PRACTICE ADVISORY1 December 2015

PRESERVING THE ONE-YEAR FILING DEADLINE FOR

ASYLUM CASES STUCK IN THE IMMIGRATION COURT BACKLOG

By Sandra A. Grossman and Lindsay M. Harris2 The immigration courts’ unprecedented backlogs are creating procedural and substantive challenges for attorneys trying to comply with the One-Year Filing Deadline (OYFD) in asylum cases. 3 These difficulties are most prevalent in scenarios where an asylum applicant is running up against the OYFD and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has issued a charging document, but not yet filed it with the immigration court. Similar complications arise where a master calendar hearing is scheduled beyond the one-year filing deadline. As practitioners know, failure to meet the OYFD can have severe and lasting repercussions for applicants and their families. What steps should a practitioner take to comply with the OYFD under these circumstances? How can a practitioner best create a record for appeal if an immigration judge denies asylum for failure to meet the OYFD due to circumstances beyond the respondent’s control? This Practice Advisory answers these questions and discusses strategies and procedures for complying with the OYFD.

What is the one-year filing deadline? In order to establish eligibility for asylum under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the applicant must prove by “clear and convincing evidence” that the asylum application was filed within one year of the date of his or her last arrival in the United States unless one of two statutory exceptions, discussed below, applies.4

Asylum applications may be filed either affirmatively with U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) or, if the applicant is in removal proceedings, defensively 1 Copyright 2015. Click here for information on reprinting this Practice Advisory. This advisory does not substitute for individual legal advice supplied by a lawyer familiar with a client’s case. 2 Sandra Grossman is the Founder and Managing Partner of Grossman Law, LLC in Bethesda, Maryland. Lindsay M. Harris is a Legal Fellow with the American Immigration Council. The authors wish to acknowledge the assistance of Dree Collopy, Melissa Crow, Lisa Green, Laura Lynch, Jennifer Rotman, and Kate Voigt who provided helpful comments and editing. 3 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA) of 1996 created the requirement that an asylum applicant must file their asylum application within one year of their last entry into the United States. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(2)(A). 4 See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(2)(i)(A).

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with Executive Office of Immigration Review (EOIR). Affirmative filings are mailed to a USCIS Service Center. Applicants should then receive a USCIS receipt notice as well as a notice from an Application Support Center (ASC) instructing them to appear for an appointment for the collection of biometric information. Applicants should retain their ASC biometrics confirmation as proof that biometrics were taken.5 Due to unprecedented backlogs in the processing of affirmative asylum claims, according to current processing times, USCIS may take up to four years to schedule an interview in an affirmative asylum case.6

In defensive filings, asylum applications must be filed in “open court” at a master calendar hearing.7 Attorneys also must comply with pre-filing instructions by sending the first three pages of the Form I-589, their Form G-28 Notice of Entry of Appearance, and a copy of DHS’s “pre-filing instructions” to the USCIS Nebraska Service Center (NSC). Applicants will then receive a USCIS receipt notice as well as an ASC notice instructing them to appear for an appointment for collection of biometric information. Applicants should retain their ASC biometrics confirmation as proof that biometrics were taken, and should be ready to provide the proof at their removal hearings. Immigration judges may not grant asylum without valid, unexpired biometrics and a complete background check performed by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

The clear and convincing evidence standard for showing compliance with the OYFD applies to both affirmative and defensive asylum filings.8 Clear and convincing evidence falls somewhere between the “preponderance of the evidence” standard (51% or more) and the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard. 9 Some ways to establish clear and convincing evidence that an application has been filed within the OYFD include: a certified mail receipt where the mailing date will be considered the filing date,10 credible testimony, or documentary evidence that establishes when the applicant entered the

5 Due to extensive backlogs in processing asylum claims, biometrics are only valid for fifteen months. See DHS Procedures for Implementation of EOIR Background Check Regulations for Aliens Seeking Relief or Protection from Removal (August 22, 2011), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws/Laws%20Static%20Files/EOIR_Q_A%202011_FINAL.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2015). Following the expiration of biometrics, the applicant must request a second ASC appointment notice. In some jurisdictions, attorneys must proactively call ICE to request new ASC notices on their clients’ behalf. In other jurisdictions, respondents may simply appear at the local ASC with an immigration court hearing notice and will be allowed to have biometrics retaken. Practices to maintain current biometrics vary by jurisdiction. 6 See USCIS Affirmative Asylum Scheduling Bulletin, available at http://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-asylum/asylum/affirmative-asylum-scheduling-bulletin (last visited Nov. 10, 2015). 7 EOIR Practice Manual, Chapt. 3.1. 8 See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(2)(i)(A). To satisfy the standard, an applicant must provide enough proof to “produce in the mind of the court a firm belief or conviction” that the claim was timely filed. See Matter of Carrubbam, 11 I&N Dec. 914, 917 (BIA 1966). 9 Asylum Officer Basic Training: One Year Filing Deadline, 6 (March 23, 2009), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20%26%20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20Lesson%20Plans/One-Year-Filing-Deadline-31aug10.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2015). 10 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(2)(ii).

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United States. 11 Attorneys should gather all available documentary and testimonial evidence to demonstrate compliance with the OYFD. What are the exceptions to the OYFD? The one-year filing deadline is subject to two statutory exceptions. An applicant may apply for asylum more than one year after entry by demonstrating “either the existence of changed circumstances which materially affect the applicant's eligibility for asylum or extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay in filing an application.”12

An applicant demonstrating changed circumstances must also demonstrate that the application was filed “within a reasonable period given those changed circumstances.”13 Similarly, an applicant demonstrating “extraordinary circumstances” must show that the application was filed “within a reasonable period given those circumstances.”14

Depending on the procedural posture of the claim and whether it is a defensive or affirmative filing, the asylum officer, the immigration judge (IJ), or the Board of Immigration Appeals (Board or BIA) will determine whether the applicant qualifies for an exception to the OYFD.15 Changed circumstances must have a material effect on an applicant’s eligibility for asylum. They include but are not limited to: changes in the applicant’s country of nationality or country of last habitual residence (for stateless individuals), changes in U.S. law, changes in activities in which an applicant has become involved outside his country of nationality, and the loss of a child-parent or spousal relationship to a principal asylum applicant via marriage, divorce, death, or attaining the age of 21.16 Extraordinary circumstances are defined as “events or factors directly related to the failure to meet the one-year deadline” and are especially relevant in the context of the immigration court backlogs. 17 Extraordinary circumstances may include but are not limited to: serious illness or mental or physical disability; legal disability (such as being an unaccompanied minor); ineffective assistance of counsel; maintaining Temporary Protected Status or other lawful immigrant or nonimmigrant status until a reasonable period of time before filing the asylum application; having timely filed an application that has been rejected for the applicant to make corrections; or the death or serious illness of an applicant’s legal representative or immediate family member. 18 Because problems

11 See Asylum Officer Basic Training Participant Workbook, pt. IV (March 23, 2009), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20%26%20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20Lesson%20Plans/One-Year-Filing-Deadline-31aug10.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2015). 12 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). 13 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(ii). 14 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5). 15 See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(2)(ii). 16 See 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(i). 17 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5). 18 Id.

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stemming from backlogs before the immigration courts are beyond the applicant’s control, they should similarly constitute an extraordinary circumstance that excuses the OYFD.

The USCIS Asylum Office’s Lesson Plan on the OYFD explains that other types of circumstances might also justify an extension if the applicant can show that they were “extraordinary and directly related to the failure to timely file.”19 These circumstances include: “severe family or spousal opposition, extreme isolation within a refugee community, profound language barriers, or profound difficulties in cultural acclimatization.”20 Any such factor or combination of factors must have compromised the applicant’s functioning severely enough to have generated a “significant barrier” to timely filing.21 Attorneys should carefully review their client’s cases to determine if any such factors, other than the EOIR backlog, played an outcome-determinative role in the failure to timely file.

Applicants bear the burden of convincing the IJ or asylum officer that the failure to timely file was not their fault.22 The BIA has set forth a three-part test to determine whether an applicant’s failure to file within the OYFD was due to an extraordinary circumstance. 23 First, the applicant must establish that an extraordinary circumstance actually exists. Second, the applicant must demonstrate how those circumstances directly relate to his or her failure to timely file the application. Third and finally, the applicant must prove that the delayed filing was reasonable under the circumstances. 24 These criteria should be easily satisfied where failure to comply with the OYFD is due to immigration court backlogs, as long as the asylum application has been submitted in a timely manner and the applicant (or the applicant’s attorney) presents evidence of other good faith efforts to file.

Timing plays an important role in arguing exceptions to the OYFD. Both extraordinary and changed circumstances may excuse an applicant from meeting the OYFD only if the asylum application is filed within a reasonable period of time.25 However, unlike changed circumstances, extraordinary circumstances must occur during the OYFD period, as they must directly relate to the applicant’s failure to timely file. 26 The BIA examines “reasonable time” disputes on a case-by-case basis but has found that “waiting six months or longer after expiration or termination of status would not be considered

19 Asylum Officer Basic Training: One Year Filing Deadline 13, (March 23, 2009), available at http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Humanitarian/Refugees%20%26%20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20Lesson%20Plans/One-Year-Filing-Deadline-31aug10.pdf (last visited Nov. 10, 2015). 20 Id. at 20. 21 Id. at 20. 22 Id. 23 Matter of Y-C-, 23 I&N Dec. 286 (BIA 2002). 24 Id. at 288. 25 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(5) 26 See e.g., Dree K. Collopy, AILA’s Asylum Primer: A Practical Guide to U.S. Asylum Law and Procedure (7th ed. 2015), pp. 193-194.

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reasonable.” 27 Attorneys should review the specific facts of their clients’ cases to determine whether, taking into account the totality of the circumstances, a bona fide argument exists for timely filing.28 What is the difference between lodging an asylum application and filing it in court? Asylum applicants are eligible to receive employment authorization documents (EAD) from USCIS 180 days after their asylum applications are filed in both affirmative and defensive cases. The 180-day waiting period is calculated according to the “asylum EAD clock,” which tracks the number of days since an asylum application has been filed. To facilitate USCIS’s adjudication of EAD applications, EOIR provides USCIS with access to the clock for cases pending before the immigration courts.29 USCIS will consider an application “filed” only when it has been submitted in open court. However, the asylum EAD clock starts after an application has been “lodged” with the immigration court. An application is “lodged” for purposes of determining eligibility for employment authorization, when an applicant or attorney submits an asylum application to the court clerk either in person or by mail.30 Pursuant to the “ABT Settlement Agreement,”31 EOIR accepts defensive filings at the immigration court window and stamps these applications “lodged not filed.”32 EOIR then transmits the “lodged not filed” date to USCIS.33 For detailed guidance on lodging an asylum application for employment authorization purposes, see Employment Authorization and Asylum: Strategies to Avoid Stopping the Asylum EAD Clock, American Immigration Council Practice Advisory (last updated February 5, 2014).

27 Matter of T-M-H- & S-W-C-, 25 I&N Dec. 193, 193 (BIA 2010) (noting “[s]horter periods of time would be considered on a case-by-case basis, with the decision-maker taking into account the totality of the circumstances”); but see Taslimi v. Holder, 590 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2010) (finding that asylum application filed nearly seven months after circumstances changed to be within a reasonable time). 28 Alternatively, some practitioners have also argued that the regulations providing applicants with a “reasonable time” to file after the changed circumstances occur are ultra vires. The statute only requires that “that the application has been filed within 1 year after the date of the alien’s arrival in the United States.” See INA § 208(a)(2)(B) The Act then allows for the changed and extraordinary circumstances exception. See INA § 208(a)(2)(D). Nowhere does the statute provide temporal limits on filing once an exception is met. 29 See EOIR Practice Manual, Chapt. 4(l), citing INA § 208(d)(2), § 208(d)(5)(A)(iii); 8 CFR § 1208.7. 30 See EOIR Practice Manual, Chapt. 4(i). 31 As part of a settlement of a nationwide class action lawsuit, B.H., et al. v. USCIS, et al., No. CV11-2108-RAJ (W.D. Wash.), EOIR and USCIS established certain procedures that affect the eligibility of some asylum applicants for employment authorization. The settlement agreement and other documents pertaining to and interpreting the agreement can be found here: http://www.legalactioncenter.org/litigation/asylum-clock. 32 See EOIR Practice Manual, Chapt. 4(i). 33 Id.

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For purposes of the OYFD, a lodged asylum application is not considered “filed.”34 The asylum application must still be filed with an immigration judge at a master calendar hearing.35 Nevertheless, as explained below, “lodging” is one of several actions attorneys may utilize in seeking to comply with the OYFD. How can I preserve the OYFD where the immigration court does not schedule my client’s master calendar hearing or schedules it beyond the OYFD? Many practitioners face the scenario where a client has been served with a Notice to Appear (NTA) but the NTA has not been filed with the immigration court. Alternatively, even if is the NTA has been filed, an initial master calendar hearing may not be scheduled until after the OYFD has passed. In these situations, clients are best served by a multi-pronged strategy demonstrating that their failure to meet the OYFD is due to circumstances beyond their control. This strategy may include some or all of the steps discussed below. Filing the I-589 Application for Asylum with USCIS In cases where an NTA has been served on a client but not filed with the immigration court, attorneys should file the asylum application with the relevant USCIS Service Center. At a recent USCIS Asylum Division Quarterly Stakeholder Meeting, John Lafferty, Chief of the Asylum Division, indicated that asylum applications (Form I-589) sent to USCIS Service Centers will be rejected only if internal databases show that the NTA has been filed with the immigration court, thereby establishing jurisdiction with EOIR.36 Thus, the Service Center will accept the application if an NTA has not yet been filed with the court. If accepted, the application will be forwarded, along with the applicant’s A-file, to the relevant USCIS Asylum Office, which will then determine whether to adjudicate the case. Filing before USCIS may also constitute evidence of good faith efforts to meet the OYFD.

In some jurisdictions, submission of an application to USCIS may not excuse a late filing. In the Houston immigration court, for example, an IJ found that the extraordinary circumstances exception did not apply where the respondent had timely filed his application and biometrics request with USCIS, but the first available master calendar hearing date fell beyond the OYFD. The IJ found that counsel’s failure to file a Motion to Advance the Hearing date precluded a finding of extraordinary circumstances. As of November 2015, the case was pending before the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals.

34 Id. Please note that some judges and immigration court jurisdictions do accept lodged applications as “filed” for the purposes of the OYFD. Please see footnote 38 below describing local practices across the nation. 35 U.S. Department of Justice, EOIR, Memorandum from Chief Immigration Judge O’Leary, “Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum 13-03: Guidelines for the Implementation of the ABT Settlement Agreement,” Dec. 2, 2013; see also, EOIR Practice Manual, Chapter 3.1(b)(III)(A). 36 USCIS Asylum Division, Quarterly Stakeholder Meeting Agenda and Unofficial Notes, August 7, 2015, AILA Doc. No. 15111204, available at http://www.aila.org/infonet/uscis-asylum-division-liaison-minutes-08-07-15 (last visited Nov. 23, 2015).

