Power Transitions

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Seven Bridges Press, LLCOs Fifrh Aveoue

New York, NY 10010

vii; ,POWER TRANSITIONS

The Dynamies oí Deterrence

Nucleilr ProliferilriOrl and rh e Likelihood of Wuf

The Case oí Ballislic Missile Deíense

Conclllsions and Policy Implieations

5. Economíc Applications: Growth, Trade, anc/ Democrac)'The Polilies o; Security ¡md Econolllics

The Status Quo and International Political Economy

Power Transi lion and Economie PoliciesEconomic Growth and Regirne ChangeIntegration

Eeonomic Consequenees of Waf

Conclusions and Policy Illlplica ti ons

Part 111 Poliey <;ha/lenges

6. The Realignrnent Challenge: Th e Expansion o( NATOPower Transilions and lhe Exp,lf1sion o( NATO

Russia's Oplions

Managing Russian Entr )' inlo NATO

Managing ¡he Ch inese ReactionConclusions: The Futllre oí NATO

7. The Asían Chal/enge

Managing Power: The Prirnacy of China

Tlle Dynami cs oi China's Power Transition

Managing the Transilion

Slrategy 1: Engineering Satisfaction \Vith "f{ealignmenr"

Srrategy 2: Contro/ling Territorial Flashpoints

Slrategy 3: Reengineering Power Distributions

Managing Power: The Emergence of India

Conclusions: China, India, and (h e United Sta tes

8. The World to Come

The 5tate of (he Worfd

-rhp Nf!xt Internalional Periad

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List of Figures

FIGURE 1.1 7Classic Powtr Pyram id

FIGURE 1.2 8

Hierarch ies in the Internacional S)'stem

FIGURE 1.3Disrribution of Sa risfaction

FIGURE 1.4Degree af Cooperarion and JoinrStatus Quo Evaluations

fiGURE 1.5War Occurrences and Joim StatusQuo Evalu¡lrions

FIGURE 1.6AlIiances ood Joint Srarlls QuoEvaluarions

fiGURE 1.7A/lia -nce Fonnarion, StatuS Quo,and rhe Probabiliry oE Wal'

FIGURE 1.3The Endogenolls Growrh Trajector y

FIGURE 1.9

A wirh a HighProbability of War

fiGURE 1.10

A Transition wirh :l LowProbabiliry of War

FIGURE 1.11

A Transirion wirh a Very HighProbabiliry of War

FIGURE 1.12

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FIGURE 2.1 46Grear l'owcr Shifts, 181 5-2000

FIGURE 2.2 49

Crear Power Competirion,

FIGURE 2.3 52The Gerrnan Challengc, 1900-1950

FIGURE 2.4 53

German-U.K. Status Quo Evalll<1tion,1870-2000

FIGURE 2.5 55SlIperpowcf Competition. 1950-2000

FIGURE 2.6

511perpower Status Q \ IO Evaluation,1941-2000

FIGURE 3.1

Regional Hierarchies in theln tcrna rional Sysrem

FIGURE 3.1Probability ol Regional Wars

FIGURE 3.3

Relarive Power of Norrh undSouth Vietnam, 1955 -75

FIGURE 3.4

ReI,l[ive Power of Iran and lraq,1962-95

fiGURE 4.1

Nuclear War POPlllarion Lossesfor Grear Powers

FIGURE 4.2

Tbe $trucrure of Delctreoce

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:¡

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\ Power Transitions:

Strategies for the .

21 st Century

Ranald L. Tammen

Jacek KuglerOauglas LemkeAllan C. Stam 111I\1ark Abdallahian

Carale AlsharabatiBrian Efird

andA.F.K. Organski

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CHATHAM HOUSE PUBLISHERS

S EVEN B R I D G E S .PRESS, LLC

NEW YORK • LONDON



viiiPOWER TRANSIT/ONS

The Oynamics of Oeterrence

Nuclear Prolifera/ion and Ihe Likelihood of WilrThe Clse of Ballistic MissiJe Oefense

Conclusions ancJ Policy IrnpJiC3tions

5. Economic Applications: Growth, Tl'ade, and OemocracyThe Politics oi Secwity and Econornics

The Status Qua and InternationaJ Political Econorny

Power Transition ane! Economic Polícies

Economic Growth alle! Re gime Change

Integrat ion

Economie COl1sequenees or War

Conclusions ilnd Poliey Implications

Pan 11) Policy <;:nalJenges

6. The Realignment Challenge: The Expansíon of NATOPower Transi/iolls and the ExpJnsiol1 01 NATO

RU$sía's Options

tvlanaging Russiall Entry into NATO

Managing the Chinese Reaetion

Conclusions: The Future of NATO

7. The Asían Challenge

Managing Power: The Primacy of China

The Oynamic5 of China's Power Transitioll

Managing the Trallsition

Strategy 1: Engineering Satislaction with

Strategy 2: Contralling Territor ial FJashpoints

Strategy 3: Reengineering Power Oistributions

Managing Power: The Emergence 01 India

Conclusions: China, India, and the United States

8. The World to Come

The State o( the Worle!

The Next InternationaJ Perioc/

Notes

Bibliography

Index

About the Authors

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List of Figures

FIGURE 1.1 7Classic Powtr Pyramid

fiGURE 1.2 IIHi erarchies in che Internarional Sysrern

fiGURE 1.3

DiSlribution of Sarisfaction

FIGURE 1.4Degree of Cooperarion and JoinrStatus Quo [valu3rions

FIGURE 1.5War Occurrences and Joint Status

Quo Evaluations

FIGURE 1.6!\lIiances and Joinr Status QuoEvaluacions

FIGURE 1.7Alliance Formarion, Sratlls Quo,and rhe Probabiliry of War

FIGURE UJ

The Endogenou5 Growrh Trajectory

FIGURE 1.9A Transicion wirh a HighProbabiliry of War

FIGURE 1.10

A Transirion wirh a LowProbabilíty of War

FIGURE 1.11A Transition wíeh a Very High

Proba biliry of War

FIGURE 1.12Relative Power, ancl $atisfacrion,and che Probability oí \\lar

fIGURE 1.13

Th e Timing of War

FIGURE 1.14

The Severily of War

FIGURE 1.15The Duration of \'í':lr

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FIGURE 2.1 46Grear l'ower Shifts, 181S -2000

FIGURE 2.2 49

Grear Power Competition, H 1.5-1900

FIGURE 2.3 52

The Gerrnan Challenge, 1900-'1950

FIGURE 2.4 53

German-U.K. Starus Quo Evaluatíon,1870-2000

FIGURE 2.5Superpower Competition. 1950-2000

FIGURE 2.6

Superpower Starus Quo Evaluation,1941-2000

FIGURE 3.1

RegionarHierafchics in rheInternarional Sysrem

FIGURE 3.2Probability of Regional Wars

FIGURE 3.3ReJative Power of Norrb and50mh Vieltlam, 1955-75

FIGURE 3.4

Relarive I' ower 01 Iran and Iraq,1962-95

fiGURE 4.1

Nuclear War Popularion Lossesfor Grear Powers

FIGURE 4.2

The Srrucrure of Dererrence

FIGURE 4.3Classical Dererrence and rheProbabílity 01 Nuclear War

FIGURE 4.4PoweJ Transjrion alld rhe Probabilityof Nuclear War '

FIGURE 4.5The Dynamics of Deterrence

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Contents

List of Figures

Preface

Acknowledgments

A Tribute to AF.K. Organski

Part I Foundations

1. Power Transition Theory for t he Twenty-first Century

The Seareh for New Expl <) ll ations

The Strueture af Pawer Trallsition Theary

Dynamics oi Satislaetion ancl Dissatislaetioll

Dynamies oí Power

Why Confliet Arises in the International System

The Management oí Worlcl Politics

Conclusions and Projeetiolls

2. Pawer Transition Theory Tested in the Nineteenth

and Twentieth Centllríes

Evolution of the International System since '1815

Conclusions and Projections

Part II Applications

3. Regional Applications: MlIltiple Hierarchies

Multiple Hierarehies in World Polilics

The Multiple Hierarchy MocJel

Regional Analyses of the Multiple Hierarchy Model

Dynamic5 af Regional Transitions

The Dif(usion 01 War

Conclusions and Poliq' Implications

4. Security Applications: Deterrence and Proliferatían

Tlle Costs oí Nuclear War

Th e Structure of Deterrence

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xii POWER TRANSITIONS

in that ir offers cJear and relevant implieations for polieymakers concerned

with rhe management of internarional poliries. This is a propirious moment

for (his theory ro be extended into poliey terms. The theoey has now pro-

gressed far enough to offer refined polie)' advice.Alhl there is a clemand fo c

new ideas ro guide foreign policies at rhe staet of the new centuey.

This book explains how the internacional sysrem is organized. Ir dis-

CLlsses when, how, and why wars occur ar the grear power and regional

power levels. Ir provides guidanee for polieymakers abour managing rheincernational system ro avo id war. It offers a general theory oE internacional

policics tbat ries togecher both economic and seeurity eonsiderations. Ir also

provides a gllide to undersranding peaee ,15 a produce of economie and

policical integration.

Our ideas are first presented rheoretically. The theory subseqllently be-

comes a framework for rhe applieacions, but only after being sllbjecced to

empirical validarion by resting against the historical record. Following chis

foundation, currenr policy implieations are diseussed and analyzed. Fllture

exrensions are elaborated as a guide ro sysrematie long-cerm policy devel-

opment. The final ehapter oHers a theoretieally informed walk inco the

future.

The poliey chaprers address the fundamental ehallenges oí che inter-national sysrem. In che afrermath of rhe Cold War, regional conflicrs have

been eleva red in importance. We deal with these issues direerly in chaprer 3.

Despice the aseendancy oE regional issues, nuclear weapons and strategy re-

tain a position of nationalimporrance. Therefore, nuclear deterrence and

proliferarion are disellssed in chaprer 4. Wirh the downgrading of major

power eonflier propensity, che foeus oE major power relations also has

shifced ro economic intcractions. In chis arena there are rwo trends, one

wward integration and consolidatian and a seeond involving sanctions and

rrade wars. Chaprer 5 discllsses rhese issues in detail. Having looked at

currenr regional, nuclear, and eeonomic issues, we move to the ehallenges

faced by deeision makers looking fo rward in rime. Chapters 6 chrough

8 formulace spee ifie poliey reeommendarions for rhe furure relations ofrhe great powers of the twenry-firsr ee ntllry: the Uniced Sta res, China, che

European Un ion, Russia, and India.

In che poliey chapters we focus firsr on how NATO expansion, perhaps

ro indude Rnssia, could affecc worldwide power distributions. In che eady

decades of this eentury, the British failed to eonstruet a coalition to preserve

srability and peaee in rhe Jaee of rhe German-led challenge to the inter-

narional order. The United States has rhe opportunity to avoid rhe mistakes

of the 1930s by strueruring a more suceessful eoalicion. The United States

can also maintain peace and stabiliry by slIccessfully managing rhe fllture

transitions wirh China and India. The eoalition opríon is discussed in chap-

ter 6, tbe Chinese and lndian power transitions are discllssed in chapter 7,

and the shape of rhe next international bierarchy is projeered in chapter 8.

xiii

PREFACE

The eoneept oE this book was boro in a typhoon in Tokyo, where Or- ,

ganski, Kugler, aod Tammen fOllnd themselves isolated by che forees oE

natllre. Released from the ryranny of eheir schedules, rhey olltlined the

organizaríon oí rhis volume wirh rhe purpose oE translaring Power Tran-

sition from ¡es rheoretieal base ro poliey prescriprions. We hope chis is

just rhe flrst srep in this evolution. }?eing individuals, not ro mention aea-

demics, we may disagree on sorne nuanees or colorings in this volume, bllt

we share a commondediearion ro the power Transition tradition and (O

the proposition chat, where possible, academie research should be lItilizedin rhe poliey world. To do less is to waste a signiflcanc resource and ro

place the United Sta tes at a comperirive disadvantage in rhe international

markerplaee of ideas.



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FIGURE 4.6Shifcs in Nuclear Capa bilicies,1990-2000

FIGURE 4.7

Classical Dererrcnce, Pro!iferatioll,and Nuclear War

fIGURE 4.8

.Power Transirion, Proliferatiol1,and Nucbr War

FIGURE 5.1Ma xim;zing Coopera¡iveand Comperirive Dyadic

FIGURE 5.2

Economic versus Securiry Conccrl1S

FIGURE 5.3The Dynamics of Trade anelMonetary Policies

FIGURE 5.4

The Dynamics of tabor lvlobility<l ne! Tcchnology Tral1sfers

FIGURE 5.5

The Consequences oí \(1;1'-;The Phoenix Factor

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FIGURE 7.1'fhe Global f-/icrarch y:

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POWErl TRANSIT/ONS ( ")

FIGURf 7.2

US . and PRC Power Shif¡s,1980-2040

FIGURE B.l

EI"oludon of ¡he Global 1-[icra rchy

FIGURE B.2The Global Hierarchy in rheWor/d Wars Period

FIGURE 8.3The Global Hierarchy in ¡heCold War Period

FIGURE 8.4The Glo bal Hi erarchv i 1 ¡hePosr-ColdWar

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flG URE 8.5 190

CurrcIlt \Vurld Popula¡ion res

FIGURE 8.6Curren¡ World GDP 5hares

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FIGURE 8.7Mid-Cenrllry World GDP Shares

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FIGURE 8.B 192

I\ltcrnative A: The Global Hierarchyunde.r a U.S.- Icd Superbloc

FIGURE B.9 192

AI¡crn ati vc Il, The Global Hiel"ardll'under China '

,rP·

Preface

The purpose of this book is to help bridge rhe gap between the aeademieand paliey communiries in world palities. We recognize che magnitud e ofchar task and rhe moclese role we hope ro play in che process. We alsoundersrand thar th is may be an exercise rhar wil1 not be welcomed by sorneauthorities on botb sicles. There may be those in the aeademie commu-niey who would ha ve preferred rhar we hacl devored rhis entire volume torhe purpose oE theflrst chapter - codifying and lInifying Power Transítiontheory by integrating its various strands and themes and by adding the eon-clllsions of formal proofs. And there may be those in the pol iey communícywho will hnd che introdlletion of rheorerical rerms and tests to be less thanuseflll in an operational setring. In a sense, ir is this membrane of ignorancechat keeps llS apart, diluting che ríeh intellectual promise of rhe former andhandícapping the strategie chinking of che larrer.

Despite rhese an tieipated obstacles, we designed this book with botheonsrituencies in mind. The importance of the praetical applícations of thetheory motivates llS to speak to the palie}' community. The importance ofche aeadem ie implieatíons oí a llnif1ed theory morivates us to ex tend andreetif)' the vaIÍolls strancls of Power Transition research. We as k polie)""rnakers ro be patient with rhe theoretica l chapters and cheoretieians ro bepatienr with the poliey chapters. Scholars will Íind many of their qllestionsaddressed in rbe more detailed endnotes. Policymakers looking for a setof tools ro address critieal problems of the twenty-first century may safelypass over many oE [hese academic references withollt losing the thrust oE

our argumentoThe arguments presented hereil1 are a eoherenr compilation and ex-tensíon of the academic tradítion oE Power Transition theory. The auchorsrepresent three inteIle ctual gelleratíons of that theory, inclllding A.F.l<.Organski, who invented rhe theory in 1958í Jaeek Kugler, who eollabo-rated with Organski in an empirieal evaluacían oE the cheorYí and DouglasLemke, who extended it beyond merely great power interactions. Ronald L.

Tarnmen and Allan Stam, also in the Organski lineage, ha ve publishedartides that apply Power Trans ition concepts in policy settings. Mark Ab-dollahian, earole Alsharabati, and Brian Efird have added formal tests andtheoretieal extensions ro rhe rheory. This book represents [he latest, andin sorne ways che most aggressive, step in a contínuing forty-year research

proíect.Those years have produeed a rheory llnusual among aeademic products



xv;

POWER TRANSITIONS

elal appreciarion to Bruce Russeu, \Virh whom AUan Stam co/laborared forchaprer 6.

MI oI om spouses deserve special commendarion tor toleraring us

cluring rhe ofren inconvenient process of writing lhis book. We thereforegratefully acknowledge Cher)'l Kugler, JiJl Lemke, B.B. Sram, Danny Al-

sharabati, 2nd, in panicular, Susan Tarnmen, wbo nor only graciousJy

inviced an army of liS to occupy her home on several occasions but alsoWas influential in rhe selecrian of oUt" book title. Patricia Organski sup-

o ported liS every step oE the way, even through rhe mOst difficult oE rimes.Patricia, yOl! are always in our hearrs .

As One oE Ollr allthors is an emp/oyee of rhe u.s. governmenr, we mustsrate thar nothing conrained in rhis volUlue shoule! be consrrued as repre-

seming rhe views of the Depanmem of Defense or rhe executive branehmore generally. Tllar said, cIeady we believe thar one da y rbis volumeshould represem those views.

... -'

A Tribute to A.F.K. Organski

This work .,vas inspired by the brilLiant theoretical contributions of A.F.K.Organski, who died on 6 March 1998, while rhis project was in pl"Ogress .

In adclition ro his profound inrel!ect ancl originaliry, Kenneth Organski will

be remembered for his zest for life, love of language, and gifr for friencl-

ship. The magnetic force (hat surrounded him inexorably drew studenrs

arrd colleagues into his vortex. He was a devotecl husband, fathef, arrcl

grandfather who wil! be missed beyond measure by his family, colleagues,and generations o.f clevoted students.

Kenneth was an academie's academic who macle major contriblltions

ro the study oE wodd polities. At a time when it was consiclefed heresy,he challenged the realism school of Hans Morgenthau by derailing its in-

consistencies. Lacer, he pioneered the use of empirical evidenee ro test

proposirions when other scholars relied on instinet Ol" allthority. Wirh

an uncanny ability ro idenrify and restructure central issues in the neld,

Kenneth was a galvanizing figure of his generation. His impacr 011 the

profession has many measures but perhaps the most important is tbat he

inspired generarions of studenrs to advanee the frontiers of knowleclge.

AFKO dicl not believe in sterile aeademic accomplishments. 1f possible,he urged, research should be put to use for che bendir of mankind. Thus

he strongly supported the transfer of academie researeh into the policy

world.This extraordinary political scientist, practitioner, ane! edueator was

born in Rome in 1923, where he attended the Ginnasio Liceo Torquaro

Tasso. He carneto

the Unired $tatesfleeing the

anti-Jewishlaws

of the

Mussolini regime. He served with che American armed forces in the Pacific

theacer from 1943 co 1945. (Later in his life, when lecturing before seniormilitary officials, Kenneth would gleefuUy recount chat as a private he had

hared oHicers and that he now took great pIeasure telling rhem what to do!)

AfterWorld War II, he sertled in New York, where he beca me an Americancirizen in 1944 and earned his B.A. (1947), M.A. (1948), and Ph.D. (1951)

degrees fram New York University. In 1952 be staned teaching at Brook-lyn College, moving in 1964 ro the University oE Miehigan, where most

recently he was professor of political scienee and senior research scientistin che Institute for Social Research. In addition to his long and extraordi-nary teaching and research career, he was also chairman oE the board of

Decision lnsights, a consulting firmo He cofounded rhis company in order



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Acknowledgments

This is a jointly authored book, an undertaking designed ro demonstIate

rbe broad appeal of Power Transition rheory. Al! allthors concributed toeach chapter, an exercise tbar proved inteUeccually stimularing and re-markably collegial. Fol' organizational purposes, sorne individuals assumedleadeIship for particular chapteIs as follows: cbapter 1, Kugler, Lemke, andTammenj cbapter 2, Abclollahian; chapter 3, Lemke; chapter 4, Alsharabariand Kuglerj chaprer 5, Efirc! and Kuglerj chapter 6, Stam (an earlier vcrsionoE this chapter was coauenored wirh Bruce Russetr)j chapter 7, Tammenj

ancl chapter 8, Kugler, Lemke, and Tammen. Kenneth Organski, of COluse,lives on in every page.

The Earhart Foundatíon, lec! by Secretar}' and Director of Program

Antony T. Sullivun, was generous in providing funding for our rescarch,including two conferences, one at rhe Nacional War College (NWC), rheother ar che Monterey Insritute fol' International Scudies (MUS). We thank

Provost 5reve 8aker and Dean Phil Morgan of MIÍS and Dean David Trerler

of NWC for hosting us ar eheír institurions and for providing sabbatical

suppart to Ron Tammen, which facílicared the organizarion of this ef-

forro The Nacional Defense University Foundation administered the Earhart

FOLlndation gramo We enjoyee! the strong support ane! exceptional sen-iceprovided by James V. Dugar and TOI11 Gallagher, rhe presidenr ane! execu-

ti ve director, respectively, of rhar Founclacion. Bob Gormley, the publisher

of Chatham HOLlse, has become a friend and key adviser in this project. The

importance of his firm commitment to our goal of reaching both the aca-

demic and policy communities cannor be overstaced. Katharine Míller hasadded immeasurably co che quality oE chis book. We thank her not only forher editorial ski lis bur for her parience in dea ling with mnltiple authors. Wealso wish to thank Sarah Mikels, Library Director, and ]eannemarie Faison,

Reference Librarian, ac the National DeJense University. Their experrise

and assisrance proved invaluab le.A number of índividuals reviewed pocrions 01' al! of our drafes and

provided important insights ane! welcome criticisms. With apologies ro any-one we may have accidentally omittecl, we specifically wish ro thank BruceBueno de Mesquica, Glenn Palmer, Yi Feng, Paul Zak, Marina Arbetman,

Thomas Willect, Woosang Kim, Frank Zagare, Charles Doran, Randy Siver-

son, Sherry Bennett, Jim Rosenau, George Graham, Richard Rosecrance,Siddharrh Swaminathan, Míchelle Benson, and Kennech Osterkamp. A spe-





! ,xviii ') f'OWER TRANSITIONS

ro imroduce scientific rigor te the execution oi poliey and decision makingin government and business.

A.F.K. Organski wiU long be remembered for a of extraordi-nary intellectual contributions. His influential ideas on power hierarchies in

world politics were imroduced in 'iX/orld Politics and extended in The War

Ledge/; coaucllOred wíth Jacek Kugler. His powerful insights on nationaldevelopment were set forth in Populatíon and World PoweJ; coauthored

with Katherine Davis Fox, advanced in Stages of Political DevelofJ111ent,and docllmented in Birth, Death al1d Taxes, ,which \Vas wrirten wirh severalof his students. In The $36 Billiol1 Bargain, Kenneth outlined the prospecrsand possibilities for peace in {he Mie!dle East. In these works and countlessarticles and presentations, he advanced new ideas about the Euture oE worldpolitics and applied these notions to real problems. He was the rare inno-

vat.ive academie who involved and inspired orhers ro furrher elaborare his

insights and ro apply rhese new angles of vision to resolve problems. His

willingness to take risks in the pursuit of knowledge was a distinguishingcharacteristic of his careel'. Organski's honors included the DistinguishedFaculry Achievement Award fmm the Universiry of JvIíchigan, the tifetime

achievement award trom the Conflict Processes Section of rhe American

Polítical Science Associarion, and the Cavalieri de la Republica from thegovernment of Iraly.

Above a1l, Kenneth Organski was a superb edllcaror. His leeturesat the Ulliversity of Michigan were, wirhollC exaggeration, legendary. He

would light up a room \Vith his intellectual force and wirh rhe passionand humor oí his charismatic personality. Some will remember him tellingstudents: "math, math, matb" ane! "wrire, write, write." Others will re-

member hís authorirative voice and presentation style and his ability to

focus imently on ea eh individual asif no one else mattered. Through his

writings and through his srue!ents, Kenneth Organski achievee! immortality.He counted among his students many who became prominenr authoritiesin the profession, including Aaron Wildavsky, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita,

Jacek Kugler, Youssef Cohen, AUan Lamborn, AlIan Stam, Glenn Palmer,and ElIen Lust-Okar. In turn they taught and inspired others, includingDouglas Lemke, Marina Arbetman, Suzanne Werner, Frank Zagare, JamesMorrow, David Lalman, Woosang Kirn, Mark Abdollabian, Carole AI-sharabati, Vesna Danilovic, Brian Efird, ane! Ben Hllnt - a1l dedicatedro extending our knowledge oí development and war ane! peaee, and all

keepers of the Organski flameo Orher students ehose to hone rheir tal-enrs in rbe poliey world, íncluding Ronald L. Tammen, Arthur House,Roben Hormats, and Ajaj jarrouj. There they applied Organski insightson Capital Híll, in the exeeutive branch, ancl in the business and .financialcommunities.

[n Kenneth's memory, we have consrfllcred 3n "Organski Tree" at rhe

Internet sire Powertransitions.com. This genealogy depiets ¡he sllccessive

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POWER TRANSITlONS) xix

generations of Organski students who have continued tO advance his PowerTransition theory. The tree is a firse and very limited eHort to visually eat-alog the "Organski Effect." \Ve invite al! WhO have been associated withKenneth's Power Trans.ition work tú contact Ron Tarnrnen at that site so

that we can add names tO this lineage.This book represents om - his students' - Írnmeasurable debt oE

gratitllde. ,Thank yo u, Kennerh. '



4 I'OWHl THN'ÍSITIONS

defending tlle United Sta tes from the ideo logiea! alld milirary challenges ofcornmunisrn as represented by the USSR. oE thjs ef-

its na rrow J?ut necessary perspective, masked emergíng crends in \Vorld

.power rhat \Vill ha ve a profound impact on rhe international system in rhistwency-Jirst·

Frorn che mid-1900s on, American s tl'ategis ts forgcd consenSllS basee!

on pereeprioJls of [he threat. Then rhe dissolution of the Soviet Union

undereut the intellectual 3nd publie support for the U.S. role in che wor/d.In a phrase, ir changed everyehing. The nature of rhe rhreat, the so-ca lled

bipolar world, the tast-West blocs> ,ilr meJred into history. In rhe afterrnarh,It is as i an inrellectual void has been creared, filled ad ho.; by rhe rhrt>at ofthe day ol' the sum oE al! new threats. What ha s been mis sing is the rheo-

retical amI practica! foundation tlpon which policy can be estaOlished. Thepurpose of rhis book is ro offer a new perspectiye of rhe warlcl based 011 él

coherenc and validated theory thar bridges the the oretical-policy gap.This oook deals wirh rhe fundamental sbifrs in warld power - po\ver

rransirions -- thar ha ve been submerged by th7 'Ü.S ..U:SSRc uo;peri ríOn·.: It

provides a rheory, a that nQ.LQ..nJy ..oLtbe Ullitcd<ls"rhe aorníiiarlt power out also rhat role into chis ce ntury.

Laying out rhe fllture challenges to American leadership, it offcrs llo t unlyan intellectual foundation for anticipJring these evt>I\ts but si;1e-cífic rnanagcmenuool s that could be miJizcd ro enSllre a peaceflIréV5rut1m

among che great powers.This is a oook abollr theory in policy terrns and polic)' in iheoretical

rerITIs. Ir ullifies Power Transitíon rheory and app lies ir ro tbe cemral ques-

tíons of the next dccades. How shollld rhe United States artempt to manageworld politics, partieulady rhe challenge oI China? How wil! critic,ll al-

liances such as rhe North Atlantic Teeat}' Organízation (NATO) el'olve in

rhe future? What is che n8ture and scope of regional insta biliry? How canregional conflicts be managed? How will nuclear proJiferation affeet rhe

stabiJitv of dererrcncc? What are the global eeonornic effects o( integraríon,

trade, growth? ITOI,,:i::TIJeconomicEower rdarioñSfilps r Thi s !look offers a bridge whereon practitioners andthCOfTsCs ñlay meer to evaluare these and walk togerher into the ne\v

centuey. Py(. , -.lhe Search' for New Explanations

The economic collapse and political dissolutioJ1 of rhe So viet Uníon has

lefr polieymakers and scholars searehing for new fund ame ntal rruths abolltthe nature of the internacional sys cem. for man}', tbe Cold Wa r era was

rhe sup.rerne threat to internacional ancl security, but in hindsight, it

was also imellecrual!y cornfortable. The llarure of the rhreat was known.Ir was a powerfu! mooilizing roo! fol' governmem, business , an d society. '-

•

POWf:R TRt,NSlTION THEORY FOR THE TWENTY-FlIlST CENTURY :5

The ll,ss (JI' tha t threat has crea red conclitions, f(JI the first time in morerhanJifty fa.v.a.r.abJe_to an of how che

internari 9l1a l sysrCl1l ope rates wi.th.2,uJ viewedoI rh e Cold War.- ---The of a l1lonolithic threar has forceapolicymakers ro search_Jo!.. explanatíons rhar lit che oew cireumsraneesW)llg q,lel, cllerishcd concepts. Tlíe foreign policy eomlllunity has gone

through a diffic1.l1r and wrenching exercise in che past ten years. The De-partmcnt of Dcfense has iclentified a new se t oE rr ansnatíonal threats-

including internarional crime, drugs , terrorisITl, biological and ehemicalwea pon s, and proli ferarion of nuclear wea pons ane! delivery systems -that, in many ways, are less powerfuJ for mobilizing policical support, yetmo re cornplex anel challenging than th e bnlre force speecer of Soviet agg res-

sion . Similarly, U.S. forei gn policy has undergone a sys rcmatie realignmenr,an economic fOC llS for the poJitieal and milira ry imperarive oi

meeting communist chn!lenges in the developing world.Tbe sense of uncertainty about the look of rhe new world stems nor

¡usr frorn the radical change s it has undergone, but equally from the real-izn fi on thar the ,o le! rheol' ies did nor predict and cannot eX,PEin why tlJ..is

dramatie transfo'rmation occurred.1

Why is it that the world seems saferwithour twO great superpowers balaneing each orher - thercn ce rhat securccl global. peace? Was OllI notion oi peace and balance ofpower misplaced? If so, rhar misjudgment ma)' \vell represent che singlemo st imp ortant intellectual and policy fa illlr e of rhe post-Worlcl Wai' II era.

This cbaprer is e! es igned ro accompJish two goals. First, ir offers rhe

[cader (\ composite picrure of Pawer Transition rheory by integraring thevarious extenslons and amplificntions into a coherent whole. 2 lt brings ro"

gerher that new research and wcnvés itinto the Jich text o.f the lInderlying(he or}'. By pro viding a systemacic outline of che

among power, satisfaccion, and the choice of peace aodoffers a füundation 1m exploring internarional polit¡cs.

Secon d, chis chapter translates Powel' Transition theory imo paliey-relevant terms. Despite extensive empírical validarion, the theol'Y bas been

inaccess ible ro the poliey community, in pan beca use of its spedaliz.ed use

of langl1age ane! in part because of ies ac ae!ernic focus. For the po licy-

oriented reader, therefore, we keep the rheo rerica! arguments cogent andreadable. For the academic spec ialisr, we provide c1etailed eitations and

\

discuss various nuanees, eolorings, nnd controversies in the enclnates.The heart of this chapter ís devotee! to rhe three components of Power

. Transirion rhéory: structure, dynamics, an.9 QS?licy': 1:he2 uctural aspecc 9fthe theo]')' is exp!ored nrse sínce it provicles an understanding of natureof power among natio_ns, and characteristies ofthe interMiridnal system linking nations. Wirh tbe international scructurein place, the tl,eory rhen <[('counts ior the m'osr importanr dynamics in the



)

:)

. ,r:.

( (UM O,. ¿u-k. '"'

CHAPTER 1

Power Transition Theory for the

Twenty-first Century

Never before has there been such utter confusion in the public

mílld with respeet lo U.S. (oreJ:gn palie)'. The President doesn't

understand it; Congress doesn't understand ít; 110r does the

public, nor does the press. They all wGnder arotmd in ti

labyrinth of ignoranee and error and conjeeture, in whichtruth is intermíl1gled with fietion al a hundred points, in whicÍJunjustified assumptions have attained the 'Uillidity of premises,

amI in which t!Jete ís 110 recognized and authoritative theory

toohold 011 too - GEORGE F. KENNAN

The United States is engaged in a quiet war. Ir is the intellectual war be-

l\veen rhose who favor tbe expansion of Am.cricall inflllence abroad and

rhose who rejecr íllvolvemenr in distalH ¡ands with serange [lames fo! pur-

poses having ¡inJe apparenr linkage ro their daily lives. Ir is a war thar

gO .es far beyond rhe old descriprions of "internarionalist" and "isolarion-

ise" or rhe more modern rerrns of "engagement" and " rerrenchment." lt is

a war foughr wirh words, ideas, PLlblic opinion, and legislarían as each sicle

attempts to mobilize írs reSOUfces within the interested public. Often oper-

ating as che subtex t of national debates, tbis batde for primacy represents

rhe single mose importanc decision rhe Unired States faces today. Funda-

mentail y, it IS a strnggle no less than the deflning role of che Unitecl

Srates in '[he -1l1rCl" millenniul1l.

X/ilí [he Unired States ;;etreneh, withdra w, retrear illto the perceived

'seelll' iry of noninvolvemenc, or \ViII ie recognize the imp end ing pówer shifts

<lnd make tbe polie)' choiees neeessary ro mece [hese new conditiolls? lt is

a decision critical noe only ro rhe economic well-being and secllIity of rhe

United States, bU[ to rhat of rheinternarional system ir informa!!y lencls. Ir

is <l queseion central ro rhis boak.

Intellectua!!y rhe United States is il! prepared for this challenge. From

1945 tu 1990, American elires and che informed Pllblic wcre unified in their

worldview. The single excepriotl was rhe Vietnam War in ¡es latel' stages.

The Unired States was unified beca use of a comInon, clocumented chreat.

lo meee ehar threar, Amrrican poliey inrellecruals, polítical leaders, and

military officials fas hioned a se ri es of straceg ies wirh rhe eommon goal of



!JTRANSITIONS

1 ' (.,\l D, "1'(, \,( .

(,1

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Figure 1.2 Hierarchics in the International System

'archy is subordinare ro the influences of the global dominant power and the

great power structure. Rel ative power estabJishcs the relationships withill

regional hierarchies and decermines che spheres of lnfluence thai: link 'theglobal '!E.1d regional hierarehies. power Transition anticipares rbar wars . .¿Vjildiffusej ,ownward from global to rhe regiq.n ill hie.rNc hies

up.ward from regional global. For tbis reason, World Wars 1anclII,which were majar co"'Í1Ricrs fol' the great powers of rhe imernational

system, diffused to inelude <lImase cvery regional hierarchy. Limited wars

involving che major global powers, slIch as the wars in Korea, Vietnam,

and Afghaniscan, rCll1aíned con6ned to rheir regions, des pite fears to theconrrary.

POW€f

Defining power Ís central to the theory of Power Transition as relative

power establislle,s the preeondition foL' war and peace iluhe international

is defirted as the ability ro impose on OI persuade fin 0PPO-o; ; t 'to eomply wirh demands.5 In rhe lexicon of Power Transiríon rheory,

power is a combinatioll of three elements: the numDer oE people who can

"'l.o.rls. ane! fighc, t)lúr economic producrivity, and che eHectiyeness of rhepolítical system in eJ\tra..,eting and pooJiog individual cOlltributiollS to Hd-

natío_o:! How much "power " thcs e capabiliries cndow a stace

!

