Presented at presented at - International Energy Forum · 2017-11-16 · 2017 edition Presented at presented at 1 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Riyadh, 15 November

WOO2017

OPECWorld Oil Outlook 2040

2017 editionPresented at

presented at

1

Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

Riyadh, 15 November 2017

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Excellency, Secretary General of OPEC, Ladies and gentlemen, Good afternoon and welcome to Secretariat and to the Launch of OPEC’s World Oil Outlook (WOO)

2© 2017 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

Disclaimer

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2

Presenter

Presentation Notes

© 2017 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries WOO2017

OPEC’s WOO 2017

● Presents global energy mix outlook to 2040

● It includes detailed projections for oil demand,supply, refining and trade

● The WOO combines the expertise of the OPECSecretariat experts, professionals as well as inputfrom various other sources.

● The WOO is a renowned and key source ofenergy information for policymakers, NOCs andIOCs, as well as all other energy stakeholders

3

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Before I delve into the presentation, I will mention few words about our flagship publication, the World Oil Outlook (WOO): As you know, the WOO is an annual publication by the OPEC Secretariat, offering medium-long term outlook (including Global Energy Mix & Detailed projections for oil demand, supply, refining and trade). It is important to mention that the WOO combines the expertise of many dedicated experts here at the Secretariat, professional from our Member Countries as well as valuable learnings gathered through dialogues and engagements with various entities. Indeed, OPEC’s WOO is a renowned and key source of energy information for policymakers, NOCs and IOCs, as well as ALL other energy stakeholders.


Outline

● Key assumptions

● Energy outlook

● Oil outlook

● Critical uncertainties

● Key takeaways

4

Presenter

Presentation Notes

In this presentation, I will first state some key assumptions for the reference case. Then, I will share with you the energy outlook demand by fuel type and by region. This will be followed by a deeper dive into the oil outlook (both Supply & Demand). Since the projections for these sections are related to the reference case, critical uncertainties and sensitivities will also be presented. I will conclude with key takeaways.


Outline

● Key assumptions

● Energy outlook

● Oil outlook


● Key takeaways

5

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Clearly, global energy markets, oil in specific, will be driven by number of factors: The critical one include: population growth & changing demographics, economic growth, policy changes & technology advancements.


The World is experiencing an era of demographic change

● Global population to increase by 1.8 billion, reaching almost 9.2 billion in 2040

● India to become the most populated country in the early 2020s and population in China peaks in 2028

● Population growth in OECD supported by migration

Population by region (millions)

6

Growth 2015–2040 %

OECD 116 6Non-OECD 1,692 94World 1,808 100

0.0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1.0

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8

2.0

0

1,000

2,000

3,000

4,000

5,000

6,000

7,000

8,000

9,000

10,000

2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040

%millionNon-OECD OECDOECD annual growth Non-OECD annual growth

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Starting with the population, The global population is estimated to increase from 7.3 billion in 2015 to 9.2 billion in 2040. The additional 1.8 billion people will mainly come from Non-OECD countries, particularly from the Middle East, Africa and India. The combined population of Middle East & Africa is anticipated to increase from 1 billion in 2015 to 1.7 billion in 2040 (+0.7 Bln) while India’s population is expected to expand from 1.3 billion to 1.6 billion (+0.3 Bln). As for China, it is expected that its population will peak in 2028 at around 1.42 billion (almost the same year India is expected to overtake China) then start a slow decline to 1.4 billion by 2040. In the OECD region, an additional 116 million people are forecast in the period to 2040 supported by immigration.


Long-term economic growth will be driven by Non-OECD Countries

● Long-term global GDP growth estimated at an average rate of 3.5% p.a.

● Long-term economic growth will be driven by Developing Countries, with growth in the OECD constrained by weaker demographics

● The size of the global economy in 2040 is estimated to be 126% that of 2016

Long-term real GDP growth rates (%, 2011 PPP)

7

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Now, moving second key assumption. In the Reference Case, global GDP between 2016 and 2040 is expected to increase at an average rate of 3.5% p.a. Most of the global growth will be driven by Non-OECD countries, which on average are expected to grow by 4.5% p.a. This is on the back of higher labour productivity growth and a more favorable demographic outlook. The OECD countries are expected to grow by only 2% p.a It is worth noting that the size of the global economy in 2040 is estimated to be 126% that of 2016 with the developing countries accounting for three-quarters of the global GDP growth over the forecast period.


Energy policies and technological development drive emissions reductions and energy efficiency

● The Reference Case assumes an evolutionary development oftechnology and energy policy in the long-term

● Overall, energy policies and technological development are expected tocontinue driving energy efficiency and emission reduction

● Technology will continue shaping global energy industry as a whole; oilindustry in particular

● Current development of renewable energies and the of introduction ofEVs are strong signs of such trends.