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Decisions such as these are prime example of the need for attorneys to follow a multi-pronged approach, combining many efforts, to preserve the OYFD. “Lodging” an asylum application with EOIR In cases where the NTA has been filed with the immigration court but the master calendar hearing is scheduled beyond the OYFD, the “lodging” procedure described above may constitute additional evidence of good faith efforts to meet the filing requirements. Indeed, the EOIR guidelines under the ABT Settlement Agreement specifically permit judges to “consider the legal effect of lodging an asylum application when considering whether an exception to the one-year bar applies.” 37 Policies and practices regarding whether lodging is in fact accepted as filing vary widely nationwide.38 If pursuing a “lodging” strategy, practitioners should comply with the requirements for lodging set forth in the EOIR Practice Manual.39 Additionally, given the firm deadlines involved, there is little room for error. EOIR rejects “defective filings” where for example, the I-589 is not signed by the applicant, the I-589 is not filed at the correct court location, or where the case is not pending before EOIR, among numerous other reasons.40 Similarly, an application that is submitted by mail or courier for lodging purposes may be rejected if it is not accompanied by a self-addressed, stamped, envelope; does not include a cover page; or does not include a prominent annotation on the top of the front page stating that is being submitted for the purpose of lodging.41 Filing a Motion to Advance the Hearing Date In cases where an NTA has been filed with the immigration court but the master calendar hearing is scheduled beyond the OYFD, attorneys should also consider filing a Motion to 37 U.S. Department of Justice, EOIR, Memorandum from Chief Immigration Judge O’Leary, “Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum 13-03: Guidelines for the Implementation of the ABT Settlement Agreement,” Dec. 2, 2013 at 6. 38 AILA asylum liaison contacts across the country shared the lodging and filing practices at their local courts with the authors of this Practice Advisory. This informal polling yielded the following information which is provided for informational purposes only, is subject to change, and should not be relied upon as established practice in any matter or proceeding before EOIR: Judges at the immigration court in Arlington, VA have agreed (and communicated their agreement to local attorneys through pro bono liaison meetings with the court) that lodging constitutes filing for the purpose of meeting the OYFD and routinely permit an exception to the deadline where an applicant has lodged the I-589 within one year of his or her last entry into the United States. Judges in some courts, including Omaha, NE, Los Angeles, CA, New Orleans, LA, and Seattle, WA, accept lodging as filing but have not made any formal policy announcement to that effect. In other courts, including Denver, CO, Judges do not consider lodging as filing for the purposes of the OYFD. In Houston, TX court personnel informed practitioners that each immigration judge has discretion to determine whether lodging constitutes filing and that there is no official guidance. In Portland, OR, practitioners similarly report that there is no official rule regarding lodging as filing, but that Judges seem to often accept the lodged date as filed for the purposes of the OYFD. 39 See EOIR Practice Manual Chapter 4(i)(A). 40 Id. 41 Id.

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Advance the Master Calendar Hearing Date. Such a motion may constitute further evidence of good faith efforts to meet the OYFD and will preserve a record for appeal should an IJ find there are no extraordinary circumstances.

A Motion to Advance should “completely articulate” the reasons for advancing the hearing date, the negative consequences of not doing so, and the relief or remedy sought.42 Attorneys should explicitly state that the purpose of the motion is to enable the respondent to meet the OYFD. Motions should be accompanied by the respondent’s written pleadings, a copy of the asylum application (as well as any additional copies for family members included in the application), and supporting documentation. The motion must be filed with a cover page labeled “MOTION TO ADVANCE” and include a proposed order for the IJ to sign.43 While not required by the regulations or the EOIR Practice Manual, a Motion to Advance may help preserve arguments for appeal should an IJ refuse to accept an asylum application due to issues relating to the OYFD.

After filing a Motion to Advance the Hearing Date, an attorney should be ready to proceed if the motion is granted. Attorneys should prepare the asylum application and supporting documents for submission to the immigration court, along with evidence of their attempts to timely file. Such evidence may include a copy of the cover page with the “lodged not filed” stamp, the USCIS receipt and ASC notices, and a copy of the Motion to Advance.

Arguing that a Request for a Credible Fear Interview is an Application for Asylum

In a situation where a client has undergone or requested a credible fear interview, and then failed to file within one year of entry into the United States, the following argument may be made. Paragraph (1) of INA §208 provides that an application for asylum can be made “in accordance with this section or, where applicable, section 235(b) of this title.”44 The OYFD rule provides, of course, that subject to certain exceptions described in the statute, paragraph 208(1) shall not apply unless the application for asylum is made within one year of the applicant’s entry into the United States.45

INA §235(b), in turn, provides that when an inadmissible alien seeking admission “indicates either an intention to apply for asylum under INA§208 of this title or a fear of persecution, the officer shall refer the alien for an interview by an asylum officer under subparagraph (B).”46 INA §235(b) provides the process for consideration and review of the credible fear interview for applicants for admission. No particular form is required.

Once an applicant states that he or she is afraid to return, the applicant is deemed an applicant for asylum. The argument should be made that under the plain language of the

42 See EOIR Practice Manual Chapter 5.10(b). 43 See Id. at Chapter 5.2(b). 44 INA § 208(a)(1) (emphasis added). 45 INA § 208(a)(2)(B). 46 INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(ii).

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statute, a request for a credible fear interview under INA Section 235(b), made within one year of entry, constitutes an application for asylum. As such, practitioners should argue that any individual who has undergone or even simply requested a credible fear interview, is not subject to a bar to asylum raised by the OYFD. Again, practitioners and their clients are best served by a multi-faceted approach that, when applicable, incorporates this argument, as well as the other strategies cited herein. Under what circumstances should I appeal a denial of an asylum application based on failure to meet the OYFD? If an IJ denies asylum based on a failure to meet the OYFD, attorneys should consider appealing the decision to the Board and, if necessary, to the relevant court of appeals. The REAL ID Act limits judicial review of legal claims, with the exception of constitutional claims or questions of law.47 Courts have generally considered questions of timeliness and changed or extraordinary circumstances to be questions of fact, and therefore unreviewable. 48 Nevertheless, attorneys may argue that an IJ’s refusal to accept an asylum application is not a pure question of fact, but also an error of law that deprives an asylum applicant of his statutory and due process right to seek asylum.49 The Ninth Circuit has found jurisdiction to review the Board’s extraordinary and changed circumstances determinations. In Husyev v. Mukasey, for example, the Ninth Circuit concluded that EOIR had established a “meaningful standard” by which it could review the BIA's extraordinary circumstances determinations, “including review of the

47 See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) (“[n]othing ... in any ... provision of this chapter (other than this section) which limits or eliminates judicial review, shall be construed as precluding review of constitutional claims or questions of law raised upon a petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section.”). 48 See e.g., Diallo v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 1274, 1281-82 (10th Cir. 2006); Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 633-35 (3d Cir. 2006); Chen v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 144, 154 (2nd Cir. 2006); Mehilli v. Gonzales, 433 F.3d 86, 93-94 (1st Cir. 2005); Vasile v. Gonzales, 417 F.3d 766, 768-69 (7th Cir. 2005); see also Chacon-Botero v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 427 F.3d 954, 957 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that the REAL ID Act did not confer jurisdiction to review an IJ’s untimeliness ruling); Bosung v. Gonzales, No. 05-1555, 2006 WL 851092, at *1 (4th Cir. 2006) (unpublished opinion) (per curiam) (same). 49 See e.g., Almuhtaseb v. Gonzales, 453 F.3d 743, 748 (6th Cir. 2006) (modifying a previous holding to bar review of asylum applications denied for untimeliness “only when the appeal seeks review of discretionary or factual questions, but not when the appeal seeks review of constitutional claims or matters of statutory construction.”); Ramadan v. Gonzales, 479 F.3d 646, 648 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that “jurisdiction over ‘questions of law’ as defined in the Real ID Act includes not only ‘pure’ issues of statutory interpretation, but also application of law to undisputed facts, sometimes referred to as mixed questions of law and fact.”); Nakimbugwe v. Gonzales, 475 F.3d 281, 284 (5th Cir. 2007) (“finding that “the IJ's determination was based entirely on his construction of a federal regulation, which is a question of law over which we now have jurisdiction.”); Lumataw v. Holder, 582 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2009) (holding that “the question of whether the IJ and BIA applied the correct filing deadline in assessing the timeliness of his asylum application, constitutes a ‘question of law’ underlying the agency's timeliness determinations.”); Mabasa v. Gonzales, 455 F.3d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 2006) (finding jurisdiction over Petitioners’ claims under the REAL ID Act on the basis that “they were not afforded a meaningful opportunity to be heard since the BIA wrongly analyzed their claim as one of extraordinary circumstances”); see also Dree K. Collopy, AILA’s Asylum Primer: A Practical Guide to U.S. Asylum Law and Procedure Ch. 12 (7th ed. 2015).

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‘reasonable period’ prong in particular.”50 In Taslimi v. Holder, the court applied similar reasoning to find it had jurisdiction to review whether the respondent had filed her asylum application within a reasonable period of time given the changed circumstances presented by her religious conversion.51 These cases suggest an argument that, given existing backlogs in the immigration courts, an IJ’s refusal to accept an asylum application under one of the exceptions to the OYFD constitutes an error of law that is subject to judicial review. What other arguments can I make to appeal a denial of an asylum application based on failure to meet the OYFD? Attorneys may also argue that denials of asylum applications for failure to meet the OYFD for purely technical reasons are too stringent and beyond the scope of Congressional intent. The exceptions to the OYFD were intended to be flexible and broad.52 At the time of enactment, Congress’ “paramount objective” was to prevent fraudulent claims.53 “Wide concern existed that undocumented immigrants were abusing the asylum process in order to obtain permission to work and access other societal benefits.”54 Nevertheless, even with these concerns, Congress sought to ensure that the U.S. “remain a safe haven” for legitimate asylum seekers fleeing persecution in their home countries.55 Recognizing this overriding goal, Senator Orrin Hatch, a proponent for the one-year bar, stated that he too was “committed to ensuring that those with legitimate claims for asylum are not returned to persecution, particularly for technical deficiencies.”56 Where asylum applicants have made good faith efforts to file asylum applications within a reasonable period of time, for example, by lodging, by filing a motion to advance the hearing date, filing an application with USCIS where possible, and other such strategies, it would be contrary to Congressional intent to reject such claims for failure to file within the OYFD. Strict application of the OYFD in this manner is rigid, does not prevent fraud, and denies protection to legitimate asylum seekers. The American Immigration Council and AILA are interested in tracking and potentially intervening as amicus in cases where immigration judges or the Board of Immigration Appeals have declined to find an exception to the OYFD even though a respondent’s

50 528 F.3d 1172, 1181 (9th Cir. 2008). 51 590 F.3d 981, 985 (9th Cir. 2010). 52 See Vahora v. Holder, 641 F.3d 1038, 1045 (9th Cir. 2011); see also, Karen Musalo and Marcelle Rice, The Implementation of the One-Year Bar to Asylum, 31 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 693, 696 (2008) [Hereinafter “Musalo, Implementation of the One-Year Bar to Asylum.”] 53 Vahora, 641 F.3d at 1045. 54 Musalo, Implementation of the One-Year Bar to Asylum at 695. 55 Vahora, 641 F.3d at 1045. 56 See 142 Cong. Rec. S11838 - 40 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch) cited in Vahora, 641 F.3d at 1045.

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master calendar hearing was scheduled beyond the deadline. Please submit your case via our online form.57 Conclusion The immigration court backlogs present serious challenges for asylum seekers. By pursuing the type of multi-pronged, proactive strategy described above, attorneys can assist their clients in complying with the OYFD and thereby safeguard their ability to apply for asylum. 58

57 Call for Examples: Denial of Asylum Based on Master Calendar Hearing Scheduled After One-Year Filing Deadline, August 4, 2015, AILA Doc. No. 15071403, available at https://liaison.formstack.com/forms/asylumfilingdeadline. 58 For additional practice pointers regarding the OYFD, see e.g., Dree K. Collopy, AILA’s Asylum Primer: A Practical Guide to U.S. Asylum Law and Procedure (7th ed. 2015), pp. 184-197.

FROM: Brian M. O'Leary Chief Immigration Judge

rti

U.S. Department of Justice

Executive Office for Immigration Review

Office of the Chief Immigration Judge

Chief Immigation Judge 5107 Leesburg Pike. Suite 2500 Falls Church. Virginia 22041

December 2, 2013

MEMORANDUM

TO: All Immigration Judges All Court Administrators All Attorney Advisors and Judicial Law Clerks All Immigration Court Staff

SUBJECT: Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum 13-03: Guidelines for Implementation of the ABT Settlement Agreement

Table of Contends

I. II. III.

Introduction The ABT Settlement Lodging Asylum Applications

2 2 2

A. Meaning of the Term "Lodged" 3 B. "Lodged not Filed" Process 3

1. Defensive Asylum Applications Only 3 2. Court Staff Responsibilities 3

a. General Process 3 b. Applications Lodged by Mail or Courier 4 c. Transmission of "Lodged not Filed" Date to USCIS 5

3. Filing the Defensive Asylum Application 5 C. Addressing ABT Implementation Issues 5

IV. The Immigration Judges' Responsibilities 6 A. Reasons for Adjournments 6 B. Offering Future Hearing Dates 6 C. Providing the 180-Day Asylum EAD Clock Notice 6 D. Consideration of an Exception to the One-Year Bar 6

V. Cases on Appeal or Remand 6 VI. Conclusion 7

Attachments: A. ABT Settlement Agreement B. 180-Day Asylum EAD Clock Notice

OPPM 13-03: Guidelines for Implementation of the ABT Settlement Agreement Page 2

C. Rejected Lodging Notice

I. Introduction

As part of a settlement of the nationwide class-action lawsuit B.H., et al. v. U.S. Citizenshipand Immigration Services, et al., No. CV11-2108-RAJ (W.D. Wash.) (referred to as the “ABTSettlement Agreement”), the Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”) and the U.S.Citizenship and Immigration Services (“USCIS”) agreed to change certain procedures that willaffect the eligibility of some asylum applicants for employment authorization documents(“EAD”). This Operating Policies and Procedures Memorandum (“OPPM”) provides guidanceon the implementation of the terms of the ABT Settlement Agreement, a copy of which is providedas Attachment A.

II. The ABT Settlement

The ABT Settlement Agreement resulted from a class action complaint challenging theFederal Government’s practices with respect to EADs for applicants for asylum. The suit wasfiled in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington in 2011. The plaintiff classconsisted of all noncitizens in the United States who have been placed in removal proceedings,have filed a complete Form I-589, Application for Asylum and Withholding of Removal, and havefiled or will file a Form I-765, Application for Employment Authorization, pursuant to 8 C.F.R. §274a.12(c)(8).

EOIR is required to implement certain interim provisions of the agreement on December 3,2013. These interim provisions include:

(1) making the 180-Day Asylum EAD Clock Notice (a copy of which is provided asAttachment B) available at hearings;

(2) providing the 180-Day Asylum EAD Clock Notice to an asylum applicant when theapplicant lodges or files an asylum application;

(3) stamping defensive asylum applications as “lodged not filed” at the immigration courtfiling window and entering the lodged date into CASE, to be transmitted to USCIS; and

(4) making certain amendments to OPPM 11-02: The Asylum Clock. These changes havebeen made and the OPPM has been reissued as OPPM 13-02: The Asylum Clock.

III. Lodging Asylum Applications

Pursuant to the ABT Settlement Agreement, EOIR will accept defensive asylumapplications at the immigration court filing window as “lodged not filed” and will transmit the“lodged not filed” date to USCIS.

OPPM 13-03: Guidelines for Implementation of the ABT Settlement Agreement Page 3

A. Meaning of the Term “Lodged”

If a defensive asylum application is submitted outside of a hearing for the purpose oflodging the application, the asylum application will be stamped “lodged not filed” and returned tothe applicant, following the process laid out below. The lodged date is not the filing date and alodged asylum application is not considered filed. The requirement that an asylum application befiled before an Immigration Judge at a master calendar hearing will not change. See OPPM 13-02:The Asylum Clock; Revised OPPM 00-01: Asylum Request Processing. A respondent who lodgesan asylum application at an immigration court filing window must still file the application beforean Immigration Judge at a master calendar hearing. However, USCIS will consider the date onwhich an asylum application is “lodged not filed” for the purpose of calculating the time period forEAD eligibility.

B. “Lodged not Filed” Process

1. Defensive Asylum Applications Only

An asylum application that is first filed before an Immigration Judge at a master calendarhearing is known as a “defensive” application. Only a respondent who plans to file a defensiveasylum application, but has not yet done so, may lodge an asylum application. An asylumapplicant may only lodge an asylum application once. If an asylum application is lodged, it mustbe lodged before that application is filed before an Immigration Judge at a master calendar hearing.An applicant who already has an asylum application pending with the court may not lodge anasylum application. Accordingly, if a respondent filed an application with USCIS and USCISreferred that application to the court, the respondent may not lodge an asylum application.