"

rOWtR TRANSITJON THEORY FOR THI' TWENTY·FIRST CENTURY 9

wirh generates the abiliry to proiect influence beyond its borders. Po pula-

tia n is an essential eomponenr bllt cannot alone confer international power,

as can be seen by the relative weakness of Bangladesh, Indonesia, or Brazil.

In order t9 be, !,llly p<¿werflll che For

i his reason developed cOllntries·have far more inf]uenee than their develop-

ing counterpans. That is whv the Unitecl States dominates China today..... .Eut those advantages cannot be realized wirhollr

fined as the ability of to ,extraet ::csouLces to .advance natcienalgO<ils. Politically eapable governments garner relatively more resourees and

thé;eby expand national po\ver. FOl" rhis reason No((h Vietnam defeated

rhe more populoLls and affluent South Vietnam in spite of the United Sta tes'

massive help to the Sourh. \ '

}I t ü 'M f" ..... . ' \ 1 ""\ '",,! , t

Satisfaction and Dissatisfaction " l' '. : <! ¡ ; ". .' ....

clriyinp_decisi?ns . U[ w.ar and peaee is relative

wll h the the

y, eonflict s are generarcd by the

. desire of a nariOll to improve ies political position in che hierarchy. DissaJis-

Jiecl nacions challenge rhe s.tatus quo. Contlict does not occur frequently atthe great power level beca use most of rhese natioJ1s are relatively satisfied

and support the existing rules of che inremarional system. Instead, rhese sta-

tus quo nations seek cooper<lrive solucions to problerns that enhance cheireconomie and security gains. .

Narions :lt the top of the hierarcby (figure 1.3, p. 10) set the rules inplace and are more likely to be more sacisned with chose ru les rhan rhose

lower In che global hierareh)'. This should not come as a sUl"prise since the .

great powers control most of rhe wealrh, enjoy most of rhe prosperity, and

wie!d most of Ihe power in the international system. By definiríon, the dom-

inant power is satis.6ed, ancl specifically so in \the absenc; of open cont'iíct

challenging its dominance. The dominant narion is the defender of the sta-

tus quo. After aU, it crea tes and maintains the global or regional hierarchyfroIn which ir aecrues substamial benents.6

The few clissatisfied JlatiOlJs at the top and many at the bottom oE chehierarchy view rhe internacional system as not .•eqllaLt9rheir cxpectations and long-term interests. They cOIlsider the internationa 1system to be unfair, corrllpt, biasecl, skewecl, ancl dominatecl by hostik

forces. Their ratíonale or grievance may be historical (Germany prior to

WorldWars 1 and 11), ideological (Soviet Uníon), religious (lean), territorial

(Israel), personal (Libya and [raq), Ol" cultural (China). Despite different

perspectives, dlssatlsned nations all view che global status quo as unfavor-

able. They are dissatisfied with established internationalleadership, its rules

and norms, and wish ro .chaQge them. The largest proportion of di'ssatisfied

nations likely reslcles in rbe small power e<ltegory, nationswith mini;nal

jJ- l"> , . .,.. . , : a.. (r, v . 01. ,,(<;/1'-.':.. rt / frnd""tn , '(rG () } \ 1i.? T, . ' · tl ".c. . " I ' ,1

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I'owm TRANSiTJONS

systcm. Oí aH theo,ies ar the internarional level, Power Transirion has chemosr tighrly integra red and inrernally eonsistenr explan<1r ion für.lv.hy .. ho.w,am! when wars ocellf. In addition, ir provides evidenee aboU( the cosrs,intensicy, duration, and eonsequenees of war.

H:lving deseribed the inrernacional s)'stcm and holV ir deals wirll con-f1icr, tbis chaprer continues by . exploring how the rheory rhemajor polie)' issues faeing the \Vorle!. Wirh the srruerural and clynamic COI11-

in place,lS

- ¡;lpositiol1te

cleal wirh rhe managemenrof allianees and internarional organizarions, eo_} liüon PQ)iric:11economy concerns, and rhreats' to international arder - such as nucle 'arp;-;;¡¡feration and loca! wars. finally, rhe chaprer ends wirh a look beyondthe present, based llpon the Power Transirion víew of our future.

lh e Structure of Power Transition TheorryIn a rh eo rctica l sense, Pow er tradirional typecastíng, It is

neith.eu:e.aliS:L.lLo.r..ideaUsr, though some scholars have placed it in che for-Jle g,refer to cal! ir rationalisi. Ihat }e t

ayna!1lic, since it<recognizes tharpo'¡¡cy are auhe ca-re'"of ardis-

pures, Sub;ect ro empi rical tesríng, ir mesheswell wirh objective conclusíonsfrom J:¡istory. Thus, it marr.ies empirical evidence witil tradirionaischolarly researeh and sound policy advice. It i5 a rheory rhar lends icself caa blend of rhe empírica! and poliey worlds.

Hierarchíes

Power 1j'ansirion tÍ1eory- de.scribes a hie¡:ar.chical systeJll, Al! recog-nize the presen ce of this hierarchy ami the relarive distribution of power

.tberein, The disrribution 01 power is uneven and is concentra red in rhehands of a few. A domínanr narion sits at the cap of this s)'stem (see fig-ure 1.1), Thar nation co nrrols che largest proponion of resO llrces wirhin

the system. Yer this natíon, despite out' clescription as clorninam, is !lota hegemon, Ir c3nnot single-handedly. co ntrol the aetions of othcr power-fuI nation .s. Ir maintaíns ícs position as c10minant power by ensuringpower preponderanee ove r potential rivals and by managing the inter-national system Lindel' rules that benefir its allies and sarisfy rheir nationalaspirarions.

As we can see in figure 1.1, rhe eategory of gl'ear powers resides below(he dominant nacion, eaeh hav ing a significanr proportion of rhe power ofthe leader. Currenrly che grea t pO\AJers are China, ]apan, Gennany or rheEuropean Union (EU) in roro, and Russia (assuming reeovery). Their role,in most cí rcumstances, is to share in th e allocation of resouree.s and ro helpmaintain rhe internacional powers one occasionally

nnds nations, such as China 01" India, thar art' flO[ fulJy inr.egratecl juta cheJ

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?üwm TlIANSITION THEOflV fOR THF. TWENTY-FIRST CENTUflV ) 7

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Dominant Power

Great Powers

Middle Powers

Sma ll Powers

Figure 1.1 Classic })owerPyramid '. _ 'J

On occa sion a .potenrial éha lJenger at'ises out ofchis pool. .Cha llengers are ..wjth 80 pe.rcel}r or, more of me

Today, only Chifla porential chal-lengel" to rhe Unired Srares, and then only ifjL rema.i.os.its internacional role. In the dis tant futul'e 1ndía could al50 play this ro le.Dissatisflcd and th e,ir Sp'ppDrtcrs are initíators 01

Beneatb rhe great Q..owers at.e lhe mlddle powers, subs wnt ive sta tesof th é si'ze of Franee, Italy, or Brazil, with resources ,har cannot be dis ··

po.wer ro challeng¿' the clomÍllant powe0 orinrer;;; r.ional conuoL The largest number of narions resides farrher clownthe pyralTlid: smal.L.p,owers with few resources relative to thY-flliddle. :lnd

i '

grea .r powers. They no r2 che dominanI nation'sth e lnrernanonal systel11. - "New research has shown rhar hierarchie s also exisr at regiona.llevels:

1

Wirhin each region, such as Solltií Ámerica or rhe Middle East, thúea reregional h:erarchies, wirh their own se[s of dominant powers, great powers,ancl lesser These regional hierarchies are inf1ueneed by the globalhi.erarchical systcl1l out ca nnor, in turn, control rhat larger sysrem: Figure1.2 (p. 8) suggests rhe relative power distributions in rbe global sysrem and

in .l few reg ional sysrell\s.Note tha[ (he distriblltion of pOWl"f clead)' makes rhe regional hi-

erarchies sub ordinate to rhe global hierarchy. These regional hierarchiesfuncrion in dIe $dll1e manner and operate rile same power rules as

cbe global hi erarchy, In al! cases rhe dominanr power in rhe regional hier-

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12

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_;,$' L _ . POWER TRM'ISITIONS\ . . ! " ..•• ... \. \ \? \A...l,.j I\.I\..t.S"t'O 1.-j ...• .. - v . I

I Joint Status Quo );yalunlion ."s. +.t -fe tI t

SMisficd-Salisficd S.tisl1ed-Dissutisl1cd Diss:1lislicd-\)j""tislicd '

No wurINo disputes Rare low-Ievel, r: warINu dispules l, . , .--.-. .".

,hort displllesg IU

"

Rare, low-Illoderatelscver¡(y¡f¡splIles, sllor! lO

mcdiulTI c.luratioll

Many sub-war dispules,sny duration possible ,

any severÍly possible

Cold War

Moderate amoull! omedium-high disputes,

duration varies

g. duratiQJl, lota; war, .L long

end s in l\llllihilation Iof WWII_)_1

Figure 1.5 War Occurrences alld Joint Status Quo Eva luatiOllSI\ J u e l' + \..

.,

rOWER TRANSITION THEORY FOR THE TWENTY·FIRST CENTURY n

, • I

. , th.e Yis i:2!::...Pf9vided by rhe d.issatisnep We believe this was

che situarion between Nazi Germany and rhe SovietlJnion after OperationBarbarossa, the Gecman invasion of Russia in 1941.

figure LS also provides a glimpse imo re1arions between the UnitedSrates ane! China. lmmediately after \X1orld War E, these twO nations were

at odds and pursued noneoopenitive.strategies. Despire ies relative weak-ness eompared to the Starcs, China intervened in rhe Korean conflict

in ] 950. Following Nixon's historie visit ro China in 1972, relations im-proved ro rhe point that extreme noocooperatioo was reduced. rf rhis

reJarionship, follows the path exemplifled by 13ritisb-German or German-French relati-;ns in the post-World \YIar 11 era, borh parties eould cooperareto their lllutual advantage. On rhe other hand, if differences between

illcreª §e,.rhey are likely foemploy lloncooperativc taeríes .chat in th e,

overall tensions in w_orld As C.h.i!J.¡¡_'U,2'::$SLowar9.J2aritv Stat.t:;.:!, tbe possibility of war inereases.- -.... ...

Allianees

Power Transition argues that the s¡apiLlEY of alli§ rlee§ the.

..l 'o. . . y í of interesrs and the degree of agrecmellt ab.out the status q.\.1O allies.

World War Il can be attnbllted dlrccdy to a change from noncooperative 1\? L_ l'Jations thar share form stable alhances, sueh as

to cooperative interactions as the pair f:om che NATO. j! Llianceuhat arero sansfied-sansfied eoJulllns. che ElLls .Y..lSJ!llC li!<ely beb.E0J5el] ..!Yhenj :Os: e!angeJ..lta t prompte.g theeoaULioo. As COrllmon. wisclol11. indicates, a':ld ...ag.¡:oome.o.u!.lliaP..p,ears. This waS the case with che Allied agreement wirh

natioos dominace. worle! polities. lneeractions produce' a Cold che USSR in World War n. From a long-term dynamic perspectlve, alliancesWar when rhe dissatisfiecl natíon has insuHicient resourccs to direccJy canoor be treateel as if cbey are simply responses to secllrity chreats. hgLl&-

ehallcnge tbe c!omínallt g.Qe. In sueh situarions relarions are srable but con- lasting a!lianees are basecl 00 policy eompatibíLity among .l/le

frontationaL Under of <In, th: pro bahility joint .ar ].tlt.lS _Q.!!2.: ShOL't-term agreemenrsormaJor wars -such as-\'{forld \YIar [ 01' U-I S at ¡ts hlghest. 1 he satlsficd- drawn among oppanenrs ba:<¡ed only on external threats. Because...Ro,«er

dissatisfied dyads seldom cooperare. Cooperation between sllch sra tes is Transition concentrates on long-term dynamies, the relevanr a[[ianee.s 'lreantieiparecl to be cpisodic at best anu is pcrhaps most likely when the dis- stable ancl with few Figure 1.6 (p . 14) illustrares the eonditionssatisfied srate is pereeivcd to be ehanging its evaluation of the status quo. for stable--;nd unstable a/lianees thar can be eseablished within eicher aAn example migbt be provicled by U.S.cSoviet cooperacion afrer 1989. As global or a regionai hierarehy.sueh transi tory situations clarify, the satisfied nati an will either continue Enduring ane! well-formed allíances are formed among nations thatto cooperate because ie accrlles gains - as lS che case after Wodd War II 4 share a common commitment ro the status qua and cooperate \.;Tth eachwith the ,?v'!arshall Plan - or will retreat from cooperation - illu strated other. Indeed, che special relationsbip between che United Staees and Britainby rhe emcrgence of the lron Curta in in Eastern Europe. Thus, eithcr the cannot be understood in any other terms. These two nations bave eoorcli-pajr mov es firmly imo the sarisned-satisned colllmn or the cooperarion nated pulicies even when the gains frorn slIch eHorts were not clear for

diminishes. both sides. Recall that che United Sraces violated tbe principIes of the Mon-Finally, jo i.ntly nations can colInde when they concur abotlc roe Doctrine and a long-standing anticolonial isr poliey when it sidecl wirh

t_heir opposition to the sratus quo. Such similar dissatisfaccioll WaS -che England during the Palkland-1Ylalvinas War. tQUg_analysis at rhe time sug-basis for the alliance between MussoJini and Hider. Alternatively, jointly .\.1IJired s.taces coul.d gainJar more

e!issaeisflecl states engage in noncoopera tion or outright sidemo.\:t

'x.illing tQ

,onni" b","" Ih" "jO<! Ihe imec"";on,r;;-;;;,;g;,me",, ,"ppon. Yo!, d"pitG minim,1 g,iru; Ih, U"itGd S",,,



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rOVVER TR/\NSITlONS

1

.Figure 1.3 Disíl'ibutioll of SlltisfactiOIl

)

influence in rhe internationaI system who ofren consider chemselves thevicrims of more powerful neighbors. Occasional1y a great power - like -. Germany or the Soviet UnioIl - - is irs role and >.

.the -internacional sysJem . .rf 'ir is growiQg ar <l Hlre and exrracring"'re- .

sources J2 ,f_use <lt the nationaJ may become a challs:nger jtothe dominant natíon. . -..i d.. 1'16

Dynamics of Satisfaction and DissatisfactionThe horizoncal axis of figure 1.4 illustrares the relationship berween che sat-isfaction or dissatisfaction oE two councries with either a global or regionalStatus quo. The vertical axis describes rhe type oí relationshíp, by degreeof cooperatíon, wirhin the same dyad oE nations, Jointlu atisfie"cC.l:!.atÍonsinteract cooperatively.. Examples are long"term secu(iry coml11unities, suchas NATO wirh che Uniree! States and ¡tny number of European acrors anelecooomic imegrariol1, as is occurríng wirhin rhe European Union, Deteri-oratían in the degree of cooperaríon implies that one (lf the states maybe becoming díssatisfied. Thus, the dyadic relariol1ship is becoming morecomperitive.

The secancl column, illustnltes che relationship within a sarísfied .

díssacisned dyad. Na clons coopera te Linde! these conditiOl1s when thesatisfied power anticipa tes rilar the other is becoming satisned, This is atransítionaJ stage that should be remporary at besr, The mo se prevaJerlCrelationship is confronrational competition. Given pariry wirhin this col-

------" ,. -

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.

POWER TIIANSITION HIEOIlY ¡.OR THE TWfNTY-rlRST Ct:NTURY "11

Joillt Status Quo Evaluatiou1 S"tislied-S,,('isfiod Salisfi.d-'O;'snti.ficd I

I Securiry comrnunities Competitive-Improving Col!\ls iw partnership.e- g I ECüllomic inlcgraliolJ.<: U

'":"

I omperitivc·Delcrioratirtg Confronlalional

Compclilion..,<:>.,c. "

,EL Hierarchical:;- Reorderillg Wllr Escalaling wal' ie ,yeoZ

Figure lA Degrec of Coopel"lltinn and Joint Status Quo Evaluations

Llrnn, rhe exrreme form of lIoncooperarion i§3 . )<11: rqche SOLu;ce of che chalJenger's dissatisÍacrion,

The final column represenrs interactions between twO dissa risfied na"tions. If two nacions are dissatisfied withrhg status qU 0 for rhe same Feason,thar is, they both would like ro in$tiJL1te the,s<lme changes to the status q.UQ,

.rbe . resuJe may be ". coll·,!..sive partnership in which the dissarisned;¡Jign against the satisijec! coali.tion. However, nations can be dissacis11edwirh rhe status quo for (har is, [hey would Iil<e to insri-

differenr añd pérhaP'fincompacíble changes to rhe status quo. In suchcases rhcir relarions wil! be very nuncooperarive, ane! there may be a high

thae rhey will resort to war.Figure 1..5 (p. 12) summarizes the relationship benveen the probabil-

ity andintensity of conRict berween differenr rypes of dyads. Tbese factorsare interrelated and can reinforce, Ol' defuse confrontations, For simplicity

we center on the security dirnension only, bllr an equiva lenr analysis apply-ing ro economic concerns is the ropic addressed in chapter 5. The reader'shouicl llore rllal in flgure 1.5 Or in rbe text, specific cases are offered asexamples illustrating lhe highlighted relatiooships, None of rhe figures arepresenrarions of empirica] data, although extam empírical research justifiesthe examplcs we

Figure 1.5 otstatJls gIlQI"'?v.'¡lu,<lrig lls .on_ probability) i id_s.ever.itY_Q l confliq. ]ointly sarisfiecl narions are expected

ro be rhe mosr cooperarlve ,lnd ro face the lowesr probabíli¡y of conflicto[n the rare evenr rh,u a conflict shouJd occur, it is anticipared ro be of themildesr severiry. Sarisfled nations do llor engage in conrinuous, lloncQO.per-ativ.e beha\,ior because rhey resolve disputes rhrough negoriaJiqn. Indeed,

the difference in relations between Germany and France before and afeer



12

o.

.g"¡:j::::....e

'"""

es cürrSatlsflcd-Satisfied Salis Ocrl -Dissati, roed Dissatislied-Dis,atisficd

..> ---- 'o wariNo di5pllteS'f; I No warlNo dispules Rare low -Iev el ,

short disputes¡c.oeV

..>

Rare, low-moderatc-•. scv{ri(Y'tlispules , short lO

Illcdiulll uuralioll

¡"'[any sub-war disputes,any dumlioll poss ible,

any severity possible

Cold War

Modernte [11110 11111 0' -

mediulll-high di spules,d\lrationvaries

I long

I Rare. inten se war, long durntioll, (otai war, !e du ra tlon, en s wilh defeat ends in ¡mllihilation

I (We stern fh mt of WWII) Úonl 01' W\VIl)__ '-_______ ...L__ _____ .- 3

.. rt ,U

POWER THEORY fOR THE TWENTY·flRST CENTURY 1 ]

.. ,t!;e yisfih.-Rr ovid ed by the orheu iissa.tisJie.d We belie ve [his wasche siwarion bet'Neen Nazi Germany and the Soviet"Union after OperationBarbarossa, the German invasion of RlIssia in 1941.

Figure 1.5 (lIso provides a glimpsc into reiations between the UnitedSta res and China. lmmediately after World War U, these cwo natÍons wereat odds ane! pursued noncoopcrátive stracegies. Despite its l'elacive weak-ness compared to rhe Unit)'!d Sta tes, China intervened in the Korean confliet

in 1950. Following Nixon's historie visir ro Chilla in 1972, relations im-proved to the poillt rhat extreme noncooperacion was reduced. If thisrelarionship,.follows the parh exemplified by Britísh-German or German-French in the post-Wodd War 1I era, both parties could coopera e

to their mutual advantage. On the other hand, if differences betweenths m they.ar e likeJy themploy_noncooperative tactíes chae in ch e..

will increa-se ovel'all tensions in 'N.odd poJitic§. As C.hj.lJ.<1 _moves

possibility oI war ¡ncreases.

AJlianees

Figure 1.5 Wllr Occurrences and Join1 Status Quo F:valuatíons..

,.( ' <..,.., J Power Tr ans.itiol1 ;¡rgues that stayili ry oí alli,sUlce § the

. . . , l ' .. -' y I of interesss and the degree or agreemel1c abo lit the status am?.!!g alhes.World War 11 can be atmbuced dlrecdy to a change fmm noncooperarive t..:. l _ l'rations thar share WIl! forl11 stable alitances, sLlch as

to cooperative .inceraccions as the pair from .the saris6ed-dissatisfiee! NATO. areto satlsfied-satlsned colllmns. &'lU .s.-tlK. likely to be (hecoa.!J ti 0,0_ 0S commOll ,.WlsdOI1l. Indica tes, .. 31 nd This was the ca se wlth the Al(¡ed agreement wlth

nacions dOll1inatewor!c! polit.ics. Interaccions produce a Cold che USSR in WorldW al' n. From a long-term dynamic perspective, allianeesWar when the dissatisfied nation has insufficient rcsourccs ro directly cannot be trencee! as jf tbey are simply responses to security ¡hreats. k2n &-ch allenge the dominant o le. In slIch situations relations are stable but COll- lasting alliances are based on poliey cOlTIpa,tibility al110ng

Uncler th( ran:: circwnstances ()f clu: pmbabllity ¡oinc c?_mn:,i5ment _or Shorc -term agreementsof maJor wars -slIch rld W<1r 1 or Ir - IS at .rts 11lghest. 1 he satJsnecl- drawn arnong opponents are basecl oIlI}' on external threats.dissatisfled dyads se!dom cooperare_ Cooperation between sllch states is Transition concentcatcson long-term dynamics, the relevant allianceS. <\re

amicipated to be episodic ar best ane! is perhaps 1110st likely when the dis- stablc and with few defections. Figure 1.6 (p. 14) illustrares rhe conditionssatisfiecl state is perceived to be changing its evaluaríon of rhe status quo. f¿I stable -ancl thar can be established within eicher aAn example might be provided by U.S.'Soviet cooperatíon after 1989. As global OI a regional hierarchy.such transitory siruations c1arify, the sarisfied o<1cion will either continue and well-formed alliances are formed thae

ro cooperate beca use it accIues gains - as is the case after \'V'orld War Il .,( a common commitl11ent to che' status quo and cooperate wich eachwirh the Marshall Plan - or will retreat from cooperaríon - ¡Ilusrrared other. lncleed, the special relacionship between rhe Unired States ane! Britainby the emergence of che lron Curtain in Eastern Europe. Thus, either the cannot be understOod in any other rerms. These twO nations have coorcli-pail' rnov'es finnly into che satisf1ed- satis.fied coiumn or the cooperatío n nated policies even when che gains frorn such efforrs were not ciear fordiminishes. both sides. Recall that the United Sta tes viola ted che principIes of the Mon-

Finally, ioi,Ptly dissatjsfied. !l?cions can collude whe,l} they eoncur about roe Doctrine and a long-s tanding anticolonialist policy when it sided with.opposÍtion, to the status ",qLlO. 5uch similar dissatisfaccion was ' the England during [he Falkland-Malvinas War. P_Qli9'_ nalysis at the rime sug-

basis for che alliance between Mussól.ini and Hitler. Altemari-vely,. jojntly gcsted..tha t tl1c Unitee! States could gainJ ar mpre JlxS\!\!R Qnl!1g .

dissatisfied sta tes engage in 9l' ourright \Y"iJl iPJLrg r:e$ ª,rd ilie.

_,onnia be""" ,hey coi'" ,he "'Pyo". Yet, d"pite minimal gaio> ,he United S",,,



o.

.§:;

.....e

')

t .C ::: .

.

POWf;R TIlANSITIONS

GillJ";.i¡ ,: ,: No A liallce; !.!!

TenuOlls Allianee

D EI/dllrj¡¡g Allianee

'l"-t' ( I / ) ' o( , (,. f.r.:;(1

Joint Status Quo Evaluntioll )

Figure 1.6 Allianees aucl Joint Status Quo Evuluations

favored Britain beca use ir anticipated thar in the funlIe Britain woukl recip-

rocate. This was an accurate assess rnem. Brirain has been an lIIlwavering

) ' pOVVER lRi\NSIT!ON TH EORY fOR TriE TWENTY-F!ltST CENTURY

High

'"":o'-''-'d

:;:

...<;

:<)

"g"""

Low .. ;:' . ;:; .-.... ,' - , .. . .-, . ,'

Diss alisfi ed Nemrul.Ioin! Status Quo ¡¡:,'alllatioll: Llefcllder »lId Po!enlilll Ally

[ '- 1 Jswb!" ..rIJiallce [:, ,' ( " tl 5mb le -r/l illJlce

15

Figure 1.7 Allianee Fonnation, Status Quo, and the Probability ofWar

supportel' io the Unired N ations, the most important defender a nd par- , ,ricipant in U.$.-led actions against Iraq following Deserr Srorm, ;][Id our of m]-srrongest ally dunng the Kosovo crisis. G:ooperarion and trl!sr ¡iated and lIU)j nca inecL by che polic.)L goals_ NATO,

- -,,--. - for wastormed afeer World War Il, aided inpa¡:-tGy the Mar-

..1hat do nat share a common view of the status guo may still , sh a ll Plan bUl also by the shared goa ls imprínted on (he vanquished by an

:nter in t.o but t?ey ¿'ictuñ1 l;at \A'<l-J [ OCCUPYn g force. ltj s for" rhis. . tl!,atthe enemy 01 enero)' IS rny lnen d accurately descnbes short-bved al- (¡ \' j ; ''; " . _

hances of convenlenCe. For example, dUfmg World War.II rhe Umted Stdtes .J orher autocraC1es.and the USSR joincd forces to wage War against Germany, onl)' ro turn on ':\L" , abQY_ _O,IL45-clegree li-n e..are crea.red .io J he .,iliadow

each other once the Nazi threat was defeated. Powe r Transirion theor" an- - of war N.atioE§Jl1a.ximize_th.ciU:_l ati ve

ticipares that such al liances wiJl persisr onl}' as necess';;y; ;:;d' w.ill pow! .;· T,héUsSR Allies enteredchanges In tbe sh orr,tenn calculations, AlIiances ineo such an agreement to defeat NaZI Gcrmany dunng World War JI, but

between nations rhat do not share- COn 1JnO;¡ pret'eréñées but nevertheless that alliance d,d nor tase beyond the war and eveutuaJly mutated into open

cooperare are far less srable and are. coosequently easy tO For ex- 1.)" ¿ } hostilir)'. Likewise, rhe Russian-German alliance lasted ooly a few years

ample, the alhance bet,wecn the Urllted Sta res ,and Saudl ArabIa 1S O j \ ' , un ,!l HIt.ler (hose ,tú challe,nge ,he , • tf r- 4 ' , fínor based on s,hared preferences, }'ec econOlmc loteractJons and regIonal rl;C\ Yh/ f f ;," J." !-:X! I v.-'<"C · I. f ( .. f '" X f q,w ) P t.-J ,S f Vt

goals preserve lt. The comm1tment ro defend Saudi Arabia fcom potencial \jtt..;.,t f af Al/lis (f..:J"Jharm froro lraq is credible. A similar commitment in the evenr of conflict 1 1- (, tVl€.-1.--L- \ ynalnlcs O Power

with Israel is far fess Iike1y. fT IFigure 1.7 shows the po temial contribution oC alliance members and

rhe re sulting stability o f sllch alliances in the face of war. 7 AUÍ<wces.esLab ·

l¡ne condition

.flows from the combinarion of a posirive valllation oí che status quo and- ..--' .... ....

--

Power Tnmsiüo.n postula tes rhat a counrr function of P..9pu-

L1JÍon, productiviw, an .d 20 by

¡hese three key elements, each w jch a Population

,ize is relacively fixed anélOllFícult ro change in rhe snort tem1. Economicgrm'Ltb changes_ l11ore f<lJúdlY .$l lli! ff:cts power in rhe,

/



,':1

·'01

t' 1

16 ,. J - '- ... ... - ' • , . j'VO ' - POWER TRANSITIONS' tj \ '

"\.... '. , e • •naJ[y, capacity, which be highly volatile, affects p-O\'l.er j{L\.,heshoJ't

meas.ure. in

,thls measure accurately fOI

. óllCcamc ,oE. codlIcts w¿¡ge,Lamor].gJu Uy . lJniJke

alternate meaSllres ir accounts wirb equivalenr accuracy far che ourcameof conflícrs between developed contenders and developed and developing

'A l1umber of competlllg conceptualizations of powel' or national capa-

bilities are available, bue mose fajllli..UlVin t;'; O'racC'css ro me<!SLm: llle.l1.C

and accounting f(ifr djñ anilc The mast wi dely llsed measure ín- '

';orld poJitics is an economic, and military COI11-

ponen es. National capa,biliry measures are effective in ranking rhe relationsbetween natJOns but [ad to captllse . Q change.

Economic Growth

The foundation for economic growrh describecl in figure 1.8 is adaptcdfram CLlcrenr and f!}ture capital acclll"1.1l!!!'LtÜ)J)

purpose is effectively reflected and measurecl bydomestic product (CDP) pe rp e ira . P?.8ic.:ll detailed below, is

abi lity of governments ro extraer resources fIOll.l .0.g rder

to advau(.e the policy goals 9(the governmen_. Nore thar nations wirh lim-ited GDP and low political capaci ty may fall inco a "poverty trap." On the

other hand, as economic growth starrs, prompted by changes in politicalca pacity, rapid econolllic growrh is achievecl. For this reaSOIl,

output change are concentra red among developiog, societies, When Ilatíons

achieve relatively high levels of cap ital accumularion and maintain políticalcapaciry ae average rares, Olltput growth stab ilizes and produces susrainedurowth ar moderate leveis. /o

Endogenous growch rhe charaereristics of che stages of

develop;entÜrlgiñ'áll'YPropósed by Organski;reiITfO¡:Cing rhe reñets ofPower Transition.

1oEndogenous growth theory shows that

cal \Vit/¡ crev;¡ope.dmaintail1 steady growth races, buc will l10e allow them to remain ahe.ad ofrapiclly developing cOllntries. The dynamics of endogenous growth suggestthar che ' distribucion of capical and labor ae ross socieeies will force out-puc ,f.onverg€-nce societies with relacively low rates of per-eapita

GDP wiJl, if chey avold the poverty trap, enjoy high growth rateo Thus,efficieIH discríbution of reSQurces in marker ecul10mies eventually will ]cad

ro among alLeconomies wich growcn.

Figu re 1.8 ¡¡lustrares poss ible growth paths fol' societies ar differentstages in their economic growth. ' J witb. lev- '

els of política] capaClty have .Qlfferent growtb Natioos with

I\'\,POWER TRANSITION THEORY FOR THE TWENTY·FIRST CENTURY

" Oola n" d {rCrowch I High

__.".o...

.:"'..6oel

'"'"(; TrfH1Si(¡0I1!\1

t': Growth

0.- D)'n'Hllks

'"'-<.J

:>-

r::

¡;;

Low Poli lica lCapacily Trajeclory

Poverty Trap -

Cnpíln Gross DOlJleslic Product

Figure 1.8 The Endogcnous Growth Trajectory

17

45°

high poll rical capacity grow rapiclly ane! achieve sustained growrh muchea}'lier. On the other hand, low polítical capacity gove.rnments maintain

rates (Jf economic growth and conrinue to flirt with the possibiJiry oí

hlling inro rhe poverty trap. Figure 1.8 also illustraces the distincrlon be-

tween the direction uf rhe growth path (indicated by the arrows locared 011 '

the growrh trajcctories)_ CouIHries are either headed inco the poverty trap(rhe lowcr lefe comer of rhe figure) or roward susraínecl economic growth(the llpper right comer oI che figure). Fol' the path that leacls to a povenytrap, political capacity ane! inicial physical OI human capiral is so low th atthe economy will be callght in a low-income developmenraJ trajeeror}', Thatis, when there is a pauciry of physical ane! human capital, birth rates wil!

be so high char human capital deaccllmulates over generations. As a result,Ollrput will contraer.12 .

/ Power Transition shows that the shifts in power associated wirh such( dynamics have seriOLIS consequcllces foc stability. The dynamics 01niLtioral

,PAw,e..r...growth .canno.t be cha-nged dramarically by in.ternatio.nal interven"i rhe long term, political factors profllpt cllanges in physical 'am:l

capital driven by technology ane! lead IO economic convergence in

\ per-ca pita terms. When socieeies with similar populations are at differentstages in rheir growcb paths, one dominares rhe other. When they are ae

the same srage; they aehieve parity. From {he perspecrive oE war, the mos{

pOíentially dangerous co ne!it ion in rhe incernatiQnaJ system occurs when a



')POWER TRANSITIONS

sociery <'Ir the gIO?::I.LliyarcbY, rhªt ha,sP?ssedEY : .9Pjdly .gr,o..w"Íng na,cion

mucJl J argeepQpuJ §!eion. Such un Mcrtakíng gready increases rheIjkelihood oE majar War. fndeed, rhe srory oE che Wesrern world can be SUI11-

marized effectively by exploring rhe overraking berwecn, firsr, France andEngland, ehen England and Germany, and more recently rhe unsuccessflllovertaking by the USSR oE rhe Ul1ited States (see chapter 2).

Despice rhe technological advantages of developeclnilrjons, chaUengershigh 15rowth rates

01 convergence. The high dífferential in per-capiea GDP berween the- Urucú! Srates and China cleady is a temporary condiriol1 ¡'har aCCOU[][$ for

the currenr substancial power advantage of the Uniced Srates. Butcan annual ecol1omic grow0. pool'ly withwhicnare i'i.vo ro t'hreefillles higher. Short oE panirio-;;-ó;' decenrralizarion,China eventually will become the worJd's !argest econo111y, This processisno different rhan che severa! overrakings of rhe United Kingdom by Gel'-many. Note thar in two occasions würld wars were fought, but folIowingrhe last conflict, the EU emerged. produce warbut )':_9 WEYs tb e struc.cu re These dyn amics haveimport¡¡nr policy ramíficarjons for U.S. -Chinese relations, 2nd fmure rela-tions among China, rhe Uníred Slares, 2nd eventually India (see chaprers6 ancl 7).

Popa/afian

,Of rhe three power v,!ríables, opOpllJaüon che , sine, 8La ,nP!l. toxpower Population is rhe poremial resource pool [IJat a nation can

.- begin -ro mobiLize rhroLlgh economic development. Productivity can be al,.te red ayer rhe long [un and relarive poljeical capacity can be changecl in rhcshorr mil by rhe imposit ion of new, more effective polítical controls. BU[without a large population, a narion cannot hope ever ro become eithe)'

a grear power Ol' a dominant nacíon. Popul,ation nor identical ro greator dominant power sra tus, bur, if mobi!ized inro a pl'O( fucrivefor use at rhe u;-\tio'),allevs:!, la,!'.ge_po-púlúioñ's offe¡' cilÚt' rnous P9-

t enrial resources. Of the (hree varia'b¡es, is the leasr suscéptible-...... . . " " " '. . -- . ._- . .-

change. GoveIlrnrents can íntervene economically ro alter l1<lrionalproducrii;;Ey and politically to enhance rhe relative political capacity sitie O[

')

l\-.

POWER mANSITION THEOllY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTUflY ) 19

vidualJy for dominance in ,he global híerarchy. Despice rheir economicproduccivity, rheir popuJarion base is no longer sufficienr te compete "vithnacional populations rhe síze of rhose in {he United States, Russia, China,01' lndia.

