Privatizing Social Policy in an Age of Austerity: The Canadian Case

Paper prepared for: Panel 39, New Policies of Privatization International Conference on Public Policy

Grenoble, France, June 26-28, 2013

Ann Porter Department of Political Science

York University Toronto, Canada aporter@yorku.ca

1

This paper is concerned with new policies of privatization that are being discussed and

introduced in the area of social welfare in Canada in the current period of austerity. Like other

OECD/G20 countries, the Canadian government, in the face of the 2008 global recession,

introduced a major stimulus package. This was followed, in 2011 and 2012, by austerity

measures introduced with the goal of balancing the budget by 2014-2015.1 Despite assertions

that the budget was to be balanced “without raising taxes, cutting transfers to persons, including

those for seniors, children and the unemployed, or cutting transfers to other levels of government

that support health care and social services, Equalization, and the gas tax transfer to

municipalities,”2

Historically Canada has had a mixed system of social services and social welfare, involving

all three levels of government: federal, provincial and municipal. The welfare state of the post-

war period incorporated a fragmented system of income security and social services. The

federally-run Unemployment Insurance program (UI), established in 1940, provided benefits to

a significant re-orientation of social policy and social programs is occurring;

one which is likely to have a significant impact on the level and quality of support and services

available. Figuring prominently here have been calls for, and initial steps towards, greater private

sector involvement in both the delivery and funding of social programs, as well as a continued

shift in responsibility for poverty and unemployment from the state to the individual and family.

The aim of this paper is to come to a better understanding of social policy privatization initiatives

in this context. It aims to come to a better empirical understanding of the transformations taking

place, as well as to raise more general questions about how we understand the restructuring of

social policy and trends to privatization in the current era. What form does privatization take? In

what ways is it new? What are the driving forces behind the current initiatives? What are the

implications?

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unemployed workers who qualified as a right, based on labour force participation. For those

who did not qualify for UI or whose benefits had run out, the provinces provided means-based

social assistance, as well as a range of social services, (counseling, assessment and referral

services, rehabilitation services, daycare, and homemaker services) partially funded (after 1966,

through the Canada Assistance Plan) by the federal government. Charities which previously,

along with municipalities, had been major providers of social welfare, came to play a more

residual role, although, as Valverde and others point out, they did not disappear, and the “mixed

social economy” remained a feature of the social welfare landscape.3

This paper focuses on recent federal government privatization initiatives in two key areas

of income security and social welfare in Canada: employment insurance (previously named

unemployment insurance) and recent initiatives encouraging charitable organizations and the use

of investor capital via “social financing” in the provision of social services in a range of areas for

vulnerable populations, including the homeless, the persistently unemployed, and at-risk youth.

4

Both these areas have been characterized by “creeping privatization5”, with recent changes a

culmination of processes on-going since the 1980s. The changes since 2011 do, nevertheless,

represent a new phase in both privatization and social policy reform. In the area of EI, the

recent reforms continue the privatization of the risks and responsibilities associated with

unemployment, but in addition, what is new is increased state control in certain labour market

areas, as seen for example, in the centralization of decision making within Cabinet, the move

away from a tripartite structure and the alteration of the appeal procedures, the latter two which

have been features of the program since its inception. In addition, there is an increased coercive

role for the state with respect to the unemployed. In the social service area, the most recent

initiatives build on previous reforms to increase the role of charities in the provision of services,

3

in particular through the use of tax incentives, and break new ground in their efforts to turn

funding as well as service delivery over to the private sector, in particular through encouraging

the use of investor capital.

Looking at these two sectors as a whole provides some insight into the complex process

of state reregulation and restructuring accompanying privatization in the current era. It can be

seen that privatization has been somewhat different in these two areas, with the state retaining

control in key labour market areas, particularly involving support to low wage industry, but

devolving responsibility for the most vulnerable to charities and the private sector. The changes

have elements of commonality in that both represent a fundamental break with the post-war

social contract and with a commitment to state provision of social services. While being

introduced in an austerity period, it is not clear to what extent these reforms will actually reduce

expenditures and “austerity” appears to be used as an opportunity to push ahead and deepen

reforms to social programs in ways expedient to the particular political goals of the party in

power.

The first section of the paper discusses key drivers of change with regard to privatization,

and examines how the privatization project with respect to social policy has unfolded in the

Canadian context. The second section examines the two case studies, discussing recent changes

in the areas of employment insurance and charities and social finance. The final section draws

out conclusions with regard to new policies of privatization in this area.

I. Privatization: Drivers of Change, Canadian Context and Historical Background

Recent privatization initiatives in the area of income security and social welfare have to

be seen within the context of the longer-term privatization project that has been a key part of the

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neo-liberal initiative in the anglo-american world. The term “privatization”, as it emerged onto

the policy agenda in the 1980s was initially, and most visibly, associated with the sale of

government assets to private interests, but quickly came to have a much broader meaning and to

refer to a range of policies and practices favouring the primacy of markets over politics.

Privatization thus also included practices such as contracting out, deregulation, user-pay

approaches to public services, applying private sector management practices to government

administration and the downloading of government responsibilities and services to lower levels

of government, the private sector, the family and voluntary organizations.6

While the government rationale for privatization was about the need to eliminate waste,

increase efficiency, and reduce government deficits and debt, the move to privatization has both

reflected and reinforced a shift in power arrangements involving new roles for the state, shifting

the balance between public and private power, and between various political and economic

actors. In Canada, as Savoie, Cameron as others note, it was the business and financial

communities, mobilized in part through corporate lobby groups such as the Business Council on

National Issues (BCNI), that were the main driving force behind the initial privatization and

contracting out initiatives of the 1980s.

The term

“privatization”, then, came broadly to signify the underlying market-oriented ideology and the

market-driven politics associated with the introduction of neo-liberalism.

7 For business, privatization meant fewer, or more

favourable government regulations, and using state resources to serve the business community.

Privatization meant not so much a de-regulation as a re-regulation: a “highly selective process of

shifting some public responsibilities to the private sphere while … protecting and intensifying

the role of the state to regulate in other areas”.8 While the rationale for privatization was often

framed in terms of the need to increase competitiveness, in fact, as Laux documents, the selling

5

off of government assets increased corporate concentration in the Canadian economy and

reinforced existing government-business elite networks.9 Privatization also, critically, meant the

opening up of new outlets and investment opportunities for capital. Cameron, for example,

stresses pension fund liberalization in the 1990s as a key moment in the privatization process.10

The accumulation of financial surpluses in pension funds meant a search for new investment

outlets, creating further pressure for privatization.11

In the area of social policy, the privatization process has been distinctive. Resistance to

change in this area meant that privatization arrived relatively late and has been characterized

more by a creeping privatization. Key drivers of privatization in the social policy sector have

included the downloading of the costs of social reproduction onto families and individuals, as

well as a reduction in labour costs through a greater reliance on the voluntary sector. Social

policy has traditionally performed a dual function: providing support to the unemployed and

vulnerable, but also acting as a form of social control. While the state is in the process of

transferring some of those control aspects – moral regulation in particular – back to charities, as

discussed below, it has retained control in other areas, for example, to do with labour markets

and to, a certain extent, the disciplining of the unemployed. The role of the state, then, is uneven:

the privatization project has involved less state regulation in some areas, but in others, including

certain aspects of social welfare, increased surveillance and coercion, dovetailing in critical ways

with the increased emphasis on a law and order agenda and efforts to control more vulnerable

parts of the population.

12 Privatization in the area of income security and social welfare has been

important to the overall privatization strategy in that it has played a significant role in shifting

power arrangements, eroding the position of labour and other disadvantaged groups, and

contributing to the rewriting of the social contract that formed the basis of the post-war welfare

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state. Privatization in the income security and social welfare area has been characterized to

some extent by the contracting out of services, but in addition, by more subtle forms of

privatization, including the privatization of responsibility for and of risks associated with

unemployment and other contingencies.13

Privatization and Social Policy in Canada

The most recent trend to privatization in the social

policy area draws on these aspects, but also adds new ones, in particular the opening up of social

policy areas to investor capital.

