George Campbell

The goal of the series Rhetoric in the Modern Era is to prompt and sponsorbook-length treatments of important rhetorical theorists and of philosophersand literary theorists who make substantial contributions to our understandingof language and rhetoric. In some cases, a book in this series is the first book-length treatment of the figure; in others, a book in the series is the first toexamine a philosopher or theorist from the perspective of rhetorical theory.

The intended audience for books in the series are nonspecialistsgradu-ate students coming to the study of a theorist for the first time and professorsbroadly interested in the rhetorical tradition. The series books are compre-hensive introductionscomprehensive in the sense that they provide briefbiographies, descriptions of the intellectual milieu, and discussions of themajor scholarship on the figure as context for a detailed examination of thefigures contribution to rhetorical theory or history.

We envision these as the first books on their subject, not the last. Whilebooks in the series may exceed these modest aims, their focus is on achiev-ing them. A complete list of books in the series can be found at the end ofthis volume.

ii

SUNY series,Rhetoric in the Modern Era

Arthur E. Walzer and Edward Schiappa, Editors

George Campbell

Rhetoric in the Age of Enlightenment

ARTHUR E. WALZER

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS

Published byState University of New York Press, Albany

2003 State University of New York

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Printed in the United States of America

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Walzer, Arthur E., 1944George Campbell : rhetoric in the Age of Enlightenment / Arthur E. Walzer.

p. cm. (SUNY series, rhetoric in the modern age [sic])Includes bibliographical references and index.ISBN 0-7914-5577-7 (hc : alk. paper) ISBN 0-7914-5578-5 (pb : alk. paper)1. Campbell, George, 17191796. Philosophy of rhetoric. 2. Rhetoric. 3. English

languageRhetoric. I. Title. II. SUNY series, rhetoric in the modern era.

PN173.C33 W35 2002808dc21

2002075788

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

Acknowledgments vii

Introduction 1

1 George Campbell: Minister, Theologian, Professor, and Philosopher of Rhetoric 5

2 Intellectual Milieu: Foundations and Influences 15

3 Faculties and Types of DiscoursePhilosophy of Rhetoric, Preface, Introduction,and Chapters I, II, III 33

4 How Rhetoric Holds Logic: Logic, Reasoning,and Evidence

Philosophy of Rhetoric, Book I, Chapters IV, V, VI 49

5 Imagination, Resemblance, and Vivacity 65

6 Securing Belief by Engaging the Passions: The Seven Circumstances and Sympathy

Philosophy of Rhetoric, Chapters VII, VIII, IX 75

7 Correct Usage: Reputable, National, PresentA Reading of Book II 89

8 Style and Book III: Vivacity and Animation as Stylistic Qualities 103

9 Campbells Other Work: Dissertation on Miracles,Lectures on Pulpit Eloquence, the Sermons 111

v

Contents

10 Review of the Scholarship and Conclusions 127

Appendix. Lectures on Pulpit Eloquence in Lectures on Systematic Theology and Pulpit Eloquence: An Abstract 139

Notes 153

References 161

Index 171

vi Contents

I thank the University of Minnesota for a three-month leave, which allowedme to visit Scotland, and I thank the University of Aberdeen and their stafffor the welcoming access to their manuscript collections while I was there.

My colleagues at the University of Minnesota are always a source of support.Alan Gross, who is more willing to read the works of others than any one else Iknow, read this book in manuscript and offered perceptive suggestions. RichardGraff, who has already taught me much about the rhetorical tradition, made cor-rections and offered advice on some chapters. Bill Marchand and Tom Scanlan,great friends for thirty years, are constant sources of ideas. Billie Wahlstromdeserves special thanks for being a department head who never questioned therelevancy of historical work. I would like to single out David Beard among themany graduate students at Minnesota who have helped me. Tom Clayton, of theEnglish Department at Minnesota and my dissertation adviser thirty years ago,is a model as a scholar; he was also tireless in his efforts to improve my writing,which, whatever its quality, is at least better for his efforts.

Two of the State University of New York Press readers, Lewie Ulman ofOhio State University and Glen McClish of San Diego State University,offered helpful criticisms and excellent suggestions. Glen also reread sectionsof the revised manuscript with great care and, again, made important sugges-tions which I adopted. Director of State University of New York Press,Priscilla Ross and her assistant, Oli Baker, were supportive and efficientthroughout the research and writing of this manuscript. No one should holdeither the reviewers at SUNY Press or my colleagues responsible for any of mymisunderstanding or errors.