A second aspect of popularion is critical in lInderstanding how powergrows in rhe intemarionaJ system. As figure 1.8 (see p, 17) suggests, ma-ture developednatiol1s have sri¡bJ\,-,..J)9FulatipQs. have fully

lIndergone . he demographic transition and are unlikely to expand -theirTheir 0;11y (Ol' growrh is_ brOlJ.g¡¡Jm-and rhrough

chIS clemographlc riansltlon. 'Some natlOl1S, slIch as hance, Japan, andev'cn lraly, may weU have declining po.puJations in this century, pevel9pingf!,!ltigns, ,S1Il hancl, ....Pe

.• yeaes or _so_:.:.'enAs implied in figure 1.8, capable govern-

ment creates an envÍronment conducive to a demographic transirion, thusboosting human capital and economic growth. Governmems in develop-il1g narions (hat can increase government capaciry \ViII take conrrol oE thepopulation expansjon, acce/erate investment in human capital, and anain

self-sustaining growth.\X'hile deveJoping narions are able to reduce popularions rhrough a

combinaríon of polítical imervcntion and econornic prosperiey, ir is veryhard to innease a popul '! tÜm---Ín

( , <orle 'L economic";'Vl\:, The mostimportanr ím¡:ilication of such power clynamics is that it is very

(p,,"obkI6 f O\ /c ( -

1j :!

difficult ro reverse a power ovenaking. Once France lose its premie' po-sition in Europe after Napoleon, ie couJd no Jonger challenge Britain andGermany beca use both hacl the of far larger popl1lariolls, Like-wise, England and Germany cOllld no longer compete for wode! leadershipwhen theí! colonies underwenr rhe industrial revolurion and became ¡nde-

p ...\- .1\

. 1, I• *'T'1.{

pendent. Neither could confrone rhe more populous Russia and the United

Sta tes,In rhe long run,che jl.lrt<¡ dy prosperolls Unüed States cannor remain ehe

domiI]ant ü{ the internarional systemllecau;e Go th.bave popüla rioJlsjoli) J inlJ;s] a.1Úr. This population gap cannot be bridged

p by a developed society. Therefore, becausc of the COl1straínts rhat stable-' popuJ8cions impose on rhe expansion oE power in deve/oped societies oncethe equacion, bur in rbe shorc terITI , popularion growch rates are difficuir ro !.\

manage by governmcnt policy.Ll \; Asían iJations modernize 3nd overtake che Unired States, no new transirionsare anticipaced. H rhe current roseer of nations remains in ¡'JJace, it appearsChina and eventuaUy Indiawill become furure dominant nations. Unlessfailecl empires regenera te, no new subseqllenr overtakings will take place

The síze oE popularions ultimately determines rhe o(

a natíon. PopuJarion is rhe element rhar determines in che long run which-' rt:i 't'it lS- will remain major powers. France, England, ane! Germany were

great powers when the resr of rhe world had nor jointd the industrial

revolution. Today rhese n<ltions no longer can hope to challenge indi-

eJ.,

S since no exísting narions wil! have the potential to chaUenge ei[her China01' India and

I /---1

'- C \"<2 v ' J I · , • v,r- . : l

"



1

,:,.';

20'Ó 0 o POWER mANSITION5

Polítical Capacity

The final component of nacional power is relative polítical capacicy. Re-membering (h at relative political capacity IS' the abiJity of governm"C r ts tú

extraet reSOUfces from rheir poplllarions, rhe qucstion is, ">2lidLcuuntxieswifl be ableJ o [ranslate rheir economic vitality into national power? Focus-ing on the endogenolls growth trajectory in figure 1.8, ler LIS examine ¡hepossibiliti es.

Countries at the boctom of this growrh trajectory with low levels ofrCSO LlI'CCS from tht:ir pop-

.lllations, sinee individuals consume musr if nor aU resources to SllppOrt

-daily existence. As na[ions develop, however, it does not lIel:essa rilyfoJIow that,¡¡ower increases either dil'ectly or proportionaJly. Among- low

nations, there i5 sllbs'tanriaJ in abilityto extract reSOllrces. Nations with SHong political concrols have le ver-age amI can mobili2,e potemial populatíon resonrces into actual nationalpower.

The Viemam War provides a gone! exarnple of che differences betweenpotential and ac tual power. By virfue of effecrive polítical controls, NorthVietnam extracted a higher proportion of resnurces from ,\ smaller basepopulation during the conflicto Sourh Vietnam, with weak political cor1tl'olsyer a largel' econorn.ic and dernographic base, could noto Even substancialU.5. assÍsrance and clirecr rni[itary intervention in slIpport of th e SomhVietnamese eould not give Souch Vietnam rhe edge.14

lior counrries wirh large populations and improvi ng productivity on chesteep portian of th e trajectory, relative polir icali apac itythe s ruCÍ;:d variable fOI hO\y -pow_erful becorn.es . For example,should lndia, with a population oE 1 billion, increase its per-capita produc-tivity and then efficient!y extraer resources frOI1l irs po pulacion, ir wOllldbe on a trajectory ro evenrually chailenge international leadership in thelarter half of che twenry-first century. On the orher hane!, if Trae¡ were to

undergo economic moclernization and increase productivity, chat natíoneould only aspire ro chalJenge for dominance in its regional hierarchy dueto the relatívely small Iraqi population of about 20 milIion.

Countries at che rop of the endogenolls growth rrajecrory have lTIobi-lized mQst of the population ahd cconomic resources in theír soc iety andface increased eosts for any marginal addition. It is physically impossi·ble, fol' example, ro dOllble the extraction oí resources in Sweden whenthe gü vernmem already takes more than halE of the available gross do·rnestie producto 5ubsequendy, rhese mature societies expand slowly bothin econornic anel polítical development e!ue in large pan ro technologicaladvanees. The lens of Power Transition allows a sc halar or to

thar poli'tic; l and econornic changes are inescapably linked.

I

)'\ :?" )

.J

\i,

V';.

'3 l

-

c'- 12k..¡ I l '

POWER TRANSITION THEORY FOR THE TWENTY-FJRST CENTURY

Why Conflict Arises in the International System

Overtaking

2'1

Most theories explain how and why conflicc emerges in che internationalsystem only in the mose generalized sense. Power Transirion, however, haslogical srructures Jinking the core iSSlles oj conJlLct io sys-tern-: tll'é timillg, ir!.ÍÜillion,_coscs, Assuch, it is unrivaled in scope and reach. It nor only offers an explanarion ofwhy connicr OCCllJ'S, but also describes ane! anticipa tes the characteristics ofco nflict and provides advice 011 how to manage conflicto

Two cWine rh;ef al the,Fto.babilin QLW t._Jh e first ¡mri, . Ir. TransitioIlexists in a hierarehy when a gl ?-: ' wer becomes a potential

80 persent (Jf rhe or the -:domioant: na-.Rm1,. oE the dol1lin ántnatiQ.,rLby

The secone! concegt is m'ertaking, piccurecl generically in figure 1.9(p. 22¡-:Ovtttaking occurs when

Ja ru ing power enters the steep growth

portion of che enclogenous growth trajectory and develop$. ec.o.Q.omically at

ª .. z:: ertaking process, risingachieves p<!riry either through increasecl prodllctivity and/or politicalc2.pa cJ..rU .nd is the domil1ant"nation in of relativepower. This evenr grearlyj w::xe.as_.s óf conflict.

Figurel.9 di S'plays ihe dynamics oí Po; ; r Trañ5ifiOñ1)rillustrating therelative power relationships of a challenger and dominant natíon over time.The solid line is the power trajectory of the defender/dominant power, andthe e!otted tine is che power trajectory oI che challenger. Duríng the earlytime period, rhe dominant power has unambiguolls power preponderallceover the potential challenger, a superiority rhat is recognized by boch sides.Note that of the dominant power is relativeJy sJow comRaredto thaJ 01 chal lenger b_ecallse ·the dOill..in,ant power has a ma-

Under such cone!itions, war i5 highly unlikely; 'the expectedolltcome is pea ce. When a E,Qltn tia:l ...

hierarchyEltering..the-exis.tiQg regime aLldj rwuJt:],,...ÍJ:.cb12Qses

This type oE structura! coodicion is depictee! by relations in the Koreanpeninsula toda)'. Despite its isolation and dissatisfactÍon wich (he exist-ing arder, North Korea can no longer challenge 50mh J(orea as it didin 1950. Although both nations árglle that division is llnaceeptable, theyhave not recoociled governrnental structures and conrinue ro threaten eachorher across rhe demilitarized zane. Peace is preserved beca use 50mh [(o-rea now holds a preponderant aclvantage over the Nonh and could compel¡he North in case ofwar. Indeed, assurning thar thírd pa rties -such as [he

Unjted Sta tes, China, or RlIssia - are not involved, ·any confLict on the Ko-

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Figure 1.9 A Tl'ansition with a High Probability of War

rean peninsula wOlltd be short ancl would terminate wirh the imposition ofSourn Korea's preferenees over tbose of the North,

Ip.Jigure 1.9.rhe ve power

gap wirh tbe dominan t pariry. While the dOJ]linanc20wer remains superior, irs abiliry to influenee che ehallenger diminishes. Inrhe ione of parity, bach the ehallenger and the dominanr power rea li ze thar

an overtaking wil! cake waf

wagedexist-J,hacis., gccur whl;l1.JD.e ehallenger

, conclitiof!1or pariry, ang overtaking l!lay .l.1 \é.cl,:¿Lmui)iet. Asngl11'e 1.9 illustra tes, war is rhe likely ouccome when the challenger is dis-

satisfied and overrakes the defender. Recafl that Germany and Great Brjtain

foughe long and biccerly in War/d Wars 1 and 1I preciscly bec2use Genm1l1ybad ovenaken Britain prior ro , eaeh war and beca use Germany's lea dersanricipated in each case th_ t ha.i<l _air oí

i!}J%e Qf fQrg;s. In .overrakillgq¡rovide che fol' coo fljeebeca use the chalJenger anricipaces a fail' chance of winning. m.cs.<;"p_<U.-

iry, evel1 accompanied cause of conflicr.Parity and overtaking muse beminatíon ro change the status q-Lw- anc{' its illcur h__ b. __ . _ ... _ . .,;0 ,., _ ••

sign ifica nc risks in order ro alter che rules of the ex isting hienuc hy. From

, rhe defender's perspeccive, conditions for war are generated by [he inabiliry

to persuade che challenger th ac ¡[S iOlerestS will be incorporated into the

exisring regime along with relatee! changes in power structures.

i.

') POWER TRANSITION THEORY FOR THE TWENTY·FIRST CENTURY

..<J

G""

Defender

P/'epondel'antPati/y

\ Overtaking

,

e/¡aJlellgerPrepo/Ulel'llllt

Challenger

, SatisfiedL - - - - - - Defe nder

23

!_ (, I,,:·v · Time

Figure 1.1 O A Tnmsitíon with a Low Probability of War

Parity and overtaking increase the probabilicy rhat there will be an ini-

riaeion oE co nfli cc. Eut, as illLlscrated in figure, 1.10, the actual overtaking..may be eaceful. This was [he case a f the Uniree! States and Crear Bntain

ar t e end ot the nineceentb centllry when boch nations were satisned, The

United Sra tes' overtaking of Great Britain did nor (hreaten [he srrueture

of rhe exisring internarional order, In-deec!, the rea son that the c10minant powel' do es nor prcempt while ir holcl s

preponderance over a poremial challenger is rhe hape fol' reconciliarion of

differences. If [he dom jn ant power ane! challenger were ro realign prefer-

ences ove r time - as the Uniree! Stares and Great Brirain e!id foflowing rhe

War of 1812 - a preelllv,riye<\

ttaGk wOlJld not be because sa t-\. ,i.s.6e e!

Bominanr -- --' 1.r - ! Ks_[aces Power Transi!.ion _ r] _aseord witb theL.2E.1 QYJe1..lJ:.al)si Úgn,

is si milar iey 01 governmenrs' foreign poliey goals across time thac- Jos.te.rs sacísfaeritln with [he status quo, Since the dominant power ere:

. , _ tites ilie global s¡ aws'qu'o in wa yS'laro rable ro it5eH, it foJlowsi':,,, '( \ that sim ilarly co nstiruted srates wiU also benefit froIn rhe sra'rus qua. TI1US,

, ',O'i 's tates witb economicªne! politica! instj cutions sim ilar (O those of che e!omi-_l..I/\Q. p.!ver lt!ze,[ y \;; 11 be satisficd with the Status quo.

»:i[h othcr , risfl ed)and Democra tie nations appear ro gener-

ate anc enjo)' 11 g 1 degrees of sarisfacrion, arguably beca use cbe dominant

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Figure 1.11 A TransítiOIl with a Very High Probability of Wal'

power is a democracy., sif!lilarity y¡jrUJ D..e

state thus leads liS to anticípate the existence of a ebno.Cl'atic peace. 16

'Figure 1.11 illustrares rhe of rwo equatly matched d.issatisfif dpowers <lt Ocr;;:- a circum Stance s b_ar .ha s not at the global level

natiorls are ur pariry and face an impendingovcrtaking, neirher is satisfied with rhe existing status_qJJ.O_ªP..9

Such conditions mayhave been descríptive of rel ations berween Egypt and Israel before rhe es'tablishment of a regional status quo in rhei[ pan of rhe Middle Ea se. ln

such a case either side could iniciare war beca use both are dissarisfied wico

the eXlsting status quo. These rare conclirions are che most dangerolls in theinternational system. Wars are rhe expe¡ tcd ¡

\ , \. . <, ,. ' ,- \. v.. ./ h. j ' v" 1 • " ,. r I \' J\..t.\, ' ' ' '- v . "" '?'1

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The Initiatíon of War , ,

Power Transition is a powerful predicror of waI in global aud regional hi-cQl1f1u,S: l).ce of parity

one At the globallevel followÜígWorld War Ir, 110 natío.n has achíeved parity wirll 01' rhreacened ro overcakethe Unired Sta tes. Consequently no great power wars have occl1rred. Be-

rween 1850 and 1950, on che orber hand, Germany overtook rhe UniredKingdom ¡ust prior to World War 1 anc! again just prior ro World War n,

thereby isolating this narrow period of opportunity for global conflicrY

1\ \f.

e

POWER TRANSlTION THEORY FOR THE TWENTHIRST CENTURY 2S

A similaI process takes place within regional bierarchies. For example, thecSnflict between Iran and Iraq) ovcrt?kíng of ha n, inthe wake of rhe 1980 collapse of Ibe I!'.E.3. ian.- 'Power relations are an important detenninanc of conflict when thereare rhe status qua bllt not a material con-sideration wben sllch differences are ni iñi'm-al. Nations can reduce the

of war by reducing their T1iiSiSlYy'ÍÍo easy.

OissatislactiQ;l Ts ... ba se'd on- 'jJ(;'rccived real differences between cbe pop-uJations in councries. A simple agreement will noc nu!lify such effects.Populations have long memories. For example, it took time and majorchanges in government for European narÍons to accept that Germany was110 longer a threar to their exi stence. Leaders are constrained by theseendming preferences of the popularions beca use they have to respond te

rheir desires of their public suppoJ'ters to mainra.n polítical power. The ac -ceptance of Germany as pare of Europe has progressed fai" more amongEU members than in the East European countries. Moreover, drama ticchanges in rhe structure and behavior of the Russian leadership currendyfall under peJsistent semtiny in the Unired States. 'fhe imporc q,r .t p.oint here.i.Lth.a.t.iJ cou"ntrie? disappear, .cooperarion rather rhan

becomes the rule.NatlOnTU FfV/o: hlte"rn;?te eQ,smesJabijity, an9In international where confrontation is

! the rule, nations tend toward dererrence, which is a rhreat te respond in

kind against anticiparecl challenges from ao opponenr. Clearly such nationsalso employ satisfaction,builcling measures, but tbey rely more heavily 011

rheír ability to increase cosrs to reduce probability of war . This is rhe storyoE the Calel War between the Uníced Srares ami rhe USSR, which endeclnor with reconciliatíon between these two opponents, bU( because of checollapse of [he USSR. Ultimately, when a ver)' dissarisfied natían cannorresolve in; diHerences with rhe defender, they wil! resort ro war. This wasrhe case of Nazi Germany and England in 1939. When a power transition

ir ta,g,es a single dissatisfied a coñilict.;hile irtakes nariOjl s.... rO .preserve

In the nuclear envíronment, consideree! i.n further detail in chavter 4,",: of '("ar beca use costs Leade'rs

wiU think fa r more carefully befare initiating a conflict that has the PCl-

tential for enormOllS casualties than in the case of a war with very limitedconsequences. Thus, when two satisfied nations acquire nuclear weapons,there i5 litde potential for conflict regardless of power relarions - as wasche case between Britain ane! France after 1945. When a satisfied natíon ac'quires nuclear weapons, as did (he UnÍted Sta tes cluring the Cold War, theproba bility of war decreases and remains low uncíl a díssatisfied challenger.reaches parity. When a dissacisfiecl nation ; uclear weapons , as did

rhe USSR after 1950, OI when jointly dissacisfied nations do so, as is rh e



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Figure 1.13 The Timing

Being reJuctant ro take OIl a poteminl challenger when ie has clear supe-riority, che dominanr power is even Jess like!y to do so when rhat challengerbecornes more powerful. Having passed up rhe opponuniry to rid itself of

<In irritélnt early on, ir now Bnds char che costs oi war againsr a more power-fui challenger are inueasingly high,12 Once_rbs ,dominanr couner)' sets the

rules .at the it.s actionsa re inhibited by <lclherence to die-status quo that it has devised,

. - ---The Timing of War

Underscanding the logic provides a perspective on tbe rirning

of war, Wars between great powe occur ar specified til!!.c:syliehin the pe-Examined from t lttó ther side of the ca in,

figure 1.13 shows thar greardearly superior dominant powe([mbalances of power preserve rhe peaceConditions of relative equaliry orBalancés are · of (?otentiª-I. ..!:Y§!.r,

original presentarian of Power Transition postula red thar wars are

iniriared before che actual overtakíng but after che challenger had enteredrhe period of parity,lJ conckd!i rhar wars)Y...QllkLoccllr

Power Transirion scho.lars cOntinlle to debate this

question. The most receor research indica tes rhat rhe probabiliry in-

creases prior ro the overtaking but the of añ"ywareñatd oes occur

in chis early parity period is diminished, After the overtaking, che probabil-

-

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POWER TRANSITION THEORY FOR TIjE TWENTY-FIRST CENTU¡¡Y

l it .... , ,oJI'! oC. rí" \1 iC'r¿ tr

Higo

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Ch<111enger

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Low 1__ -- - ; _____

Time

Figure 1.14 The Sevel'ity of War

ity of war deereases, but the severiry of war increases,b.lg..udy (such as World Wars 1 ancl

II), whi!e more frequenr eonfronratÍons of Jesser magnitude occur beforeovertakings,25

lLo(\ +:-, JThe Severity of War

The severity of war depends on the riming of the outbreak of conflictduring the parit)' period, As figure 1.14 shows, if a challenger miscaJcu-

lates and initiates war early in the parity period, ir faces significanr risks.g:tLll1tl:y .h.as-ere;¡red _3..Jl!:2l!g

quendy has enorm,.Q,Lls.,resotHces ofLt.he -chalknge. [n

thisj iñi'acQi1""W3r wilt b_ ilie. éra lJeng,er but nGt as coSi ly

for che international under -orher scenarios, -Later in-.fhe-par-period, ho ,:yey.er, c.ondLri9ns.-haJie-Gh-aflged, Fírsr, rhe challenger has

grown more powerful than the dominant coulltry_ Seeond, the dominantnation's allíance system will ha ve weakened appreciably as sorne supportinggreat powers ¡:ecognize d1éhiñd arnerlcáTshift occurring in che intemationalsys tem and begin ro decouple from the dominant power, if nor realigncomp!etely with the challenger, The shift in tbese (W 0 conditi011S suggeststhat wars in rhe parity period following be intense andcost1y, World Wars 1and n followed power transitions aS ancícipáredWRilethe -Pranco-Prussian War of 1870, for example, occurred at rhe time of

overtaking.1';

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Figure 1.12 Relati ve Power, alld SatisJactiou, and the Pl'obability ofWar

case for Pakisran and India today, rhe probabiliry of war increases as thcyapproach pariey. Mutual assured desrrLIcrion (MAD), cherefore, tronf the

power cransirion perspectivcis a renUOllS condition rllat should be avoidedrather rhan encouraged .

'"SatisfactiOf/, and Co',¡flicl

A summary of rhe argurnenrs we have made thus fae can bes e be visualized

by displaying the between relative power, degree oi s..atisfac-tion,_and_rhe -p.r.obabilit)' oC conflicr (see figure 1.12).19 Note that as an

; ' ; ;[aking occurs, if the ch;ll;nger' becomes satis,ried, rhen rbe probabil-íty of war declines precipitously, sometirnes leading te integratían. The new

preponderant pOwer becomes a defender of che status quo under stable con-dirions, as we indicaree! was the case between Englane! and the Unieee! Sraces

at rhe beginning of the l'wentierh cenrury. In those cases whefe che defenderfails ro accommodate during rhe overraking and cbe challenger conrinues LO

be dis sat isiied, [he proqability of war is very high. Further, thi s probabiíityincreases after parity, leading ro él very long period ';vith a high peobabilicyof war. This wa s the case between Gcrmany and the United Kingdof1l duro

ing eh,chrst haH of rhe twemíerh cenrury. Tlle choice now facing the Unirecl

..

rOWER TRANsmON THEORY FOR 'fHE TWENTY·F IRST CENTURY 27

States ¡¡nd Ch ina is ro avoid the trap oE dissarisfacrioJ1 und transicion, whichgrcatly raises rbe ¡:¡robabiliry ot war.

fo!_s:onOicL Bue as weshow aBoye, evCñ 111 mF1d<l-¡n..the rdln nor eX,R.lall1 why sorne ove rtaklllgsresult in war and vihy others are the rhírcl-Y'a.riab.le

ro rhe calcularian,Great powers engage in conflict over preferences ane! policy differences

¡lne! (hese srem from a country's sen se af satisfacrion. Sarisned narions arenot expecred ca cngage in conflict even iI tbere is an overtaking amongrhem .A peaceful transfer of responsibilities and leadership is antici.parecl

due ro the .a nQ ,?ecurit)' .gruJJs...tl1 e.y- 9€Q;:.e,..fmffi lllter.FlMi.o.nal

ysteñ;'-On I'he orher hancl, a dissatisheJ challenger overcalcing a domi--!4-,n:.1Jlt country calculates rhar irs prospeces for victory are increased by ies

rapid grawrh in paweeBeing wich the the

IeMlers of rhese nations are condirioned to seek changes to rhe status quo.Parity, cherefore, brings díein opportunity. And rhey are likely to se ize tharopportunity ar some point in ehe ove rtaking periodo Dissatisfiecl challengers

fu!y ro iniriare

A challenger coñsi.¡ med with gríevances ma)' seek redress early in rhe

parity perioe! only to find irs power and allíance system ins ufficienr roachieve success. A moee cautious havlt!g ove rtaken rhe domi-nant rhan a redress of ;;aTSe ek

fO'Csr"\hlish an internacional sysrem lInder its' awn chis wil! givc

rise ro a war of greac ferocicy. Ir should be poinred out rhar sratistically forwars among all srates, iniciators have \Von rheir wars far more freqllently¡han defenders, buc in major wars chis nend is reve rsed as allies join the

defender of rhe status quo ro ensure their $Llrviva1.20

One quesrion rhar needs lO be poseel is, wh)' doesn'c a dominant powerralce advanrage of its enOrmou s power advamages, prior ro parir}', to ini-

ciarr war againsr its real or potenria l cnemies? The resrs wirhche hierarchical system establishecl by rhe dorninanr power. The dominant

natian has createel a syscern wirh standard rules and nOIms provicling eco -nomic and securily It has a supporcing case of satisfied natiollSo

Under ¡bese conclítions, initiating conllíct is counterproelucrive since the

nacjan would the-ª.!liance 01 sacisfied scares) even possibly tearing it apart. Having ser [he

tirles-a n-d nd'rms, rhe dorninant nation cannot disrupt chem by

irs awn actions wirbour serious 1055 of support. Instead, by preserving tbe

stacus gH..o, to attract aJ...!!l<1!]1

as possible ro secure its preponderance. The for'mation ofNATO demon--mates tfiar rbe Unlted Srates did noc seek simpl)' a balance of power withche USSR bur ra(her a preponderance of power in arder [O minimize che

rísks oE wal'. by bandwagoni,]g21 ro create

an overwhclmülg coalirion againsr rhe Soviet Union.



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32 POWER TRANSITIONS

oI Germany following World War 1, and reestablished great dissatisfaccíonamong the vanquished Germans, who subsequendy attempted once moreto bid for dominance in che international syscem.

War in the Nuclear Age

Power Transirion theory recogn)zes that ,the costterrep"! .J.Q...tns: are nor universally nor uniform!y

by the specter of massive eosts.coupleq withthe opporrun.i.rY..i9r jI}

rela.tive power This ha s distincr and ímportant poLicy implica-tlons for che nuclear age, It also rllns CQumer to rhe prevailing doctrine of 'the Cold War periodo

The doctrine of mutual assured desr!Lletion declared that, despite wha t-ever dífferences mighr divide rhem, natlons wirh secure second-srrike forceswould be deterred from initiating nuclear \-var. Under these condi ;: ions, itwas argued, nuclear wac \Vas renderecl .i rrational and unthínkable. Thus"safety wil! be che sturdy chíld oE terror, and survival rhe (win brotherof annihilation, "31 and the possibility of deliberate \Var was minimized ifoot eliminated.32 Mutual assured destruction was the logical extensiOll ofbalance oE power ehcory ioro the nuclear age. It brought wirh ie all rheinrellectual failings oí the former and none of the promised security.

That rhere was no war between rhe United States and the USSR dur-íng this period is ofren cired as a confirmarían of docrrinal Sllccess, Freed[rom the restraims of Cold War orthodoxy, this camfortable condusioncan now be debarecl. In retrospeer, rhe degree of relative safety enjoyedby the United Sra tes wa s higher befare the Cuban Missile Crisis than after.In our view, rhe period oí MAD \Vas by no means reassuring, BOl1nded byserious discussions on copies sueh as "launch on warning," post-attack sur-vival capaeÍties, national minimum and maxirnum death statÍstics, nuclea reffects overlays 011 major ciríes, not co mentían movies and television pro-grams dealing wirh "day after" themes, it eerrainly did not "{eel" like asafer period of time than today. Preponderance "feels" a good deal moreseeure.

The dassL balance of power/mutual assured destruction lngie sug-gested that the spread af nuclear deterrence the peace . When alarger number reached -and entered rhe condi-tion oi mutual assured clesrruction, the theory argues, rhe likelihood of waramong them deereased for ,he same reasons it did for the United Statesand the USSR during rhe Cold War, Pushíng rhis argumeíJ.t to its 10gicaJ

lS.ussia, .ana Clilna s liOliT¿íaé lvoGare..th <l-l,rans-.(g oJ nuclear weapons din!iE.is.b.Jb.e ,probabiliry.ofwar between them and with Israel. Moreover, the nuclear tests undertaken

"by lñCliaañcf1iaklstan

r

;houldb e víewed by classie MAD proponenrs as

POWER TRANSIT10N THEORY Fon THE TWENTY·FJRST CENTUIlY 33

a welcomc addition chat brings srability to the region. And, in lact, some

theorists take this posicion.33

.contradií;ÚQlLherween p!.0 terat.ioll-.andoE nuclear is not a remedy for eonfliet.

lPe. b t

The reconciliation oE satisEacti Q,n wltfiiñ1 heJ • ince;:-nacional order, is the remedy. Nuclear weapons in the hands ol satis-

' .... ;\..(\ - r ed powers pose 'no ducat. weaponsin the hands of dissatisfiedO (O." 10><\( \ powers, the Ilsk takers of the international sysrem, pose unusually severe

.....Q threats. Power Transition does not hold that dissatisf1ed p_Olvers

...

will be creterrenrom iS irrg by some ñucleaÍ"counrerbalance,'IÜr .war_,úJl

determined by g,..na tion's pOPlLlpt[oJ), s_:...Ql1Q!nic ¡:[evelopment, and politiealIt is for this reason

thar the United Sta ces has invested so much to deoy Iraq nuclear eapability.Finally, Power Transition suggests thar China not only muse be watched ata global leve! wheo it overtakes rhe Unired States, but must be monÍtoredwithin ¡es regional hierarehy if lndia beeomes a regional challenger in themid - to late-twenty-nrst and nuclear

do noc mix without serious consequences.

The Management of World Politics

Managing A/Jianees

Power Transition as stable coalítionssimilar ()f... Stable alliances are not agreementsoí convenienee that can be altered easily or \Vith few consequenccs, A casein point is the Allied coalitíon with the USSR dllring World War n, whiehwa s a tempoIary, unstable, aod unreliab!e assoeiation that .fell apart imme-diately after rhe end of the common conflict.,)n alliancc; in

Power T[ansitLQ1 _.3r.e_arrangements _oi where nationsbeca use of eommonll' heJd commiqnellts to exisüng_ uls;s a.n.d rhe economícaÍ1_d secuI-Íty ·gains [-hus as eX(lmpli fied by U $.-Britísh relations aodthe larger NATO coaEtíon. SLJfh a!lianees. to be long

o tIte c.Qug¡llenee,.2 fj nteres[ amoQg

rhe membe.rs.AlIiances ereated by the dominant power are desígned to strengthen the

stability of the sysrem by creating a preponderanee oí §P tisfie, l countries.A successful dominant power attracts- a oí g;"e; t and middlepowers and some small powers in suppon of ltS leadership, l)I.ations ioin-ing the dominant power become part of a status quo a!lianee system. U.S,

foreign poliey in the pos(war era provides a cJear example.t ' t I, .- • • · .y ·o\...\.\ l' . \ i \ '\ Iv l CV,{\ /v,\.Q

f L ' ' ? \ , \" • • , 11 <:ó1í' ¡ <:: t- ; <' t \\.. \ /\/ ....

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Preponderan! Pm'ity

Overtaking

POWER TRANSITIONS

Challellgef

Preponderllllt

Challenger

_ _ _ _ Defender

Short l__ --- --------

Figure 1.15 The Ollratioll of War

The Duration of W,lr

Power Transition also provides a guide ro undersranding che duratíon of

war. Figure L15 shows rha[ as a clissatisned chalJenger approaehes pari[yand overtaking with the domínant natíon, rhe duraríon of Hny war thar

may oceur inereases clramatjcally. rhe relativeJy equal powerth.aL ea¡:h narion brings ro bear du;ing a conflicto ,<\s'-neithe rr l1'éC!omi;1Hnrnatíon qQr rhe ehallenger __á LJnilatel:ár power adválltage, -barl'! are

likely to engage in a war of attrí.rion. Hoping te wear rhe other side clown ,

each si de is fighting with an equal chanee oí' winning clue to rheir relatively

equal power. \'V'orld \)lars r and Ir are resrimony ro the almost egual püwer

ol primary combatants and a!líances in a costly and drL\wn-our war.

longer two .rival natíons are in relative pariry, the 19nger che duratíon of aoyrheYñ 1i'gh'CligJJ.t. As either the challenger 01' dominant nation

a relative power advantage, the expecred duration oE wal' deo'eases. This

is clue to one side achieving an advantage over the other, increasing thelikelihoocl oI that side prevailing and che war rherefore terminating

Speed of Overtaking and War

There is sorne evidence linking the speed of rhe overrakíng with the sever-

ity of war. FasGer.o.venakings appear to lead to a lower probobility of wa!

and slower overtakings inerease rhe pro.b.ilbility of war. lntegratíng these

empírical observa'tloíis resulrs in the concfusioll thar longer, siower rrans.i-

...... i

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powm mANSITION THEORY rOR TrIE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 31

rions tcmporarily pOStpolle eo nflier but may eventually res \lIt in the most

severe wars. Shorter, {aster transírions inerease rhe likelihood bllr lower the

severity of warY

There is a poliey logie to these conclusions. With fasc overrakings, thecwo countries are in parir}' for a short period of time and eheJe is rela-

tively less opporrunicy' for polier- disputes ro dev elop ¡!HO war. Bur with

slower transícions, these paliey disputes have time to develop irreversible

mom entum Jeading to war.

Pmver Transirion scholars agree that che period of parity remains asthe zone al contenrion and probable war. The rheory holds rfJae- eonRict

can oecur anytimc during the parity period but che probabiliries and con-

sequences vary wirh the specific eonditions of that transition.

nations are in rclative parie)', the higher the probaQiJity' of war and

I¿nger the durarion or any war they may flght.

The Cons€qllenc€s of War

rna jQ.r.J:Yar is rhc_relative am0.2K .

are rediscribLlted. Conrrary to expectarions, llations recover relatively.

qu .cldy from the consequences of war. 28 Dominant ancl orher great powers

can engage in war and return to theif earlíer posiríon in the internacionalsystem after one generaríon. For an aclvaneed muion, rhe time necessary

to eateh up ro ¡ts prewar growch pattero is less than twenty years. Power

Transition theorists call this the .Phoenix Factor.,29

, Beeause of the Phoenix Factor, [he outcomes oí grear power wars

ti do llot change long-term growth rates. However, wars do bu.e a dra-

lL arie an the distriburion of satiSf8:C iOñ ancl' dissarisfaer!o; -ínj !?eThe lessons oFdeva sratingw ars "are d'iát peace and

stability is short-livecl if diss atisfaetíon is allowed ro .f1ourish among rhevanquished. A punitive peace, or a peace without effortS to reeonstitute chevanquished state as a satisfied member, is likely ro be a short peace._The,.,

of political systems in Germany and ,Tapan and the prOvision

of post,war W'Úe aesigned' ro transform.chOse:ñi..rtPnsdissatistledj:o satisfied soeieties.

The poliey 'P'ower Transition's Phoenix Factor are in-srmctive. Following a conflict, the dorninant nation must find ways to

reconcile the norms and values of the defeated challenger (who will be in

(he position to ehallenge again wirhin one generation) with ies own. Other-

wise, confliet wiII once more 100m on the hOl'izon. Thus, despite the fact

(har the power di srributions following boch wodd wars wece very simi-

lar, the United Stares chose ro rransform the vanguished seates after World

War n lEld aehieved a stable env ironmenr where power transitions amo r,lgE:uropean grear powers did 110r generare war due to widespread sarisfac-

cion. On rhe other hand, rhe French <1nd English emphasized punishment

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., ) POWU1 TRANSITIONS

The objective of NATO is not alld has nar been simply rhe defenseoE the associared nations from an attack by che .Warsaw Pac to .Mmual se-

curity has been the dorninating focus in public disco urse and the vehicleused tO justify rhe alliance wi(hin rhe capírals of NATO countries. But anequally important and perhaps even superior objective, according to PowerTransition tl1eo ry, is. the maimenance of stability_within EUlo.pe.ancLrhe ce-menting oL.tie.s. l1nder U.S. guidance, ensurec:rhat power overtakings among France, England, and Germany did IlOt lead

to the reperirion of Wor!d 1 and U. nc.:figbJ....Q!}e another. ,- ," r,. , " J •

LooIJ;g(o warcl the fmure 'from the Powcr Transitioll perspeetive, thedominant power sho-lld..,.anempt ca integrate new a l-Liance as pare of a lª rger effort oJ defending rhestates wpe.re .pecessary from salli,fled nations. The benencsfór the dominanr-nation ' are obviollS. Ir expand-s Íts po01()T resources ancl .supporters while transforming potential rivals il1(o allies.

