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MAIN PAGE As per Resolution  of Ministry of Law, Justice and Company Affairs (Department of Justice)  the First National Judicial Pay Commission was constituted by the Government of India on  21 st  March 1996.  It is headed by Justice Jagannatha Shetty , Former Judge, Supreme Court of India. The members of the Commission are Justice P.K. Bahri (Rtd.) , Former Judge of the Delhi High Court, and Justice A.B. Murgod (Rtd.) , Former Judge of the Karnataka High Court. The Commission submitted its Report regarding Pay Structure of the Judicial Officers of the Subordinate Judiciary of the country during November 1999. Presently, it is examining the grievances of the staff of the Subordinate Judiciary as per the direction of the Supreme Court. PREFACE 1. Our Constitution makers were keen to ensure that the Judiciary is independent of the Executive. The Constitution has tried to insulate the Judiciary from outside influence both from the Executive and the Legislature. Independence of judiciary is a basic structure of the Constitution. Independence of the judiciary constitutes the foundation on which rests the edifice of our democratic polity1. 2. With regard to subordinate Courts, the Constitution contains a group of Articles 233 to 237 in Chapter VI in Part VI under the heading ‘Subordinate Courts’. These provisions were also intended to ensure the independence of the Subordinate Judiciary2. 3. Courts, like all other branches of Government, belong to people. Indeed, of all branches of Government, Courts can be seen as the most open. Yet, the people know less about the Courts than they do about the Executive and the Legislature. People blame Courts for delay in disposal of cases; perhaps, not knowing the handicaps with which Courts function. 4. The general concept of judicial independence is that a Judge should be free of any pressure from the Government or any one else as to how to decide any particular case; for that reason, a Judge’s salary is not dependent on the Executive decision and his conditions of service are secured and not to be varied at the whim of the Executive. This is the general concept of judicial 

PREFACE - aijopc.nic.inaijopc.nic.in/SHETTY_COMMISSION_REPORT.pdf... the First National Judicial Pay Commission was ... the staff of the ... to have a "judicial compensation commission

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  • MAINPAGE

    AsperResolutionofMinistryofLaw,JusticeandCompanyAffairs(DepartmentofJustice)theFirstNationalJudicialPay

    CommissionwasconstitutedbytheGovernmentofIndiaon21stMarch1996.ItisheadedbyJusticeJagannathaShetty,FormerJudge,SupremeCourtofIndia.ThemembersoftheCommissionareJusticeP.K.Bahri(Rtd.),FormerJudgeoftheDelhiHighCourt,andJusticeA.B.Murgod(Rtd.),FormerJudgeoftheKarnatakaHighCourt.TheCommissionsubmitteditsReportregardingPayStructureoftheJudicialOfficersoftheSubordinateJudiciaryofthecountryduringNovember1999.Presently,itisexaminingthegrievancesofthestaffoftheSubordinateJudiciaryasperthedirectionoftheSupremeCourt.

    PREFACE1.OurConstitutionmakerswerekeentoensurethattheJudiciaryisindependentoftheExecutive.TheConstitutionhastriedto insulatetheJudiciaryfromoutsideinfluencebothfromtheExecutiveandtheLegislature.Independenceofjudiciaryisabasic structure of the Constitution. Independence of the judiciary constitutes the foundation on which rests the edifice of ourdemocraticpolity1.

    2.WithregardtosubordinateCourts,theConstitutioncontainsagroupofArticles233to237inChapterVIinPartVIunderthe headingSubordinateCourts.TheseprovisionswerealsointendedtoensuretheindependenceoftheSubordinateJudiciary2.

    3.Courts,likeallotherbranchesofGovernment,belongtopeople.Indeed,ofallbranchesofGovernment,Courtscanbeseenasthemostopen.Yet,thepeopleknowlessabouttheCourtsthantheydoabouttheExecutiveandtheLegislature.PeopleblameCourtsfordelayindisposalofcases;perhaps,notknowingthehandicapswithwhichCourtsfunction.

    4.ThegeneralconceptofjudicialindependenceisthataJudgeshouldbefreeofanypressurefromtheGovernmentoranyone elseastohowtodecideanyparticularcase;forthatreason,aJudgessalaryisnotdependentontheExecutivedecisionandhis conditionsofservicearesecuredandnottobevariedatthewhimoftheExecutive. Thisisthegeneral conceptofjudicial

    http://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/bio_ms.htmhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/bio_member.htmhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/bio_chrn.htmhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/constitut.htm

  • independence.

    5.Ancillarytothisconcept,thereistheobligationoftheJudgetoprovidespeedyandfairtrialtolitigants.Thespeedytrialis recognisedasafundamentalrightinourConstitution.

    1.S.P.Guptav.UnionofIndia:1981Supp.S.C.87,408.

    2.UnionofIndia&Othersv.Bonnerjea&Another(1995)6SCC765.

    6.ThefactremainsthatinspiteofthebesteffortsofJudges,thejudiciaryhasnotbeenabletoprovidespeedyjustice.Thereasonsaremanifold.Tonameafew:

    i)Thingshavechangedintherecentpast,particularlyinthelast20years.Therehasbeenagreatupsurgeincrimeandcriminallitigations,andequallyinthenumberofcivildisputes.Sotosay,thereisunmanageabledocketexplosionineverycourt.

    ii)Tomeetthischallenge,therehastobealargeincreaseinthenumberofjudges,courts,courtstaffandotherinfrastructure.Butnosuchincreasehasbeenmade.Evenintheexistingcourts,theworkingconditionsinmostofthemareunsatisfactory.The courtshaveinsufficientstaffandinadequateinfrastructure.Theyareprovidedwitholdtypewriters.Theydonothaveenoughstationeryfortheirdaytodaywork.

    iii)Theydonothavefinancialindependence.TheirfinanceisundertheExecutivecontrol.Theyarenotevenprovidedwithenoughcontingencyfundstomeettherequirementsofthedaytodaygoings.

    iv)IneveryBar,thenewmembersareaddedeachyear.ButeitherintheBarroomorintheCourtHalls,thereareanyadditional facilities.EventheCourtHallsarenotproperlyfurnished.Mostoftheadvocateswhoarerequiredtoattendcourtshavetostand allthewhilewaitingfortheircasestobecalled.

    v)Thelawbooksarethetoolsofthetradeforjudges.Butthejudgesarenotprovidedwiththeuptodatestatutesorlawbooks andcommentarieseitherintheirownCourtLibraryorintheirindividualdomesticlibrary.Thejudgesaregenerallyunderthemercyoflawyerstoprovidecopiesofthedecisionsorenactmentsreliedduringthecourseoftheargument.Somejudgeswrite

  • judgmentsintheirownhandsforwantofstenographers.

    vi)Thejudgesarenotgivenpropertrainingeitherattheinductionlevelorperiodicalrefreshercoursestoupdatetheirknowledge andtechniqueoffasttrackdisposal.

    vii)ThejudgesapplythesameoldprocedureandthesameoldCourtManagementandCaseManagement.

    viii)ThereisnoInformationTechnologyforCourtManagementinmostoftheStates.ThereisnoDataBaseapplicationforcases.NoScannerorElectronicFilingandforRetrievingDocumentsetc.,themeanswhicharecommonlyusedinallIndustrial housesandbusinessestablishments.

    7.CommentingonthesimilarconditionsintheBritishjusticesystemwhichexistedatonetime,ofcourselonglongago,LordDevlinthensaid:

    "Ifourbusinessmethodswereasantiquatedasourlegalsystem,wewouldhavebecomeabankruptnationlongback."

    8.Thesedeficienciesareindeed,insidiousthreattotheindependenceofthejudicialsystem,thoughnottotheindependenceofindividualjudgeswhooperatethesystem.Theindependenceofthelegalsystemdoesnotdependentirelyontheindependenceofeachindividualjudge.Italsodependsuponthemannerinwhichthesystemisoperated,andhowjudgesareprovidedfor.SomeoftheseaspectshavebeendealtwithbytheSupremeCourtintheAllIndiaJudgesAssociationCase3.TheCourtobserved:

    "....UndertheConstitution,thejudiciaryisabovetheadministrativeexecutiveandanyattempttoplaceitonparwiththeexecutivehastobeabandoned."...."Thejudgesarenotemployeesandjudicialserviceisnotserviceinthesenseofemployment.Asmembersofthejudiciary,theyexercise

    ____________________________________________________________

    3. AllIndiaJudgesAssociationCaseAIR1992SC165andAIR1993SC

    2493,2510.

  • thesovereignjudicial poweroftheState. TheyareholdersofpublicofficesinthesamewayastheMembersoftheCouncilofMinistersandtheMembersoftheLegislature."

    ".....Theserviceconditionsofthejudgesshouldnotbelinkedtothoseoftheexecutivesandtheserviceconditionsof thejudgeshavetoberevisedtomeetthespecialneedsofthejudicialservice."....."TheJudicialofficersthroughoutthecountryperformtheworkofthesamenatureand,therefore,theirserviceconditionshavetobeuniformanditshouldbeexaminedbyaseparateCommissionandtheStateshouldnotmakeagrievanceiftheirserviceconditionsareimproved."....."TheexertionsinvolvedinthedutiesoftheJudgecannotbecomparedwiththedutiesofotherservicesandthejudicial servicebyitsverynaturestandsonadifferentfootingandshouldbetreatedassuch."

    9.ThedecisionoftheSupremeCourt3 hasgivenanewlifesupporttothesubordinatejudiciaryofthiscountry.ThereappearstobenosuchdecisioninanyoftheCommonwealthcountries,exceptarecentjudgment4oftheCanadianSupremeCourt,inwhichitwasobservedthatitisimperativetohavea"judicialcompensationcommission"forprovincialcourtjudges in order to protect the courts frompolitical interference. It was also observed that the Commission must beindependent,objectiveandeffectivetodeterminethejudicialremuneration.

    10.TheinvolvementofanindependentCommissionislikelytopromotetheindependenceofjudiciary.Itprovidesaforuminwhichthemembersofthe

    4. Re.InthematterofareferencefromtheLt.GovernorinCouncilregardingtheRemunerationofJudgesoftheProvincialCourtsdt.18September1997.

    judiciarycanfearlesslyraiseconcernsabouttheirconditionsofservicewhichtheycouldnothaveraisedatthebargainingtablewiththeExecutiveortheLegislature.

    11.Moreover, theCommissionlikethisservesasaninstitutionalsievewhichprotectstheCourtsfrompoliticalinterference

  • througheconomicmanipulation,adangerwhichinheresinsalarynegotiation..

    12.TheJudiciarysrelianceuponGovernmentforperiodicincreasesinremunerationentailsanobviouspotentialforimpairmentofjudicialindependence.AstheChiefJusticeofSouthAustraliahasnoted5:

    "Thosewhocontrolthepursestringswillalwayshavesomecapacitytoinfluencetheactionsofthosewhoaredependentuponthecontentsofthepurse......Therecanbenodoubtthatexecutivegovernmentcontroloverjudicialsalaryfixationisalwaysatleastanincipientthreattojudicialindependence."

    AsaCanadianJudge6putitmorebluntly:

    "Whenyouarereducedtobeggingforadecentsalary,howcanyoubetrulyindependent."

    13.ThisCommission,bysurveyofthesubordinatecourts,hasfoundthatthereisalargescaledissatisfactionintheSubordinateJudiciaryalloverthecountry.

    14.Themajorcauseforthisdissatisfactionappearstobetheburgeoningjudicialworkloadandthefinancialpressureduetoinadequatecompensation.

    15.WewanttoimpressupontheGovernmentthatthedebilitatingeffectsofinadequateremunerationofthejudgesinthelong runcanonlyleadtoworsening

    5.See:ReportoftheRemunerationTribunalofCommonWealthofAustralia,1997,p.33.

    6.JudgeFrancoisBeaudoil,PresidentoftheConferencedesjugesdueQucboc.

    moraleanderodingcommitmenttoservice.Itistheuniversalexperiencethatmenandwomenwhofeelthattheyareunderpaidforthedemandingworktheydo,wouldgenerallysufferfromlowmoraleanddecliningsenseofcommitmenttoservice.Thisis, indeed,happeninginmanyStateJudiciaries.Thelosersare,however,notthejudgesintheultimateanalysis, ratheritisthepublic.Thepublichavetogobeforecourtsforcriticaldecisionsincasesaffectinglawandorder,casesthataffecttheirciviland

  • legalrights,casesinvolvingtheirlivesandlibertiesandcasesrelatingtotheirwelfareandtheirchildrenswelfare,etc..Wecanillaffordtoentrustsuchcasesinthehandsofdissatisfiedjudges.

    16. It is, indeed, appropriate to recall the warning given by Senator Henry Clay during the debate in the House ofRepresentatives7:

    "Thelabourerisworthyofhishire;andifyoudonotgivehimthewagesofhonesty,itistobeapprehendedthewagesofcorruptionmay,inprocessoftime,cometobesought."