In Canada, the introduction of privatization as a major policy direction began under the

Conservative government of Brian Mulroney, first elected in 1984. Following Thatcher in

Britain and Reagan in the US, Mulroney embraced the privatization project, signaling it as a

priority immediately after the election and, in 1986, appointing a Minister of State for

Privatization. While the selling of government assets in areas such as telecommunications,

aerospace and rail transportation was the most visible form of privatization in the 1980s and

early 1990s, 14 privatization efforts were also launched in a range of other areas. Initiatives were

introduced to downsize the federal government, public sector “think tanks” such as the Economic

Council of Canada and the Science Council were closed and services contracted out. In the area

of social security and social welfare,15 crucial steps towards a more marketized and privatized

form of provision began as early as the 1980s and, indeed, the origins of current privatization

initiatives in this area have to be traced to this period. While the Mulroney government was

certainly intent on reforming the income security system, it was widespread opposition to

changes in this area that meant that privatization proceeded much more slowly. What did occur

in the 1980s was a profound ideological shift, strongly supported by business organizations such

as the Business Council on National Issues, as well as government-initiated commissions16, to a

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more marketized and privatized view of social security that laid the groundwork for later

privatization initiatives. Social policy was to be subordinate to the goals of economic

competitiveness and social policy recipients were presented as consumers with choices rather

than as clients or beneficiaries with entitlements and rights. Significant steps were taken towards

the privatization of the risks and responsibilities associated with unemployment, as the

government withdrew its commitments to full (or high) levels of employment in favour of

market-determined employment and unemployment patterns. The causes of unemployment were

increasingly viewed as an individual problem or a matter of individual choice, and programs

such as UI and social assistance were presented as creating “dependencies”, obstacles to labour

market adjustment and as themselves creating high unemployment levels. Within these

programs, the focus shifted to improving incentives to work.

Incremental privatization steps did also take place in the income security area in the late

1980s and early 1990s. A range of federal government initiatives and pilot projects, including

the 1985 Canadian Job Strategy, shifted the emphasis from job creation and problems of

structural unemployment to improving individual “employability” and encouraged provinces to

move in the direction of work-ready, and work-for welfare schemes.17 Growing “fiscalization” of

social policy meant that increasingly decisions about social policy issues were being made, not in

departments of health or welfare, but in the Ministry of Finance, subject to the logic of fiscal

restraint, and presented as part of budget packages. The culture and “benchmarks” of private

enterprise thus became the critical framework within which social policies were evaluated.

Reforms to the UI program in the late 1980s and early 1990s made it more difficult to obtain:

qualification requirements increased, the maximum duration of benefits was lowered, benefit

rates were reduced (from 60% to 57% of past wages) and harsher penalties were introduced for

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anyone who left their employment “without just cause”. As the federal government withdrew

from its commitments in these areas, costs and responsibilities for those who were without work

fell increasingly to provincial social assistance programs, municipal social services, charitable

organizations such as food banks, as well as private individuals and households. Privatization of

the financing component of UI also occurred at this time, as the federal government withdrew its

share of financial contributions, leaving the UI account to be fully funded by employer and

employee premiums.

More significant moves towards a more privatized and market-oriented approach to

income security and social welfare occurred in the mid-1990s, as the UI program was completely

overhauled and the name changed to “Employment Insurance” (EI), signaling a shift from a

“passive” to an “active” labour market approach. The calculation of benefit entitlement shifted

from previous weeks worked to hours worked, but with much higher qualifying levels, with the

consequence that far fewer met the requirements. At this time also the delivery of employment

assessment and counseling services was privatized, transferred from government-run centres to

primarily non-profit, community-based organizations such as Goodwill, the YWCA,

neighbourhood service centres and settlement organizations, as well as some school boards and

colleges.18 In addition, there was a shift from job training for UI/EI recipients funded by the

federal government and delivered through the public community college system to an individual

voucher system. The Canadian Labour Force Development Board, a tripartite organization

(employers, unions and government) was closed, signaling the end of a tripartite industrial

development approach to labour market planning.19

In 1995, the repeal of the Canada Assistance Plan (whereby the federal government

shared the cost of provincial social assistance and social services programs, provided they met

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certain conditions) and its replacement by the Canada Health and Social Transfer20

In addition to privatizing trends in the area of income security, further privatization of

social welfare also occurred as policy-makers began, in the 1980s, and more so in the 1990s,

again following trends in both the US and Britain, to look to the voluntary, charitable, and non-

profit sectors to shoulder an increasing share of responsibility for social service delivery.

dramatically

reduced the federal commitment to financing social programs and removed conditions (such as

that social assistance had to be provided on the basis of need alone) and, in turn, opened the door

for provinces to introduce more market-oriented workfare style policies, requiring social

assistance recipients to work or participate in community type activities in exchange for benefits.

21 At

the provincial level, privatization and contracting out of social services began as early as the

1980s. As Rekart, for example, describes, in British Columbia services of previously

government-run institutions, for example, in the mental health field, were contracted out and

relocated to community-based non-profit and proprietary agencies.22 Contracting out similarly

occurred in the areas of children-in-care resources, services to families, and juvenile justice.23

At the federal level, charitable organizations were encouraged, in part, through enhanced

tax benefits. In 1988 a two-tier tax credit was introduced, providing a credit of 17% on the first

$250 of charitable donation, and 29% for amounts above that,

24 providing a substantial incentive

for charitable giving. As Duff notes, this particularly benefited high income contributors since

most charitable donations by high-income tax payers were creditable at the 29 percent rate,

whereas low income tax payers, who could donate less, tended to receive the 17% rate. 25 In the

1990s the credit was amended several times in a way that increased its generosity. The

contribution level at which the 29 percent credit would apply was reduced from $250 to $200.

The value of the donations that could be claimed increased from 20% of the taxpayers annual

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income to 50% in 1996 and 75% in 1997.26 More generous tax benefits were also provided for

testamentary gifts, “so that an individual’s tax liability for the last two years of his or her life

could be eliminated entirely by donating a sufficient amount of money or property to a registered

charity.”27 Gifts of real estate or shares also received more generous tax credits. In 1997, “the

government announced a 50% reduction in the taxable capital gain realized on a gift of

securities”.28 In addition, to encouraging charities via the tax system, direct federal funding to

voluntary organizations pushed these organizations to take a greater role in service delivery and

to limit themselves to that function, while the amount of advocacy activity that voluntary

organizations were able to engage in was restricted. 29

In sum, by the mid to late 1990s, creeping privatization and the adoption of more market-

oriented approaches had changed the philosophical basis and policy practices with respect to

income security and social services. The privatization initiative involved a moving away from

the notion of a pooling of risks via state programs, and the costs and responsibilities for

unemployment were increasingly borne by individuals and households.. The withdrawal of state

responsibility for unemployment levels has been a privatizing strategy in its assertion that these

levels should be left to be determined by market forces, that the state was to act, not to counter

the cyclical nature and precarity of the market, but to reinforce market trends, and that the

unemployed must adapt to the marketplace. In addition, this period saw the privatization of the

financing of the UI program, as well as certain parts of labour market-related programs, such as

employment assessment and counselling. At the same time, governments increasingly looked to

voluntary and charitable organizations to fill the gap in needed service provision. The shift from

the direct provision and funding of services towards enhanced tax benefits for charitable donors,

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as well as the increased emphasis on service delivery by voluntary organizations, constituted

further dimensions of creeping social policy privatization.

II. New Forms of Social Policy Privatization in the Austerity Era: Employment

Insurance, Charities and Social Finance

In the most recent period, the move to austerity has led to new forms of privatization in the

social policy area. The budget introduced by the governing Conservative party, led by Stephen

Harper, in the spring of 2011 marked the turn to austerity. The budget was first introduced while

the Conservatives were in a minority position and about to face an election and it was

reintroduced immediately after the election with the Conservatives now in a majority position.

