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Presented by: HACKERS Bhupinder Singh Narang Farhad Doneshwar Ishita James Jasleen Pandher Manjot Kaur Shubha Gururaja Rao Department of Computer Science & Engineering San Jose State University An Analysis of RTSP network security An Analysis of RTSP network security CMPE 209 Team Presentation CMPE 209 Team Presentation

Presented by: HACKERS Bhupinder Singh Narang Farhad Doneshwar Ishita James Jasleen Pandher

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An Analysis of RTSP network security CMPE 209 Team Presentation. Presented by: HACKERS Bhupinder Singh Narang Farhad Doneshwar Ishita James Jasleen Pandher Manjot Kaur Shubha Gururaja Rao Department of Computer Science & Engineering San Jose State University. Agenda. Streaming - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Presented by: HACKERS Bhupinder Singh Narang Farhad Doneshwar Ishita James Jasleen Pandher

Presented by: HACKERS

Bhupinder Singh NarangFarhad Doneshwar

Ishita JamesJasleen Pandher

Manjot KaurShubha Gururaja Rao

Department of Computer Science & Engineering

San Jose State University

An Analysis of RTSP network securityAn Analysis of RTSP network security

CMPE 209 Team PresentationCMPE 209 Team Presentation

Page 2: Presented by: HACKERS Bhupinder Singh Narang Farhad Doneshwar Ishita James Jasleen Pandher

Agenda

Streaming RTSP Security Considerations

Page 3: Presented by: HACKERS Bhupinder Singh Narang Farhad Doneshwar Ishita James Jasleen Pandher

Streaming What is Streaming..??

Different Streaming protocols

Page 4: Presented by: HACKERS Bhupinder Singh Narang Farhad Doneshwar Ishita James Jasleen Pandher

Introduction to RTSPSession control protocolSupports VCR-like operationsSupports

Media RetrievalAdding media to an existing

sessionActs as a network remote control

Page 5: Presented by: HACKERS Bhupinder Singh Narang Farhad Doneshwar Ishita James Jasleen Pandher

Introduction to RTSP (cont.)(cont.)

Protocol PropertiesRTSP message formatRTSP message types:

RequestsResponse

IETF Standard – RFC 2326

Page 6: Presented by: HACKERS Bhupinder Singh Narang Farhad Doneshwar Ishita James Jasleen Pandher

RTSP State Transitions

Setup Start an RTSP session and resource allocation for a stream

Play and Record Start data transmission of the stream

Pause Temporarily halt a stream without freeing server resources

Teardown Free resources associated with stream and end of a session

Page 7: Presented by: HACKERS Bhupinder Singh Narang Farhad Doneshwar Ishita James Jasleen Pandher

Working of RTSP

Page 8: Presented by: HACKERS Bhupinder Singh Narang Farhad Doneshwar Ishita James Jasleen Pandher

RTSP Message Exchange

Page 9: Presented by: HACKERS Bhupinder Singh Narang Farhad Doneshwar Ishita James Jasleen Pandher

Authentication MechanismChoice of Authentication Schemes

Basic AuthenticationDigest Authentication

Abuse of Server Log Information Transfer of Sensitive Information Concentrated denial-of-service attack Session hijacking

RTSP Security ConsiderationsRTSP Security Considerations

Page 10: Presented by: HACKERS Bhupinder Singh Narang Farhad Doneshwar Ishita James Jasleen Pandher

Authentication Mechanism Client MUST be able to do the

following:• recognize the 401 status code; • parse and include the WWW-

Authenticate header; • implement Basic Authentication

and Digest Authentication.

RTSP Security ConsiderationsRTSP Security Considerations (cont.)(cont.)

Page 11: Presented by: HACKERS Bhupinder Singh Narang Farhad Doneshwar Ishita James Jasleen Pandher

Choice of Authentication Schemes•Server may return multiple challenges

with a 401 (Authenticate) response, and each challenge may use a scheme

•"most secure" authentication scheme choice first from server

•possible man-in-the-middle (MITM) attack would be to add a weak authentication scheme to the set of choices

RTSP Security ConsiderationsRTSP Security Considerations (cont.)(cont.)

Page 12: Presented by: HACKERS Bhupinder Singh Narang Farhad Doneshwar Ishita James Jasleen Pandher

Basic AuthenticationUser agent must authenticate itself with a user-ID and a password for each realm

RTSP Security ConsiderationsRTSP Security Considerations (cont.)(cont.)

Server

Unauthorized request for URI

WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm=“ "

Authorization: Basic QWxhZGRpbjpvcGVuIHNlc2FtZQ==

ClientClient ServerClient ServerClient ServerClient ServerClient ServerClient ServerClient ServerClientWWW-Authenticate: Basic realm=“ "

ServerClient ServerClient ServerClient ServerClient

Page 13: Presented by: HACKERS Bhupinder Singh Narang Farhad Doneshwar Ishita James Jasleen Pandher

RTSP Security ConsiderationsRTSP Security Considerations (cont.)(cont.)