2. Court Staff Responsibilities

a. General Process

If a respondent submits an asylum application at the immigration court filing window forthe purpose of lodging the application, court staff should make an initial determination as towhether the application may be lodged. In the following situations, court staff should reject theapplication:

o the Form I-589 does not have the applicant’s name;o the Form I-589 does not have the A-number;o the Form I-589 is not signed by the applicant (Part D on page 9 of the Form I-589);o the Form I-589 has already been lodged with the court;o the Form I-589 has already been filed with the court;o the Form I-589 was referred to the court from USCIS;o the Form I-589 is being submitted for lodging at the incorrect court location;o the case is pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”); oro the case is not pending before EOIR.

Such an application should not be stamped with the “lodged not filed” stamp or the court datestamp. Rather, the application should be rejected, and a copy of the 180-Day Asylum EADClockNotice need not be provided.

OPPM 13-03: Guidelines for Implementation of the ABT Settlement Agreement Page 4

Note that a Proof of Service is not required to lodge an application. Accordingly, staffshould not reject an application for lack of a Proof of Service.

After determining that the asylum application may be lodged, court staff should stamp theapplication with the “lodged not filed” stamp and with the court date stamp. Court staff will thenupdate the field “lodged not filed” date in CASE. Court staff should not place the lodgedapplication or a copy of it in the Record of Proceeding. The original stamped application shouldbe returned to the respondent along with a copy of the attached 180-Day Asylum EAD ClockNotice.

Once a “lodged not filed” date is entered into CASE, it should not be changed except inunusual circumstances, such as to correct a data entry error. The “lodged not filed” date shouldnot be changed when the asylum application is filed or when the Immigration Judge issues adecision on the asylum application.

In addition, court staff should ensure that the 180-Day Asylum EAD Clock Notice isavailable in all courtrooms during hearings.

b. Applications Lodged by Mail or Courier

A respondent may submit an asylum application by mail or courier for the purpose oflodging the application. Court staff should make an initial determination as to whether theapplication may be lodged. If the application has any of the defects described in subsection (a),above, it should be rejected using the Rejected Lodging Notice, a copy of which is provided asAttachment C. The Rejected Lodging Notice should be processed in the same manner as anyother rejection notice. If the application is rejected, a copy of the 180-Day Asylum EAD ClockNotice need not be included with the rejection notice.

In addition to the defects described in subsection (a) above, court staff should also rejectthe application in the following situations:

o The application is not accompanied by a self-addressed stamped envelope orcomparable return delivery packaging. In this situation the application should berejected using the Rejected Lodging Notice, a copy of which is provided as AttachmentC. The Rejected Lodging Notice should be processed in the same manner as any otherrejection notice. If the application is rejected, a copy of the 180-Day Asylum EADClock Notice need not be included with the rejection notice.

o The asylum application is not accompanied by a cover page or does not include aprominent annotation on the top of the front page of the form stating that it is beingsubmitted for the purpose of lodging. In this situation the application should berejected using a regular Rejected Filing Notice, not the Rejected Lodging Notice. Ifthe application is rejected, a copy of the 180-Day Asylum EAD Clock Notice need notbe included with the rejection notice.

If an asylum application submitted by mail or courier meets the requirements for lodging,court staff should process the application as described in subsection (a), above.

OPPM 13-03: Guidelines for Implementation of the ABT Settlement Agreement Page 5

c. Transmission of “Lodged not Filed” Date to USCIS

Once a date is entered into the “lodged not filed” field in CASE, it will be provided toUSCIS electronically. No additional action is necessary by court staff.

3. Filing the Defensive Asylum Application

As noted above, even if a respondent lodges an asylum application at an immigration courtfiling window or by mail or courier, the respondent still must file the application before anImmigration Judge at a master calendar hearing in order to apply for asylum. See section III(A)(Meaning of the Term “Lodged”), above. Whether or not a respondent lodged an asylumapplication does not affect the respondent’s eligibility to file a defensive asylum application at amaster calendar hearing.

When a respondent files an asylum application, the judge should make sure the respondentreceives a copy of the 180-Day Asylum EAD Clock Notice. See section IV (The ImmigrationJudges’ Responsibilities), below. In addition to providing the 180-Day Asylum EAD ClockNotice, the judge and court staff should follow the existing process for reviewing and accepting acomplete asylum application as filed. See Revised OPPM 00-01: Asylum Request Processing;OPPM 13-02: The Asylum Clock.

C. Addressing ABT Implementation Issues

Under the terms of the ABT Settlement Agreement, there is a separate Individual ABTClaim Review process for asylum applicants who believe they have not received the reliefdescribed in the Agreement. Applicants will have access to the Individual ABT Claim Reviewprocess before EOIR for the following claims only:

o The lodging claim – The clerk at the immigration court filing window refused to either1) stamp a respondent’s asylum application “lodged not filed,” or 2) after properlystamping a respondent’s asylum application “lodged not filed,” return the stampedapplication to the respondent.

o The notice claim – The respondent did not receive the 180-Day Asylum EAD ClockNotice when he or she lodged or filed a defensive asylum application, or the notice wasnot made available at all hearings before the Immigration Court.

To submit a complaint under the Individual ABT Claim Review process, an asylum applicant mustcomplete an ABT Claim Form and send it to EOIR’s Office of General Counsel.

Asylum applicants requesting review of an asylum clock issue outside of the IndividualABT Claim Review process should follow the administrative procedures set forth in section VII(Addressing Asylum Clock Requests) of OPPM 13-02: The Asylum Clock. Applicants claimingthat USCIS failed to fulfill one of its obligations under the ABT Settlement Agreement should filean ABT Claim Form with USCIS, following the instructions on the form.

OPPM 13-03: Guidelines for Implementation of the ABT Settlement Agreement Page 6

IV. The Immigration Judges’ Responsibilities

This section describes the responsibilities of the Immigration Judges.

A. Reasons for Adjournments

The judge is responsible for deciding the reason for each adjournment. If at a hearing, thejudge must make the reason(s) for the case adjournment clear on the record. See OPPM 13-02:The Asylum Clock.

B. Offering Future Hearing Dates

Judges should follow the guidelines set forth in OPPM 13-02: The Asylum Clock whenoffering future hearing dates. Generally, when setting a non-detained case from a master calendarhearing to an individual calendar hearing, a minimum of 45 days must be allowed, even if the180-day adjudications deadline is imminent. Generally, when setting a detained case from amaster calendar hearing to an individual calendar hearing, a minimum of 14 days should beallowed. These time periods may be shortened if requested by the applicant.

C. Providing the 180-Day Asylum EAD Clock Notice

When the applicant files a defensive asylum application in court, the judge must make itclear on the record that the applicant received a copy of the 180-Day Asylum EAD Clock Notice.See section III(B)(3) (Filing the Defensive Asylum Application), above.

D. Consideration of an Exception to the One-Year Bar

The Immigration Judge adjudicates whether an asylum application was filed within oneyear after the date of the applicant=s arrival in the United States and, if not, whether an exception tothis filing deadline applies. See INA § 208(a)(2)(B); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4. Legal determinationsregarding the effect of lodging an asylum application are within the province of the presidingImmigration Judge. For example, judges may consider the legal effect of lodging an asylumapplication when considering whether an exception to the one-year bar applies.

V. Cases on Appeal or Remand

As discussed in OPPM 13-02: The Asylum Clock, EOIR=s asylum adjudications clockpermanently stops when the judge issues a decision granting or denying the asylum application, asthe decision constitutes “final administrative adjudication of the asylum application, not includingadministrative appeal” under section 208(d)(5)(A)(iii) of the Immigration and Nationality Act.Therefore, EOIR’s asylum adjudications clock does not run during any appeal of the decision tothe BIA, during judicial review before the Federal courts, or if a case has been remanded to theImmigration Court. However, if an applicant is applying for asylum for the first time during aremanded proceeding, then the clock starts and stops as usual.

The ABT Settlement Agreement does not require any change in EOIR’s proceduresrelating to cases during any appeal of a decision to the BIA, during judicial review before the

OPPM 13-03: Guidelines for Implementation of the ABT Settlement Agreement Page 7

Federal courts, or if a case has been remanded to the Immigration Court. However, immigrationcourt staff should be aware that USCIS’s procedures relating to calculation of work authorizationeligibility after a remand have changed. Pursuant to the ABT Settlement Agreement, if a decisionis appealed to the BIA and the BIA remands it to a judge for adjudication of an asylum claim,USCIS will include the total number of days between the Immigration Judge’s initial decision onthe asylum application and the date of the BIA’s remand order in determining the applicant’seligibility for work authorization. USCIS will also include the total number of days accruedfollowing the remand order, excluding any delays requested or caused by the applicant, indetermining the applicant’s eligibility for work authorization.

Accordingly, if an asylum applicant believes that he or she is eligible for workauthorization after his or her case is remanded to the Immigration Court, the applicant shouldcontact USCIS.

VI. Conclusion

This OPPM provides guidance on the implementation of ABT Settlement Agreement inproceedings before EOIR. If you have any questions, please contact your Assistant ChiefImmigration Judge or Mark Pasierb, Chief Clerk, Office of the Chief Immigration Judge.

E-Service Fact Sheet (Rev. 7/15/15) Page 1 

  

Office of the Chief Counsel U.S. Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement New York, NY

     

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, NEW YORK ELECTRONIC SERVICE FACT SHEET

 The Office of the Chief Counsel, New York, will begin the use of electronic service (E-Service) effective May 31, 2015. Participation is voluntary and is a substitute for in-person service and service through regular mail.

 E-mail Addresses: The following existing email box addresses will continue to be operational: x For Requests for Prosecutorial Discretion: OPLA-PD-NYC-OCC@ice.dhs.gov x For Joint Motions to Reopen (non-detained): NONDETAINED.NYC_JMTR@ice.dhs.gov x For Joint Motions to Reopen (detained): DETAINED.NYC_JMTR@ice.dhs.gov

Please direct other E-Service filings to the following email box addresses: x For 26 Federal Plaza Court Cases: OPLA-NYC-eService@ice.dhs.gov x For Varick Street Court Cases: OPLA-NYC-VRK-eService@ice.dhs.gov x For Ulster/Downstate Court Cases: OPLA-NYC-IHP-eService@ice.dhs.gov

Terms and Conditions of Use:  

1. E-Service is limited to the following types of documents filed with either the Immigration Judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals:

 a. Requests for Prosecutorial Discretion b. Motions b. Briefs c. Applications d. Exhibits in Support of Relief Applications e. EOIR and DHS Forms (EOIR-28, EOIR-26, etc.)

 2. General inquiries and specific questions should be directed to the duty attorney at:

x (212) 264-8572 3. All messages delivered to the E-Service mailbox other than those including documents for service

will be deleted without being read. 4. Attachments cannot exceed 10 Megabytes (MB) of data storage.

 5. All pages must be clearly scanned.

E-Service Fact Sheet (Rev. 7/15/15) Page 2 

 6. Subject lines/document names.

 a. The subject line must include (in this order): A-number; document type/s;

Immigration Judge; and next hearing date (if available). Do not include any other information in the subject line.

i. Examples: 1. A123456789; MTR and G-28; IJ Morace; NHD unassigned 2. A987654321; EOIR-28; IJ unknown; NHD-06-15-16 3. A999999999, Evidence Packet, IJ Sichel, NHD- 8-23-16

 b. Documents must be named (in this order): A-number, document type.

i. Examples: 1. A123456789-MTR 2. A987654321-EOIR 28 3. A999999999-Evidence

 7. Documents must be saved as standard Portable Document Format (PDF) files only, and

must be attached to the email correspondence. OCC will not access documents through hyperlinks to storage servers, file drop-boxes, “cloud” servers, or other sources.

 8. The body of the email must include the following information:

 a. Alien's A-Number b. The full title of the document being filed c. Attorney's Name, Mailing Address, Telephone Number and Email address

 Note: Electronic correspondence containing only attachments and without text in the body of the email will not be opened by OCC and will be deemed improperly served.

 9. Within 5 business days, an email will be sent to the sender if the filing is rejected. Otherwise,

the auto-reply will serve as your receipt of filing.  

10. By serving documents electronically through this system, the alien and his representative consent to receipt of service of ICE submissions by electronic service in accordance with DHS policies.

 11. Acceptance of electronic correspondence in compliance with this agreement constitutes

proper service as required under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.32 and waives objections relating to service requirements under Immigration Court Practice Manual Chapter 3.2(c).

 12. By serving documents electronically through this system, the alien and his representatives

consent to these Terms and Conditions of Use. 13. Participants in E-Service acknowledge and agree to a limited waiver of data security that shall

only attach to the electronic service and transmittal of documents that may contain sensitive personally identifiable information (SPII). Participants in E-Service should be aware however that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) cannot ensure that information transmitted outside of the DHS network will remain secure during transmission. Please be

E-Service Fact Sheet (Rev. 7/15/15) Page 3 

advised that this waiver applies to both your receipt of information transmitted by ICE and the transmission of information from you to ICE. Please also be advised that 1) from the time information leaves the DHS network until receipt by your email system and 2) during the time that information is being transmitted by your email system to the DHS network, the information contained within the email, including but not limited to SPII, is not necessarily secure against interception. You are strongly encouraged to encrypt any documents containing SPII prior to sending to OCC via email and to send passwords under separate cover. By participating in E-Service you expressly agree to assume the risk that SPII might be intercepted during transmission to or from the DHS network and as a result be obtained by or disclosed to third-parties.  

14.  Emails that do not comply with the Terms and Conditions of Use may be rejected and ICE may object to the admission of the documents into the record. Violation of the Terms and Conditions of Use or misuse of the E-Service mailbox will result in suspension of E-Service access and rejection of future E-Service filings.

E-Service Fact Sheet (Rev. 7/15/15) Page 4 

 Office of the Chief Counsel U.S. Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement New York, NY

 

Frequently Asked Questions – E-Service

Q1: What is E-Service?

A1: E-Service is the electronic service of documents between the OCCs and the private bar and respondents through a dedicated OCC email address.

Q2: Does E-Service allow for the electronic filing of documents on the immigration court?

A2: No. Although the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR) is working on a plan to allow for electronic filing of documents in the future, currently EOIR accepts only EOIR Form 27 (Notice of Entry of Appearance before the Board) and EOIR Form 28 (Notice of Entry of Appearance before the Immigration Court) electronically. EOIR’s Office of the Chief Administrative Hearing Officer (OCAHO), is also conducting a voluntary pilot program to test an electronic filing system in cases filed with OCAHO.

Q3: How will the public be made aware of E-Service?

A3: Each OCC has created a local OCC E-Service Fact Sheet to be distributed to the local chapter of the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA), NGOs, and made available in immigration court. This OCC E-Service Fact Sheet will provide all the details necessary for serving documents electronically on the local OCC.

Q4: What types of documents will be accepted through E-Service?

A4: OPLA’s goal is to accept all documents through E-Service that are filed with the EOIR and served on the OCCs; however, due to varied local resource constraints, each OCC will determine the documents they are able to accept electronically during this initial roll out. Please consult the local OCC E-Service Fact Sheet for a list of documents that will be accepted.

Q5: What format should documents be sent?

A5: Documents being served must be in either Adobe Acrobat (PDF) or Microsoft Word format, and must be attached to the email correspondence. OCCs cannot access documents through hyperlinks to storage servers, file drop-boxes, “cloud” servers, or other non-attachment sources.

Q6: Is E-Service of documents filed with EOIR mandatory?

