Premium Tanks the Soviet Experience

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TEE THREAT OF THE PREMIUM TANKTHE PRODUCT AND PROCESS OF THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. ArmyCommand and General Staff College in partialfulfillment of the requirements for thedegree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

James M. Warford MAJ USAB.A. University of Santa Clara Santa Clara California1979

Fort Leavenworth Kansas1992

Approved for public release: Distribution is unlimited.


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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCETHESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of candidate: MAJ James M. WarfordTitle of thesis: THE THREAT OF THE PREMIUM TANKTHE PRODUCT AND PROCESS OF THE SOVIETEXPERIENCE

Approved by:

Thesis Committee~S eutenant olonel Robert E. Lee, M.A. Chairman

MemberLieutenant Colonel John K. Boles 111, M.A.-7:Aq- MemberBruce W. Menning,-PP(.D.

Accepted this 5th day of June 992 by:

Director, GraduatePhilip J. Brookes, Ph.D. Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those ofthe student author and do not necessarily represent theviews of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College orany other governmental agency.


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ABSTRACTTHE THREAT OF THE PREMIUM TANK: THE PRODUCT AND PROCESS OFTHE SOVIET EXPERIENCE by MAJ James M. Warford USA 123pages.This study investigates the tank development concept ofsimultaneously evolving two parallel tank designs andfielding both tanks in a high-low force mix. The high endof this force would consist of very high value andinnovative Premium Tanks which incorporate the highesttechnology available at a given time. Because of theirinherent high cost complexity and high risk designpremium tanks are normally produced in relatively smallnumbers. The low end of this force mix would be made up ofMain Battle Tanks that are less sophisticated and cheaper toproduce than premium tanks and would be produced in muchlarger numbers.Focusing on the Soviet example of premium tank developmentthis study emphasizes the massive impact these tanks havehad in the past as well as the projected threat new premiumtanks constitute for the future.This study concludes with an examination of a future premiumtank design that represents a new and projected premium tankthreat. The employment of the next premium tank may give anew adversary a critical advantage for the future.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE....Introduction and Review ofLiteratureThe Soviet ExperienceThe Premium TankPremium Tank EmploymentSoviet Tank DevelopmentThe T-34The First Premium TankThe T-34's InnovationsThe Impact of the T-34From T-34 to the Future PremiumThe Premium Tank-5Review of LiteratureStatus of Existing Research

CHAPTER TWO....Research MethodologyFirepower, Mobility, and ProtectionProduction, Employment, and ImpactUse of the PTAMThe Example of the T-64 and T-72

CHAPTER THREE..Premium Tank Case Study: The SovietT-64Origins of the T-64Evolution of the T-64Missile-firing T-64Improved FirepowerInnovative Armor ProtectionIraqi use of Laminate ArmorApplique Armor ProgramSoviet .Reactive ArmorInnovative EngineConclusion

CHAPTER FOUR iscussion and AnalysisPost-war Soviet Heavy TanksImpact of the Heavy TanksPost-war Heavy Tanks in CombatThe Last Soviet Heavy TankHeavy Tanks and the Modern PremiumsThe Hidden Weapons of the Soviet ArmyThe IT-122 and IT-130 Tank DestroyersThe American T-95 Premium Tank ProjectThe OPTAR RangefinderThe Mobility and Protection of theAmerican T-64


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American Composite ArmorThe Failure of the T-95The Export of the IncreasinglyCapable MBTThe Modern Soviet MBTIraqi T-72s in Operation DesertstormAssessment of the T-72 METThe Export of the Soviet PremiumTank

CHAPTER FIVE onclusionsThe Premium Tank-5Improved FirepowerActive and Passive CountermeasuresMobility of the PT-5The Innovative Protection of thePT-5The PT-5 ScenarioThe Third Crisis in Tank andAntitank Warfare

BIBLIOGRAPHYINITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST


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LIST OF FIGURES

CHAPTER ONE....Introduction and Review of LiteratureFigure l....Soviet T 34 Model 1940

CHAPTER TWO....Research MethodologyFigure 2....The PTAM

CHAPTER THREE..Premium Tank Case Study: The SovietT 64Figure 3....T 64A TankFigure 4....T 64B with Reactive ArmorFigure 5....Soviet Explosive ReactiveArmor

CHAPTER FOUR...Discussion and AnalysisFigure 6....Soviet Heavy TanksFigure 7....Soviet IT 122Figure 8....The T 95 Base Model

CHAPTER FIVE...ConclusionsFigure 9....The PT 5Figure 10...The PT 5 three view


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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE

Research Question

Does a potential adversary's capability to develop,produce, field, or acquire innovative and high technologytanks constitute a threat to the U.S. Army of the 1990s andbeyond?

The fact was that the Soviets had, as one generallater put it, turned inside us. They had managed tofield a tank that, despite its shortcomings, was aheadof anything in the West. American tankers were right inthinking that if war came, they would almost certainlylose-and lose quickly.1

With the signing of the Commonwealth accords onDecember 21, 1991 the Soviet Union, as the world has knownit, ceased to exist. The new Commonwealth of IndependentStates (CIS) has replaced it. The CIS has inherited all ofthe former Soviet Union's military hardware. While thethreat posed by the CIS is far below that of its


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predecessor, the surviving legacy of one of the SovietArmy s most significant developments in land warfareremains. The demonstrated capability to develop, produce,and field innovative and high technology tanks, and thenkeep those tanks secret until they are needed. This remainsa matter of grave concern. The product and process of thehistoric Soviet experience with the development of thepremium tank, is an example for the U.S. Army and anypotential opponents of what can be achieved by thedevelopment of a truly superior tank.

THE SOVIET EXPERIENCE

According to The Military Balance 1991-1992, in June1991 the Soviets could field a tank force of approximately54,400 tanks. Of this total, approximately 20,725 werelocated in the Atlantic To The Urals (ATTU) Zone specifiedby the CFE negotiations; and between 4,116 and 5,000 werestill located in the Western Group of Forces (WGF) section2of eastern Germany. Unlike the total tank strength of aWestern army, these Soviet totals embodied the results of aunique Soviet concept. The concept concerns the fielding ofa tank force consisting of two different tank types in ahigh-low mix.

The Soviet Main Battle Tank (MBT) was designed as alow-cost tank that was intended to be fielded in lower

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priority Soviet divisions as well as being made available toSoviet allied countries. These tanks had the necessarycapabilities to be competitive on the battlefield, whilebeing inexpensive and simple enough to be produced in verylarge numbers. Some of the most well known tanks in theworld are Soviet MBTs: the T-54, T-55, T-62, and T-72.Although not incorporating the cutting-edge of tanktechnology, these tanks still have been very successfuldesigns. The T-55 MBT, for example, was in production from1958 to 1979 for a total Soviet production run of

3approximately 27,500 tanks. T-55 MBTs are still widelyused today, with approximately 1500 T-55s and its variantsoriginally available to the Iraqi Army during OperationDesert Shield/Desert Storm in 1990/1991. MBTs, like thosedescribed above, constitute the bulk and the low-end of theSoviet tank fleet s high-low mix.

THE PREMIUM TANK

The Soviet tank type that made up the high-endremainder of the fleet was the Premium Tank (PT). Theconcept of the premium tank has historically been uniquelySoviet and therefore has no Western equivalent. A premiumtank is defined as a very high value and innovative tankthat incorporates the highest technology available at agiven time. The premium tank concept should not be confusedwith the development and fielding of sophisticated MBTs like


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the M1 Abrams and Leopard 2 in the West. In those armiesthe sophisticated MBTs are fielded alongside older tanks toallow the numbers of the new MBTs to get large enough for aone-for-one exchange with the new model. Then the oldertanks are taken out of frontline service and supplied to thevarious reserve forces. According to the premium tankconcept, both the less sophisticated MBTs and the premiumtanks are developed and fielded concurrently, with thereserve forces employing the same MBT as the bulk of theactive force.

Due to their inherent high cost, complexity, andhigh risk designs, premium tanks are normally produced insmaller numbers than main battle tanks. The relationshipbetween these two tank types, however, is very close. Inthe Soviet example, the premium tank and MBT designersrelied on each other for mutual support. In some cases,technological innovations that required a higher level ofmaintenance support, or were initially very expensive toproduce would eventually appear on MBTs once they maturedsufficiently. This sharing of the wealth not only ensuredthat the quality of the MBT force was improved as much aspossible, it also ensured that a high degree of commonalityexisted between the two tank types. This explains some ofthe confusion that spread through the various Westernintelligence agencies when two very similar Soviet tanksappeared in 1976 and 1977. Since the Soviet T-64 premium

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tank and the Soviet T-72 MBT have many of the samecharacteristics, they were difficult to tell apart.Eventually, enough information was learned about thesuperior T-64 to separate it from its less sophisticatedstablemate.