    17.Therefore,improvingtheserviceconditionsofourjudgesisnotintheinterestofjudgesalone,butintheinterestofsoundandefficientadministrationofjusticeaswell.ThatwouldultimatelybenefitallofusandmoresotheGovernment,becausethe Governmentisalitigantin60percentofcasesthatcomebeforecourts.

    18.Thereisyetanotheraspect.Thevastmoralauthorityofcourtsinoursystemisboundupinthepublicmindwiththevisible adjunctofthosewhodispensejustice,includingcertainwayoflivingandthemannerinwhichtheycommutetocourts.This concernwasillustratedwellbya1949memorandumfromthreeEnglishCountryCourtJudges,complainingaboutlowsalary8:

    7.TheAnnalsofCongressreportthefollowingdebateintheHouseofRepresentativesinMarch1816,betweenHenry Clay(WhigParty,18151821)andJohnC.Calhoun(WarDemocrat,18111817).

    8.IndependenceofJudiciary:TheviewfromtheLordChancellorsoffice,ByRobertStevense,p.121.

    "Ifjudgeshavetoliveinmeanhouses,wearcheapclothes....notonlywouldtheirworksufferbyreasonof theirmentaldiscomfortbutthepresenthighestimationinwhichthejudiciaryiseverywhereheldwouldalsosuffer.Ifthemembersofthejudiciaryarenotregardedwithrespect,theirimpartialitywill,suchishumannature,cometobedoubted....."

    19.Inurgingtoboostjudicialsalaries,webynomeansaresuggestingthatsalariesshouldbesetataleveloftheincomeofthemostprosperousandsuccessfuladvocates.Weareonlytryingtosetthesalaryatalevelthatallowsaspirantswithmodest

  • backgrounds, and with family responsibilities, to accept the challenge of judicial service and a level that does not progressivelypenalisethosededicatedindividualswhochoosetoserve.Wearetryingtobefairtothosewhoaremakingsacrificesintermsoflonelinessandgeneralwithdrawalfromcommunityaffairstoservethepublic.20.ThereisnobetterwaytosumupouraimandobjectthantoputitinthewisewordsofChurchill9:

    "Ouraimisnottomakeourjudgeswealthymen,buttosatisfytheirneedstomaintainamodestbutdignifiedwayoflifesuitedtothegravity,andindeed,themajesty,ofthedutiestheydischarge."

    21.Thesearetheprincipalreasonswithwhichwehavesuggestedcertainemolumentstojudicialofficers.Afterall,wedonot spendmuchonourjudiciary.TheexpenditureonjudiciaryinourcountryintermsofGNPisrelativelylow.Itisnotmorethan 0.2percent.InKorea,itismorethan0.2percent;inSingapore,

    _____________________________________________________________

    9.Ibid4,p.127.

    itis1.2percent;inU.K.itis4.3percent;andinU.S.A.itis1.4percent.10UnlikeintheotherdepartmentsoftheGovernment,morethanhalfoftheamountwhichisspentonIndianJudiciaryisraisedfromtheJudiciaryitselfthroughcollectionofcourtfees,stampdutyandmiscellaneousmatters.Therefore,anyincreaseinthesalarystructureoftheJudicialOfficerscannotbeconsideredasaburdentotheState.

    22.Thatisoneaspect. Theotheraspectrelatestothepubliccriticismregardingthefunctioningofthejudiciary.Thepubliccriticism includes amongothers, the delay in disposal of cases; unsatisfactory judgments and creeping corruption in somequarters.Thejudiciarycannotaffordtobeindifferenttothesecriticisms.Thecostsofprovidingjusticeislikeothercallsonthepublicrevenues.Allpersonsanddepartmentswhoutilisethepublicrevenueareaccountabletothepublic.Thejudgescannotbeanexceptiontothisrecognisedprinciple.TheyareequallyaccountablefortheiractsandomissionsbothontheBenchandofftheBench.Itis,therefore,necessaryforjudges,individuallyandcollectively,toensurethatnosuchcriticismislevelledagainstthem

  • oragainstthesystem.

    23.ItisneedlesstostatethattheHighCourthasagreaterresponsibilityintheproperfunctioningofthesubordinatecourts.TheHighCourtwhichhasabsolutecontroloverthemembersoftheSubordinateJudiciarymustwatchthewatchmentoensurethatthepublicconfidenceinthejudiciaryisnotdiminished."Misbehaviourbyanyjudge,whetherittakesplaceontheBenchorofftheBench,underminespublicconfidenceintheadministrationofjusticeandalsodamagespublicrespectforthelawoftheland,ifnothingisseentobedoneaboutit,

    ____________________________________________________________

    10. See:ReportsubmittedbyDr.N.L.Mitra,Director,NationalLawSchoolofIndiaUniversity,Bangalore,totheCommissionp.195196.

    thedamagegoesunrepaired"11.Therefore,theHighCourtmusthaveperiodicalandmeaningfulinspectionsoverthesubordinatecourts.Evensurpriseinspectionsmayberequired.TheVigilanceCelloftheHighCourtmannedbycompetentjudicialofficersmaybegivengreaterpowertoenquireandinvestigatethecomplaintsagainsttheJudicialOfficers.

    24. Thereviewof all the Judicial Officers at the age of 50, 55and60years for compulsory retirement bythe procedureprescribedbytherespectiveServiceRulesshouldbeundertakenregularly.ThereshouldbecontinuingCommitteeofSeniorJudgesoftheHighCourtheadedbytheChiefJusticeforthispurposeofreview.

    25.TheHighCourt,ifwemaysayso,shouldberuthlessintakingactionsagainsttheindolentandundesirableelements.

    26.WetrustandhopethatthisReportawakenstheconcernedtotheneedsofthewholeprocessofjusticedeliverysystemandinspiresJudicialOfficerstorededicatethemselvestorespondpositivelytomeetthechallengesofthenewmillennium.

    Justice K. Jagannatha ShettyFormer Judge, Supreme Court of India

    Chairman

  • Justice P.K. Bahri (Rtd.) Justice A.B. Murgod (Rtd.)Judge,

    Delhi High Court Judge, Karnataka High Court

    Member Member-Secretary

    ___________________________________________________________

    11. JacksonsMachineryofJusticebyJ.R.Spencer:8thEd.,p.369370.

    ACKNOWLEDGEMENTAttheoutset,itisourdutytoacknowledgewithgratitudethegeneroushelpthatwehavereceivedfromtheKarnatakaHighCourtandparticularlythethenChiefJusticeMr.JusticeS.A.Hakeemformakingavailabletherequiredpremisesattheheartof thecityintheCityCivilCourtComplex,Bangalore,forlocatingtheHeadquartersoftheCommission.

    ThetaskofestablishingtheCommissionwiththenecessary funds, staff andequipments wasmucheasedbythecontinuedsupportfromtheMinistryofLawandJusticeoftheGovernmentofIndiaandinparticular,bytheguidanceofMr.M.P.Singh,AdditionalSecretary,Dr.P.K.Agrawal,JointSecretaryandMr.P.N.Singh,DeputySecretaryandtheirpredecessorsinoffice.Ms.S.Anand,P.A.O.andherstaffhavegivenproperguidanceinfinancialmatters.Wewouldliketothankthemforalltheir assistance.

    Weare grateful to all the High Courts, State Governments and Union Territory Administrations for their cooperation in collectionandcollationofinformationandmaterialrequiredforpreparationofthisgigantictask.

  • WewouldliketootothanktheIndianInstituteofPublicAdministration,NewDelhiandMr.M.C.Gupta,itsDirector,Mr.O.P. MinochaandProf.S.S.Singhwhoconstitutedtheteamforevolvingprinciplesofrationalisingthepaystructureforthethree cadresofourJudicialofficers.

    ToDr.N.R.MadhavaMenon,formerDirectoroftheNationalLawSchoolofIndiaUniversity,Bangalore,weoweaspecialdebtofgratitude. Wehavehadtheadvantageofhiscritical advicefromhisprofoundknowledgeoflegal educationandjudicialtraining.HehasindeedtakenpersonalinterestinpreparinganinnovativeReportonJudicialEducationandTraining.

    Special thanks are due to the Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore, the Director Dr. M. RamMohan Rao, Mr. S.S.Vaidyanathan and Prof. S. Krishna for preparing the report on Improving Work Methods and Work Environment in theSubordinateCourtsinIndiaandalsoforcoordinatingforholdingthe"NationalConsultativeActivityonJudicialEducationandTrainingandI.T.forJudiciary."

    OurthanksarealsoduetoDr.N.L.Mitra,Director,NationalLawSchoolofIndiaUniversity,BangaloreandhisstaffwhohavefurnishedawealthofinformationregardingthehistoryofthejudiciaryincertainStatesandUnionTerritories.

    Mr.K.R.Chamayya,initialMemberSecretaryoftheCommission,evenafterhelefttheCommissionhasbeenkindenoughtoassociatehimselfwiththeongoingworkoftheCommissionandweareobligedtohimforpreparingdraftsofmodelCivil CourtsAct,modelJudicialServiceRulesincludingConductRulesforJudgesandRulesforRecruitmentofJudgesofFamilyCourts.

    Ininstallingcomputersanddevelopingsoftwaretoourrequirement,SriA.Venkateshan,TechnicalDirector&StateInformaticOfficer,KarnatakaUnit,BangaloreandcolleaguesofNICwereofenormoushelptotheCommission.

    ItisapleasuretomentionJusticeMr.C.S.Ramlu(Rtd.),PresidentandMr.N.S.Saini,GeneralSecretaryoftheAllIndiaJudgesAssociationwhohavesubmittedadetailedrepresentationtoourQuestionnaireandallotherJudicialOfficersAssociationsandotherswhohaverespondedtoourQuestionnaireandwhohaveparticipatedinthepersonalhearings.Weareobligedtoeachoneofthem.

  • ThecentralfeatureofthepreparationoftheReporthasbeentheinhousehardandsustainedworkfromourlimitedstaff,whoare indeed, the unsung heroes, details of whom are in the Annexure. They took pride in working overtime with a sense ofinvolvementinthepreparationoftheReport.

    Itwouldbetruetosaythat,withoutthehelpinghandofMr.H.G.Srivara,K.A.S.,DeputySecretaryandMr.R.Ramapriya,Joint Director (Economics &Statistics), thewholeproject might haveaborted. ThesetwoOfficers deservegreat thanksfortheirpatienceandassistance.

    WealsowishtothankourSecretaries,Mr.K.VittalSheregar,PrincipalPrivateSecretarytoChairman,Mr.B.KrishnaMurthy,P.S. to MemberSecretary, Mr. S. Seetharam, P.S. to Member and Personal Assistants, Mr. R. Venkataraman and Mr. N. Prabhakar, for their hard work. Wealso acknowledge the useful service rendered bySri R. Ramachandra, Section Officer(Accounts)oftheCommission.

    WealsothankMr.Panduranga,Proprietor,FiveStarImpressionsandMr.K.Narayana,Proprietor,SpanPrintfortheircoordinationinbringingouttheprintedReportwithinthestipulatedtimeframe.

    Justice K. Jagannatha ShettyFormer Judge, Supreme Court of India

    Chairman

    Justice P.K. Bahri (Rtd.) Justice A.B. Murgod (Rtd.)Judge,

    Delhi High Court Judge, Karnataka High Court

    Member Member-Secretary

    CHAPTERS1. Introduction

    http://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/introduc.htmlhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/introduc.html

  • 2. History of Judiciary (States / UTs)3. Judicial Structure & Remunearation - International Experience4. The Trial Judge is really 'On Trial'5. Rechristening of Subordinate Judiciary6. Equation of posts CMM and CJM7. Amalgamation of Multiple Cadres into three uniform cadres8. Recruitment to the cadre of Civil Judge (Jr.Dn.)-cum-Magistrate I Class9. Civil Judges (Sr.Dn.) - Whether it should be mixed cadre or purely promotional cadre10. Direct recruitment to the cadre of District Judges - Profile, Problems & PrognosisAnnexure - Draft Judicial Service Rules11. Whether the Lower Judicial Service Person could be made eligible for direct recruitment to the post of District Judges'12. Principles relating to Inter-Se Seniority between Direct Recruits and Promotees in the cadre of District Judges13. Judicial Training & Education - Status, Needs, Organisation & Strategies14. Principles Governing the Pay Structure of the Subordinate Judiciary15. Evolution of new Pay Scales16. The Administration of Justice in the States should be Joint Responsibility of the Centre and the StatesAnnexure - CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF CENTRAL ACTS17. Assured Career Progression Scheme and Functional Scales18. Dearnes Allowance - A Perspective19. Allowances, Amenities and Advances20. Promotional Opportunities21. Superannuation Age of Judicial Officers22. Retirement Benefits23. Pension Structure for Past Pensioners24. Work Methos and Work Environment25. Information Technology in the Administration of Justice26. All India Judicial Service

    http://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/Aijs.htmlhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/infotech.htmlhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/cwcm&adr.htmlhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/pnsnstru.htmlhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/retmtbft.htmlhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/superann.htmlhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/prom_opp.htmlhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/amenitis.htmlhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/da_persp.htmlhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/acp&fs.htmlhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/jointsh1.htmlhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/jointshr.htmlhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/payscal1.htmlhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/prin_pay.htmlhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/report1a.htmlhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/prn_inte.htmlhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/lower.htmlhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/chamayya.htmlhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/dist_jud.htmhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/civil_jd(sr).htmhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/recrj.htmhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/amalgama.htmlhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/eqn_cmm.htmlhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/rechrist.htmhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/trial_jd.htmlhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/jud_stru.htmlhttp://www.kar.nic.in/fnjpc/history.htm

  • 1.INTRODUCTIONPrenatalHistoryoftheCommission:

    1.1Thoughtherehasbeenseparationofjudiciaryfromtheexecutive,andthoughthepowersandfunctionsofJudicialOfficersarequitedifferentfrompowersandfunctionsoftheExecutiveOfficers,theserviceconditionsofJudicialOfficers,however,havebeentaggedwiththoseofthecorrespondingExecutiveOfficers.EventhescalesofpayoftheJudicialOfficerswererelatedormadeidenticalwiththepayscalesofthecorrespondinglevelofExecutiveOfficersoftheStateCivilService.