A6: No. E-Service is a voluntary option for those individuals who would like to take advantage of

E-Service Fact Sheet (Rev. 7/15/15) Page 5 

serving documents on an OCC electronically. However, by serving documents electronically, individuals consent to receipt of documents via e-mail in the case which is the subject of the e-Service. It should further be noted that in some locations OCCs have established rules requiring certain requests from local attorneys that are not filed with EOIR to be electronically sent to the OCC. These documents can include Joint Motions to Reopen and requests for prosecutorial discretion.

Q7: Is E-Service consistent with the Immigration Court Practice Manual and 8 C.F.R. 1003.32, which provides that service must be done in person or by first class mail?

A7: Yes. The use of E-Service is purely voluntary and serves as a mechanism to improve the speed and efficiency of receiving EOIR filings for both respondents and the government. As part of each local OCC E-Service Fact Sheet, respondents and their counsel consent to receive E-Service from the government only in those cases where they have availed themselves of E-Serving the government. In so doing, DHS, respondents, and their counsel also agree that acceptance of electronic correspondence in compliance with the E-Service Fact Sheet constitutes proper service as required under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.32 and waives objections relating to service requirements under Immigration Court Practice Manual Chapter 3.2(c).

Q8: How will ICE protect sensitive personally identifiable information (SPII) in electronically

serving personal e-mail addresses?

A8: Pursuant to DHS policy, ICE is committed to protecting SPII. To this end, all documents sent from ICE to a personal e-mail address as part of E-Service will be encrypted with a password.

Q9: Are there data security risks associated with participation in e-Service?

A9: Participants in E-Service acknowledge and agree to a limited waiver of data security that shall only attach to the electronic service and transmittal of documents that may contain sensitive personally identifiable information (SPII). Participants in E-Service should be aware however that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) cannot ensure that information transmitted outside of the DHS network will remain secure during transmission. Please be advised that this waiver applies to both your receipt of information transmitted by ICE and the transmission of information from you to ICE. Please also be advised that 1) from the time information leaves the DHS network until receipt by your email system and 2) during the time that information is being transmitted by your email system to the DHS network, the information contained within the email, including but not limited to SPII, is not necessarily secure against interception. By participating in E-Service you expressly agree to assume the risk that SPII might be intercepted during transmission to or from the DHS network and as a result be obtained by or disclosed to third-parties.

Q10: What type of proof will be given from the OCCs confirming receipt of electronically served documents?

A10: OCC E-Service mailboxes will generate an auto-reply advising the sender that their submission was received. 

12-2163Lin v. Lynch

BIABrennan, IJ

A 088 517 180UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

August Term 2015

Argued: August 25, 2015 Decided: February 11, 2016

Docket No. 12-2163

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - WU LIN,

Petitioner,

v.

LORETTA E. LYNCH, United States Attorney General,Respondent.

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Before: NEWMAN, WALKER, and JACOBS, Circuit Judges.

Petition for review of the April 30, 2012, decision of

the Board of Immigration Appeals, reversing a decision of an

Immigration Judge that had approved an application for

asylum.

Petition granted and case remanded. Judge Jacobs

concurs in the grant of the petition for review and remand

to the BIA for further consideration with a separate

opinion.

1

Gerald Karikari, Law Offices ofGerald Karikari, P.C., NewYork, NY, for Petitioner.

Ashley Y. Martin, United StatesDepartment of Justice, (StuartF. Delery, Principal DeputyAssistant Attorney General,Mary Jane Candaux, AssistantDirector, on the brief),Washington, DC, for Respondent.

JON O. NEWMAN, Circuit Judge.

This petition to review a decision of the Board of

Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) requires consideration of the

standard of review for a court of appeals considering the

BIA’s determination that an Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”)

findings of fact are clearly erroneous. This issue arises

on a petition by Wu Lin for review of the BIA’s decision of

April 30, 2012, denying his application for asylum. We

conclude that, although the BIA recognized its obligation to

apply the “clear error” standard of review to the IJ’s

findings of fact, it erred in its application of that

standard and provided an insufficient basis for rejecting

the IJ’s findings. We therefore grant the petition for

review and remand to the BIA for further consideration.

2

Background

Wu Lin is a native and citizen of the People’s Republic

of China. In August 2007 he entered the United States

without authorization. Lin was apprehended in Texas a few

days after his entry. In September 2007, an official of the

Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) conducted a so-

called “border interview” to determine whether Lin

“indicate[d] either an intention to apply for asylum . . .

or a fear of persecution,” Immigration and Nationality Act

§ 235(b)(1)(A)(I), 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). Under oath,

Lin stated that he would be imprisoned if returned to China.

Asked why, he answered, “I was working for the birth control

department in China and I let two women go . . . without

having the procedure.”

As a result of the border interview, Lin was referred

for a so-called “credible fear” interview conducted in

September 2007 by an asylum officer to determine whether Lin

“ha[d] a credible fear of persecution,” 8

U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii), which means “a significant

possibility . . . that the alien could establish eligibility

for asylum,” 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(v). Lin testified

that his reason for believing that he would be persecuted if

returned to China was that he was arrested and fined when he

3

“went to reason with the people in the family planning”

after they forced his girlfriend to have an abortion. The

asylum officer asked Lin why he had told the Border Patrol

that he feared imprisonment because he had helped two women

escape from the birth control department. He answered,

“[W]hen I was there with them, they told me I did not have

to say me [sic] the whole story there, but to tell it to the

immigration officer.” Lin added, “I released two women that

were nine months pregnant.

Lin filed a written application for asylum in July

2008. Abandoning his claims made at the border and credible

fear interviews, Lin wrote that he had been persecuted by

the Chinese government by beatings and detention because of

his practice of Falun Gong. He explained the recantation of

his previous claims by stating that he had been instructed

by the snakeheads (smugglers) on the way to the United

States to say certain things and that if he did not say what

he was told he would be sent back to China and have to pay

the smuggling fees. Lin’s testimony before the IJ repeated

what he had written in his asylum application.

In an oral decision, the IJ credited Lin’s testimony.

He found that Lin had “reasonably explained” his previous

versions and was “satisfied” with Lin’s explanation.“

4

[T]his is an example,” the IJ stated, “of the power of the

snakeheads to whom he owed money and to whom he owed his

presence and entry into the United States.” Then, evidently

contemplating an appeal by DHS, the IJ added, “This is an

example for any reviewing Court of the power of the

snakeheads over [asylum seekers] who are coming to America.”

The IJ said he “g[a]ve great weight to the fact that [Lin]

came forward voluntarily to withdraw those statements and to

explain why he said those statements.” With respect to

Lin’s current claim, the IJ said he credited Lin’s practice

of Falun Gong and the detention and beatings he had suffered

while detained in China. The IJ also found that Lin had

“produced reasonably available evidence to support his

claim,” referring to a letter from Lin’s father, a letter

from his co-practitioner in China, a copy of the dismissal

notice from his employer, a sworn affidavit from his uncle,

and several identity documents. The IJ exercised his

discretion to grant Lin asylum.

DHS appealed the IJ’s decision to the BIA. The BIA

began its opinion by recognizing that its regulations

required it to review an IJ’s findings of fact under the

“clearly erroneous” standard. See 8 C.F.R.

5

§ 1003.1(d)(3)(i). The BIA stated, “There is clear error in

a factual finding when we are left with the definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” In re Wu Lin,

No. A088 517 180, at 1 (B.I.A. Apr. 30, 2012). The BIA

ruled that the IJ had “committed clear error in crediting

[Lin’s] explanation for his repeated lies to immigration

officials.” In re Wu Lin, No. A088 517 180, at 2. The BIA

also stated, “[W]e find clear error in the [IJ’s]

determination that [Lin’s] third asylum claim based on his

practice of Falun Gong was credible.” Id. at 3. Based on

these rulings, the BIA reversed the IJ’s grant of asylum.

We consider the BIA’s reasons for these rulings below.

Discussion

In nearly all the petitions for review of asylum claims

that reach this Court, the BIA has affirmed an IJ’s denial

of asylum. In the pending petition for review, however, the

BIA, applying the “clear error” standard of review, has

reversed an IJ’s grant of asylum.1 The initial issue for us

is what standard of review should we apply to the BIA’s

ruling that an IJ’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous.

1 If the BIA grants asylum, either by affirming an IJ’sgrant of asylum or by reversing an IJ’s denial of asylum,DHS is not authorized to seek review in this Court.

6

This is an issue that rarely arises in judicial review

of agency decisions because an agency’s use of a “clear

error” standard to review findings of fact is itself rare.

Under the Administrative Procedures Act, “[o]n appeal from

or review of the initial decision, the agency has all the

powers which it would have in making the initial decision

except as it may limit the issues on notice or by rule.” 5

U.S.C. § 557(b). Thus, most agencies reviewing findings of

fact are entitled to find facts, i.e., “use the powers

[they] would have in making the initial decision.”

However, the BIA is subject to a different regime. The

Department of Justice (“DOJ”), acting pursuant to the

“except” clause of section 557(b), has required the BIA,

which is a constituent entity within DOJ,2 to review an IJ’s

findings of fact under the “clear error” standard: “Facts

determined by the immigration judge, including findings as to

credibility of testimony, shall be reviewed only to determine

whether the findings of the immigration judge are clearly

erroneous.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i). DOJ also prohibited

the BIA from making findings of fact: “Except for taking

administrative notice of commonly known facts such as

2 “There shall be in the Department of Justice a Boardof Immigration Appeals . . . .” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(i).

7

current events or the contents of official documents, the

Board will not engage in factfinding in the course of

deciding appeals.” Id. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv).

DOJ has explained that “[t]he [Justice] Department’s

adoption of the ‘clearly erroneous’ standard encompasses

the standards now commonly used by the federal courts with

respect to appellate court review of findings of fact made

by a trial court.” Board of Immigration Appeals: Procedural

Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54878-01,

54890 (Aug. 26, 2002). Those standards are set forth in

Rule 52(a)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:

“Findings of fact, whether based on oral or otherevidence, must not be set aside unless clearlyerroneous, and the reviewing court must give dueregard to the trial court's opportunity to judgethe witnesses' credibility.”

So when the BIA reviews an IJ’s findings of fact, it must

accept them unless they are clearly erroneous, and the BIA

must give “due regard” to the IJ’s opportunity to judge a

witness’s credibility.

Before determining how we should review a BIA ruling

that an IJ’s findings of fact are clearly erroneous, we

endeavor to consider what “clear error” review means. We

are not encouraged in this task by Judge Learned Hand’s

8

observation that “[i]t is idle to try to define the meaning

of the phrase, ‘clearly erroneous,’” United States v.

Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 433 (2d Cir. 1945),

or the Supreme Court’s later acknowledgment that “the

meaning of the phrase ‘clearly erroneous’ is not

immediately apparent,” Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470

U.S. 564, 573 (1985).

The most frequently expressed statement of the meaning

of “clear error” review was first provided by the Supreme

Court in United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364,

395 (1948): “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although

there is evidence to support it, the reviewing court on the

entire evidence is left with the definite and firm

conviction that a mistake has been committed.” The Court

has repeatedly used this formulation. See, e.g., Anderson,

470 U.S. at 573; McAllister v. United States, 348 U.S. 19,

20 (1954). The BIA itself repeated a portion of this

formulation when it rejected, under the “clear error”

standard, the IJ’s findings in this case. “There is clear

error in a factual finding when we are left with the

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”

In re Wu Lin, No. A088 517 180, at 1 (B.I.A. Apr. 30,

2012).

9

The “definite-and-firm-conviction” formulation provides

little, if any, guidance as to the circumstances that would

permit a reviewing court to conclude that a factfinder has

committed “clear error.” Indeed, the formulation can be

misleading if it is misunderstood to mean that a reviewing

court can reject a finding of fact simply because the court

subjectively believes that the factfinder was mistaken.

The formulation purports to be an explanation of when a

factfinder has committed “clear error,” but the key

question is what constitutes “clear error.”

The Supreme Court’s most quoted attempt to explain

“clear error” identifies what the phrase does not mean:

“[C]ertain general principles governing theexercise of the appellate court’s power tooverturn findings of a district court may bederived from our cases. . . . This standard[“clear error” review] plainly does not entitle areviewing court to reverse the finding of thetrier of fact simply because it is convinced thatit would have decided the case differently. Thereviewing court oversteps the bounds of its dutyunder Rule 52(a) if it undertakes to duplicate therole of the lower court. In applying the clearlyerroneous standard to the findings of a districtcourt sitting without a jury, appellate courtsmust constantly have in mind that their functionis not to decide factual issues de novo. If thedistrict court’s account of the evidence isplausible in light of the record viewed in itsentirety, the court of appeals may not reverse iteven though convinced that had it been sitting asthe trier of fact, it would have weighed theevidence differently.”

10

Anderson, 470 U.S. at 573-74 (citation and internal

quotation marks omitted).

Some examples of clear error can be readily imagined.

There might be no evidence at all to support a finding of

fact. Or the finding might be controverted by indisputable

evidence, as when indisputable evidence establishes that an

asylum witness claiming to have been beaten was at a

location far from where he claimed the beating occurred.

Of course, such extreme examples of clear error are not

likely to arise. A more likely example might arise where

an IJ has obviously misunderstood the testimony of a

witness and based a finding of fact on that

misunderstanding. Situations might also arise where the

evidence opposed to the claimant’s version, though not

indisputable, has overwhelming persuasive force. How

overwhelming the opposing evidence must be will often be a

close question for the entity applying clear error review

and for the court reviewing a clear error conclusion. What

is not in doubt, however, is that the phrase “clear error”

is to be taken literally: the error must be clear.

One aspect of “clear error” review that has been

generally recognized is that it is less deferential to a

factfinder than “substantial evidence” review. In

11

Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152-53 (1999), Justice

Breyer explained a significant difference between appellate

court application of the “clear error” standard to a bench

trial judge’s finding of fact (what he called “court/court

review”) and its application of the “substantial evidence”

standard to an agency’s finding of fact (what he called

“court/agency” review). “Traditionally, this court/court

standard of review has been considered somewhat stricter

(i.e., allowing somewhat closer judicial review) than the

APA's court/agency standards.” Id. at 153 (citing 2 Kenneth

Culp Davis & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Administrative Law

Treatise § 11.2 (3d ed. 1994)). In other words, even if

there is substantial evidence to support a finding of fact,

a reviewing court or an agency like the BIA can conclude,

with sufficient justification, that a “clear error” has

been committed.3 A leading treatise agrees: “If the

3 In Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 246-57 (2001),the Supreme Court, reviewing for clear error the findingsof fact of a three-judge district court in areapportionment case, made a meticulous analysis of thetestimony of several witnesses before concluding that clearerror had occurred. The Court’s approach might have beeninfluenced by the Court’s reluctance to interfere with astate legislature’s reapportionment decisions. “The Courtalso has made clear that the underlying districtingdecision is one that ordinarily falls within alegislature’s sphere of competence.” Id. at 242.

12

findings of fact are against the clear weight of the

evidence or the appellate court otherwise reaches a

definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made

by the trial court, the appellate court will set the

findings aside even though there is evidence supporting

them that, by itself, would be considered substantial.” 9C

Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice

and Procedure § 2585 (3d ed. 2007). With this

understanding of “clear error” review, we now turn to how

a court reviews a court or an agency decision rejecting a

finding of fact upon “clear error” review.

The most familiar context in which an appellate court

reviews another tribunal’s application of a “clear error”

standard to a finding of fact is the Supreme Court’s review

of a court of appeals decision that a district court’s

finding of fact is clearly erroneous. In this three-

layered context, the Supreme Court puts itself in the shoes

of the court of appeals and makes a de novo decision as to

whether it has a definite and firm conviction that a

mistake has been made. See Anderson, 470 U.S. at 577;

13

McAllister, 348 U.S. at 20-21.4 However, in the three-

layered context of court review of an agency’s application

of the “clear error” standard to an IJ’s finding of fact,

we have no authority to displace the BIA and apply the

“clear error” standard to an IJ’s finding of fact.