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Presenter

Presentation Notes

The 3rd & 4th main key factors that impact the future development of energy sector are Energy policies & technological developments. Indeed, the Reference Case assumes an evolutionary development of energy technology & policy in the long-term. Overall, energy policies and technological developments are expected to continue evolving; driving energy efficiency (hence emission reduction) and ultimately changing the future energy landscape. For example, the current development of renewable energies and the introduction of EVs replacing ICE vehicles are strong signs of such trends


Outline

● Key assumptions

● Energy outlook

● Oil outlook


● Key takeaways

9

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Now, with these key assumptions, we move to the Global energy mix Outlook. It is worth mentioning that over the next slides, we will focus on main messages as the detailed analysis, at a granular level, is available in the WOO.


Global primary energy demand will increase by 35%

10

World primary energy demand by fuel type

+35%

● Energy demand increases by 96 mboed (35%, 1.2% p.a.)

● Oil remains dominant (0.6% p.a.)● Gas contributes most to future

energy demand growth (3.6% p.a.)● Coal demand peaks towards the

end of the period (0.4% p.a.)● Renewables record the fastest

growth rate (6.8%)● Fossil fuels still provide over 75% of

the world’s energy needs by 2040

Presenter

Presentation Notes

First of all, total primary energy demand is forecast to increase by 96 mboe/d, rising from 276 mboe/d in 2015 to 372 mboe/d in 2040. In relative terms, this represents a 35% increase (1.2 % annual growth) At the global level, Oil is expected to remain the fuel with the largest share in the energy mix. We will see more detail about oil outlook in the following section of this presentation. The largest contribution to future energy demand growth is projected to come from natural gas as the demand for gas will increase by almost 34 mboe/d, reaching a level of 93 mboe/d by. Its share in the global energy mix will increase by a significant 3.6%. Other renewables (consisting mainly of wind, photovoltaic, solar and geothermal energy) is projected to be by far the fastest growing energy type (growth rate of 6.8% annual). However, given that its current low base in the global energy demand mix (about 1.4%), the share of other renewables will still be below 6%, despite its impressive growth. Oil and coal are projected to grow at much lower rates of 0.6% and 0.4% p.a., respectively. Despite these relatively low rates, fossil fuels will retain a dominant role in the global energy mix, although with a declining overall share. Indeed, the share of fossil fuels in the global energy mix will drop from 81% in 2015 to 75% by 2040 (oil and gas together combined 53%).


● Growth is concentrated in Non-OECDcountries (98%)

● India & China are the two largestcontributors to future energy demand

● Demand in the OECD peaks in the early2030s

● Energy demand growth (mboed):

Non-OECD: All fuel, especially gas (+29) & oil (+23)

OECD: Focus on gas (+5) & other renewables (+5)

Growth in primary energy demand by region & Fuel, 2015–2040

11

Energy demand will be driven by Non-OECD countries

Presenter

Presentation Notes

On regional level, global energy demand growth is rather unequally distributed among major regions as Energy demand will be driven by Non-OECD countries (98%). In fact, energy demand in developing countries is expected to grow at an average rate of 1.9% p.a. while for the non-OECD, the average growth rate will be about 0.1% p.a (expected to peak in the early 2030s). The key reasons for this variation are the different prospects in terms of population growth, urbanization rates and expansion in economic activity. India & China will be the two nations with the largest additional energy demand over the forecast period (both in the range of 22–23 mboe/d). Looking at the bottom graph, the largest demand growth is expected for gas (+29 mboe/d) , followed by oil (+23 mboe/d) and coal (+14 mboe/d). Non-OECD countries' energy demand is expected to grow by around 2% p.a on average, with the fasted growth rate forecast for other renewable (8%), and nuclear (more than 7%). In OECD region, while total energy demand is expected to stay almost flat, the greatest shifts in the energy mix are forecast be a lower reliance on oil (-8.6 mboe/d) and coal (-6.2mboe/d), and a shift toward gas (+5 mboe/d) and other renewables (+5.7 mboe/d). These shifts are reflections of efficiency improvements & growing environmental concerns and related policy measures aimed at reducing global carbon emissions.


● Energy efficiency improvements will continue in both the OECD and non-OECD regions:

Technological progress

Energy policies, and

A more service-oriented economic structure

● Reduction of energy intensity will accelerate

Real GDP, energy demand and energy intensity growth

12

Energy demand and energy intensity growth

Presenter

Presentation Notes

On the Energy efficiency front, improvements are anticipated to continue in both the OECD and non-OECD regions. In fact, the energy intensity is anticipated to decline by 1.8% p.a. in the OECD region and by 2.2% p.a. in the non-OECD region (2010 and 2025). This is due to technology further develops, policies are further tightened and a more service-oriented economic structure.