PREMIUM TANK EMPLOYMENT

In addition to the technological innovationsincorporated into the premium tanks, the Soviets also wereconcerned with ways of employing them to fully exploit theircapabilities. The best example of this is the T-64 and itsrole in the Soviet Operational Maneuver Group OMG) andForward Detachment. The.Operationa1 Maneuver Group, first4identified in the Polish military press in 1981 was nota standard organization with a fixed structure. An OMG wasnormally a highly capable combat force that was taskorganized for a specific mission. An Army level OMG, forexample, would probably be made up of a division that hadbeen reinforced with aviation units, engineer units, andadditional logistic support elements. Designed to operateas a separate force, the OMG would be basically employed asa strike force that would exploit a breach created in theenemy defenses and drive for specific deep targets.

OMG missions could include the destruction of majorNATO weapon systems that were capable of destroying Soviet


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main body forces, disrupting coordinated NATO defenses to..:the point of seriously reducing their effectiveness, and thecapture of objectives and key terrain in the enemy rear'areathat would facilitate the rapid movement of the mainbody. For any of these missions to be possible, the OMQwould initially be equipped with a tank that had thecapability to penetrate NATO defenses and survive theintense volume of fire presented by NATO antitank weapons.The T-64 premium tank, with its vastly improvedcapabilities, gave the Soviets the OMG Tank they werelooking for. The T-64 became the cutting-edge of thisdangerous Soviet operational concept. Although theorganization that became known as the OMQ is dead, theSoviet concept of a well equipped deep strike force is stillan important topic of discussion.

Like the OMG, the Forward Detachment was a deepstrike or raiding force designed to disrupt the cohesion ofNATO defenses. Division forward detachments, normallyconsisting of reinforced tank battalions, would attack aheadof the division main body to penetrate NATO coveringforces. They would then move as quickly as possible inprebattle or march formation to capture key terrain in themain defensive area. The goal of seizing this key terrainwas to disrupt or preempt the conduct of the defense, and toopen multiple avenues for the attacking divisional first6echelon forces. Again, like the OMG, the requirement to


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penetrate the NATO defensive lines dictated the use of apremium tank. Only a tank with the firepower mobilitycharacteristics and armor protection of a premium tank hadthe capabilities essential to the use of the OMG or forwarddetachment. It was within these two offensive concepts thatthe technological advantage gained by the premium tank couldbe employed to the fullest extent.

SOVIET TANK DEVELOPMENT

In the Soviet experience the development of armoredvehicles has historically been a complex process headed bythe Defense Ministry and carried out by several industrialministries. While the Soviet General Staff examined therequirements for.future armored vehicles the TechnicalInstitute for Armored Technology at the Kubinka ArmoredProving Grounds worked on new and innovative technologiesthat would be incorporated into those future armoredvehicles. If one of the studied concepts is selected forfurther development a commission would be formed to preparea requirement that would be formalized into a TacticalTechnical Assignment. At the completion of advanceddevelopment a Technical Tactical Requirement was drawn up.Once the approval of the Defense Ministry and General Staffwas received it was handed down to the relevent DesignBureau.


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The design bureau is more than a tank design team,and as such, has no direct American counterpart. Not onlydo they design new armored vehicles, they also may controlthe plant that produces the new weapon. According to U.S.sources, there were seven design bureaus associated withtank, armored vehicle, and artillery development in theSoviet Union. Each of these seven design bureausnormally was responsible for one part of the overall armoredvehicle development plan. Historically, there has been aseparate design bureau for the design and development ofmedium tanks,'heavy tanks, and light tanks. The relevantdesign bureau selected or developed the necessarysub-systems and prepared to build a number of prototypes ofthe new design. These prototypes were then tested andrefined by the design bureau. After these local tests, thevehicle was subjected to a series of state trials where adecision concerning the production of the new tank was made.

Contrary to the U.S. practice of delaying seriesproduction of a new tank until after later operationaltrials, a new Soviet tank design may have been deemed matureenough to be put into initial production at a much earlierstage. Once a significant number of the initial productionmodels of the tank was produced, they were then put throughoperational trials. These trials were normally conducted bya bell weather division and would include the developmentof the tactics, maintenance procedures, and crew training,


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required to support the tank. The result of this system wasthat the initial production or base model of the new tankmay differ in many respects from the more mature andimproved mass production or standard model. Finally atthis point the new tank was accepted into operationalservice. Development of the tank would normally continuethroughout its service life with improvements and up-datesadded to the original design whenever appropriate.

THE T-34

The Soviet premium tank entered this system as aproduct of the Koshkin design bureau based at the Kharkovtank plant in July 1939. Koshkin felt that his T-32prototype design should be considered a universal tank thatcould fulfill the roles of the the infantry support tankthe cavalry tank and the medium tank. The decision wasmade to up-armor the original T-32 design and put it intoproduction as the T-34 medium tank. The original productionorder was for 200 T-34s to be built in 1940 with the firsttwo completed in February of that year. The T-34 Model1940 at figure 1 did suffer from some major teethingproblems with its transmission a fact that probably causedmore T-34s to be lost due to mechanical problems than enemyaction in 1941. The original short barreled 76.2mm maingun mounted on the T-34 Model 1940 also fell short of thestated requirements. New T-34 Model 1941s mounting a much

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Fig ure 1 Soviet T 34 Model 1940Source: TANK Magazine 8, 1991


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improved longer barreled 76 2mm main gun went intoproduction just prior to the start of the war. With the newmain gun and improved transmission the T-34 would prove tobe superior to any tank on the battlefield.

THE FIRST PREMIUM TANK

The T-34 is classified as a premium tank for manyreasons. First of all it was truly a universal tank. TheT-34 was designed to fulfill the roles of three differentclasses of tank. Although the eventual decline and fall ofthe only other really credible class of tank the heavytank was still many years away the T-34 was virtuallyself-supportable. In fact the excellent and very wellknown KV-1 Model 1940 heavy tank was not as well armed asthe T-34 due to it mounting a less potent 76 2mm main gun.It was later replaced by the same main gun carried by theT-34. The thicker armor fitted to the KV-1 over thatmounted on the T-34 was also a mixed blessing due to thelack of increased engine power to compensate for theadditional weight. While the KV-1 would prove to be a verycapable stablemate to the T-34 it clearly did not displaythe innovations and advanced capabilities that would bringSoviet post-war heavy tanks and the modern premium tank onine.


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THE T-34's INNOVATIONS

Secondly, the T-34 employed a revolutionarycombination of the three classic tank design areas:firepower, mobility, and protection. As mentioned above,the main gun mounted on the T-34 consisted of a veryeffective 76.2mm gun that was far superior to anything theGerman Army had at the time. The T-34's thick and wellsloped frontal armor, conceived by Koshkin's team member M.Tarshinov, was very innovative and truly ahead of it'stime. By angling the front slope or glacis armor of theT-34, an attacking projectile was forced to penetrate beyondthe armor's actual thickness and into the length of thearmor plate. The result was that the vast majority of theprojectiles fired at the front of the T-34 would simplyglance off the sloped armor. The mobility characteristicsof the T-34 were also superior. The combination of a highpowered engine, innovative wide tracks, and light weightobviously imparted an extraordinary cross-country mobility

to the tanks through mud, swamps, or snow, a fact which wassubsequently fully proved and which greatly increased the

1combat value of the T-34s. The revolutionarycombination of innovative tank technology represented by theT-34 would prove to influence or dictate the designs of allthe tanks that would follow it.


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THE IMPACT OF THE T-34

Finally, the massive reaction the T-34 caused withinthe German Army also confirms the T-34 s label as a premiumtank. Prior to the new Soviet tank s appearance on thebattlefield, the Germans were given a hint of what was tocome. In the spring of 1941 a Soviet military commissionwas sent to Germany to visit various German tank factoriesand schools. Since the Germans had not yet invaded theSoviet Union, Hitler decided that the visiting Soviets wouldbe allowed to see all the latest tank production facilitiesas well as the best tanks in the German Army. He insistedthat nothing be concealed from the Soviets. The Germansfelt that their latest tanks would surely be technicallysuperior to any in the Soviet Army, and that thissuperiority would override any Soviet numerical advantages.

When the Soviets were shown the German Panzer MarkIV, however, they were not impressed. They did not believethat the Germans were showing them their best tanks. TheSoviets were convinced that the Germans were stillconcealing their latest tanks, and complained that they werenot being allowed to see them. After the Soviets had left,the German Ordnance Office eventually came to an unfortunateconclusion. The fact that the Soviets insisted that theywere not being shown the best the German Army had to offer,


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when in fact they were meant that the Soviet Army may have11already possessed a technically superior tank.

This eleventh-hour realization became battlefieldfact a few months later when the T-34 made its appearance atthe end of June 1941. This Soviet premium tank pressed theGermans into the very dangerous position of having to reactto a technically superior enemy tank. According to GeneralHeinz Guderian the T-34 caused a crisis in German tank andantitank warfare. The impact of this new Soviet tank was sogreat that Guderian urged that a commission made up ofGerman tank designers and ordnance experts be sent to thefront to examine these new Soviet tanks first-hand. One ofthe first recommendations was to rush a German copy of theT-34 into production and get it out to the troops as soon aspossible. It was also clear that the German antitank gunarsenal would require the addition of a new heavy guncapable of knocking out the T-34. The biggest problem forthe Germans was that the series of demanded responses to theT-34 would take a long time to materialize. The crisismentioned above was far reaching and forced the Germans toexpedite the development of projected weapons as well as thefielding of modifications to their currently fielded tanks.


