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Presentation to ACSAC 2009 Cyber Security and Information Assurance R&D Federal Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD) Program Tomas Vagoun Technical Coordinator [email protected]

Presentation to ACSAC 2009 Federal Networking and ...Federal Networking and Information Technology Research and Development ... access control rule analysis, ... Secure System Engineering

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Presentation to ACSAC 2009

Cyber Security and Information Assurance R&D

Federal Networking and Information Technology Research and Development (NITRD)

Program

Tomas Vagoun

Technical Coordinator

[email protected]

2

NITRD Program

Definition The NITRD Program is the primary mechanism by which the U.S. Government

coordinates its unclassified networking and information technology (IT) research and development (R&D) investments.

Legislation

The High-Performance Computing Act of 1991 (Public Law 102-194) as amended by:

Next Generation Internet Research Act of 1998 (P.L. 105-305) and the

America COMPETES Act of 2007 (P.L 110-69)

Objectives Serve as the Federal focal point for interagency technical planning, budget planning,

and coordination for the Federal NITRD Program

Serve as a source of timely, high-quality, technically accurate, in-depth information on accomplishments, new directions, and critical challenges for the NITRD Program

Support NITRD-related policy making in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP)

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13 Member Agencies – N/IT R&D Budget ~ $4B

Agency for Health Research QualityNational Institutes of Health

National Oceanic and

Atmospheric Administration

DOE/Office of Science

Defense Advanced Research

Projects Agency

DOE/National Nuclear

Security Administration

National Institute of Standards

and Technology

National Science Foundation

National Archives and

Records Administration

Department of Defense

National Security Agency

National Aeronautics and

Space Administration

Environmental Protection Agency

4

Selected NITRD Agency Budgets in Cyber Security and Information Assurance (CSIA) R&D

Selected NITRD Agencies

Cyber Security and Information Assurance R&D

FY 2010 Budget Request (Unclassified)

DARPA $143.6M

OSD and DOD Service research organizations

$70.0M

NSF $67.4M

NSA $32.2M

NIST $29.3M

Source: “NITRD Supplement to the President’s FY 2010 Budget,”

http://www.nitrd.gov/Pubs/2010supplement/FY10Supp-FINALFormat-Web.pdf

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NSF: Many Topics Funded by Trustworthy Computing Program

Cryptography: provable security, key management, lightweight cryptographic systems, conditional and revocable anonymity, improved hash functions

Formal methods: access control rule analysis, analysis of policy, verification of composable systems, lightweight analysis, on-line program disassembly

Formal models: access control, artificial diversity and obfuscation, deception

Defense against large scale attacks: worms, distributed denial of service, phishing, spam, adware, spyware, stepping stone and botnets

Applications: critical infrastructures, health records, voice over IP, geospatial databases, sensor networks, digital media, e-voting, federated systems

Privacy: models, privacy-preserving data-mining, location privacy, RFID networks

Hardware enhancements for security: virtualization, encryption of data in memory, high performance IDS, TPM

Network defense: trace-back, forensics, intrusion detection and response, honeynets

Wireless & Sensor networks: security, privacy, pervasive computing New challenges: spam in VoIP, “Google-like” everywhere,

virtualization, quantum computing, service oriented architecture Metrics: Comparing systems wrt security, risk-based measurement Testbeds and Testing Methodology: DETER, WAIL, Orbit and GENI,

scalable experiments, sanitized data

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NSF Strategic Priorities in CSIA

Foundations: models, logics, algorithms, and theories for analyzing and reasoning about all aspects of trustworthiness

Usability: make security accessible for system developers, system administrators, programmers, evaluators, and home users

Privacy: scientific methodologies and technologies to reason about privacy policies, and to explore the interplay among privacy, security and legal policies

Security Architecture: security architectures to obtain trustworthy systems

Evaluation: metrics comparing systems with respect to security/privacy/usability, risk-based measurements; testbeds and testing methodologies, data to support testing

Slide 6

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NSF: Major Supported Centers

TRUST: Team for Research in Ubiquitous Secure Technology Create new technologies and perhaps even new social institutions to build

inherently secure computer software and networks 5-year, $20M award to UC Berkeley (prime), Carnegie Mellon University, Mills

College, San Jose State U, Smith College, Stanford U and Vanderbilt U

ACCURATE: A Center for Correct, Usable, Reliable, Auditable, & Transparent Elections Improving the reliability and trustworthiness of voting technology through new

architectures, tamper-resistant hardware, crypto-graphic protocols 5-year, $7.5M award to Johns Hopkins U (prime), Rice U, Stanford U, Berkeley

U, University of Iowa, and SRI International

CCIED: Collaborative Center for Internet Epidemiology and Defenses Analyzing the behavior and limitations of Internet pathogens (e.g., worms,

viruses), reverse-engineering of worms, developing early-warning and forensic capabilities, and defending against new outbreaks in real-time

FY04 5-year, $7.5 award to UC San Diego and UC Berkeley, International Computer Science Institute

TCIP: Trustworthy Cyber Infrastructure for Power Address technical challenges motivated by power grid problems 5-year, $7.5M award, University of Illinois, Dartmouth College, Cornell

University, Washington State

SAFE: Usable Security 5-year, $7.5M award CMU

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NSF: Science of Security

Are there powerful models (like Shannon’s binary symmetric channel) so that realistic security and privacy properties can be computed?

Is there a theory that enables secure systems to be composed from insecure components

Metrics: Is there a theory such that systems can be ordered with respect to their security or privacy?

Can entire systems (hosts, networks) and their “defenses” be formally verified with respect to realistic security objectives and threats?

Are there security-related hypotheses that can be validated experimentally?

What kind of an instrument (testbed) is needed to validate such hypotheses?