Outline

● Key assumptions

● Energy outlook

● Oil outlook


● Key takeaways

13

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Now, we move to the oil outlook, and starting with the demand,


Oil demand growth remains healthy

● Oil demand in the medium-term (2016–2022) increases 6.9 mb/d from 95.4 mb/d to 102.3 mb/d

● IMO regulations will impact medium-term demand growth pattern:

– Surplus of HSFO volumes priced at a discount

– Volumetric processing gains related to switching from fuel oil to diesel

Global oil demand growth in the medium-term

14

Presenter

Presentation Notes

The Medium-term oil demand outlook for the period 2016-2022 shows an increase of 6.9 mb/d, rising from 95.4 mb/d to 102 mb/d One of the most important impacts on medium-term oil demand growth patterns will be the introduction of new International Maritime Organization (IMO) regulations. In particular oil demand growth in 2020 is expected to be higher, at almost 1.4 mb/d. This is due to a combination of two factors: The primary reason is the need for additional refinery runs to provide required fuels that lead to a surplus of high sulphur fuel oil (HSFO) volumes priced at a discount. It is assumed that these will mainly be absorbed by the power generation sector. Furthermore, higher demand growth is also a direct consequence of volumetric processing gains related to switching from fuel oil to diesel.


Sectorial oil demand

● In long term, global oil demand will increase by 15.8 mb/d, reaching 111.1 mb/d by 2040

● The transportation sector will remain the main consumer of oil

● Demand growth decelerates over the long-term

World oil demand by sector

15

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Long-term oil demand is expected to increase by 15.8 mb/d, rising from 95.4 mb/d in 2016 to 111.1 mb/d in 2040. Indeed, most of the demand for oil is used for transportation purposes (road, aviation, marine, rail and domestic waterways). It is the sector where oil continues to face the weakest competition from alternative fuels (2/3 growth). Light products (ethane, LPG, naphtha and gasoline) are expected to satisfy more than 50% of global demand growth in the period to 2040 (8.5 mb/d out of a total demand growth of 15.8 mb/d). Oil use for industrial purposes (petrochemicals and other industry) is also expected to increase, though at a slower pace than in the transportation sector. Oil consumed for other uses is forecast to grow marginally. It is worth noting that the oil demand growth is expected to decelerate on the back of efficiency improvements driven by technological developments, a tightening of energy policies and a relatively low (albeit increasing) penetration of transportation fueled by natural gas and electricity.


Road transportation will remain the main consumer of oil products

● The number of passenger cars will double by 2040

● The fleet composition is anticipated to change smoothly

● Electric vehicles will represent 12% of the global fleet by 2040

● Demand in the road transport sector increases by 5.4 mb/d

● Light products will satisfy more than half of the long-term oil demand growth

Passenger car fleet composition

16

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Looking deeper int o the transport sector, the global number of passenger cars is expected to grow steadily. The car fleet is forecast to increase by 954 million during the forecast period, to reach 2,030 million in 2040. The vast majority of new passenger cars are expected to be seen in the Developing countries on the back of higher population and economic growth rates, rising income levels and increasing urbanization. At the same time, the fleet composition is anticipated to change smoothly. Alternative fuel vehicles (including electric, natural gas and fuel cell) will increasingly penetrate the global fleet. With approximately 235 million units (126 million being BEVs and 109 million PHEVs) by 2040 EVs will represent the major fleet share of alternative fuel vehicles. Demand in the road transportation sector is anticipated to increase by 5.4 mb/d over the forecast period as expanding global car fleet outweighs improving efficiencies and increasing penetration of alternative fuel vehicles globally.


Oil demand in the road transportation by region

● Demand in the OECD will decline (-7.1 mb/d) but increase strongly in DCs (+12 mb/d)

● Expanding global fleet outweighs improving efficiency and increasing penetration of EVs in DCs but not in the OECD

Demand in the road transportation sectorOECD Developing Countries

17

Presenter

Presentation Notes

In the OECD, the moderate increase in the car fleet would add around 1.6 mb/d to sectoral demand. However, efficiency improvements as a result of a further tightening of emission reduction policies, technological developments, changing driving behaviour and the increasing penetration of alternative fuel vehicles (particularly EVs including plug-in hybrid electric vehicles and battery electric vehicles and, to a lesser extent natural gas and fuel cells), is expected to significantly shrink sectoral demand. In Developing countries, the picture is rather different. The massive increase in the car fleet would increase sectoral demand by 26.4 mb/d over the forecast period. However, increasing efficiency, changing driving behaviour and the penetration of alternative fuel vehicles, particularly EVs in China and India, will only partially curb demand growth.