I thank my mother, Eileen Walzer, a diligent reader and writer, for herunwavering support and love. I thank my daughter, Emma, for being just the kidI wanted. To my wife, Ginny, who shares everything with me, I owe everything.

vii

Acknowledgments

yanuladaThis page intentionally left blank.

George Campbell is a good fit in this seriesa series of introductory bookson important figures in the history of modern rhetoric. His Philosophy ofRhetoric (POR) is amply represented in our anthologies and justly praised inour surveys as the most important rhetorical theory of the Enlightenment.Yet, this is the first book-length study of Campbell to be published. Further-more there is little scholarly discussion of Campbell today, and it is difficult tomotivate graduate students to undertake the challenge of coming to termswith the Philosophy of Rhetoric (POR). No doubt the postmodernist critique ofthe Enlightenment (and Campbell was a consummate modernist thinker)contributes to this lack of interest. But there are other reasons as wellrea-sons for which Campbell himself must accept some of the responsibility.

First, POR is a frustrating read. Campbell writes with point and edge inhis Dissertation on Miracles, with admirable simplicity in his Lectures on PulpitEloquence, and with clarity and interest in Lectures on Ecclesiastical History. Butthe Philosophy of Rhetoric suffers from an often turgid, sometimes pompousstyle. First, key points are expressed obscurely or elliptically, lost in prose thatlectures us on what seems obvious. Second, the text manifests a reluctance,born of Campbells intellectual conservatism, to dramatize what is originaland important about the theory advanced. The result is that the unity andoriginality of Campbells theory is obscured in his work.

These expository problems motivate my general approach in this book.My goal is to make Campbell clearer. In my opinion, the unity of the Philos-ophy of Rhetoric comes into focus when Campbells intentions are made moreconsistently present to the reader, for he wrote with both tradition and moder-nity very much on his mind. The rhetorical tradition, as defined by the worksof Aristotle, Cicero, and especially Quintilian, and modern empiricist philos-ophy, as set forth by John Locke, Thomas Reid, and especially David Hume,are the textual voices that resonate in POR. In identifying these works as cru-cial to understanding Campbells theory, I have not unearthed a hiddenhermeneutic key, for Campbell signals his intentions to his readers in his

1

Introduction

introduction. There, he writes that the classical rhetoricians had set forth thebasic tenets of the art of rhetoric, leaving for his more scientific, philosophicage the challenge of explaining in theoretical terms the basis for ancient dicta.My approach then is informed by what I take to be the intentions manifest inthe Philosophy of Rhetoric. I present this book as an historical reconstruction ofan important rhetorical text, that is, a work that, in Edward Schiappas defin-ition, attempts to reconstruct an important text as much as possible in thewords and mindset of the original author (1990, 19394), as distinguishedfrom a modern appropriation, which would interpret an author in the inter-preters philosophical framework.

Whether intended as historical reconstruction or modern appropriation,previous scholarship on Campbell has also emphasized the influence of eigh-teenth-century empiricist philosophy on the Philosophy of Rhetoric. More thantwenty-five years ago, Vincent Bevilacqua and Dennis R. Bormann taught usto see Campbell with reference to the Scottish Enlightenment, and composi-tion scholars have more recently emphasized how Campbells empiricist phi-losophy shaped the nature of his influence on nineteenth-century writinginstruction. The valuable historical research of H. Lewis Ulman and, recently,Jeffrey Mark Suderman has examined in detail Campbells Scottish relations.My book is especially indebted to the work of Lloyd F. Bitzer, the foremostCampbell scholar. In short, in viewing Campbell from the perspective of eigh-teenth-century philosophy, I can claim only the good sense to have followedin the path that these scholars have created, though the greater length that abook offers allows me to provide a sustained close reading of Campbells textin relationship to the work of his empiricist teachers.