What rhen are [he implicacions for NATO expansion? Power Transition¡ustines the expaosion of NATO to Poland, Hurígary, and the Czech Repub-lie and to al! others who now sharc the values (demoeraey and economicgrowth) and accepe [he rules (status quo) oE the dominant power. This in-

corporatíon, however, does not substantially alter the distriburion of powerjn the inrernational o....$m a 1.,

is fundamental rela tions}úp¿ jn rheinternac ional s.yscem.

From the perspective of che enHene dom il1ant power, the United States,the most important near-renn adjusrment ir could make to the internationalalliance This would servetwo purposes. First, ir wOllld accererate rhe development oE a satisned na -tioo out of one that retains the po re ntÍal to revert to dissatishecl status.Second, it would signi6cant!y ¡¡cid to (he pool of reSOlll"CeS of the domi-nant councry. The tighe integratiol1 of Ru ssia into the U.S.-Ied internationalsystem would be the largesr single step to preserve .tileinternatíonaJ system,.ch,fQ ¡¡ILQe tá.k,e ñ-- ií1:"fíle near .futme.

an efrort would certainly acldress complainrs rhar currenr NATOexpansion makes Russia feel isolated and threarened. To earry chis argu-ment to its next logic'al point, che subsequenr foreign paliey goal of cheUnited States should be che a sa-isfied China, eicher by diren in-regration into an alliance ür- t5y "creating opportunities to §oéliíli'Ze í: ¡m o ¡heexisring.imern ¡lQ?nals ys tem whereby ir aecepts prevailing rules and no rmo.ln ' both cases - Russia and China - the Unired Stares would be rakíng ae-tion to avoid a challenge by a dissat isfied power. In rhe case orChi;;, ane xpansion of NATO to- indude rhis nation may help in creacingthe conditions for a peaceful overraking, should rhat oceur, rhus redue ing

the possibiliry of global war.

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I'OWEll TflANSITION THEORl' rO R TH E TWENTY·fIRST CENTlIllY' 35

lnterna tignal organizJtions are inst.irurionalpower and ltS great powers ro eodify 'and/Slr

U

1Qrms,-15 Inrernmional organizatiol1s also create eondírions and arenas fo r1esolving disputes thar mighr fornent conflicr in di ssarisn ed nations. The

perm anent membership oE rhe UN. Security Couneíl constitutes a uscfulvehicle for understanding the Power Transir io l1 perspecrive on managing- lterl1ational orgal1izations. -

The Power Tram ition perspec tive ha s imporrant implicarions far inter-narional organizations. For exa mple, permanent rnembership on the Se-eurity asna p '!JiÜt of

power i!]1mediately after World Wal' n. TheUnited Srate s, Great Brirain, "Franee, and rhe Soviéi Un ion were rhe grearpowers of rhat time. Since that time, however, the same economie mod-ernizarion pracess rbat propelled th ese stales to great power status haschanged .s.be _Great Brirain and FrillJQ!)1: vepower relarive ro Germany and Japan. The excl usion o[ Géfmany andJapan from periñalieñt iñembershit) on the Securiry Council was logieal atth ar rim e since th ey we re defeated adversaríes and did l10 t hold subsrantialpower. eeoo,?!.:nie '!O l0.llgerconsisterÍt t.he

To -eí-ihance managel'ial ab ilit y and maintain satisfacrion in rhe inter"national system, pe rmanent lllembership 01\ the Security Coull eil shonldreflecr rhe hierarchy. Th at translares into a perma-nenr rnembership compose e! oí the United Srates, China, Germany, Japan,Russia, ane! evcntLlally India. Should rilar unlikel y ad jusrmem come to pass,rhe exclusion of rhe Unitcd Kinge! om flnd t rance from rhe Secu riry Coun-

" ci l eould be seen as weakeniJ1g rhar bocly. Bllt this would not neeessarilybe the result oeca use both are sarisfted mcm be rs (lE rhe dominanr coalition,and England is the mo st lo ya l aUy of che Unit_d Stares, While thi s

. Council ,should norbe

sratlc . ]n the tuwrc, India or sorne orher y¡able canaldare'11

1lght emergeto replace Japan o,. Ge rmany. On ly by reflecciog the current power real-ity can the SecLlIity CounciJ play its critieal roJe <IS a mediator of di sp utes,peacekeeper, an d peac emaker.

Managing Sa isfaction

To pre s;::cN! lhe exisring status quo, the principal objective of ¡he dominantconntry ami its c10sest allies is to expand international-sYSfem. Thc'i:lüfiITñ1iñ t' counrry mlisr-5e-ca reful nor ro allow clisputeso 1

perceprions o f inequitable tr ea rment ro metasrasize inro diss<lrisfaction with¡he sys tem . 1'lli5 is pa rti cularly uue among grea( pO\-vers rhat are or even-tual!y coulcl Decomeclti l1enW-rs . Thls means ¡hat ¡he dominant counrry



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36 POWER "fRANSITIONS

must meer two foreign paliey challenges: crearion oE binding

associarions and che resolution of territorial disputes.

ower Ua ñSít"ion cheOrY suggests that ffié"'púrpose of cconomic corn -

munities sllch as \VTO,l'<AFTA, ancl tbe EU is ro providej:hat enhance s atisfas..tinn ,wirhin che •. S-9aliti g.o. )) l...-re-ii striSD!ion oCbel1e6ts creates arrel mainJains highche dominanr nation's syste,m,¿ nd attraccs

me leaomg coa[ition wl1Tle con fIíCr. Trrbese ecollomic commu-nities stirnulare growrh, then this dfart has 'rhe collateral benefit of adding

to che power resources of che sacisfied campo This is aa importanr con-

siderarion if a significant challengc;: appears. The record of NATO ane!the W<usaw Pact is él I;:¡sting testimony of how rhe United States used 'icseconomic ane! military preponderance to soLidify ¡ts position over a poten-

tial chaLlenge by rhe USSR. Support ror the European Union rl'ovided theeconomic backbone, while che commitment ro NATO yieldecl enduring

security arrangement that could not be challenged by a Soviet-Ied coaLitioll,aside, terriroríal disputes rema in . 2i

_ confliq,·16 They have che potencial to crea te long-lasting polarizarion often

characterized by inrractable posieions colored byideologícal 01' narionalist

rheroric. FR.Ub,isreasan, dO TIllllil IlC q>untry tú ensureDerso (¡rs OW.l1 alliance do noe enter ineo open conAict. The United States

a.ndNAto have becn imemal conf1ict,with che arguable exception of Greece and Turkey's dispute over Cyprl1s.Although chat conflicr remains, cleady a cap has been imposed on che ac-ceptable lim its of Greek nnd Turkish policy actions. NATO efforts in rheformer Yugoslavia renect the sensiriviry of the alliance system to conflicr.

Despite sorne voices of disapproval in rhe Congress, U.S.-NATO leadership

was impera ti ve, nocjusr for human righes purposes but to reduce the ehrentsto national borders in an are<l (lf potencial NATO expansiono That Rus-sia, Turkey, Greece, arrd Iran have intereses in che Balkans makes it evenmore critical thar rbe United States managed che Kosovo crisis from thescandpoint oE irs own inrernational power interests.

Using the NATO alliance ro limit rerritorial disputes among allies hasdistinct benefits fol' rhe United States. Wíthin NATO, United Smtes preemi .

nence is an accepted valLH: and its le8dership .role is virtuaJly llnchallenged.

Wichin che Unired Nations, however, rhe U.S . role is circumscrihed by cheveto rights of rhe Securiry Council's perm ancnt members ane! the disparate

pressures of rhe broader international community. Thus

comioues ro serve its paramollnt pllrpose oÍ unifyi.og srujsfied nations undcr

r11e [eadership of the clominant naúon, the most efficíent tool

}or rhe resolutian oE pocentially conllietual situatioQ.§ !

Lastly, ir should be Gotee! that che Süvicc Uma n was also successful

in concrolling territorial disputes wirhin ltS coalition, the Warsa w Pacto

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,POWER TRANSITION THEORY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CF.NTURY37

Uolike the Unitee! Srates in NATO, the Soviet Uníon resorted to lirnirec\conflict in order to retain Hungary, Poland, aod Czechoslovakia il1 itssphere o( in/1uence. The strength of the USSR's conHicr managemenc canonly be appreciated by corf¡parison (O current' instabilities in rhe forrner

Soviet Union.Disruptive territ.oria[ disputes !llay occur outside the dorninant COl1n-

try 's coalition. T<liwan and China are relevant, if not potentially explo,ive,

examples. The United Srates has moved to defuse this situation by the skill-ful application of rhe "One China" poliey ane! rhe "Three Communiqués."

Had China been pan of rhe U.S. alliance syslem, this would be a mucheasier problem tO address. Because China rests Olltsicle the U S. system and

beca use ir has che potenrial ro be a chailenger, the Taiwan issue rakes on

signincaIlce well beyond ies geographical comext. The United States cannoc

afford to allow [he China-Taiwan dispute ro polarize U.S. -Chinese relaeions

al' poison che relarionship to the extenC chat China becomes an aggl:essive,dissatisnecl power (see chapter 7).

The sicuarion 011 the !(orcan peninsula presents another porentia[ ap-

plieatiol1 of Power Transition srrategy. The potencial foc eonflicc has now

as Nortb ICorea is no longer a viable regional contender vis-ii-vis

Souch Korea. Instability 011 the península is driven by the isolation and dis-satisfaction (Jf North Korea but it no \onger has rhe power to challenge

{he SOllch . When parity existee! between North and -Sonrh Korea during the

19505, the United Srates prevented an invasion by rhe dissatisfiee! Nonh.

Today wirh South K(Jrea being preJominant, rhe United Sta tes' role is robríng both mHions inco a relarionship rhar resolves territorial íssues and

encourages che long-rerrn prospecrs of a satisfied Korean península .As seen before, one of the most imponant insíghts derived frol1l Power .

Transition is chat peace is preserved when naüofls are satisned wirh theinrcrnatíona[ order. The capal5ílity' tO-:ltrack ihe Uníted States

witn nucle::\l' weapons has diminished but remains signíficant, even though

its conventional cap<lbilíties have been reduced dramatically. However, che

United Sta tes nO longer considers such an attaek to be likely. This rep-resents a drasric ch.ulge in expectations. The difference before and after

1991 ís not so much the collapse of the Soviet Uniorr, bllt rhe change il1

- f! Utitudes within thar country toware! éooperation wíth che Wesr. Thedamenrai reforms oí a dernocratic structure, an emerging !llarket economy, Jand che exrension oí civilliuerties tu Russían citizens has concl'ibuted mOJe I

to stability than the reduction of arl1l<lments. lA ?,,' J 1,.

Managing Power

Wítn a mature economy growing at iower. .cates, a clominanc country JTlayfilld a fast-growing chaHenger arisíng from rhe ranks of the great powers.

Being ar different stages of economic development, it is irnpossible for the

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r:tv 'OWER IRANSlTiO"

,1 l "-" ies growth (afe_ro cQmpensare fol' a chal,

lenger t'6ca'ced 011 rhe sreep portio n oí ¡ts enclogenoLls growth erajccrory.

eh,en does ai!j

$The dominant pmver faces two realitics. Since substamial gaios in' rel·

<Lei ve no_1Q!.}gtr

e,xternal resoulff S Ir Q..ges 5.o...b_y_expanding irs a.lliance system, by ,expanp-

UlL its ecol1WI1 if l:ea_ch, ,_OrJ2Qm.,37 Over time the dominam powerwill

atrempt ro bring members into ies alliance inclllding, where possible,

formerly dissatisfied powers. E(lch new acquisicioo adds co rhe power base

oí the alliance, the pool of reSOllrces that eould be called upon in ao emer'

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,enc)'. This s)'srem is 1l9t inrended ro "bala ':,Se oH" power .:!Yi thalld thus ,deter war.Jr s overwhelm·

íng preponderaoce of power and rhe reSOUfces sufficient to head off any

• fasc·growíng challenger. When lookíng tú allgment alliance che

jominant power could bring ín m<llly smaller counrríes, iJ availabIc, or

more efficiently find one large nation whose addition 'Nou!d make a siz-

able difference. If thar narion \vas formerly dissatisned so 11l1lch rbe bener.

This is exacdy the argllmem for why Rllssia should now be incorporaree!

into NATO.

In sorne situations, formal a!liance acquisitions may llar be possible oreven desired. Some acquisirions rnay be (0 0 cosdy fol' tbe dominant coun·

try or the other a¡¡goed great powers. \\'lith consua.imt-s, .the, do g:llml nc

, l'0wer Pll l_then lo.ok"Jo ,expanding alliaQces "as, <In alt,ernarive

.1Lé:V:iGG ro

Economic relationships are llseful devices sínce ili'eY'Eypass the formal

structmes reC¡llired of aIliance assoc:iario)1. COllntries may, ar leastinitiaJJy,disagree on sorne policy issues Ye( find comrnon ground in the cc(')l1 om)carena. The dominam counrry can reach out to a broader range of countries

'and pul! thel1l ihto ltS polie)' orbit through ... agJ'ee-

mencs. _These agreements crea te reciprocal centers QJ seLf-inrerest " n bo eh

countriés, and by themse!ves, without orher stimllli, may cause couotries

. to resolve political differences.

F9IJ his agreements arethe most subtle and least appreciarcd cools of rhe dominant The

\ ys poliey success in Ellrope following WorldWar n s a classic exampleof dfective po"ver management by a uominanr nation. Toda)', atcempts to

align Russia al1long marlcet economy democracies could set che stage fo r anexpanded Europea n Un ion. Similarly, manipulation oE economic incentivesremains one oE the most powerful policy tOo!s ¡he United States can \Nield

in its relationship wirh China.

which i5 the extensiOIl of ioternationallv accepted ru b---- .y ' , ,

and norms through norHtate aetOrs, also is a powe.rful asset of the dOlll-

inant power. It í5 a subcle, indirecr means of sp.reading sarisfaction. [ve¡}

if..cherus o oatioo::s g¡ i1J.aJiz.aJl®,

the o:vcraU ,interests of the dominam

POWER TRANSITION THEORY FOR THE TWENTY·FIRST GNTURY ) 39

""

the cotl1m ercial ane! in large In someways, globalizarion can be a more effective rool fm influencing dissatisfied

srates, slIch as China, than direcr U.S. inltlatlves,( In a similar fashion, information technology, with its ability to pene-

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trate borclers, open new markets, discributecíes, and tie commOll interesrs, serves rhe purposes of a statusquo clominam poweE. Wbile information dominance may incre<lse th e rel-

leading mui Ol for a time, its more useful purpose

flows from pf!ill.el cs1s, The infow1ª ,tion age n1 1Y \yell he,JLllriw;,i,paL 'l.chi.de

<lnd s(1tisfacrion,N.2c 0!...e roblem; can 'be by elle favorabl e

ecoIlornic riliD.Ql1s. t'i1tractabi e difficulties occur when neirher the prospects

for allianee nor economic a5sociaciol1 are attractive indLlcernents for key na-

cions. This ca n be seen in che Middle Ea st, where the pa sslons of ideol ogy,

religion, and culture ourweigh the promises of alliance and ecollomic in"

regration. This is the reaSon rhat the Middle East always seems to be a

"special case" in internacional poli'rics .

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Man,lging Nuclear Weapons

Nuclear weapons ha ve changed che calclllus of waL Unlike previo Lls periods

of tlme wheo domioanr powers could defeat 'ChaHengers while minimizing

coses, nuclear weapons have raised the cose threshold dramatically, even

fOl' che winne r, The coses or severiry of war 110W are inversely relaredJ_o ¡be- """ , . -" - -- -- ... - - .".. -...

J)l'2,.babiUtt 2 f,.JYar. Transirion VlCWS nuclear proliferation as che sin:gle mosr clangerous elemenr in rhe internacional sysrcm. Yet, that fact cloes

noe éliminate the possibility of very intense, if infrequent, war. When tbe

conclicions of and diss atisfacrion are present, the pwbability of

war is higb, nuclear weapoos not¡t t1Pismiülmg. NlI.de..'u cle.retl eOcel!Uwu-

ous. Tbe nucl ear weapons are Ilot absolure in the faee---" -- .........,-

of

, . ,. 11 LI t_el.imilJJU!!l,g.the possl)JJhty T1115 1$ partlcul crdy tnreateIl1l1g 111 rhe regIOnal hl·erarchies wnere rhece could be numerons transitiollS in che re!ative!y near

(mure. From a Powcr Transitíon perspeccive, the proliferation oE nuclear

we apon s to a given regíon, sucb as che Midd!e Easr, is particlllarly danger,ou s since transitions frequently occur there among dissatisfied, risk-taking

'! , ,.... '. (1 t'o .< l

The Middle East is stable because Israel now is a preponderant nuclearpower. lf lran 0 1' Iraq were to achieve lluclear parity, few doub¡ [he re -

gion wOllId remaio srable, The proliferaríon oí nuclear warheads to Indiaand Pakistao offers a different perspeerlve. Pakisran CilnllOt hope ro macch

the relarive power potemial of India over rhe long termo There wiJl be no

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40 POWER TRANSITJONS

overraking here. Thus a major war is not likely ro OCCUl", wich or wichournuclear arsenals. However, in the long term India's nuclear capabiliry mayincrease rhat cou ntry's threar to China and an overraking could occur be-tween these rwo adversaries. Tbis sbould give pause to ,hose \mO_ . _ ...... - i'

¡bat J?klriry he twee11 ri va...ls som .ehq;w maT<eSl'íre world a sa fel J.? bce.Alehough proliferarion of nuclear weapons ha s noe been widcsp¡:eáel

as technology permirs, this could change over time. \Vith prolifer2rionaod the multiplicarion oE MAD·likc condj¡ions within hierarchies, derer-

rence becomcs increasingly unstable. Assuming that few nations will giveup nuclear weapons, as diel SOllthAfrica, che Ul<raine, and Kazakhstan,the challenge for a dominan!" its _oa.l.i-tiol1 is co guarantee rhat

we;p;; ,s-;[<ltes a re do narrlS! " war.

Managing Local Crises

The Unired Sta tes cannot become rhe policeman of the \Vorle! , givenits position as rhe dominant power and the leader of a great power coali-tion of historically unrivaled strength . The UnitccLStates,;1ud . has ooly Juarginal j nfluence .o.ver _he

The World Bank or InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF) may-. influence China, India, or Indonesia but only marginally. The histori-

,- cal growth patterns of these eounrries are rclatecl to I110l'e fLlndamem aiI ¡ pressures expressecl domestically from rheir resource base .

growth l·ates, . overcaJsing5, - challengers,eonflicr can be expecred in m¡¡n)' Tocal glübe.

!The dominanr p6 weJ ancl-ttscoalition wíll Hor see value in inrervening ineaeh case. The costs may be too high relative to che gains, ¡here may notbe a galvanizing rationale for intervention, or atrention may be divened toother issucs. Whatcver rhe reason, the dominant power mu st concentra te

') ies attention on its kc)' responsibiliries, wh ieh are the maimcnancegregation of ¡ts power ar the global level, the satisfaction of ies cqaJitionmember states, and (he management of possible ehaJ[cngers. This rneansthe United States shoulJ not attempt ro intervcne <lt will. Ir has more press-ing responsibilities. Ir ha s to piek and ehoose which fore ign poliey crises

its attenrion, bas ecl l1pon the geostraregic vis ion that asks: Wh<lt)actiol1S, aJZd allialu;es can provide relative lJower prelJonderance orcreale satisfaction with the status quo within a regi(¡na l hierarchy?

Potential confljcts in loca l and reg io nal hierarchies could be rninimizedwith the suggestions offered in the discussion of managing international or.ganizatÍons. If local dominanr and ehalleng ing powers in a local hierarchyare brought into the UN Secllrity Council for deliberations 0 11 iss l1es centralto rheir regions, then rhe likelihood of a peaeeful solution incrrases an d rhenecessity for intervention by rhe dominant power decreases. For this reason,

• rOWER TRANSITION THEOIlY FOR THE TWENTY·FIRST CENTURY 41

a dominant should adopt a globalist perspective and avoid, '¿be tempration ro maximize short-term narional sovereignty <lr rhe expense

of long·term instability. The United Sra tes coneeriy focused on the USSRdUfing the Cold War and shou ld fOCllS eqllal attention on China's rerrico-rial concerns uver Taiwan and its imernal economie developmenr patterns,If [hese siruations cannot be resolved so rhat the disputants aCCl'l1e positivepolitical and economic gains hom the status qua - or <In)' polic)' solutionclose to rhe stal'llS qua - ir is in the dominant natiol1's interest ro create

unilateral power preponderance over the disputants.

Advi!nce Warnings for Crisis Managemenf

Power Transition is not only a llscful descriptioo of the structllce and dy-namics politics, but more impürrantly it is a' powerful

'toO l foi the polieymaker. lt

'p.owcr- relario}1ships as we.ll ..i!s regional fleritics. As a clynamic theory, ireonstanrly adjusts to cbe changing realities of power fluctuations ancl [hercsulting consequenees for peace and war. -lt.-tells, lls_WÚeiulati.OJ1sJQ.fQr b..Qstile ir,lteIH,.<lnel when rllat ¡ment ma u .ake.tb.e..J9J".1U .9J.actioo. Specif·icall)', it aleres policymakers in advance when condirions favor the outbreakof war

Power Transítion theory describes an internacional system under whichdominant coLlntríe s attempe to world staolüty as well as regional

\Vbile it gives highl)' llsefullong-term gLlÍdance,ie does llOt provicle immediate poliey aclvice 00 specinc issues. Ir is, after all,a grand theory that ideneifies che preconditions fo1' cooilict. How to manip·ulate euueO( polic)' to meee rhose eonditions is beyond the seope of sLlch ,systemic thcor)'. HQ}Vever, Power Transition does idencify general princi-pIes fOl" how to manage foreign polig . wnar positions to a'dopt,and which foreign polic)' interests are crucial. .

For example, Power Transition theory shows that nuclear proliferationin rhe regional contextis an espeeially dangerous prospeet because o,' thelikelihood of future regional overtakings aoel the concomitant risk of waramong (hen nuclear seates. But the theor)' does not give specific advice onpolie}' implementa tion, nor on how to prevent the proliferation of nuclearor an}' other weapons of mass deseruceion in a specific case. This should not¡eave Power Transition pract.icioners wirh a feeling of helplessness. Wide-spread acceptance and use as one of tbe principIes of international relationswill foster (he selection of approprjate poLicies rhat minimize che likelihoodof - - : - - -- ' - , - - - - - -

New tools are available co help che translaee Power Tran-sition theory into specific poLicy recommendations. The theory irself has ar¡ch flow of general policy reeommendations as diseussed a for

specific poliey implementarion anel execution issues, iuvolv-



)

CHAPTER 2

Power Transition Theory Tested in the

Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries

M. ore than an end to wm; we UJant an ene! to the beginnings o(all wars. - FRANKUN DELANO ROOSEVELT

Since che dawn of rhe industrial revolur io n, population, economic prodllC-tiviry, and politicl! orgallization have been che building blocks oI narionalpower. $ince [hese variables change over time, thefe ha ve been lllélssi ve

power shifts in rhe international system. As seen in chapter 1, grear pmversare the few nations ae rhe apex of che global hierarchy capable of affecringthe S[Cllcture and distriburion of power. Therefore, ehe srory ol rhe grearpawers is particularly important.

Histo rlcolly, rhe great powers Iose ..gr..Qllncl teJative ro newly

emerging natip ns . When this infrequent yel important power ovcrtak ing

is underway, dissa tisfied na rions ar the bo[[orn of che great power hierar-eh)' mal' rise ro challenge the established leaders. 5uch cb allenges result in

wars, which are ver)' co stly in tcrms of political, eco nomic, and humanreSOllrces. cHe fo llowed by a major transference ofpower rhe dominanr nation and ies sUPPol.tit;g coaIisioneo. the challenger and irL$.uPP Qners. But not a ll challenges are slIccessful.In the lasr century we have seen German ambitions thvvartcd twice by aBritish-American al/iance. Likewise, in the las t de cade we h:1Ve wjtnessedehe Soviet threar to the U.S . inrerrwt ion al arder rlln oue of srealll. Looking

ahead, rhe re are signs of anocher poss ible chaJlenge, thi s time from Ch ina.[n order to answer the foreign policy rhreats thar policy rna ke rs arelikely to face in the next cenrury, we musc turn ro the evollltion of rhe

internarional system over the past two hundrcdy ears forThere we see the histor}' of greac power competitioll ami co nfl icr \-vr itren

in the Powe r Transition process: a dissarisfied challenger":"'- Ge nllany orRU5sia - a ttempts to overtake the defender - cbe Unitecl Kingdolll or che

Unired StaCes - 311d vie 10r rhe mantle of internacional leaclershíp. Whethersllccessful or llor, tI!.c char propel grear power competitian can_be traced. tlwugh histoJY, demol1s tratíng rhar pariry, overtaking, and rhelransi.tio¡:J_p.wcess.Jrame...:th(} str.:lJct..w:al condírions fQLWa.c.

Scholars and poliey pr acc irioners have learned él great clcal abou t reg-

lllariries ane! ehange in re lations am ong che grC<le po wers . Amo ng grea t,1

1L ' ¡ . 1, élV\.Q

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POWER Tf{ANSITION THEORY TESTED ) 4S

powers th ar support rhe status quo, changes in the power srructure do notlea d ro confronratiolls . Indeed r.he srory of Europe following World War II

is a peaceful one despice Germany's overtaking of rhe Uniced Kingdomand franee. CpaJlges_ n _po :>.\.eU 1f..llctur-es iJW.QUe risin2.e.e0ne llcs of tlK sta.ws .,q.U(), ..cu¡.r becomes likely.

ln order co capture chese dynamics, we rel)' on extensive .d.ae,a s.,e!ks..ofgross domeslÍ f prod.1!ft.,S.,_per-capita prod ticrs, po·pufa7 ion, and satisfaction

the quo developed by political scienri!i ts, eco no·misrs, and dernographers over recent decades. To capture satisfaction anddjssa tisfaction wieh tbe rules of che intemational order, we turn ro measuresof eco nomic and securicy poliey alignment that rellecr che swelling tensionsberween competing dyads as well as inc reasing cooperatÍon.\ The data offer

for che

clynamlcs oCthe the pase

Power Transition perspecrjye withfuture . _ ._ ._- --

Evolution of the International System sjnce 1815

The clynarnics esrablished by great powers' rela tions noc only generate thecon dicio ns essenrial to stabjlity and peace, bur also set forth (he elementsior change and conflict. The narional power in thisc.baprer p!"Qv ides

all evolmionary perspect ive oE che gteat system J.J.l.L 1!§ ingTransitiol1 rbe ory. The GDP series pro vides a panoramic view of the

explosive pacterns of growch anel co llapse rhat have shaped the structure of{he ínternacidhal sysrem as we ll as the dynamics rhat may sculpt its fururedevelopment. Fi{jUl"es 2 .1 and 2.2 provide an overview of great power evo··lution. Us.ng differences in gro).Y th¿ .l!-cürerion, we canco rnforrably divide rhe data into three distinct periods. 2 The first st recc!les

from che end oE ehe Napoleoníc Wars, when our series beg ins, te che end

of rhe nin eteenth century. The second period takes up che first half oE the

twe ntieth cencllry. The thircl period begins with che Co ld War and continuesto the present day. .

The International Power Distribution: An Overview

Figure 2.1 ((2 ._4§Lcl¡;¡lli:S§... rb.e [eladveJeveJs of . andpolitical power of the greae PQwe.rs ftOm 1§1.LmJ 995. The differencesirl growch across members shape ilie clynamics oE the internacionalpower distribution. While che broader disCllssion of comparing power be-

tween nations in ehapcer 1 co nsidered the elements of _po 1ricaUª,[.ll\cjty

and delllographic base in to economic prodúCr1vity, we ..wjUJo.cl1S

simp l}\.oll the size oJ . .J'he daca neecl ed to compare

these.nacions along polirical alld clemographic lines for rhe broad sweeps of

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.,: ',

powm TllANSmONS

(ing multiple var.ious .imenSi(jeS of influence and interests¡ vve

must .s!l::.!l.. to theory fQf --

m:.uriage between strucrural-dyn,amic ¡-beories as Power Tran-sTt'ióll "anClC!eéisi.J n-rií'alft ng

,

' \-. - . . .--. --

dynarnic theories itluminate ¡he conditions thar are désiraHe ro ::\chíeve

in the internacional system, \'V'hile decisíon theory provides [he roadl1lapto specífic enciso From the poliey perspec¡iye, Power Transition providesrhe objective§ while. d·ecision tl1eory rife

¡Siéins of We do not intend to describe deeision rheory here sinceir is nor rhe fOCLlS of chis boak: But we would be remiss nor to highlig,htit as ,111 exwwrdinary tool for rhe policymaker lnterested in manipulatingcomplex polieicaJ and economíc variables.

Conclusions and ProjectionsThe incernational system currently is composed aL largeters: the Unired States, Europe, Russia, aod China, India represents ,1

fifth potencia1 center. Beyond these - fi no orher large countr) or re-

gional allíance currenrly appe:Hs ro llave the requisite resources, in termsof popularion-producrivity-political capaciey, to overtake the large power

cenrers.Uncler these circulTIstances, we forecas, al.0:;ired n!-.!.mpp QU:).lture

p""Q.w..c:..r..!;falliLr lQ!ls, From roday's vantage- poiilt, there are only [WO possibili-ríes !ooming 011 the horizon, The first is China overtaking d1e Uniree! Sta res,

anc! the second, in the las.t ha17 oi ebe ty¡enJ):=-first century"is.JnJi a::ÜY.-;;úak-ing eicher China Ol" [he Unireel States. If China ,wd Inclia develop as satishecl

gre·at powers; rlien 't heSe-transitions wil! Occur lInder peaceful eonditiol1s, I.f

they develop wirh significanr grievances against che internacional systern,(hen these tmnsirions could resul.t in war.

The timiflg of rhese transitions wilJ depend, of coursc, OH rhe

growth rates, producrivity, and poJitica! !he Unitedane! China will be the nrst to overtake" tb.e: Oliíted

Sta tes in rerms of GDP bU( it wil! take many more years before thar mo-mentum can be channeled into actual power. Likewise, there are rnany

pitfalls along this road. Chinese growth rates may slow; the centralernmel1t may weaken 01' even collapse in the faceof regional power ba ses;

polítical mobilization may fragmenc with the dissolllrion of ComrmmiscParty controJs. A Chinese challenge ís by no means assurecl , Moreover,there is sufficienr time for che Unitee! Sta tes to rnanage - throLlgfí [he tx-

-teñSiün oE NATO ro lo-eluele Russia or India, for exampJe - an emergíngtransition so as tú avoíd conflict. The transicion with China could be eithcrpea-¿efúl or lti' ss ii-nply too early to rell. The deveiopmerlt oIIndia is much faHher in the fnture and equally uncertain. The iargest cle-

J110cracy in the worle! has just adopcec! a limitee! market econor.ly and

POWf.P. rnANSITJON THEORY FOR THE TWF.NTY·FIRST CENTURY 43

behind China in economic deveJopment. However, írs population is ex-pected (O sllI·pass that of China around 2040 and thus could pose borha regional and global tlueaL

Transitions will cominue ro occ1)r withiI1 rhe IOGd hierarchies, perhaps

higher mtes tha;; now .There are a signi.ncanr 1l1ll11ber of poten-tial the Middle East, and porrion s of Asia.Thís will give rise to precondirions foi· a continuing slIccessioI1 of eonflicrs

- ar tbe regional leve!. The time and atremion of [he great powers will be

gready srressed by this eruption ol' conflict frorn below. Because they re-rnain great powers, even if they come into policy co nflict wirhone anoche!", such as over supportíng rival local hierarchica! combatanrs,

they wil! resol'le ehese differences without reSOl"C ro conflier at che ínrer-l1atlonallevel. This wjll place a premium on rhe developmem and exeeutionof peacekeeping and peacemaking skills, attributes we are jusr beginning (O

learn now.

While the prospect of war is unpleasanr, rbe corollary is quite oprí-mistic, perhaps even uropian, [f great powers do oor splinter like the USSR,

.it ,he European Union remains llnitecl, <l od if econornic development pat-rcrns stay on course aItering the power rankings among great powers as

predietecl, then the stage is set for ,1 remarkable, evcn unigue, period in his-

ro ry. H rransitions involving China and [ndia materialize and arepeacéturIy, then che ü ft l1e inrerMeÍonal system would . con-ratn d!ssarisfiecl wo iÍdbe likely to

ÍrOHl below, -(herefore, the preconditions for gre at power contlict woulci be

a bsent, \'(le would enter a new age: the Clge of great pou.!eLpeace.

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Figure 2.1 Power Shifts, 1815-2000

history we discuss in rhis ehapter are simply llOt sllfficiem for the task. SinceilCe.focusing on grea,r po.weJ:S,. .:V,e <;x p.eJ;:t --."

should dosely app,roximijre of p_owc r;.,Iil-i-sAJooi, $.ug-

gests, The log GDPs, represeming power, capture rhe pereemage diHerenees

in eomtant rates over tune, We have highlighted the three shorter periods

that will be analyzed in Jetad later, bllr here we simply wisn to pro vide an

overvlew af the general power rrends in rheinternaeional systern.

.In tbe ninereemh cemury the eCQllomic exp.ansioll ,oL alL1E.-llil,bers [)fthe system is relarively indicated by rhe Rae GDP r['ajecrories. Al! al

the great powers are relatively c10se in terms of economic magnitudes, The

Unitcd States is che only anomaly in che otherwise consisrent pattern. The

ecollornic and demographie growrh oE che Unired Sra tes, re.

flecred in the expansioll of ics domesric product toward the end of checentury, signals che shapc and directíon of fllture system e1evelopment . In

this relatively peaceful period, the rise of Prllssia and ¡ts overtaking of

Allstria-Hllngary aod rhen Franee stands out. Overall, however, svstemic

stabiliry js guarameed by che absence oE major war between a domi-

nam United Kíngdom and any challengers OIl the continent. There are nosignificam shifts in the global power h.ierarchy.

D,uring the second period, rates ane! levels oJ ecoJlomic expansion beginto íncrease fol' che group of grear powers as a whoJe. This proceS$ is rarher

uneven, however:. Shorc perioels of growth are interruptecl by two world

wars ane! a global depression, As suggesred by Power TransitiOfl cheory,

massive internacional turmoil coupled with domestic political and eeonomic

\¡POWER TRANSrTlON lHfORY TESTEO 47

difficulríes Emir econornic gaills aIld threaren system stability, Two Geeman

challenges ro Brirish leadership drastlcaJly alrer rhe landscape of rhe global

power dístribution,

Final/y, in the rhird period, economie gl'owth acce/erates rapidly. In tbe

posrwar period all members in -our set experíenee major (lnd susraineJ ex-

pansion of their economies, This ¡nerease in the relacive performance of rhegrc3t powers' economies radically transforms rhe natnre of the syscem, yet

does so withour conflict. The crearion 01 the European Community and rhe

colbpse of rhe Soviet Uníon occur ín rhe absenee ot conflict despite Illulti-

pIe overtakmgs, producing che enigma of peClCC, Using rhe Power Transirion

perspective, however, we ean explain sysrcm srabiJity even in che presence

of such large Aucruarions in power.