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FROM T-34 TO THE FUTURE PREMIUM

The relationship between the T-34 and modern Sovietpremium tanks is not as confused as it may appear. Whilesuccessful characteristics from earlier premium tanks havebeen incorporated into post-war MBTs, the premium tank linehas remained relatively constant. The premium tank hasevolved from the T-34, through the Soviet post-war heavytanks, and into the current T-64 series and T-80 series ofmodern premiums. Like the premium tanks themselves,information concerning these tanks is relatively scarce andfar more restricted than the data describing more well knowntanks. When any questions are asked concerning the futureof the premium tank however, the available open-sourceinformation is even more restricted and details arepractically nonexistent.

THE PREMIUM TANK-5

Due to the lack of available information, the futureof the premium tank will be examined using the author'sprojected Premium Tank-5 (PT-5) as the subject. Theprojected Premium Tank-5 (after the T-34, post-war Sovietheavy tanks, T-64 series, and T-80 series of premiums) isthe result of combining the available open-sourceinformation with the analysis of the author. Thediscussions that have taken place concerning premium tanks

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of the future have focused primarily on three developmentsoriginally known as the Future Soviet Tank-1 FST-1). FST-2,and FST-3. These initial designations do not refer toactual vehicles; instead, they refer to different levels orclasses of tank technology that are expected to appear.These expectations and the threat represented by the PT-5are the focus of this thesis. Just as the T-34 achieved theadvantage over the German tanks of World War Two, theunexpected appearance of the Premium Tank-5 could force theU.S. Army of the 1990s and beyond into that same dangerousposition.

The importance of this study is clear: a modern-daycrisis in tank and antitank warfare caused by thehistorically demonstrated capability to develop, produce,and field innovative and high technology tanks must beprevented. The Premium Tank-5, and the threat itrepresents, must be fully understood and effectivelycountered to prevent any potential opponent from gaining adecisive advantage on the battlefields of the future.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

There is currently a vast amount of generalinformation available on the development and characteristicsof the tanks that have appeared since the start of World WarTwo. As this study is being written, however, the only

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known development and deployment of premium tanks has beenconfined to Soviet efforts since the appearance of theT-34. Therefore, a large part of the relevant literatureexamined for this study is focused on the design anddevelopment of Soviet tanks. Articles from publicationslike Jane s Intelliaence Review and International DefenseBeview, as well as U.S. Government publications like theSoviet Military P o w e ~ eries have been critical to thisstudy. Some of the more important books on the subjectinclude: Sov ePresent, by Steven J. Zaloga and James W. Loop, Abrams: AHistory of the American Main Battle Tank, by R.P. Hunnicutt,JSina of the Killina Zone, by Orr Kelly, and Inside theSovietm y Viktor Suvorov. The Jane s series ofyearbooks including Jane s Armour and Artillery 1990-199L,by Christopher F. Foss as well as translations of Germanassessments from World War Two also proved to be invaluableto this study. Finally, some of the most valuable sourcesof information concerning the development of Soviet tanksare the Soviets themselves. Official Soviet publicationslike Red Star, Technoloav and Armament, and Soviet Soldiercan provide keen insights into the direction of premium tankdevelopment over the years.


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STATUS OF THE EXISTING RESEARCH

The term Premium Tank was first used by Sovietarmor expert and author Steven J. Zaloga in 1987. In hisbook Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles 1946 to the Present(co-authored with James W. Loop), Zaloga reported that theSoviets put a radically new tank into production in 1965that would prove to be the most controversial tank sinceWorld War Two. Because the T-64 was so superior to the U.S.and NATO tanks of the same period, its appearance forced thearmies of the West to scramble to Soviet innovations. Therevolutionary combination of firepower, mobility, andprotection embodied in the T-64 would have a significantimpact on all the tanks that followed it. Zaloga alsodetails the Soviet system of developing and deploying tanksin a high-low mix. What may have appeared to be a moderncharacteristic of the Soviet tank development process, wasin fact initiated in the late 1940s.

In this book, as well as several other books andarticles he has authored, Zaloga tells the story of Soviettank development since the end of World War Two. While thisdescription was very informative and introduced the conceptof the premium tank, it failed to fully detail thecontinuing relationship between the premium tank and theMBT. Zaloga. like some other writers, has incorrectlyidentified this relationship as a curious pattern of an

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advanced-technology tank followed by a de-evolutionary,12retrograde design. This explanation trulyunderestimates the significant role played by the MBT, andcompletely misses the essential sharing of mature premiumtank technology from the premium to the MB T design. Thisgap in the currently available research would make theexamination of a future non-Soviet premium tank verydifficult. This difficulty should be overcome by theresearch conducted for this study.

In his books, Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles ofForld War Two (coauthored with James Grandsen), and Soviet

and Combat Vehicles 1946 to the Present, Zaloga givesthe authoritative analysis of the development of Sovietheavy tanks. The history of Soviet heavy tanks issignificant to this study because it is an integral part ofthe development of the premium tank. Starting with theIS-3, which saw only limited combat around Berlin during thefinal weeks of the war, post-war Soviet heavy tanks were ineffect premium tanks themselves. The revolutionary designand excellent capabilities of these tanks are alsohighlighted in John Milsom's book Russian Tanks 1900-1974.Like the earlier T-34 medium tank, the appearance of theIS-3 heavy tank in 1945 proved to have a significant impacton the tank designs being developed in the West. Thesignificant role played by the post-war heavy tanks in thelineage of the premium tank was brought home by t he

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appearance of the T-64 in 1976. Apparently, it took a tankwith the capabilities of the T-64 to convince the SovietArmy that the heavy tanks were no longer required.

In his book Jnside the Soviet Army, Viktor Suvorovgives several examples of the Soviet ability to keep certainSoviet weapons truly secret. According to Suvorov, theGermans were not the only ones surprised at the appearanceof the T-34 in World War Two. The Soviet ability to keepsecrets applied to their own generals as well. Once the warhad started, the secret tanks were moved forward and sentinto battle. While the Soviet tank crews had been trainedon older, less sophisticated tanks, they quickly masteredthe T-34s.they learn

hidden awayexamples ofSoviet tank

Suvorov states that this trend would continue;on a Volkswagen, but keep the Mercedes secretly

3.until it is really needed. One of the bestthe ability to keep key weapons secret concernsdestroyers or heavy assault guns. According to

Suvorov, these tank destroyers were only employed duringperiods of tension, and were not fielded outside the SovietUnion. Since Jggide the Soviet was published, theSoviets have admitted that these tank destroyers do in factexist.

The existing research does confirm that the Sovietshistorically have been able to surprise their enemies withpreviously secret weapons. The available literature goes


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even further by reporting that this was not confined toobscure weapons that were produced in small numbers.According to Bina of the Killina Zone by Orr Kelly, theappearance of the T-64 on a battlefield of the 1960s or1970s would have come as almost a total surprise, truly a14secret weapon. While this premium tank was beingfielded in the Soviet Army, the armored forces of the U.S.Army were equipped with tanks that fell far short of theirpotential competition.

In his book arams: A Historv of the American M a bBattle Tank, R.P. Hunnicutt describes the development of thetank projects that were intended to replace the brand newM48 Patton and still to be developed M60 series of MBTs.The first of the three major tank development programsinitiated was the T95 program. Although not fitting thedefinition of a premium tank completely, the American T95offers the only known non-Soviet look at a premium design.The T95 premium tank project incorporated many advanced andinnovative concepts, and like the very similar Soviet T-64,was truly ahead of its time. The T95 was fitted with alarge caliber smoothbore main gun, advanced fire controlsystem, innovative engine, and innovative siliceous-coredcomposite armor. The T95 premium tank project ran fromJanuary 1955 to July 1960, when it was cancelled in favor ofan improved M48A2 MBT known as the XM60. Not willing toaccept the risks inherent in an innovative design, the U S

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Army felt that it was not necessary to fully develop andfield a premium tank.

A recurring problem in the available literature isthe apparent desire by many authors to attack the quality ofthe Soviet Army in general and to criticize Soviet tanks inparticular. Some of these authors are quick to compareSoviet premium tanks to more modern Western tanks like theMlAl and Leopard 2. This comparison however is onebetween apples and oranges. Since Operation Desert Stormthese unfair comparisons have become all the more popular.In many cases the poor performance of the Iraqi Army wasincorrectly blamed on the quality of the hardware providedby the Soviets. The Soviets themselves would probably agreethat tank for tank the MlAl is far superior to the exportedT-72 MBTs employed by the Iraqi Army. What manycommentators are failing to recognize is that for any ofthese comparisons to be valid they must set two tanks withsimilar capabilities against one another. Given tank crewsof equal training capabilities and motivation an accurateappraisal of the MlAl should include a comparison againstthe next premium tank it could encounter; not the 26 yearold T-64. The research conducted for this study and theresulting Premium Tank-5 examined in Chapter Five isintended to balance the scales and allow a true comparisonbetween American capabilities and the projected threat.