Courts of appeals conduct three-tiered court/agency

review in other contexts that are somewhat analogous to our

review of the BIA’s application of the “clear error”

standard, but these contexts are sufficiently different to

be unhelpful to our inquiry. The first concerns the Tax

Court. The Tax Court by rule has adopted a highly

deferential standard for reviewing a Special Trial Judge’s

recommended findings of fact. “[T]he findings of fact

recommended by the Special Trial Judge shall be presumed to

be correct.” Tax Ct. R. 183(d). Whether or not this

standard is as deferential as “clear error” review, Courts

of Appeals are statutorily instructed to review a Tax

4 Where the Supreme Court reviews a decision of a courtof appeals that has upheld a finding of a trial court, theCourt generally applies what it calls “the two-court rule,”declining to reexamine the finding. See, e.g., Graver Tank& Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275(1949) (“A court of law, such as this Court is, . . .cannot undertake to review concurrent findings of fact bytwo courts below in the absence of a very obvious andexceptional showing of error.”).

14

Court’s findings “to the same extent as decisions of the

district courts in civil actions tried without a jury,” 26

U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1), i.e., under the “clear error”

standard. We have no similar authority with respect to BIA

application of the “clear error” standard.

The second context concerns the Court of Appeals for

Veterans’ Claims. That Court applies “clear error” review

to a factual determination of the Board of Veterans’

Appeals. See 38 U.S.C. § 7261(a)(4). However, the Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which reviews rulings of

the Court of Appeals for Veterans’ Claims, is explicitly

precluded from reviewing a challenge to a factual

determination. See 38 U.S.C. § 7292(d)(2).

With no special guidance from these two possible

analogies, we are left with our traditional approach to

reviewing a ruling of law – de novo review. The BIA’s

application of “clear error” review is the application of

a legal standard to findings of fact and as such is a

ruling of law. See Kabba v. Mukasey, 530 F.3d 1239, 1245

(10th Cir. 2008). However, de novo review does not mean

that we can redetermine de novo whether we think the IJ has

committed clear error. It means that we must determine

15

whether the BIA has provided sufficient justification for

its conclusion that the IJ has committed clear error. It

also means that we must make sure that the BIA has not

violated the prohibition against making its own findings of

fact.

Sometimes the distinction between a BIA’s permissible

ruling that an IJ has committed clear error and the BIA’s

prohibited finding of fact might appear to turn on how the

BIA explains its decision. If the BIA says it “finds” that

the evidence establishes the opposite of what an IJ has

found, the BIA would appear to be finding a fact, which it

is not permitted to do. On the other hand, if the BIA says

that, after considering the entire record, it concludes

that the IJ has committed clear error in making a finding

of fact and provides a legally sufficient explanation for

its conclusion, its ruling will ordinarily be upheld.

We do not mean to imply that a BIA ruling “finding” a

fact to be the opposite of what an IJ had found must always

be rejected merely because the BIA used the terminology of

factfinding. Reviewing courts sometimes say that they

“find” that something is so, e.g., that a party’s legal

contention is invalid, even though they are not finding a

16

fact but, instead, stating a ruling of law. If, for

example, a reviewing court ascertains as a matter of law

that the evidentiary record cannot sustain an IJ’s factual

finding and therefore compels the conclusion reached by the

BIA, rejecting the BIA’s ruling merely because the BIA used

the wrong terminology in expressing a legally compelled

result would be senseless. At the same time, the BIA

should be mindful that careless use of factfinding

terminology when its intention is to rule, with

explanation, that an IJ’s factfinding was clearly erroneous

can cause confusion and unnecessary remands.

Just as we require an IJ to give “specific, cogent

reasons” to support rulings, see Cao He Lin v. U.S. Dep’t

of Justice, 428 F.3d 391, 400 (2d Cir. 2005) (internal

quotation marks omitted), we expect the BIA to supply

cogent reasons for its rulings. See Vitug v. Holder, 723

F.3d 1056, 1063 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Under clear error review,

if the BIA rejects a finding of the IJ, . . . the BIA [is]

obligated to explain why the IJ clearly erred in so

finding.”).

The three cases in this Circuit reversing the BIA for

an invalid application of the “clear error” standard

17

reflect this approach. Our first encounter with a BIA

decision ruling that an IJ’s finding of credibility was

clearly erroneous was Fen Yong Chen v. Bureau of

Citizenship & Immigration Services, 470 F.3d 509 (2d Cir.

2006). We rejected the BIA’s ruling. See id. at 514-15.

We noted that, although the IJ had explained why he

discounted inconsistencies between the applicant’s hearing

testimony and his prior credible fear interview, the BIA

“gave no explanation for why it rejected the IJ’s reasons

for discounting [that] interview.” Id. at 514. The BIA, we

ruled, “started anew, conducting its own credibility

analysis.” Id.

Similarly, in Sherpa v. Holder, 374 F. App’x 104 (2d

Cir. 2010), where the BIA rejected an IJ’s finding that the

applicant was credible, we rejected the BIA’s ruling

because the BIA had “reached its own credibility

determination.” Id. at 105. In Padmore v. Holder, 609 F.3d

62 (2d Cir. 2010), we ruled that the BIA had engaged in

impermissible factfinding in determining, contrary to an

IJ’s ruling, that cancellation of removal was not

18

warranted. See id. at 68-69.5

In the pending matter, the IJ found as a fact that Lin

was credible in testifying about his persecution because of

his Falun Gong activity. The IJ also was “satisfied” with

Lin’s explanation for his false statements at the border

and credible fear interviews. The IJ specifically credited

Lin’s testimony that he feared being returned to China and

forfeiting money unless he gave the two prior statements as

instructed by the snakeheads. That threat, the IJ found,

“is an example . . . of the power of the snakeheads.”

In rejecting the IJ’s findings, the BIA first stated

the indisputable fact that Lin had presented three

different asylum claims, i.e., his release of two women at

the family planning office, his opposition to his

girlfriend’s abortion, and his persecution for practicing

Falun Gong.

The BIA ruled that Lin’s explanations for the first two

claims, which he recanted at his hearing, “are not

5 In Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2008), wefound no error in the BIA’s finding of subsidiary factsbearing on whether Ji Wen Shi, one of the three asylumclaimants, had an objectively reasonable fear ofpersecution because the parties had consented tofactfinding by introducing new evidence before the BIA. Seeid. at 162.

19

plausible or consistent.” The BIA offered two reasons for

this ruling. First, “[Lin] has not demonstrated that he

would not have had to pay the smuggling fees regardless of

whether he was successful on his asylum claim.” [Id.] The

BIA gave no indication as to how Lin might have

demonstrated that the snakeheads would have delivered on

their threat. We cannot imagine that the BIA expected Lin

to call the snakeheads as witnesses. There is no

indication that their whereabouts at the time of the

hearing was known. More important, the issue, pertinent to

Lin’s credibility, was not whether the snakeheads would

have carried out their threat, but whether Lin believed

that they would, and gave his false versions because of

that belief.

We can readily understand the BIA’s skepticism that Lin

was being truthful in stating his third reason for seeking

asylum after stating, at his border and credible fear

interviews, two reasons that were false. Prior false

testimony is often a basis for disbelieving a witness’s

later testimony. But the issue for the BIA was not whether

Lin was telling the truth when he gave his third reason for

seeking asylum. That was an issue of fact for the IJ. The

20

issue for the BIA was whether it had sufficient

justification for ruling that the IJ had clearly erred in

finding that Lin’s third reason was truthful.

The IJ not only found that the third reason was

truthful, but explained why he so found. First, he counted

in Lin’s favor the fact that Lin came forward and

acknowledged the falsity of his two prior reasons. Second,

he deemed entirely plausible Lin’s explanation that he gave

false reasons because he was threatened by the snakeheads

to do so. See Kabba, 530 F.3d at 1246 (“[T]he IJ found that

[the claimant] offered a legitimate explanation. This was

a factual finding entitled to deference on review.”).

Third, he considered Lin’s demeanor supportive of the

truthfulness of his hearing testimony. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

52(a) (“[T]he reviewing court must give due regard to the

trial court's opportunity to judge the witnesses'

credibility.”).

In view of the IJ’s explanation for his finding, the

BIA did not provide us, as a reviewing court, with a

supportable basis for its conclusion that Lin’s explanation

for his initial false testimony was not “plausible” and its

consequent ruling that the IJ committed clear error.

21

The BIA also deemed Lin’s explanations “inconsistent.”

The first example of a claimed inconsistency was that when

asked to explain his false versions before the IJ, he first

testified that he “had no idea about American laws” when he

was apprehended at the border, but later testified that he

was informed about asylum law before the critical fear

interview. These statements, however, are not

inconsistent. Nothing in the record undermines Lin’s

unsurprising testimony that he knew nothing about American

law when he was apprehended at the border. That lack of

knowledge is not inconsistent with his testimony that after

his release from custody, which preceded his credible fear

interview, he “consult[ed] with a lawyer” and “then I

realized American law protects people from being

persecuted.” Thus, the record refutes the BIA’s first

claimed inconsistency.

The BIA’s second example of a claimed inconsistency in

Lin’s testimony was his statement that he did not talk with

his attorney while he was in custody and his later

statement that he was represented by an attorney while in

custody. Again, there is no inconsistency. It is

regrettable, but not uncommon, that a person in custody has

not spoken to his lawyer until after his release from

22

custody. Lin also testified that, while in custody, the

lawyer’s “assistant telephone[d] me,” but the record does

not indicate that the assistant was a lawyer. The BIA’s

second claimed inconsistency is not supported by the

record.

On this record, the BIA’s “clear error” rejection of

the IJ’s findings is not adequately supported and must

itself be rejected. On remand, the BIA will have to either

accept the IJ’s findings or, if it can, provide a

supportable basis for rejecting them.

Conclusion

The petition for review is granted, and the case is

remanded for further consideration consistent with this

opinion.

23

DENNIS JACOBS, Circuit Judge, concurring in the grant of the petition for reviewand remand to the BIA for further consideration:

Petitioner has advanced three successive reasons for needing asylum. 

Each is an archetypal asylum narrative: (1) helping women escape an abortion

clinic, (2) opposing his girlfriend’s forced abortion, (3) practicing Falun Gong. 

The immigration judge (“IJ”) credited the third narrative after Petitioner

withdrew the first two, and granted asylum.  The Bureau of Immigration

Appeals (“BIA”) was “left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake

[was] committed,” see United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948),

and therefore rejected the IJ’s credibility finding as clearly erroneous and denied

relief. 

No one can doubt that, considering (as must be done) the totality of

circumstances, there is room for profound skepticism.  The reason for

persecution is the essence of an asylum claim; it is implausible that anyone forced

from his land by persecution would not know why; yet this Petitioner lied about

it (at least) twice.  The majority remands for the BIA to adduce further reasons for

its definite and firm conviction that Petitioner is lying now.    

1

I

I agree with the majority opinion as to the legal standards that govern our

review of the BIA.  The BIA’s review of the IJ’s fact‐finding is for clear error. 

When the BIA has concluded that clear error has been committed, our review is

not de novo; rather, we decide whether the BIA has provided sufficient

justification for its conclusion.  Inherent in this distinction is the possibility that

the BIA might believe the IJ committed clear error, while we might believe the IJ

did not, and both conclusions might have “sufficient justification.”  

I deviate from the majority opinion because, in my view, the BIA had

ample reason to conclude that clear error was committed, given that the BIA

reviews the totality of circumstances, and that the circumstances include two

prior false narratives.  But I concur rather than dissent because I see no harm in a

remand to the BIA (to explain the obvious), and because specificity of reasons is

good practice.

2

II

The REAL ID Act directs the agency to make a credibility determination in

asylum proceedings based on the “totality of the circumstances” and “all

relevant factors.”  8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).  Among the factors bearing on

credibility listed in the statute are candor, the inherent plausibility of the

applicant or witness’s account, and consistency of account.  Id.  Thus an adverse

credibility determination may be premised even on inconsistencies that do not

“directly relate to the applicant’s claim of persecution,” so long as the totality of

the circumstances establish that an applicant is not credible.  Xiu Xia Lin v.

Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 164‐65 (2d Cir. 2008) (per curiam) (“Under the standard

established by the REAL ID Act, an IJ is required to evaluate inconsistencies in

light of the ‘totality of the circumstances.’”).   

 “A finding is ‘clearly erroneous’ when although there is evidence to

support it, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been committed.”  U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S.

at 395.  This formulation of clear error coincides nearly verbatim with the BIA’s

own regulations governing its standard of review.  See Board of Immigration

Appeals: Procedural Reforms To Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg.

3

54,878‐01, at 54,889 (Aug. 26, 2002) (citing Anderson v. City of Bessemer, 470 U.S.

564, 573 (1985)).  

The BIA determined that Petitioner’s explanations for his lies “are not

plausible or consistent,” and that the IJ committed clear error in determining that

Petitioner “reasonably and credibly explained his repeated lies to immigration

officials.”  Certified Administrative Record (“CAR”), at pp.4‐5.  The BIA is the

agency charged with administering our nation’s immigration laws, and so it is

their definite and firm conviction that matters, not ours.  

Among the totality of circumstances here are Lin’s shifting claims.  On

September 3, 2007, he issued a sworn statement that he feared returning to China

because he released two pregnant women while working for a birth control

facility.  During his credible fear interview with an asylum officer ten days later,

he testified that he feared returning to China because his mistress suffered a

forced abortion, which he opposed.  None of those things ever happened to Lin. 

At his hearing before the IJ, he recanted the stories about his heroism in the clinic

and the tragedy of his girlfriend’s forced abortion, and unveiled the entirely new

claim that he suffered persecution in China for practicing Falun Gong, the

account that was credited by the IJ.  

4

To support its conclusion that the BIA improperly applied clear error

review, the majority opinion principally relies on Chen v. Bureau of Citizenship

& Immigration Services, 470 F.3d 509 (2d Cir. 2006).  In that case, the BIA ruled

that discrepancies between the asylum applications and the asylum interview

were dispositive as to that petitioner’s credibility.  We remanded because the BIA

had substituted its (adverse) credibility finding for the IJ’s, without “point[ing] to

any misstatements of fact, errors in analysis, flawed reasoning, or improper

applications of law,” and thus performed (impermissible) de novo review.  Id. at

514.  Chen does not control the present case.  In Chen, the discrepancies were in

the details of the asylum claim, such as how Chen managed to escape from

family planning officials after he was arrested.  Id. at 512.  Here, the falsehoods

are not mere discrepancies concerning particulars; the two recanted falsehoods

(like the third account) concern why Petitioner needs asylum at all.  Cf. Ye v.

Depʹt of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Because the BIA has

identified a material inconsistency in an aspect of [Petitioner’s] story that served

as an example of the very persecution from which he sought asylum, we hold

that the inconsistency afforded substantial evidence to support the adverse

credibility finding.” (citations and quotation marks omitted)).

5

III

Lin told the IJ that he advanced the two false (coercive population control)

claims because he was told to do so by the snakeheads, who threatened that

otherwise, if he were returned to China, his smuggling fees would not be

forgiven.  

There are sufficient reasons, implicit in the facts, for rejecting this

explanation.  The plausibility of the explanation for outright fabrication is itself

sapped by the lie it is offered to explain.  Moreover, as the BIA pointed out, there

is no indication that Lin would ever be relieved of his obligation to pay the

snakeheads the smuggling fees, regardless of whether his asylum claim was

successful.  Snakeheads do not have the refund policy of American department

stores.

Moreover, the three successive accounts are not incompatible; so the

snakeheads’ requirement that he proffer one false account or another does not

logically preclude his offering the truth, if only as belt and suspenders.  Neither

the IJ nor the majority has posited a plausible explanation for why the Falun

Gong fears were omitted.  See Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 166 n.3 (2d

6

Cir. 2008) (“An inconsistency and an omission are, for [credibility] purposes,

functionally equivalent.”). 

The majority argues that the proper question is not whether the

snakeheads would actually carry out their threat, but rather whether Lin believed

they would and committed perjury “because of that belief.”  Maj. Op. at ____. 

However, any such subjective belief must still be objectively reasonable.  Cf.