Vast differences in rhe growrh races among great powers teU a ¡arge

ponian of rhe great powers competirion story, The sharp spasms in growth

eausea by war Clnd depression in rhe imerwar period are apparent in our

cl ata, Even more visible is the n:markable explosion of growth aflcr W'orld\XIar n and the differences in national power growth, This posrwar phenom-

enon is rhe result of rhe Phoenix Factor eHect. Gennany, Jap<l1, Franee, and

haly are nor permanenrly dCll11aged by the costs of wal'; rhe COI!ScqLlences of

war are short-tenl1. \X'ithin eighteento

rwemy years, eaehoE

chese nationsrerums ro rhe growth trajectory anticipared by rheir prewar performance,

'Che stories oI individual countries <re compelling, The most disrinc-

tive ;lne! sready growch performance is char of tbe Unired Starcs, which

expands wirh only one major falrering - t:he Great Depression, Japan, onthe orhcr hand, experiences prorracrce! ecoTlornic growrh, acceleraring after

World War n, T11i5 grmvth rate is sharper than chat of rhe Soviet Union Ol'

Germany, thollgh ir decelerates roware! the ene! of om series, Japan is now

enrcring ¡he m3wcation phase of lower growrh rates on ¡es ene!ogcnous

growch trajectory.

Also norable is the profound growtb of rhe Soviet Union fOI the deeade

and a halE preceding Worlcl War n ane! rhe two anel halE clecades after. This

growth in power propelled rheC6lípledwirh Sovier dissarisfaerion, ir createel

rhe Cold \'<lar. The decelerarion of the Soviet economy in rhe mid-1970s

is also apparcJ1t,inclucling che free faH resuJtíng from the implosiol1 of the

So\'iet Uníon.

Toward rhe end of Ou t series we nncl the importanr aeeelerarion of Chi-

nese growth, a harbinger of things ro come, The rare of Chtnese growth is

rather fIar until the ilHerwar period, What is apparenc, however: is China's

positíon as an extremely large, ,yet lIncleveloped nacion prior to begio·

ning ¡he modernizatioll- processJ hiuignals itS_p-OtftlltiIlL Jwwer. a

largc poplllarion and high rate oL grQyvtll, Cj1iQ-ª_

tua(po:;"er and be

sysrem, Already China can be seen as on che high growch portion of its en-



I

!

48 POWEfl TRANSIT/ONS

dogenous growth crajcctor)'. Ler us now rurn to che intcractions arnong om

powcr var iables and conflicr wirhin each of the three periods.

The First Period: The Power Dynamics of Peace in the Nineteenth

Century, 1815-99

In this period we explore che power clynamics following the Congress of

Vienna and che evolution of gre at powers in the nineteenth cenwry. TheJ 1nite.9J<ingd o.ITL\\I.-L l2rec/.? mina'!.r throughoLlt the _century uncil the U.S.

centttry) British dominanee on the continent ensuredthe Pax BritanniciI , a[lowing the United Kingclom ro impose rules anclnorms governing the European and glob al status quo.

In the global hierarchy, most other Europenn powers are <lt similarlevels of c1evelopment and national power dUrlng these early S:ages ofindustrializacíon. Germany, FIance, and AustFia-Hungary'\ all vie for theposirion tú chaUenge the Unitee! Kingdom through out the nineteenth cen-tury. In order to understancl the srructure a!ld dynamics oÍ this competiríon,we wil! concentrare 011 ke y dyacl s - che United Stares-United K ngdom andGermany-France - ro ascertain whether overtakíngs are assocjarecl withmajor war and if power preponderance results in peaee.

Figure 2.2 focuses on the global hierarehy by Jísplaying the relativeclistribution of powcr (he United Kingdom, tbe Unitecl Sta tes, Ger-many, and France'- the major actors cluring this period o Firsr, consider

theU.K. power trajectory throughout the nineteenth eentnry. Our seriesindicare thar the U.K. power advanrage over evel'y majar Europcan na-tíon provides a favorable circumstance for Britain to estabiish stabiliry onthe Continent. British dominance is the first instance where tlle leader's

power preponderance ís derived from the modernization process. The newresources produeed by an industrial eeonomy are mobilized by a mgrf ef-

féeti.;e governme!Jl." Tne g¡:itishexperiencecl aecelerated-growth up to 6

pereent per anJlUIll compared tú the 1.5 percem average for the res( ofEurope. .

The BrÍtish power advantage over Franee, the la rgest and most power-

fui of the resu]t of an overtaking most likely iD. tI]e

des aqes LIsr before the Congl'ess of Vienna. 5 The overcaking of Franeeby the United Kingdom insrigated an intense fol' control oithe great power system. This competitíon was accompanied by a series ofmajor power wani- ove r twenty yea rs. As figure 2.2 demonstrarcs, Englishinternational dominanee over Franee beca me ev ident witb the defeat ofNapoleon in 1815.

Figure 2.2 shows the nature of power asymmetry betwecn rhe UnitedKingdom and Franee throughout che nineteenth century. As expected by thePower Transitíon pcrspectíve, this period is dcvoid oE wal' despite Brítishforeign poliey preoccllpation with a porential French rhreat. In retrospect,

"i

POWER TRANSITION THEORY TESTEO

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Figure 2.2 Grellt Power Compe tition, 1815-1900

this is simílar to the Cold Wal' berween the United States and the USSR interms oE preponderance, dissatisfacrion, and lacI< oí war.

We now rurtl to the U.S .: -U.K. dyad oí grear poweIS. [n this period

the growth of the United Sta tes is pronounced. The United Sta tes beg insíes modernizarion process cluring the 1840s, but progress is interrupted

by rhe Civil Wal'. After rhe war, the United Sta tes recovers quíck!y audreturns to che high growth portion oE ¡ts growth trajectory. Fígure 2.2 dis-plays the Unitecl States beíng propelled past the United Kingdom and a ll

other great powers ín less rilan fifty years. But the relationship between the

Unired StatC$ and United Kingdom was peaceful beca use both nations sup-ported the status quo established under the fax Britannica.

6The United

States continued expanding its prepot;lderance tú the point that by the endof the nineteenth century, ics power aclvantage was rarely le'ss_ha_n twice!! lat o. G,:·eat Brirain. The very large power asymmetry that the United

Sra tes maíntained throughout al! of the twentieth eentury is Iooted in les

ninetecnth-century growth performance.The overtaking of the Uníred Kingdom by the Uníted Sta tes in 1879

eould have beeo expecred to induce system instabílities. \'<lhy chen did rheUnited Kingdom nor resise rhe overraking oí the United states, as it was rodo so bitterly, and ar such cost, in the case of Germany thirty years later?

Recal! that pariry and overtakingstions fol' confliet A.challenge tú the sratuS quo is also req.uirfq. In

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rhe case of rhe U.S.-U K. ovenaking, rhcre waSJ:LO coofluence bcrwcen t;hesetwo Scnola ..Q do nor two eOlio tries as

during this perlod, indicating rhey were borh saris!1e,.d wirhtbesta tus guo.: Thís satisfaction probably derived from I\ritish leadersbip,a common iristimtional hcritage, American polítical separarion from Eu-ropean affairs, and a pronrabJe marker fOI Brirish capi,tal in America Allundollbtedly helped reduce Brirish anxieries and sllspicions of Americangrowrh. s

The issue of sa tisti.!..<;,ti . At the macro level, a nationalpriorities and directions creatcd a state oE satisfaction in che

. Unircd Kingdom and Uní red States. The ruling politicalleadership forged acompromise of self-inrerest among rhe coalitiolls rhal comprised their po-litical power Tlle reason why che Unired Kingdom dedined to useor evcn rhrearen rhe use of force to head off the American overtaking wasclerermined by economic A large <lt;.9. p..ow_xJul sec! orot the Briris.h bl1siness cQrrlrñurÚt x...nad a srake in the U:S. ecouomy. BririshcapItal was crirical in fueling the machilÍc. It was in rheintcresl of t'he U.K. governing coalirion [har econornic ries between the lWOnations be mainrained.

( \/,\ lÁn <lssociared Power Transition question is, why did rhe Unired Srates

aceept the secone! spot far so long aher ir acruaHy passed rhe United King-dom in power? Why di. I che Unired Sta.tes..Jl.oc jnsist 011 its righ.t ro thedominanr posirion ro which its power cleady entitled it?

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is impossible, bU( we offer [he following. expla.nation, .At rherime oE che overraking of rhe Unired Kingdam, rhe Unired Sta res was a de-centralized politica! system. Business, labor, and regional interests had an

stake in ll1aintaining rhar decentralization. They were nO[ abourro ceele control of resources uncler their control ro the cenrral governmenr.hj ::';\ ji .

( , . ,This domestic hase of polit,ica .¡ and a-dra!J1<lri¡; jm-paet on U.S. inrernariolla..LrelatioDs. While resources were maele availabJc in

1 , cases of external attack, the story oE rhe Unítecl Sta tes in rhe firs( haif of rhetwencietb century is one of imbalance oE domestic 'power.. The reaSon whythe United States did not press h; rder ro ootaiñ' internacional leaclershíp ·may have been that the central governmental elites were weak anft could

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Timing may also have been critica!.. Tbe United Srates ovenook allEuropean powers befo re it initiated systemaric involvemcnt in Europeanaffairs. During chis period rbe Uniree! Kingclom also had reason ro be in-creasingly concerned wirh che more chreatening pros[.leet of powergrowth.1\

Using .figure 2.2, let us now turn ro rhe second overtaking, that of adissatisfied Prussia and France. This WaS the grearesr threat ro sysrem stabil-ity in nineteenrh-century Europe. Prussia s propcls i.r ro

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t>ehind ro .pass Auscria in 1836 ,and France in Wº"I.P(\1§sian an 4 Ffencheaeh oJher. unril a.s_h;ll .p_as;celerarion oí Erussian grQ.;b'th

imrnediately before rhe f¡;anco-1?russian '\Yac The between Ger---- .rnan}' ancrF[ance for preeminence among Continental powers results fromrhis ovenaking, coupled with Germany's destre ro rcsuucture che Europeansnu

usquO 12 Figure 2.2 bighlighrs rhe period of parit)' between these rivals

during rhe late 1860s. Tlli; lack oí .. Gn ..betw.een:iW .. by the_ the

Franco-Prussian \'í/ar of 1870.13

In su¡nmary, despire che German challenge, peace prevails among Ger-many, ¡he Unieed Sra tes , and rhe Unired Kingdom in rhe first periocl. Thelast decade of the nineteenth ccnrury shows Germany narrowing rhe powergap separating ie from rhe United Kingdom, ami, to a much lesser excent,rhat of che United Sta tes. The power asymmetry in the United Kingdom'sfavor preserves the st,lbiliry in Europe and in rhe internationa! sysrem asa whole. Wirh rbe narrowing gap berwecll itself :1nd rhe United Kingdoll1,Gennan progress begins ro appear menacing ro E,uropea n powers. Everyadvance heighrencd rhe realizarion of a future power alteration on the

Conrinent.

. The Second Period: Conflict Dynamics in the First Half of the

Twentietll Century/ 1900 -1949

The race on the Continenr dominates grear power relations during chesecone! periodo Ir is a time characrel'ized by German attempts ro obrain sys-teroie leadership in Europe. Concenrraring on the main contenclers, figure2.3 (p. 52') illustrares the rise of Germany and the parity periods prececling\VaL the United Kingdom in U!.Q'Z andThe overtakings prceipirated the mose devasratíng W<lrs in histor)', WorldWars 1 and n. The prize oE such conflicr \Vas control of rhe internationalsystem. Each case of German overtaking is consistent wirh expectacionsabout conflict offered by che Power Transition perspective. That is, both

pariry and dissaeisfaction were presento The Gerrnan overraking is an ex-ample of a more economically advanced society being passed in overallpower by oae less economically advanced but possessing a larger popu-lation. Gennan population was a third larger rhatí Errar of Great_Btitainwhereas -Gennao p-eJ::.capira prodllct waS roughly a. third lower than ,..tba[-01

(he "unired Kingdorn. 1'1

r The seccmd condirion conducive (O conflicr, dissatisfaction wich cheglobal sra tuS quo, also is present in rhis time periodo Figure 2,4 (p. 53) de-picts the changes in U.K. and German satlsfacrion and dissatisbcrion. Upuncil 1910, alrhough Germany was dissatisfied and rhe Unieed Kingdomsarished, rheir cooperative and noncooperative relations were approxi-mately equal.. The arms bllildups thar occurred becween Germany ane! the

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POWER TRANSITlONS

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United J(ingdom prior to borh world wars, one srarcing in 1906 aud theother in 1930, demonstrate che nOllcooperative nature of their relatíons.'5Both world Wars are classic eXél mples of rwo great powers, at parity andwirh Ol1e dissarisfied, waging Wal' for control oE the intcrnOltiOf131 system.Notiee chat Olftee \Vorlo War H, borh nations are satisfied witll the statusquo and pursue cooperative relaeions to maximize absolLlte gains.

As a result of rhese long periods of pariey and dissatisfaction rhrough-out the beginning oE [he twenrieth cemur)', rhe durarion and severicy ofoot11 wor/el wars were high. Remember that Power Transition theory pos-

tulares rhat the langer ;:¡ dissarÍsfied challenger and dominam nation arein pariry, the higher the severity oE war-as \Vell as [hc longer the durationof conflicto Figure 2.3 shows that t.he U.K .-Germany dyad was in re1ativepariry for mosr oE rhis periodo

The dominant role of the U.K.-Gcrmany dyad during rhis period ac-coums for the initiation of bot11 \Vorld wars . COI1C lIrren tI y, there were anumber oE conflicts in regional hierarchies,including rhe RLlsso-]apaneseWar of 1905 and rhe invasion of China by Japan in 1932. These regionalconflicts did nor escalate to ,he globallevel beca use they did not pose a di-

rect rhreat ro [he dominam power in che global l1ierarchy. Regional wars do

not cliffuse upward. Regíonal conflicts can, however, become parr of wor/dconflagrarían. Once war is waged at tbe global level, regional conflicts can

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53

diffuse and escalate. The V.S.-Japanese Pacific rheater of World War nis a perfect example. Despite rhe importance oí the conflícr wirh Japan,the resolurion of the world war was dependent upon clefeat oí the majorcontender roe global supremacy, Germany. Global wars diffuse downw;¡rd.

In rhe first half of che twenríeth century, two things are apparent fromrhe Power Transition perspectíve. First, tbe Unitecl States had secllred pre-ponclerance over al! other great powers. Second, and more important, is

rhé c10sing of the Britísh power gap with a dissatísfied Germany and othernations. Whether the assassination of an archdllke 01' the sinking of a shipignited the conflíct, rhe strtlctural precondieions far war - pariry and dis-

sarisfaction - were present. 16 Europe truly was a "powcler keg" at the timeof both wars, as Power Transition anticipares.

The consequences of World War 1, though massívc, varied by nat.ion.

The peice of war for Austria-Hungary was severe, leading to che dissolu-tion oE rhe Hapsbllrg Empire in 1918 and Austria's dísappearance fromthe raster of greac powers. Russia emerged horn this conflíct tora by rhe

Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, campounding the enormous Iosses sufferedouring che war. At che global level, f1uctuations oE GDP in the late 1920sand early 1930s show the effects of the worldwide depression on all che

great powers. The United States, eveh though spared the direct bllrden ofwar, experienced a sharp decline in growth rares foUawed by a slow recov -ery. After World War r, French power and economic performance sllfferedgreatly, and did so again after World \Var 1I.

Violent, protracted world wars should have long-term costs. Counter-intuitívely that ís not the case. Frorn tbe asiles of destructiOI1 great powersrise anew. After World War 1, German power declined substantiaHy. Com-bined with teHicorial losses and the burden oí reparations, Germany'sdevastation demonstrated exactly the high costs oE war. Nonetheless, Ger-

mall recovery began as early as 1924 aod contillued in a sustained fashion



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ahcr ] 932 due to che Phoenix Factor. With Hider's accession, German

power rapidly increased from 1932-39 so rhar by tbe ourbreak oL Worlcl

\'('a[ 11 Germany ovcrtook the Unitecl Kingdorn for the seconcl time.

Figure 2.3 demonsrrares how vietory or defca! in war does nor perma-

nently alter the Iong-run evolution of power. Germany afrer World War l

and Germany, ]apan, and haly after World War 11 shrugged off the heavy

losses sl1ffered as a resulr of their dcfeaes. 17 Note thar Gcrman growch

reaehed pre-Warld War 1 leve/s ¡use prior tú rhe outbreak of World War n.After German GDP was by one-ehird in World War 11, ir regained

prewar levels in less than ren years. In retrospect, the losers have done mueh

berrer than the winners . The performance of combaranrs befo re the war

WaS a predictor of how narions woutd perform after the war. Ir was a better

predictor than the actual outcOI-ne oi the war.

\X'herher a nation chooses peace or war, ir cannot manipulare its under-

Iying power dynarnics 01' those of irs competitors. Nations may lose grear

power wars and rise to evcn higher levcls in the international sysrem. Great

powers who win and hold on to their relari'le power preponderance do nO[

have ro fighr. 18 These observations have major implicaeions fol' policymak-

ers and scholars alike by highlighting che cOllstraints ane! opporrunities that

the international power disrriburion placeson

national foreign poliey goals.

The Third Period: The Dynamics of System Transformation

and Pea ce, 1950-9.5

The postwar erais charaeterized by the lack ofrnajor conniet among rhe

grear powers. This period of peace is che resLllt of the power preponderance

of che United Seates. Despire the challenge of a diss:1risfied USSR durillg che

Cold War, peace was mainrained beca use rnere was no overtaking. Figure

2.5 shows che asymmetric power difference between the United Sta tes ane!

the Soviet Union throughour tbe Cold War period, culminating wíeh the

1990 Soviet economic collapse. The logic of .Power Transieion suggests [hat

the conditions associated with the successful maintenance of peaee werepresent throughout the postwar periodo The V<lst power asymmetry be-

tween the United States ane! [he Soviet Unian prevemed an oven challenge

ro U.S. dominance. 19

This asymmetrical distribution of power was known ca borh si.des, anc!

thar fact gave the Unired States usefulleverage. When eensions erupted be-

rween the Unired Sta ces and the Soviet Uníon in disputes like the Cuban

Missile Crisis, rhe Soviet Union backed clown. The United SC3res chose nor

te interfere with Soviet control in Eastern Europe, alJowing Soviet íncer-

vention in Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Easr Germany, and Poland beca use it

did nor threaten the stability of the international arder. \'(iíth ¡he buildup

of NATO in rhe 1970s, ,he U.S.-led coalirion developed overwhelming

superioriry over an increasing[y weak ane! divided Warsa w Pacr coalicion.

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The dynamic period of Soviet power growth began with the commu-

nist revolution in 1917 and lasted into che early 1970s, ar which poinr the

Soviet economy began to stagnate. Evcn ar the height of Soviet power, how-

cver, there never was parity betwecn rhe Unired States and the USSR. In the

second half of that period, the possession of nuclear weapons masked che

Soviee's fundamental inferiority. But these weapons were powerless ro com-

pensate for Soviet deficiencies in polítical, eeollomic, and social resourees.

From che perspecríve of Power Transitíon theory, it was this imbalance

of power wirll the United States chat created the structural eonditions

far peace.Given this imbalance of power, why did both the U.S. and the Soviet

leadership believe explicitly and implicitlyin a rough balance of power?20

Why did many political analysls suggesr rbar American "hegemony" was

coming to an end?It is a fascinating puzzle tiMe tbe leaders ol both the Soviet Uníon and

the United States maintained rhar there was power pariry between the two

countries. As seen in figure 2.5, the power ratio berweerr the Unired States

and the Soviet Uníon hovered aIways around two ro one in favor of rhe

Unired Sta res, and indeed, che interval between rhcm actually increased as

the Cold War went on. The clairn to the contrary by borh governmems con-

tains, in our view, the key to underslanding che dynamics of rhe Cold War.



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We hypothesize rhat sLlch a clairn served the purposes of the subsets oE elites

leading the two narions. Tlle assertion oE power parity renc!ered eredible

the leadership claim thac tbe adversary endangered its society, The power

oE that clairn made it possible ro obtain the resources needed to buttress

their counrry's position ami, concomicanrly, their own.

Wirhout their claim of encirclement and the threat of aggression by che

United Srates, the Soviet leadership would ha ve found it very difficult, if not

impossible, to extraet ane! allocate suEficient resourees from its sociery to

support its huge national seclIrity apparatllS - the party, rhe secrer poLice,

the milítary, rhe governrnental burcaucracy, and the hea vy-industry sector.

011 the U.S. side, without a c1aim that the nation was in mortal dtlnger from

Soviet military expansion, deterred only by U.S. military power, it would

have been impossib!e rOl' the political leadership to obtain rile resources

required to fight off isolationist forces and meet international challenges.

The belíef thar both nations were equal in power had its uses.

Figure 2.6 depiets rile evolution oi U.S. and USSR re!ations since 1941.

Dllring World War 11, the cooperative Allied relarionship was necessitated

by Cerman and Axis aggression. Wirh the emergence of the Cold War

and Russian dissatisfacrion wich American leadership of the international

system, both the Soviers and the Americans pursued noncooperarive ami

competitive poJicies across mosr issues. In the aftermath of the Cold War,

rhe U.S.-Russian relationship eould move in either direcciono lf the Uníted

Sta tes allows Russia to slip away imo a state of dissarísfacrion in the futllre,ir wiU be a strategic miscalculation oE hisrorie proportions.

Although serving domesrie elites' interests, the Cold War was grounded

equally in traditional "power poliries" of foreign policy competiríon. The

Soviet Union headed a substancia! international order oí eleven natiOIlS

comprising fOllghly one-thire! of the people of the world wbile ae the same

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POWER TRANSITION THEORY TESTEO S7

time leading an international eommunist movement. I-Iad the Soviets actu-

ally overtaken the Unired Stares, their foreign policy goal of a Soviet-Ied

internacional system wOlllcl have greatly increasee! the probability of global

war. Being a dissatisfied challenger, the Soviet Union would have sought to

dísmantle rhe existing internacional order and subsritute one oE its own.

The U.S. poliey of meeting the Soviet chaHenge arollne! the world

under the eootainmenr doctrine was 'consisrem with Power Transition rhe-

orl'. Given U.S. straregic eoncerns regionally - i n the Middle East, Asia,

and Latin America - the United States was willing ro expend significant

1I1ilitary ane! eeonomic resou.rces in order to mainrain or crea te a preponder-

ance of satisEed minor powers in a regional hierarchy that would suPPOrt

the U.S. global status quo. Since the Soviets could not ove re/y challenge

the United Srates at rhe globa lleve! due to American preponclerance, rhey

attempted ro destabilize theAmerican-led status quo in various regions.

Moreover, by changing regional hierarchies around rhe globe rrom sup-

porting the United Sta tes to a more pro-Soviet alignmenr, the Soviets might

ultimarely abet an open challenge to the Uniree! States ar the global1evel.

The Soviet-American confrontation officialll' came to an end with the

dísinregration oE the Soviet empire, cosring the newly reconstructed Russia

a loss of 100 mili ion citizeos and an economic collapse as seen in figure2.5. The consequence fol' the global power distribution is Russia's decline

from the oumber-two spot in che great power hierarchy to the middle of the

paek. Whether it can survive as a geeat power in this ceIltury wil! depend

on irs government facilirating economic recovery and rcnewed growth,

Having dealt wirh the U.S.-Soviet eompetitíon, let us now turn to re-

gional hierarchical relationshíps during the thire! periodo European anel

Japanese satisfaetion with tbe status quo maintained the peace in regions .

supervised by these states, Oveitakings oceurred rhrollghollt the postwar

era aS most European nations were at similar levels oE nal'ional power. Cer-

many passed France ancl che United Kingdom again, emerging once more

as a predominant power in Europe. This time however, the passage was

entirely peaceful. The European powers no longer competed fol' leadershipof the international order beca use they approved of the status quo. Within

the region they created the European Union, ensuring the distriburion of

sarisfaction and the resulting peace. .

A telltale sign of the differences between the nrsr two periods :J.lld rhe

posrwar era ís the total absence oI arms buildups among key competitors

in Europe.21 Germany, che United Kingdom, and France no longer direct

their military estab!ishments againsc each other. For che first time since the

Congress of Vienna, al! of the European great powers are members of the

same security alliance, NATO, while forging common economic ground in

the European Un ion . This major system transformarion takes place as a

consequenee of the emergence of rhe Pax Americana.

Cumulative restructuring of rbe global hierarchy occurs in this last pe-



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riod. The shift from a European ro a global hierarchical strucrure \Vas

linked ro (he ascendancy of the United Stares and Soviet Union over rhe

relaüvely smaller nacions. Indee d, che Western Europcan nacions char hadbeen lhe great powers in the ninereenth cemur)' were at the bottom of thegreat powers' ros ter by rhe middle of the Cold War.

Coupled with che decline of rhe European great powers, che Pax Ameri-

cana took form when the Uniced Seates claimed the leadership position afrerWorld War H. This was not only a tlln10ver in dominance, bur a sysremic

restruccuring as wel!. The American interna(ional order e!iffers in impo r-tane respects from irs predecessor. Most prominently, great power controlover rhe developing warld has changed radical/y. The rigid and increasinglycostly structures of political colonialism were dismantled, and Americanclominance was exercisecl through a more flexible and {ar less invasive formof poLitical aIlcl economic controls.

U.S. elite clecisions lO cJ a im leadership and che Soviet collapse allowedfol' l'ealities and perceptions about international rule [Q coincide at lasr. We

have witnessed the passing of.the first American cenrury, with che secondairead)' underway. U.S. leadership and arder is based on ,1 long-standing,stable, ane! large power advantage over all oeher great powers. The over-

whelming stability of the American power asyrnmerry can be seen in the

following staeisrics : Thc Uniced Stares passessed approximately 40 percentof che power of the entire greac power syscern in (he years 1913, 1938,and 1985. Its advantage over the main contenders in che twentieth centnry,Germany and Russia, rernained ullvaried ayer this long period of rime al' aratio of almose (Wo-to-one. Ameri ca n isolarion¡st policies masked rhe real-

ity of American power preponderance uc the st,ll't of chis period. 22 The greatdifference after World War tI was the U.S. decision to move ro an inrerna-rionalist poscure, cledicating enorrnOllS resources ro enforcingits leadersbipposition.

Conclusions and Projectiolls

The major argument of this chapter focuses on differences in rhe size oE che

reSOU l'ce pools rhat nations possess, consequenrly establishing not onl)' thedistribmions of inrernarÍonal power, but J11oreover the strucrLlraLcondi t:0 ns

fol' war and conflicto These thr:ee comp.o.nenrs;_p2P-ularion sizeú lfoductivi¡y, and political capacity. Cambined they denne the

siie-or a nation's resource potencial <1vailable for exercising power. Oolvnation ha,:; a

sured. DiHereoces in races of economic change among nationai resourceporeñ"tials drive shi fts ii1 the rankings of great powers and contain che dy-namics associated wirh conflicto [n the Power Transition perspective, rhe

ovenaking challenger's satisfaction witn the global status quo strongiy af-

fects the prospects for war01'

peace. These are the constraints of ¡he

I'OWER TRANSITION THEORY TES CEO 1 S9.'

inrernational power dynamic. The aggregare measures of economic per-formance and rhe POVv-er Transition perspecrive allow social scientists <1nd

policymakers alike ro iclencify and explain these important phenornena.Our overview of the developmenr of the internarional syseem since

18J 5 leads LIS to pose several e-ssential quescions,,-First, whac is rhe poten-rial for overtakings) Second, how peaceful wil! sllch-passages be!

Finally, what can be done ro enhance rhe pxobability of peace? The reSE

of lhis I)ook is dedicatee! tú answering these qllesrions, bllr so me summar)'

polie)' conclusions can be foreshadowed here.In the nexr few deeades, Chin a will overtnkc the Uniced States. The po-

tencia l fol' al1 arms buildup berween the 'se rwo cannot be dismissed. TE suchan event occurs, past cxperience is mixed, Recal! rhat British anel Gerrnandites chose wal repeatee!ly befare opring for cooperarion anc! peace, On

rhe orher hand, the United Stares ovenook England withont conflict andaccepeed the mande of leadership when i ts leadership was assured. The cen-eral question then beco me s what can be done to ensure that China fol.lows

rhe latter parh racher than (he fOfmer.

It is incorrect to compare (he potential ov.ercaking by China withche Soviet challenge during tb e C9ld War . There are critical diffe re-ncesbetween cheses (wo challenges. The power as)'mmetry that secured U.S .

hegernony from Soviet threats was basee! borh on productivity and pOpllla -t.loll. China has the poremial ro overtake the United Swtes becallse it onlyrequires a level of productivity one-fifth ¡haC of che United Sta tes due to ¡es

tremenclous population ae!vantage. Short of a carasrrophic nuclear \Val' 01'

domestic disinregration, ane' cannot but anticipate the emergence oI Chinaas che largesr and most productive nat io n in the interna cional sysrem.

The historical experiences we have evaluated suggesr that ovenakingsb)' themseJ.ve s are nar sufhcient conditions fol' conflict. China might readf1y

aceepe internatíonal rules ancl accommodare irs ínt'eres ts wirhin (har frame-wor k. lf such changes do occur, we do [lot anticipare the bu ildup of armsbetween tbe challenger and dominant nation. There wOllld be no alter-narian in the status qua, and (he resulr would be a peaceflll overtaking.If China does m,odify íts current te5fnnnenU DWNd

J iSlleclu ñder rhe Pax j. mericana, rhe

..... i ca say, in .th e..Jl Uclear era slIch

Chaprer 7 deals wirll rhe poremial China challeoge io depth. •of hiswry does not Icave LIS helpless. The resolution of

long-eerm conHicts in Europe sugge sc s pos si ble changes líkely to help peaceprevail. The crearion of th e Elll'0!2ea n Uníon sho ule! nor be seen only_as

an exe rc i'iie in-ecollom ic integra (ion- It ffiusca lso, viewed as che crearionor-a peaceful envir onment th ar has replaced long-standing co nfrollratiolls.Following the callapse oE the Soviet Unian, the United Sra(es and--;he

pean powers face very similar challcnges (O internacional stability. IfNATOis expanded to inelude [lOt onl )' Eastern Emope but Russia as wdl, the se-



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60 POWER TRANSITIONS

cLlriry threat rhat dominared the Cold War will be a distant memoq'. The

expansion of the European Community into Eastern Europe, rhe forrner

Soviet republies, and cventually Rus sia, would restructure thar communicy

as much as the original EEC restructured Wescera Europe. Moreover, che

possibiliry of a broader coalitioa, including che United States, grearerEu-

rape, and Jap:W", eould becorne a bloc oí such magnitude thar rhe

int<::n:ptional stabifur. could bepreserved for_l sig-

nifieant periodo This "sllperblo <: " would stave off the imrninenr dominance

óf 01l11a, malntain system srability, and guarantte rhe pea ce irrespective oE

Chinese dissatisfaction wirh rhe status guo. Chapter 6 aclclresses the foreign

poJicy implieations of allianee fonnarion and managemenr with a specific

focus on NATO and Russia.

Out analysis has strategic implications for future international Jistri-

butions of power. Cbina, India, 01' perhaps other members oí the successful

world eventllally must be invited to the company of rhe grear

powers. Maintaining power asyrnmerry pro_vids:s breathing spaee for th ; )\international comrnunicy ro reconcilc differences and forge acecptablc rul.?s

hat al! members can suppon. China and other populous devdoping na-

iOllS cannot be excluded from tbe set of satisfiecl nations íf we hope ro

maintain peace and stability in tlle twenty·first century. For surely the .

and powcr clynamies that prope! che enrrent great powers

will a1so thrllst the developing worlcl to preeminenee.

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CHAPTER 3Regional Applications:

Multiple Hierarchies

A general theory of intei-national polities is necessarily basedon the great powers. The theory once UJrítten a/sa app/iesto lesser states that interact inso(ar as their ínteractions areinsulated (ram the intenJention o( th e great powers o( asystem, whether by the relative indi((erence o/ the Jatter or by

the difficulties o( communication cmd transportatían.- KENNETH WALTZ

The discussion thus f<lf generally has focllsed on interacrions among (be

great powers. This is a rime-honored tradirion in international politics re·search. NonerheJess, power transirlons between the ver}' strongest sta tes arerare phenomena, whíle •.d1S

in regional . This fact has a'powerful politit"áfirnperative. In (he absence of a great power challenger,U.S. polícyi:nakers focLls on regional conflicts, be it warfare in lraq andKosovo or rhe potential of confljcr in Norrh Korea. As is often the casein international polirics, che immediate displaces the long-termo For PowerTransi(ion rheory, this change of venuc is not a handicap.

The wealth of empírical suppon for Power Transition theory has

crca teel a prelin1Ínary consenSllS al110ng many international relations re·searchers (hat .oE

a.!!. m,.ughIY .E<91Lal 1 d-2.,re difterent in poy>,er. 1 Since many of the findings upon

whíá¡'[his consensus is based eva luare power relationships and conflict foral! pairs of states, tbere is a logical ex(ension rhat the relationship between

fParity and war is applicable ro minar powers as well as great powe.rs, to 1

e;glonal subs)'stems as well as to rhe overall system.. Pawer Transirion theory posits rhat preponderance by che domínáóI

power is pacif}'ing, while parity between rhe dorninant power and a dis·satisfied challenger gready inCIeases the probability of war. Jf the conRictsdescribed by Power Transirion (heory were boxing matches instead of ínter·S(3te wars, on ly heavyweight ti de fights wontd be peninent to the theory.

In this chaprer we argue rhat, proyided che great powers do nor intervene,

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Power Transition theory applies (O all divisions, frolD f1yweight to heavy-weight. Tbe purpose of this chapter is to establish rhe existenee of a gerleralrdevance for Power Transition rheory beyond the great po\vers.

A generalizarion of Power Transitiorl theory to regio naTConflicts in-creases _eonfidenee in the aecuraey oI the overall theory in international

relatiorls. This inereased confidence ¡listines usi ng Power Transition theory

to oHer guiclelines ro formulate foreign polie}" stra tegies.