Non-OPEC supply shows strong growth in the medium-term, slowing thereafter

Total liquids supply, 2016-2040

18

● Medium-term non-OPEC liquids grow by 4.9 mb/d to 62 mb/d in 2022

● Growth is heavily concentrated in the US (+3.8 mb/d)

● In the long-term, non-OPEC liquids modestly decline to 60.4 mb/d by 2040

● Demand for OPEC crude risessteadily after 2025 to reach 41.4 mb/d by 2040

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Now, to cater to this demand, we look at the supply side. In the short-medium term, the total non-OPEC supply grows by around 5mb/d (from 57 mb/d in 2016 to 62 mb/d in 2022) with 75% of this growth (3.8 mb/d) comes from the US alone, mostly driven by tight oil. In the longer term (2022-2040), non-OPEC declines to 60.4 mb/d as US tight oil peaks, and in the absence of other sources of major growth. With this, the demand for OPEC crude stays relatively flat at just over 33 mb/d until 2025 (which at the US tight oil peaks, along with other non-OPEC), then the demand for OPEC crude rises steadily to reach 41.4 mb/d by 2040. Regarding investment for the upstream and mid-stream required between 2016 and 2040, it is estimated at around $9 trillion


Tight oil’s increasing importance shows up in higher implied decline rates

● Non-OPEC supply growth is overwhelmingly driven by higher tight oil production

● US tight oil is the most important contributor to non-OPEC supply, but peaks after 2025

● Tight oil growth is also anticipated in Canada, Russia and Argentina

Global tight oil supply outlook

19

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Few words on the tight oil supply outlook in the reference case: Non-OPEC supply growth is overwhelmingly driven by higher tight oil production. US tight crude and unconventionals continue to make up the bulk of this, rising to a peak of 12.3 mb/d by the latter half of the 2020s, after that decreases to around 10 mb/d Canada, and to a lesser extent, Argentina and Russia also see some tight oil production. Other countries with tight oil potential, e.g. China, Colombia, Mexico, do not see the emergence of tight oil production in the Reference Case.


The majority of new refining capacity expansion located in Developing countries

● Total capacity additions until 2040 estimated at 19.6 mb/d

● The majority of new refining capacity expansion located in Developing countries, driven by rising oil demand

● Expansion led by Asia-Pacific and the Middle East accounting for almost 70% of the total

Crude distillation capacity additions,2017–2040

20

Presenter

Presentation Notes

On the downstream and oil trade front, We expect a total capacity additions of about 19.6 mb/d, with almost 70% in Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. The major driver is rising demand in developing countries but also efforts of some regions to increase product exports (e.g. Middle East). New refining capacity will need to compete against this existing refining capacity, especially high complex refining systems with sufficient domestic crude supplies. Net refinery closures in the period 2017–2022 estimated at around 1.6 mb/d and further 0.9 mb/d until 2025 The majority of closures expected developed countries (mostly Europe) Estimated investment downstream required between 2016 and 2040 , around $1.5 trillion


Long-term global oil trade is set to increase gradually

● Global crude oil exports increase by 6.5 mb/d reaching almost 44 mb/d in 2040

● Between 2016 and 2025, US & Canada contribute the most to the overall increase in crude exports

● Middle Eastern exports increase significantly after 2025, as other exporting regions are either stagnating or in decline

Global crude oil exports by origin, 2016–2040

21

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Regarding oil movement, Global crude oil exports increase by 6.5 mb/d reaching almost 44 mb/d in 2040 The increase of crude oil exports in 2020 driven by the US & Canada, which increases exports by around 3 mb/d (mostly light-sweet barrels) and in turn imports more heavy and medium-sour volumes, which is more suitable for the refineries in the US . Latin American and African exports decline due to the increase in the local use of oil in these regions (and in line with the expansion of the local refining capacity). Trade flow between the Middle East and Asia-Pacific remains the most important one. Middle East exported around 14.5 mb/d of crude to Asia-Pacific in 2016 (almost 40% of global crude flows), which is expected to increase to almost 22 mb/d in 2040 (almost 50% of the global crude flows).


Outline

● Key assumptions

● Energy outlook

● Oil outlook


● Key takeaways

22


Oil demand in the Economic Growth sensitivities

● Two alternative sensitivities: Higher GDP growth (HG) and Lower GDP growth (LG)

● Demand in 2040:– Reference Case: 111.1 mb/d– HG: 113.8 mb/d– LG: 107.5 mb/d

● Overall uncertainty from GDP growth is in the range of 6 mb/d in 2040

Long-term oil demand (mb/d)

23

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Addressing the issue of economic developments, two alternative sensitivities were developed: Higher GDP Growth (HG) and Lower GDP Growth (LG). The HG sensitivity assumes that the average GDP growth for the forecast period is 3.6% p.a. This is the result of additional labour productivity gains and employment growth due to further efforts to improve human capital and promote labour market participation. In the LG sensitivity, the average GDP growth for the forecast period is assumed at 3.3% p.a. This is the result of an increasing move towards protectionism that limits trade and migration. In the case of the HG, global oil demand reaches 113.8 mb/d in 2040. The LG sees demand at 107.5 mb/d in the same year. This implies that the overall uncertainty emerging from the economic developments is in the range of around 6 mb/d in 2040. Moreover, it is important to highlight that the uncertainty is skewed to the downside.