While, as noted below, the 2011 budget indicated directions of change, for example, with respect

to charities and social finance, more significant changes were introduced in the spring of 2012,

which was, in effect, the first budget designed when the Conservatives were in a majority

position. The 2012 budget implementation bill was 450 pages long and amended some 70 pieces

of legislation. Among these amendments were significant changes to the employment insurance

program and indications of further support for charities and social finance. These social policy

directions are discussed below.

1) Employment Insurance Changes: Privatizing Risk, Shaping the labour market, Disciplining the Unemployed

The 2012 budget announced that there would be a number of changes to the EI program in

order to make it “a more efficient program that promotes job creation, removes disincentives to

work, supports unemployed Canadians and quickly connects people to jobs.” The changes

introduced have been controversial, provoking sustained protests in parts of the country,

particularly in Atlantic Canada and Quebec. These policies represent both the continued

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privatization of the risks and responsibilities associated with unemployment, increased

centralization and control over key aspects of the program, and overall a more coercive role for

the state vis a vis labour and the unemployed. While there have been calls for many years to

reform the EI program in a way that would allow it to cover more workers, the current

amendments move the program in the opposite direction. As discussed below changes include a

tightening of EI provisions that will make it more difficult to obtain, particularly in regions

characterized by high seasonal employment, increasing cabinet discretion and ministerial power

over a range of issues, the linking of the EI program to the Temporary Foreign Worker Program,

and the reorganization of the appeals procedures, both moving away from long-standing tripartite

structures and making it more difficult to bring appeals forward.

a) Increasing executive control: “suitable employment” and “reasonable and customary efforts”

Particularly controversial, Bill C-38, the omnibus budget implementation bill, repealed

certain sections of the EI Act outlining steps that have to be taken to find employment, and gave

Cabinet unprecedented power to decide these criteria. Subsequent regulations brought in by

Cabinet are more coercive, targeting, in particular, “frequent users” of EI and requiring them to

accept work at considerably lower rates of pay. According to the EI Act, in order to receive

benefits unemployed individuals must show that they are ‘capable of and available for work but

unable to find suitable employment’ and further that they undertake ‘reasonable and customary

efforts to obtain suitable employment’. As Andrew Jackson describes, previously, “suitable

employment” had been defined in a way that allowed claimants a period of time to find a job in

their usual occupation, and at wages which were not below the prevailing wages,30 or if outside

the claimant’s usual occupation at an equivalent rate of pay “except that after a ‘reasonable

interval’ a claimant is expected to accept a job which offers wages and conditions matching

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those in agreements or offered by ‘good’ employers.” As Jackson notes, “the clear intent of

these Sections [was] to allow for a period of job search to find a job matching previous

employment wages and conditions, and to prevent the unemployed from driving down wages and

conditions.”31

The new regulations brought in by Cabinet are privatizing in the sense that they remove

some of the protections previously available to workers and require them to further adapt to a

low-wage labour market. It is a privatizing strategy in the sense of continued subordination of

social goals to economic and the continued, and accentuated, shaping of policy to reflect market

priorities and ways of operating. The regulations specify what is considered “suitable

employment”, as well as “reasonable and customary efforts” to look for work. The type of

employment now considered suitable depends on the claimant’s past history of having received

benefits. Specifically, on this basis, the new regulations create three categories of EI claimants.

These are identified in the box below. Essentially, the new regulations require those who are

receiving benefits to accept jobs further outside their usual occupation and at lower rates of pay

then has been the case in the past, and the more often benefits are used, the more so this is the

case. “Frequent users” will immediately have to accept work involving a 20% cut in pay or lose

their benefits. After seven weeks, a refusal of a job 30% below the previous wage will result in

the termination of benefits. Other categories of claimants will also have to accept pay cuts, but to

a lesser degree if they have not used the program much in the past.

32 Up to a one hour

commuting time is now considered acceptable. Criteria for determining whether the claimant’s

efforts to obtain suitable employment are “reasonable and customary” have been specified as

including such things as attending job search workshops, networking, undergoing evaluations of

competencies, as well as contacting employers, going to interviews and so on.33

14

These changes have been presented as a cost saving measure (although it should be noted

that the program is entirely funded by employer and employee contributions, not out of general

revenue). The government estimated that these new measures would “result in an estimated

8,000 claimants having their benefits temporarily discontinued” and that, as a result, savings of

“approximately $12.5 million in EI benefits in 2012-2013 and $33 million in 2013-2014 and

every year thereafter.”34

One of the rationales provided by the government for these changes is that Canada faces

skills and labour shortages and that “encouraging and supporting unemployed Canadians to get

back to work more quickly will be critical to ensuring the country’s economic prosperity.”

35

Skills shortages, however, are primarily in Alberta, connected to the oil sands development.

Provisions for “frequent users”, on the other hand, are particularly targeted at those who work in

Frequent claimants: These are claimants who have had three or more claims and collected benefits for more than 60 weeks in the past 5 years. They would, from the beginning of their claim, be required to accept a job “similar” to the one that they had just lost and to accept wages of 80% of their previous hourly wage. After seven weeks, they would be required to take any available job, at wages 70% of their previous wage. The majority of seasonal workers are in this category.

Long-tenured workers: These workers are defined as those who have paid into the EI system for the past 7 of 10 years and have received 35 or fewer weeks of EI benefits over the last five years. These workers are expected to accept jobs paying 90% of their previous hourly wage and if, after 18 weeks, they were still have not found a job, they are required to expand their search to jobs “similar” to their usual one and to accept wages starting at 80% of their previous wage.

Occasional claimants: All other claimants are in this category. In the first six weeks they are required to accept a job in their usual occupation and wage paying at least 90% of previous hourly wage. After 7 weeks, they will be required to expand their job search to jobs similar to what they normally perform, with wages at 80% of previous earnings. After 18 weeks, they would be required to further expand their job search to include any work that they are qualified to perform and to accept wages starting at 70% of their previous earnings but not lower than the prevailing minimum wage.

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seasonal industries, much of it located in Atlantic Canada and in Quebec and concentrated in

industries such as fishing and forestry where there tends to be long spells of unemployment in

the winter months. This reflects a chronic imbalance in the Canadian economy and a problem for

the individuals and communities concerned where there are few alternative jobs available. EI

has played an important role in providing some economic stability to those communities. The

changes to the definition of “suitable employment” which focuses on particularly tough measures

for “frequent users” target those communities. For the communities most targeted, on the

Atlantic coast or Quebec, the impact of these changes is devastating. Not surprisingly, there has

been widespread resistance in these communities to the changes that have been brought in.