Multiple Hierarchies in World Politics

The multiple hierarehy model asserts that the international system is eom-posed of regional hierarchies wirh parallel funetions.2 Power Transition

tl1eory has focused on the overall global hierarchy; which is domirJaccd bythe greac powers. Wars fought for control of tbe global hierarchy are fougbr

for control oí the global syscem. Such conflicts involve cheof sta ces and are devastatingly desrructive .

lvhat mast refer ro as the global sl'stem.,

. The multiple hierarchy modd extencls this approach to smallcr powers

around the globe. Their regional hierarchies function identically to the over-

al! global hierarchy. 1n the rcgionarlUerarCi1ieStJiere is a regíoñalCfOñitñiilt-sTater Fiatestar;TI$hes and maintaíns a regional status qua. Other sra Ces inthe regional hierarcby either are advalHaged by and satisfied with this re-gional status quo or disadvantaged by and dissatisfied wirh it. Should one

_oLthes.e .QOgi<.? nal ly dissatisned sta tes pow! r paEky ->viU1

d-0mÜ1..1.I1LS.!:ate, a war wiflriíi"'t'he regional hierarchy is likely. Thus, power

pariry an d negative evaIuations of the status quo are associa ted with wacin regionalhierarchies, jl1st as they are in Power Transition theory's over,dl

global bíerarchy. Great powers atop the global híerarchy probably could

upset theoutcome of any confrontation at ¡he regional level, but they

seldom do so.Figure 1.1 (p. 7) diagrammatically represems the global international

híerarchy as a triangle \-vhere height represenrs greater power and width re-f1ects the faet that the re are more states ar lower levels of power than at

higher leve!s. The strong are few whiJe the weak are many. lt might beeasiest to conceíve of che multiple hierarchy model's addition to Powcr

Transition theory by vísualizing che triangular international system as a

three-dimensional cone within whích smaller eones are nested. Eaeh cone

represents a power hierarchy. The largest cone ís the overall global hi-erarch)', exactly the same power hierarchy as tbar rcpresented by Power

Transítion theory's original triangle. The sma!ler cones wirhin the overall

eone are rhe regional hierarchies.

of ¡he !};iapgle as a cone adds a third dimens.onBrazil and India, for example, m ay be siwl.larly

powerful and would thus be placed at approxirnately the sarne height in

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1\ lobal Hiera/'chy

Regional Híerarchies

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Figure 3.1 Regional Hierarchies in the lnternational System

the triangle, but the y do notinterac t within rhe same regional híerarchy.

They are separated by many thousands of miles of oceans and continents.

Therefore, India is an important actor in a regional hiera rchy in Somh Asia,Brazil in a regional bierarchy in South Ame rica. Tbey would consequently

be found in separa te smaller eones nested withia the overall cone. Figure

3.1 depices chis emendation to the original figure 1.1.Regional hierarchies function just líke the overall global hierarchy, but

thece is at lease one important difference. The regional bieraq:: h ie@ re pec-hierarc.hY"J t is as che

regional are ..intematíonal arenas over which external and more

.powerfu[ spectate. Should tlie great powers wish to interfere with

relátions among regional hierarchy members, they can do so. International

history offers many examples of great power irlterfererlce in minor power

affairs. Thus, when conceptualizing rhe wodd as a series of functionally

similar power hierarchies, one,JP u§t mifld tbe regional t}er-arcbies are subiect ro external interventiol1,- while the-.relations between

grea t powers <\1. the peak Qf the overall g.lobal hieral'chy are noto Conse-

quently, sorne cautíon ís required when determining the impact oE great

power behavior on relations within regional .hierarchies. At the same time ,

it is important to bear this distinction in mind when concepcualiúng to

POWER TRANSITrONS



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The Multiple Hierarchy Model

First we must have an operacional definirían 'of regional hierarchies. Awealrh of scholarly eHon has been dedicateJ co ¡he idem.ific:uion of "re-gions," "subordinare srate sysrems," "subordinare internacional s)'sr tJ1lS,"

"internarional subsystems," "geogra phic "regimes," "regional sub-sysrems," "polirically re!evant· neighborhoods," or "clusrers of nations. "JA wide range of em.pirical concerns an d dara 'soul'ces have been associatedwith these various efforts ro SlpSeJS .oÜ he.syscem, The crireria by which the various subunirs have been cOllstl'L1cted

CuJi.u.ral si.mi1ªcití.es,_t.fil.dq¡¡LtrQ:QS, cOI!2m21l _ 1,!embe[$.hip21J.n.,teJnatiOñai organizaríoJ1s, alliance patrerns, and d:ém.ogea.phic.sirnil-ai"

JJis tilling rhis

.:.:::. dis W°f.'ortionacclY_J!.gSL ro define }!$iSns:ll1 teractlOn.

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Proximity

Studies have shown rhar the presence of internacional bo rders plays an ím.portanr role in subsequent wars berween cOllntries.4 Ir is nm the bordersper se (hat cause wars, bur rarher that borders are symptomaric of prox-

imity. Proximiry inereases interactions between coumries, forces cou nrriesro take each other serioltsly, and ineceases rhe potemial for disputes.5 Some

scholars, noting [har territorialiry is an importanr charaeteris tic of vjnuallyall animals, argue thar rerritoriality makes people sensieive regarding rhe

space they inhabic and rhreats ro ir.6 Since proxirnicy increascs interactions,and people are sensirive aboLlt interactions involving rerritory, the potemialfor conflicr inereases with proximity.

Sueh consider(\cions are important f01' evalllating the rnultipJe hierar-

chy moJel beca use in order to determine wherher minor powers fighr warsnnder the same circumstances as rhe great powers, we firsc have to knowwhich minor 110 wers to eonsider. Anyone would know not ro evaluate theinternaeional relations of Paraguay wirh Thailand beca use ehe two COlln-

tries lie so far apart there is virrually no cllance they will go ca wal' wich

each oeher. We need to remove from consideration all pairs of srates such asParaguay and Thailand and focus instead 011 srates thar consíder each othcrwhen assessing poremial threars to cheie security. Sets oE minar power statesthar couldplaus ibly assess ea ch oeher as potenrial security threars comprisea regional hierarehy.

With such variables in mind, regional hierarchies have been defined as

existing where minor powers' "politically relevant neighborhoods" Over-

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REGIONAL APPlICATIONS: MUlTlPI.E HIERAIlCHIES ) 67

lap. The political!y relev anr neighborhood of any stace is thar pare of rheearth's surfaee with whieh rhe state coneerns irself. More powerful sea tes

will have larger areas of concern. Less powerful srares wil! be , necessarily,to rhink of internarional affairs in more regional terms since

rhey do not ha ve rhe resources ro a ffecr matters far from theír borders.The procedure by which regional hierarchies have been operarionally de-

fined explicitly 'assumes rhat sta tes pay more arcencion ro chat pare of che

globe wiehin which (hey can exert military inlluenee. This isI lot

to sayehat che leader of a minor power sta te would ignore the superpowers, butracher (hat when formlllaring his or her scate's foreign policies and makingstrategic plans, rhese wil! rcmain primarily regional.

Given rhat a stare's politically re/evant neighborhood is defined as thearea wichin which ie can exerr mi./irary influenee, it is possible ro mea surethis area by eo nsideration oE rhe logis ríes of military transito One wa y to

do chis is (Q begin with él eOllnrry's power resourees (measlIred in waysdescribed below), and rhen give consideracion ro how far chese can be clis-

parch ed. In calculating this, a "Ioss-of-srrength" formulais developed thatrakes imo account rhe actual terrain char would be faeed in any eEfort to

move military reSO LlCces f1'ol11 point A ro poil1t B. This formula adjusrs

nacional power by degrading it for the d¡sranee to be covered.7

Ad juscedpower is chus the 3mOllnt ot original power left over when the impacr ofdistance is taken into

The innovation in the use oE this formula for multiple hierarchy modelpllrposes eoncerns the "miles- per-da y" component of rhe exponent. Thiseomponenr is supposed ro represent rhe possible transíe rangc allowed by

available teehnology. PrC\'íous uses of the exponent had assigl1cd a transierange of 250 miles from 1816 to 1918,375 miles frorn '1919 ro 1945, and500 miles per day after 1945. 9 While ie is el"ue thar advaoees in tl'ansporta-

. rion have dramaticaJly increased the transir ranges of milirary forees, 500miles per day is especially ovcroptilTlisrie for rhe miliracy forces of minorpowers. JO ConsequentIy, rhe version oE the formula lIsed oere takes into ac-

cOllm obstacles thar lie betwcen potential minol" power adversaries such asmountains, jungles, 01' riversj as well as how fasr rhese obsrades can be

overcome.Adjllsted power is designed to determine which minor powers are able

ro intcract milíc arily. Ir defines a stare's polítieally relevanr neighborhood as

comprising al! those other sta res ro whích it can move 50 percent or moreoE ¡rs power ineo the other's national capital. This 50-pereent thresholdisjustilied by rhe asslImption th at if most of a stare's capabilities are Spcntin transit, the disrance is probably too great ro warrane che expenditure ofresources. In defining regional hierarchies, chis formula is applied ro eachsrate's capability share over che distances ro each orher state ro dererminethe politically rele va nr neighborhood for each minor power srate. When

two 01' more sta res' polirically relevanr rreigh borhoo ds overlap, th ose srates

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very likely rhink of each orher wheo formulating foreigo policy or con-

sidering military activity. Politically relevant ncighborhoods are the centrale1ement of reg ional hierarchies.

Patterns of Interaction

Regional hierarchies are funccionalJy simi lar to rhe overall global hierarchy.While the dominanr global power establishes a global status quo tilar bell-

ehts itself, regional dominant stares establish regional status quos. Whataspecrs oE internacional interacrions can the regional leaders "carve out"as their own? Although no de6nitive answer exists, rhe regional status quoconcerns issues primarily oE regional concern. Access to straregic or orher-wise valuable te'rrirory must play an imporrant parro Níany, iE not most,minor power wars have been fought for territorial gain. Who was to have

access ro the mineral riches of the Arac3ma Desere jusrified the War oE rhe

Paci-ic pitting Chile versus Peru and Bolivia in the 18705. Who wiJl controlthe religious sites oE Judaism and Islam undergirds much of rhe Arab-Israeli

conflict. India and Pakistan are unable te agree abollt control of Kashmir.The overall dominant power is litde concerned with who specifically

controls rhese variOllS parts of the globe, so long as the mineral (iches are

exponed and the global status quo undisturbed. Thus, access te variousterritories must bc an impo rtanr part of the regional status guos. By rerri-tory we shotlld probably thiuk broadly in terms of navigable waterways,defensible borders, access to holy or cultllrally imponanr sites, as weU as

arable lands ane! mineral cleposits, Thus, rhe territorial focus of regional

status quos may also llave imporcant components aside from the intrinsicvalue of the land.

That regional status quos are primarily territorial does not prede-rermine that they wil] be exclusively concerned wirh che posscssion ofrerritory. It is quite possible rhar regional status quos ',Viii be character-izec! by ethnic, military, economic, or icleological disagreemems between

regional dominant powers ane! regional challengers. Por example, one ofrhe regional hierarchies identified in Africa comprises the ceneral Africanstates of Rwanda anel Burundi. Any regional status quo between these twostates wili ha ve a heavy erhnic quality. Although the horrific vio lence in

these counrrics has been largely dorncstic racher than cross-border, rhere

are substantial connections berween R wanclan and Burundian HUtL1S andbetween Rwandan and Burunclian Tursis rhar indicate the leaders of eithersrate ."ould prder thar rheir ethnic confreres be dominant in the orher.

An ideological regional status qUQ example can be drawn from a re-gional hicrarchy in 50urheast Asia. With its vicrory over and absorprion of50mh Vietnam in 1975, rhe Democrarie Republic of Vietnam beca me the

strongesr state in Sourheast Asia and thus the regional dominanr power.

For some time, North Vietnam's leadees had been encouraging a commu-

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REGIONAl,\PPlICATlONS: MUlTlPlE HIERARCHIE5 69

nist insurgency in Laos, anel in 1975 rhey ínvadeel Cambodia and instituteda similar regime in Phnom Penh. It seems clear thar the Vietnamese sratusquo in Soucheasr Asia, rhough limired in time, was primarily ideologicaL

The character of the regional status quo gives srrong indications aboutpotencial great power interference wirhin regional hierarchies. A regionalstatus quo concerned with che disrribution of territory is unlikely to be

of interese to external great powers for rhe simple reason thar so long as

rhe reSOllrces of Chat territory are made available for expon, who specifi-cally eontrols the territory is inconsequential to che great powers. However,when che regional sra tus quo concerns a mattee of interest to the greatpowe r, as was rhe case in Southeast Asia in rhe 19605 and 1970s, interÍer-ence is mucb more likely. Of course this does nor mean char grear powerswill be toral ly uninteresred in regional hierarchies where the regional status

quo is primarily territorial, rather it simply means thar rhere is a greaterlikelihood of great power interest and inrerference when rhe regional statusquo is more sa lient externally.

Such concerns are nor tri vial. A monkey wrench can be tbrown intoregional hierarchy interactions jf great powers interfere. In contrast, lead-ers of rcglonal hierarchies cannot interfere wirb rhe hierarchy of che great

powers. T!lere is no clear-cuc answer to questions of how much this in-equality of interference affects wodd politics. BU( it seems clear thar che less

interference [rom aboye, the more rhe regional hieraxchies parallel the over-

aH global hicrarchy. In fact, the basic hyporhesis of the rnultiple hierarchymodel extension of Power Transition theory is chat absent such imerfer-ence, regional hierarehies will function in the same way as does the globalpcwer hierarchy. Thus che main hypothesis of the multiple bierarchy model

extension is operative only absenr grear power interference.This raises an interestíng question of how often and to what degree

great powers actuall)' do intervene in minor power relations. Here rhe sur-

prising conclusion is rhat great powers rarely involve themselves overrly inminor power imerstate relations. lI To be sure, there are dramaric exam-

pies ro the contrary offered by the cases of wars in Vietnam, Korea, andAfghanistan. Grear powers. sllch as the United States or Sovier Uníon aremore involved in minor power relations than are smaller members of theglobal hieral'chy. Bur when one considers rhe number of minor power in -teractions and the potentia l opportuníties for interference compared ro rheactual number of interventions, the startling conclusion is rhat rhe greac

powers by and large ,gnore the weaker srates oE the world.Thcl'e is drarnatic evídence for this c1aim. The Militarized [nrerstace

Dispute clata setll lists all irrstances in which one state rhrea te ned, dis -played, 01' useel force against another between (he yeaes 1816 and 1992.[n total, there are more rhan 2,000 slIch militarized inrersrare disputes in

the data ser, lf we consieler only disputes rhat begin between minar powers

and trear each minO!' power militarized intcrstare dispute as a porential in-

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IlECIONAl M'PLlCAflONS : MUlTIPlE HIERARCHIES 71



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rervencion oppofCllniry for each of the grear powers,I;I there were more than

5,800 such opportunities. Of these near!y 6,000 opportuniries for eaeh of

the great powers to intervene, tbefe are fewer rh:t11 seventy toral insrances

of overt military partic.ipation and rhis includes threats, displays) and use

oE force by the great powers. The grear powers have inre rvene d in minor

power interstate conOicts in just over 1 percent of all opporruniríes ro do

so. Great powers usually ignore [he minor powel's.14

The previous two paragraphs are llot offered as proof rhat regional hi-

erarchies are free of great po\ver interferenc€ lnsteacl, they are offered assuggestive eviclenee rhat chere is more: independence of minor power re-

lations fIom gIeat power interfcrence rhan an impressionistic perusal oE

currenr evenes might convey. Again, the hypmhesis of the mulciple híerarchy

model ís thar che regional hierarchies operace parallel co the overall hicr-

archy, absent external interference. The resulcs below ¡he parallel

operation is aCCllrate. The valiclity of the results is enhan.:.:ed by considera-

tion of the plausibiliry of cbe independence of regional rdations from greatpower inrerference.

A final poinr we would make along chese lines is that logically there

stiH are ímplications from Power Transitíon theory abollt when such rare

interventíons/inrerference might oecur and how great powers mighc ínter-

vene effectively. Readers should Ilot assume great powers never intervene inminor power affairs oc rhat great powers ollght not imervene in such af-

fairs. The observarion aboye of limired great power ¡nrerfeIence is IlH)St

likely rhe consequenee of a strategie interacrion between great power

expectations and behavior wirh minor power expectatiollS and behavior.

Specifically, whenever rhe stakes (the regional status quo) involved in a

minor power dispute are conseqllential to great powers we shonJd antici-

pate great power interference. The leaders oE minor power stares, how ever,

should expecr this interference roo. Consequently, they will probably be

less likely to get involved in con(\icrs they expecr ro provoke great power

imerference beca use doing so woulel largely remove control of their aHairs

from their own hallds. Leaders of minar power stares are thus probabIy

disproportionately likely to construcr their relations such rhar their dis-putes do .llar involve stakes consequcntial ro great powers or ro resolve

disagreemems aboLlt such stakes in slIch a way as ro avoid grear powerimerference.

All of this sllggests that grear powers do interfere witll minor power

relatiolls, but eirher ar the margins 01' via expecrations before conflicts aCtll-

alty erupt. Knowledge oI rhe likely narure of great power incerference oHers

suggestions for prodllCtive ways in which grear powers, like rhe United

States, might achieve objecrives in regional hierarchies . Mak ing ir known

ahead of time that the United States will involve i(8eH if SOrne regionai sta-

tus quos become challenged (for example, there appears to be a reasonably

strong precedenc ro rhis effecr with respect ro the terrüoria[ integrity oE

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Kuwait), rnight be an intervemioll char \vOLlld prevellt sLlch a challenge in

che first place. Sllch poliey relevane applicarions are raised.in the conclllding

section of [his chapter and in chaprer 8

Regional Analyses of the Multiple Hierarchy Model

In regional hierarehies, the 9sn'v'eSJ1 .

.power and each regional are studied to determine whether or not

power pariry and dissa cisfacrion wirh rhe regional status qua are associatedwith war wirhin che regional hierarchies. 1.l Simply pllt,we discern whether

peIiodLill . regiQnal is rOLlgJ1fx emLilio

Row er wars Q.c_J.lrr..ecl

wirhin regional hierarchies.

-----:'[0 apply the rnultiple hicrarchy model, regional hierarchies are delinee!

for SOLlrh America, East, Empiri-

caUy, Power Transition theol:y's expecrations abOllt pariry and status quo

evaluariolls are sus rained. South America experienced two wars17 during

chis rime frame, rhe War of the Pacific anel che Chaco War. Both occurred

lindel' conditions of power pariry anel sc<\rus C¡L10 dissarisfaction by che

challenger. In che Middle fa sr there were four wars during the covered

years (Six Day War, Yon¡ KippUI War, Israeli -5y rian 1982 WaJ in sourhern

Lebanon, and rhe Jran-lraq \'{lar), a1l bllt one of whicb (Israeli-Syrian) oc-

curring under condirions anticipa red by rhe rheory. Easr Asia's five relevant

wars (Tndia-Pakisran 1965, India-Pakistan 1971, Nonh -SourhKorea 1950,

Norch-Sollth Vietnam 1965, alld Viernam-Cambodia 1975)were all fought

under conditions of status quo dis sa tisfaction, bur only (W O of them (Korea

and Viet nam) were foughr whilc rhe principal belligerencs were at rel¡¡cive

The rwo waIS in Africa since 1960 (Ethiopia-Somalia 1977 and

Ugancla-Tan za nia 1978) did nor occllr as anticipated by the theory, neíther

power parit)' nor dissatisfaction were observed (althollgh, power parir)' and

status quo di ssarisfaction do have importanr impacrs in Africa becallse they

increase che probability of dispures and wars, as clescribed below).

The STUclies summarized in figure 3.2 (p. 72) evaluare the probability

of observing a war within a regi onal hierarchy s'ven variation in rhe res-

regi onal challen er. 19 Figure 3.2 can be i!1terpreted intuirively. It represcnrs

the pro a Ji icy otwar oeclIfl'ing under varying combinations of power dis-

tribmi ons and sa tisfaction. For example, che probabilícy oE a war occurring

within Ah'ican regional ís far less likely when neirher pa r iry nor

dissacisfaction is present. Figure 3.2 ma kes slIch comparisons possible by

pro viding the condicional probability of observing a war given differenr

combinations of power parie)' and/or status quo dissatisfaction. 20

rOL ail fiye regions, the probability of war

n eed, war is fiveto

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REGIONAL APPLlCATIONS: MUlTIPLE HIEI<ARCHIES i3



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I'OWER TRANSITIONS

Conditiona! Probability of War by Regioos(in percenlage)

Powers¡Ifrica FI/r East

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Figure 3.2 Probability of Regional Wars

2,3

ami dissaÜsiaceion are joiml}'

ábi!ities of war iu.m.ino-LlJ.,Owp, .U.e.glons_(] -.o.\l tº 19.4 percetuLs.tiU in.4 ica.tes

al]_d War ís such a ghascly

business thae even seemingly min(Jr increases in ¡ts probability are clanger-

OllS.

A condieional probability of war of 19.4 percent might seem Iow, butthis srill means that one in five Far Enstern dyacls characterized by parieyaod clissarisfactíon go ro war. From our perspective, chis is substanciaL)·1

The cell entries of figure 3.2 are conditional probabilities of war basedon logisric regression analyses. To see how ml1ch going from preponderancero parity increases the probability of wal' for a given great power dyad, one

woulcl compare the second row of the first co[uml1 (14.8 pereenr) to thefirst row of rhe /irst column (7.9 pereent), Doing so provides tbe change in

the probability of war for the average greac power clyad as it varíes feom

a situaeíon of preponderance to one of parity. What we learo by makingthis eomparison is that the average great power dyad under parity is twice

as Iikely to go ro 'war as is a great power clyad nO( characterized by p'arity

Similar comparisolls can be macle within eaeh oE the other regional con-textSj al! lead to the conclusion that ,parity ancl dissatisfaction make warrnuch more líkely.

In the case of the greac powers we observe that as we go from nei-

ther parity nor dissaeisfaction to situations in which there is parity alone ordissatisfaetion a[one to situacioIls in which there is borh parity and dissat-isfaction, rhe estimated probability of war inereases froITl about 8 percentto aboue 15 percent, then to 32 percent, and fina[]y reaches írs peak ataImost 49 percent. Thcse are enormous substantive changes. Parity and dis -satisfaction make war six times more Jikely than is the case when (hese

(WO belligerent conclirions are not presento This is impressive support for

Power Transirion theory, but ir is support we already anticipaeed based on

the discussion of Power Transition's empírical validity in chapter 1 <1nd lhe

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graphic slIpporr addllced in ehapter 2. What lS perhaps mLlch more intcrest-ing, ancl certainl)' l1nique to this chapter, is rhat the same sons of increasesare observed within minor power regional settings as wel!.

When we make comparisons aeross the ceUs of figl1re 3.2 fol' ¡he minorpower region s, we find rhat the-probability of war in African regional hi-

erarchies increases almost tenfold (frorn 0.8 percent in ¡he nrst row to 7.8percent in the bottom row). Similarly, in Far Eastern regional hierarchiesthe probability of war when (he conclitions Power Transition theory sLlg-

gests are tbe causes oE war inerease aimose ninefold (from 2.2 percent in

the first row to 19.4 percem in the bottom row). In ¡he Midclle East theprobability of war in regiO!l<11 hierarchies increases almost tenfold (from1.4 to 13.3 percent). and rhe same is true in SOllth American regional hi-

erarchies (wh ere the corresponding increase as we go hom neither paritynor dissatisfaction to the joint presenee of rhese two dangerous conditionsis frolll 1.2 to 11.6 percent). Parity and dissatísfaction make war, on aver-age, ten times more likely in minor power regional settings. Th.s is strongempiIic::d validation of the multiple hicrarehy model's expectations

\X1hy shollld this be a surprise ro anyone? Why should we care aboutthis finding ? The answers to borh qllesrions "re related. Over the years there

has been a tendency in academic circles and in foreign polie)' organizationsro focus on whatis unique Ol' specific ro a. given country 01' place. TheU.S . Depawnent of Sta te is organized by "countr)' desks," unirs specificto each foreign country with which the United Sta tes can'les 011 diplomaticrelations. In acaclemic cireles ie is very common to train "arca specialists"who become experts in the polities and history of a given country or region.

\Vhile cOllntry desks and arca specialists are important, even essentía!repositories for decailed descriptive informarion, rheir very existence sug- .gests the assumptioll that tbere is sornethíng uoique abOlir rhe place in

which they specialize. Similarly, popular opinion holds that rhere is "some-thing dífferem" about Africans compared to Europeans, 01' about MiddleEastem interstate relations compared to relarjons between Canada aod the

United States. We hear of intractable disagreements, irrational attachrnentsto holy war, to tribe or caste affecting relations beeween minar powers. [n

contrase, the seates of the developed world are presurnecl, if only implic-itly, te> be more rational, more calculating, and thus less emotional in theír

interstare interactions .The findings reported in figure 3.2 sllggese that the factors associared

with the occurrence of war are similar enough across minor power regionsand across the minor-major power divide rhar we can use one theoreticalstructure to explain and thus anticipate when wars will occur aronnd the\Vorlcl. There may still be importam differences between Arab-lsraeli rela-tlons cornpared to British-German relations, but those differences are oídegrce, not kind. Regardless of culture, level of development, or whatever

orher variable allegedly makes sorne part of the world "different" from the

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I'OWEr¡ RE.GIONAl APPLlCATlONS : MUl.TIPlE HIERARCHIES 75



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rest, tbe presence of power parity and clissatisfaction with rhe status quo

has a substancial and consisrent!y posirive impact on th.e probability of war.

This means (har we can have greac confidence in llsing Power Transicion

theory co guide Qur expeccarions aboLlt futllrc internacional inceracrionswithin minar power regions as well as among rhe great powers ..

Dynamics of Regional Transitions

An addirional and perhaps .more' inruitivé way ro demonstra te rhe im-

porcance of Power Tr'1nsicion argulllénts tor analysis of minor power

inreractions and cheir relationship with major powers can be achieved by

consielering rhe dynarnics oE transitiol1s in imponanr regi on al conflicrs. Two

cases were seleeted basee! on their high visibility and impact in the rwentierhcentllry.

Norlh and SOllfh Vietnam

Figure 3.3 shows the rdative power sha res of North and South Vietnam.""

When rhis rario is aboye pariry, the challcnging North is more poweJful

rhan the defending 50mh. The COuntries face prolonged parir)' from 1954until rhe defear of SOLlth Vietnam in 1975. Thcse are che classic conditions

for a serious and prolonged war, speeified by Power Transition theory. Fig-

L1re 3.2 is divided inro two perlocls. The early Wal" period refers to the initial

confliet between North <lnd SOLlth Vietnam, roored in rhe regional hierar-

ehy. Inrerference by the foreign actors is mínimal during this periodo The

Freneh wirhdrew from Norch Vietnam following rheir cldeat at Dien Bien

Phu and were onl)' minor parricipants during chis periodo Thc Unitee! Stares

involvemenr was increasing bLlt stiH limited prior [Q rhe Gulf of Tonkin in-

cident. During the U.S. -slIpporred \'lar periad, which begins in 1964, the

coniliet shifts from a regionally focu se d war ro a conflicr involving globalpowers, who were critical in deterrnining the final OlltCome.

Following rhe overtaking in 1955, short of external íntervention, onewould anticipare tbac North Vietnam wOlJld have defeared the 50mh and

uflified che COllntry. Thc extension of rhe war beyond 1964 is e/early the

result of American interventiol1, which shifted rhe bal ance of forces in favor

of rhe South. Despite massive U.S. support, pariry is maintained throughOlltthe conflicto23

The regional dyoamics óf power and status quo eva[uations ac(ount

fox the iniriation oí this conflier. Both coumries Were dissarisfied with rhe

exisring distribution oí territory, which was che result of che French defeat.

From the perspective oí che Unieed Staces and orher major powers, this was

a wac of limired scope. While U.S. fataliries exceedecl fifty chollsan d, rhe

magnitude of loss was noc as substancial as io World Wars 1 and n.

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Fo!" the Viecnamese, (his was the regional equivalenc of the mos e dra-

matic wars ac che globalleveJ. [ndeed, as POWel" Transition anticipates, (he

.mosr scvere wars (lccnr ar times of parity, both ae rhe regional and global

leve!. Severe regional wars ca n be a{feeted by the inrerventíon oE great

powers, whichwill not accepe losses of the same ma gnitude as wirh a global

war. This is "Che difference between rhe global hierarchy, where war Out-

comes are unaffected by the lnvo]vement of orher actors, and the regional

hierarehies, where anticipa ted outcomes ca n be reversed by great powcr tn-

volvement. Incleecl, ro full)' unders rancl region<ll wars, oue muse consider the

patrern of inter ventio l1s and influence in the global hierarchy - enhancing

.rhe levels of uncenairuy.

Iran and Iraq

The case of Iran and Iraq ¡Ilustrares different dynamics in tbe regional tran-

sirion process. Figure 3.4 (p, 76) demollstrates rhar Iran was stronger rhan

Traq consistently from 1962 rhrough ,he 1973 oil crisis. This rnajor clis-

tllrbance of the Middle East regíon did not cause a conflict. lran soon

recovered from ,he eeonomic dislocarion chis engenclered aild returned ro

a positioll of superioriry over lraq . However, in che late 1970s lran's power

share declined precipitoLlsly because of che lranianRevolurion oc 1978.

This domestic scrife gurted Iran's sharc of power within che regional hi-

erarchy. Afrer the installation of elle AyutoUah Khomeini, 1ran expcrienced

7fPOWER TRANSITIONS

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Figure 3.4 Relative Powcr ofIran lllld Iraq, 1962-95

a swift reeovery, Faced wich el narrow windO\\I of opportunity, Iraq rook

aJvantage of this new lrani;¡n weakness ami iniriared che lmn-Iraq War.

figure 3.4 reveals that Iran and Irae¡ remained in the parit)' regíon for

the duration of this very bJoody confliet. This is the likely reason che warendured so .long.

The Gulf War, pitting United Narions forces against che Iraqi militar)'establishment, may ha ve precipitated a scrdemenc oE the Iran-IraqWar.

That eadier conflict had dragged on wirhout clear reso!lItion oE the under-lying claims. Although overt fighting had stOpped, its renewal was seen as

!ikely by rnany. However, che wa!" over Kuwa it brought in the United Sta esand othe!" international powers, which dramaric;¡!ly shifted power re!atiol1s

within tbis regional hierareh y. Th.is lirnired war clestroyed the relative bal-

,mce in the regíOIl, Iraq can no longer hope to chaUenge lran in the nearfuture. Although Iraq cIear!y remains dissarisned with regional relations,Power Traasition theory does Ilot anrícipate a rcsumption of the conflictunless Iraq somchow regains parity with Iran. Given continuing sanctionsagainsr Irag, such a reeovery is nor amicípated anytime $Oon.

These figures are only illustrative, but they demonstrate how .Power

Transirion theoey anticipares wh en minor powers wage war against one

another. Discllssion aboye abOllt rhe variOllS regions and a eomparisonbetween rhe rhird and sccond rows of figu re 3.2 (p. 72) suggests rhat dissat-

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isfac rion with che regional status quo has a largee impact on the probabiliryof war than does parity. These figures demonsrrate the plausibiliey of the

exrension 01 Power Transition theory to analysis of minor power relationsand substantiare the importance of parity not only on war onser, bur alsoon war's likely severity ancl dur.ation.

In SUI11, evaluation of minoe power inceractions within regional hi-

erarchies in Somh Am erica, the Micldle East, the Far Easr, and Africa

demonstrates that minar powers fight w:us when expected to, based 011 che

Jl1ultiple hierarchy model oE Power Tra nsition rheory. Thus, Pow er Transi-tion theory provides a powerful explan<ltion of most minor power conflicrs,as well as oE the traditional major power wars.

The Diffusion of War

within Power Transition predudes rhe diffusion of a global¡'nto In faet, one mighr anti cipare slleh diffusion based

on Power Tr ansition rheory, Since (he global wars berween the dorninampower and c1issatisfied challenger are fought [or control of the international

s)'stem, rhey are ex pected to be very large, ver}' widespread conflicts. Onlythe great ha ve che_ability .ML

-Creat powers chus 'míght a conflicc¿b oulg remain_eoJJ.fins:dTransition suggestu hat direg chi l le.!lge.u.o....the

§.tatlls quo_aLe The ·original eonceptualiza-tion of these \Vars involved direct threats to the territorial integriry of thebeLligerents. 14

The great powers can rhrearen the

iUl.Q.t.t.u;,e. For example, Wo.rld War n diffused from

lhe original conflicr berwe en Germany and che Unireu Kingdom to encom-

pass virtuall)' every hierarchy in the internalional sys re m wirh rhe exceptíon

oE South America. Even that exception is debatab!e since seve ral Somh

American statcs were sllccessfully induced to ;oin che AlEes by declar-

ing wal" on Germany, and there were naval skírmishes in SOLlth American

waters, as when the German battleship Graf Spe e was comered in Uruguayby rhe British navy.

As Gcnnany failed in ¡ts ' bid to Ov.ercome the Uníted Kingclorn in rhe

Batde of Britain, Hitler chose to expand rhe scope of rhe coní1icr to inelude

Russia. The \Var between Japan and China, whicb had been waged in areg io nal conrcxt since 1936, escalared ro an :maek on the British. World

War [[ rose to global proportions when Japan challenged the United Sta tes

for control oE the Pacifi co The United States placed primary emphasis on

the international challenge by supportíng the United Kingdom in ¡rs waragainst Germany. Later it rea llocated force s for the Pacific theater. The

Unitecl States chose this order oí prioriry beca use ir ul1derstood rhar the

European cfforc was for concrol oE the international system. War s in the

TRANSITION:; REGIONAL APPlICATiONS, MULTIPLl HIERARCHIES 79



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global hierarcby that diffuse ro rhe regionallevel generate seriolls conflicrs

beca use of rhis unclerlying imperarive.Regional confiicrs, on the other hand, are waged over regional con-

cerns. When minor powers iniriare sllch conOiets, rh 'eir goal is lO establishprominence withio the regiooal hierarehy.)iYclt.,.C.anflicrs.. do oor diffllsel!pward ro the ..v-Oh.e..d.-ill• sJlch_¡;JlaJ-

.. rhe l2.illver rQ.And yet, the severíty of conflier wirhin regions can be heighrened by che

inrervention, even by rhe limited incerventions, of rhe great p()wers.Despite fears ro the contrar}', rhe Vietnam War did 1l0t escalare out-side of Sourheast Asia because none oí the minor power countries involvedcould challenge rhe interests of rhe grear powers. The same argument holdsfol' rhe conflict in Korea, whieh was internationalízed but never escalaredbeyond rhar restricred region. rn Korea rhe threat of escalation ro other re-

gions involved rile potential conRict be tween China and rhe Urúred Sta resfollowing rhe crossillg of the Ya lu River. However, che conflicr did not es-

ca late since the Unired Sta tes could not be ch allcnged outside of NortheastAsia. Similar argumenrs apply tO rhe conflicr in Afghanisran and rhe recenrseqllence of wars in rhe Middle fase.