Oil demand in the penetration of EVs Sensitivity Case

● Sensitivity Case: Penetration of EVs is higher than in the reference case

● Annual EV sales reach 80 million by 2040

● Oil demand in 2040 is reduced by 2.5 mb/d compared to the Reference Case, to total 108.6 mb/d

● Global oil demand plateaus around this level in the second half of the 2030s

Long-term oil demand (mb/d) in the reference Case and the Sensitivity Case

24

Presenter

Presentation Notes

Focusing on the penetration of EVs in the passenger car segment, a alternative Sensitivity has been developed: the Sensitivity Case. In this sensitivity, a more higher level is taken on the penetration of EVs with the assumption that annual EV sales reach 80 million by 2040. This would mean that three out of every five cars sold in 2040 would be electric. Under the assumption that the increasing EV penetration in the passenger car segment in the Sensitivity Case spreads, at least partially, to commercial vehicles, particularly in the medium duty segment, oil demand in 2040 is reduced by 2.5 mb/d compared to the Reference Case, to total 108.6 mb/d. Moreover, global oil demand is estimated to plateau around this level in the second half of the 2030s.


Oil demand in the efficiency improvements Sensitivity Case

● Accelerated Efficiency (AE) Case assumes more aggressive efficiency improvements

● Overall demand reduction in the AE case is 3.2 mb/d by 2040, reaching 107.9 mb/d

● Two-thirds of the demand reduction takes place in DCs

Long-term oil demand (mb/d)

25

Presenter

Presentation Notes

The third case developed concerns efficiency improvements. An alternative Sensitivity – Accelerated Efficiency (AE) Case – was developed assuming somewhat more aggressive efficiency improvements than those incorporated in the Reference Case. Compared to the Reference Case, the overall demand reduction in the AE case is 3.2 mb/d by 2040. The larger part of this reduction, around two thirds, is assumed to take place in Developing Countries where a higher potential for efficiency improvements exists. Assumed efficiency improvements in China would translate into some 0.6 mb/d lower oil demand than in the Reference Case while India contributes another 0.3 mb/d. Because of the high overall level of oil demand in the group of Other DCs, the potential demand reduction in this region is more than 1 mb/d.


Liquids supply in the Upside/Downside Sensitivities

● Based on the Upside Sensitivity, demand for OPEC crude would be curbed in the medium-term; reachging 36.8 mb/d by 2040

● By contrast, in a Downside Sensitivity Case, demand for OPEC crude stays relatively flat at 33 mb/d until mid-2020s; then rises to 45 mb/d by 2040

Supply sensitivities: impact on demand for OPEC crude

26

Presenter

Presentation Notes

In the supply side, The Upside Sensitivity potential for higher non-OPEC supply results in the demand for OPEC crude falling to around 31 mb/d until the mid-2020s. After US tight oil peaks around that time, demand for OPEC crude rises again to 36.8 mb/d in 2040. In a Downside Sensitivity Case, demand for OPEC crude stays relatively flat at 33 mb/d until the mid-2020s, and then rises to 45 mb/d by 2040.


Outline

● Key assumptions

● Energy outlook

● Oil outlook


● Key takeaways

27


Key takeaways●Energy demand increases by 35% between 2015 and 2040●Oil is expected to remains the most important fuel ●Global oil demand will increase by 15.8 mb/d, reaching 111.1 mb/d ● There is no expectation for peak oil demand over the forecast period ●Medium-term non-OPEC liquids growth is heavily concentrated in the US●US tight oil is the most important contributor to non-OPEC supply, but peaks after 2025,

raising the need for more OPEC crude●Refining capacity expansion takes place predominantly in developing countries, led by Asia-

Pacific and the Middle East ●Crude oil exports rise, led by increases from the Middle East and US & Canada● In the period to 2040, the required global oil sector investment is estimated at $10.5 trillions.

28

Presenter

Presentation Notes

In my last slide I would like to share with you the key takeaways: Energy demand increases by 35% Oil is expected to remains the most dominant fuel up to 2040 Global oil demand will increase by 15.8 mb/d, reaching 111.1 mb/d There is no expectation for peak oil demand over the forecast period Medium-term non-OPEC liquids growth is heavily concentrated in the US US tight oil is the most important contributor to non-OPEC supply, but peaks after 2025, raising the need for more OPEC crude Refining capacity expansion takes place predominantly in developing countries, led by Asia-Pacific and the Middle East Crude oil exports rise, led by increases from the Middle East and US & Canada In the period to 2040, the required global oil sector investment is estimated at $10.5 trillion

www.opec.org

Thank you

A comprehensive interactive version of the WOO is available at www.opec.org

29

Presenter

Presentation Notes

I would finally, inform you that A comprehensive interactive version of the WOO is available at www.opec.org Thank you for you attention

http://www.opec.org/


Table 1.1 Population by region

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Figure 1.1 Population growth 1990–2015 versus 2015–2040