As critics have pointed out, with this approach to labour market policy, people are

unlikely to have sufficient time to find a job in the area in which they were trained or were

previously working in, or to upgrade their skills to obtain better work.”36 There is increased

pressure to accept low-wage and low-skill jobs and there is a further ratcheting down effect, as

subsequent claims will be based on a lower rate of pay.37 Jackson notes that: “the biggest impact

will be on wages in relatively low wage jobs, given that the average EI beneficiary earned about

$16 per hour in her or his previous job”.38

b) Linking the EI program with the Temporary Foreign Worker Program

The 2012 budget also announced measures to link the EI program more closely with the

Temporary Foreign Worker program. The latter program brings in workers for a short period of

time, generally at lower wages and without access to benefits, and requires them to leave the

country when their job ends. Initially concentrated in seasonal agricultural work and the live-in

domestic caregiver field, the program has expanded significantly in recent years to include

16

miners, restaurant, hotel and fast food workers, IT workers in the major banks and so on. The

number of Temporary Foreign Workers has grown from 101,000 in 2002 to 338,000 in 2012.39

In linking the EI program with the TFW program, the government stated that it wishes to “help

make local and qualified Canadian workers aware of vacancies and available to fill them” before

employers are approved to hire temporary foreign workers.40 Diane Finley, the minister

responsible, stated that, for example, in January 2012, Albertan employers received approval for

1,261 TFW positions for food counter attendants, while, at the same time, “nearly 350 people

made a claim for EI who had cited significant experience in the same occupation and

province”,41 noting that “[w]hat we want to do is make sure that the McDonald’s of the world

aren’t having to bring in temporary foreign workers to do jobs that Canadians who are on EI

have the skills to do”.42

While it is clearly desirable to link unemployed Canadians with vacancies that meet their

skills, in keeping with an overall labour market strategy based on encouraging downward

pressure on wages and precarious work, this linkage between the two programs can be seen as

much as a (coercive) threat to unemployed Canadian workers to accept lower paid work, or to be

replaced by someone with even fewer resources, as an attempt to seriously address labour market

issues. While Finley has stated that “these changes are about empowering unemployed workers,

[and] helping them get back into the workforce”, it is difficult to imagine that workers will be

willing to uproot themselves to travel long distances within the province in order to take a job at

McDonald’s.

c) Appeals Procedure

The Budget Implementation Act also profoundly reorganized the appeals procedures of

the EI program, linking in important ways the above privatization (of risks, responsibility etc) to

17

the erosion of democratic procedures. Since its inception, the administration of the EI program,

including its appeals procedures, has been characterized by tripartite governing structures with

representation from employers, employees and the government. At the time of the 2012 budget,

if a claim for benefits was refused, an individual had the right to appeal to a tripartite Board of

Referees. The appeal procedure was very decentralized with Boards of Referees in 83 regions

and approximately 1,000 part-time adjudicators who dealt with some 25,000 cases per year.43

Under certain conditions the decision of a board could be further appealed to an EI Umpire

(generally a judge of the Federal Court of Canada). In 2012 there were 32 Umpires hearing

appeals from the Boards of Referees.44

The 2012 Budget Implementation Act introduced far-reaching changes by eliminating the

Boards of Referees, as well as the position of Umpire and replacing them with a Social Security

Tribunal, located in Ottawa. The new Social Security Tribunal will hear appeals from Canada

Pension Plan (CPP) and Old Age Security (OAS) claimants as well as EI claimants. Rather than

a tripartite body, hearings for EI claimants will be before one of 39 full-time members

specializing in that area. An appeal is brought first to the General Division of the Social Security

Tribunal, with the possibility, under certain circumstances, of further appealing the decision to

the Appeal Division.

The decisions of the EI Umpire formed a body of

jurisprudence that, in turn, guided EI insurance officers in future decisions.

45 While questions of efficiency and the elimination of administrative

duplication are mentioned, a major specified rationale is cost-savings. According to the

regulation introducing the change, ”consolidating the current tribunals to create the Social

Security Tribunal… is expected to save approximately $25 million annually”.46 The 2012

Budget projected that this change, combined with other internal administrative changes, would

18

save $39.4 million in 2013-14, rising to $183.2 million for 2014-15 and for each subsequent

year.47

The change in appeal procedure is likely to significantly reduce the ability of EI

claimants to bring forward appeals. It is unclear how the new 39 member tribunal will handle

the large number of appeals up to now done by over 1,000 regional experts across Canada

48 and

it is feared that delays and the difficulty of getting a fair and timely decision will discourage

people from launching appeals. A number of new stages to the appeal process will further limit

appeals going forward. A mandatory new stage, involving an initial request for a

“reconsideration of the decision by the Department” has been introduced. The General Division

must dismiss an appeal if it feels that it has no “reasonable chance of success” (summary

dismissal). Permission is now required in order to appeal further to the Appeal Division (leave

to appeal). 49

The Boards of Referees played an important role in helping to define the terms and

conditions under which benefits could be received, and, above all, in making it possible for

people to bring their issues forward and to tell their stories. The Boards were decentralized,

located throughout the regions and with members based in, knowledgeable about and responsive

to local labour conditions. This structure provided an important window on what the rules and

regulations meant in practice and important documentary evidence of what unemployment has

meant in concrete terms. They were on the front lines in terms of having to respond to changes in

labour market conditions, as well as challenges to prevailing norms and practices, to do, for

example, with hiring practices, discriminatory practices and so on. In this way, they became an

Pre-hearings conferences, dispute resolution processes, and settlement conferences

have been introduced to “allow appeals to be resolved without the completion of a full hearing,

in the interest of efficiency.”

19

important forum through which challenges to discriminatory practices or prevailing norms, or

arbitrary decisions could come about,50

It will be difficult for the centralized Social Security Tribunal to play the same role. With

one centralized tribunal in Ottawa the knowledge of the local labour market is likely to be gone.

The elimination of the tripartite nature of the EI appeals procedure both reflects and further

reinforces the weakening position of labour as an actor in the policy arena. Concerns have been

expressed that the changes are likely to lead to a less informal, more legalistic process. With the

Boards of Referees, almost all hearings were in-person. This is unlikely to continue to be the

case, given that many unemployed are in regions 3,000 to 4,000 ki away from Ottawa. Under

the new system, hearings can occur by email, video or teleconference, or in person.

as well as, more generally, providing insight into the

lived experience of those who have lost their job.

51

EI changes and privatization:

This new

process will present many more challenges for those with limited language or literacy skills, as

well as for those without access to and familiarity with internet processes. Overall it represents

the further silencing of the most marginal.

While the Conservative government austerity changes have contributed to privatizing

responsibilities associated with unemployment, and to the privatizing trend of having labour

adapt to market priorities, overall it has involved more, rather than less, state intervention and the

weakening of democratic processes, particularly with regard to appeals. The desire to maintain

control over the shaping of labour markets can be seen in part as connected to the priority of

developing natural resources, in particular the extraction of oil from the tar sands in Alberta, but

can also be understood in terms of the overall encouragement of a low wage industry and low-

20

wage service sector jobs. In both cases, it involves focusing resources on private sector needs. In

addition, there is a punitive or disciplinary aspect to the increased role of the state with respect to

the EI changes. The implication is that it is the individual’s fault if they are unemployed, they are

essentially being lazy and choosing to collect benefits rather than working. It is punitive in the

reallocation of labour to low-wage sectors. The disciplinary or coercive aspects of the state’s

policies in this regard have been reinforced by the stepping up of monitoring, house calls and so

on, in many respects, in keeping with the neo-liberal, coercive functions of the state.

While being introduced in the context of austerity, the changes are about far more than

balancing the government books. The changes taking place within the EI program are consistent

with shifting power relations, in particular, the erosion and pushing aside of labour and labour

representatives. The demise of the EI Umpire and the Boards of Referees is emblematic of the

demise of the post-war social order and social contract. The changes represent a further move

away from the insurance-based nature of income security provision and will increase the

numbers relying on provincial social assistance, charities and services such as food banks.

Privatizing trends in the area of social services are discussed below.