    1.2Therepeatedefforts oftheJudicial Officers togetanimprovedserviceconditionsanddelinktheir payscalesfromthecorrespondingExecutiveCadresbecamesuccessful.TheStateGovernmentsdidnotaccedetotheirrequest.AllIndiaJudgesAssociationv.UnionofIndia1:

    1.3In1989,theAllIndiaJudgesAssociationanditsWorkingPresident,filedWritPetition(Civil)No.1022of1989beforethe SupremeCourtofIndiaunderArticle32oftheConstitutionseekingmanyreliefsastoimprovetheconditionsofserviceofsubordinate Judicial Officers all over the country. But during the hearing of the petition, only the following reliefs werehighlighted:

    (i)UniformityintheJudicialcadresindifferentStatesandUnionTerritories;

    ( ii ) An appropriate enhanced uniformageof retirement for the Judicial Officers throughout thecountry;

    (iii)Uniformpayscalesasfaraspossibletobefixed;

    ____________________________________________________________1.AllIndiaJudgesAssociationv.UnionofIndia,AIR1992SC165=(1992)1SCC119.

  • (iv)ResidentialaccommodationtobeprovidedtoeveryJudicialOfficer;

    (v)Transportfacilitytobemadeavailableandconveyanceallowanceprovided;

    (vi) Adequate perks by way of Library Allowance, Residential Office Allowance, and SumptuaryAllowancetobeprovided;

    and,

    (vii)Provisionforinservicetrainingtobemade.TheJudgmentoftheSupremeCourtintheAllIndiaJudgesAssociationCase:

    1.4AthreeJudgeBenchoftheSupremeCourt,afterhearingtherepresentativesoftheUnionofIndia,alltheStatesandUnion Territories, disposedofthesaidWritPetitionbyjudgmentdated13November1991.RanganathaMisra, ChiefJustice,whospokefortheBenchobserved:

    (a)AnAllIndiaJudicialServiceshouldbesetupandtheUnionofIndiashouldtakeappropriatestepsinthis regard.

    (b)StepsshouldbetakentobringaboutuniformityindesignationofOfficersbothincivilandthecriminal sideby3131993.

    (c)Retirementageofjudicialofficersberaisedto60yearsandappropriatestepsaretobetakenby31121992.

    d. AsandwhenthePayCommissions/CommitteesaresetupintheStatesandUnionTerritories,thequestionofappropriatepayscalesofJudicialOfficersbespecificallyreferredandconsidered.

    (e)TheDistrictJudgeandChiefJudicialMagistrateshouldbegivenRs.300/andRs.200/respectivelyasSumptuaryAllowancepermonth.

  • (f) Government accommodation for residence toeveryjudicial officer has tobeprovidedanduntil Stateaccommodation is available, the State at the instance of the High Court should provide requisitionedaccommodationaccordingtoentitlementandtherecoveryofnotmorethan12%ofsalaryoftheOfficertowardsrentshouldbemadeandthebalancemustbemetbytheExchequer.

    (g)Theresidentialaccommodationmustbespaciousenoughtohaveaseparateroomforofficepurpose.

    (h)EveryJudicialOfficermustbeprovidedwithuniformpatternofsmalllibraryinhisofficialresidenceandtheDistrictJudgeshouldhaveprovisionmadeinhisbudgetforthepurpose.

    (i)EveryDistrictJudgeandChiefJudicialMagistrateshouldhaveaStatevehicle.JudicialOfficersinsetsof5shouldhaveapoolvehicleandotherswouldbeentitledtosuitableloanstoacquiretwowheelerautomobiles withindifferenttimelimitsasspecified.

    (j)InserviceInstituteshouldbesetupwithinoneyearattheCentralandStateorUnionTerritorylevel.

    Reviewfiled:

    1.5TheUnionofIndiaandsomeStateGovernmentsbeingaggrievedbytheaforesaidjudgmentpreferredReviewPetitionsraisingseveralobjectionsincludingConstitutionalquestions.Theobjectionsmaybesummarisedasunder:

    (i)Thepowertoprescribeserviceconditionsisvestedintheexecutiveandthelegislature.TheSupremeCourt byissuingthedirectionsinquestionprescribingtheseparateconditionsofservicehasimpingeduponthefieldexclusivelyassignedbytheConstitutiontotheExecutiveandthelegislature.

  • (ii) Theservice conditions of the State employees andtheJudicial Officers are periodically reviewed byindependentPayCommissionsconstitutedforthepurpose.

    (iii)Thereisnothingdistinguishableaboutthejudicialwork,andifthedirectionsgivenbytheSupremeCourt arefollowed,theotherserviceswouldalsodemandsimilarserviceconditions.Thatwouldplaceaveryheavyfinancialburdenonthepublicexchequer.

    (iv)ThefinancialresourcesofalltheStatesarenotequalandsomeoftheStateswouldbeunabletobearthe financialburdenbygivinghigherpayscalesandotherperquisitestotheJudicialOfficers.

    ReviewJudgmentoftheSupremeCourt2:

    1.6AnotherthreeJudgeBenchoftheSupremeCourt,RanganathaMisra,ChiefJustice,sinceretired,aftercarefullyexaminingthecontentionsraisedbytheReviewPetitioners,deliveredthejudgmenton24August1993modifyingsomeofthereliefsgivenintheoriginaljudgment,whilegivingadditionalreliefs,P.B.SawantJ.,whospokefortheBench,interalia,observed:

    "TheJudicialServiceisnotserviceinthesenseofemployment.Thejudgesarenotemployees.AsmembersofthejudiciarytheyexercisethesovereignjudicialpoweroftheState.Theyareholdersofthepublicofficesinthesamewayasthemembersofthecouncilofministersandthemembersofthelegislature.Whenitissaid thatinademocracysuchasours,theexecutive,thelegislatureandthejudiciaryconstitutethethreepillarsoftheState,whatisintendedtobeconveyedisthatthethreeessentialfunctionsoftheStateareentrustedtothe threeorgansoftheStateandeachoneoftheminturnrepresentstheauthorityoftheState.However,those

  • whoexercisetheStatepoweraretheministers,thelegislatorsandthejudges,andnotthemembersoftheirstaffwhoimplementorassistinimplementingtheirdecisions."

    ThelearnedJudgecontinued:

    "TheJudges,atwhateverleveltheymaybe,representtheStateanditsauthorityunliketheadministrativeexecutiveorthemembersoftheotherservices.Themembersoftheotherservices,therefore,cannotbeplacedonparwiththemembersofthejudiciary,eitherconstitutionallyorfunctionally."

    _______________________________________________________________2.AllIndiaJudgesAssociationv.UnionofIndia,AIR1993SC2493=(1993)4SCC288.

    Hewenton:

    "WiththeinaugurationoftheConstitutionandtheseparationoftheStatepowerdistributedamongthethreebranches,thecontinuationofthelinkagehasbecomeanachronisticandisinconsistentwiththeconstitutionalprovisions.Aspointedoutearlier,theparityinstatusisnolongerbetweenthejudiciaryandtheadministrativeexecutivebutbetweenthejudiciaryandthepoliticalexecutive.UndertheConstitution,thejudiciaryisabovetheadministrativeexecutiveandanyattempttoplaceitonparwiththeadministrativeexecutivehastobediscouraged.Thefailuretograspthissimpletruthisresponsibleforthecontentionthattheserviceconditionsof thejudiciary must becomparable tothoseof theadministrative executiveandanyameliorationin theservice conditions of the former must necessarily lead to the comparable improvement in the serviceconditionsofthelatter."

    Hepertinentlyremarked:

    "xxxxxxxxx

    Hence the earlier approach of comparison between theservice conditions of the judges and those of theadministrativeexecutivehastobeabandonedandtheserviceconditionsofthejudgeswhicharewrongly

  • linkedtothoseoftheadministrativeexecutivehavetoberevisedtomeetthespecialneedsofthejudicialservice."

    Healsoobserved:

    "Further,sincetheworkofthejudicialofficersthroughoutthecountryisofthesomenature,theserviceconditionshavetobeuniform."

    Finally,thelearnedjudgeemphasised:

    "WehavealsoemphasisedearlierthenecessityofentrustingtheworkofprescribingtheserviceconditionsforthejudicialofficerstoaseparatePayCommissionexclusivelysetupforthepurpose.HencewereiteratetheimportanceofsuchseparateCommissionandalsoofthedesirabilityofprescribinguniformpayscalestothejudgesalloverthecountry.Sincesuchpayscaleswillbetheminimumdeservedbythejudicialofficers, theargumentthatsomeoftheStatesmaynotbeabletobearthefinancialburdenisirrelevant."

    1.7Forimmediatereference,theviewsexpressedintheaforesaidReviewJudgmentmaybrieflybesummarisedasfollows:

    (a)Thelegalpracticeofthreeyearsshouldbemadeoneoftheessentialqualificationsforrecruitmenttothejudicialpostsatthelowestrunginthejudicialhierarchy.

    Wherever the recruitment of the judicial officers at the lowest rung is made through the Public ServiceCommission,arepresentativeoftheHighCourtshouldbeassociatedwiththeselectionprocessandhisadviceshould prevail unless there are strong and cogent reasons for not accepting it, which reasons should berecordedinwriting.

  • a. TheSuperannuationageofeverysubordinatejudicialofficershallstandextendedupto60years,buttherespectiveHighCourtsshouldassessandevaluatetherecordofthejudicialofficerforhiscontinuedutilitywellwithintimebeforeheattainstheageof58yearsbyfollowingtheprocedureforthecompulsoryretirementundertheServiceRulesapplicabletohimandgivehimthebenefitoftheextendedsuperannuationagefrom58to60yearsonlyifheisfoundfitandeligibletocontinueinservice.Incaseheisnotfoundfitandeligible,heshouldbecompulsorilyretiredonhisattainingtheageof58years.Thosejudicialofficerswhoarenotdesirousofavailingofthesuperannuationageof60years,havetherighttooptoutat58yearsbyproperintimationtotheHighCourtbeforetheyattain57years.

    (c) Thedirection for granting sumptuary allowance to the District Judges andChief Judicial Magistratesstandswithdrawnforthereasonsgivenearlier.

    (d)ThedirectionwithregardtothegrantofresidencecumlibraryallowancewillceasetooperatewhentherespectiveStateGovernments/UnionTerritoryAdministrationsstartprovidingtheCourtswiththenecessarylawbooksandjournalsinconsultationwiththerespectiveHighCourts.

    (e)ThePrincipalDistrictJudgeorPrincipalJudgeateachdistrictheadquartersorthemetropolitantownandtheChiefJudicialMagistrateandtheChiefMetropolitanMagistratewillbeentitledtoindependentvehicleswiththefreepetrolsubjecttomaximumof100litrespermonthinconsultationwiththeHighCourts.TherestoftheJudgesandMagistrateswillbeentitledtopoolvehiclesoneforeveryfivejudgesfortransportfromresidencetoCourtandback.Wherepoolvehiclecannotbeprovidedorjudgesdesireloanforpurchasingtwowheelers,theyshouldbegivenloansonsuitabletermsandalsotheconveyanceallowance.

    (f)InviewoftheestablishmentoftheNationalJudicialAcademy,itisoptionalfortheStatestohavetheir independentorjointtrainingjudicialinstitutes.

    (g)ThereshouldbeuniformpayscalestosubordinatejudgesalloverthecountryandsuchscalesshouldbedelinkedtothepayscalesoftheExecutiveOfficers.

  • (h)ThereshouldbeseparateCommissionfordeterminingthepayscalesofthejudicialofficers.

    (i) TheStates shouldnotpleadfinancial constraint if thepayscalesof thejudicial officers are enhanceddelinkingthesamefromthatofthecorrespondingexecutiveofficers.