31


Figure 1.2 Population trends in developing Asia and Middle East & Africa

32


Figure 1.3 Total population and annual growth

33


Figure 1.4 Age structure in the world and in the OECD region and China

34

© 2017 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries WOO2017 35


Table 1.2 Medium-term annual real GDP growth rates in the Reference Case

36


Table 1.3 Long-term annual real GDP growth rates in the Reference Case

37


Figure 1.5 Long-term GDP growth rates (2016–2040) by components

38


Figure 1.7 Real GDP per capita in 2016 and 2040

39



Table 2.1 Total primary energy demand by region

41


Table 2.2 World primary energy demand by fuel type

42


Figure 2.2 Growth in energy demand by fuel type, 2015–2040

43


Table 2.3 OECD primary energy demand by fuel type

44


Table 2.4 Developing countries primary energy demand by fuel type

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Table 2.5 Eurasia primary energy demand by fuel type

46


Figure 2.3 Growth in energy demand by fuel type and region, 2015–2040

47


Table 2.6 China primary energy demand by fuel type

48


Table 2.7 India primary energy demand by fuel type

49


Figure 2.4 Energy demand growth by region, 2015–2040

50


Figure 2.5 Coal demand growth by major regions, 2015–2040

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Table 2.8 Coal demand by region

52


Table 2.9 Gas demand by region

53


Figure 2.6 Natural gas demand by major regions, 2015–2040

54


Figure 2.7 Number of nuclear reactors by region, 2017

55


Figure 2.8 Nuclear energy demand by region, 2015–2040

56


Table 2.10 Hydropower demand by region

57


Figure 2.9 Hydropower demand by major regions, 2015–2040

58


Figure 2.10 Outlook for biomass demand by region, 2015–2040

59


Figure 2.11 Global expansion of other renewables, 2015–2040

60


Figure 2.12 Annual CO2 emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels, 1990–2040

61


Figure 2.13 Per capita CO2 emissions in the Reference Case, 1990–2040

62


Figure 2.14 Cumulative CO2 emissions from 1900, 1990–2040

63


Figure 2.15 Global energy demand and real GDP, 1970–2040

64


Figure 2.16 Real GDP, energy demand and energy intensity growth

65


● Rapid economic expansion in the developing world has lifted millions of people out of poverty

● In 2015, average energy consumption in the DCs had tripled compared to 1970

● However, the gap is still wide and energy poverty remains a critical issue, particularly in India and Africa

Real GDP, energy demand and energy intensity growth

66

Energy demand per capita vs GDP

Presenter

Presentation Notes

The last point that I will present in our energy outlook is related to energy intensity. Rapid economic expansion in the developing world, particularly in developing Asia, has lifted millions of people out of poverty and enlarged the middle class base, prompting an increase in energy access. In 2015, average energy consumption in the Developing Countries had almost tripled compared to 1970, with the gap to the OECD clearly narrowing. Nevertheless, the gap is still wide and energy poverty remains a critical issue. In specific regions, such as India and Africa, energy consumption per capita is still very low, underscoring the challenge related to energy poverty. Strong political commitment and resolute support from the global community is required to ensure that modern energy services are universally accessible and affordable.This is a main issue that OPEC work on in order to reduce energy poverty. Also OPEC supports sustainable development and environment protection.


Figure 2.17 Energy consumption per capita versus GDP at PPP per capita, 2015–2040

67



Table 3.1 Medium-term oil demand in the Reference Case

69


Figure 3.1 Global oil demand growth in the medium-term in the Reference Case

70


Figure 3.2 Annual oil demand growth in the OECD (2017–2022)

71


Figure 3.3 Annual oil demand growth in the Developing countries (2017–2022)

72


Figure 3.4 Average annual oil demand growth between 2016 and 2022

73


Figure 3.5 Oil demand revision (with respect to the WOO 2016) in 2022

74


Table 3.2 Long-term oil demand in the Reference Case

75


Figure 3.6 Average annual oil demand growth in the Reference Case

76


Figure 3.7 Oil demand revision (with respect to WOO 2016) in 2040

77


Table 3.3 Long-term oil demand by product category in the Reference Case

78


Figure 3.8 Demand growth by product category in the long-term

79


Figure 3.9 Share of the different sectors in demand by product, 2016 and 2040

80


Table 3.4 Sectoral oil demand in the Reference Case

81


Figure 3.10 Sectoral oil demand growth in the Reference Case

82


Figure 3.11 Sectoral oil demand in the OECD, 2016 and 2040

83


Figure 3.12 Sectoral oil demand in Developing countries, 2016 and 2040

84


Table 3.5 Projection of number of passenger cars

85


Table 3.6 Projection of number of commercial vehicles

86


Figure 3.13 Composition of new passenger car sales according to technology, 2016 and 2040

87


Figure 3.14 Passenger car fleet composition, 2016–2040

88


Figure 3.15 Composition of new commercial vehicle sales according to technology, 2016 and 2040