2) Private sector involvement in social welfare: encouraging charitable organizations and social

finance

Privatization of a different nature has occurred in the social services and social welfare

area. The government’s interest in this area was first signaled in the 2010 Federal Speech from

the Throne which indicated that it was looking “to innovative charities and forward-thinking

private-sector companies to partner on new approaches to many social challenges.”52 Proposals

have called both for an increased role for charities in this sector, as well as increased possibilities

21

for investor capital. With regard to the latter, considerable attention has been focused on “social

finance” proposals. The focus here is on mobilizing private capital in areas involving “societal

problems” or “societal challenges”. In this regard, the Canadian government initiatives have been

inspired and influenced by similar efforts in Britain, particularly David Cameron’s “Big Society”

projects, as well as by various initiatives in the US and Australia. Efforts to increase private

sector involvement in the provision of social welfare via charities and social finance are

discussed further below:

a) Charities in Canada

Building on the renewed emphasis on charitable organizations in the 1980s and 1990s, in

the current austerity context, considerable attention has been paid to increasing the role of

charities in the provision of social services. Proposals for reform have focused both on changing

the tax system to increase the incentive for individuals and corporations to make charitable

donations and allowing charities to function more like for-profit businesses, in the sense of being

able to generate and use revenue. The 2011 Budget announced that the Government would ask

the House Standing Committee on Finance to undertake a study of charitable donation tax

incentives, with a view to encouraging increased charitable giving.53 A number of measures have

also been introduced to tighten up the regulatory regime with respect to charities. The 2011

budget announced a series of amendments to ensure that abuse does not occur and that charities

are operating in an accountable manner.54 Budget 2012 proposed “measures to ensure that

charities devote their resources primarily to charitable, rather than political, activities”, including

an enhancement of the monitoring activities of the Canada Revenue Agency and requiring

charities “to provide more information on their political activities, including the extent to which

they are funded by foreign sources.”55

22

Given that the general direction and nature of debate being put forward by the

government is to greater reliance on the charitable sector for addressing social welfare, it is

worth considering in greater detail the implications of this form of privatization of social welfare.

The emphasis on providing social welfare via tax incentives for charities shifts key aspects of

policy formulation from the legislative process to discussions around regulations found in the

Income Tax Act and their judicial interpretation. This acts to limit and obscure key social issues.

What are essentially political decisions, the terms of which could be open to discussion within

the community, are being determined by narrow, technical and legal criteria, or interpreted by

the courts. The decision about which organizations will be supported through the tax system

revolves around the question of what constitutes a charity. In the absence of a definition in the

Income Tax Act, the definition of charity in Canada is derived from the 1601 British Statute of

Elizabeth, as interpreted by the courts. On this basis, common law has established four categories

of activities as charitable: the relief of poverty, the advancement of education, the advancement

of religion or “other purposes that have been found to be beneficial to the community”.56 While

charities are able to engage in advocacy and political activities, these activities can involve no

more than 10% of a charity’s resources, and “must be ancillary and incidental to the charitable

purpose and must be non-partisan in nature”.57

In practice, there has been considerable debate and contention over the question of what

constitutes a charity and what constitutes political activity. For example, the Fraser Institute, a

conservative think tank, has registered charity status, but the Vancouver Society of Immigrant

and Visible Minority Women, in a case that went to the Supreme Court of Canada, was denied

this designation. While the key purpose of the latter organization was educational forums,

classes and workshops for immigrant women, it was ruled that this did not constitute

23

“advancement of education” within the meaning of the charities law. (It was particularly

concerned about topics such as human rights, employment equity and violence against women.)

The question of what constitutes political activity became further contentious as changes in the

2012 budget, providing greater monitoring of the political activities of charitable organizations,

have been widely interpreted as directed primarily towards environmental groups raising

questions about the oil sands development and the Northern Gateway pipeline project.58

With the shift to tax incentives for charitable donations, the decision about what services

should be funded and how is less and less a collective, public and accountable decision, but is

driven by the parameters of the charity law and by the decisions of individuals,

disproportionately wealthy individuals, about where to donate their money. Figures from the

Finance Committee hearings indicate that those making charitable donations tend to be both

older and wealthier. It was noted that 80% of total donations are given by donors 45 years of age

and older and half of total donations are given by donors with incomes over $80,000 a year.

59

The shift in emphasis to funding of social policy via tax breaks for charitable donations, shifts to

the private sector key decisions about the nature and terms of services to be provided. This is

likely to lead to growing inequalities in terms of who benefits from tax incentives, who shapes

social policy directions, and who has access to social supports. There is no guarantee that there

will be any uniformity in the level and quality of services provided across the country or

province, and social policy will operate in less progressive or redistributive ways. Religious

groups constitute 40% of charitable organizations60 and this also has implications for the types of

social programs put forward. The revival of notions of charity, with its positing of deserving and

undeserving, its intrusive practices and its possibilities for discrimination on a number of

grounds (religion, race, single mothers) furthers inequalities in access to social welfare.

24

While the emphasis placed on charities is taking place in the context of a discourse about

the need to reduce government expenditures, tax incentives for charitable donations represent

considerable tax revenue foregone. The Department of Finance, for example, estimated the cost

resulting from the charitable donations tax credit for individuals and the charitable donations

deduction for corporations at $2.9 billion for 2011.61 Canada’s tax incentives for charitable

giving have been described as “among the most generous in the world.”62

b) Social finance and social impact bonds

What is happening,

then, is not so much the withdrawal of the state, as a redirection of state finances, involving

substantial amounts of money, in favour of tax subsidies to particular groups or organizations.

Perhaps the largest steps in the direction of privatization and a new relationship between

the state, charities and non-profits, and the private sector have been initiatives with respect to

social finance and social impact bonds. What is new about these proposals is that they involve

not simply privatization in the sense of the contracting out of social services, or the privatization

of responsibility for social welfare to households and charities, but also the use of private

investor capital in what had previously been considered public social service areas. In the

austerity context, social financing is presented as a way for charities and non-profit organizations

to find new sources of funding, for the government to reduce expenditures, and for capital to find

new investment opportunities and realize financial gains.

Over the last few years, a range of think tanks and policy actors63 in Canada have called

for greater private sector involvement in the social services and social welfare area. In December

2010 a “Canadian Task Force on Social Finance”, made up of a range of actors from the

philanthropic, financial and other sectors,64 issued a report, Mobilizing Private Capital for Public

25

Good. The focus here, as the title suggests, is on mobilizing private capital in areas involving

“societal problems” or “societal challenges”.65 The aim of impact investing66, as it is also

referred to, is to create both a profit and a social return; to “mak[e] it financially attractive to

solve social issues”.67

In the last two years, the Canadian government, inspired in part by experiences in the US

and the UK, has developed considerable interest in these proposals and taken initial steps in this

direction. Finance Minister Jim Flaherty met with the Task Force prior to the release of the

report and it was reported that there is “strong support inside government” for moving further on

these issues.

The proposals put forward by the Task Force include having public and

private foundations invest a certain proportion of their capital in “mission-related investments”;

the establishment of an “impact investment fund”, involving the use of public capital to leverage

private impact investment capital, changing the regulatory and tax framework to allow charities

to generate and use revenue; the use of pension funds assets to support impact investing, and tax

incentives for investors in social enterprises.

68 In the 2011 budget the Conservatives announced that they would pursue the issue

of social partnerships and social financing, noting that “all across Canada, citizens, businesses,

charities and other groups, such as the Canadian Task Force on Social Finance, are working

together to develop innovative ways to address local challenges” and that “some groups, such as

the homeless, persistently unemployed, and at-risk youth, face complex and continual social

challenges and often the best solutions to tackling these difficult problems are found locally.”69

HRSDC Minister Diane Finley established a Voluntary Advisory Council on Social Partnerships,

composed of key individuals from the private and not-for-profit sectors70, and travelled to Britain

to meet with “global social finance leaders”, think tanks and government officials.71 In the 2012

budget the government announced that it would continue to explore social finance instruments,

26

mentioning, in particular, pay-for-performance agreements, the leveraging of private sector

resources, and social impact bonds.72 Following up on this, in November 2012, Finley launched

a Call for Concepts for social finance, with the goal of “find[ing] new initiatives to shape social

policy in Canada and inviting “interested parties to submit innovative ideas”. In launching the

call Finley stated that: “By harnessing private sector capital and business practices, we can better

respond to social challenges such as homelessness, unemployment and poverty.” 73 In May

2013, the government released a list of projects that they felt exemplifies social finance

possibilities, including introducing young people to careers in the skilled trades, funding housing

units for people with mental illness, and a program targeting at-risk youth.74

A major form of social financing that the government has expressed interest in is “social

impact bonds”. A social impact bond is essentially a contract between the government and a

private investor. The investor will provide money to finance an organization (for example, a

charity or non-profit) to deliver a service. If the agreed-to results are achieved, the government

may pay the investors up to 100% of the original investment as well as an additional premium. If

the results are not achieved, the government does not pay.