    (j)Therestofthedirectionsgivenintheoriginaljudgmentaremaintained.ConstitutionoftheCommission:

    1.8InpursuanceoftheabovedirectionsoftheSupremeCourt,theGovernmentofIndiabyResolutiondated21March1996constituted the FIRSTNATIONALJUDICIALPAYCOMMISSION for the Subordinate Judiciary all over the country with thefollowingtermsofreference:

    (a) Toevolve theprinciples whichshould govern thestructure of payandother emoluments of Judicial OfficersbelongingtotheSubordinateJudiciaryalloverthecountry.

    (b)ToexaminethepresentstructureofemolumentsandconditionsofserviceofJudicialOfficersintheStatesandUTstakingintoaccountthetotalpacketofbenefitsavailabletothemandmakesuitablerecommendationshaving regard, among other relevant factors, to the existing relativities in the pay structure between theofficersbelongingtosubordinatejudicialservicevisavisothercivilservants.

    (c) To examine and recommend in respect of minimum qualifications, age of recruitment, method ofrecruitmentetc.,forJudicialOfficers.Inthiscontext,therelevantprovisionsoftheConstitutionanddirectionoftheSupremeCourtinAllIndiaJudgesAssociationCaseandinothercasesmaybekeptinview.

    (d)Toexaminetheworkmethodsandworkenvironmentasalsothevarietyofallowancesandbenefitsinkindthat are available to Judicial Officers in addition to payand tosuggest rationalisation andsimplificationthereofwithaviewtopromotingefficiencyinJudicialAdministration,optimisingthesizeoftheJudiciaryetc..

    CompositionoftheCommission:

  • 1.9

    1.ChairmanMr.JusticeK.JagannathaShetty

    (FormerJudge,SupremeCourt)

    2.MemberMr.JusticeP.K.Bahri

    (FormerJudge,DelhiHighCourt)

    3.MemberSecretaryMr.K.R.Chamayya

    (Rtd.ChairmanofStateAdmistrativeTribunal)

    1.10On2ndApril1996,Mr.K.R.ChamayyaassumedofficeasMemberSecretaryoftheCommission.

    1.11On24thApril1996,Mr.JusticeP.K.Bahri(Rtd.)assumedofficeasMemberoftheCommission.

    1.12On1stJune1996,theChairmanoftheCommissionassumedoffice.

    1.13On27thAugust1996,Mr.K.R.ChamayyaresignedasMemberSecretaryandinhisplace,Mr.JusticeA.B.Murgod,retiredJudge of the Karnataka High Court was appointed, and he took charge on 28 August 1996, as MemberSecretary of theCommission.TheCommissioningoftheCommission:

    1.14ThoughtheCommissionwasconstitutedinMarch1996,itcouldnotbemadeimmediatelyfunctionalforwantofoffice, financeandstaff.

    1.15On8May1996,theChiefJusticeoftheKarnatakaHighCourt,atthepersonalrequestoftheChairmanoftheCommission, waspleasedtomakeavailablethepremisesforestablishingtheofficeoftheCommissioninthenewlybuiltAnnexetotheCity

  • CivilCourtComplexattheheartofBangaloreCity.ThesaidpremiseswereentrustedtotheCentralPublicWorksDepartmentforalterationstomakeitsuitableforCommissionsrequirements.TheC.P.W.D.finishedtheirworkanddeliveredthepremises totheCommissioninthemiddleofSeptember1996.Procedure:

    1.16TheCommissionhasbeenauthorisedtodeviseitsownprocedureandappointsuchadvisers,institutionalconsultantsandexpertsasitmayconsidernecessaryforanyparticularpurpose.TheCommissionmaycallforsuchinformationandtakesuchevidenceasitmayconsidernecessary.

    1.17AllStateGovernments,UTAdministrationsandtheMinistries/DepartmentsoftheCentralGovernmentarerequiredtofurnishsuchinformation,documentsandotherassistanceascalledforbytheCommission.Staff:

    1.18Regardingthestaff,theCommissionhasnotbeengivenpowertorecruitthemfromopenmarket.TheCommissionwas askedtorecruitpersonnelwiththe"SurplusCell"oftheGovernmentofIndia.Afterprotractedcorrespondence,theCommissionfoundthattherewasnosuitablepersonforitsrequirementinthe"SurplusCell".

    1.19Therethen,GovernmentallowedtheCommissiontoappointthestaff,eitherbydeputationfromotherdepartmentsorreemploymentofretiredpersons.TheCommission,however,couldnotsecuretheservicesondeputationsaveinthreecases.TheCommissionwasleftwithnoalternativeexcepttoappointretiredpersons.Literally,theCommissionhadtochasetheretiredpersonswhoarebelow60yearssinceiftheyareabove60years,thespecialpermissionhastobeobtainedfromtheCentralGovernment.Inviewofthisconstraint,eventodaysomeofthepostsarelyingvacantforwantofsuchretiredpersons.Finance:

    1.20Regardingfinance,itwasonlyon22August1996,thefirstLetterofCreditwasreceivedfromtheGovernmentforasumof Rs.7.50lakhsandthefirstchequebookwasreceivedforthedisbursementofthesaidamounton9September1996.Butthat amountwashardlysufficientforpaymentofthebillofC.P.W.D.andtopurchasenecessaryofficeequipments.

  • 1.21Afterrecruitingtheskeletonstaffintheaforesaidmanner,theCommissionbecamepartiallyfunctionalatthefagendofDecember1996.

    1.22TheMainOfficeoftheCommissionislocatedatBangalore,whileasmallBranchOfficewiththeMemberMr.JusticeP.K. Bahri(Rtd.)isbasedatNewDelhiforcoordinatingandinteractingwiththeJudicialOfficersoftheNorthernStates.TheTaskoftheCOMMISSION:

    1.23ThetermsofreferencetotheCommissionareallembracing.Itisjustnotdeterminingthepayscalesofandconferring certainfinancialbenefitstoJudicialOfficersasthenameoftheCommissionpurportstoindicate.Theworkincludes,amongothers,therestructuringthemultiplejudicialcadresintothreeuniformcadres,prescribinguniformjurisdictions,determininguniformpayscales.TheCommissionisalsoconcernedwithRecruitment,Training,WorkMethodsandWorkEnvironmentofJudicialOfficersetc.CollectionofMaterial:

    1.24TheCommissionisnotonthetroddengroundbutonthevirginfield.Ithasnomaterialtofallbackupon.Sinceitisafirstofits kind, even preliminary particulars have to be gathered for preparing the Questionnaire. Even before establishing theCommissionsoffice,theChairmanaddressedacircularletterdated31July1996toalltheChiefJusticesoftheHighCourts requestingthemtofurnishcertaininformationpertainingtotheirJudicialOfficersintheprescribedformat.TheinformationstartedtricklingfromSeptember1996rightuptotheendofFebruary1997.Inthemeanwhile,theChairmanvisitedNewDelhi,Madras,MumbaiandPuneandhadpersonaldiscussionwiththeJudicialOfficersontheirproblemsandrequirements.Questionnaire:

    1.25Aftercollectingpreliminarymaterial,acomprehensiveQuestionnairecoveringthetermsofreferencewasprepared.On15March 1997, the Questionnaire was released by Mr. Justice R.P. Sethi, Chief Justice of the Karnataka High Court. TheQuestionnairehasbeengivenwidepublicityinprintandelectronicmediasothatitmaycometothenoticeofalltheJudicial Officers all over the country. The Questionnaire was also sent to all High Courts, State Governments, Judicial Officers

  • Associations,BarAssociations,BarCouncilofIndia,JuristsandOthers,seekingtheirviews.

    RepliestotheQuestionnaire:

    1.26AlmostalltheAssociationsofJudicialOfficershavepromptlyrespondedtotheQuestionnaireduringtheperiodfrom4June1997to29December1997.

    1.27ButtheHighCourtstooktheirowntimetoexpresstheirviewsontheQuestionnaire.TheHighCourtsofHimachalPradesh,MadhyaPradesh,Sikkim,Kerala,BiharandJammu&Kashmirsenttheirrepliesin1997.TheHighCourtsofKarnataka,UttarPradesh,TamilNaduandAssamsenttheirrepliesinthebeginningof1998.

    1.28Theremaining8HighCourtsnamely,Calcutta,Gujarat,Mumbai,Rajasthan,AndhraPradesh,Delhi,Punjab&HaryanaandOrissadelayedtheirrepliesinspiteofrepeatedrequestsandremindersfromtheCommission.

    1.29 Most of the State Governments were also not active in responding to the Questionnaire. In 1997, only the State GovernmentsofGoaandMizoramandUnionTerritoryAdministrationsofLakshadweep,Diu&DamanandDadra&NagarHavelihavesenttheirreplies.TheStateGovernmentsofManipurandAssamsenttheirrepliesinFebruary1998andMarch1998respectively.

    1.30On15July1998,theSupremeCourtcametotherescueoftheCommissionbydirectingtheRegistrarsoftheHighCourtsandalsotheStateGovernmentsandUnionTerritoryAdministrationswhohavenotrespondedtotheQuestionnairetosendtheirrepliestotheCommissionwithin8weeksofthereceiptoftheorderoftheSupremeCourt.

    1.31Accordingly,thesaidHighCourts,StateGovernmentsandUnionTerritoryAdministrationsrepliedtotheQuestionnaire.

    1.32TheAllIndiaJudgesAssociationsubmittedapreliminaryreplytotheQuestionnaireduringMay1998andfinalreplywasreceivedon5August1998.Consultants:

  • 1.33TheCommissionengageddifferentConsultantsfordifferentwork:(i)IndianInstituteofPublicAdministration,NewDelhi,wasentrustedwiththetaskofrationalizingandsuggestinguniformpaystructuresandotherbenefitsfortheproposedthreecadres; (ii) IndianInstituteofManagement, Bangalore, wasengagedforpreparingareport onCaseManagement andCourtManagement;(iii)TheNationalLawSchoolofIndiaUniversity,Bangalore,wasrequestedtocollectandcompilethehistoryofStateJudiciaryandadvisetheCommissiongenerally;(iv)Dr.N.R.MadhavaMenon,FormerDirectorofNationalLawSchoolofIndiaUniversity,Bangalore,agreedtoprepareareportontheJudicialTrainingInstitutewiththesyllabusandcourseoftrainingforJudicialOfficers;and(v)SriK.R.Chamayya,formerLawSecretary/LegislativeDraftsmanandChairmanoftheKarnatakaAdministrativeTribunal,wasrequestedtoprepareamodelCivilCourtsAct,SmallCausesCourtActanddraftUniformRulesforRecruitmentofJudgesofFamilyCourts.

    1.34TheConsultants,namely,theIndianInstituteofPublicAdministration,NewDelhi,theIndianInstituteofManagement,Bangalore andDr. Madhava Menon, after discussion with the Commission, prepared separate Questionnaires in respect ofsubjects assigned to them. They sent the Questionnaires to all the High Courts, Judicial Officers Associations, StateGovernmentsandotherconcernedpersonsandInstitutions,seekingtheirviewsthereon.Afterexaminingtheresponsereceived,theyhavepreparedthereports.

    1.35TheNationalLawSchoolofIndiaUniversity,BangalorehascollectedandcompiledalotofmaterialrelatingtothehistoryofthejudiciaryinsomeoftheStatesandUnionTerritories.AmendmenttotheTermsofReference:

    1.36TheoriginaltermsofreferencedidnotempowertheCommissiontodeclareanyinterimrelief.TheCommission,therefore,requestedtheGovernmenttoappropriatelyenlargethetermsofreferencetorecommendinterimreliefastherewererepeateddemandsfromthejudicialofficersofeveryState.TheGovernmentofIndiavideResolutionNo.15014/1/97Jusdated16121997amended/enlargedtheoriginaltermsofreferencebyinsertinganewparaasunder:

    "TheCommissionmayconsiderandgrantsuchinterimreliefasitconsidersjustandpropertoallcategoriesofJudicialOfficersofalltheStates/UnionTerritories.Theinterimrelief,ifrecommendedshallhavetobe

  • fullyadjustedagainstandincludedinthepackagewhichmaybecomeadmissibletotheJudicialOfficersonthefinalrecommendationsoftheCommission".

    InterimRelief:

    1.37TheexistingpayscalesofJudicialOfficersvaryfromStatetoState.TorationalisetheirpaystructurebygivinguniformpayscalesisoneoftheobjectsoftheCommission.Asapreliminarytoachievethatobject,theCommission,on31July1998granted InterimRelieftotheJudicialOfficersofStatesandUnionTerritorieswherethebenefitsoftheVPayCommissionoftheCentral Governmentwerenotextended.TheInterimReliefwasgrantedonvaryingtermslike35%to75%ofbasicpaywithadmissibleDearness Allowanceof Judicial Officers ason1.1.1996. TheCommissionalsograntedcertainInterimRelief to theretiredJudicialOfficers.TheInterimReliefwasgiveneffectfrom1stJuly1996.

    1.38SomeStateGovernmentspromptlyimplementedtheInterimRelief,butothersdidnot.Takingnoteofthisanomaly,theSupremeCourtmadeanOrderon27thApril1998asfollows:

    "WedirecttheotherStateGovernmentstotakeappropriatedecisionwhethertogivetheinterimrelieforthebenefitsundertheFifthCentralPayCommissionsReporttotheJudicialOfficersintheStates/UTsandmakepaymentwithinfourweeksfromtoday,andreportcompliancetothisCourt."