89


Figure 3.16 Commercial vehicle fleetcomposition, 2016–2040

90


Table 3.7 Oil demand in the road transportation sector by region

91


Figure 3.17 Demand in road transportation in the OECD, 2016 and 2040

92


Figure 3.18 Demand in road transportation in Developing countries, 2016 and 2040

93


Table 3.8 Oil demand in the road transportation sector by segment

94


Figure 3.19 Oil demand in the road transportation sector by product

95


Figure 3.20 Passenger car fleet in the Reference Case (first series) and in the MaaS case (second series)

96


Figure 3.21 Total miles driven in the Reference Case (dotted lines) and in the MaaS case (solid lines)

97


Table 3.9 Oil demand in the aviation sector by region

98


Figure 3.23 Marine bunker demand by fuel type in the medium-term

99


Table 3.10 Oil demand in the marine bunkers sector in the Reference Case

100


Figure 3.24 Product demand in the marine bunkers sector

101


Figure 3.25 Global basic petrochemicals capacity

102


Table 3.11 Oil demand in the petrochemicals sector in the Reference Case

103


Figure 3.26 Regional demand in the petrochemicals sector by product

104


Table 3.12 Oil demand in rail and domestic waterways in the Reference Case

105


Table 3.13 Oil demand in ‘other industry’ in the Reference Case

106


Table 3.14 Oil demand in residential/ commercial/agriculture in the Reference Case

107


Table 3.15 Oil demand in electricity generation in the Reference Case

108



Table 4.1 Medium-term liquids supply outlook in the Reference Case

110


Figure 4.1 Select contributors to non-OPEC total liquids change, 2016–2022

111


Figure 4.2 Revisions to medium-term Reference Case (vs. WOO 2016) for total liquids supply

112


Figure 4.3 Non-OPEC liquids change by year

113


Figure 4.4 Regional growth in non-OPEC liquids supply, 2016–2022 and 2022–2040

114


Table 4.2 Medium-term non-OPEC crude and NGLs supply outlook in the Reference Case

115


Figure 4.5 Medium-term non-OPEC crude and NGLs supply outlook in the Reference Case

116


Figure 4.6 US components of crude and NGLs production over the medium-term

117


Figure 4.7 Cost of drilling oil and gas wells in the US

118


Figure 4.8 US oil rig count by major basin

119


Figure 4.9 Evolution of wellhead breakeven prices by play

120


Figure 4.10 Oil rig activity in the Permian

121


Figure 4.11 Global tight oil supply outlook in the Reference Case

122


Table 4.4 Global unconventional NGLs supply outlook in the Reference Case

123


Table 4.5 Medium-term other liquids supply outlook in the Reference Case

124


Figure 4.12 Canada components of crude and NGLs production over the medium-term

125


Figure 4.13 Mexico crude and NGLs production over the medium-term

126


Figure 4.14 Brazil crude and NGLs production over the medium-term

127


Figure 4.15 Russia crude and NGLs production over the medium-term

128


Table 4.6 Medium-term non-OPEC biofuels supply outlook in the Reference Case

129


Figure 4.16 Long-term non-OPEC liquids supply outlook in the Reference Case

130


Table 4.7 Long-term liquids supply outlook in the Reference Case

131


Figure 4.17 Regional change in non-OPEC liquids supply in the Reference Case

132


Table 4.8 Long-term non-OPEC crude and NGLs supply outlook in the Reference Case

133


Table 4.9 Long-term other liquids supply outlook in the Reference Case

134


Table 4.10 Long-term non-OPEC biofuels supply outlook in the Reference Case

135


Figure 4.18 Historical and projected annual upstream investment

136


Figure 4.19 Annual upstream investment requirements for capacity additions in the Reference Case, 2017–2040

137


Figure 4.20 Global crude supply by API gravity category, 2015–2040 (share)

138


Figure 4.21 Global crude supply by API gravity category, 2015–2040 (volume)

139


Figure 4.22 US & Canada crude supply by API gravity category, 2015–2040 (volume)

140


Figure 4.23 Average global crude quality

141


Figure 4.24 Average OPEC crude quality

142


Figure 4.25 Average non-OPEC crude quality

143



Table 5.1 Global refinery base capacity per different sources

145


Table 5.2 Assessed available base capacity as of January 2017

146


Figure 5.1 Annual distillation capacity additions and total projects investment

147


Table 5.2 Assessed available base capacity as of January 2017

148


Figure 5.2 Distillation capacity additions from existing projects, 2017–2022

149


Figure 5.3 Additional cumulative refinery crude runs, required and potential

150


Figure 5.4 Additional cumulative refinery crude runs, US & Canada, required and potential

151


Figure 5.5 Additional cumulative refinery crude runs, Europe, required and potential

152


Figure 5.6 Additional cumulative refinery crude runs, China, required and potential

153


Figure 5.7 Additional cumulative refinery crude runs, Asia-Pacific excl. China, required and potential

154


Figure 5.8 Additional cumulative refinery crude runs, Middle East, required and potential