75 Examples that have been provided

of social impact bonds include, in the US, an initiative of Goldman Sachs which “recently

partnered with New York to lend $10 million to a social services provider for a jail program.

The global investment firm would get its money back plus a profit if recidivism rates are

reduced, or get less back if the program fails.”76 Diane Finley has used Food nMore in Calgary

as an example. As she describes it, this is a coalition of 25 agencies in Calgary formed in 2007

that reduces the cost of buying food for groups who serve vulnerable populations. One of the

required functions of Food N More is front-line service delivery of 1,000 volunteers who deliver

food hampers across the city.77

27

A number of financial institutions have expressed interest, or are already participating in

social financing schemes. The Royal Bank of Canada (RBC), has invested $20 million in an

impact fund to address social and environmental issues such as energy, water and youth

employment.78 The Canadian Task Force on Social Finance quotes RBC’s subsidiary Phillips,

Hager & North as saying that the “notion of making it financially attractive to solve social issues

… is intriguing a growing number of institutional investors globally”.79 Macquarie Capital

Markets Canada chairman Stanley Hartt, a member of the Canadian Task Force on Social

Finance, noted that the best way to deal with social problems is through a partnership between

the government, the community and private sector: “the old mentality of business making profit,

while government funds social services is no longer tenable.”80

The social finance initiative asserts a new role for the state in the social welfare area. The

language that the government has been one of “supporting local communities”, “empowering

individuals and communities”, “unlock[ing] innovation in local communities”; of people “taking

more personal responsibility” for their own well-being, and developing partnerships between the

government and the local community. The government’s announcements have reiterated

previously stated views of the family as the foundation of society and primarily responsible for

well-being,

81 as well as reasserting views of the government as “enabler and facilitator rather

than procurer of services”.82 In practice, this initiative signals new forms of privatization and

new state-private sector relationships in the social policy area. Rather than the state as

responsible for identifying social policy priorities and providing services, social finance searches

for ways to shift cost, responsibility for and delivery of social services and social welfare from

the state to the private sector. Programs rather than acting as a counter to the consequences of

market outcomes, are tied in ever more closely to it, with it being left to the market to determine

28

if and to what degree services for the most vulnerable will be provided. Again, despite being

introduced in an austerity context, it is not clear whether this initiative would involve less state

expenditure, or is simply a means of diverting government money to investors, who have the

potential to make a profit, rather than directly to provide services for those in need. There are, as

yet, many unanswered questions about this program. What happens to those in whom it is not

profitable to invest? What are the implications for procedures and accountability? Under what

conditions is it “financially attractive” to solve social issues? While these questions are still to be

answered, it seems, as in the other areas discussed, to signal a fundamental change in the nature

of the social contract.

Conclusions

In the period since 2011 reforms introduced in the context of austerity have entailed

further significant privatization of income security and social service programs at the federal

level in Canada. While both areas have been characterized by a form of creeping privatization,

with recent changes, to some extent, a culmination of processes on-going since the 1980s, at the

same time, the measures introduced represent a new phase in both privatization and social policy

reform. In the area of EI, the continued privatization of responsibility for unemployment to

individuals and families has, paradoxically, been accompanied by an increased centralization of

power within the cabinet with regard to the control and the determination of the parameters of

the program. The changes have involved a shift away from tripartite representation, a weakening

of the appeals procedures, and an increase in the disciplinary role of the state vis a vis the

unemployed. While the state has retained control in key labour market areas, other initiatives

devolve responsibility for the most vulnerable to charities and the private sector. Privatization in

29

the area of social services for the most marginalized has taken the form of increased reliance on

charities, particularly through the use of tax incentives to encourage charitable donations. The

introduction of social finance initiatives and the turn to investor capital in these areas marks a

new stage in the privatization process, one characterized by the privatization of decision making

about how and through which vehicles social policy is to be delivered.

While these reforms are being introduced in austerity context, they have to be seen as the

latest phase within the longer term privatization trajectory, where the concerns have been a shift

in power arrangements involving new roles for the state, shifting the balance between public and

private power, and in which the position of labour and other disadvantaged groups has been

steadily eroded. The most recent social policy privatizations have elements of commonality in

that both represent a fundamental break with the social contract as it has continued to exist since

the post-war period, and with a commitment to a minimum level of state provision of social

services. As a consequence social policy reforms in the austerity context are likely to exacerbate

the inequalities already generated by the economic turmoil of this era, and, indeed, to introduce

new forms of inequalities, for example, in terms of who benefits from tax incentives, or profits

from the marginalizations that have occurred, who shapes social policy directions, or has access

to social supports.

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1 Canada, Department of Finance, The Next Phase of Canada’s Economic Action Plan: A Low-Tax Plan for Jobs and Growth, June 2011, p. 19; accessed at http:www.budget.gc.ca/2011/plan/budget2011-eng.pdf,. The 2012 Budget projected a $1.3 billion deficit in 2014-15 and a return to a surplus in 2015-16. Canada, Department of Finance, Jobs, Growth and Economic Prosperity: Economic Action Plan 2012, March 29, 2012, p. 22. Accessed at: http:www.budget.gc.ca/2012 2 Canada, Department of Finance, The Next Phase of Canada’s Economic Action Plan: A Low-Tax Plan for Jobs and Growth, June 2011, p. 17; accessed at http:www.budget.gc.ca/2011/plan/budget2011-eng.pdf 3Mariana Valverde, “The Mixed Social Economy as a Canadian Tradition”, Studies in Political Economy 47, Summer 1995; Margaret Little, “The Blurring of Boundaries: Private and Public Welfare for Single Mothers in Ontario”, Studies in Political Economy, 47, Summer 1995; Josephine Rekart, Public Funds, Private Provision: The Role of the Voluntary Sector, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993) 4 Canada, Department of Finance, The Next Phase of Canada’s Economic Action Plan: A Low-Tax Plan for Jobs and Growth, June 6, 2011, accessed at: http://www.budget.gc.ca/2011/plan/budget2011-eng.pdf 5 On the notion of “creeping privatization” see Joan Gilmour, “Creeping Privatization in Health Care: Implications for Women as the State Redraws Its Role, in Brenda Cossman and Judy Fudge (eds), Privatization, Law and the Challenge to Feminism (University of Toronto Press, 2002) 6 Donald Savoie, Thatcher, Reagan, Mulroney: In Search of a New Bureaucracy, (University of Pittsburgh Press), 1994 W.T. Stanbury, “Privatization and the Mulroney Government, 1984-1988”, in Andrew B. Gollner and Daniel Salee (eds), Canada Under Mulroney: An End-of-Term Report (Montreal: Vehicule Press, 1988); Judy Fudge and Brenda Cossman, “Introduction: Privatization, Law and the Challenge to Feminism”, in Brenda Cossman and Judy Fudge (eds), Privatization, Law and the Challenge to Feminism, (University of Toronto Press, 2002); Duncan Cameron, “Selling the House to Pay the Mortgage: What is Behind Privatization?”, Studies in Political Economy, 53, Summer 1997 7 Savoie, Thatcher, Reagan, Mulroney; 149, 169, Cameron, “Selling the House”; Jeanne Kirk Laux, “Shaping or Serving Markets? Public Ownership after Privatization”, in Drache and Gertler, The New Era of Global Competition: State Policy and Market Power (McGill-Queen’s University Press,) 8 Judy Fudge and Brenda Cossman, “Introduction: Privatization, Law and the Challenge to Feminism” p. 20, drawing on Sol Picciotto, “Linkages in International Investment Regulation: The Antimonies of the Multilateral Agreement on Investment”, University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Economics and Law 19(3), 1998, 731-68 9 Laux, “Shaping or Serving Markets?”, 295, 299-300 10 Cameron, “Selling the House”, pp. 24-5 11 Cameron, “Selling the House”; Asbjorn Wahl, The Rise and Fall of the Welfare State, (Pluto Press, 2011), p. 56 12 See, for example, Loic Wacquant, Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009) 13 On these points see Jacob S. Hacker, “Privatizing Risk without Privatizing the Welfare State: The Hidden Politics of Social Policy Retrenchment in the United States”, American Political Science Review, vol. 98, no. 2, May 2004; Suzan Ilcan, “Privatizing Responsibility: Public Sector Reform under Neoliberal Government”, Canadian Review of Sociology, 46, 3, 2009 14 Jeanne Kirk Laux, “Shaping or Serving Markets?”; Cameron, “Selling the House”. Canada, prior to this early wave of privatization was somewhere between the US and Europe in terms of the number and extent of publically owned enterprises. Estimates from the late 1970s put the number of federal government enterprises (crown corporations) and subsidiary corporations owned or effectively controlled by the federal government at somewhere between 306 and 464. See Stanbury, “Privatization and the Mulroney government”, p. 121 15 These areas have been identified by Wahl as part of the “core institutions or the last bulwark of the welfare state” where privatization arrived relatively late. Asbjorn Wahl, The Rise and Fall of the Welfare State, (Pluto Press, 2011), p. 59 16 This included, most notably, the Royal Commission on Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, its three-volume report issued in 1985 and the Forget Commission of Inquiry into UI