Ramsameachire v. Ashcroft, 357 F.3d 169, 178 (2d Cir. 2004) (“[A] well‐founded

fear of future persecution . . . requires that the alien present credible testimony

that he subjectively fears persecution and establish that his fear is objectively

reasonable.”).

It is not objectively reasonable to believe that snakeheads conduct their

business on honorable principles, that they give refunds, that any undertakings

by them can be enforced in any forum, or even that they can be found for

enforcement of contract obligations.  

Additionally or alternatively, Lin claims that he failed to advance his Falun

Gong claim because he “had no idea about American laws.”  CAR at p.4.  The

plausible inference is that, if Lin had known that practicing Falun Gong was a

valid basis for an asylum claim, he would have made it in his initial interviews. 

7

But Lin was given an open‐ended opportunity to tell the immigration officials

about any fear he had about being sent to China.  He was advised: 

U.S. law provides protection to certain persons who face persecution, harmor torture upon return to their home country.  If you fear or have a concernabout being removed from the United States or about being sent home,you should tell me so during this interview because you may not haveanother chance.

CAR at pp.197, 295.  

The BIA and the majority opinion consider whether Lin made any

inconsistent statements about speaking to a lawyer.  But those questions bear

only upon when Lin would have become aware that Falun Gong was his ticket to

stay in the United States.  So it does not matter whether Lin made any

inconsistent statements about speaking to or being represented by a lawyer. 

Nothing about his supposed ignorance of our law accounts for why he did not

express a supposedly truthful fear of persecution for practicing Falun Gong,

either on September 3 or September 13, 2007.  He was told to tell the truth, the

interviews were conducted in Mandarin (which Lin said was his best language),

and there is no evidence that Lin failed to understand the questions.  See Yun Zui

Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 398‐99 (2d Cir. 2005) (noting factors to determine

reliability of asylum and credible fear interviews, including whether alien

8

understood the questions posed and whether those questions elicited details of

an asylum claim).  

Ignorance of American asylum law cannot assist Lin unless he was

ignorant of the obligation to tell the truth, notwithstanding that that obligation

was impressed upon him  by immigration officials.  In another context, we have

held that “even an alien who is unfamiliar with the technicalities of immigration

law can, under certain circumstances, be expected to comprehend that he has

received ineffective assistance without being explicitly told so by an attorney.” 

Rashid v. Mukasey, 533 F.3d 127, 132 (2d Cir. 2008).  It makes no sense to impose

on aliens stricter requirements to know that their lawyer is being ineffective than

for knowing their own reasons for being afraid to return to their home country. 

Cf. Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991) (“The general rule that

ignorance of the law or a mistake of law is no defense . . . is deeply rooted in the

American legal system.”).  

In any event, truth is not a quirk of American procedure.

*   *   *

I understand entirely the reasons why the BIA formed a “definite and firm

conviction” that a mistake has been made.  For that reason, however, the remand

9

will entail no heavy lifting on the part of the BIA, and when it comes to reasoned

dispositions, more cannot hurt. 

10

14‐2343Lora v. Shanahan

In the1

United States Court of Appeals2

For the Second Circuit3

________4

5

August Term, 20146

No. 14‐2343‐pr 7

8

ALEXANDER LORA,9

10

Petitioner‐Appellee,11

12

v.13

14

CHRISTOPHER SHANAHAN, in his official capacity as New York Field15

Officer Director for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement;16

DIANE MCCONNELL, in her official capacity as Assistant Field Office17

Director for U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; THOMAS S.18

WINKOWSKI, in his official capacity as Principal Deputy Assistant19

Director of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; JEH20

JOHNSON, in his official capacity as Secretary of the U.S. Department21

of Homeland Security; LORETTA E. LYNCH, in her official capacity as22

the Attorney General of the United States;1 and the U.S. DEPARTMENT23

OF HOMELAND SECURITY,224

25

Respondents‐Appellants.26

______27

28

Appeal from the United States District Court29

for the Southern District of New York.30

No. 14 Civ. 2140(AJP)   Andrew J. Peck, Magistrate Judge.31

1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 43(c)(2), Attorney General Loretta E. Lynch isautomatically substituted for former Attorney General Eric H. Holder, Jr.2 The Clerk of the Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.

________1

2

Argued: April 20, 20153

Decided: October 28, 20154

________5

Before: KEARSE, PARKER, and WESLEY, Circuit Judges.6

________7

The government appeals from a judgment of the United States8

District Court for the Southern District of New York (Peck, Andrew9

J., M.J.)3 granting Alexander Lora’s petition for a writ of habeas10

corpus.  Lora was detained pursuant to section 1226(c) of the11

Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which12

mandates detention, while their removal proceedings are pending,13

of non‐citizens who have committed certain criminal offenses. 14

Because section 1226(c) is ambiguous, we defer to the Board of15

Immigration Authority’s (“BIA’s”) interpretation that detention need16

not be immediate in order to be mandatory.  We also find that the17

statute applies even if the non‐citizen is not released from a custodial18

sentence.  However, we hold that reading section 1226(c) to permit19

indefinite detention raises significant constitutional concerns, and to20

avoid them, we construe the statute to contain an implicit temporal21

limitation on the length of time a detainee can be held before being 22

afforded an opportunity to seek bail.  Affirmed.23

________24

CHRISTOPHER CONNOLLY (Sarah S. Normand, on25

the brief), Assistant United States Attorneys for26

Preet Bharara, United States Attorney for the27

Southern District of New York, for Respondents‐28

Appellants.29

30

3 The parties consented to Magistrate Judge Andrew Peck’s jurisdiction over the case under 28 U.S.C. §636(c). (Dkt. Entry No. 9.)

2

REBECCA A. HUFSTADER, Legal Intern, LUIS ANGEL1

REYES SAVALZA, Legal Intern, (Alina Das and2

Nancy Morawetz, on the brief), Washington Square3

Legal Services, Inc., NYU Law School, New York,4

NY; Bridget Kessler, Brooklyn Defender Services,5

Brooklyn, NY, on the brief, for Petitioner‐Appelleee.6

AHILAN  ARULANANTHAM,  ACLU  Immigrants’7

Rights Project, Los Angeles, CA; Judy Rabinovitz8

and  Anand  Balakrishnan,  ACLU  Immigrants’9

Rights  Project,  New  York,  NY;  Alexis  Karteron10

and  Jordan  Wells,  New  York  Civil  Liberties11

Union Foundation, New York, NY, on the brief, for12

Amici  Curiae  American  Civil  Liberties Union; New13

York Civil Liberties Union.14

Andrea  Saenz,  Immigration  Justice  Clinic,15

Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, New York,16

NY, for Amici Curiae the Bronx Defenders; Detention17

Watch  Network;  Families  for  Freedom;  Immigrant18

Defense  Project;  Immigrant  Legal  Resource  Center;19

Kathryn  O.  Greenberg  Immigration  Justice  Clinic;20

Make the Road New York; National Immigrant Justice21

Center; National  Immigration Project of  the National22

Lawyers  Guild;  Neighborhood  Defender  Service  of23

Harlem; New Sanctuary Coalition of New York City;24

Northern Manhattan Coalition for Immigrant Rights.25

Farrin R. Anello, Immigrants’ Rights/International26

Human  Rights  Clinic,  Seton  Hall  University27

School  of  Law,  Newark,  NJ,  for  Amici  Curiae28

Professors of Immigration and Constitutional Law.29

________30

31

3

BARRINGTON D. PARKER, Circuit Judge1

________2

In 1996, with the passage of the Illegal Immigration Reform3

and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”), Congress significantly4

expanded the categories of non‐citizens subject to mandatory5

detention pending their removal proceedings.4  Under section6

1226(c) of the revised INA, the Department of Homeland Security7

(“DHS”) is required to detain aliens who have committed certain8

crimes “when [they are] released.”  The section contains no explicit9

provision for bail.5  When the constitutionality of section 1226(c) was10

challenged in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), statistics showed11

that removal proceedings were completed within forty‐seven days in12

eighty‐five percent of cases in which aliens were mandatorily13

detained.  Id. at 529.  Emphasizing the relative brevity of detention in14

most cases, the Court concluded that detention during removal15

proceedings was “constitutionally permissible.”  Id. at 531. 16

However, the passage of the IIRIRA, which, among other17

things, expanded the definition of criminal aliens and required states18

to provide notice of aliens who violate state criminal laws, combined19

with a simultaneous rise in immigration to the United States, has20

resulted in an enormous increase in the number of aliens taken into21

custody pending removal.6  By 2009, Immigration and Customs22

4 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Div. C, §§ 303, 305, 110 Stat.3009–585, 3009–598 to 3009–599; 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c),1231(a) (1994 ed., Supp. V).5 Congress adopted section 1226(c) in an effort to strengthen and streamline the process of removingdeportable criminal aliens “against a backdrop of wholesale failure by the INS to deal with increasingrates of criminal activity by aliens” and “evidence that one of the major causes of the INS’ failure toremove deportable criminal aliens was the agency’s failure to detain those aliens during their removalproceedings.”  Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518–19 (2003).  6 See U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the Federal Detention Trustee, Detention Needs Assessment andBaseline Report: A Compendium of Federal Detention Statistics 14 (2001),http://www.justice.gov/archive/ofdt/compendium_final.pdf (“The number of aliens ordered detained andtaken into the custody of the INS pending removal from the United States or other outcome of animmigration proceeding increased from 72,154 during FY 1994 to 188,547 during FY 2001.”).

4

Enforcement (“ICE”) was imprisoning close to four hundred1

thousand aliens every year, two‐thirds of whom were subject to2

mandatory detention under section 1226(c).7  Not surprisingly, the3

time that each immigrant spends in detention has also risen4

substantially.  In 2001, the average time an alien was detained from5

the initiation of removal proceedings to release or entry of a final6

order of removal was approximately thirty‐nine days.8  In 2003, the7

average detention time for most section 1226(c) detainees was8

approximately forty‐seven days.  See Demore, 538 U.S. at 529.  Since9

then, the situation has worsened considerably.  ICE has not provided10

statistics regarding the length of time that mandatory detainees11

spend in detention.  It is clear, however, that today, a non‐citizen12

detained under section 1226(c) who contests his or her removal13

regularly spends many months and sometimes years in detention14

due to the enormous backlog in immigration proceedings.9  There15

are thousands of individuals in immigration detention within the16

jurisdiction of this Court who languish in county jails and in short‐17

term and permanent ICE facilities.18

No doubt an appreciable number of these detainees have19

criminal records that subject them to mandatory deportation.  Many20

in this group are dangerous or have no ties to a community.21

Congress was quite clear that it wanted such individuals detained22

pending deportation.  On the other hand, this group includes non‐23

citizens who, for a variety of individualized reasons, are not24

dangerous, have strong family and community ties, are not flight25

7 See Dora Schriro, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Immigration and Customs Enforcement,Immigration Detention Overview and Recommendations 2 (2009),http://www.ice.gov/doclib/about/offices/odpp/pdf/ice‐detention‐rpt.pdf (stating that, as of reportʹspublication date, over 370,000 noncitizens had been detained in the preceding fiscal year and estimatingthat 66% of detained noncitizens are held pursuant to mandatory detention).8 Detention Needs Assessment and Baseline Report: A Compendium of Federal Detention Statistics, supra note 6,at 15 n.41.9 See Mark Noferi, Cascading Constitutional Deprivation: The Right To AppointedCounsel For Mandatorily Detained Immigrants Pending Removal Proceedings, 18 Mich. J. Race & L. 63, 80–82(2012) (discussing how immigrants may face prolonged detention as average case processing times nowexceed one year).

5

risks and may have meritorious defenses to deportation at such time1

as they are able to present them.  2

One such detainee is Alexander Lora, a lawful permanent3

resident (“LPR”) and citizen of the Dominican Republic, who was4

convicted of drug related offenses, sentenced to probation, and taken5

into custody by ICE agents pursuant to section 1226(c), over three6

years into his five‐year probation term.  After four months in7

immigration custody, Lora petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus. 8

He contended, among other things, that he was eligible to apply for9

bail because the mandatory detention provision of section 1226(c)10

did not apply to him because he had not been taken into custody11

“when released” and that indefinite incarceration without an12

opportunity to apply for bail violated his right to due process. 13

His petition was granted by the District Court (Peck, M.J.). 14

Magistrate Judge Peck agreed with Lora’s statutory argument, did15

not reach his constitutional argument, and ordered that Lora be16

afforded a bail hearing.  At that hearing, the government did not17

contest his eligibility for bail.  Following the parties’ stipulation that18

Lora, who was gainfully employed and had substantial family ties to19

his community, was not dangerous and posed no risk of flight, the20

immigration judge (“IJ”) ordered Lora’s release conditioned on his21

posting a $5000 bond.  This appeal followed.  22

The main issue of statutory construction driving this appeal is23

whether, as Lora argues and the District Court ruled, the “when24

released” provision of section 1226(c) applies only if the government25

takes an alien into immigration custody immediately following his26

release from a custodial sentence or whether, as the government27

argues, an alien is subject to mandatory detention even if DHS does28

not detain him immediately upon release.  On this issue we agree29

with the government and conclude that Lora was subject to30

mandatory detention under section 1226(c).  31

6

However, we agree with Lora’s constitutional argument. 1

While the Supreme Court has held “that the Government may2

constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the limited period3

necessary for their removal proceedings,” Demore, 538 U.S. at 526, it4

has made clear that the indefinite detention of a non‐citizen “raise[s]5

serious constitutional concerns” in that “[f]reedom from6

imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other forms7

of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the Due8

Process] Clause protects,” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 682, 6909

(2001).  Following this guidance, we hold that, in order to avoid10

significant constitutional concerns surrounding the application of11

section 1226(c), it must be read to contain an implicit temporal12

limitation.  In reaching this result, we join every other circuit to have13

considered this issue.10  Specifically, we join the Ninth Circuit in14

holding that mandatory detention for longer than six months15

without a bond hearing affronts due process.  See Rodriguez v.16

Robbins, 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013).11  Accordingly, we affirm the17

District Court’s decision to grant the petition.18

BACKGROUND19

Lora entered the United States as a lawful permanent resident20

(“LPR”) from the Dominican Republic in 1990 when he was seven21

years old.  For the next nineteen years, Lora lived continuously in22

Brooklyn, New York where he has a large family network, including23

his U.S. citizen fiancée, chronically‐ill U.S. citizen mother, LPR24

father, and U.S. citizen brother and sister.  Lora has two sons whom25

he supports: a two‐year‐old son who is a U.S. citizen and lives in the26

United States and an eight‐year‐old son who lives in the Dominican27

Republic.  During the nearly two decades that Lora has spent in this28

country, he attended school and worked in grocery stores to support29

himself and his family.30

10 The government, too, agrees that aliens cannot be detained indefinitely.  Gov’t Reply Br. at 25.  11 Lora was detained for five‐and‐a‐half months, and it is certain that, were he to be returned to custody,his total period of detention would exceed six months.