In contrast, an apparencly great

powers aEe invo lved and rheir lQteresrs World Warstaned beca use of che minor conflict between Austria-I-lungaJ;J':.Jllld Serbia...... .- _ _ N

Serbia's Russian sllPRon p{.p.v.jd¡:d .. corlÍlicr_heu'lt.e.l1

,. to express itseH, thus sparking rhe broader\var.More recenrly, as imilar conflict in the Balkans did nat escalate becauseno great power's interests were ar stake - their goals were to limie rhe co n-nice. lui ri,&e wa r oche _d.ominant goweJ

Analysts frequently wor ry thar a conJlict in any part of rhe globc can es-calate to a serious global conflagra rion. The multiple hierarehy perspecüve$uggesrs thar such pereeptions are incorrecr. Major war$ starr beca use of

, --azity con.clirionsio_ hS!_&lobal l i f .ats.,hy ll..!l4; }¡eír..rdaced..ilialk,Ilges .Jo "he

Minor wars Stan beca use of similar conditions withiD regionalhierarchíes . Diffusion from rbe global to the regional hierarchy is possiblebecause che c6ul1tries involved can make such choices withollt direcdy af-fecring che primary tbreaCs they face, Members of the regional hierarchy areqependent in rhis sense , beca use escaIaCiOñ- ;S-Umited withour great power

d"o no! face dírecr fWlJJ

The multiple hierarchy modcl offers al1 extensíon of Power 1ransiriolltheory (hat can be llse.cl tú analyze minor power international interaccions.Preliminary empirical evaluations suggesr rhe basic premise of thethat minor powers fight wars when power pariry exisrs berween a regionaldomi nam power and a dissaeisfied regional challen ger - is sllpported by

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the evidence. This is good news for those who would base polic)' pre-scriptions on Power Transition rheory, beca use ir Sllggests that in addicionto being internally logical and consistem, che theory also offers al1 accu-rare descríprion and persuasive explanarion of a wide range of inrerstarerebrions.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

A number of polie)' implicarions follow directly from the mulriple hierarchymodel of Power Trans.iüon rheory. The firsr is thar it may well be possi-o le ro anticipare when regional minor power wars wiU oec .ur. Power pariry

between a regional elominant power anel a dissaris.fied regional challengerdramatically increase ¡he probabiliry of war be[\'Veen minor powcrs. If aconten riou s pair of minor powers are nor roughly egual, or if neieher seemsdissatisfied wirh the regional statuS guo, war is unJikely ro occur berweenrl1ém. This knowledge CQuld well help policymakers predice how seriouscon t1icts mighr become in VariOll$ "rrouble spors."

For exarnple, Norrh Korea h¡lS drawn a gr eat Jeal of American arten-tion in rhe lase few years through irs effons to deveJop a nuclear arsenal,as well as ies repearcd daims rhar the Korean peninsula should be unired

lInder Norrh Korean leadership. Whether North J(orea would act on suchclaims has been an importClIlC question. The multiple hierarchy model ofPower TransilÍon rheory and rhe evidence summarized aboye suggest rhatan)' arraek by Norrh Korea againsr South Korea is very llnlikely indeed.Figure 3.2 (p . 72) suggesrs that a dyad such as Nonh and Sourh Korea hasonly a J O-pCcccenr cbanee of .Üince North Korea is clearly •dLssatisfiedbut is not at parity wirh south Korea). By gathering data on statusquo

-...... --valuarions and relative power within minor power regional systerns. anyanalyst cOll.ld generate similar preclictions abour rhe potentíal for war in

wharever area of (he world in which rhey ll1ight be interested, Such predic-tions do no\' mean thar no conflicr will occur, bllt they will indicate howlikely it is rh at crises and/or disputes will escalare ro the serious leve! of

open \Varfare.Acting upon sueh knowleclge, American foreign policy leaders couldtake steps ro render wars less likely in variol1s minor power regions.Fo! example, faced wirll a persisrenr cont1ictual relationship berween adver-saries sllch as Egypr ane! Israel, two dífferent steps could be taken. First, lheUnited States (o uld ensure thar one side (presumabl)' the one wirh which ir

hacl more common inreresrs) remained preponderanr over the other. such apolie)' wOllld likely be ver}' expensive sinee ir \Volitd entail massive resourcetransfers fl'Om the United Sra ces ro the recipient srate, bur, if earried oue

ro che point where clear preponderance was achieved, ir should pacify the(elanonship.

Such efforts arguably were undertaken by the United Sta res anc l Soviet

80 POWER TllANSITIONS

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Union wirh respecr to the Egyptian-lsraeli dyad during the Cold Wa •. Ho, ..·-

ever, in this C8se the two superpowers may have only offset each orher's

comriburionsY In an eHorr to make their favored minor power belligcrem

stronger, they may have suceeeded in making rhem equal, and thus pro-

longing the conHietual period (lf parirr. A JIlllch better way ro paeif)' Illinor

powcr relationsis to help rhe minor powers come to 811 accGmmOd;Hion

with each other over rhe regional starus quo.

A seconcl area in which the nlultiple bierarehy model of Power Transi-

rion theory can oHer policy implications concerns rhe condiúolls likeIy ro

(avor intervention into ongoing minor power conflicts. Pirst, if thefe is a

dispute or crisis between tlVO unequnlminor power st:1tes, th8t dispute or

crisis is unlikely tO escalare to waL In sllch circl.llllstances rhe Unitecl Sraces

neccl nor neeessarily fear chat wal' will follow if ir does not aCt quickly. Two

roughly equal minor powers involved in a dispute OI' crisis have a mlH:h

greater probabilít)' of escalaring their nostilities to war, ami tllLlS the

of urgency wOllld neeessarily be grearer. Faced with a nurnber of trises si-

multaneollsly, the United Srates could li(('rally prioritize rhcm based on their

probability of escalating tri war ancl then deal with thern sequcntial!y.

Building on tllcse minor power inrcl'srate crises, thcre is :1 final policy

implicarion of the lTIulrip!e hierarchy model. The characterist:c of (he re·

gional status qLlO likely determines whether or !lot a pC:.lceful resolLICiorl

uf minor power conflicts can be achieved. [f the regional status quo can

be easily clrvided, then a peaceful sO!lIcion to minor power contlict wil! be

much more [ikely

We memioned above rhe minar power comperition between Chile,

Peru, and Bolivia over the AtacamJ regio n ,110ng rhe Pacific Coast 01 Soutb

America. \Ve might also have drawn <lrtention ro the similar PdragLwY ,1D -

Bolivian comperitiol1 ove1' chc Cllaco Boreal in the 1920, amI 1930s. Aside

irom rhe material value (Jf the nitrate deposits in che Atacama (anrJ the ac-

cess ro rhe se,1 ir granted Bolivia) and sU5pected Di! riches in rhe Chaco,

therc was norhing about either rerritory char cnuJd llot have becn di-

vided. These cases of regional WaL" might well hnve been averted had the

United Scates or another actor managcd to serve as rnccliators. Were the

maintenance of peace in western South America in the 1870s and 1880s,

or in central South j\merica in the 1.9205 ancl 1930s imporcanr enough,

the Un.ited States ma y ha ve even. becn ab!e to provide sufficicnr linanci,ll

incentives of ies OW/1 ro forestal! these rragic wars .26

Such territoIy-based regional status quos may be more arnenable ro ne-

gotiated scrtlemems than others. By cuntrast, many wouJd argue ,hat rhe

teniraríal dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashrnir is of a different

nalure than that between Bolivia and Paraguay over the Chaco. Tbis mal'

well be trlle, but rhe faec thar accoml11odation becween Eg)'pr and Lrad

was found strong[y suggesrs thar efforts could and should be madc towarJ

a similar goal in the subcontinent. Given that India and Pakistan ,lre nuw

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f'.

borh nuclca " stares, rhe incentive ro finu <1 way to keep both sacisfied lVith

their regional quo has ncver been greater.

This cbapter has described a transformation 01' Power Transition theory

into a genera! theor)' of war iniriation. The ablJity to identrfy the condirions

under which wars are most likcly to occur is critical for the optima.! COll-

strucrjon of foreign poliey. An of regional hierarchíes should

1,lay ao important raje in the foreign policy oE the dominant world power,

for chesc miniature international systems compIise a substantial pare of

che internarional systcrn within which che preponderant country establishes

intcrsti1tc J"clatiol1s.

¡J¡; h \ \'0 t '

_ 1 lu:.. r / 101.

SECURITY Al'f'UCMIONS: DETERR ENCE AND PROllHRATlON OJ-í



(>,c..j

'1

CHAPTER 4Security Applications:

Deterrence and Proliferation

- -

ID

The spliuing u( lhe atol11 has challged euerythillg Sill'L'

mall's moJe o( t/;illkillg: l!JI/S, !Uf! dri(t tU/llards //I/IJar,dle/e.!catastrophe. - A!.!\ERT EINSTEIN

:."3 S, l. This chaprer explores the policy ill1plicatioJls dcrivcd trom the Powcr Tr;lll-t:-; \' sitian perspecrive for ·tI.1e nuclear era .. r:m:using Ol l dist.ributiol1s uf pOIVCI"

'\..:.,-<- as wcll <lS rhe spre<ld ot Iluclear cap:lhdlrles, the. Pmvcr TransltJoll..::::.?:: S01lle aspccts !101icY-¡Jll 11I1de;¡r dClurellcc--<l -"".'-:'·-bur gCl1craifYSupports curr6i rp; ;¡íC" . "---",'"\1-;.. in assurcd de-

:', , srrucrion (MAD) associates srabilir)' \Vitil JlllC!c::;\r pariry, Powel' TrallsitiollSlIggests ¡har Iluclear p;lriry . gener:1te ills/a/iili/y.1 The r\lcor}' ¡¡cceptsproposIciÓn thár nuclear Wcar(ms dimllllsh the likclihood ()f \V ,1I' byrhe coses associared \Viril conflicto Incrcólsillg the sizc of 1111dear arsrn,lls til1-

questionably magnifies the porential severit)' uf war. Bur PUWCrTI',\11SiliOlltells liS t,h'<lLdcte[(epec is not al1 "bsollltc. The (lffcrcd hy liu clc<H

will nor ,1/1 Clrculllstanccs. Po\\'cr trall 'sitions in the nuclear era rel11,1il\ dangel'olls CVCIllS r\lar L:ln rcsult il\ \\';\1',

\Veapons Ilotwithsranding. Undcr Iluclc,u' p,lI'ity the proh:lhili[v (JI'is luwcr rhan in a cOllventio'I;;il "p¡¡r ity is slill

highú- rhail ':li '-nlideú'"- í l i csc-iilsighrs 011 Jeterr t:ncc' fllnd<llllent;lll)' S()llIe ",-

cxisting bclids and Joctrine. Tl1is ch;l!l(cr e'lIltciIll :; rhal 11l1(iC'M dern -rCIlCC is structur:¡11 unstablc lInrcliablc. n<lniclIlarl; ' \\Ibel'15 achícve , . ,:ullclllSiol1S <1 re ,1 t milis h Ihe IOllg-l;eid

tenets of U.S. arms conrrul polie}' rhar ir is in (he Unircd Sta tcs' illterest romaintain nuclear eql1 ;dity ;J/I101lg potenti,¡\ ,llld th ;lt securitv iscnslIrcu h,y redllcing nuclear arscnals sillluleaneulIsly. Wc lind

h<1nos (if .a defender \Vho Sl;lIl1S

<\\)0 ensurej.p.cacc. NuLlc:1j""p:tmy'Ór"prepolldcr:1 llct: hr .1 (h"l·

Icng .:r cad ro nuclear ·';v'¡¡r.-That c.lisrinclion "I(llle di srillgll;shcs Po\Vcr

fr01l1 currcllt thc()rics 011 \kterrcllce.With rc).\ard ro prolil'er<lti011, !>()wer Tr,111sitioll ¡¡rgllcs ¡h ;H Ihl' il)rc<lJ

()( nllLiC:1r WC¡¡POIlS i5 panicu\;Hly Jangcrol1s. When rel ,11iv('i:'

> PCW) -,.:l-..tYl fllXluy ) P)J

11atio11s such ;15 India 01' Ir<ll1 join rhe nuclear dub anJ therc are rcgioil4i01' global transitions, the 11I'<obability u( nuclcar "",ar riscs. Thus, PowerTransirioll's illsights 011 proliferarion are cOl1sistellC wirb currcnt U.S. poli,y,,1il'hough {he lInderlyillg rarionale Ill<ly be diffcrent.

Dererrc lKc allJ arllls control are rhe twin pillars upon which Ihe U.S.secll rity policy WaS bascd rhroughollt rhe ColJ War. Whíle cleterrcncc has(;lded i 1 importam:c, long <l seconda rv now has be-come a cenrr:t 1.10qls .<U'..lL$. , po licy.):;:IÚre-fI"a11 adccaJe afrer ,he end of the

Cold-W;;r, Jleither of ¡hese COIlCeprs has been systcm:ltically chólllcngeu ,lTilis hpse uf interest could b;lve grave consequenccs. We íntcnd ro atldrcss50l11C of the funJamenta l isslIcs here . l

The Costs of Nuclear WarNuclear WC;lp()ns signilic<lnrly r"ise rhe uf intersraee conflicto Recog -nizil\g th,¡t there are l11al\)' tedllliques anJ cOl1troversies about calculatingthe cose s (lf Iluclear W:l1', \Ve offer figure 4.1 (p. 84) as one designo Ir is bascdiln c,l\culalions for thIC Unitt:d Sta res anJ che USSR. The vertical axis occhis figure represcnts rhe likcly percentage of poplllatioll that would be de-srroyeo sixty days afrer a nuclear exchangc. The horizontal axis reprcsents

the total nUlllber of JJleg:ltons lalln¡;hed during a war.Since we llave ohservcJ rhe effecrs of a nuclear war only once a( lowmagnituJc, \'IC mu sr rely 011 estimatcs of rhe likcly .costs ot sllch a dispute.The lowest estimate onl)' rhe effects of the impace per megatonrrol11 rhe blast radills:' This estimate suggests thar ae least 500 eqlliv¡¡lentIl1cgatolls are nccessary ro dcstroy more-lIJan 20

cOllservativc estimare col1siders tberhat 1,000 cqu ivalcnt l1legatons \Viii dcstroy

,'Ioser ro .jO pcrccllt ({ rhe popularioll o(tllc -t,lr'gcfc<;üiírry.3 Finally, thegril11ll1est cstimate sllgges'rs' nuclear devices will cause ;¡

winter oue 10 rhe dllst :1lld dehris rhar will be fo rced into the lowerThis <ll1cillary destru..:tiol1, it is argllcd, will r,¡ise che levcl n{

desrrllctioll 1'0 Ilcarly rhe t:11tire \Viril just over 1,000 Iluclearwarhe;Hls. Ir woulcl clestro)' wcll ov'?r 40 percent of rhe populaciull wirh.500 cquivalellt

¡\m i s ,1grCl:l11emS reached al' ¡he time nI this writing stilLp'<;J111ir theUni(eJ .':lta(cs ami Rllssia cadl ro de-stroying the (aher coulHry. Such arsenals also woulJdesrw) China amithe Europcan Union hecallsc of ¡he higher geographic concel1lratioll oi thepoplIlatioll :1IlJ urhnn celltcrs. Regio.'al hierarchies pose ;1 II111eh Jif(crcllfpicrure. 11\ the ¡vlitldle E:lst, fm C;":,ll11p le, weapolls dcli\'erin¡; ' he cquivalcmuf 10 mt'gatolls \\'Iluld Illure rhall su{(ice ro dcstro}' ,111)' socicty ill rkit re-gioll. Likcwisc, ( l l \ th\: Koreall pcninsuhl, rhe <lhiliry ro Jelil ' 5 equivalcnt

ono", life <1"'0 .

84 POWEJ! TRANSITlONS SECURrTY APl'lICi\TrONS: IJETEHI!ENCE ¡\ND PHOLlFERAT\ON 05



100

........ ............... ", .....,'"dr/u 117",,., H..,¡",oltg ,-, ,-

O..J

<:

.g

. . ..

!II,,

,t"/ "..-;

...-,.".. N"Jituh,,, I : flimdll'

:'::'60 J '.. oS

"

:. i

.,.-I

- \::: .1() \,/

, ........... 1111" fl l i lffnlt'.. ....()

]y"

'''1 /\//'

0' /

5nn 1110(1 1 ¡OI)!1 Jrll l i l \(1111 -1111111

E'I"i\':lICI\!

Figure 4.1 Nuclc:lr W:l1' PU)lII(atiIlJl Losscs for Creat ('owel's

There can be TlO doubt abour th!.: desrrucrive n<lrlll'C ()f Il\lclc.H \Veap-ons. Conrrast rhese estimares wirh those achie"ed by C()!1VClIriOIl;1 cClI1t1icr.Convenrional conflicts ar thc l11agnitudc ()I WorlJ Wars I ami If desrroyed.

;l t their height, up tu J 5 percenr of [he tuf,,1 popu!atioTl alTlong comhar-

anrs. In World \Var JI, rhe highest casualries as a pcrcelluge (lf rhe 1I.\[iOII\poplllation were suffel'ed by Poland ar 19.6 percent, Yugoslavia ar (0.6 per-

ccm, and Russia at 10.1 percent, while GCrIllany e!ldured losscs of about

') perccllt, Frailee 1.5 pcrcent, rhe Unircd Kingdom Iess than .07 p('l'(cl1r.

and the Unitcd Sta tes Icss than .02 perccnr. 7 Such losse5 p;dc in (olllp.Hi·

son wirh the 40 percenr or grc<1ter for sel'ious !lllclc;! r exchangcs.

or the spccter of a nuclear wimcr rhar (ould dccilll.ne ,I11Usr lifc (Jl1 rhepLlI1ct.

Nu(lear wcapOlls are as Jcstru(tive as advocltcs ()f derl'rrell<.:e (()l1rcIlJ.

Tl1e)' increase rhe (osr of \Var. Hur Jo rhey oftú the penn;1I1C " . 'it)" ni

PC;¡CC Jcrcrrence? 1)(1 rhe 10m) c (O$r s Illake \Y;11' \'íA'

rhink IH-;'-Powcr Transiriun warm J;oliC\"llla"kers noTtO )ut ult imare fairh

in !ludcar detcrrc,Ilcc. We will prcsent our C(lnc lISIOI1S 011 rhis rJ¡C'orelicallyanJthell in policy rerllls.

The Structure of Deterrcl1ce

Ler liS rcv icw rhe main thcoreri(<\1 perspecri"cs on Jcterrencl' ;Ind rhe jloli-

cies rhat follolY fmm thelll. Classi<.:al lIurlcar dcrcrrellce, ()ur h.1SC casc

,/"""/ "-

/ "-/1 Cone "-

/. ur /"-// \" \ro. / " -,

/ \ 'Á \/ 1"-

/\,

\X·'" p{b.«,

/ \", .i\IaH:h'f Trrrur

/ n",.II"llon

/ 4'\ 1"-','1-:" 0 :'\1/\1) \. /

y,

"?(/

"., """J""

/}'

11;'(1

Figure 4.2 Thc Strueturc of Dctcrrcllce

1m clllllpal'étive purposes , :1 derivarivc oE the ha!an,-c of 1'()\lN tlllH.u:.y.s\Y,IccIÚ')(lsé tlíccl:'\sslc,Te-crrciiCe ¡)'osítiOrl, rather than ol1e 01' its \'arial1ts,

hecl1u sei r oiiers the l110st clear eOJlrnlSrS \Virh Po\Vcr Trj1Jl·sitiOJl tlicory. Ohviuusly rhere are Illany c1arific;ltiolls and exrensiol1s 01class ic deterrel1ce rhcory rhar would l1lodif)' the comparisolls in rhe follow-

ing thrcc scctiol1s. ilur rhe srark conrr.lsts serve Ollr purpose of encollragil1g

()[hcrs ro ehallengc doglll.l. \'l/e exnmine (he srruerure (lf detcrrel1ce as

dc(¡ncL! h)' rhe inrcracriol1 ----Basedol1 rhe tigure 4.2 marches

rhc cxpecr;niol1s of cosr to rheorerical arglllnents ahour dcrerrence. In fig-1II"l' 4.2, (he righr axis por trays rhe total populatiol1 loss rhe challellger caninflicr 011 rhe defender in rhe evcnr of al1 all-out l1uclear conllict. whilc rhelefr axis repn:senrs the toL11 porulariol1 IOS5 chilt rhe defender can ¡nfliet ClIl

the c1dlcngcr. bch of these aXC$ dil11inishes in inrcnsiry. Ar the hot[CJ1ll 01rhe Hgure, l1111fU.¡J aSSllrcJ Jcstruction represcnts rhe almost complete erad-

ieariol1 of eaeh popul<1tion in an all-out Iluclear exchange. This rorcrays

the nuclear relationship hetwcen rhe Unitcd States alld rhe Suviet Unioll {()-w;lrd the end (lf rhe CCJlcI W,1I'. l'v!Utll<1I assured dcstl'ucri()ll ilSSUIl1CS that

hotil 1)()Id a sccure t:apability aii(t!?(J'S"S"cs massivc



1:16

record massivc

preserves pea ce. Mass ivc

stable.

is

, a ttcsts ro the

POW€R lRANSITIONS

tha! MAD is ullrastahlc.

011 lhe defender \Ve

show thm fmm the .

conditiOl;S. }\s thc historknl

de(clldcl'

h;ll1d:; ís [.\1' less

Both c1assical dClcrrcllcc alld Power' Transi¡íon he S(Tw.:tun:d within

thc Dar¡¡l1Icters esta blishcd bv fitturc 4,2. t c¡¡eh pcrspcetivc

descrlhe ;\l1d then cvu

a to !l udc,¡

SECURITY API'UCATlONS: DETERIlEN(E AND PROUFERATlON 87

me DelcrrQllcc



IIB

....

Ó

:3::;

":.

POWER rRANsmONS

llt}fh

Inll/c! U

4,3 Classical De!cn'cncc ami tllc uf Nuclear War

massive rttnl ía tioneall th"t Is dcfilled as or goverl1ll1ct1t rules ,HH{ llOfll1S.

That ¡5, Jo !lot Jetcr and therdorc cllOose \Var over pe¡lcc ¡!S

díd in World \\lars 1 II.I! Yct lInder nuclear nrenonder<1l1ce;tis bandoned síllce war will not be as 11lldcar \\lea pOIlS ha ve !lO useother ¡han tu de ter war, 1\ 011 ¡he otllCr is reilltroduccd ;1$

ami arsellals mus!ach sitie sccurcd

qua 10 war since it

behavior to l1uclear

detcrrcnce introduces

tions;111<.1

Ilot for

Iluden 11<1"

powers. Wilen c!assic;¡1 deterrcllce cOllsidcrs

SECURITY A!'PlIC¡\TIONS: OETERRtNCE ANO l'I/OllFERATlON 1.19

;¡ preemptlve WM

Ye! if ¡UltiOll doc!> 11m initiate war WhCll ie¡hen why shoulJ the reintroductioll

thilt is worthlludc<H

war?

Thc rml\;ticul imnlicattolls of thís

argull1cnr Cnllllot he

C"CIl in <1 cOllVemiOllalno t lItilizc ,1 rirst-strikc

II', h,Hl Ir,1 q red IlUde,lr wcapol1$

WUl1ld slIch \VC,lpOIlS !lot h:lve hCCH cvcn if

01 Iminl! a cOIlVClIlional

lhe

ro ¡he

govcl'll1nellt ufCOllflict? Much oí ¡he

classlcal dé-

trallsítions. Tllete

J



90 f'OWER TR¡\NSmONS

PQwer Tr,JnsitiOIl

ncc

W preserve the starus

SECURITY AI'I'UCAflONS,

..

"'-

'":o

"o

l>..

AND

.tA 11on'cr Tl'Illlsítion :md fbe

COSfS a IHlde:1

of NuclearWar

92 POWEI!

cJo,-s ..L •J<. of ISlA.: t4.-S ih

SECURITY AI'I'lICAflONS; Df:HllllENCE ANO PROUHRATlON 93\1



is prcponJcram, chough this is <111 un/ikcly evenL hllal/y, war Illltkr i\; l l \ [)

is likcly [() cscalate to massivc Icvels whifc W(1I' 111lJcr 1ll.lssivc rC(;lliariollIeJ by the challenger is likcly ro rem.lin lilllitt:d hec ause (lf rhe dcfclldcr'sinabiliry to rcsponJ in kínd.

Unlike dassícaJ uctcrrence, Power Trans ition '\IHiciparcs rl1 ;lI incre,1:; edcoses redilee rbe prQbabiliry of fonllict but are insufficient to prcvC1J t COII -

avcre escalatícIl. IncreaseJ costs make nuclear conflicr ullder¡css likely, bur ¡f wagcJ, br more severc. Nucle :lf arsenals Jo 1I0r, therefore,o{(er che cold comfon of stability through fear promised by lI\utual assl1reddestrucrion. lnsread, i( war breaks our lInder pariry rhe hugc Iluclear arse-nills he!el by nuclear contenders allow thern ro escabte lhe Cl)sts of war to!cvels as yet unseen.

Consider first the MA D conditions hrokcll dowll :1lol1g ;¡dhcrcnce ,1Ild

oppositíon to rhe status <jUO. The effccts of Me disturhing. ¡\

díssatisficd natian that marches rhe nudc :l r capacity uf lhe defender i ; e:\-rected to use its c:lpability ro aJvance c!c mands (JI' a Ill'W otatlls (jllCl. FI'OIll

rhis perspecrive, che Cold Wal ' rCIl1<lined cokl hCC:lllse the Ullitcd St:ltcs W;1S

prcponderant, allJ rhe USSR could 110t credibly challenge the Unitcd Slateso[ its NATO allíes. The on!y question¡,blc «lse is the abscnee of i1IIC!c;1r W;\I '

bctween China an J RlIssia irnll1ecliJtely (ollowing rhe collapse 01' lhe USSR.

To act JlIring rhis ovcrtaking, China had ro llave l1uclear parit y. which i(

did noto Still, conditions CklSC ro rhose descrihcd by Powcr TI',1nsition \Vcrc

present for a very shorc period, alld a conflict <.lid not uke pl 'ICC."

When convencional pariry is presellt "long witil di ssatisfactioll, theprobability rha t disputes \Viii he resolved wilh ,1 Iluclear attack rises sh;lrpl\,.Fo 'r (his reaSOIl, rhe fllture relatiOlls bt: tw et:11 tht: Ullitnl Starl'S :lnd Chil;¡¡

are seen ;]$ far more dangerous rhan the previolls I·ela tiolls hcrwccn rht:

Unitcd Statcs and (he USSR. When China re;lChcs conventional pariry .11)(1

threat\!l1s ro overtakc ¡he United Sratcs s01llctime in th is celltul 'y, Ih!.: pllssi-hility of el nuclear war shou ld rise thest: two Il ar ions tTCCJIlCik thcirdi ffcrcnces.

Nuclear cOlll1icts in regional hi era rchies also are possihle. 111 the ivliddleEJst, tor e:<;ll11p\c, 5evcraln<ltiOIlS ,Ire attelllpting ro chal\cllge ¡he Isr;lc!i 11\1-

clear lllollopoly thar ha s ensured rhe peaee. As the ecollomics 01' diss,lti nedI\rah nalions grow, the potencial fol' Ilude¡\)" \Var ex pected ro inCl"e ;lsesillcc pcace will nO longer be ensured by rhe Illlclear prepondcl',lIKe of therclarively satisned of these nari(lns .He attelllptillg ro dl'vclopnuclear wcapons, andth'"Cr"e is a rcalisti_ potcncial (or a powcr trallsiriollwirh Israel. Ir is worth noting that the Illdear cap,lbiliry required fm ¡hesel1ariolls (O achicve lIucl ea r parity \Virh is (;.r Icss dl'IIl:lIlding rh;ln rh ;ltachicveJ hy rhe Illaior powers. Rcgion:11 nu clear wal's of devastaring mago

wheJl nuclear 'lr,e n' lh ,He ver' sllla)1. Lcss rll ;1I1 ;1dozell one-megatot1 \Var sor t leir equ ív<llellt, rnollllted (¡JI short-r; lll¡.!C

missilcs or .,írfrJnlcs are surricient ro ;Issure the destruclioll ()f ally 1l.1I iOI1

in [ht: ¡\;liJJk [;1:;1, "lid t!VeJl fewt:r would he rcqllired ro dcstf(l:' [he Ko-

rean península. roI' this reaSOJl, attempts by Ir<lll, Iraq, .1Jld othcrs in theregio .. to aCt)uire lilllited nuclear arsc llals could produce regional n\lclearparity altllos! overnight. lf' 1\1\ the preco11(liriol1s cOllducjvc ro Jluclear (011-

nict (power tr,lnsítioll, di ssatisfacrion, ¡lnJ I1\lC1ear arity) :1re t:lTlerging in

(his regioll. ,severa l ya s are at r1S , inclllding tlle 11I05t o!Jviolls uf Israel!Iraq anJ Iraq/lrall, If [>ower Transirion theory is correct, the stabiliry 01 dc-

terrence will he sorely testcJ over the Jlext two dccades in these regionalhier;Hehies. These Middk Eas( scenarios sqll<lrely challengc the Jogie ofde(errcl1ec. 17

Similflr Jistincrions appe:1r with regard tO the cffecrs üf nuclear pro-lifcr,Hioll. Powcr Transition jlosits d1at stability is assured linder parir}'whcn horh sities ;1pprove ()f (he status quo, hut Ilot orherwise.prolifcration is rhe po\icy (JI Iluclear Ilations. f()r this rcasoll the UnitcJSt:Í!es lIntlsh 'lcqulslrioll of nuclear weapOIlS, prohably eovenl)"assisted rhc !sl"¡lelis. :1lld offcrt:d only token resisrallcc ro rhe illdigl?lloUS de-velopmcllC of Iluclear CJp;lhilitics by Frailee. Thesc c()untrit:s all SlIpportcd¡ht: glohal status qllO.

The Un ite d Srates opposed (he acquisition uf Illlclear capabilitics by

Ru ssia and China beca use bOtll were Jissatisfied with rhe -Iob I sr:ltlls lIO.

Ir also ohjected to the acqulsltloll o weapons by India and Pakistan. So

Jid China, albeit s0111cwhat ¡,(ter rhe faet. The United 5tates is workingvery hard to prevellt Iluclear prolifer,lrion ro (ron, lroq, and NortiJ Ko-

rea. Consistent with Power Transitíon, val'iations in response to nllcle"rproliferatiol1 gcncr:dlr are directly rcl;JteJ ro rhe degree of dissarisf;lcrioll,1111(11); lIari ollS. They ,Ire lIot dircct lO rhe 'l((llIisirioll (lf lIuc!carweapom pel' se.

Let LIS ncxt cOlIsi·det· lIlassivc retaliarioll. \'\IiJell rhe 11<11,\lICC (JI' IllIclear.Hsenals favors the dOllllllalH ami s,ltísricd powcr ill " hierarchy, PowerTr,lllsitioll ami clJssical Jt:tL'ITencc cOlllelll1 th,1l the likclihood uf collilictmilIillw/. Tht: Uni(cd Statcs did \lO! initiate World War' 1I1 aga1l1st ¡hc USSR

[olJowll1g events as the Berlin Crisis (Jr the Hl1llgarian Rcvolution be-(¡Iuse its ¡.:\),d \Vas ' lO the St:1tus quo. The UnitcJ Sta tes Jid l10t lIse

l1uclear weapol1s against China ro resolve the war ill Korca for preciscly rhe

SJ me rcasol1s. The Soviet Union did not use nuclear weapons against Chilladllring rhe Sino-Soviet split bec:1\ise Chilla couJd llOt challengt: the USSR's

cOllvt:lltiollal c<1p;'lbility at the time.Illlwer Transitioll differs fUlld'llI1elltally trolll cJassical dererrem:e re-

garding (he illlplicatiol1s nI' Illassi\'e rctaliatioll whell I l l l r lCH ¡m:p.w.u.I.cr.ancc

(avors the 1\ prepol1dcr:l1lr ch;dlcllgn wOllld initiate ¡¡rohes to

,llter ,ht: status qUil . h1cillg ;J prepolltleranr, dissaristied na(ion, rhe 11011-

IlUlle;1r defellder would mosr likely givc in, hur mighr tight ,1 ,,110rt dcfclIsivc

\Var. This (olldirion is vyry lI11ljkel)' <lBs! DO ! lIl;llcrialized ¡b.us raro f\ dis-

s;ltisried 1l,ltioll is lIIust likclytI l

score low011

tcchlllllogy ;lIId protlllc5ivit)',

94 I'OWER TR!\NSITlONSSECURITY Al'l'lIC!\TlONS: I)HERR(NCE ANI) I'ROUfERATlON



thus ir is unlikely rhar rhis nation wuuld leaJ in rhe Jeployll1clH ot nu-

clear wcapol1s within its hierarchy. Yer if slIch wntliciol1s Jo emerge, rilen

che Jissacisficd nac ia n shoulcl ;¡ttcmpt to challcngc che sta tus q\lo bcca\l sc

ir is disadvanragcd by ie. Unlike c1assical deterrence, the powcr Transiriol1

.Rcrspecrive postulates rhar massjve in che h,lllds uf a dissatisfieuchalkngcr is very dangerous ro peace. [-bJ Hirler, Sta i il1 , or Hussein ne-

quircd nuclear we apo ns first, rhcysurcly would havc ll sed thcll1 to ,ltlv,lIlce

a ncw Status quo (or the globe or region.

The policy implicatiol1s offerecl by c1assical Jetcrrence anJ I'ower Trall-

sirion coultl not be mOfe differcnt. Given rhe likcly I.:onsellllcnces of a

fallure, knowing which perspecrive is more ;tCClIrate beco llles cxtrell1el)' inl-

porranr. As JiscLlssed later in rhis chaprer, rhere is inuircct cvidclICC, horh

logic;tl and empírical, ro suggest thar the implications drawn írom PDwer

Transitioll theory are more consistent with rcalit}" th a ll ,He ¡hose froll1

classical deterrence.

The Dynamics of Dctcrrencc

Ex tcn sions o( Powcr Transition 5UggCSt, in their Ilcwesr formrtl Illodl'b, tl1,H

spccific dynamics underlie So f<lr, studics of W<lr illiti<1l io ll

have resemblcd a static photograph. Thc ncw jJower Transition dynamicrnoJels, in contrasr, resemble al1 <1nimareo lllov ic whcre s itllariolls evolve

ano uecisions develop over time. Our theorcti ca l argulllcnt, which is con-

sistenc wirll policy insights, srates tllat Jeadershi lrcferenccs alld narional

chal1ge over til!le and thar sLlc h changes att.cct the tillling () W;H. Thc

inrroductioll of time prodllces il1lportallt insighr s.

h U Il I Power Tr;lnsirion's pcrspccrive, the relarivc srrcngth nI (lnc n,Hio ll

ro that of its oppon ent increases avcr time Juring the trallsitio l1. During the

rransitioll, anticip :lted gains as til1le <llld a b,der W<lits IIlltil

the chances of victory :lre m:lxim izcd beforc initiating " hght. I\r rile sallle

sl llhle IIlId",. Imri tr

I'owcr Tra nsitioll:

_

Xlilhl" /IIrder 1)/'('PrI'"'''I"O!lI'''

'1 OCfCrJlkrCcnera) Dcterrcllcc A __N,,/ 1'iJ"'/I"; \/I"('(ltl'lI

Challcngcr

!Jm:k D01>'11

Dctcrrcncc: I I mmcdiatc DcterrcnccSII/h/" 1111<1,,1' Ilrepollllen/llc('

Dcfcllucr

Püwcr Transition: __ lJack D",m

lIlfS/Ilh!, . /l/u/el' pn'l'rlllderl/J/( 'e

Figure 4.5 Th e Dyn:unics of Dctcrrcncc

95

threar whcl1 che OOmil13nt powcr is overwhelmingly preponderant be-

ClIlSe rhe prob;1bility ()f succeS5 is minimal. Such conclítions are overcarne

during 3 power rransitiol1. Then wal' iniriarian is reacheJ after two srages.