While scholars have attended to the eighteenth-century influences onCampbells work, Campbells debt to the ancient rhetoricians has received lessattention. Campbell learned a great deal from the rhetorical tradition and isvery much a product of it. Quintilians Institutes of Oratory is the most compre-hensive embodiment of classical rhetoric ever written, and Campbell appar-ently regarded this work with a respect that bordered on reverence. Althoughthe Philosophy of Rhetoric is often presented as paradigmatic of a new rhetoric,Campbell did not intend to challenge Quintilian. Quite the contrary: he seeshis work as confirmation of Quintilians view, believing that the psychologicalinsights of eighteenth-century empiricism would only deepen our appreciationfor the classical rhetorical tradition. Campbells allegiance to classical rhetorichas not, in my view, been emphasized enough in previous scholarship. Fur-thermore, understanding the Philosophy of Rhetoric as a merging of ancient andmodern perspectives can resolve many of the most impassioned disagreementsthat have characterized work on Campbell to this point.

I wanted to organize this book in a way that would be helpful to studentsworking their way through the Philosophy of Rhetoric and have, for that reason,created a sequence of chapters that, as much as possible, tracks the parts of

2 Introduction

POR. My first two chapters set forth the background for the reading of PORthat forms the heart of this book. Chapter 1 reviews Campbells life and career.Chapter 2 discusses the major Enlightenment influences on Campbells theory.With the possible exception of his study of classical rhetoric while he firstflirted with a law career and subsequently prepared for the ministry, the mostsignificant influence on Campbells views on rhetoric resulted from his involve-ment with the Aberdeen Philosophical Society. With the other members ofthis society, Campbell explored the implications of the work of Sir FrancisBacon, John Locke, and David Hume for various arts and sciencesin Camp-bells case, for rhetoric. And he came in direct contact with the work of Alexan-der Gerard and Thomas Reid, both members of the Society whose views alsoinfluenced his understanding of how the mind comes to belief. Chapters 3focuses on the preface, introduction, and PORs first three chapters. In thesechapters PORs intentions become clear. Campbell would deepen our theoret-ical understanding of classical rhetoric. He will draw on the empiricist philos-ophy to provide an account of belief and on faculty psychology to establish therelationship of that account to the motives of audiences and the purposes ofrhetoric. Chapter 4 examines Campbells presentation of discourse addressed tothe understanding, taking up his theory of evidence and reasoning. In callingfor a natural logica description of how the mind understandsCampbellin effect establishes psychology as more relevant than epistemology forrhetoric. Chapter 5 discusses Campbells analysis of the imagination. ForCampbell, appeals to the imagination play a most important role in belief, forone of the ways that an idea is made present to the mind in a way analogous tothat of a primary sense impression is through imaginative appeal. This descrip-tion of rhetorical efficacy, which I call Campbells resemblance theory ofrhetoric, comes gradually to Campbell, as he reflects on classical notions ofvividness from the perspective of Humes notions of vivacity and the lively idea.Chapter 6 considers Campbells analysis of the passions. Here again, Campbelldeepens cassical notions of amplification (through his concept of the sevencircumstances) and of thos through his analysis of sympathy. Chapter 7 ana-lyzes Book II of the Philosophy of RhetoricCampbells philosophy of languageand his prescriptions on usage. Campbell responds to what he perceives as theneeds of his contemporaries in Scotland by arguing for a standard of usage thatwould prefer national usage over local, present usage over past, and the habitsof reputable authors over common use. He is delighted to find support inQuintilian for much that he recommends. Chapter 8 considers Campbellsviews on style, including his analysis of vivacity in Book III. Here again, we seeCampbell building on Quintilians analysis but deepening the classical accountby providing theoretical explanations in empiricist terms. Chapter 9 deals withCampbells other work, especially the two works that most contribute to anunderstanding of PORhis Dissertation on Miracles and his Lectures on PulpitEloquence (which is summarized in appendix 1). The concluding chapter offers

3Introduction

a review of the major scholarly work on Campbell and also my own conclu-sions. A reader might prefer to start with the review of the literature in the con-clusion. Im grateful to anyone who reads the book in any order.

