEAN by referring to ASEAN-initiatedmultilateralism such as the ARF and ASEM, as well as ‘the best use ofthe framework of ASEAN+3’ (Koizumi 2002). The Koizumi adminis-tration’s diplomatic stance also contributed to the creation of the EastAsia Summit (EAS) in 2005. Japan was a key supporter for expanding

1 INTRODUCTION 7

the membership of this new institution from the existing ASEAN+3 toinclude India, Australia and New Zealand, the three democratic nations.

After Koizumi’s step-down from the prime ministerial post inSeptember 2006, the three short-lived Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)cabinets were formed until September 2009. These administrationsattempted to exhibit new diplomatic postures such as the value-orienteddiplomacy and the arc of freedom and prosperity and sought to forgecloser relations with China through summit diplomacy. However, theywere unable to show long-term visions for Asian diplomacy.

Because of a landslide victory in the Lower House election in August2009, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) ousted the LDP fromthe power. The Hatoyama cabinet, the first DPJ administration, gainedinternational attention in foreign and security policy as it advocated amore ‘equal’ partnership with Washington and attempted to forge closerpartnerships with Asian nations under the banner of the East AsianCommunity (EAC). However, the administration’s diplomacy becamedysfunctional soon largely because of mistrust in relations with the U.S.,and the EAC concept was unable to secure support from the domesticpolitical circles and even from major Asian countries (Hosoya 2013: 153).

Despite Hatoyama’s willingness to establish a trustworthy partnership,diplomatic relations with China deteriorated during the DPJ era. In June2008, both governments had reached a political agreement on coopera-tion in the East China Sea. The agreement contained joint developmentin the northern part of the East China Sea and the participation ofJapanese legal persons in the development of Chunxiao (Japanese name:Shirakaba) oil and gas field. In September 2010, the boat collision inci-dent occurred in the East China Sea. The Japan Coast Guard arrested thecaptain of a Chinese fishing boat on suspicion of operating in Japaneseterritorial waters and obstructing public duties of coast guard personnelby deliberately hitting patrol vessels. The Chinese government reactedto this incident decisively by stopping the export of rare earth elements,suspending ministerial and higher-level exchanges, and postponing talkson a treaty concerning joint gas field development. Exactly two years later,Japan–China diplomatic relations deteriorated further as the DPJ cabinetannounced the nationalisation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands.

There are at least three critical features in the trajectory of Japan’sdiplomacy towards Asia. First, Japan was tightly embedded into greatpower politics. Tokyo has maintained a close alliance with Washington,which became the foundation for its overall diplomatic policies including

8 H. YOSHIMATSU

those for Asia. The fundamental character of the alliance changed froma security architecture to defend Japan from the communist threat to aregional public good to guarantee security stability in the Asia-Pacific. Inthe 2000s, the presence of China became far important for Japan’s Asiandiplomacy. Beijing’s continuous high growth eclipsed Tokyo’s economicpresence, and China began to lead the formation of multilateral initia-tives in Asia. China’s maritime offensive intensified in the 2010s in boththe East and South China Seas. How to cope with the China offensivethrough its self-efforts and external partnerships mainly with the U.S.became a key diplomatic challenge for Japan.

Second, Japan’s overall diplomatic presence in Asia was not necessarilyprominent. Japan maintained extensive economic reach to Asia throughthe combination of trade, investment, and foreign aid, which under-pinned economic growth and industrialisation in major countries in theregion. While Japan remained a crucial source of new investment, tech-nology, and foreign aid for Asian countries, its relative economic powerdeclined due to the long-term stagnation after the 1990s and the steadygrowth of other Asian economies. ASEAN-initiated multilateral institu-tions embedded Japan into regional cohesion, and Japan has behaved asa supporter of such institutions. Japan’s presence was particularly weak inan ideational initiative. Indeed, ideational concepts such as the EAC andvalue-oriented diplomacy were advocated, but they were not permeatedinto other Asian countries. Japan was generally passive about providingmeaningful ideas for sustaining a stable regional order.

Third, domestic politics mattered in Japan’s foreign and securitypolicy. While the Koizumi administration’s distinctive foreign and secu-rity strategies were underpinned by its long-term reign, the Hatoyamaadministration’s new diplomatic postures were produced as a consequenceof power transition from the LDP to the DPJ. Moreover, the unstableadministrations that failed to secure the people’s long-term support andthe solid backup from the ruling party were unable to formulate andimplement effective diplomatic strategies to enhance Japan’s externalposition and interests. Thus, the administration’s position in domesticpolitics has a significant effect on its engagement in external policies andrelations.

1 INTRODUCTION 9

Literature on Japan’s AsianDiplomacy and Critical Assessment

Prime Minister Abe Shinzo who organised the second administrationin December 2012 has adopted proactive diplomatic postures, pursuing‘diplomacy taking a panoramic perspective of the world’. The Abe admin-istration has implemented purposeful diplomatic strategies designed toenhance Japan’s international prestige and defend its national inter-ests. For this objective, the administration has positively engaged in thestrength of the Japan–U.S. alliance and closer partnerships with Australia,India, and major Southeast Asian countries.