    1.39Pursuanttotheaforesaiddirection,alltheStateshavesinceimplementedtheInterimRelief.Oralhearing:

    1.40TheCommissionaffordedanopportunityofbeingheardtotherepresentativesofalltheJudicialOfficersAssociations,High Courts, State Governments / Union Territory Administrations etc., Hearing commenced on 2 November 1998 andconcludedon24February1999..NationalLevelConsultativeMeetingon12th&13thDecember1998:

    1.41TheCommissionthoughtthatthereportspreparedbytheIndianInstituteofManagementandDr.MadhavaMenonshouldbe discussed by the judicial fraternity, and other concerned authorities, before they are finalised by the Commission.

  • Accordingly,theCommissionconvenedaNationalConsultativeMeetinginIndianInstituteofManagement,Bangaloreon12and13December1998.ThemeetingwasconvenedwiththecollaborationofsaidInstituteofManagement.Mr.JusticeB.N. Kirpal. JudgeoftheSupremeCourt inauguratedtheMeetingwhichwaspresidedbytheChairmanoftheCommission, Mr.JusticeR.P.Sethi,ChiefJusticeoftheKarnatakaHighCourtwastheChiefGuest.IntheMeetingthedraftreportpreparedbytheInstituteofManagementonintroductionofITinCourtworkandthereportbyDr.MadhavaMenononjudicialtrainingand Institutewerethoroughlydiscussed.Dr.MadhavaMenonandDr.RammohanRao,SriVaidyanathan&Prof.KrishnaofIIMplayedaprominentpartinthetwodaysdiscussion.

    1.42TheActingChiefJusticeofRajasthanHighCourt,NomineeJudgesoftheHighCourtsofAllahabad,AndhraPradesh,Delhi,Gujarat,Guwahati,Jammu&Kashmir,Karnataka,Kerala,MadrasandMumbaiparticipatedinthedeliberationsandgavetheirvaluablesuggestions.Besides,theDirectorsofJudicialTrainingInstitutesatLucknow,Nagpur,JabalpurandAhmedabadandtheDirectorofSardarVallabhbhaiPatelPoliceAcademyatHyderabadwerealsopresentandtookpartinthediscussiongivingtheirviewsandsuggestions.TherepresentativesofsomeoftheJudicialOfficersAssociationsandothereminentpersons alsosharedtheirviewsonboththesaidreports.ReportsoftheCommission:

    1.43TheCommission, after duedeliberations and takingintoconsideration every aspect, has prepared theReport in threeVolumes. We trust and hope that all the State Governments / Union Territory Administrations would implement therecommendationsmadeintheReportattheearliest.

    *****

    2.HISTORYOFJUDICIARY(LISTOFALLSTATESWEREGIVENINORIGINALREPORTHEREONLYBIHARISREFERED

    2.3BIHAR

  • 2.3.1Initially,inBihar,theconstitutionofCourts,jurisdictionandpowers,appointmentsofJudicialOfficersandmakingofrulesweregovernedbytheBengalCivilCourtsAct,1871.ThesaidActwasrepealedbytheBengal,AgraandAssamCivilCourts Act,1887,underwhichthefollowingCourtsattheDistrictlevelinBiharwereconstituted:

    1.CourtofDistrictJudge;

    2.CourtofAdditionalJudge;

    3.CourtofSubordinateJudge;and

    4.CourtofMunsiff.

    2.3.2 The Local Government was empowered to make appointments of the aforesaid Judicial Officers in consultation with the High Court of Calcutta which had then the jurisdiction over the entire area of Bengal, Assam, Orissa and the present State of Bihar.

    2.3.3 The High Court of Judicature at Patna was established by Letter Patent dated 9thFebruary, 1916. In that year, twelve District Judges came to be appointed at the following Headquarters :

    1) Muzaffarpur, 2) Bhagalpur, 3) Gaya, 4) Patna, 5) Saran, 6) Ranchi, 7) Cuttack, 8) Munger, 9) Darbhanga, 10) Purnea, 11) Sahabad and 12) Manbhum.

    2.3.4 By 1950, the number of District Judges was increased to 15 with the addition of three more posts at the following places:

    1) Hazaribagh, 2) Champaran and 3) Santhal Parganas.

    PAYSCALE:

    2.3.5 In 1916, the concerned officials were paid a fixed monthly salary as indicated :

    DistrictJudge:IGrade(2posts)Rs.3,000/IIGrade(5posts)Rs.2,500/

  • IIIGrade(7posts)Rs.2,000/

    SubordinateJudge:IGrade(2posts)Rs.1,000/IIGrade(6posts)Rs.800/

    IIIGrade(11posts)Rs.600/

    Munsiff:IGrade(14posts)Rs.400/IIGrade(20posts)Rs.300/

    IIIGrade(22posts)Rs.250/

    IVGrade(12posts)Rs.200/

    2.3.6Thisstructureofthesubordinatejudiciaryespeciallywithreferencetothecadresandjurisdictionhadcontinuedtill1959withamarginalincreaseinthecadreofJudicialOfficers.

    2.3.7TheStateofBiharenactedtheBiharSuperiorJudicialServiceRules,1951andtheBiharJudicialServiceRecruitmentRules,1955forregulatingtherecruitmentandconditionsofservicesofSuperiorJudicialServiceandBiharJudicialServicerespectively.

    2.3.8UndertheBiharJudicialServiceRecruitmentRules,1955,theinitialrecruitmenttothecadreofMunsiffwasdonefromamongstthemembersoftheBarofatleastoneyearscontinuouspracticeasonthedateoftheadvertisement.TherecruitmentwasdonebythePublicServiceCommission.TheOfficerswouldremainonprobationforaperiodoftwoyears.Thepayscaleofthe Munsiff is Rs. 24257528001004000. The promotional cadre to the post of Munsiffs is that of the Chief JudicialMagistrates/AssistantSessionsJudges/SubordinateJudgescarryingthepayscaleofRs.30004500.However,theMunsiffafter10yearsofservicegetsthesaidhigherpayscaleofRs.30004500.

    2.3.9Atpresent,thereare266ofsuchpostsand1043postsofMunsiffs.

    2.3.10TheSubordinateJudge/ChiefJudicialMagistrateisentitledtoasecondlevelpayscaleinthescaleofRs.37001254700

  • 1505000.Suchpayscalewouldbeavailableupto121%ofthecadrestrengthoftheBiharSubordinateJudicialServicewhichincludesMunsiffsandSubJudgesincludingChiefJudicialMagistrates.Further,therewillbethirdlevelpayscaleofRs.45001505700availabletotheextentof21%ofthecadre.

    BIHARSUPERIORJUDICIALSERVICE:

    2.3.11TheBiharSuperiorJudicialServiceconsistsofDistrict&SessionsJudgesandAdditionalDistrict&SessionsJudges.

    2.3.12Atpresent,thereare228postsofAdditionalDistrict&SessionsJudgescarryingthepayscaleofRs.370012547001505000.33%ofthecadreisfilledupbydirectrecruitmentfromthemembersoftheBarwithsevenyearsofpracticeand67%isbypromotionfromamongthemembersoftheBiharJudicialService.

    2.3.13ThepostofDistrict&SessionsJudgeispurelyapromotionalpostfromthepostofAdditionalDistrict&SessionsJudge. Atpresent,thereare49officersinthecadreofDistrict&SessionsJudgewiththepayscaleofRs.370012547001505000.

    2.3.14ThereareSelectionGradepostsofDistrict&SessionsJudgesinthepayscaleofRs.45001505700andalsoSuperTime ScalepostsinthepayscaleofRs.59002006700.2.3.15JURISDICTION:

    (a) The Territorial jurisdiction of the Courts established at the Sub-Divisional Head-quarters is over the entire territory of the Sub-Division.

    The Territorial jurisdiction of the Sessions Judges and Additional Sessions Judges is over the entire Sessions Division. However, on such stations where more than one permanent Court of Munsiff are established, the territorial jurisdictions of such Courts are divided on police-station-wise.

    (b) The pecuniary jurisdiction of the Courts to hear and dispose of original suits is as follows:

  • i) Additional Munsiff - upto the valuation of Rs. 20,000/-.

    ii)Munsiff(permanentCourts)uptothevaluationofRs.30,000/.

    iii)TheAppellateJurisdictionoftheDistrictJudgeisuptothevaluationofRs.60,000/.

    *****

    3.JUDICIALSTRUCTUREANDREMUNERATIONINTERNATIONALEXPERIENCE

    INDIA:

    3.1BynationalityweareIndians,butbylegaltradition,wearegenerallystillBritish.OurjudicialsystemwasEnglishinorigin. WehaveadoptedtheEnglishmodel.SupremeCourt:

    3.2ChapterIVofPartVoftheConstitutionofIndiaprovidesforUnionJudiciary.ItconsistsofArticles124to147providingforestablishmentandconstitutionofSupremeCourt,appointmentofjudgesandChiefJustice.TheSupremeCourtstandsasaheadofthejudicialpyramid.TheChiefJusticeiscalledtheChiefJusticeofIndiaandtheotherjudgesaretermedasjudgesoftheSupremeCourt.Theycannotberemovedsavebyimpeachmentforprovedmisconductorincapacity.Theyretireattheageof65years.

    3.3TheSupremeCourthasoriginaljurisdictiontotheexclusionofanyotherCourtinanydisputebetweentheGovernmentofIndiaandoneormoreStatesorbetweentheStatesinterse.IthasappellatejurisdictionfromthejudgmentsanddecreesoftheHighCourtsincertaincases,bothincivilandcriminalproceedings.Ithasgotabsolutediscretiontograntspecialleavetoappealfromanyjudgment,decree,determination,sentenceororderpassedormadebyanyCourtorTribunalinthecountry.Ithasalsoadvisoryjurisdictionorconsultativefunction.ThepowerisconferredonthePresidentofIndiatoconsulttheSupremeCourtifit appears to him that the question of lawor fact has arisen or is likely to arise is of such public importance. Theopinion

  • pronouncedbytheSupremeCourtinitsadvisoryjurisdictionisnotajudicialpronouncementinthesenseitisnotbindingonthepartyunlessthepartyhasagreedthatitwouldbebinding.However,ithasagreatpersuasiveforce.TheSupremeCourtisfreeto passexecutabledecreesortopassanyorderasmaybenecessaryfor"doingcompletejusticeinthecause".

    3.4ThedecisiongivenbytheSupremeCourthasbindingforce.AllCourtsinIndiaareboundtofollowthedecisionofthe SupremeCourt.WhileajudgmentofaCourtnormallybindsonlythepartiestolitigationbeforeit,thelawdeclaredbytheSupremeCourtshallbebindingonallCourtswithintheterritoryofIndia.Allauthorities,CivilandJudicial,intheterritoryofIndiashallactinaidoftheSupremeCourt.

    3.5TheSupremeCourtistheguardianoftheConstitution.Ithaspowertoissuedirectionsorordersorwritsoranywritforthe enforcementofthefundamentalrightsguaranteedtothecitizensanditisopentoanypersontomovetheSupremeCourtby appropriateproceedingsfortheenforcementofhisfundamentalrights.

    3.6TheSupremeCourt,byitsownjudgemadelawandprocedure,hasbecomeoneofthemostpowerfulInstitutions.Itisnota CourtoflimitedjurisdictionofonlydisputesettlingliketheSupremeCourtasweknowinanydemocracy.Almostfromthe beginning,theSupremeCourthasbeenalawmaker,albeit,inHomes'Expression"interstitial"lawmaker.Besidestheroleofdisputesettlingandinterstitiallawmaking,theCourtisaproblemsolverinthenebulousareas1.Italsostepsinasanintervenerwheretheexecutivefailstoperformitsobligations.

    3.7EveninregardtoappointmentofjudgesoftheSupremeCourt,theGovernmenthasnofreedomofchoiceofcandidates.TheGovernmentisboundtoactupontherecommendationoftheChiefJusticeofIndia,whichissupportedbythemajorityviewof fourseniormostpuisnejudgesoftheSupremeCourt2.Innoothercountry,theopinionoftheApexCourthasbeengivensuchprimacyinthematterofappointmentofjudges.

    ____________________________________________________________1.K.VeeraswamiVs.UnionofIndia(1991)3SCC655at708.

    2.SpecialReferenceNo.1of1998:(1998)7SCC739.

  • 3.8ThejudgessitonpanelwhichisconstitutedbytheChiefJustice.TheChiefJusticeofIndiaisalsoaparticipatoryfunctionaryinmattersofappointmentofjudgesoftheSupremeCourtandtheHighCourts.

    3.9Asontoday,theSupremeCourtjudgedrawsthefixedsalaryofRs.30,000/permonthinadditiontoperiodicalDearnessAllowance. He is entitled to Sumptuary Allowance of Rs.3,000/ andHouse Rent Allowance of Rs.10,000/ per month, ifGovernmentquartersisnotprovided.BoththeallowancesarefreefromIncomeTax.TheChiefJusticeisentitledtothesalaryof Rs.33,000/ permonthandSumptuaryAllowanceofRs.4,000/.TheSumptuaryAllowanceisfreefromIncomeTax.Heisprovidedwithrentfreefurnishedquarters.