7

In July 2009, while working at a grocery store, Lora was1

arrested with one of his co‐workers and charged with several New2

York state offenses relating to cocaine possession.  In July 2010, Lora3

pled guilty to criminal possession of cocaine with intent to sell,4

criminal possession of cocaine with an aggregate weight of one5

ounce or more, and criminal use of drug paraphernalia in violation6

of New York Penal Law §§ 220.16, 220.50.  Lora was sentenced to7

five years of probation.  He was not sentenced to any period of8

incarceration and he did not violate any of the conditions of his9

probation. 10

On November 22, 2013, over three years into his probation11

term, ICE agents arrested Lora in an early morning raid in the12

Brooklyn neighborhood where he was living at the time.  After the13

agents took Lora into custody, he was transferred to Hudson County14

Correctional Center in Kearny, New Jersey, where he was detained15

without bond.  Lora was charged with removability under INA §16

237(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B), for having been convicted of a17

crime involving a controlled substance, and INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), 818

U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), for having been convicted of an19

aggravated felony, namely, trafficking in a controlled substance as20

defined in INA § 101(a)(43)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(B).  DHS took21

the position that Lora’s removal charges rendered him subject to22

mandatory detention under section 1226(c) and that he was not23

eligible for a bail hearing.24

While his removal proceedings were pending, Lora moved in25

New York state court to set aside his conviction.  His motion was26

granted on consent and in March 2014, his original plea and sentence27

were vacated.  Lora was then permitted to plead to a minor28

offense—a single count of third degree possession of a controlled29

substance—and was re‐sentenced to a conditional discharge30

imposed nunc pro tunc to July 21, 2010.  With this new sentence, Lora31

now has a strong argument for cancellation of removal under 1226(c)32

because third degree possession is a Class B felony under N.Y. Penal33

8

Law § 220.16(12) and does not qualify as an aggravated felony for1

immigration purposes under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii); 1228b.12 2

However, he is still technically subject to mandatory detention under3

section 1226(c) because he had been convicted of a crime involving a4

controlled substance under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i).  In March5

2014, Lora requested that he be permitted to file an application for6

cancellation of removal and that he be afforded a bail hearing.  The IJ7

granted Lora’s request to file for cancellation of removal but denied8

Lora’s request for a bail hearing.13 9

At the same time, Lora filed a petition for a writ of habeas10

corpus, challenging his continued detention.  Lora argued that he11

was not subject to mandatory detention under section 1226(c), which12

requires an alien to be taken into DHS custody “when the alien is13

released” because DHS did not take him into custody at the precise14

time “when” he was released on his underlying convictions, but15

years later, and that he could not have been detained when he was16

“released” because he was never incarcerated or kept in physical17

custody following his triggering conviction.  Lora also argued that18

his continued imprisonment without a bail hearing raised19

constitutional concerns under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth20

Amendment in light of his substantial defenses to removal and the21

strong possibility of his indefinitely prolonged detention.  Finally,22

Lora raised the alternative argument that his continued detention23

12 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a) (“The Attorney General may cancel removal in the case of an alien who isinadmissible or deportable from the United States if the alien‐‐(1) has been an alien lawfully admitted forpermanent residence for not less than 5 years, (2) has resided in the United States continuously for 7 yearsafter having been admitted in any status, and (3) has not been convicted of any aggravated felony.”). Lora was admitted to the United States in 1990, has worked and resided in this country ever since, andhas strong family ties and responsibilities including serving as the primary caretaker of his U.S. citizenson.  See March 26, 2014, Declaration of Talia Peleg, Esq. (“Given Mr. Lora’s residence in the United Statesas a green card holder, his strong family and community ties here, and other relevant factors, it is myopinion that he has a strong defense to his deportation.”).13 Lora’s cancellation of removal proceedings are still pending, but because he is no longer detained, hisremoval proceedings have been taken off of the expedited track. Due to a backlog in non‐detainedremoval proceedings, his merits hearing on his application for cancellation of removal is currentlyscheduled for January 2018. 

9

was not in the public interest, and that he should be released on1

parole.2

The District Court granted Lora’s petition, holding that3

section 1226(c)’s “clear language” requires that DHS detain aliens4

immediately upon their release from criminal custody, and because5

Lora was not detained until years after the criminal conviction that6

formed the basis of his removal charge, he was not subject to7

mandatory detention.  In the alternative, the District Court also8

found that Lora was not subject to mandatory detention because he9

did not serve a post‐conviction custodial sentence in connection with10

his criminal offense and so was never “released” from custody.  The11

District Court directed the government to provide Lora with an12

individualized bail hearing by May 15, 2014, which was the date of13

his next hearing before the IJ.  The government did not seriously14

dispute that Lora was neither a flight risk nor a danger to the15

community and the IJ ordered that Lora be released from custody16

after posting a $5000 bond.  Insofar as the record reveals, since being17

admitted to bail, Lora remains gainfully employed, tied to his18

community and poised to contest his removability once DHS clears19

its backlog sufficiently to afford him a hearing.  20

The government appeals, contesting the District Court’s21

interpretation of section 1226(c).  The government maintains that,22

even though Lora no longer stands convicted of an aggravated23

felony, he is still deportable and subject to mandatory detention as a24

result of his conviction under a law relating to a controlled25

substance.  Notably, the government does not take the position that26

it should be permitted to hold immigrants indefinitely.  Rather, it27

contends that due process requires a “fact‐dependent inquiry” as to28

the allowable length of detention and there should be no bright‐line29

rule for when detention becomes presumptively unreasonable. 30

Gov’t Reply Br. at 25.31

32

10

DISCUSSION1

When the government seeks removal of an alien, an IJ can2

ordinarily conduct a bail hearing to decide whether the alien should3

be released or imprisoned while proceedings are pending. 4

However, 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) requires the mandatory detention, for5

the duration of their removal proceedings, of aliens convicted of6

certain crimes.  The portion of section 1226(c)(1) applicable to Lora7

provides: 8

9

(1) Custody10

The Attorney General shall take into11

custody any alien who . . . 12

(B)  is  deportable  by  reason  of  having13

committed  any  offense  covered  in  section14

1227(a)(2)(A)(ii),(A)(iii),  (B),  (C),  or  (D)  of15

this  title  [i.e.  specified  offenses  including16

controlled substance offenses]; . . . when the17

alien  is  released, without  regard  to whether18

the  alien  is  released on parole,  supervised19

release, or probation, and without regard to20

whether  the  alien  may  be  arrested  or21

imprisoned again for the same offense.22

23

(2) Release24

The Attorney General may release an alien25

described  in  paragraph  (1)  only  if  the26

Attorney General decides . . . that release of27

the  alien  from  custody  is  necessary  [for28

certain  witness  protection  purposes],  and29

the alien satisfies the Attorney General that30

the  alien  will  not  pose  a  danger  to  the31

safety of other persons or of property and is32

likely  to  appear  for  any  scheduled33

proceeding. . . . 34

11

1

8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)–(2) (emphasis added).  2

Thus, detention without a bail hearing under section 1226(c) is3

mandatory unless DHS determines that an alien falls within a4

narrow witness‐protection exception not applicable here.  See 85

U.S.C. § 1226(c)(2).  However, the clause in paragraph (1), “when the6

alien is released,” has been the source of persistent confusion and7

extensive litigation in this Circuit and elsewhere.  8

This case calls for us to decide: (1) whether an alien is subject9

to mandatory detention only if he or she has been sentenced to and10

“released” from prison or some form of physical custody; and (2)11

whether an alien is subject to mandatory detention if there is a gap12

between the alien’s being on post‐conviction release and his or her13

confinement by DHS.14  Although these are issues of first impression14

for this Court, other circuits as well as numerous district courts, both15

within and outside of this Circuit, have addressed the issue but16

remain divided on how to apply section 1226(c).1517

Meaning of “Released”18

The government argues that the Court should reject the19

District Court’s holding that Lora is not subject to mandatory20

detention because he was never “released” from a post‐conviction21

sentence of incarceration.  The government relies on two BIA cases22

14 Because this appeal raises questions of law as to the interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), we review theDistrict Courtʹs decision on how to interpret the statute de novo.  See Puello v. Bureau of Citizenship &Immigration Servs., 511 F.3d 324, 327 (2d Cir. 2007).  15 Compare Olmos v. Holder, 780 F.3d 1313, 1324 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that even if there was a delay afteralien was released before the alien was taken into immigration custody, mandatory detention stillapplies), and Sylvain v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 714 F.3d 150, 156–61 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that immigrationofficials do not lose authority to impose mandatory detention if they fail to do so “when the alien isreleased”), and Hosh v. Lucero, 680 F.3d 375, 378–84 (4th Cir. 2012) (holding that a criminal alien who is notimmediately taken into immigration custody after his release from criminal custody is not exempt fromsection 1226(c)’s mandatory detention provision), with Castañeda v. Souza, 769 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 2014)(interpreting “when” as signifying that DHS can subject an alien to mandatory detention only if it detainsthe alien at or around the time the alien is released from criminal custody), reh’g en banc granted, opinionwithdrawn, Jan. 23, 2015.

12

in which the Board determined that the word “released” in section1

1226(c) includes pre‐conviction release from arrests.16  See In re2

Kotliar, 24 I. & N. Dec. 124, 125 (2007) (“[W]e have held that an alien3

who is released from criminal custody[,] . . . including from an arrest4

preceding a conviction, . . . is subject to mandatory detention.”); In re5

West, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1405, 1410 (2000).  West and Kotliar also suggest6

that the alien must be released from some form of physical custody7

for § 1226(c)(1) to apply.  See, e.g., West, 22 I & N. Dec. at 1410 (“[W]e8

construe the word ‘released’ . . . to refer to a release from physical9

custody.”).  The government urges that, consistent with these cases,10

“released” can refer to a release from pre‐conviction confinement,11

such as an arrest.  12

Because we find that section 1226(c)(1) unambiguously13

mandates detention in this circumstance for other reasons, we need14

not confront the BIA decisions or the government’s interpretation of15

them.  See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.16

837, 842–43 (1984).  “[D]eference to [an agencyʹs] statutory17

interpretation is called for only when the devices of judicial18

construction have been tried and found to yield no clear sense of19

congressional intent.”  Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 540 U.S.20

581, 600 (2004) (citing INS v. Cardoza–Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446–4821

(1987)).  A natural reading of the statute suggests that the term22

“released” in section 1226(c) means not incarcerated, not imprisoned,23

not detained, i.e., not in physical custody.  See Demore, 538 U.S. at 51324

(“Congress[ was] justifiably concerned that deportable criminal25

aliens who are not detained continue to engage in crime and fail to26

appear for their removal hearings . . . .”).  Thus, detention is27

mandated once an alien is convicted of a crime described in section28

1226(c)(1) and is not incarcerated, imprisoned, or otherwise29

detained.  This interpretation avoids nullifying the provision in30

section 1226(c)(1) that DHS “shall take into custody any alien who . .31

. is inadmissible [or] is deportable by reason of having committed [a32

16 The Third Circuit has deferred to the BIA’s interpretation and has held that a pre‐conviction releasefollowing arrest satisfies section 1226(c)’s release requirement.  See Sylvain, 714 F.3d at 161. 

13

certain type of crime] . . . when the alien is released, without regard to1

whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation”2

(emphasis added)—which clearly contemplates non‐carceral3

sentences.  See, e.g., TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001)4

(noting that statutes should be read to avoid making any provisions5

“superfluous, void, or insignificant” (internal quotation marks6

omitted)).  Moreover, where Congress has intended to limit7

detention to aliens sentenced to a certain prison term, it has done so8

explicitly.  See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) (alien is not eligible for a9

visa or admission if the alien has committed a crime involving moral10

turpitude for which a sentence of at least six months has been11

imposed).  Accordingly, we conclude that an alien who has been12

convicted of a qualifying crime under section 1226(c) is subject to13

mandatory immigration detention, whether he is sentenced to a14

prison term or to probation.15

“When” the Alien is Released16

The government next argues that the District Court wrongly17

interpreted the word “when” in the “when the alien is released”18

clause of section 1226(c) as imposing a temporal limit on DHS’s19

obligation to mandatorily detain non‐citizens.  Because Lora was not20

taken into immigration custody until more than three years after his21

July 2010 criminal conviction and sentencing, the District Court22

found that he was outside the reach of the statute and so was eligible23

for bail.24

This single issue consists of two inquiries: (1) whether “when25

. . . released” contemplates detainment immediately upon release, or26

merely at some time after release, and (2) whether, notwithstanding27

the meaning of “when . . . released,” the statute imposes a temporal28

restriction on the agency’s authority and duty to detain an alien. 29

Because we defer to the BIA’s interpretation that “when . . . released”30

does not impose a temporal restriction on the agency’s authority and31

duty to detain an alien, we need not decide the meaning of “when . .32

. released.”33

14

Over a decade ago, the BIA, the agency charged with1

administering this statute, considered a challenge from a detainee to2

his mandatory detention.  See In re Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 117 (BIA3

2001).  The detainee argued that because he had not been taken into4

custody “when . . . released,” as directed by section 1226(c)(1), he5

was not subject to mandatory detention under section 1226(c)(2).  Id.6

at 118.  The BIA declined to consider whether  “when . . . released”7

meant immediately upon release or merely sometime after the8

detainee was released, and instead agreed with the government that9

regardless of the proper interpretation of “when . . . released,” the10

text, structure, history, and purpose of the statute all suggested that11

Congress did not intend the “when . . . released” clause to limit the12

authority of agents to detain an alien.  Id. at 121–25.  Under the BIA’s13

interpretation, “when . . . released” refers to the time at which the14

duty to detain arises, and does not place a temporal limit on the15

agents’ authority to detain an alien—thus, 1226(c)(2) mandates16

detainment even if DHS does not detain the alien immediately upon17

release.  Id. at 123–24.  This has been referred to in this Circuit as the18

“duty‐triggering” construction, while Lora argues for what has been19

referred to as the “time‐limiting” construction.  See Straker v. Jones,20

986 F. Supp. 2d 345, 352–53 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).21

Because we are faced with an administrative agency’s22

interpretation of a statute, we follow the two‐step Chevron inquiry. 23

See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–44.  If we find, based on the plain24

language of the statute, that “the intent of Congress is clear, that is25

the end of the matter.”  Id. at 842.  However, if we find that the26

statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, we27

will proceed to the second step: determining “whether the agency’s28

answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.”  Id. at29

843.  We defer to the BIA’s interpretation so long as it is “reasonable,30

and not ‘arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.’“ 31

Adams v. Holder, 692 F.3d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 2012) (quoting Chevron, 46732

U.S. at 844).  The government argues that, because the statute is33

15

ambiguous, the District Court should have followed the BIA’s1

reasonable interpretation.  We agree.2

At the first step of the Chevron inquiry, we have little trouble3

concluding that it is ambiguous whether “when . . . released” should4

be given the “duty‐triggering” construction or the “time‐limiting”5

construction.  The BIA agrees.  Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 120.  And the6

Supreme Court has long recognized that the word “when” may7

alternatively mean “the precise time when a particular act must be8

performed,” or “the occurrence which shall render that particular act9

necessary.”  United States v. Willings, 8 U.S. 48, 55 (1807).10

As the BIA recognized, it is unclear from the text of section11

1226(c) whether the “when . . . released” clause is part of the12

definition of aliens subject to mandatory detention.  Rojas, 23 I. & N.13

Dec. at 120.  Section 1226(c) requires that DHS take custody of aliens14

convicted of four categories of predicate criminal or terrorist acts and15

offenses (“A” through “D”) when they are released and that DHS16

may not “release an alien described in paragraph (1)” unless that17

alien falls under an exception for protected witnesses.  But it is not18

clear whether the phrase “an alien described in paragraph (1)” refers19

to the aliens described in categories “A” through “D,” as the20

government argues, or to aliens who both qualify under these21

subcategories and were taken into immigration custody “when . . .22

released” from custody, as Lora argues.  Noting this difficulty, the23

Tenth Circuit has described how the “when . . . released” phrase can24

be considered adverbial, modifying the opening verb phrase “the25

[DHS] shall,” or it can be considered adjectival, modifying the noun26

phrases in categories (A) through (D).  See Olmos, 780 F.3d at27

1318–19. 28

Because we find that Congress has not directly spoken on the29

meaning or application of “when . . . released” in this statute, we30

must consider whether the BIA’s interpretation of section 1226(c) is31

permissible and thus entitled to Chevron deference.  See Khouzam v.32

Ashcroft, 361 F.3d 161, 164 (2d Cir. 2004).  In Rojas, the alien argued33

16

that he was not subject to mandatory detention under section 1226(c)1

because immigration authorities did not take him into custody until2

two days after his release.  To resolve the statute’s ambiguity, the3

BIA used four separate approaches to analyze section 1226(c): (1) the4

ordinary meaning of the statute’s language, although that language5

was ambiguous;17 (2) the overall statutory context and goals; (3) the6

statute’s predecessor provisions; and (4) practical considerations. 7

Rojas, I. & N. Dec. at 121–24.  The BIA, while not deciding whether8

“when . . . released” meant immediately upon release or something9

else, concluded that “the duty to detain is not affected by the10

character of an alien’s release from criminal incarceration,” id. at 121,11

and “that [the alien was] subject to mandatory detention pursuant to12

section [1226(c)] of the Act, despite the fact that he was not taken13

into [immigration] custody immediately upon his release from state14

custody,” id. at 127.18  Consistent with Chevron, we are not convinced15

that the interpretation is  “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly16

contrary to the statute.“  Adams, 692 F.3d at 95 (internal quotation17

marks and citation omitted).  As the BIA explained in Rojas, “[i]t is18

difficult to conclude that Congress meant to premise the success of19

its mandatory detention scheme on the capacity of [DHS] to appear20

at the jailhouse door to take custody of an alien at the precise21

moment of release.”  23 I. & N. Dec. at 128. 22

Moreover, the BIA’s interpretation of section 1226(c) follows  23

Supreme Court precedent establishing that statutes providing “that24

the Government ‘shall’ act within a specified time, without more,”25

are not “jurisdictional limit[s] precluding action later.”  Barnhart v.26

17 See Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 120 (“We find the statutory provision, when read in isolation, to besusceptible to different readings.”).18 As the Supreme Court explained in Demore, 538 U.S. at 518, Congress adopted section 1226(c) inresponse to its frustration with criminal aliens’ ability to avoid deportation if they were not already inDHS custody when removal proceedings were completed and its concern that criminal aliens who are notdetained continue to commit crimes.  See S. Rep. No. 104‐48, 1995 WL 170285, at *14, *23 (1995).  The BIArelied on this history and concluded, “we discern that the statute as a whole is focused on the removal ofcriminal aliens in general, not just those coming into [INS] custody ‘when . . . released’ from criminalincarceration.”  Rojas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 122 (second alteration in original).