155


Figure 5.9 Additional cumulative refinery crude runs, Russia & Caspian, required and potential

156


Figure 5.10 Additional cumulative refinery crude runs, Africa, required and potential

157


Figure 5.11 Additional cumulative refinery crude runs, Latin America, required and potential

158


Figure 5.12 Net cumulative regional refining potential surplus/deficit versus requirements

159


Table 5.4 Global demand growth and refinery distillation capacity additions by period in the Reference Case

160


Figure 5.13 Crude distillation capacity additions in the Reference Case, 2017–2040

161


Table 5.5 Net refinery closures, recent and projected, by region

162


Figure 5.14 Net refinery closures, recent and projected, by region

163


Figure 5.15 Global oil demand, refining capacity and crude runs, 1980–2022

164


Table 5.6 Crude unit throughputs and utilizations

165


Table 5.7 Estimation of secondary process additions from existing projects, 2017–2022

166


Figure 5.16 Conversion projects by region, 2017–2022

167


Table 5.8 Global cumulative potential for incremental product output, 2017–2022

168


Figure 5.17 Expected surplus/deficit of incremental product output from existing refining projects, 2017–2022

169


Table 5.9 Global capacity requirements by process, 2017–2040

170


Figure 5.18 Global secondary capacity requirements by process type, 2017–2040

171


Figure 5.19 Conversion capacity requirements by region, 2017–2040

172


Figure 5.20 Desulphurization capacity requirements by region, 2017–2040

173


Figure 5.21 Desulphurization capacity requirements by product and region, 2017–2040

174


Figure 5.22 Octane capacity requirements by process and region, 2017–2040

175


Figure 5.23 Cost of refinery projects by region, 2017–2022

176


Figure 5.24 Projected refinery direct investments above assessed projects

177


Figure 5.25 Refinery investments in the Reference Case

178



Figure 6.1 Inter-regional crude oil and products exports, 2016–2040

180


Figure 6.2 Crude oil supply outlook to 2040

181


Figure 6.3 Change in crude oil supply between 2016 and 2040

182


Figure 6.4 Global crude oil exports by origin, 2016–2040

183


Figure 6.5 Crude oil exports from the Middle East by major destinations, 2016–2040

184


Figure 6.6 Crude oil exports from Latin America by major destinations, 2016–2040

185


Figure 6.7 Crude oil exports from Russia & Caspian by major destinations, 2016–2040

186


Figure 6.8 Crude oil exports from Africa by major destinations, 2016–2040

187


Figure 6.9 Crude oil exports from the US & Canada by major destinations, 2016–2040

188


Figure 6.10 Crude oil imports to the US & Canada by origin, 2016–2040

189


Figure 6.11 Crude oil imports to Europe by origin, 2016–2040

190


Figure 6.12 Crude oil imports to the Asia-Pacific by origin, 2016–2040

191


Figure 6.13 Regional net crude oil imports, 2016, 2020 and 2040

192


Figure 6.14 Regional net imports of liquid products, 2020, 2030 and 2040

193



Figure 7.1 Average annual global GDP growth (2016–2040) under the different sensitivities

195


Figure 7.2 Average annual global GDP growth under the different sensitivities

196


Table 7.1 Average GDP growth rates under the different sensitivities

197


Figure 7.3 World oil demand in the economic growth sensitivities

198


Table 7.2 Oil demand in the higher economic growth sensitivity

199


Table 7.3 Oil demand in the lower economic growth sensitivity

200


Figure 7.4 EV sales in the Reference Case and the Sensitivity Case

201


Figure 7.5 EV penetration in the car fleet in the Reference Case and the Sensitivity Case

202


Figure 7.6 Oil demand in the passenger car segment in the Reference Case and the Sensitivity Case

203


Figure 7.7 Oil demand in the Reference Case and the Sensitivity Case

204


Figure 7.8 Oil intensity in major regions

205


Figure 7.9 Oil demand reduction in Accelerated Efficiency sensitivity compared to Reference Case in 2040, by region

206


Figure 7.10 Oil demand reduction in Accelerated Efficiency sensitivity compared to Reference Case in 2040, by sector

207


Figure 7.11 Oil demand in the Accelerated Efficiency sensitivity compared to the Reference Case

208


Figure 7.12 Non-OPEC supply in the upside/downside supply sensitivities

209


Figure 7.13 Additional supply in the upside sensitivity by country, compared to the Reference Case

210


Figure 7.14 Additional supply in the upside sensitivity by source, compared to the Reference Case

211


Figure 7.15 Reductions to liquids supply in the downside supply sensitivity by country, compared to the Reference Case

212


Figure 7.16 Reductions to liquids supply in the downside supply sensitivity by source, compared to the Reference Case

213


Figure 7.17 Upside/downside supply sensitivities: impact on demand for OPEC crude

214

Documents

Presented at presented at - International Energy Forum · 2017-11-16 · 2017 edition Presented at presented at 1 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries Riyadh, 15 November