    3.10UndertheprovisionofPartIoftheSupremeCourtJudges(ConditionsofService)Act,1958asamendedbytheHighCourtandSupremeCourtJudges(SalariesandConditionsofService)AmendmentAct,1998,theChiefJusticeandotherJudgesofthe SupremeCourt,whohavecompletednotlessthansevenyearsofserviceasaJudgeinIndiawouldgetpension.ThemaximumpensionallowedtotheChiefJusticeisRs.16,500/permonthandtootherJudgesisRs.15,000/permonth.

    3.11AJudgewhoisnoteligibletoreceivepensionundertheaboveprovisionwillgetpensionofRs.64,030/perannum.HighCourt:

    3.12ChapterVofPartVIprovidesfortheHighCourtsintheStates.ItconsistsofArticles214to231providing,interalia,forappointment andconditionsofserviceoftheChief Justice, judgesoftheHighCourt, andtransfer fromoneHighCourt toanother.AttheapexofthejudicialpyramidistheHighCourtineveryState.Ithasvarietyofjurisdictions.Ithaspowertoissue writs and orders for the enforcement of any of the fundamental rights and for any other purpose. It has the power ofsuperintendence over all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territory in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction. It hasabsoluteadministrativeandjudicialcontroloverthesubordinateCourts.ThejudgesoftheHighCourtareliablefortransferfromoneHighCourttoanotherHighCourt.TheycannotberemovedsaveforprovedmisconductorincapacitybytheprocedureprescribedforremovalofSupremeCourtjudges.Theyretireattheageof62years.

    3.13TheyareentitledtoafixedsalaryofRs.26,000/permonthwithusualDearnessAllowanceandotherperquisitesliketaxfreeSumptuaryAllowanceofRs.2,000/andHouseRentAllowanceofRs.10,000/,ifnotavailedofGovernmentquarters.Chief

  • Justice of the High Court is entitled to a salary of Rs.30,000/ per month and Sumptuary Allowance of Rs.3,000/. TheSumptuaryAllowanceisfreefromIncomeTax.Heisprovidedwithrentfreefurnishedquarters.

    3.14UndertheprovisionofPartIoftheHighCourtJudges(ConditionsofService)Act,1954asamendedbytheHighCourtandSupremeCourtJudges(Salaries&ConditionsofService)AmendmentAct,1998,aJudgewhohascompletednotlessthansevenyearsofserviceiseligibletoreceivepensionatRs.14,630/perannumforeachcompletedyearofserviceasChiefJusticeandat Rs.11,150/perannumforeachcompletedyearofserviceasJudge.

    3.15AJudgewhohascompleted14yearsofserviceincludingnotlessthansixyearsofserviceasChiefJusticeinoneormoreoftheHighCourtsisentitledformaximumpensionofRs.15,000/permonth.

    3.16AJudgewhoisnoteligibletoreceivepensionundertheaboveprovisionwillgetpensionofRs.51,190/perannum.SubordinateCourts:

    3.17 The Constitution of India also contains a group of Articles 233 to 237 in Chapter VI of Part VI under the heading "SubordinateCourts".Article233providesforappointmentofDistrictJudgesbytheGovernoroftheStateinconsultationwith theHighCourt.TheConstitutionalsoprovidesfordirectappointmentofDistrictJudgesfromtheAdvocatesorPleaderswhohavenotlessthansevenyearsofpractice,providedtheyarerecommendedbytheHighCourtforappointment.Normally,1/3rdofthecadreoftheDistrictJudgeisdirectlyappointedbythismethodineachStateandtherestareappointedbypromotionfromthecadreofCivilJudges(SeniorDivision).

    3.18ThereareCourtsofdifferentcategories,likeDistrictCourts,CourtsofCivilJudges(SeniorDivision)andCourtsofCivil Judges (Junior Division). OntheCriminal side, there are theCourts of Sessions, Judicial Magistrates of theFirst Class in Districts.MetropolitanMagistratesinMetropolitanareas.Theyareexclusivelyprofessionalpeoplefortryingcasesdependinguponthegravityoftheoffencesandpunishmenttobeawarded.ButinsomeStates,thereareSpecialJudicialMagistratesofthe FirstClassandSecondClassfortryingsomespecifiedcasesinanylocalarea.Theyneednotbeprofessionalpeoplewiththelegalbackgroundthoughitisadesirablequalification.

  • 3.19TherearelabourCourtsdealingexclusivelywiththeLabourlitigations.Likewise,thereareSalesTaxTribunals,MotorVehiclesAccidentClaimsTribunalsetc.,presidedoverbyDistrictJudges.

    3.20InsomeMetropolitancitieslikeMumbai,Ahmedabad,Hyderabad,Calcutta,ChennaiandBangalore,thereareCityCivilCourtsconsistingofDistrictJudgesandCivilJudges(SeniorDivision),establishedbyspecialstatutes.

    3.21InsomeStates,theSubordinateCourtshavegotunlimitedOrdinaryOriginalCivilJurisdiction,whileinsomeotherStates, theyhavegotlimitedsuchjurisdiction.InsuchStates,therespectiveHighCourtshavegotunlimitedpecuniaryjurisdiction.TheHigh Courts of Mumbai, Madras, Calcutta, Delhi, Himachal Pradesh andJammu&Kashmir haveOrdinary Original Civil Jurisdiction.TherestoftheHighCourtsdonothavesuchjurisdiction.

    3.22 These subordinate Courts entertain cases arising under the State laws and also under the Central laws. They followadversarysystemwithcommonlawtradition.

    3.23TheDistrictJudgesareeligibleforappointmentasHighCourtJudges.TheHighCourtJudgesareeligibleforappointment asSupremeCourtJudges.TheConstitutionspecificallyprovidesforsuchappointment.UnderthelawmadebyeachState,theCivilJudge(JuniorDivision)iseligibleforpromotionasCivilJudge(SeniorDivision)andfurtherontothecadreofDistrict Judges.

    3.24ThejudiciaryisthusacadresystemwiththeladderofpromotionjustlikeanyotherCivilservice.Allthejudgesofthe subordinateCourtsretireattheageof60years.

    3.25TheStateshavenoexecutiveorlegislativepowersinrespectoftheconstitution,organisation,jurisdictionandpowersofthe SupremeCourt.Neither,theStatehaspowerovertheconstitutionandorganisationoftheHighCourt.ThesemattersfallundertheUnionListandtheCentralGovernmentaloneiscompetenttodealsuchaspects.TheState,however,haspowerinrespectof matters relating to Officers and Servants of its High Court. It is of importance to note that the administration of justice, constitutionandorganisationoftheSubordinateCourtshavebeenincludedintheConcurrentList,whichmeans,boththeCentralandStateGovernmentshavepowertolegislateinrespectofthosematters,subjecttotherecognisednormsandlimitations.

  • 3.26ThoughtheSupremeCourtisattheapex,ithasnoadministrativecontrolovertheHighCourtsorontheCourtssubordinate totheHighCourt.TheHighCourtineachStateisindependentwithfullpowersofadministrationoverallotherCourtsandTribunals.

    3.27TheIndependenceofjudiciaryisabasicstructureoftheConstitution3.ThejudiciaryisindependentoftheExecutiveandLegislaturethoughthereisnocleardemarcationandseparationofpowersoftheJudiciary,ExecutiveandLegislature.

    3.28ThepaystructureofSubordinateJudiciaryvariesfromStatetoState.SomeoftheStateshaveadoptedthepayscalesoftheCentralGovernmentandotherStateshavegottheirownindependentpaystructure.

    3.29ThefollowingaretheStateswhichhaveadoptedCentralpayscales:(1)Maharashtra;(2)Gujarat;(3)Delhi;(4)MadhyaPradesh;(5)Goa;(6)TamilNadu;(7)Lakshadweep;(8)Haryana;(9)Pondicherry;and(10)Rajasthan.

    3.30However,evenhere,interStatepaydiffferentialsdoexistasfarasallocationofpayscalesoftheCentralGovernmentareconcerned.TwooftheStateshaveextendedI.A.S.payscalestothemembersoftheHigherJudicialService,viz.,WestBengalandMadhyaPradesh.

    3.31TheStateGovernmentswhichhavenotadoptedCentralpayscalesof1996,haveevolvedtheirownpaystructure.Theyare differentfromStatetoStateasseeninthetablebelow:

    Cadre State PayScales(inRs.)

    I. a)District&SessionsJudge,GradeI

    UttarPradesh 59002006700

    (b)District&SessionsJudge, UttarPradesh 45001505700

  • GradeII/Addl.Dist.&SessionsJudge.

    II. CivilJudges(Senior)UttarPradesh 30004500

    III. CivilJudgesUttarPradesh 22004000

    ____________________________________________________________3.S.P.Guptav.UnionofIndia(1981)Supp.SCC87,408.

    KumarPadmaPrasadv.UnionofIndia(1992)(2)SCC428.

    UnionofIndiav.PratibhaBonnerjee(1995)(6)SCC765.

    AUSTRALIA:4

    3.32TheAustralianjudiciarycomprisesthreedistinctjurisdictionsFederal,StateandTerritorial.FederalCourtsderivetheir existencefromCommonwealthlegislationenactedpursuanttoSection71oftheCommonwealthConstitution,theStateCourtsfromStatelegislation,andTerritoryCourtsfromCommonwealthlegislationenactedunderSection122oftheCommonwealthConstitution.TheHighCourtinAustraliaistheApexCourtmandatedbySection71oftheCommonwealthConstitution.

    3.33ThedeterminationofjudicialremunerationinAustraliahaspassedthroughthreestagesduringthetwentiethcentury.Thefirstperiodwasthelongest,runningfromtheturnofthecenturyorearlieruntiltheearly1950s.InmostAustralianjurisdictions, asalaryincreasewasawardedin1947or1948,withafurtherincreasein1950or1951.Thus,theannualsalaryofapuisne justiceoftheHighCourtremainedconstant(3000)fromthatCourtsinceptionin1903until1947,whenitincreasedto4000, risingto4500in1950.ThesalaryofpuisnejudgesoftheStateSupremeCourtsreflectedthesimilarpatternfollowingthe

  • Commonwealthslead.ThepositionwassimilarintheNewSouthWalesDistrictCourt,thesalaryofthepuisnejudgeremainedthesame(1500)from1883to1948,whenitwasincreasedto1800,risingto2000in1951.

    3.34Thesecondperiodofjudicial remunerationcoversfromtheearly1950suntil theintroductionofjudicial remunerationtribunals,commencingwiththeCommonwealthin1973.ThetrendwasfollowedshortlybyWesternAustralia(1975)andNewSouthWales(1976),andlaterbyQueensland(1980)andSouthAustralia(1985).Duringthisperiod,judicialremunerationwasfixedbystatute,withamendmentsraisingsalarybeingpassedwithincreasingfrequencyalmostannuallytowardstheendofthe periodinordertokeepupwithinflation.

    3.35In1950s,someStatesinAustraliaexperimentedwithautomaticadjustmentor"indexation"inthelinewithchangesinthebasicwageorthecostofliving.

    ____________________________________________________________4.ExtractfromtheReportofJudicialRemunerationofAustralia1997.

    It is, however, not clear that why such automatic adjustment was abandoned. Such indexation was probably consideredunsatisfactorybecausevariationsinthebasicwageortheConsumerPriceIndexisonlyonefactorinjudicialremuneration;otherfactorsincludetheearningsofseniorbarristers,changesinthejurisdictionandworkloadofCourtsandrelativewithsimilarCourtsinotherjurisdictions.

    3.36Overall,the1950sand1960sinAustraliahavewitnessedcontinueddeclineintherelativefinancialpositionofjudiciary.

    3.37TheThirdperiodmaybeconsideredasthecurrentperiodinwhichtherehavebeenindependentremunerationtribunalsfordeterminingtheremunerationpayabletojudgesandmagistrates,aswellastoparliamentariansandholdersofseniorexecutivepositions.ThedecisionsofthesetribunalshavenobindingforceexceptinSouthAustralia.ButintheCommonwealth(since1989),NewSouthWales,QueenslandandWesternAustralia,thedecisionsofsuchtribunalshavebeengivenbindingeffectsubjecttodisallowancebyeitherHouseofParliament.Thepositioninthevariousjurisdictionsmaynowbeexaminedbriefly.TheCommonwealth:

  • 3.38TheCommonwealthRemunerationTribunalwasestablishedpursuanttotheRemunerationTribunalsAct,1973.TheActestablishes a Tribunal of three parttime members appointed for a term of not more than five years, but eligible for reappointment.OneofthemembersistobeappointedChairmanbytheGovernorGeneralinCouncil.ThatpersonoriginallyhadtobeeitherajudgeorretiredjudgeofaStateCourtorqualifiedtobeappointedassuch.5ThefirsttwoChairmenweresittingjudges,namely,W.B.(laterSirWalter)CampbelloftheSupremeCourtofQueensland(197482)andDennisMahoneyoftheNewSouthWalesCourtofAppeal(198292).Therequirementforajudiciallyqualified

    ____________________________________________________________5.RemunerationTribunalsAct1973(Cth)Sec.4(6).

    Chairmancametoberemovedin1992sincethatpositionwasnotrequiringanyspeciallegalskills.6

    3.39TheTribunalwasrequiredtodetermineannuallytheremunerationpayabletoMembersofParliamentandseniorpublicservantssubjecttodisallowancebyeitherHouseofParliament.TheTribunal,however,wasonlyto"inquireinto,andreporttotheMinister"onjudicialremunerationandministerialsalaries.Thiswasintendedperhapstoovercometheconstitutionalbarriers,whichprecludetheTribunalfrommakingdeterminationsrelatingtoremunerationofjudgesandsalariesofMinisters.