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END NOTESCHAPTER ONE

1Orr Kelly, Kina of the Killina ZoneNorton Company, 1989 , 21.

(New York: W.W.-The International Institute for Strategic Studies,The Militarv Balance 1991-1995 (London: Brassey's, 1991 ,37. 3Steven J. Zaloga and James W. Loop, Soviet Tanks andCombat Vehicles 1946 to the Present (Dorset: Arms andArmour Press, 1987 , 47.4Lieutenant Colonel John G. Hines and Philip A.Petersen, The Soviet Conventional Offensive in Europe,Militarv Review, April 1984. As reprinted in the U.S. Army

Command and General Staff College C3000 Reinforcement andForward Deployed Operations Syllabus Book, p. 96.Ibid., 97.6U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-2-1 (Draft), The SovietArmy: O~erations nd Tactics (Washington D.C.: Departmentof the Army, 1990 , 204.Steven J. Zaloga and James W. Loop, Soviet Tanks andCombat Vehicles 1946 to the Present (Dorset: Arms andArmour Press, 1987 , 21.8Ibid., 22.9Steven J. Zaloga and James Grandsen, Soviet Tanks andcombat Vehicles of World War Two (London: Arms and ArmourPress, 1984 , 129.10Department of the Army, Headquarters EuropeanCommand, -A (Garmisch: Office ofthe Chief Historian, 1947 , 18, photocopied.11General Heinz Guderian, Panzer Leader (Costa Mesa:The Noontide Press, 1988 , 143.

12Steven J. Zaloga, Soviet Tank DevelopmentRevealed, Armed Forces Journal International, December1990, 24.13Viktor Suvorov, Inside the Soviet Army (New York:Macmillan Publishing Company, Inc., 1982 , 206.


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14Orr Kelly, Fins of the Killina 20- New York: W.W.Norton Company, 1989 , 18.


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CHAPTER TWO

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The examination of the premium tank concept can be achallenge to the researcher. The study of a weapon systemthat has been shrouded in secrecy throughout its lifetime,is very similar in many respects to more well known andunderstood vehicles, and is intended to outperform bothfielded and comparable projected tanks by using thecutting-edge of available technology, is likely to get miredin misperceptions and detail. To contend with this problem,the research methodology for this thesis is based on theoriginal Premium Tank Analysis Model PTAM) at figure 2.The intent of the PTAM is twofold: first, to guide theresearch conducted for this study while examining the commoncharacteristics that make up both the MBT and the premiumtank; and second, to focus on the intent and capabilitiesthat separate these two tank types.


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As can be seen in figure 2, the PTAM portrays thePremium Tank (PT) and the Main Battle Tank (MBT) as beingparallel and simultaneous development efforts.Historically, the Soviets would employ a specific designbureau to develop a premium tank, while other bureaus wouldconcentrate their efforts on MBTs or heavy tanks. As statedin Chapter One, information would flow between the bureausto ensure the compatibility and commonality of the paralleldesigns. Both the PT and the MBT incorporated six designareas: firepower, mobility, protection, production,deployment, and impact. While the first three of theseareas are considered traditional concepts, the second groupis original to this study. Prior to conducting anexamination of each one of these areas, it should beemphasized that, although these tank types were beingdeveloped concurrently, the influence that each design areahad on a given tank design could be very different. The wayto separate the PT from the MBT, therefore, is to quantifyeach design area and then determine how it relates to agiven tank.

FIREPOWER, MOBILITY, AND PROTECTION

The three classic interrelated tank design areas,firepower, mobility, and protection, were selected for themodel because they have been at the heart of tank designsince the weapon s conception. Prior to the tank s first

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Premium Tank Analysis ModelPremium Tank PT) vs. the MBT

.n Known Innovat ionI-.W Threat HighD

N Design AreasDdj FirepowerMobility

ProtectionProductionDeploymentImpactature PT

echnologySharing

Risk


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appearance on the battlefield on September 15, 1916 therequirement for a mobile protected gun was well known. Assoon as the threat of enemy tanks became a reality, theability of one tank to destroy another evolved into aprimary requirement of tank design. This requirement wasmet through the use of firepower. Over the years, theability to destroy enemy tanks has become a yardstick formeasuring the effectiveness of one's own tanks. Inconsequence, the evaluation of tank designs reduces to thedetermination of the probabilities of success in destroying

1hostile tanks.

Like firepower, the mobility of the mobile protectedgun has been a critical factor in the history of tankdesign. After the start of World War One, the adoption oftrench warfare highlighted the need for tracked armoredvehicles. Although very slow and cumbersome, even by WorldWar Two standards, the tanks that emerged to fight in WorldWar One could cross wide trenches, crush thick strands ofbarbed wire, and knock out enemy positions. The ability tosuccessfully traverse a cratered battlefield not onlyenabled the tank to bring its firepower to bear on theenemy, it also provided an important degree of survivabilityto the tank itself. The more mobile the tank, the moredifficult it became for the enemy to hit. Based upon thepower provided by a given engine and the design's total


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allowable weight the mobility available to a tankquickly evolved into a paramount consideration of tankdesign.

When the tank first appeared it was able tomaneuver on the battlefield with relative immunity. Theprotection provided by its armor plating made it proof fromthe devastating fire of the machinegun. The thin armororiginally carried by the tanks of World War One howeverwas quickly over matched by the development of antitankweapons. The armor fitted to the tanks in turn was thenincreased to protect them from these new threats. Theresulting action-reaction development policy betweenfirepower and armor protection still governs tankdevelopment. Since additional armor and larger cannonsincrease the weight of a tank the mobility available willbe reduced. As mobility is reduced the tank will becomemore vulnerable to enemy fire and will require heavierarmor and more firepower to protect it. Like firepower andmobility the concept of protection is a fundamentalconsideration in tank design. While each design area iscritical to tank design individually the modification ofany one area has a profound effect on the other two.


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PRODUCTION EMPLOYMENT AND IMPACT

As mentioned above the second group of tank designareas is original to this study. Like the three traditionalareas the areas of production deployment and impact playan important part in the development of both the premiumtank and the MBT. How each area relates to the two types oftank however can be very different. By definitionpremium tanks are complex vehicles which are normallyproduced in relatively small numbers. Since fewer premiumtanks are built it is possible to concentrate theirdevelopment and production at a few or even a singlefacility. Concentration not only allows the majority of thetank production effort to be focused on less sophisticatedand easier to produce MBTs it also helps maintain theinherent high level of secrecy associated with premium tankproduction. The production of MBTs on the other handwould be accomplished at a much higher rate. Since they areless costly less sophisticated and less controlled thanthe premiums MBTs would be produced in enough numbers toequip the majority of home units as well as exportcustomers.

How each type of tank was deployed would also bevery different. The premium tank would only be provided tothe highest priority units of the home forces. Using theSoviet Army as an example the premiums were deployed only


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to the Groups of Soviet Forces in Eastern Europe and to highpriority divisions within the Soviet Union. In most cases,the existence of a certain premium tank would be kept secretuntil they are provided to forward deployed forces. Thedeployment of an MBT is not nearly as controlled as it iswith a premium tank. From its inception, the MBT wasintended to be widely deployed. In addition to beingprovided to the bulk of the home forces, the MBT could alsobe the tank used by the army reserve forces. keyconsideration with the deployment of MBTs is their use byexport customers. Since premium tanks are normally notexported, the deployment of the MBT by an allied country mayprovide the only look at a given country's tank developmentprocess. The Iraqi experience with the employment of SovietMBTs during Operation Desert Storm will be discussed indetail in Chapter Four of this study.

Finally, the impact a given tank has on a country'senemies or potential opponents is a very key design area.While the two areas described above are very important andare critical to the discovery and identification of apremium tank, the impact that the design has on itsadversaries is what truly separates the premium from anyother tank. Chapter Three of this study will focus on theSoviet tank which can accurately be referred to as theflagship of the premium tanks: the Soviet T-64. The T-64

had a profound impact on the NATO armies of the Cold War


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because its capabilities and resulting impact could havebeen a disaster for NATO had war broken out in CentralEurope. More modern Soviet premium tanks like the T-80U andits potential successor were able to maintain the initiativeby reinforcing this massive impact dealt to the WesternArmies of the 1960s and 1970s. The impact of the MBT, onthe other hand, is based on its original design combinedwith the mature premium tank technology that is borrowedfrom the more sophisticated design. This technologysharing enables the MBT to have a certain level of impacton any opponent. Since the MBT is normally more well knownthan the premium tank, the impact and reactions of the enemymay be based on the assessment of the far less dangerous ofthe two tank designs.

USE OF THE PTAM

As stated above, the development of the premium tankand the MBT are parallel and simultaneous efforts. Whilethe objective for both designs on the battlefield is thesame, the goal that each is designed to achieve is verydifferent. As shown in the PTAM at figure 5, the premiumtank is designed to have capabilities above and beyond thoseof the known threat, and if possible, any projected threatsas well. This is made possible by the incorporation ofinnovative and high risk technology depicted in the PTAM asthe line at the tip of the premium tank's capability arrow.