31

17 Peter Graefe, “State Restructuring, Social Assistance, and Canadian Intergovernmental Relations: Same Scales, New Tunes”, Studies in Political Economy, 78, Autumn 2006 18 Alice de Wolff, “Privatizing Public Employment assistance and Precarious Employment in Toronto”, in Leah Vosko (ed), Precarious Employment: Understanding Labour Market Insecurity in Canada (McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2006). See also McBride (87-88) 19 De Wolff, “Privatizing Public Employment Assistance” 20 The CHST combined federal government funding to the provinces in the areas of health, education and social welfare into one unconditional block grant but with a 25% cut in overall funding. 21 Neil Brooks, “The Role of the Voluntary Sector in a Modern Welfare State”, in Jim Phillips (ed), Between State and Market: Essays on Charities Law and Policy in Canada, (McGill-Queen’s University Press, ) 22 Josephine Rekart, Public Funds, Private Provision: The Role of the Voluntary Sector (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993) 23 Ibid, p. 38 24 This replaced a 1957 provision which allowed taxpayers to claim a $100 optional standard deduction, without submitting receipts. 25 David Duff, “Charitable Contributions and the Personal Income Tax: Evaluating the Canadian Credit”, in Jim Phillips (ed), Between State and Market: Essays on Charities Law and Policy in Canada (McGill-Queen’s University Press) 26 Lisa Philipps, “Tax Law and Social Reproduction: The Gender of Fiscal Policy in an Age of Privatization”, in Brenda Cossman and Judy Fudge (eds), Privatization, Law and the Challenge to Feminism (University of Toronto Press, 2002), p. 78 27 Ibid, p. 79 28 Ibid 29 Rachel Laforest, Voluntary Sector Organizations and the State: Building New Relationships (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2011) , pp. 35-6. She notes that this contributed to “the marginalization of identity-based groups, such as women’s groups and visible minority groups”. 30 Andrew Jackson, “Tightening the Screws on the Unemployed”, Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, http://behindthenumbers.ca/2012/05/15/tightening-the-screws-on-the-unemployed/; accessed 5/3/2013. 31 ibid 32 Canada, Government of Canada, Canada News Centre, Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, “Connecting Canadians with Available Jobs”, 2012/5/24; Canada, Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, “Speaking notes for the Honourable Diane Finley, announcing improvements to Make Employment Insurance Work Better for Canadians”, May 24, 2012, http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?nid=676369. Accessed 11/28/2012; Canada, Government of Canada, Regulations Amending the Employment Insurance Regulations SOR/2012-261, Nov. 30, 2012, in Canada Gazette Part II: Official Regulations Vol. 146, no. 26, 19 Dec. 2012 33 Canada, Government of Canada, Regulations Amending the Employment Insurance Regulations SOR/2012-261, Nov. 30, 2012, in Canada Gazette Part II: Official Regulations Vol. 146, no. 26, 19 Dec. 2012 34 Canada, Government of Canada, Regulations Amending the Employment Insurance Regulations SOR/2012-261, Nov. 30, 2012, in Canada Gazette Part II: Official Regulations Vol. 146, no. 26, 19 Dec. 2012 35 Canada, Government of Canada, Regulations Amending the Employment Insurance Regulations SOR/2012-261, Nov. 30, 2012, in Canada Gazette Part II: Official Regulations Vol. 146, no. 26, 19 Dec. 2012 36 Les Whittington and Bruce Campion-Smith, “EI Reform: Unemployed Canadians face crackdown under federal changes”, the star.com, May 24, 2012; www.thestar.com/printarticle/1183424; Matthew Mendelson, quoted in Bill Curry, “Sweeping EI changes usher in three new tiers of jobless workers”, The Globe and Mail, May 24, 2012; Andrew Jackson, “The Budget, Employment Insurance and the Unemployed”, The Progressive Economics Forum ,June 6,2012 www.progressive-economics.ca/2012/06/06the-budget-employment-insurance-and... accessed 11/22/2012 37 Andrew Jackson, “The Budget, Employment Insurance and the Unemployed”, The Progressive Economics Forum, ,June 6,2012, www.progressive-economics.ca/2012/06/06the-budget-employment-insurance-and... accessed 11/22/2012 38 Andrew Jackson, “The Economics of EI “Reform”, May 24, 2012 http://behindthenumbers.ca/2012/05/24/the-economics-of-ei-reform/ accessed 5/3/2013.