    3.40WhetherornotconstitutionalconcernsreallyunderlaythelimitationonthepowersoftheTribunalregardingministerialandjudicialsalaries,theCommonwealthParliamentchangeditspositionregardingthelatterin1989,andnowrequirestheTribunaltodeterminejudicial(butstillnotministerial)remunerationaswell.

    3.41TheeffectivedeterminationofjudicialremunerationbytheRemunerationTribunalappearstohaveoperatedreasonablysatisfactorilyuntilthemid1980s.Butthereafter,ithasfalteredforvariousreasonsandconsequentlyjudicialsalarieshadfallenandseniorbarristerswererefusingtoacceptappointmentandinsomecases,judgesbegantoresignfromtheBenchtoprivatepractice.

    3.42InMay1988,theHawksGovernmentdecidedtoalterthemannerofdeterminingthesalariesofChiefExecutiveOfficersofGovernmentBusinessEnterprises(G.B.Es)toenablethemtocompeteagainsttheprivatesectorforthebestcandidates.Their

  • salaries would no longer be linked to those of senior public servants, but would be determined by G.B.E. boards afterconsultation

    ____________________________________________________________6.RemunerationandAllowancesLegislationAmendmentAct1992(Cth)Sec.20.

    withtheRemunerationTribunal.Theresultwasanepochalreportof18November1988,whichwastohavesuchdetrimentalrepercussionsfortherelationshipbetweentheCommonwealthGovernmentandthefederaljudiciarythatitisdoubtfulwhethertheresultingjudicialbitternesshasyetdissipated.

    3.43WewillnowbrieflyrefertothejudicialremunerationintheStatesandTerritories:StatesandTerritories:7

    3.44Judicial remuneration is determined byan independent statutory tribunal insix of theeight States andselfgoverningTerritories, anddefactoforSupremeCourtjudgesinanother(Tasmania). TheremunerationofAustralianCapitalTerritoryjudgesandMagistratesisdeterminedbytheCommonwealthRemunerationTribunal,theremunerationofA.C.T.SupremeCourtjudgesbeingthesameasthatofFederalCourtjudges.NewSouthWales,Queensland,SouthAustralia,WesternAustraliaandtheNorthernTerritoryhavetheirownTribunals.WesternAustralia:

    3.45TheearliestofthesewastheWesternAustralianSalariesandAllowancesTribunal,establishedin1975,justtwoyearsafter theCommonwealthRemunerationTribunal.Itconsistsofthreemembers,includingaChairman,appointedbytheGovernorinCouncil foratermofthreeyears (renewable). Nospecial qualificationisstipulated, butpersons holdingofficeswithintheTribunalsjurisdictionare(appropriately)expresslydisqualified.TheTribunaldeterminestheremunerationofawiderangeofpublicofficersaswellasjudgesandmagistrates;theStateGovernor,Ministers, MembersandOfficersofParliament,seniorpublicservants,andalsotheentitlementsofformerpremiers,MinistersandMembersofParliament.

  • ____________________________________________________________7.ExtractstakenfromthecompilationofthejudicialremunerationinAustralia.

    3.46Judicialremunerationmustbedeterminedatleastonceeachyear.Since1992theterm"remuneration"hasincludednonpecuniary "benefits", such as cars. Reduction in remuneration is not prohibited. Determinations are binding, subject todisallowance byeither House of Parliament, apower whichParliament has never exercised. Nevertheless, judges havenotalwaysregardedtheTribunalsworkfavourably,andhaveoccasionallycomplainedtoitinprivate.TheheadsofthevariouscourtsalsoaddressformalsubmissionstotheTribunalonbehalfoftheircourts.TheChairmenoftheTribunalhaveincludedtwo former senior public servants (an Under Treasurer and a Genera Manager of the Public Service Board), a former Chief CommissioneroftheStateIndustrialCommission,andaformerCommonwealthMinister.MembershaveincludedaManagingDirectorofabank,lawyers,anaccountant,aformerMemberofParliament,andaretiredpublicservant.

    3.47TheTribunalisnotlegallyrequiredtohaveregardtocurrentwagefixingprinciples,buthastakenaccountofwagerestraintprinciples.ItsreportshaveechoedtheconcernoftheCommonwealthRemunerationTribunal,seekingtobalancegeneralwagerestraint with the need to raise judicial remuneration to reduce the "unacceptably large" gap between judicial salaries andearningsofseniorpractitioners,which(aselsewhere)hasledtodifficultyinrecruitingjudgestoboththeSupremeCourtandthe District Court. The Commonwealth Governments failure to implement the November 1988 recommendations of theCommonwealthRemunerationTribunal,whosereporttheWesternAustralianTribunalhasgenerallyendorsed,hasmeantthatithasfollowedtheproposaltofixtheremunerationofSupremeCourtjudgesatabout85%ofthatofHighCourtjusticesonlywithconsiderablemisgivingandoverwidespreadjudicialopposition.NewSouthWales:

    3.48AfewmonthsafterWesternAustralia,NewSouthWalesestablishedaStatutoryandOtherOfficesRemunerationTribunaltodeterminetheremunerationofjudgesandstatutoryofficers. TheTribunalmustdetermineremunerationnotlaterthan31AugusteachyearorwhenevertheMinistersodirects,andmayalterapreviousdeterminationinordertoapplyawagesdecisionbytheStatesIndustrialCommission.However,judicialremunerationmaynotbereduced,Tribunaldeterminationsarebinding,

  • subjecttodisallowancebyeitherHouseofParliament.Adeterminationwasannulledin1982,butthatwasaccomplishedbylegislation,notbydisallowanceonthegroundthattheincreasedremunerationawardedwasunacceptableinthethenexisting economicclimate.

    3.49TherelativityofthesalariesbetweenjudgesoftheFederalCourtandtheirSupremeCourtcolleagueswasamatterofsomeconcerninNewSouthWales.JudicialremunerationwasdiscussedataPremiersConferenceon28June1990,atwhichthePrime Minister and Premiers agreed jointly to address issues such as disparities between salaries and "leapfrogging". Consequently,theChairmanoftheCommonwealthRemunerationTribunalmetwithrepresentativesfromStateandTerritoryRemunerationTribunalsandtheVictorianGovernmentonthreeoccasionsbetweenAugust1990andJuly1991andthereafteronseveraloccasions,andreachedconsensusthatprovidedtheremunerationofHighCourtjusticeswassetatan"acceptablelevel"andregardwashadtomajordifferencesinbenefits,thesalariesofFederalCourtandStateSupremeCourtjudgesshouldnotexceed85%ofthatofaHighCourtjustice.Theyalsoagreedtoconsultinformallybeforedeterminingjudicialremuneration, whichshouldoccurataroundthesametimeeachyearinordertoavoid"leapfrogging"8.NewSouthWaleshasfollowedthisconsensussincethenandtheTribunalhasgenerallyfixedtheremunerationofaSupremeCourtjudgeatthesalaryofaFederalCourtjudge,(i.e.85%ofthatofaHighCourtjustice)plus$10,362.

    ____________________________________________________________8.N.S.W.StatutoryandOtherOfficesRemunerationTribunal,Reportonthe

    SalariesofJudges........(28November1991),para,3.

    3.50However,FederalCourtjudges'salariesgenerallyexceedthoseoftheVictorian,SouthAustralianandTasmanianSupremeCourts,leadingtoconcernsoffederal"poaching"ofStatejudgesinthoseStates.SinceFederalCourtsalariesaresetat85%ofHighCourtsalaries,nationwideadoptionofthe85%standardforSupremeCourtjudgeswouldensureparityinremunerationbetweenthemandtheFederalCourt.

    3.51Initsdeterminationof31August1996,theTribunalincreasedtheremunerationofaSupremeCourtJudgeby4.25percent

  • to$1,77,488thuspreservingtherelationshipwiththesalaryofaFederalCourtJudge.Theamountof$10,362whichtakesintoaccountthedifferenceinconditionsofFederalCourtJudgesandSupremeCourtJudgeswasadded,makingatotalremunerationof$1,87,850perannum.

    3.52TheTribunal,afterconsideringtheviewsoftheAssessors,determinesthatthebaserateofremunerationforaSupreme CourtJudgeshouldbeincreasedonandfrom1October1997by5percentfrom$1,77,488to$1,86,362perannum.TheTribunalalsodeterminesthattheamounttobeaddedtotakeintoaccountofthedifferenceinconditionsofSupremeCourtJudgesandFederalCourtJudgesshouldremainat$10,363thusmakingthetotalremunerationofaSupremeCourtJudge$1,96,725perannum.

    3.53AspokeswomanforAttorneyGeneralJanWadehaspromisedthatthereportoftheCommissionwasbeingconsideredasreportedin"HERALDSUN(MELB)"1stEdition,17September,1997p.15.Queensland:

    3.54ThenextStateTribunalwasQueenslandsSalariesandAllowancesTribunal,establishedin1980.Itdeterminesthesalaryandallowancesofjudges,butnottheallowancesofMagistratessince1991.Thedeterminationofjudicialremunerationisitssolefunction. Its determinations, whichmust occur at least once each year, are legally binding, subject to disallowance by theLegislativeAssembly.Butthatpowerwasexercisedonlyoncein1993tosetasideadeterminationwhichwasconsideredlegallyflawed.9

    3.55TheTribunalisnotspecificallyrequiredtotakeaccountofWageDeterminationPrinciplesorvariationsinthecostofliving,but is required to consider the equity of Queensland judicial remuneration in the light of such remuneration elsewhere in Australia.SouthAustralia:

    3.56SouthAustraliaestablisheditsRemunerationTribunalin1985.Butitdidnotdeterminejudicialsalariesuntil1988.Until then,judicialsalariesweresetpursuanttoalegislativeformulawhichessentiallyfixedSupremeCourtsalariesat95%ofthe

  • averageintheothermainlandStates,andDistrictCourtsalariesat85%oftheSupremeCourts,withsubsequentincreasestofollowwagedeterminations of the State Industrial Commission; the Remuneration Tribunal hadpower only to fix judicialallowances,notsalary.Since1988,theTribunaldeterminesbothsalaryandallowances.

    3.57TheTribunalmustdeterminejudicialremunerationatleastonceineachyear.Theirdeterminationsarebinding,andnot subjecttoparliamentarydisallowance,althoughtheycould,ofcourse,beoverturnedbylegislation.Butthathasneverhappened.

    3.58Indeterminingremuneration,theTribunalisrequiredto"havedueregardto"and"mayapplyandgiveeffectto",any principlesenunciatedbythe(Full)StateIndustrialCommission,whichitselfisrequiredtopaysimilarregardtothe

    ____________________________________________________________9.SeeQueenslandParliamentaryDebates,19November1993,60966102,disallowingQueenslandSalariesandAllowancesTribunal,FourteenthReport(31August1993).

    decisions and declarations of the Commonwealth Industrial Relations Commission. Moreover, the Tribunal is (and, again,uniquelyinAustralia)specificallydirectedto"haveregardtotheconstitutionalprincipleofjudicialindependence".

    3.59TheSouthAustralianRemunerationTribunalappearstohaveperformedwell. TheTribunal hasactedresponsiblyandindependently,withoutgovernmentalinterference.NorthernTerritory:

    3.60JudicialremunerationintheNorthernTerritoryisdeterminedfromtimetotimebytheAdministrator,butcannotbereducedduring a judges term of office. The Remuneration Tribunal was established in 1981. The Tribunal only makes"recommendations" on judicial remuneration; but its recommendations have always been followed. In fact, the terms andconditionsofNorthernTerritoryjudgesprovidefortheir remunerationatrates notless thanthosepayabletojudgesoftheFederalCourtandtheTribunalhasalwaysrecommendedremunerationequivalenttothatoftheFederalCourt.Tasmania:

    3.61 Tasmania and Victoria do not constitute Tribunals to determine judicial remuneration. Tasmania relies indirectly on

  • determinationsoftheSouthAustralianandWesternAustralianTribunalstofixSupremeCourtjudgessalaries.TheChiefJusticeofTasmaniassalaryistheaverageofthesalariesoftheChiefJusticesofthoseStatesandpuisnejudgesreceive90%ofthat figure.ThesalariesofSupremeCourtMastersandMagistratesarefixedbyreferencetothesalaryofthePermanentHeadofagovernmentdepartment:92%fortheformer,and81.25%forthelatter.TasmaniahasnointermediateCourt.Victoria:

    3.62Since1980,theremunerationofVictorianjudgesandMagistrateshasbeendeterminedbytheAttorneyGeneral.Until1987,it was determined in response to wage increases awarded by the Australian Conciliation and Arbitration Commission andthereafter,followingarecommendationoftheRobinsonInquiryin1986,determinationsfollowuponincreasesawardedbytheCommonwealthRemunerationTribunal.