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The use of cutting-edge technology in each of the relatedtank design areas is what truly separates these two tanktypes. The success of this process can be seen with thedevelopment of the T-64. This particular tank was providedwith certain capabilities that were more advanced than NATOtanks that would not appear for an additional 15 or 16years.

As seen in the PTAM, the goal of the MBT design ismuch less ambitious than that of the premium tank. Depictedas the line at the tip of the MBT s capability arrow, thegoal for the MBT is the known threat. While the MBT isintended to fight and defeat identified and fielded threattank forces, it is also intended to challenge the continueddevelopment of enemy MBTs. This challenge, seen in thecontinued development and improvement of one s own MBTs, ispossible through the policy of incorporating mature premiumtank technology into the development of MBTs. The advancedcapabilities that initially were not available to the MBTdesigns are provided later as they mature. This sharing ofthe wealth ensures that the MBT stays competitive withcontinually evolving enemy MBTs. As shown in the PTAM, themature premium tank technology arrow is directed back fromthe innovation and high risk goal of the premium tank to thegoal of the MBT. In effect, the known threat is confrontedfrom both the high and low end of this two tank, high-lowdevelopment concept.


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The PTAM is not a perfect model and clearly does notcover each premium tank perfectly. Projected futurepremiums like the Premium Tank-5 may also not fit the modelexactly. In fact, using this model with the expectationthat it will fit every situation perfectly is risky and willdemonstrate the PTAM s limitations. The simplicity of itsdesign and the ease with which it can be applied to bothtypes of tank, however, highlight the utility and strengthsof this model.

THE EXAMPLE OF THE T-64 AND T-72

Perhaps the best example for demonstrating the useof the PTAM is discussing the relationship between theSoviet T-64 premium tank and T-72 MBT. The T-72 MBTrepresents a classic main battle tank. It has very capablefirepower, mobility, and protection characteristics, and iscurrently in the process of replacing the T-54/T-55 as themost widely deployed MBT in the world. When used as part ofa complete system, which will be discussed in Chapter Four,it is a very powerful weapon. As can be seen in the PTAM,the advanced capabilities of the premium tank (in this casethe T-64) were incorporated into the T-72 as they matured.Like the T-64, the original T-72 has grown into a series of16 identified variants. Since the T-72 is less complex andcheaper to produce than the premium tank, the T-72 series


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has been produced in very large numbers and has been widelyexported.

Although the T-64 has shared some of itscapabilities with the T-72, when the T-64 first appearedthese capabilities were truly revolutionary. The Sovietsaccepted much risk with the T-64 s expensive and complexdesign, so by Soviet standards the number produced was smalland limited to an estimated 9,700 tanks. Some sources,however, put the T-64 production total as high as 13 5002tanks. As will be discussed in detail in Chapter Three,the impact the T-64 had on the military world wassignificant. This impact was brought home to the armies ofthe West when the T-64 was deployed to the high priorityunits in the WGF in (what was) East Germany and to theSoviet Southern Group of Forces (SGF) formally stationed inHungary.

The PTAM was developed to give the researcher theability to analyze and compare the differences betweenpremium tanks and MBTs. It provides a model where virtuallyany tank can be identified and evaluated. The researchmethodology developed for this study fully supports the bodyof the research conducted and was fundamental to thedevelopment of the answer to the research question.


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END NOTESCHAPTER TWO

1R. M. Ogorkiewicz, qVehicles (Garden City: Doubleday Company Inc., 1968 ,168.

Christopher F. Foss, Jane s Armour and ArtilleryJ989 199Q (London: Jane s Publishing Company, 1989 , 317.


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CHAPTER THREE

PREMIUM TANK CASE STUDY: THE SOVIET T-64

As stated in Chapter One, the appearance of theSoviet T-34 in 1941 came as a surprise to the German Army.This case, however, may have been only the first example ofthe Soviets ability to beat their adversaries in tanktechnology. This capability-to develop technically superiorarmored vehicles and then keep these vehicles secret untilthey appear on the battlefield, or until their secrecy is nolonger required-has been an increasingly dangerous threat.This capability has in fact been demonstrated twice inrecent history.

The Soviets started to produce a new controversialand innovative tank in 1965. The T-64 premium tank was notonly superior to the western tanks of the same period, butalso forced the Western armies into the position of havingto scramble to react to Soviet innovations. Even inpeacetime, the T-64 s appearance caused a massive reactionby the armies of the West. This reaction, however, was

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only a fraction of the impact this tank would have wroughton the battlefield had war broken out. The U.S. Army mustbe prepared to identify and counter whatever develops as thenext member in the line started with the T-34 and continuedwith the T-64. The U.S. must avoid any futureeleventh-hour battlefield scenario that could translate

into the same kind of surprise that the Soviets have beenable to inflict upon their opponents in the past. A closeexamination of the T-64 suggests what could have happened ifwar had broken out prior to the appearance of the AmericanM1 Abrams and German Leopard 2, as well as what might happenif the next innovative premium tank is allowed to surprisethe U.S. Army.

ORIGINS OF THE T-64

When the Soviet T-62 MBT entered production in 1960,work had already started on a newer tank. By the time theT-62 was first seen in public in 1965, this still-newer tankhad been put into production. While Western intelligencesources knew of the existence of this new tank, since it wasnot seen until 1976, they did not appreciate how radicallyit differed from earlier Soviet designs. Beforeidentification of the new design that would become the T-64,the Soviets had developed tanks in a series of progressive,evolutionary steps. Starting with the T-34 series, and


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running through the T-54, T-55, and T-62 MBTs, the Sovietshad followed a fairly predictable path. The T-64, however,was a much more daring evolutionary step.

Like the T-34, the T-64 incorporated major changesfrom its predecessors. With its vastly improved armor,larger main gun, and new flat, opposed piston five-cylinderdiesel engine, the T-64 was clearly in a class by itself.The production models of the T-64 developed by the N. Shomindesign bureau were preceded by a number of prototypes thatdiffered primarily in turret front and hull designs.Several sources identified a particular vehicle that wasused for tests and became known as the T-67. This vehicle,probably originally identified in some very poor qualityfilms of a winter exercise conducted in 1970, was mostprobably the base model T-64. This new tank was given theprovisional designation of M1970, and has since beenreferred to as both the T-70 and the Dvina Tank (afterthe March 1970 Dvina exercise in the Byelorussian ~i l = ta r yDistrict). Since the first views of the T-64 were of verypoor quality (the tanks were most likely misidentified asdevelopments of the T-62), various speculative designationswere attached to this new tank. Once better qualityphotographs became available, it was obvious that the tankin question was much more than a modified T-62.


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EVOLUTION OF THE T-64

The Soviet Army fielded the T-64 for operationaltrials in 1967 with the 100th Guards Tank Training1Regiment. Shortly after the start of these trials, thetank was subsequently issued to the 41st Guards TankDivision. Since its initial fielding, the Soviets havecontinued to develop and modify the T-64. To date, Westernintelligence sources have identified seven differentvariants in the T-64 series. After the various pr ot ot v~ esmentioned above (jointly included as the first variant), thesecond variant discovered was the T-64 Base ModeL; which hasalso been referred to as the T-67, M1970, T-70, and theDvina Tank. There had been some speculation concerning

the main gun mounted on this tank. What was originallythought to be the same U-5T 115mm main gun from the T-62, isnow belived to be a shorter version of the standard 125mmmain gun. According to Jnternational Defense Review, theT-64 Base Model is recognizable by the infantry handrailsmounted on the left and right side of the turret, and by thetool stowage box mounted on the right front fender. Onlater models of the T-64, this stowage box has been replacedby a standard fender-mounted fuel tank.

The many reported teething problems that have beenassociated with the T-64 over the years are probably aresult of the problems encountered with the Base Model of

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the tank. These problems primarily concerned the tank'sautomotive performance, although reports have appeared aboutproblems with the ground-breaking and innovative automaticloading system as well. According to some of these reports,the tank's automatic loader occasionally ate Soviettankers and that few gunners are excited by the prospectof having their arm fed into the breach of the cannon.More recent information indicates that these early reportswere exaggerated and that the majority of these problems hadbeen solved with the appearance of later variants.

The third variant of the T-64 is the T-64A, atfigure 3 which is the standard model of the tank and hasbeen produced in large numbers. The infantry handrails havenow been eliminated, and the standard fender-mounted fueltank is fitted. Initially, this model of the T-64 wasfitted with four spring-loaded armor plates on each side ofthe hull. When deployed, these plates would stick out fromthe hull at a 45 degree angle and were intended to providesome protection against enemy High Explosive Antitank (HEAT)warheads. These plates gave the tank a unique appearanceand were labeled as gill armor. The T-64A went throughseveral modification programs that included the replacementof the gill armor with full length non-metalic hull skirts,and the mounting of various patterns of smoke grenadelaunchers on the turret. The most significant modificationdone was certainly the replacement of the original optical

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T 64A ank


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coincidence rangefinder with a laser rangefinder (LRF).This modification can be identified by the wider gunner'sprimary sight (GPS) protective box or doghouse with a muchlarger frontal glass area. This modification included theretention of the optical rangefinder ear that was requiredby the coincidence rangefinder on the right side of theturret roof. After the addition of the laser rangefinder,however, the right side optic was covered and sealed. Withthe new rangefinder the modified T-64A was given thedesignation T-64A LRF thus becoming the fourth variant ofthe T-64 series.