The Abe administration’s proactive foreign and security policy hasattracted growing interests from scholars in Japanese foreign policy andregional politics in the Asia-Pacific. These studies can be categorised intoseveral groups. The first group has elucidated the Abe administration’sforeign and security policy in evolving regional politics and environments.Suzuki and Wallace (2018) argue that Japan under the Abe adminis-tration was confronted with significant geopolitical vulnerability and itsresponses are largely tentative and incremental, and that political revision-ists’ self-limiting postures, in addition to the resource and antimilitaristsensitivities of the public and wider elite, explains this kind of policyresponses. Samuels and Wallace (2018) allege that Japan under the Abeadministration is ‘pivoting within Asia’ to diversify external balancing toadjust and adapt to potential regional crises and rapid deterioration in itssecurity. In a similar vein, Gaens (2018) contends that Japan’s changingsecurity conditions require a more regionally and globally engaged stance,which led to tighter strategic partnerships with like-minded states in theAsia-Pacific and beyond. Oros (2017) examines how the historical lega-cies of contested war memories, antimilitarist practices and the unequalalliance with the U.S. have influenced new policies and politics in Japan’s‘security renaissance’, and contends that the Abe administration intensi-fied a nationalistic posture through far-reaching developments in securitypolicy, institutions and practices.

The second group has explored the theoretical characterisation of theAbe administration’s stance on and policies for external relations. Somescholars have used a balancing concept in explaining the administra-tion’s foreign and security policy (Grønning 2014; Hughes 2016; Koga2016; Liff 2019; Pugliese and Insisa 2017). Others have explained Japan’s

10 H. YOSHIMATSU

strategic policies vis-à-vis China by relying on a hedging concept (Koga2018; Lin 2014; Vidal and Pelegrín 2018). Fatton (2019) and Nagy(2017) employ the ‘entrapment and abandonment’ theory for explainingthe strategic implications of the administration’s security policies. Whilethe former uses the theory for explaining Japan’s pursuit of multiplepolicy options, the latter employs it for accounting for Japan’s pursuitof an autonomous defence posture. Furthermore, Lande (2018) andPugliese and Patalano (2020) explore the nature of the Abe adminis-tration’s foreign and security policy in terms of ‘offensive and defensiverealism’ and ‘Realpolitik’, respectively.

The third group has analysed domestic policymaking in relation tothe Abe administration’s external policy. Pugliese (2017) focuses on theadministration’s hybrid policymaking authority that rests on a person-alised and politicised link between the Prime Minister’s executive office,the Kantei, and bureaucratic apparatuses. George Mulgan (2018: ch.3)and Shinoda (2018: ch.7) elucidate major characteristics in the policy-making process of foreign and security policy under the Abe administra-tion. Several scholars have highlighted government agencies of which theAbe administration made full use. Fukushima and Samuels (2018) andLiff (2018) examine the functions and implications of the National Secu-rity Council (NSC), whose establishment is regarded as one of the mostimportant institutional reforms under the Abe administration. The NSC,founded in 2013, was the centrepiece of the ambitious reorganisation ofJapan’s foreign and security policy apparatus during the post-World WarII period.

The fourth group has elucidated the essence and implications of theguiding creed of foreign and security policy, the ‘Abe Doctrine’ (Envall2020; Hughes 2015, 2017, 2018). For instance, Hughes (2017) arguesthat Abe’s foreign and security ideal opened a pathway to a radical shiftrather than maintaining continuity with the past trajectory, marking awatershed in its security trajectory as an alliance and international secu-rity partner. Envall (2020) maintains that the Abe doctrine’s policy ideasare chiefly realist rather than nationalist as they keep strong continuitieswith past Japanese security practices, and at the same time modify Japan’srealist tradition in a direction to give more focus on immediate strategicchallenges.

The fifth group has explored Prime Minister Abe’s personal attributesthat affect Japan’s foreign and security policy. Several scholars expoundAbe’s nationalistic attribute in analysing Japan’s foreign policy. For

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instance, Tamamoto (2018) contends that a nationalist Abe sought tomake Japan’s relations with the U.S. more mutual through the rewritingof the U.S.-authored constitution and highlight the need to bolsterJapanese military capabilities in preparation for disputes with China overuninhabited islets in the East China Sea. Pugliese (2015) focuses onAbe’s political and ideational affiliation with an arch-conservative polit-ical association, Sosei Nippon [Japan’s Rebirth], whose members becamecore supporters for Abe’s political comeback in 2012. Others assertthat after forming the second administration Abe has adopted a prag-matic posture to stabilise Japan’s foreign relations and an internationalorder. For instance, Mochizuki and Porter (2013) and Nilsson-Wrightand Fujiwara (2015) hold that Abe exhibited pragmatism by respectingthe 1993 Kono statement and the 1995 Murayama statement in orderto stablise relations with China and South Korea. Ramirez (2019), inanalysing Japan’s foreign and security policy, accentuates the evolvingnature of Abe’s world view: from neoconservatism in the first admin-istration to neoautonomy in 2012–2014 and to pragmatic realism in2015–2016.

As the above examination illustrates, the Abe administration’s proactivediplomatic postures and strategies attracted scholars’ growing interests.Their research works analyse multiple dimensions of the Abe admin-istration’s foreign and security policy, and demonstrate the growingimportance of Abe diplomacy in international relations of Asia. Despitethe accumulation of research on Abe diplomacy, there are still severalshortcomings or limitations in the past research.

First, the past research has not taken sufficiently the evolving characterof policy concern and geographical scope in Japan’s external policy. Interms of policy concern, the past studies have paid much attention tothe security field. The security affairs have become increasingly importantmatters for Japanese diplomacy in drastic power realignments in theAsia-Pacific, and the Abe administration has undoubtedly given priorityto security affairs in its diplomacy. However, the economic field has beenemerging as a crucial policy area as well, exemplified by the growingimportance of infrastructure investment in Asia. Significantly, securityand economics have growing complexity in Asia, which is shown by theterm, ‘economic-security nexus’ (Pempel 2013). Indeed, several studieshave explored the strategic nature of the Abe administration’s economicdiplomacy in infrastructure investment (Yoshimatsu 2017; Zhao 2019)and foreign aid (Jain 2018; Trinidad 2018; Yamamoto 2017). Yet,