My argument is, then, that the Philosophy of Rhetoric should be read as anattempt to provide a modern (eighteenth-century) theory that accounts for clas-sical rhetoric. In Campbells view, moderns had nothing to contribute torhetoric as an art (or tekhn). The Ancients had perfected the tekhn tradition.The eighteenth century, however, not only could provide a more complete the-ory of rhetoric than the Ancients had, but also could provide a better descrip-tion in causal terms for why traditional advice worked. Investigations of thefoundational principles underlying many of the arts and sciences during theEnlightenment put Campbell and his contemporaries (they felt) in a position toprovide a superior theoretical explanation for rhetoric than the Ancients had.The theory would be a psychological theory, based on a science of humannature, and, therefore, deeper and broader than a social theory that would nec-essarily be specific to a particular culture. It would examine rhetoric from theperspective of reception, not as an art of composing in the manner of classicalrhetoric. Explorations into the mental operations that constituted the mindsresponse to stimuli that philosophers, including Locke and Hume, had carriedout provided a universal theory of response that could be the basis for an expla-nation in causal terms of rhetorical efficacy. At the same time, such an approachto rhetoric could contribute to an understanding of the minds operations.Campbell intended that the empiricist account of mental operations would con-firm the Ancients advice, and he is pleased to cite Quintilian as confirmation.But the theory he produced is more innovative than the one predicted by thisapproach. For one, the importance of the imagination in Humes psychology didmore than merely explain the Ancients version of rhetorical efficacy; it changedit, at least in emphasis. As a result, in Campbells theory appeals to the imagi-nation and the passions become more importantplay a more fundamental rolein beliefthan Campbell anticipated or wanted to admit. Logical appeal andthe enthymeme become less important, both because of the syllogisms andenthymemes necessary link to culturally specific beliefs (doxa) and also becausefor Campbell demonstration seems artificial in the sense that it is belated (morea method of verification or illustration) in comparison to induction, whichresembles the way we ordinarily come to belief by inferring general conclusionsfrom particular experiences. What I call Campbells resemblance theory ofrhetoric disdains artifice in that sense. From his reading of Hume primarily,Campbell became convinced that rhetorical discourse that listeners or readersexperience as they do ordinary sense impressions is more likely to be believed.Rhetorical efficacy is then measured in terms of the degree to which the oratorcan present discourse that has a presence in minds of listeners that resembles thepresence of a primary (nonlinguistic) sense impression. Campbell offers, then, afresh analysis of concerns fundamental to rhetorical theory since Aristotle.

4 Introduction

George Campbell was a minister, a theologian, and a professor of divinity,who had a scholarly interest in contemporary developments in philosophy. Hewas interested in rhetoric largely because he thought rhetoric could help himand his students become better preachers; he subsequently became a philoso-pher of rhetoric because he saw that contemporary developments in philoso-phy had implications for rhetoric. Jeffrey Suderman, whose dissertationOrthodoxy and Enlightenment: George Campbell (17191796) is the bestsource we have for knowledge on Campbells life and career, maintains thatCampbells current reputation as an important rhetorical theorist who hap-pened to be a minister is exactly backwards: if Campbell is to be judged as hethought of himself and as his contemporaries saw him, he was first a divine(16).1 This is true. As Suderman also shows, however, as a theologian Camp-bell was undistinguished, his views interesting but typical of his period (1996,39293). By contrast, the Philosophy of Rhetoric is the most important theoryof rhetoric written in Britain during the eighteenth century. While this chap-ter is indebted to Sudermans work, its intentions are different from his. Thischapter emphasizes Campbells interest in rhetoric throughout his life as aprelude to a study of the Philosophy of Rhetoric.

EARLY LIFE AND CAREER

Throughout his life George Campbells was closely connected to the city ofAberdeen, to Marischal College (currently part of the University ofAberdeen), and to the Scottish Presbyterian Church, the national Church ofScotland. His father, Colin Campbell, was educated for the ministry at

5

ONE

George Campbell

Minister, Theologian, Professor,and Philosopher of Rhetoric

Marischal College and at Leiden in the Netherlands and ordained as a min-ister in the Presbyterian Church of Scotland, in 1703 (Suderman 1996, 14).Four years after Colin Campbells ordination, the Act of Union was approvedby the Scottish and English Parliaments, dissolving the Scottish Parliamentand creating a common Parliament that would meet in Westminister. Scot-land, with a population of about one-fifth of Englands but a national revenueof only one-fortieth of Englands, hoped to prosper by the union (Mackie1963, 206). But the decision to dissolve their national Parliament was notpopular in Scotland in 1707 and is controversial to this day. Colin Campbell,however, remained loyal to the union and to Westminister (Suderman, 15)a politics that his son George also embraced throughout his life.

Colin Campbell married Margaret Walker, the daughter of a merchantand provost of Aberdeen (Suderman, 16). The couple had six children.George, born December 25, 1719, was the fifth and the second son. In 1728,when George was nine years old, Colin Campbell died.