    3.63Victorianjudicialremunerationistobereviewedinaccordancewithcurrentwagefixingprinciplesatleastonceeveryfive yearsbyapersontheAttorneyGeneralconsiderssuitablyqualifiedtocarryoutsuchareview.

    3.64It has beennowfelt that Victoria should changeits methodofdeterminingjudicial remuneration to asystemcloselyresemblingSouthAustralias.Thatsystemisyettobeimplemented.

    3.65 Judicial remuneration in Australia is presently in a state of uncertainty, with important reviews in progress in theCommonwealthandVictoria,Australianjudgesbearastrongsenseofgrievanceandconsiderthemselvesseriouslyunderpaid,asevidencedbytheCommonwealth Remuneration Tribunals report of November 1988. Theyhavereluctantlyacceptedwageinjustice;astheyseeit,becausetheyacknowledgedtheargumentsforwagerestraintwhichdepressedthewagesofthegeneralworkforceduringtheRecession,expectingthe"injustice"toberightedoncetheeconomyrecovers.Nowthateconomicrecoveryhasbegun.

    3.66ThesalarystructureofvariouscategoriesindifferentStatesaresetoutinthefollowingTable:SUPREMECOURTS

  • YEAR HC FED.CTANDACT.

    N.S.W. VIC. QLD. S.A. W.A. TAS. MONEYWAGE

    1990 5200 5000 4000 3400 2800 2400 146

    1910 6000 5200 5000 4000 3400 3400 2400 174

    1920 6000 5200 5000 4000 3400 3400 3000 302

    1930 6000 5200 5000 4000 4000 4000 3000 422

    1940 6000 5200 5000 4000 4000 4000 3000 429

    1950 9000 8000 6200 7000 6200 5000 5200 4000 873

    1955 13000 11000 9450 8500 9050 8000 7000 7000 1579

    1960 17000 14000 11100 12300 9800 11000 9200 9200 1992

  • 1965 21000 17000 17000 15700 13500 13700 12400 12400 2435

    1970 27000 23000 22475 21350 17700 21000 19200 16650 3397

    1975 43500 36750 42720 40500 42940 39000 28800 34155 6925

    1980 73350 61800 62838 54230 62600 51087 51350 51401 11706

    1985 110246 93507 100137 89311 95850 84604 93342 86600

    1990 154991 131734 135000 131734 139000 134000 135000 123719

    1994 177604 150955 158357 150372 143500 147995 148864 146601

    ENGLAND:

    3.67Bylongusage,theexpression"thesuperiorjudges"orsimply"thejudges"usuallymeans,thejudgesoftheHighCourt, CourtofAppealandtheLawLords.ItisthesejudgeswhoarethecentreofinterestwhenpeoplethinkofCourts.Before1971,therewasasystemofCountyCourt,butotherCourtsbelowtheHighCourtwerefragmentedandlargelygovernedbypiecemeallegislation.

    3.68ButtheCourtsAct197110restructuredandrationalisedthelowerjudiciary.BelowHighCourtthereare(i)CircuitJudges;(ii)DistrictJudges;(iii)RecordersandAssistantRecordersand(iv)Magistrates.

  • CircuitJudges:

    3.69CircuitJudgessitintheCrownCourttotryallbutthemostseriouscriminalcasesandintheCountyCourtswheretheyhandlemosttypesofcivilcases.MuchoftheworktheydoisonaparwithworkdonebyHighCourtJudgesandindeedtheyare deputisingforHighCourtJudgesmoreandmoreoften.DistrictJudges:

    3.70DistrictJudgesarehandlingminorjudicialworkwhichisnotthoughttoneedtheexpertiseofaCircuitJudge.RecordersandAssistantRecorders:

    3.71Recorderssitforbetween20and50daysayear.AssistantRecorderisrequiredtositforaminimumof20daysperyear. TheAssistantRecordersworkwillbeassessed,anditisexpectedthatheorshewillhaveprogressedtoafullRecordshipafterthreetofiveyears.Ifnot,theAssistantRecorderisnotgivenasecondchance.

    ____________________________________________________________10.JoshuaRozenberg."TheSearchForJustice"(1994)p.4749.

    Magistrates:

    3.72Magistrates consist ofparttimelaymagistrates (alsocalledJusticesofthePeace)togetherwithsomefulltimelegallyqualifiedstipendiaries.

    3.73Alltheseniorjudges11(thatisthejudgesoftheHouseofLords,theCourtofAppealandtheHighCourt),CircuitJudgesandRecordersareappointedbytheCrownontherecommendationoftheLordChancellor.ThePrimeMinisternominatestheLords JusticesofAppeal, theLordChief Justice, theMasteroftheRolls andthePresidentoftheFamilyDivision(althoughit iscommonlyassumedthatthePrimeMinisterisguidedbytheLordChancellor).IntheolddayswhenjudicialpostswerefewinnumberandtheLordChancellorcouldpersonallyassessthefieldforeveryposthimself,heactedlargelyonthebasisofwhathe himselfhadheard.Withincreasingnumbersofappointments,peoplebegantowonderhowhemanaged,andthereweredarkrumorsaboutsecretfiles,blacklists, andsoforth.Todispelthesenseofmystery,in1986theLordChancellorsDepartment

  • publishedabookletentitledJudicialAppointmentwhichisavailableforalltoread.FromthiswelearnthatwithintheLordChancellorsDepartmentthereisabodyofofficialscalledtheJudicialAppointmentsGroup.Potentialappointeescometotheirnoticeeitherbecausetheywriteinandsaytheyareinterestedinajudicialappointment,orbecausetheirnamesarementionedby judgesandsenior members oftheprofession withwhomthesenior officials intheJudicial Appointment Groupregularlyconsult.Filesareopenedonthesecandidatesandremainopenwhentheyhaveobtainedaposition.Intothisfilewillgofactual information about the candidate, and opinions which have been expressed about him. At some point, a person underconsiderationforappointmentislikelytobeinterviewed,andthiswillputmoreinformationabouthimonfile.Thepartoftheinformationwhichispurelyfactualisopenforthecandidatetosee,buttheopinions

    ____________________________________________________________11.Theinformationhasbeenextractedfrom"JacksonsMachineryofJustice"byJ.R.Spencer.

    whichhavebeenexpressedabouthimareusuallygiveninstrictconfidence,andtheseheisnevershown.However,theLordChancellorortheseniormembersoftheJudicialAppointmentsGroupareusuallywillingtogivejudgesandwouldbejudgesgeneraladviceabouttheirprospects,andthisislikelytoshowanapplicantinwhatstandingheisheld.

    3.74Forcenturiesitwasthecasethattherewasnoregularsystemofpromotion.TheCourtofAppealandtheHouseofLords were filled bypromotions frombelow, but there was little movement fromthe lower judiciary to theHighCourt, andanappointmenttotheCountyCourtbenchandmorerecentlytoaCircuitJudgeshipwasregardedastheendoftheroad.Inthe lasttenyears,thishasgreatlychanged.TheLordChancellorsDepartmenthasmadeitplainthatitexpectsthepeoplewhoare appointed Recorders to have proved themselves as Assistant Recorders, and Circuit Judges to have proved their worth asRecordersorAssistantRecorders.WhilstthemajorityofappointmentstotheHighCourtBencharestillmadefrompersons eminentinpracticeattheBar,mostofthemhavebeennewstyleRecorders,andthereareanumberofHighCourtJudgesinofficewhohavebeenpromotedfromtheCircuitBench.Therearesignsthatthejudiciaryisdevelopingacareerstructurewitha promotionalladder,likeotherareasofpublicservice;althoughnooneputshisfootonthefirstrunguntilhehasreachedhis

  • middleage.

    3.75TheLordChancellor,whoisnominatedbythePrimeMinister,occupiesananomalousposition.Forsomepurposesheistheheadofthejudiciaryandhispowersareextensive.Notonlyisheinchargeofjudicialappointments,buthesitsasaLawLordin theHouseofLordstohearcasesanddeterminecasesinsofarashisotherofficialdutiespermit.Yetheisinvariablyamember ofthecabinet.Asacabinetminister,theLordChancellorholdsofficeupontheusualpoliticalterms,whichmeansthatordinarilyhewillvacateofficeifthegovernmentchanges.

    3.76ThepositionoftheLordChancellorhas,however,beenthesubjectofcommentandindeedtreatedasbeingunsatisfactoryinalectureofgreatdistinctiongivenrecentlybyLordSteven12.

    3.77ButLordWoolf13thinksotherwise.HestatesthattheLordChancellorofthedaycanactasasafetyvalveavoidingunduetensionbetweenthejudiciaryandtheGovernmentandpossiblybetweenthejudiciaryandParliamentaswell.AsamemberoftheCabinet,hecanactasanadvocateonbehalfofthecourtsandthejusticesystem.Hecanexplaintohiscolleaguesinthe Cabinetthepropersignificanceofadecisionwhichtheyregardasbeingdistastefulinconsequenceofanapplicationforjudicialreview.Hecan,asamemberoftheGovernment,ensurethatthecourtsareproperlyresourced.Ontheotherhand,onbehalfof theGovernment,hecanexplaintothejudiciarytherealitiesofthepoliticalsituationandtheconstraintsonresourceswhichthey mustinevitablyaccept.AslongastheLordChancellorispunctiliousinkeepinghisseparaterolesdistinct,theseparationofpowersisnotunderminedandthejusticesystembenefitsimmeasurably.ThejusticesystemisbetterservedbyhavingtheheadofthejudiciaryatthecentreofgovernmentthanitwouldbebyhavingitsinterestsrepresentedbyaMinisterofJusticewhowould lacktheseotherroles.

    3.78TheCircuitJudgemustbeabarristerofatleasttenyearsstandingoraRecorderwhohasheldthatofficeforatleastfiveyears.ARecordermustbeabarristerorsolicitorofatleasttenyearsstanding.ApuisnejudgeoftheHighCourtmustbeabarristerofatleasttenyearsstanding.Abarristerofatleastfifteenyearsstanding,oranexistingHighCourtJudge,qualifiesforappointmentasaLordJusticeofAppeal(i.e.ajudgeoftheCourtofAppeal).Thequalifications

    ____________________________________________________________

  • 12. TheRtHon.LordStevn,"TheWeakestandLeastDagerousDepartment

    ofGovernment"(997)P.L.

    13.LordWoolf(1998),114LawQuarterlyReview,p.579.

    forappointmentasaLordJusticeofAppealalsoqualifyforappointmentasLordChiefJustice,MasteroftheRolls,orPresident oftheFamilyDivision.TheLordsofAppealinOrdinary(theLawLords)mustbeappointedfrombarristersoradvocatesof fifteenyearsstandingorfrompersonswhohaveheldhighjudicialofficeinEngland,ScotlandorNorthernIrelandfortwoyears. Sincemostbarristersbegintopracticewhentheyarestillyoung,andjudgesareneverappointedfromthoseunderfortyandquiteoftenfromthoseoverfifty,therequisitestandingattheBarisusuallyattainedmanyyearsbeforethereisanychanceofjudicial appointment.

    3.79ThereisasubstantialdifferenceinthetermsuponwhichthesuperiorjudgesholdofficeandthetermsapplicabletoCircuit JudgesandRecorders.AllthesuperiorjudgesotherthantheLordChancellorholdofficeduringgoodbehavioursujbecttoa power of removal by Her Majesty onanaddress presented to Her Majesty byboth Houses of Parliament, this being theprovisionoftheSupremeCourtAct,1981whichultimatelyderivesfromtheActofSettlement1701.

    3.80CircuitJudgesandRecordershavenosuchsecurityoftenure.TheCourtsAct,1971providesthatTheLordChancellor may,ifhethinksfit,removeaCircuitJudgefromofficeonthegroundofincapacityormisbehaviour,andalsoforfailureto complywiththerequirementsofhisappointmentastowhenhewouldbeavailabletositinCourt.Theretirementagewasat75 years by the Judicial Pensions Act, 1959. But Sec. 26 (1) of the Judicial Pensions and Retirement Act 1993 lowered the retirementageto70(butonlyforjudgesappointedaftertheActcameintoforce).14 Section26(5)oftheActsaystheLordChancellorcanallowCircuitjudgesandotherminorjudicialfigurestostayonuntiltheyare75ifheconsidersitdesirableinthe publicinterest.15

    ____________________________________________________________14.JoshuaRozenberg."TheSearchforJustice"(1994)p.94.

    15.JoshuaRozenberg."TheSearchforJus


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