NSF/IARPA/NSA organized a workshop on SOS, Nov. 2008

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NIST CSIA Priorities

SHA-3 Hash Competition Problem: Hash collisions found for MD5; SHA-1 vulnerable; design

similarity in SHA-2 causes concerns

Internet Infrastructure Protection – Routing, Naming and Addressing Problem: DNS, BGP and IP components of the Internet’s

infrastructure are trivially vulnerable to focused attacks Goal: New trust infrastructures are required to enable secure and

robust routing, naming and addressing

Policy Machine Problem: Access control mechanisms are implemented differently

and only implement and enforce simple policies. Cannot interoperate over varied platforms and applications.

Goal: One mechanism capable of comprehensively expressing and enforcing any policy over all resources (e.g., files, work items, messages and attachments, clipboard)

Standardizing Metrology for Information Security Problem: Lack of understanding as to which security measures and

metrics are most relevant for determining security posture and making decisions; lack of understanding as to how to analyze measures and combine them into higher-level metrics

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NSA Priorities

Trusted Computing High assurance security architectures enabled by virtualization Improved enterprise protection through strong software

measurement and reporting

Mobility Secure enterprise infrastructure required for secure mobility Improved physical protection of mobile assets Location sensitive access control Cost-effective protection of air interface

Anomaly Detection Integrating data from different sensors (host, LAN, gateway) Non-signature based detection

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IARPA Cyber Security Interests

Circuit Analysis Tools (CAT) Program Tools that are necessary for circuit analysis at future technology

nodes, specifically, the 22 nm node and beyond

Securely Taking On New Executable Stuff of Uncertain Provenance (STONESOUP) Program Technologies that provides comprehensive, automated techniques

that allow end users to safely execute new software of uncertain provenance

Multi-qubit Coherent Operations Program Exploring the performance of multi-qubit systems; maintain and

improve the control over quantum operations in a more complex and noisier environment

Information Assurance Research Private Information Retrieval (PIR): query a database without

revealing the query or the answer to the (cooperative) database owner

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OSD/DDR&E CSIA Strategic Priorities

Harden key components for cyber conflict defense Assure missions despite adverse cyber effects Disrupt adversaries’ attack planning and execution

Slide 12

DoD Information Assurance/Cyber Security (IA/CS) S&T

Roadmap Study identified strategic focus areas

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AFRL: Cyber Defense Challenges

•Metrics / Tradespace•Containment Technology•Mission / Infrastructure Dependencies•Self Regeneration•Composability•Synthetic Diversity•Acquired Immunity

Avoid Threats•Polymorphic Systems / Agility•Selective Interoperability•Domain Design for Mission

Assurance•Early Warning / Anticipation•Attribution / Geolocation•Deception

Survive & Recover from Attacks

•Cooperative Agents•Timely & Effective Engagement•Formal Approaches to Policy, Intent, RoE•Fratricide Prevention / IFF•Rapid / Live Forensics•Response Action (Offensive Defense)

Defeat Threats

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AFRL: CSIA Interest Areas

Polymorphism: code, network, etc. Selective interoperability for threat avoidance Fight through / survival in a contested environment Mission assurance & understanding mission dependency on

cyber Methods for posturing offensive technologies to protect

blue assets and missions Cyber signal processing, novel observables & HPC

applications

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ARMY: CERDEC IA Thrust Areas

Technology Focus AreasComputer Network OperationsCross Domain SecurityCognitive NetworkingSoftware AssuranceIdentity Protection and Access

ManagementEncryption

IA Goals

Defend Against Attacks

Predict/Detect Attacks

Real Time Damage Assessment

Active Response/Deception

“Morph” the playing field

Suitable Security Metrics

Protect Information and Maintain acceptable level of Mission effectiveness

Protect Detect Assess Respond

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Navy Strategic Priorities in CSIA

Vision Develop the fundamental principles, processes, tools and techniques to

protect and defend information in cyberspace with assurance

Foundations Fundamental properties of algorithms, software, processes, and design Quantum Information sciences for secure computing and communications Cognitive, social, and behavioral aspects influencing interactions in cyber

Security Architecture Research for Host, Network, and Application Trust management in enterprise services Mitigation of the Botnet threat Assurances for cyber-physical systems Anti-tamper hardware (and software) Wireless security & networks at the edge High assurance in hypervisors and network virtualizations

Advanced Technology Demonstration Computer network defense Secure distributed collaboration Security management infrastructure and assured information sharing Secure dynamic tactical communications networks

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Food For Thought: R&D Framework For Secure Cyberspace

Transparency Acuity Agility

Safety Extensibility

Robust Attribution

Authentication

Automatic Security Policy Compilation and Verification

Risk Adaptive Access Control

Understand the Value of Information and System Components

Low Latency Analytics

Analysis of Streaming Data

Smart/Hardened Data

Detection/Mitigation of Insider Threat

Modeling Complex Systems

Control of Heterogeneous Systems with Non-linear Dynamics

Smart Sensors

Management and Command and Control of Distributed Sensors

Operating Center Virtual Environment

Resilient Systems

Trustworthy Platforms in Untrustworthy Environments

Trustworthy Information Flow

Advanced Cryptography

Usability

Self-Protecting, Self-Healing Data, Information, Hardware, and Software

Composition

Secure System Engineering

Social Engineering

Enablers

Metrics

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Tomas Vagoun, PhDTechnical Coordinator

National Coordination Office for Networking and Information Technology Research and DevelopmentSuite II-405, 4201 Wilson Blvd.Arlington, VA 22230

Tel: (703) 292-4873

[email protected]

Credits: information presented has been excerpted from materials provided by representatives from NITRD member agencies