George Campbell attended Aberdeen Grammar School from17291734. The school was known for its emphasis on the Classics, and thecurriculum stressed Latin, including a reading of classical rhetoric and logic(Wood 1993, 59). At the age of fifteen, in 1734, George began his studies atMarischal College, in the New Town, one of two colleges in Aberdeen, theother being the older Kings College (Kings was established in 1494,Marischal in 1593), which was in Old Town. A sense of the curriculum atMarischal when Campbell entered in 1734 can be inferred from a debate sur-rounding an effort to standardize the curriculum at the six universities inScotland. According to Paul B. Wood, the Marischal curriculum was similarto that proposed as a common curriculum for all Scottish universities and wasprobably as follows: during the first year: philology, Hebrew, Greek, Latin andarithmetic; during the second: logic and geometry; during the third: generalphysiology, natural philosophy, moral philosophy, and aesthetics; during thefourth year: metaphysics, special physiology, and astronomy. One of thechanges in the proposed curriculum was a call for oratory to be taught at alluniversities during the second year. Faculty in both Kings and Marischal tookexception to this requirement. Faculty at Marischal maintained that oratorywas already a part of its curriculum, that students were taught principles ofrhetoric each year (Wood, 3), probably as part of the theses that were requiredof students. Faculty at Kings College responded to the proposal by question-ing the meaning of oratory. If the meaning be Rhetorick, that is the officeof the regent of humanity [and hence taught in first year or second year]; or ifit be the declaiming of harrangues, thats done by the students in all fourclasses here, in our private as well as publick schooles (Fasti Aberdonenses,qtd. in Wood, 3).

After graduating from Marischal with an M.A. in 1738, Campbellintended to enter the legal profession and therefore became an apprentice to

6 George Campbell

George Turnbull in Edinburgh. In preparation for his career in law, Campbellread classical rhetoric during this time. But he changed his plans and decidedto become a clergyman and returned to Aberdeen to enter Marischal Collegeto study divinity. His interest in rhetoric continued, however. Rhetoric wasamong the central concerns of the Theological Club, which Campbell formedwith other students in 1742. Members collaborated to create a manuscript onpreaching that later formed the basis for Campbells lectures to his divinitystudents on this topic (published after his death as Lectures on Pulpit Elo-quence). In one of these lectures, Campbell recalled for his students his expe-rience with the Theology Club and its interest in rhetoric:

When I was myself a student of divinity in this place [Marischal College],there were about seven or eight of us fellow students, who, as we lived mostlyin the town, formed ourselves into a society, the great object of which wasour mutual improvement, both in the knowledge of the theory of theology,and also in whatever might be conducive to qualify us for the practical partor duties of the pastoral function. . . . Amongst other things discussed in thissmall society, one was, an inquiry into the nature of sermons and other dis-courses proper for the pulpit, the different kinds into which they might fitlybe distributed, and the rules of composition that suited each. On this sub-ject, we had several conversations. When these were over, I had the taskassigned me to make out a short sketch or abstract of the whole. This, I themore readily undertook, as it had been, for some time before, a favouritestudy of mine, having, when qualifying myself for another business [legalprofession], given some attention to the forensic oratory of the ancients, andhaving afterwards remarked both the analogies and differences between itand the christian eloquence. Of this abstract, every one who chose it took acopy; and as we had no object but general usefulness, every one was at lib-erty to communicate it to whom he pleased. I have a copy of this still in mypossession, and as in the main I am at present of the same sentiments, I shallfreely use it in the lectures I am to give on this subject. (1810, 21214)

From Campbells reminiscence on his earlier experience, we learn that Camp-bells earliest systematic reflection on rhetoric was in the context of compar-ing ancient forensic rhetoric with modern christian eloquence. Even as heread or reread ancient rhetoric while contemplating a career in the law, he wascomparing the ancient forums with the pulpit. And here when he first under-took to write on rhetoric, it is with the expressed intention of preparing forthe practical duties of the ministry. Campbells undefensive acceptance ofsome of the problematic aspects of rhetoric in the Philosophy of Rhetoric (itsappeal to the emotions, for example), an acceptance that is surprising giventhe contemporary criticisms of John Locke and others, can be explained by hissense that rhetoric was essential to faith formation and the Christian life.