17

Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149, 158 (2003).  “[I]f a statute does not1

specify a consequence for noncompliance with statutory timing2

provisions, the federal courts will not in the ordinary course impose3

their own coercive sanction.”  United States v. James Daniel Good Real4

Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 63 (1993); see also United States v. Montalvo‐Murillo,5

495 U.S. 711 (1990) (holding that the government may detain6

criminal defendants leading up to trial even if they do not comply7

with the relevant statute’s command that a judicial officer “shall”8

hold a bail hearing “immediately upon the person’s first9

appearance” before the officer); Sylvain, 714 F.3d at 157–59 (applying10

Barnhart and Montalvo‐Murillo to section 1226(c) and concluding that11

“the government retains authority under [section 1226(c)] despite12

any delay”).13

Finally, the BIA’s interpretation has the added benefit of14

accounting for practical concerns arising in connection with15

enforcing the statute.  Particularly for criminal aliens in state16

custody, it is unrealistic to assume that DHS will be aware of the17

exact timing of an alien’s release from custody, nor does it have the18

resources to appear at every location where a qualifying alien is19

being released.  State and local law enforcement may also have20

difficulty determining citizenship, since records of arrests and21

convictions may be incomplete in this regard. Accordingly, we join22

the Third, Fourth, and Tenth Circuits in holding that DHS retains its23

authority and duty to detain an alien even if not exercised24

immediately upon the alien’s release.19  Regardless of whether25

“when . . . released” contemplates detainment immediately upon26

release or merely sometime after release, we adopt the “duty‐27

triggering” construction, and hold that an alien may be subject to28

19 See, e.g., Sylvain, 714 F.3d at 161 (“[E]ven if the statute calls for detention ‘when the alien is released,’ . . .nothing in the statute suggests that officials lose authority if they delay.”); Hosh, 680 F.3d at 382 (“Thenegligence of officers, agents, or other administrators, or any other natural circumstance or human errorthat would prevent federal authorities from complying with § 1226(c), cannot be allowed to thwartcongressional intent and prejudice the very interests that Congress sought to vindicate.”). 

18

mandatory detention even where DHS does not immediately detain1

the alien after release from criminal custody.20 2

Whether 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) Authorizes Mandatory Detention3

Beyond Six Months Without a Bail Hearing4

Because the District Court decided in Lora’s favor on statutory5

grounds, it did not reach his constitutional argument.21  As noted,6

Lora also argued below and argues to this Court that his indefinite7

detention without being afforded a bond hearing would violate his8

right to due process.  We agree.  Significantly, the distance between9

Lora and the government on this issue is not large: the government10

does not advocate for indefinite detention nor does it contest the11

view that, in order to avoid serious constitutional concerns, an12

implicit time limitation must be read into section 1226(c).13

It is well‐settled that the Fifth Amendment entitles aliens to14

due process in deportation proceedings.  Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292,15

306 (1993).  “[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within16

the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is17

lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”  Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at18

693 (considering a challenge to post‐removal detention).  As noted,19

more than a decade ago, in Zadvydas, the Supreme Court signaled its20

concerns about the constitutionality of a statutory scheme that21

ostensibly authorized indefinite detention of non‐citizens.  Id.  Two22

years later, when the court upheld the constitutionality of section23

20 Lora also argues that the BIA’s analysis is unreasonable in light of the constitutional concerns it raisesby giving the government limitless authority to deny bond hearings.  However, in making this argument,Lora misconstrues Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Demore, which observed that due process concernscould arise if there was an unreasonable delay by ICE in deportation proceedings.  538 U.S. at 532(Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Kennedy’s observations were relevant to how long an alien is kept incustody, not when the custody must start or whether there may be a gap between release from criminalcustody and commencement of immigration custody.  Id. at 532–33. 21 The issue was briefed by the parties below, and we may affirm a district court’s decision “on any basisfor which there is a record sufficient to permit conclusions of law, including grounds upon which thedistrict court did not rely.ʺ  See Mauro v. S. New England Telecomms., Inc., 208 F.3d 384, 387 n.2 (2d Cir.2000) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted).

19

1226(c) in Demore v. Kim, it emphasized that, for detention under the1

statute to be reasonable, it must be for a brief period of time.  See,2

e.g., 538 U.S. at 528 (detention permissible because, as compared to3

Zadvydas, “the detention here is of a much shorter duration”). 4

Justice Kennedy explained in his concurrence that “[w]ere there to be5

an unreasonable delay by the INS in pursuing and completing6

deportation proceedings, it could become necessary then to inquire7

whether the detention is not to facilitate deportation, or to protect8

against risk of flight or dangerousness, but to incarcerate for other9

reasons.”  Id. at 532–33 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 10

These cases clearly establish that mandatory detention under11

section 1226(c) is permissible, but that there must be some12

procedural safeguard in place for immigrants detained for months13

without a hearing.  Accordingly, we join every other circuit that has14

considered this issue, as well as the government, in concluding that15

in order to avoid serious constitutional concerns, section 1226(c)16

must be read as including an implicit temporal limitation.   See, e.g.,17

Rodriguez, 715 F.3d at 1137 (“[I]n several decisions over the past18

decade . . . we have consistently held that Demore’s holding is limited19

to detentions of brief duration.”); Diop v. ICE/Homeland Sec., 656 F.3d20

221, 231 (3d Cir. 2011) (applying canon of constitutional avoidance to21

“conclude that the statute implicitly authorizes detention for a22

reasonable amount of time”); Ly v. Hansen, 351 F.3d 263, 267–68, 27123

(6th Cir. 2003) (noting that Demore “is undergirded by reasoning24

relying on the fact that [the alien in the case], and persons like him,25

will normally have their proceedings completed within a short26

period of time” and the case must be understood as only authorizing27

detention for brief periods of time). 28

However, while all circuits agree that section 1226(c) includes29

some “reasonable” limit on the amount of time that an individual30

can be detained without a bail hearing, courts remain divided on31

how to determine reasonableness.  This Court has not yet had the32

opportunity to decide which approach to follow.  The first approach,33

20

employed by the Third and Sixth Circuits and favored by the1

government, calls for a “fact‐dependent inquiry requiring an2

assessment of all of the circumstances of any given case,” to3

determine whether detention without an individualized hearing is4

unreasonable.  Diop, 656 F.3d at 234; see also Chavez‐Alvarez v. Warden5

York Cty. Prison, 783 F.3d 469, 475 n.7 (3d Cir. 2015) (explaining “the6

highly fact‐specific nature” of the balancing framework).  Under this7

approach, every detainee must file a habeas petition challenging8

detention, and the district courts must then adjudicate the petition to9

determine whether the individual’s detention has crossed the10

“reasonableness”threshold, thus entitling him to a bail hearing. 11

In contrast, the second approach, adopted by the Ninth12

Circuit, is to apply a bright‐line rule to cases of mandatory detention13

where the government’s “statutory mandatory detention authority14

under Section 1226(c) . . . [is] limited to a six‐month period, subject to15

a finding of flight risk or dangerousness.”  Rodriguez, 715 F.3d at16

1133.  We believe that, considering the relevant Supreme Court17

precedent, the pervasive confusion over what constitutes a18

“reasonable” length of time that an immigrant can be detained19

without a bail hearing, the current immigration backlog and the20

disastrous impact of mandatory detention on the lives of immigrants21

who are neither a flight risk nor dangerous, the interests at stake in22

this Circuit are best served by the bright‐line approach.23

First, Zadvydas and Demore, taken together, suggest that the24

preferred approach for avoiding due process concerns in this area is25

to establish a presumptively reasonable six‐month period of26

detention.  In Zadvydas, the Court held that six months was a27

“presumptively reasonable period of detention” in a related context,28

namely post‐removal‐determination detention.  533 U.S. at 700–0129

(finding that there was “reason to believe . . . that Congress30

previously doubted the constitutionality of detention for more than31

six months”).  After that point, “once the alien provides good reason32

to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the33

21

reasonably foreseeable future, the Government must respond with1

evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.”  Id.  In Demore, the Court2

held that section 1226(c) authorized mandatory detention only for3

the ”limited period of [the alien’s] removal proceedings.”  538 U.S. at4

531.  At that time (2003), the “limited period” referred to “last[ed]5

roughly a month and a half in the vast majority of cases in which6

[section 1226(c) was] invoked, and about five months in the minority7

of cases in which the alien cho[se] to appeal.”  Id. at 529–30; see8

Rodriguez, 715 F.3d at 1138 (“As a general matter, detention is9

prolonged when it has lasted six months and is expected to continue10

more than minimally beyond six months.”).  11

Secondly, the pervasive inconsistency and confusion exhibited12

by district courts in this Circuit when asked to apply a13

reasonableness test on a case‐by‐case basis weighs, in our view, in14

favor of adopting an approach that affords more certainty and15

predictability.  Notably, the Supreme Court has recognized that 16

bright‐line rules provide clear guidance and ease of administration17

to government officials.  See, e.g., Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 700–0118

(adopting six‐month rule “for the sake of uniform administration,”19

while also noting that it would limit the need for lower courts to20

make “difficult judgments”).  Compare, e.g., Martin v. Aviles, No. 1521

Civ. 1080(AT)(AJP), 2015 WL 3929598, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. June 15,22

2015) (holding an alien for over a year without a bond hearing23

violated his due process rights), and Minto v. Decker, No. 14 Civ.24

07764(LGS)(KNF), 2015 WL 3555803, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2015)25

(“Because Petitioner’s detention has exceeded twelve months—in the26

absence of any evidence that Petitioner might be a flight risk or a27

danger to the community—he is entitled to an individualized bond28

hearing.”), and Monestime v. Reilly, 704 F. Supp. 2d 453, 458 (S.D.N.Y.29

2010) (ordering bond hearing after eight months detention), and30

Scarlett v. DHS, 632 F. Supp. 2d 214, 223 (W.D.N.Y. 2009) (five years31

detention unreasonable), with Johnson v. Orsino, 942 F. Supp. 2d 39632

(S.D.N.Y. 2013) (fifteen month detention not unreasonable), and33

Luna‐Aponte v. Holder, 743 F. Supp. 2d 189, 194 (W.D.N.Y. 2010)34

22

(nearly three years of detention not unreasonable).  Adopting a six‐1

month rule ensures that similarly situated detainees receive similar2

treatment.  Such a rule avoids the random outcomes resulting from3

individual habeas litigation in which some detainees are represented4

by counsel and some are not, and some habeas petitions are5

adjudicated in months and others are not adjudicated for years.  6

Moreover, while a case‐by‐case approach might be workable7

in circuits with comparatively small immigration dockets, the8

Second and Ninth Circuits have been disproportionately burdened9

by a surge in immigration appeals and a corresponding surge in the10

sizes of their immigration dockets.22  With such large dockets,11

predictability and certainty are considerations of enhanced12

importance and we believe that the interests of the detainees and the13

district courts, as well as the government, are best served by this14

approach. 15

Finally, without a six‐month rule, endless months of16

detention, often caused by nothing more than bureaucratic backlog,17

has real‐life consequences for immigrants and their families.  Lora is18

one such example.  As noted, he is a LPR who has resided in and19

been extensively tied to his community for twenty‐five years. 20

During his years in this country, Lora has remained gainfully21

employed and has attended school.  He is in jeopardy of removal as22

a consequence of what now stands as a conviction in 2009 for third23

degree possession of a controlled substance for which he received a24

conditional discharge.  No principled argument has been mounted25

for the notion that he is either a risk of flight or is dangerous. 26

Instead, the record suggests that Lora is an excellent candidate for27

cancellation of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a).  He is the28

primary caretaker of a two‐year‐old U.S. citizen son who was placed29

in foster care while Lora was in detention; he has no arrest record30

aside from this non‐violent drug offense conviction; he has been31

22 See John R.B. Palmer, The Nature and Causes of the Immigration Surge in the Federal Courts of Appeals: APreliminary Analysis, 51 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 13, 14 (2006).

23

gainfully employed for over two decades while he has resided in the1

United States.23 2

For these reasons, we hold that, in order to avoid the3

constitutional concerns raised by indefinite detention, an immigrant4

detained pursuant to section 1226(c) must be afforded a bail hearing5

before an immigration judge within six months of his or her6

detention.  Following the Ninth Circuit, we also hold that the7

detainee must be admitted to bail unless the government establishes8

by clear and convincing evidence that the immigrant poses a risk of9

flight or a risk of danger to the community.  Rodriguez, 715 F.3d at10

1131.2411

CONCLUSION12

For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the13

District Court.14

23 Amici in this case cite multiple other examples of immigrants whose lives and whose families’ liveshave been upended by DHS’s enforcement of section 1226(c) without judicially imposed proceduralsafeguards.  There is the case of a LPR who was arrested by ICE, without warning, nearly nine years afterthe most recent conviction for which ICE charged him as deportable, and five days before his girlfriendgave birth to their second child.  He was detained for eleven months without a bond hearing before hishabeas petition was finally decided while his companion struggled to raise his three children in ahomeless shelter.  See Baker v. Johnson, No. 14 Civ. 9500(LAP), 2015 WL 2359251 (S.D.N.Y. May 15, 2015). Amici also cite the example of an immigrant from Trinidad and Tobago who was detained by ICEwithout bond following his arrest on a dismissed criminal charge for seven months before the districtcourt ordered that he be provided with a bond hearing.  See Straker, 986 F. Supp. 2d 345.  During thoseseven months, his daughter was left without a primary caretaker.  The fact that there are over 30,000immigrants in ICE custody in the United States on an average day and many of those individuals areparents and primary caregivers of U.S. citizen children gives some indication of section 1226(c)’s scopeand potential impact.  We are confident that the government also does not wish for the type of outcomesdescribed above and does not favor a regime that perpetuates them.24 In the present case, the length of Lora’s detention fell just shy of the six‐month mark: he was detainedby ICE on November 22, 2013, and granted bond on May 8, 2014.  Because of the length of Lora’s appeal,this Court sees no reason to remand this case so as to implicate the six‐month rule.

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