The fifth variant of the T-64 series is known as theT-64B1. This tank was paraded in Red Square in Moscow onMay 1985. Prior to the appearance of the Soviet T-SOUpremium tank on 9 May 1990, the T-64B1 was the only postWorld War Two premium tank to ever take part in that welldocumented annual parade. Sources have identified theT-64B1 as a version of the T-64B (detailed below) that isnot fitted with the guidance equipment for the KOBRA (AT-8)

guided missile system. The equipment in questionconsists of a small box housing the AT-8 Antitank GuidedMissile (ATGM) guidance hardware which would be mounted onthe right side of the turret roof in front of the tankcommander's position. In place of this box, an L-shapedrail is fitted that may permit the mounting of the missileequipment if required. The T-64B1 is fitted with an LRF


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although the optical rangefinder ear has been eliminatedcompletely. The T-64B1 was also the first T-64 variantphotographed to be modified for the application of reactivearmor. When elements of the 141st Tank Regiment, 13thGuards Tank Division, were photographed leaving Hungary aspart of the reduction of Soviet forces in the Southern Groupof Forces (SGF), T-64Bls were seen with the reactive armorfitted to the tanks. The significance of this modification,and of reactive armor in general, will be detailed below.

MISSILE-FIRING T-64

The T-64B, at figure 4 is the next variant in theseries and has also been produced in large numbers. TheT-64B, as mentioned above, also has the capability to firethe radio-frequency (RF) guided AT-8 NATO codenameSongster ATGM. The Soviets apparently refer to this

missile as the KOBRA. The AT-8 is a two-piece missile thatis carried in the tank just like the conventional 125mmammunition. When the missile is loaded by the automaticloader, the two sections are joined in the cannon's breachand then fired. Since the appearance of the T-64B, thespecific details concerning the AT-8 have been a well keptsecret. The unification of Germany and the demise of theformer East German Nationale Volksarmee (NVA), however, hasproven to be an unprecedented source of information


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Initial contiguration 19 85 )

Current conflguratlon 198 8)

Figur e 4-T-64B with React ive ArmorSourc e: Armor /Anti armor Briefin , TTC 9894 5


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concerning Soviet weapons to include tank main gun-launchedATGMS

The former NVA operated a number of tanks known asthe T-55AM2B MBT that is a heavily modified version of thewell known original Soviet T-55 MBT. According touternational Defense Review, these greatly improved tanksare capable of firing the lOOmm laser guided 9M117 ATGM.Although a more modern missile than the T-64B s AT-8, the9M117 can provide some details concerning this type ofweapon. Upon firing, the 9M117 is launched from the barrelby an ejection charge and the missile s control fins areunfolded. The sustainer motor then burns for approximatelysix seconds and drives the missile to its target. Inflight, the missile follows a modulated laser beam that thefiring tank directs and zooms on to the target. The tank sgunner is only required to keep his sight on the targetuntil the missile impacts. The maximum range of the missileis 4,000 meters, with a maximum flight time of approximately12 seconds. While the capabilities of this missile andthe T-55AM2B that fires it may be debatable to someobservers, it is apparently not to the German Army. Unlikethe bulk of the former NVA T-55s inherited by theBundeswehr, which have already been scrapped, themissile-firing T-55AM2Bs have been put into storage at leastfor the time being.


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The missile-firing T-64B has been criticized foremploying a sophisticated weapon system whose HEAT warheadis too small to successfully penetrate the advanced frontalarmor of modern NATO MBTs. What these critics are failingto see is the primary mission of the missile-armed tank.Using its very powerful conventional kinetic energy armorpiercing ammunition against those same NATO MBTs, the crewof the Soviet missile-armed tank would reserve it s missilesto engage and destroy NATO ATGM delivery systems. Whilethere is a secondary capability to engage tanks like the M1Abrams and the Leopard 2 from the flank or rear, themissile s primary targets are the M2 Infantry FightingVehicle (IFV), the M901 Improved TOW Vehicle (ITV), and theAH-64 Apache and AH-1 Cobra Attack Helicopters. Theelimination of these ATGM systems from a distance beyond themaximum effective range of deployed NATO MBTs, is acapability the Soviets have been searching for since thefirst development of the ATGM. With the exception of themissile capability, the T-64B is very similar to theM1981/1; and with both tanks fitted with reactive armor theyare very hard to tell apart. Finally, the T-64B is the lastand most modern variant of the T-64 to be fielded.

The seventh and last member of the T-64 series isthe T-64K command variant. This model is identified by thepresence of an additional radio antenna-base mounted infront of the commander s position, the lack of an

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antiaircraft machinegun at the commander s position, and anadditional storage tube for the new antenna mast fitted tothe turret bustle box. When the ten meter tall antenna mastis mounted on the turret roof, the tank is immobilized bythe mast support cables required to hold it in place. TheT-64K is normally used by both battalion and regimentalcommanders and will not be found below battalion level.Apparently, the T-64K is solely based upon the T-64A sincethis variant has been seen with both T-64B1 and T-64Bequipped units.

IMPROVED FIREPOWER

The T-64 is fitted with the 2A46 D-81TM Rapira-3125mm main gun. It was the largest main gun mounted on anytank in the world, and its destructive power is impressive.After its original use on the T-64 the 125mm main gun wasalso used on the T-72 series and T-80 series tanks. Thereare, however, some reports of dispersion problems with thegun s ammunition. These problems were probably caused bypoor quality control of the production of the initialbatches of ammunition. The gun s maximum effective range issomewhere between 1500 and 2,000 meters. For engagementsbeyond this range, the T-64B can fire the AT-8 ATOMinterchangeably with the conventional High Velocity, ArmorPiercing, Fin Stabilized, Discarding Sabot (HVAPFSDS), HighExplosive, Antitank, Fin Stabilized (HEAT-FS), and

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Fragmentation, High Explosive (FRAG-HE) ammunition. The gunis fed by a Korzina (basket) autoloader that allows thevehicle crew to be reduced to three men, and enables thetank to fire six to eight rounds per minute. Since theIran-Iraq War and Operation Desert Storm, a drawback of thismain gun has been identified. According to the Iraqis, the125mm main gun has a barrel-life of only about 120 rounds.The secondary armament of the T-64 consists of a coaxial7.62mm PKT machinegun and a 12.7mm NSVT antiaircraftmachinegun. The T-64 series and the singular T-SOU are theonly Soviet tanks that can fire their commander's NSVTmachineguns while the tank is fully buttoned-up.

Another dramatic change in the T-64 was a modernfire control system, based upon the TPD-2 coincidencerangefinder. It gave the T-64 a long range capability thatpreviously had been reserved for Soviet heavy tanks. It isvery likely that the deployment of a tank with thecapabilities of the T-64 convinced the Soviets that thehighly regarded heavy tanks were no longer required.Accurate, long range fire could now be provided by a premiumtank. As mentioned above, this capability evolved stillfurther as the T-64 was fitted with a laser rangefinder.


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INNOVATIVE ARMOR PROTECTION

Any examination of the T-64 will uncover the mostcontroversy in the subject of armor protection. The Soviet~rmy s reoccupation with ATGM development and deployment bythe NATO armies was well known and well founded. This keeninterest was initially based upon the demonstratedcapabilities of weapons carrying HEAT warheads. ATGMs werebeing deployed that had the power to penetrate the thickestarmor carried by any tank in the world. The Sovietsrealized that something had to be done to counter thisincreasing NATO capability. Although the Soviets had beenworking on new and innovative steel-ceramic composite armorsince 1940 it was not until 1967 that this new armor madeits appearance. The T-64 was the first tank in the world tobe fielded fitted with multi-layer laminate and compositearmor.

Composite armor is basically a type of armor plateincorporating different materials in its design. The theorywas that by combining both metallic and non-metallicmaterials, the armor presented multiple and varyingmaterials for an incoming round to penetrate. The intent ofthis new armor was to maximize the protection providedagainst HEAT warheads, while at least maintaining the samelevel of protection provided by conventional steel armoragainst other types of weapons. Tank turrets were cast

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incorporating an internal cavity on both sides of the maingun at the turret front. These cavities could then befilled with a ceramic material to create the desiredmetallic/non-metallic combination. When production of theturret was completed, the sealed cavities in the frontalarmor were not visible to any external examination. From adistance, the T-64's composite armored turret appearedbasically the same as the standard all steel cast turretsused on earlier MBTs. According to Soviet Military Power1986 he latest models of Soviet tanks (to include theT-64) were fitted with improved armor incorporatinglaminates and composites.