32

39 Bill Curry and Kevin Carmichael, “Carney flags ‘overreliance’ on temps”, Globe and Mail, April 24, 2013, p. B9 40 Canada, Department of Finance, Jobs, Growth and Economic Prosperity: Economic Action Plan 2012, March 29, 2012, p. 147; Canada, Canada News Centre, Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, “Connecting Canadians with Available Jobs”, 41 Canada, Canada News Centre, Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, “Connecting Canadians with Available Jobs”, 2012/05/24, p. 6 42 Tim Harper, “Diane Finley wants more Canadians working at McDonald’s”, Toronto Star, May 24, 2012; www.thestar.com/printarticle/1185128, accessed 11/28/2012 43 CBC news, “Employment Insurance review boards to be scrapped”, May 25, 2012. http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/sotry/2012/05/25/pol-employment-insurance-review-boa.... accessed 11/22/2012. 44 Ibid 45 Canada, House of Commons, Bill C-38: An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament on March 29, 2012, pp. 196-221. The announcement of the Social Security Tribunal was first made in an annex to the 2012 Budget, entitled “Responsible Spending”. 45Canada, Department of Finance, Jobs, Growth and Economic Prosperity: Economic Action Plan 2012, March 29, 2012,.annex !, p. 270. Accessed at: http:www.budget.gc.ca/2012, 46 Canada, Government of Canada, Social Security Tribunal Regulations, in Canada Gazette, Part I: Notices and Proposed Regulations, vol. 146, no 51, 22 Dec. 2012 47 Canada, Department of Finance, Jobs, Growth and Economic Prosperity: Economic Action Plan 2012, March 29, 2012, P. 270 48 CBC news, “Employment Insurance review boards to be scrapped: 74-member tribunal to replace 1,000 part-time board members”, May 25,2012, http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/story/2012/05/25/pol-emmployment-insurance-review-board , accessed 11/22/2012 49 Canada, Government of Canada, Social Security Tribunal Regulations, in Canada Gazette, Part I: Notices and Proposed Regulations, vol. 146, no 51, 22 Dec. 2012, p. 2 50 For example, as I have documented elsewhere, in the 1950s and 1960s, appeals brought to the Boards of Referees and the Umpire played an important role in challenging discriminatory practices assumptions about what was considered “suitable” employment for women and if they were “capable of and available for work” in the period around childbirth, or if they had young children. This eventually lead to changes in the jurisprudence and guidelines around what was considered appropriate work, as well as creating pressure for the introduction of maternity benefits. Ann Porter, Gendered States: Women, Unemployment Insurance and the Political Economy of the Welfare State in Canada, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003) 51 Canada, Government of Canada, Social Security Tribunal Regulations, in Canada Gazette, Part I: Notices and Proposed Regulations, vol. 146, no 51, 22 Dec. 2012, p. 4, 10 52 Canada, Government of Canada, Speech from the Throne, 3 March 2010. http://www.speech.gc.ca. 53 Canada, Department of Finance, The Next Phase of Canada’s Economic Action Plan: A Low-Tax Plan for Jobs and Growth, June 6, 2011, p. 131. accessed at: http://www.budget.gc.ca/2011/plan/budget2011-eng.pdf, 54 Canada, Department of Finance, The Next Phase of Canada’s Economic Action Plan: A Low-Tax Plan for Jobs and Growth, June 6, 2011, accessed at: http://www.budget.gc.ca/2011/plan/budget2011-eng.pdf, annex 3; Sheila M. Crummey, Mary-Ann E. Haney, Catherine A. Roberts, “Budget 2011-significant tax measures affecting the charitable sector”, McMillan; http://www.mcmillan.ca/showpublication.aspx?show=93686&print=True, accessed 2/9/2013; Mark Blumberg, Canadian Charity Law, “2011 Federal Budget – What’s new for Canadian Registered Charities”, http://www.canadiancharitylaw.ca/index.php/blog/comments/2011_federal_budget_ accessed 2/9/2013. 55 Canada, Department of Finance, Jobs, Growth and Economic Prosperity: Economic Action Plan 2012, March 29, 2012, p. 22. Accessed at: http:www.budget.gc.ca/2012, p. 204-5 56 Jim Phillips, “The Federal Court of Appeal and the Legal Meaning of Charity: Review and Critique”, in Jim Phillips, Bruce Chapman and David Stevens (eds), Between State and Market:Essays on Charities Law and Policy in Canada (McGill-Queens, 2001) 57 Ibid, p. 3. Comments by S. Keenan, Dept of Finance

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58 Paul Waldie, “New rules in budget ‘create more fear’ among politically active charities”, The Globe and Mail, March 30, 2012. http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/new-rules-in-budget-create-more-frea-amon.... accessed 2/9/2013; Kathryn Blaze Carlson, “Are new guidelines for charities just upholding current law or a way to silence oil-sands critics?”, National Post, March 30, 2012. http://news.nationalpost.com/2012/03/30/are-new-guidelines-for-charities-just-upholding-cu... Accessed2/9/2013. 59 Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Finance, Evidence, Jan. 31, 2012. P. 4. Comments by Alison Hale, Statistics Canada 60 Canada, House of Commons, Tax Incentives for Charitable Giving in Canada: Report of the Standing Committee on Finance, Feb. 2013, 41st Parliament, 1st session, p. 8 61 Canada, House of Commons, Tax Incentives for Charitable Giving in Canada: Report of the Standing Committee on Finance, Feb. 2013, 41st Parliament, 1st session, p. 9. It is referred to as the”federal fiscal cost”. This figure is also provided in the 2011 Budget, Canada, Dept of Finance, The Next Phase of Canada’s Economic Action Plan, p. 204. 62 Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on Finance, Evidence, Jan. 31, 2012, p. 2. Comments by Sean Keenan, Dept of Finance. 63 This includes the Canadian Task Force on Social Finance, the Mowat Centre, the MaRS discovery district, which has created a National Centre for Impact Investing 64 The Task Force report states that the Task Force was conceived by Social Innovation Generation (SiG). which is a “national partnership comprised of The JW McConnell Family Foundation, the MaRS Discovery District, PLAN Institute and the University of Waterloo.” See Canadian Task Force on Social Finance, Mobilizing Private Capital for Public Good, Dec. 2010. 65 Canadian Task Force on Social Finance, Mobilizing Private Capital for Public Good, Dec. 2010, p. 5 66 “Impact investing” is defined as “the active investment of capital in businesses and funds that generate positive social and/or environmental impacts, as well as financial returns… to the investor. Impact investors want to move beyond socially responsible investment … to investment with social/environmental impact as a primary qualifying criterion.” Canadian Task Force on Social Finance, Mobilizing Private Capital for Public Good, Dec. 2010, p. 5 67 Ibid, p. 7. Quote from RBC’s subsidiary Phillips, Hager and North’s report, “An Overview of Impact Investing” (November 2010) 68 Bill Curry, “Ottawa looks at rewriting rules on charitable giving”, The Globe and Mail, Oct. 28, 2011. Accessed at: www.theglobeandmail.com/life/giving/ottawa-looks-at-rewriting-rules-on-charitable... Accessed 11/9/2012. 69 Canada, Department of Finance, The Next Phase of Canada’s Economic Action Plan: A Low-Tax Plan for Jobs and Growth, June 6, 2011, p. 132. accessed at: http://www.budget.gc.ca/2011/plan/budget2011-eng.pdf, 70 Canada News Centre, Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, “Speaking Points for the Honourable Diane Finley to lauch the National Call for Concepts for social finance at the 5th annual Social Finance Forum”, http://news.gc.ca/web/article-eng.do?nid=705509. Accessed 11/15/2012. 71 Bill Curry, “Ottawa looks at rewriting rules on charitable giving”, The Globe and Mail, Oct. 28,2011, downloaded 11/9/2012 72Canada, Department of Finance, Jobs, Growth and Economic Prosperity: Economic Action Plan 2012, March 29, 2012, p. 22. Accessed at: http:www.budget.gc.ca/2012, p. 173 73 HRSDC, “The Government of Canada is taking action to address local challenges”, Canada News Centre, news.gc.ca, 11/08/2012. 74 Canada, Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, Harnessing the Power of Social Finance: Canadians Respond to the National Call for Concepts for Social Finance, May 2013 75 Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, ‘Speaking Points for the Honourable Diane Finley to launch the National Call for Concepts for social finance at the 5th annual Social Finance Forum”, Nov. 8, 2012, Toronto, Ontario, available at Canada News Centre, news.gc.ca, downloaded 11/15/2012; Les Whittington, “Feds introduce controversial ‘social impact bonds’ to fund social services, Toronto Star, Nov. 8, 2012. http://www.thestar.com/printarticle/1284941. Accessed 11/15/2012. 76 Bill Curry and Tavia Grant, “Ottawa seeks to give charities a new role in delivery of public services”, Globe and Mail, Nov. 7, 2012, downloaded 11/9/2012

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77 Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, ‘Speaking Points for the Honourable Diane Finley to launch the National Call for Concepts for social fiancé at the 5th annual Social Finance Forum”, Nov. 8, 2012, Toronto, Ontario, available at Canada News Centre, news.gc.ca, downloaded 11/15/2012 78 Canada, Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, Harnessing the Power of Social Finance: Canadians Respond to the National Call for Concepts for Social Finance, May 2013, p. 12 79 Canadian Task Force on Social Finance, Mobilizing Private Capital for Public Good, Dec. 2010, p. 7 80 Tara Perkins, “Governments look to boost charity financing”, The Globe and Mail, March 30, 2011. Accessed 11/9/2012. 81 Canada, Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, “Speaking Notes for the Honourable Diane Finley, Minister of Human Resources and Skills Development, “Addressing Social Challenges by Empowering Individuals and Communities”, 2012 Manning Networking Conference, March 9, 2012, Ottawa, Ontario, available at Canada News Centre, news.gc.ca 82 Canada, Human Resources and Skills Development Canada, Harnessing the Power of Social Finance: Canadians Respond to the National Call for Concepts for Social Finance, May 2013, p. 7