Wireshark Capture

OPTIONS rtsp://127.0.0.1/video/sample_100kbit.mp4 RTSP/1.0CSeq: 3Authorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=User-Agent: VLC media player (LIVE555 Streaming Media v2008.02.08)

RTSP/1.0 200 OKServer: DSS/5.5.5 (Build/489.16; Platform/Linux; Release/Darwin; state/beta; )Cseq: 3Public: DESCRIBE, SETUP, TEARDOWN, PLAY, PAUSE, OPTIONS, ANNOUNCE, RECORD

DESCRIBE rtsp://127.0.0.1/video/sample_100kbit.mp4 RTSP/1.0CSeq: 4Accept: application/sdpAuthorization: Basic YWRtaW46YWRtaW4=User-Agent: VLC media player (LIVE555 Streaming Media v2008.02.08)

Page 14: Presented by: HACKERS Bhupinder Singh Narang Farhad Doneshwar Ishita James Jasleen Pandher

Digest AuthenticationChallenge-Response paradigm

RTSP Security ConsiderationsRTSP Security Considerations (cont.)(cont.)

ServerClient

Request for access-protected object (No Auth header)

“401 Unauthorized” response (with www-Auth header)

Retry request, passing an authentication header line

Page 15: Presented by: HACKERS Bhupinder Singh Narang Farhad Doneshwar Ishita James Jasleen Pandher

Digest Authentication•The Digest scheme challenges using

a nonce value. •A valid response contains a

checksum (by default the MD5 checksum) of the username, the password, the given nonce value, the HTTP method, and the requested URI.

RTSP Security ConsiderationsRTSP Security Considerations (cont.)(cont.)

Page 16: Presented by: HACKERS Bhupinder Singh Narang Farhad Doneshwar Ishita James Jasleen Pandher

RTSP Security ConsiderationsRTSP Security Considerations (cont.)(cont.)

DESCRIBE rtsp://192.168.102.58/streaming_media/sample_100kbit.mp4 RTSP/1.0CSeq: 1Accept: application/sdpBandwidth: 384000Accept-Language: en-USUser-Agent: QuickTime/7.4.1 (qtver=7.4.1;os=Windows NT 5.1Service Pack 2)

RTSP/1.0 401 UnauthorizedServer: DSS/5.5.5 (Build/489.16; Platform/Linux; Release/Darwin; state/beta; )Cseq: 1WWW-Authenticate: Digest realm="Streaming Server", nonce="e539951941e259b7e69f7642cb5ea498"

DESCRIBE rtsp://192.168.102.58/streaming_media/sample_100kbit.mp4 RTSP/1.0CSeq: 2Accept: application/sdpBandwidth: 384000Accept-Language: en-USUser-Agent: QuickTime/7.4.1 (qtver=7.4.1;os=Windows NT 5.1Service Pack 2)Authorization: Digest username="admin", realm="Streaming Server", nonce="e539951941e259b7e69f7642cb5ea498", uri="/streaming_media/sample_100kbit.mp4", response="e68bd443e12e95e91f06225f3dfefe93"

Page 17: Presented by: HACKERS Bhupinder Singh Narang Farhad Doneshwar Ishita James Jasleen Pandher

Denial Of Service Attack:• An attacker can initiate traffic to

one or more IP addresses, by specifying them as destination in the setup request.

• If such multiple request exceed a certain number then legitimate request will be denied, leading to an denial of service attack.

RTSP Security ConsiderationsRTSP Security Considerations (cont.)(cont.)

Page 18: Presented by: HACKERS Bhupinder Singh Narang Farhad Doneshwar Ishita James Jasleen Pandher

Sessions Hijacking:

• RTSP unlike HTTP is a statefull server.

• It uses Session Ids to keep track of its Sessions.

• As Session Ids can be sniffed, an attacker can use a Session Id to steal a session.

RTSP Security ConsiderationsRTSP Security Considerations (cont.)(cont.)

Page 19: Presented by: HACKERS Bhupinder Singh Narang Farhad Doneshwar Ishita James Jasleen Pandher

Abuse of Server Log Information:

• The Servers are capable of storing logs of user Information, like their subjects of interest.

• This information is clearly confidential.

• Hence care must be taken that this information is not available to the attacker.

RTSP Security ConsiderationsRTSP Security Considerations (cont.)(cont.)

Page 20: Presented by: HACKERS Bhupinder Singh Narang Farhad Doneshwar Ishita James Jasleen Pandher

Transfer Of Sensitive Information:

• No method of determining the sensitivity of any particular piece of information within the context of any given request

• Applications SHOULD supply as much control over this information as possible to the provider of that information

RTSP Security ConsiderationsRTSP Security Considerations (cont.)(cont.)

Page 21: Presented by: HACKERS Bhupinder Singh Narang Farhad Doneshwar Ishita James Jasleen Pandher

IETF Standard – RFC 2326 Real Time Streaming Protocol, April 1998

IETF Standard – RFC 2068 Hypertext Transfer Protocol - HTTP/1.1, January 1997

IETF Standard – RFC 2069 An Extension to HTTP : Digest Access Authentication, January 1997

The VideoLAN forums at http://forum.videolan.org/viewtopic.php?f=13&t=44780&start=0&st=0&sk=t&sd=a

References

Page 22: Presented by: HACKERS Bhupinder Singh Narang Farhad Doneshwar Ishita James Jasleen Pandher

Thank You Thank You !!