While the exact design and type of ceramic materialsused in the T-64's armor is classified, the defense relatedpress has published enough unclassified information to makea discussion of the armor possible. Several sources agreethat, in order to limit the tank's weight originally to 8tons, the inherently heavy composite armor was limited tothe front of the turret. The use of a cast turret design asexplained above, opposed to the slab-sided weldedconstruction of more modern composite armor equipped tanks,does not in any way rule out the use of composite armor.According to Weaoons and Tactics of the Soviet Armv: FullyRevised Edition, the turret is reported to be cast with afrontal cavity that could accommodate a variety of fills,most probably alternating layers of ceramic or other


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5material with steel. In 1985, the Japanese magazinealso published a drawing of a sectioned view of a

modern Soviet tank turret. The drawing included largesquares or boxes (not to be confused with reactive armor)placed inside the turret frontal armor on either side of themain gun. It is interesting to note that the shape of theturret fronts of the different variants of the T-64 hasundergone a subtle reshaping and redesign since the tank wasoriginally fielded. It seems very likely that as the T-64evolved, the tank's original turret composite armor wasincreased and modified to counter more powerful threats.

The U.S. Army had also experimented with compositearmor during the same period with the T-95 premium tankproject from 1955 to 1960. These U.S. tests, however, werenot considered sufficiently successful to warrant theapplication of composite armor in an American tank. Whilethe validity of this decision is debateable, and will beexamined in Chapter Four, it basically ensured that Americantanks would carry less effective armor protection than theirpotential opponents until the fielding of the M1 Abrams in1981.

As far as the T-64's glacis armor is concerned, allavailable sources agree that it consists of some kind oflaminate armor. Like the composite armor used to protectthe turret, the laminate armor used on the glacis is a

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combination of metallic and non-metallic materials. Thedifference with laminate armor is that the materials usedare in the form of different layers set up like a sandwich.Since the hull of the tank is made up of welded armorplates, the Soviets were able to simply lay one layer of agiven material on top of the other until the desired levelof protection was reached. Once the design was set, thesealternating layers were bonded together to form the laminatearmor glacis. The concept was very similar to that usedwith automobile windshield safety-glass. Safety-glassconsists of a laminate with an inner and outer layer ofglass and a middle layer of plastic. This combination ofmaterials is not only strong and shatter-resistant, it alsoconfines the damage caused by a significant impact to a verylimited area. That was the basic intent of Soviet laminatearmor. Like its historic predecessor the T-34, the glacisof the T-64 was also very well sloped and forced themajority of enemy antitank rounds to glance off the armor.

According to Soviet Tanks and Combat Vehicles. 1946to the Present, the hull glacis plate incorporated a layerof ceramic armor beneath the initial layer of conventionalsteel armor. International Defense Review alsopublished a copyrighted drawing of a sectioned view of theSoviet T-80 and T-64B glacis armor in February 1987 Thisdrawing clearly shows the laminate armor to consist of anouter layer of steel, a middle layer of glass-fiber, and an

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inner of layer of steel. The actual thickness of thiscomposite armor array is given as 200mrn. The T-64 s glacisarmor, like the frontal armor of the turret, has gonethrough some subtle changes over the years. Most likely theoriginal base laminate armor has been upgraded to increasethe protection level against improving threats.

IRAQI USE OF LAMINATE ARMOR

Finally, conclusive information concerning Sovietlaminate armor has become available since Operation DesertStorm. Photographs of knocked-out Iraqi T-72M1 MBTs clearlyshow their front-slope armor to consist of a five-layerarmor array with two outer layers of steel, two middlelayers of non-metallic material, and a single inner layer ofsteel. Although the armor fitted to the T-64 is certainlymore advanced than that carried by the T-72M1, thephotographs do confirm the design of at least one type ofSoviet laminate armor, as well as the quality of the tankarmor they are willing to provide to their allies.

APPLIQUE ARMOR PROGRAM

The T-64 was also included in a four phase appliquearmor program that was intended to increase the level ofprotection provided to tanks already in the field. To date,four different types of applique armor have been identified,

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although only three have appeared on the T-64. The firstphase of this program involved the fitting of a multiplepiece nonmetallic armor blanket to the turret roof, turretrear, and hull decking above the driver's position. Thearmor blanket appears to be approximately 35-50mm thick andsimilar in design to material used in body armor. Theintent of this armor was clearly to provide additionalprotection against the increasing capabilities of Westerntop-attack and smart antitank munitions. The next phase inthis program involved the addition of a conventional steelface-plate to the tank's original glacis armor. These

face-plates, also seen mounted on T-80 premium tanks andT-72M1 MBTs, add an additional 30-40mm thick layer of armorto the tank's front slope. This new applique armor can beidentified by its shape since it had to be cut to fit overand around the tank's tow hooks and mineplow attachmentpoints. The resulting cookie cut-out holes and requiredadditional welding are clearly visible.

SOVIET REACTIVE ARMOR

The third phase of the applique armor program thatinvolved the T-64, as well as the T-80 and eventually theT-72 and T-55, was the employment of reactive armor, atfigure 5. First identified mounted on Israeli tanks takingpart in Operation Peace for Galilee in June 1982, reactivearmor would prove to be a huge problem for NATO forces.


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Soviet reactive armor, first seen mounted on the T-64B in1984, was originally only associated with Soviet premiumtanks. It is likely that initially the missile-firingpremium tanks were fitted with reactive armor to give thosetanks additional protection since they were required toremain stationary while guiding the AT-8 ATGM to itstarget. As the numbers of T-64B and T-80 premium tanksincreased in what was then East Germany, the number ofreactive armor equipped tanks facing NATO also increased.Suddenly, the NATO armies were confronted by a new armorsystem that threatened the effectiveness of a keyconventional weapon in their arsenals, the ATGM. Accordingto Jane's Defence Weekly, if the Soviets are fittingreactive armor to tanks already fitted with laminate armor,then they could well have complete protection against ATGMson which NATO relies for much of its antitank defensive7capabi y

Soviet reactive armor, probably developed during the1970s, consists of a large number of metal boxes mounted tothe turret front, turret roof, front slope, and hullskirting of each tank. The boxes are attached via two studsor mounting points that are welded on to the tank's mainarmor. Each box, either a wedge shaped or flat rectangle,contains a layer of explosive and a steel flying plate.The reactive armor explosive is detonated by the impact ofan incoming HEAT warhead. The resulting explosion forces


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the flying plate out of the box and into the direction ofthe attacking warhead. The molten jet that HEAT warheadsuse to burn through armor plate is then malformed anddefeated by the flying plate. The key limitation toreactive armor is that it is designed to defeat unitaryshaped-charge HEAT or ATGM warheads. Therefore, ascurrently configured on the T-64 and T-80 Base Model premiumtanks, its capabilities represent no threat to theperformance of kinetic energy armor piercing ammunition.

To date, the T-64B has been seen fitted with one oftwo different reactive armor configurations; the initialconfiguration in 1985, and the current configuration in

81988 The current configuration brings the T-64B on linewith the. reac tive armor fitting used on the T-80. With theemployment of reactive armor on tanks already carryingcomposite and laminate armor, the Soviets may have been ableto achieve nearly the same level of protection as the moremodern and complex Chobham type armor more recently adoptedin the West. The significance of the deployment of reactivearmor can easily be measured by the massive reaction itcaused in the armies of NATO. NATO forces realized thatthey suddenly were opposed by tanks that carried frontalarmor that was beyond the capabilities of their huge fieldedinventories of ATGMs. Crash programs were started toimprove existing systems and develop new ones to counterreactive armor. New ATGMs like the TOW-2A, HOT-2T, and

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MILAN-2T were developed and rushed to the field for the solepurpose of defeating tanks fitted with reactive armor. Theimpact caused by the introduction of premium tanks equippedwith reactive armor changed the face of the armor-antiarmorbattle. The three phases of the applique armor program thatinvolved the T-64 gave that now aging premium tank thelongevity and improved capabilities it needed to staycompetitive with the most recently fielded MBTs in NATO.

INNOVATIVE ENGINE

Like the vastly improved firepower and innovativearmor discussed above, the T-64 s engine was also trulyinnovative. The STDF flat, five-cylinder, horizontallyopposed, 750-hp diesel engine has been the subject of heatedspeculation since the tank went into production 26 yearsago. There have been reports that this engine, and itsassociated transmission, were plagued by problems andsubject to frequent breakdowns. These problems werereported to be so severe that the T-64 s initial deployment,with the 100th Guards and the 41st Guards, was dictated bythe units proximity to the T-64 tank plant at Kharkov.These problems, like the other reported deficiencies, mostlikely refer to the Base Model of the tank and have beenexaggerated over the years. However serious thoseautomotive problems actually were, they were not severeenough to stop the production and forward deployment of the


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T-64. If the tank s performance was not up to the standardsset for it and its stablemates, the BMP-1 and BMP-2 IFVs, itsurely would not have been allowed to proceed. The Sovietswere apparently satisfied with the combination of this newengine and new suspension system, which incorporated bothtrack support rollers and small stamped road wheels.