In rhe Mrst stage, chreats are made, ano in the seconu stage, these

thrcar s are cxccuted. [n otiler worus, a narion IirSI threatcns (o fight, and

thcll, if irs opponen t rcsists, ir wherher or l10t to go to war. 21 Pea ce

is prcservctl when l:('lIetll/ ,!('terrell(C is whicJ¡ is the cOl1uitiol1

wh en 110 threats are matle. Peacc is .,Iso preservetl whcl1 immediate deter-

rell(C is slIccessful, which is the cOl1ditiol1 when rhe clwllcnger threatcns toime, 1catlers di scollllt rhe v;tllle for víctor)' over time. ') Thc derisioll ro nght

lI nde r Po\Vc r Tmnsirion oceurs hecH!se of thc c()l'IIhillataoll of all inueasc

in power a rcductioll in llrility íol' con/liet O\'el" rime. Thc oprimal poi llt

is r(De bed ini tiator 'lIlticip,1tes rbar rherc I'clative

gains in powcr, anu cOllcurrenrly, lhe anticip¡l(cd gaillS frolll conflid Me!ot (¡:)lfL'd!ight, sl'nding a hostilc siglla l, hut rhen backs dowll .Ceneral t!eterrcncc is hard to illu stratc bec<lllsc when it succeeus..!Joth-

il1g 1!":l.PPSIIS. rhe of w;¡r in Europe illu strares this conditiol1, but

ir is vcr)' difficulr ro attribute it ro the cxistence of nuclear weapons since

otlter prospccrive "causcs" of peace coincidemallyhavebecnpresent.lm-

IIIcdi;¡tc detcrrcTlce, 011 rhe other halld, can be illustrated easily. U.S , actions

in [krlin, in Korca, alld lIlost notably in Cuba illustrare serious erises

tlLlt were I-csnlved, or flot resolved, hy the expIicir ¡hrear ro use nuclear

wea pllllS. 111 this Cllnlext, classical J ercrrencl' and Powcr Transit ion draw

expelteJ ro decline.

Dllring :\ powcr transirioll, a llar io l1 is e;-;pcctcd ro wai( hcfon: ..""_'_I;;;;:.__ing war lIllfil rhe gaí.l1s it foresccs (wm .1 contlict ; I r l ' maximi7.cd . Silllil,lr

argulllents can be 11l,HJe ¡1bout il1 ;t 111 o :c-stalic );011-

text, bec:llIse h¡llallcc is rhe conditiol1 ((l ! ' pcacc <1lld growlh partCt"IlS do lI()t

affect rhe expecred outcomes. Figure 4.5 shows rhe Jiffúcnt dn i v:Hion s

ohrained frorn these clJlnpeting rerspccri ves.

Figure 4.5 charrs rhe sequcnce of ( hoiccs (acillg ,1 II1 rhe I) ' l\ver

Tn:1I1sition uynamic, Icatlcrs oí diss atisfied nariom \ViII re(r.lill fr()ln rl;ll;¡ng

,

very diUcrcllt cOllclusiolls regarding the stability of th cse (W o stages o(

dctcrrence.

Froll1 rhe cb ss ical deterrencc pcrspect¡ve, when two nations :1 re equa I

ill powcr, gelleral deterrellec is lIlorc likcly ro SlIccced becausc tbe chal-

96 rOWER TRANSmONS SECUl IllY DEH:RRl;NCE AND I'ROllfERATION 97



dcm:mds that do !lQe war tu scttlc. GCl1cnl!

makes a tbrear unly

esca!;¡ríol1

N

tWCCIl war

prcvcnts nuclear war. As

eh;)

Jr é I1llebH weapons cnsurc a more

.MiJdle an ustriltion

98 POWER TRANSITIONS SECURITY ,\PPllC\TIONS: DEHRRENCf; ANO PROllFERATION ')')



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Dcplllycd

Nuclear Capahility

Figure 4.6 Shifts in Nuclcar Capabilitics, 1990-2000

To sbow rhe mast immeJiate ot rhe prolikration process, weccntcr on the limited nlll11ber of nat íons th;llll111krvvclH rn,1jor chailgcs dur-

ing this Jceade. Four nations have givcn up their nuclear deviccs durillgtime perioJ: the Ukraine, SOllth Afric¡J, J3e!;¡rlls, and Ka7.akhs[011l. InJia h,\ scnhanced irs capability. I)akist <l n 11l3tched chis dcvelopll1ellt. Nonh /(ore:1

ano lran ha ve nuclear rescarch prograll15 llnder\Vay. ¡raq's cfforts cO lltillllCbut hav e suftered a l11ajor sctback bec<1use of sallct i()lls and hOll1hing rilarfol1ow eJ the Gulf War.

Figure 4.6 shows rhat the vasr l11<1jority (()lIlltries Glpahk (}f prodllc-ing nuclear weapons have clloscll nor ro du so. Classical der c ITc1KC il11plies

that, clriven by anarchy ,wd seeking technic lllyca able narions should tr ' to <1(( \lire nu clear GlpalíITities. '{ct "iTíiSÍigufe

\ clearly illustrares thar rechnolog ical capahi iry IS nut rile ' dcterlllillal1t of Illl-

¡\Iear Thc c1oi!1l rhar proli (e ration is inevitahle is fa lse. 0111)' ,1

few narions choosc ro proliferare. A largcr se r h<1 Sdlmen ro hyp;¡ss thi s C:I'pability. This is a key cOllsiclcratioll sincc in rhc Il e,li (uturc th e ¡cchllologynow readily <lvailable tu developeJ Il<l{ions \Viii heLlllm: 1ll()I'e accessih/c {()

clcveloping nations.Classical dererrcnce alHicipates widc-rangipg nuclear

Power Transition, in (Olltrast, argucs rh8r IlU e!c:1 r prolifer,ltillll will I)e

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Nlllllhl'r uf Na'í""s ,,¡III Nuclear Weapons

Figure 4.7 Classical Oe(crrCllce, Proliferation, alld Nuclear Wa r

limítc<1 majlllv ro tlle Jissatisfied Ilations. The d<;lminalH natian dcvelops,ellhallccs, and cxpands írs Iluclear arsellal whell ir sees a challengcr on thehorizoll. This wa s ¡he case in the global hierarchy with the competitionhet\v cc n rhc Ullitcd Sta tes .1ud the USSR during rhe ColJ War. DespireU.S. s,1tisfactiol1, rhe 110tCIltia l Chinese eh,lllenge cOlHillUCS ro clrive Illl-clc,\I' ll1odcrniz;¡rj ol1 . TliC fe\V s,ltisficd n:Hi ons rhar choose chis optioll Me

within their regioll. Israel, (01' eX<l l11ple , SlIpports rhe gloh;tl sta-t\lS lJlIO bllt 11lICIc :H Wl.':lpOIlS lO rcgioll:d prepOi1tIer'lncc.I\rnil ;l lld Arg ent ina, which IlIlW support rhe status q\lO, gave up nu-clear programs <lt rh e regiona l ,1IlJ global level whcn regiol1'11 competitiol1Jilllillishcd. The French acquired nuclear we:lpons following the Cubal1,\lissil t: Crisis bec<1use th e)' fc .1red rhe USSR, anJ pcrhaps the United States,<Ind eould <let ul1i1atcrally in ElIrope. Such we:lpons may eventually be

tral1sferrcd to rhe tU. wlost lllcrn hers of N¡\TO <He able ro dcvelop such

wcapolls hllt h , lVC nO ( )'er t'lkel1 this step.The I110St illlport<ll1t p()licy inconsisrellcy hetween classic;ll dcrcrrcllce

,\lId ['nIVel' Tral1sitioll is is cllhanccd or JimjnjshcJ by Illl-

pwlifcr:uioJl. COllsidl.'l' t¡rsr rhe argurncllts (ro ll1 classical c1ercrrellcc,

ITpreSell {cd i¡;f igure 4.7:C1assical detcrreJlce suggesrs rhar nuclear proliferation enhall ccs pea ce

hculI se (he nI \Val' rise, <lnd cunsequently the probability of wardeclines. Two 1lIajor v:Hi,lllts emerge: The extended dcrcrrcncc argulIlelH

proji()$es that il onl)" Olll' natioll h,1s Iluclear weapol1S, nuclear \Varis

100 POWEf{ TRANSITIONS SECU!UTY ¡\f'1'1I0,nONS ; I)UUH,r:N(E ¡,NI) PIIOUHHAfION 101



likcly,ll When ( \Vo or more n:lrions acquire chis abiliry, rhcy deter rhe orig-

inal nuclear nacion and provide a Iluclear urnbrclla to their allies, Thus rheprobabilicy uf war Jrups Jramarically, This argulIlcnt was lIlade (rcquclltly

during che ColJ War; borh rhe UniteJ S¡ates alld rhc Soviet Union \Vcre

expecfeJ tu defcnd rheir respecrivc allies against lluclear ;¡ttack. Note that

¡here is a rise in the probability o( wal' as rhe l1ul11hcr (l f n<ltions hecollles

vcry large dile ro the possibility of acciJcllt;.¡1 nuclear war.

Thc eore dercrrence argUlllcllt is similar, Il.1tiOIlS

onJy dcfend rhemsclves againsr llucle3r ¡¡Hacle The probabiliry oT ·[lUCle'lr

war illirially rises wirh rhe acquisirioll (lf nuclenr weapOllS sincc e¡,eh ncw

comperiror can atraek wirh impunity all orhers. When rh e Illllnhcr of 11 ;1-

tiollS \Vilh rhe potential ro hold nuclear ar se llals exceeds OI1C -h,l lf of rhc

maximul11, rhe probabiliry of nuclcar \Val' declines, with

this potenrial have nuclear weapüns and .Issured seeünd-strikc capahilities,

the likclihood of nuclear war rea ches its lowesr [evels. u,Power Transjcioll suggescs :l ver)' diffcrellt -:JY;lamic ¡,esultill!:, fWI1 l I l l l -

clear prolifer.Hioll. ]1¡e prohahilii,. of is assoeiatcd 110! wirh

the level of dcstrllcrio!l bur \Viril rhe IeYe! <lf diss¡JtjS(;¡f.riol1 (sce ligure ,-uq .

As che l1urnber of JissarisneJ nuclear nat io ns illcrc:lses, the proh:lhility o(

nuclear war also inereases, The prolifcratioll of ll\lcle¡H \Vcapolls is Il<)t ¡lS

dangerolls if rhey are held by satisficd llatiollS, as the pro!1ahilit y (Jf nu-

clear war will Ilor be changeJ, Howcvcr, sarisf¡Ietion \Virh rhe qun

mal' change as che dOl1linanr power ehanges, rhe srabiliry ()frhe international sy srelll.

Of J])()sr eOllccrn are rh ose narions rilar arc vcry diss atislied wirh the

S!,lt llS quo. Givcll nuclear capabiliry, rhese n¡Jt io ns uJnflier CH 'JI

ir J.Uc (Oses are C[]Orlllc)tls, Nuclear wea¡;olls reduce rhe likciihood of greal

gi":;SJl lhc Cllofl1iiius casll<1irics il1\"()lved , bllt rhey do llor hy thcir Illcre

lieter \!:ar. As the numhcr of Iluclear ll iHions incrc:lses, rlte 11mh-

ahiliry ()f ll11elc<H \Var .llso riscs. Terror crcates fcar but is nm suH-ciellt ro

prevent \Var <1mOllg Ilations that desperatcly wi sh to changc thc quo ,

Intlccd, few dOllbt that if Israel were ro faee the possihiliry of Insing COIl -

venrionJI war, nucleM wca polls wOllld he ro dc/leet rhe CIICllly. Th l'

mosr dangerolls sitliation occurs whcll such wcapolls .HC illtrodllccd illto

highly elllltested arenas, Thus, if Irall ¡lIld Ir¡lll had h.ld ",eeess ro nuclear

weapons during rbcir conllicr in rhe 19S0s, Pmver allti(iparc s

rhar such weapollS wOllld ha ve beell useJ ro res olve the eontlict (see ligu rt.,

3.4, p, 7IÍ). If Hitler had had Iluclear wcapOIlS, Ihe)' likcly w()lIld h:lvc bCl'n

us ed even if rhe Unitcd Stares haJ disclosed similar cap'lhilities.

Thc diifcrence berwecn the classieal \'iew anJ rhe Power Tra nsit iol l

()f deterrence can bese be seen ullller eonditiol1S ()f lllutl¡¡¡J asslII"cJ

desrruetion. If this structural condirioll is 1Iltrast.lhlc. :1$ classiral dClerrcnL'c

anJ halancc ()f !10wer eonrenJ , tltcn prolifer :u ion :leross hice.lr-

chies sholllJ rCSlIle in srahilii)'. ,\s a 1ll .1tter ()f poliey, lI11rlc :lf prol itú a tiClIl

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Figure 4.1:1 POWCI' Trattsiliorl, [>rolifcratiorl, alld Nuclear War

shuuld pl 'oceed tju ickly - ;ll1gmcntctl by tcellllologieal transfers - to assure

rh :lt :1 scellrc second srrike is achicved promptly and universaJly. Speedy ae-

ti Ol would :lvoid rhe insrahiliry assoeiated \Virh rhe balance uf terror and

rhe tr'lllsitions rrolll IT1.l ssive rcrali,ltiol) ro Illurual assurcd Jesrrllctilln ,llld

converscly. If (lile thc iUgUIllCIlt of elassical Jeterrenec, one mus!

"I so logicall)' ;lrecpt universal prolifel':tr io ll uf lltKlc¡]f wearons ro ilchic ve

FelV poliCYlll ilkc rs ¡¡l1d agn:c¡\ble. \Ve hdieve (hac arc

good r!tcoretieal rcaSUllS fu)' thcir skepricislll.

In srrikillg eOllt rast, ['(¡\Ver Transition sees rhe proliferation of lluclear

lVe:lpOIlS :S ¡j ¡1otc lllial tbllgn IJlldcr :111 cirClllllstalKes, alld as ;tn actuill

d,lnger when diss,Hislied llatiollS <lcquirc surh eapahiliries anJ thrcatcll to

()ver(ake :1 s¡ltished rival. I'owcr Transitioll :Hglles titar Iluclear dClcrrcllcc

is ar bcst rC/lllOUS. Ilwlear :JsyIllIllC¡ry, srabiflty C11I he IllillnraincJ

hy iíSt:HIIS Ullder nuclcar parir)', convenrional overrakillg by:l

diss:i't1Shcd dl,dlengcr e,111 Ic¡\d tu warY

Ulllike rhe elassieal dercrrc llCc .lrgurnem Ihat eOllncCIS pC;lce wirh a

scellrc sC«)lld-srrikc capah iliry, I\jwcr Trallsirioll ,lsscrrs Ihar lludcar WC;lp-

ons sylllmetry, rOlllbillcd \Virh pariry of eOllvenliOllal IVC:lpons, grC:1r1y

illCfcaSl'S rhe probahility (lf \Var, 1'-H->lif,,["Irioll hy is ex·

In fan, ;111 prolifera!io ll is dcsI;ll>ilil.ing. !:Vl'll:lllvOl::W)'

'-01'

selecrivc prolit'cr.ltiOIl to sarisf-ied ¡lS IIrit:lin, Fr:lIKl', (Ir Is-

l'owr;R TllANSIfIONS SI'UlIllTY AI'l'lICMIONS; DH(RIUNCf i\NI) !'HOllnRAnON o:;



104

staWS quo. Ir

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fCl1sc shlc:hJ shoulJ be

or

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THE WORLD TO COME



CHAPTER 8

The World to Come

We shall see strange things befare ¡,ve die. Dare ¡,ve guess al

what they will be? - A.F.K. ORGANSKI

The State of the World

Power Transition theory is one the mesr powerful intellectual tools for pol-

icymakers to understand the dynamics of world politics in this century.

Unlike other rheories, ie captures both che strucmre and the dynamícs of rhe

internacional system. This characrerístie permits policymakers to anticipate

events that muse be managed in world polities.

This theory has chree lInique characteristies. It has a strong empiri-cal base that has been sllbjeceed to rigorous testing against twO centuries'

\\'orth oE data. lts theoretical description of the world is eonsiseent with

real political events and policies. And it provides insighrs ineo rhe future

rhat can guide polieymakers in their international management roles.

With brcadth and versatilicy, Power Transition accounts equally well

fo r borh World Wars, the Cold War, and the posc-Co ld War era. It is appli-

cable ro the prenuclear and nuclear ages. It merges economic and securiry

facrors imo one argumento Ir is a general rheory of world politics that forms

rhe basis of a grand stracegy.Power Transition theory describes rhe. international system as a hierar-

ehy based on power. Atop chis hierarchy sics the dominant power, which

organizes the global status quo. This status quo is the combined pattern

of economic, military, and orher interactions by which rhe members of the

international sysrem come ineo contact wirh one another. Wíthin the global

hierarchy so me sta tes associate with and are benefited by their rel ationship

to rhe d011linant power. Others, diss<lrisfied wirh their role and share of

benefirs in rhe system, seek ro alter the status quo.The power hierarchy of the international system is dynamic. Sta tes

grow ae different rates, thereby altering their relative positions in rhe hier-

archy. The relationship berween t he dominant power and other COllntries,

satisfied and dissatisfied, is in flux. From time to time a challenger man-

ages ro ove rtake the dominant power. If this challenger emerges from the

ranks of che dissatisfied, che probability of war rises sharply. SlIch warsare likely ro be both severe and long, but rhey are rare events. If the chal-

len ge r emerges victorioLls, the international system is altered tú ¡ts benehr.

183

In rhe alternativc, if rhe challenger emerges from the ranks of rhe satisfied,

cooperation prevails and rhe status quo is maintained without conflicto

The argllrnents we have made in chis book demonstrate rhe versatility

of Power Transition rheory to address not only global bllt also regional

eoneerns. Ar rhe global level, ir offered an effective guide, in retrospect, for

the management of relations between the Uriited Srates and USSR in the

Cold War era. Today ir is a useful rool for undecstanding rhe cornplexíty of

fucure U.S.-Chinese interactions, as well as those ínvolving NATO, Europe,and India.

After the collapse of rhe Soviet Unjon, policymakers refocused atten-

tion on and elevated the ill1ponance of regional politics. In chis envi-

ronll1ent of heightened sensirivity ro regi onal concerns, Power Transition

theory outlines when and where regional conflicts are likely ro oecur, offers

ill1plicarions abour the interaction between great and regional powers, and

addresses questions of interventioll, resolution of confliet, and the diffus ion

of war.

International economics has assumed a more important role in relation

to securíty concerns. Some analysts even argue that eeonomics have become

rhe coin of national security.1 Power Transir ion cheory provides tools tounderstand interaction between stares competing over economic concerns

or security concerns or both. The rheory outlines the conditions conducive

to economic and security integration while establishing the predicate for

continuity oE the prevailing international regill1e .

While the reduetion in tensions between the United States and Russia

has diminished concerns about deterrence, the problems raised by nuclear

proliferation have been elevated. Power Transition argues rhar deterrence

is unstable. It also te!ls us that proliferarion is extraordinarily dangerous

because during an overtak ing by a dissatisfie d state, nuclear weapons may

be used. That is why the theory recommends rhat so much emphasis be

placed 011 blocking the proliferarion of nuclear weapons.

Turníng from what the theory says to how we can use it, we see thatthe United States, as the dominant power, continlles ro manage the inter-

national sysrem. Therefore, we musr understand what strategies wil! ensure

peace and stabiliry in this century. The United Srates has followed a suecess-

fu I strategy in Europe by eneouraging democ raey and integrarion. Power

Transition theory views ElIrther NATO and EU integration into Eastern Eu-

rope as a beneficial achievement, provided it does not preclude Russia from

also joining this system. A long-term extension of this strategy includes the

incorporation of China, and rhen India, into the U.S.-Ied alliance system.

The consequence oE rhat wOllld be the crearíon of an ultrastable superbloc

of satisfied sta tes holding a vast preponderance of power.

An all-encompassing superbloc may be impossíble ro achieve. China oc

India could very we!1 decide 011 él more independent course of action. [nthis circumst:1IlCl". th p I fn,r",1 .. .. C. . II .

HI4 POWER TRANSITIONS .': WORLD TO COME



it can at tempr ro manage sarisfacríon by encouraging China to identify with

existlng internacional norms. The management of satisfaction requíres che

reduction of territorial flashpoints, che adoption of marker eeonomies, and

the expansion of democracy. If chis strategy fails, America should attempt

ro realígn che international power discríbucion into the U.S.-European-

RU$sian superbloc varianc described in chaprer 6. This would increase its

pool of resources and ensure sufficiem preponderance to postpone a future

Asin n challenger.

World Institutional Structures

Though imperfect in many respeccs, cbe United Nations is the best approx-

imarion avai lable of an institution chat can help manage rhe global status

quo. Te was created to reflect che power hierarchy in place at the end of

World War TI. The permanent members of the Security Council were, as

chey should have been, the nacions wieh the most power in the global hier-

archy. The dissatísfied, defeated narions were exc1uded. The postwar períod

was dominated by supporters of the s(atus quo, wirh the exception of the

USSR, which des pite its dissacisfaction had a voice and a veto in the Se-

curity Council. The institution has evolved modestly over time, reflecting

some of che changes in the global hierarchy driven by endogenous growth.China s replacement of Taiwan as a permanent member oí the Securíty

Council was a long overdue recogniríon of the power híerarchy,

To be effective, however, the Security Council permanent membership

should represent the changing power hierarchy rather rhan a mirror on

che pase. The composition of the Security Coul1cil should reflect actual

power distributions. This wOllld help create widespread acceptance of Se-

COlIlKil C\ctiollS. American preponderance over decision making in

the Security Coul1cil accurately reflects che current hierarchy of power,

with the U.S. coalition represented by the United Sta tes, Unired Kingdom,

<llld Fr.\nct'. But chis arrallgemenr canl10t lasr. The continued exclllsion of

Germany and Japan weakens t he institution. Given che current global hier-

archy, eirher Germany or the EU should be represenred. So shollld Japan.

As India alld, in the disrant fmure, afher narions such as Brazil gain power,

these tOO should be represented in che Security Counei!. Expansion, hüw-

ever, has its limits. Britain and France are likely candidates for exclusion as

the EU gains direct representation,lAn even bolder and more speculative conclusion would follow if de -

mocracy spreads to a11 che major regions of the wor ld a t the sarue time

that nacional economies converge. Then the types of policies selected by

the dominant natíon will be lIniversally accepted by the international sys-

temo Endogenolls grO\vth implies convergence in rhe per-capita economic

groweh rate of countries. As chis convergence becomes global, somewhere

far in(O the furure, iti5

possible to speculate that rhe yotíng power of the

permanenr members of the Secllrit}' Coul1cil wil! be changed ro more closely

approximate the size of their poplllations, making for a sort of "one person,

one voce" system with procected rights and a satisfied internacional com-

munity. Thís would resemble a democraric system predicated upon great

power peace where all nations wou:d share cammon goals and values.

Until thar lItopian period, international politics will continue to un-fold as in the past. Although drama tic change in the international system

is possible, itis premarure to assume an "end of histor)''' 01' a fundamen-

tal redefinirion oí the nature of power. Nat io ns wi11 continue to grow andcontract, continually changing their power relationships ro oue another.

International insticutions should reflect these changing realities of power.

Global and Regional Hierarchies

Interactíons within and between che global and regional hierarchies will

determine che level o f inter national conflict in the future . Once Asian states

such as China or India establish cheir preponderance, che probability of

further power transitions at the global level wi11 diminish dramatícally.

The reason is that these Asian states have slIch enormous populations chat

no contenders will be able to overrake them. The only chance for power

transitions after Chinese or lnclian dominance is established will be if in-tegration creates new "super" cOllntries 01' if che Chinese or Indian states

suffer disintegration along che lines oE rhe collapse of thé Soviet Union.

In the meantime, transitions within regional hierarchies are inevitable.

Conflicc will shifr, we believe, from the global to the regional arena, If this

assumption proves correet, then grear powerwar participarion will be char-

acterized mainly by íntervention in regional conflicts. An important issue

for consickration is how rhc ClIrrcnt dominant powcr can seabilize regions

in order to a voíd great po\ver ínrerventíon .

Whar can a dominant nation do ro increase regional stabilit y? Power

Transition slIggests thar che dominanr nation's central concern is rhe

promotion of stabíliry and sarisfaction at the global leve!. This will be

cOlllplemenred by stability within l'egions. A globally dominant nation in-

terested in regional stability should see k the suppo rr of the local dominant

nation and continue that relarionship for as long as the local power's

preponderance is assured. By such action, the dominanr nacion reinforces

regional peace and stabíliry. Assllming the new local dominant nation is

not an oppo nent of the global status quo, when a regional power cransition

rakes place, the global dominanr nation should consider a shift in strategy

and support the rising ehallenger after the overtaking has been completed.

Such aCtiOIl willlimit the probability rhar war would agaín be waged within

the regional hierarchy.

A concurrent goal of the globally domínant nacion is ro actaín support

fl'om the regional dominant nation for rhe global status qua. The findings

11)" POWER lRANSITI01'. THE WORLD lO COME ) 187



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regarding the democratic pea ce suggest thar nations with similar regimes

sharply reduce rheir willingness ro wage war,J Authoritarian regimes are

also less likely ro fight each other than are mixed dyads. 4 Power Transi-

,ion Sllggests that domestíc regime coordinaríon leads ro rhe emergence of

similar attitudes towards che glohal status quo ,.\ The fundamental point is

,har to preserve sCilbility, che global dominilnt nation shollld seek out po-

temial alIies the domil1<nt states of each l'egíol1, and work ro o'eate

common COllcerns wirh each,

Future Hierarchies

The global hierarchy oí rhe fmure may look startlingly different. New dom-

inant powers will emerge, and they may refashion rhe international system

in unfamiliar ways, The loclls of power is moving tO Asia, the land of new

challengers. We cannot sal' for sure if the transfer of power wil! be peaeeful

01' violent, but we can see rhe outlines, the shadows, of che primar)' events

through the lens of Powel' Transition theary.Figure 8.1 traces the international syscem from the year 1900 and

projeets ir through rhe end of this century. Thefigure iIlustrates how hi-

erarchies change over time. The eansequenees of these changes account far

che most signifieant events in international polities.

1900

World Wars Period

1950

Cold War Period,

2000

Post-Cold War Period

2050

Alternative A: I B:

U,S, Superbloc Chma

2100

Figure 8.1 Evolution of the Global Hierarchy

United Kingdom

United StatesRussia/USSR

Germany

Figure 8.2 The Global Hierarch y in the World Wars Period

The century began with a period of intense competirion where global

wars dominated international interactions. In the second period, the Cold

War threatened humanity, but American preponderance precluded the ca-

castrophes associated wirh the two previous World Wars. We eurrently

stand at the beginning of the post-Cold War era, a period of time strik-

ing in that ir has nor yet been given its own name. Sorne have suggested

the Informatíon Age, others the Second American Century.Whatever name

is attached ro this time, American preponderance continues ro ensure rhe

absence of global war. But this period will not last forever. If a dissatisfiedChina threatens to overtake the United Staees, we can expect ro see pre-

cursor eonditions similar to rhe Cold War. With a successful challenge, a

dissatisfied China would undoubtedly estabJish a new world order.

Looking ae the evolution of che global hierarchy in more derai!, the

World Wars period depictedin figure 8.2 was dominated by the United

Kingdam. But the British-Ied global hierarchy was not managed effectiveJy.

The failure to create a sarisf1ed Germany or to construct a eohesive prewar

alliance to derer Germany led ro World Wars 1 and JI. Perhaps che most

serious mistake was rhe failure ro integrate ehe Unired Sta tes ineo active

defense of rhe status qua prior to the ourbreak oE hosrilicies. British ex-

haustion cOllpled with the tremendous growth in American relative power

188 POWER TRANSITIONS THE WORLD TO COME189



United States

Japan

USSR k'/ /

China

Figure 8.3 The Global Hierarchy in the Cold Wal' Period

Icd ro the emcrgence of the United States as che dominant power of the

internarional system in che nexr periodo

In contrnst with Greac Bricain's failure following World War 1, the

Unired Sr:Hes transformed Germany and Japan ineo democracies after

\XIorld War Il, removing potemial challengers from che system describedin figure 8.3. China and the USSR remained outside of the satisfied inter-

n::Hional coalirion, resulting in a prorracted Cold War. The United Sta tes

responded ro che Sino-Soviet rift by taking the firsr steps eo engage China

and thereby attempt to reduce its dissatisfaction. Similar initiatives were

directed roward the Soviet Union during détente. The preponderance ofNATO, combined with these U.S. initiatives to engage potential oppo-

nents, stabilized the internarional system. The Cold War period ended

abruptly as che pressures of competition with the U.S .-NATO alliance ex-

posed the weaknesses of the Soviet s)'stem and revealed the hielden reality

of American preponderance.Thc collapse of the Soviet Union rescructured the U.S.-led international

system (figure 8.4) bllt, unlike che case of the British-Ied system at century's

dawn, did not reduce its srability.

Given ics enormous relarive ¡ncrease in power leading to rhe establish-

ment of preponderance, the United Sta tes now should move to integrate

Russia into the internacional economic cornmunity and ínto NATO. This

is nor b.lsed on Russía's current GDP, rhe size of a small European narion,

Uniíed States

Europe Russia

China

Figure 8.4 The Global Hiera rchy in the Post-Cold War Period

but on the expectation that Russia, des pite a diminished populatíon, wil!

resume its place on rhe growrh curve within a decade or two. The United

States also should expand its program oE external constructive engagement

and "internal realígnmcnt" with China. If these initiatives succeed, the sra-

biliry of the cllrrent system \Viii be ensured within chis hierarchy for che fiesthalE oE this cenru ry and perha ps beyond.

The Next International Period

The future srructure of che global hierarchy will be determined largely by

the conrinued economic expansion of rhe great powers. As endogenousgrowth fosters convergence in the growth oE per-capita economic output,rhe size of a nation s population will ultimately ser tbe limü on the size oE

its econorny. Each of the nexr tluee figures adjust rhe size oE each conti-

nenr based 011 the share of rhe particular resource foclIsed on. Figure 8.5

(p . 190) displays each continent's share oE world dernographic resources.6

Asia is clearly preponderant in terrns of popularion. The dcamatic differ-ence in rhe demographic bases of each conrinenr sers the foundaríon for the

next global hierarchy. As per-capira growth rates converge, Asia wilJ haveno rivals for its preeminence in world polítics.

Despice rhe wide disparity in popularions, the global distriburion of

wealth favors the West. Figure 8.6 (p. 190) illustrates the current worldshares of GDP for each continent.7 Today, the Western alliance of Eucope

- ; . ,.POWER TRANSITIONS

')

THE WORLO TO COME 191



190

Figure 8.5 Currcnt WOl'ld Population Sharcs

Figurc 8.6 Currcnt World GDP Sharcs

and North America is economically preponderant over che Asian region.Because of this preponderance, the Uniced States is the unrivaled globalleader. It is not surprising to find rhat ir has assembled the most powerful

coalition in SlIpport of che scatus quo.According to che model of endogcnous growth, che distribution of the

world's economic resources will shifc over time. The majority of the world'swealth will shift to Asia as per-capita GDP converges. Figure 8.7 forecaststhe world shares of CDP in che middle of chis cenrury.8 Given ¡ts dramacic

advantage in popularion resources, Asia shollId hold a larger share of GDP

,han boch Europe and Noreh America combined.

The global hierarchy needs to aceommodate (hese changes in the dis-

eribution of power. The issue is not wherher a eransition will occur, bue

Figure 8.7 Mid-Century World GDP Shares

wherher ir wil! be peaceful or conflicruaL The goal of U.S. policymakersshould be ro foster a peaceful power transieion rhat incorporares the Asian

power center into the exiscing status quo. If such cfforrs fail, rhe probabiliryof a global war increases dramarically.

A number oE srructural arrangements are possible in che twenry-firstcentury. Speeifically, [WO ideal types represent opposire ends of the spec-trum of possible hierarchies, the U.S.-led superbloc in figure 8.8 (p. 192)and Creater China in figure 8.9. There are many possible types in between,

but these [WO define rhe range. The first scenario, wherein the United Sta tescan gready .Íncrease ies power by expanding NATO into a superbloc viaincorporarion of Russia, China, and India, is iJlusrrared in figure 8.8.

In a U.S.-led superbloc, aH members of che hierarchy have been per-suaded to be part of a common international eoalition, where democracyand the markerplace are rhe distinguishing features. These are central be-

cause they are the goals of rhe current dominant power. Consrrucring asuperbloc in which bloc members are encouraged or peacefully persuaded

to adopr these goals wiIl produce a sysrem in which aIl are satisfied. Thisdistinguishes this scenario from the strategy of hostiliry and appeasemenrfollowed by the previous dominant power in rhe 1930s. In rhar case, rheBritish failed to bring the German chaJlengers into agreement wirh theír

goals. The greatest tragedy may be thar che British simulraneously failed to

coostruer a superbloc with rhe United states, a country available because irgenerally shared Brirish goals and preferences.

The prepooderant superbloc system io figure 8.8 is ultrasrable. Amer-ican leadership of this superbloc would be expecred for decades to come.

However, given demographic trends, che mosr powerful member of che

superbloc late in this century is likely to be either China or India. This

r192

POWER TRANSITIONSTHE WORLD TO COME 193

1



u.s. Superbloc

India

Russia t /

China

Figure 8.8 Alternative A: The Global Hierarchy under a U.S.-Ied Superbloc

China

lslamic Bloc

ami/or

Resurgent Russia

Figure 8.9 Alternative B: The Global Hierarchy under China

will make the superbloc an Asian- Ied alliance, but one chat has been

conditioned ro be consistent with American interests.

At rhe opposite end of the spectrum, illuscrared in figure 8.9, we find

a dissatisfied China imposing a very different internacional order. [n this

scenario, China ovenakes rhe United 5rares as its coalition proves stronger

rhan that of the s3tisfied sta tes. This raises che prospecrs for global war.China can establish chis new hierarchical order, but in so doing it has

to supplant the U.S.-escablished global status quo. Power Transition the-

ory implies rhar rhe mcans by which a dissacisfied China would impose anew starus quo is through war against the United States and ies allies. Suc-

cessfuJly besting che United 5tares would establish China as the dominant

power. The threat ro China rhen would be an eventual challenge by India,

perhaps in alignmenr wirh another emerging power, for argument's sake, a

resurgent Russia.The fundamental resulr of rhis hierarchical analysis is rhar in war or

peace Asia eventually emerges as the center of the international system withan Asian srare as rhe dominant power. While rhe ultimare outcome of Asia's

emergence is inevitable, the alternate paths ro that future are very distinct.

Which course is followed is, tú a substantial degree, in the hands of U.5.

decision makers today. Every dominant power eventually passes rhe mande

of leadership co anorher. The prudenrial dominant power makes sure thatthis transition occurs on its own terms.

Documents

Power Transitions