The T-64 was first seen in the West when it wasdeployed to the Group of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG), nowknown as the Western Group of Forces (WGF), in 1976. NATO ssurprise at the appearance of this very innovative tank wasamplified by the fact that it was already 11 years old. Asstated above, the reaction the T-64 caused in the NATOforces was massive. Suddenly, NATO tank crews faced aSoviet tank which, in spite of some well publicizedshortcomings, was better than anything NATO had to offer atthe time. This 26 year old tank, still mistakenly referredto as a failure by some sources, remains dangerous enough tohelp drive the U.S. Army s current push for new and moreeffective antiarmor weapon systems.

CONCLUSION

The historic appearance of the Russian T-34 premiumtank in World War Two seems to mark only the first exampleof the Soviet Army surprising its enemies with a new andvery innovative tank. This capability was demonstrated a

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second time with the fielding of the T-64. Had the T-64gone into battle against the NATO MBTs of the 1960s and1970s it would have certainly proven its superiority.Although the fielding of the T-64 was directed against onlythe potential enemies of the Soviet Army its impact isstill being felt today. If we are surprised again as theGermans were with the T-34 and the NATO armies were withthe T-64 a future adversary may achieve a criticaladvantage and force the U.S. Army into a third and decisivecrisis in tank and antitank warfare.


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END NOTESCHAPTER THREE

1Steven J. Zaloga and James W. Loop, Soviet Tanks andCombat Vehicles 1946 to the Present (Dorset: Arms andArmour Press. 1987), 61.Major James M. Warford, T-80: The Soviet Solution,ARMOR, January-February 1987, 32.3 The T-80 Tank Unveiled, Jane's Defence Weekly, 3May 1986, 803.

4Michael Jerchel, Missile-firing T-55 AM2B too Goodfor Scrapping?, International Defense Review, June 1991,635.David C. Isby, Weapons and Tactics of the SovietArmv, Fullv Revised Edition (London: Jane's PublishingCompany, 1988). 149.6Steven J. Zaloga and James W. Loop, Soviet Tanks andcombat Vehicles 1946 to the Present (Dorset: Arms andArmour Press, 1987), 61.Major James M. Warford, Reactive Armor: New Lifefor Soviet Tanks, ARMOR, January-February 1988, 11.8Presentation on Worldwide Developments in

Armor/Antiarmor, given by Steven J. Zaloga on 7-8 December1989, sponsored by the Technology Training Corporation,Washington D.C.9David C Isby, Weapons and Tactics of the SovietArmv, Fully Revised Edition (London: Jane's PublishingCompany, 19881, 140.


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CHAPTER FOUR

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

The evolution of the premium tank from the T-34 tothe most recently developed T-80U, includes severaldistinctive elements. While one of these elements was not apart of the Soviet experience, the others were critical tothe Soviet premium tank s successful past and provide someinsight into what may lie ahead for premium tanks in thefuture. These key elements are focused around the roleplayed by the Soviet heavy tank, the significant Sovietability to keep new weapons secret, the American T-95premium tank project, and the growing exports ofincreasingly capable MBTs.

POST-WAR SOVIET HEAVY TANKS

On 7 September 1945 the Victory in the Pacificparade was held in Berlin. Of all the units and vehiclestaking part in this well publicized event, the mostsignificant were the heavy tank units of the 2nd Guards Army


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and their new IS-3 heavy tanks. This was the first timethat these surprising new tanks were shown to the public.Nicknamed the Shchuka or Pike because of its sharplypointed front slope and bow, this heavy tank sent a shockwave through the tank design agencies in the West. Inappearance, the IS-3 was as revolutionary as the T-34, andits excellent ballistic shape and powerful 122mm main gunwould have a profound effect upon United States tank1development during the post war years.

The 15-3 heavy tank reached the front as the war wascoming to a close, and therefore saw only limited combatduring the battle of Berlin. The IS-3 and the improved IS-4heavy tank went into production in late 1944. The IS-4 wasfitted with a larger and more powerful engine than the IS-3,and required the use of a longer hull employing seven roadwheels per side instead of the six on the IS-3. This newengine also allowed more armor to be added to the hull sidesof the IS-4. The IS-3 Base Model was followed by animproved variant known as the IS-3M, at figure 6 whichincorporated a new engine and other mechanical improvementsinto the original design. These Soviet heavy tanks, theproducts of the Ya. Kotin and L. Dukhov design bureau, wereproduced in relatively small numbers with a total production2of approximately 350 IS-3s and 250 IS-4s.


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t

IS-3M HEA W TANK

IS-4 HEAW TANK

T-10 IS-8) HEAVY TANK


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IMPACT OF THE HEAVY TANKS

The revolutionary design and advanced capabilitiesof the IS-3 IS-3M and IS-4 heavy tanks combined with thesignificant reaction they caused in the West confirm theirposition as premium tanks. While not as dramatic as thereaction forced upon the Germans by the T-34 the U.S. Armyfound itself in a similar position at the outbreak of theKorean War in June 1950. The U.S. Army quickly realizedthat the North Korean employment of Soviet T-34/85 premiumtanks posed a serious problem. This problem however wasonly part of what had the potential to be a disaster. TheU.S. Army was suddenly faced with a combat situation thatcould include the employment of the IS-3 IS-3M or IS-4heavy tanks in Korea. The American Army had no tanks in itsinventory that were capable of successfully taking on theSoviet heavies. The U S was forced to scramble to put thestill developmental 60 ton T43 heavy tank into limitedproduction in December 1950. This new American heavy tankhowever was not ready for combat and was not standardizedas the 120mm gun combat tank M103 until 26 April 1956. Hadthe Korean War included the use of the post-war Soviet heavytanks the American forces would have been faced by enemytanks that were clearly superior to their own.


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POST-WAR HEAVY TANKS IN COMBAT

Although Soviet heavy tanks have been seen on manyoccasions including the invasion of Czechoslovakia inAugust 1968 the only known combat employment of these tankssince World War Two was during the Six Day War in 1967. Aspart of the Egyptian 7th Infantry Division at Rafah and the125th Tank Brigade of the 6th Mechanized Division atKuntilla the Egyptian Army deployed Soviet IS-3Ms againstthe Israelis. The much more modern Israeli M48 andCenturion MBTs had little difficulty in destroying the oldheavy tanks. During the fighting Egypt lost a total of 73IS-3Ms either destroyed or captured by the Israeli Army. Inspite of these losses it was reported that the EgyptianArmy still had one regiment of the IS-3Ms in service in31973.

THE LAST SOVIET HEAVY TANK

With the development and fielding of the IS-4complete the Kotin and Dukhov design bureau started toconcentrate on new heavy tank designs. A series of heavytank projects was studied with designations ranging fromIS-5 through IS-7. The IS-7 heavy tank designed by the NShashmurin design group was intended to be a tank of thefuture. The IS-7 mounted a specially designedsemi-automatically loaded 1 3 0 m main gun and five large

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caliber machine guns. The tank weighed 60 tons and waspowered by a 1000 hp diesel engine which gave it a maximumspeed of 60 kph. According to the tank s designer, theIS-7 s weight was considered to be excessive; and as aresult, the IS-7 was heavily modified to yield the T-10heavy tank in 1950. While some sources state that this newheavy tank was fielded with Soviet units in 1953, it was notuntil the 7 November 1957 Moscow parade that the T-10 wasfinally shown to the public. Apparently the T-lo s originaldesignation of IS-8 was changed after Stalin s death as partof Khrushchev s de-Stalinization program.

The T-10, at figure 6 was fitted with an improved122mm main gun which had a maximum effective range ofapproximately 1200 meters. The gun fired two differenttypes of two-piece antitank ammunition; Armor Piercing HighExplosive (APHE), and non-rotating fin stabilized HighExplosive Antitank (HEAT). The secondary armament consistedof two 12.7mm DShK machine guns; one mounted at the loader sposition and one mounted coaxially to the right of the maingun. The T-10 was powered by a V-2-1s (V2K) V-12 700 hpwater cooled diesel engine, which gave the 50 ton tank amaximum speed of 42 kph. The armor protection fitted to theT-10 was one of its strongest characteristics. While thefirst use of composite and laminate armor was still severalyears away, the conventional armor plate carried by the T-10was still very impressive. The turret frontal armor was

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250mm thick at the mantlet, and the front slope or glacisarmor varied from 230mm at the tank s center line to 120mmnear the hull sides. Several open sources credit the T-10as having the thickest conventional armor of any tank of itstime.

During the 1954-1962 time frame, an improved variantof the T-10 was produced known as the T-1OM heavy tank. The52 ton T-lOM, which was probably issued to Soviet units in1957, incorporated several improvements over the T-10. The12.7mm DShK machine guns were replaced by the more capable14.5mm KPV and KPVT heavy machine guns, and the 122mm maingun was fitted with a multi-baffle muzzle brake. The T-1OMwas also equipped with full stabilization for the main gunto allow for more accurate fire while on the move, and fullactive infrared night fighting equipment. Finally, theT-1OM was also equipped with a Nuclear, Biolog

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