Campbell completed his studies in divinity at Marischal and was licensedas a preacher of the gospel in June 1746. Licensure required that Campbell

7George Campbell

pass a series of tests, including preparing a sermon on a prescribed text, expli-cating a text in Greek and Hebrew, presenting a thesis on the early church,and answering questions on Church history (Suderman, 26). Campbellgained fame as a preacher (Keith 1800, xi), as he waited the opportunity ofa permanent position. That opportunity materialized when the position atBanchory Ternan opened. According to the Presbyterian patronage system, aminister was chosen for a parish by the parish patron. Sir Alexander Burnett,fourth baronet of Leys, the patron of Banchory Ternan, chose Campbell as theminister of the parish, and Campbell was subsequently ordained in June 1748.While at this parish, Campbell married Grace Farquharson in 1755 (Suder-man, 28). He also began work on the Philosophy of Rhetoric at Banchory Ter-nan (Keith, xiii).

After nine years at Banchory Ternan, Campbell returned to Aberdeen totake up the position of minister of the city. In 1759, Campbell was alsoappointed principal of Marischal College, an important administrative posi-tion that involved recruiting and disciplining students, conferring degrees, andoverseeing faculty affairs.

THE ABERDEEN PHILOSOPHICAL SOCIETY

While serving as minister of the city and principal of Marischal, Campbellhelp found the Aberdeen Philosophical Society in 1758a decision crucial tohis intellectual growth. As his earlier participation in the Theology Club indi-cates, Campbell was attracted to collaboration. In recommending the benefitsof such societies to his divinity students, Campbell remarked: I can assure youfrom my own experience, that when there is a proper choice of persons, anentire confidence in one another, and a real disposition to be mutually useful,it is one of the most powerful means of improvement that I know (Lectureson Pulpit Eloquence 1810, 213). The six original members included: ThomasReid, John Stewart, Robert Traill, David Skene, John Gregory, as well asCampbella mix of philosophers, physicians, and divines. The nine electedmembers were John Farquhar, Alexander Gerard, Thomas Gordon, JohnRoss, James Beattie, Gregory Skene, William Ogilvie, James Dunbar, WilliamTrail. This is an impressive cast. Today we recognize the work of these menmost notably Thomas Reids Inquiry into Human Mind (1764), AlexanderGerards Essay on Taste (1780), James Beatties An Essay on the Nature andImmutability of Truth (1777), John Gregorys A Comparative View of the Stateand Faculties of Man with Those of the Animal World (1765), James DunbarsEssays on the History of Mankind in Rude and Cultivated Ages (1780), andGeorge Campbells Philosophy of Rhetoric, all of which grew out of papers readto the Societyas constituting the Northern branch of the Scottish Enlight-enment (Ulman, Minutes, 1990, 12).

8 George Campbell

The questions the Society entertained at its twice-monthly meetingsreflected the several pursuits of its members, who were professionally inter-ested in natural science and medicine, as well as philosophy, theology, and lan-guage. Campbell, who had wide-ranging interests himself, seemed to use theSociety to reflect on the philosophy of mind in its relationship both torhetoric and to theology. The Society provided good company for Campbellspsychological reflections (as well as his reflections on rhetoricthe subject ofthe next chapter). Thomas Reid and Alexander Gerard (among others) werephilosophically minded divines. 2

Campbells theological explorations were often motivated by an attempt tomake the new psychology and the new natural philosophy safe for Christiansto show that there need be no contradiction between the new science and theancient religion. In Sudermans cautious terms, Campbells positions in theo-logical matters bore a striking resemblance to the apologetic works of thoseEnglish divines known as Latitudinarians (1996, 111). In theological matters,Latitudinarians identified a relatively few doctrines as binding and urged toler-ation of diverse views on a larger number of controversial issues. Typically, Lat-itudinarians would acknowledge the difficulties inherent in biblical hermeneu-tics. Recognizing that interpretations of many biblical passages could vary andthat moving from biblical interpretation to recommended practice was evenmore problematic, Latitudinarians tried to limit doctrinaire positions to whatthey regarded as the most important questions. On disputed matters, they rec-ommended weighing the evidence and distinguishing degrees of certainty. Theyaffirmed that a standard of probability was often the highest achievable and suf-ficient in any case. On these disputed, nonessential questions and practices, theyadvocated tolerance. In matters of Church governance, Latitudinarians taughtthat the contemporary church was not bound by the structure of the earlychurch, that contemporary churches could have titles and structures appropriateto modern conditions (Reventlow 1985, 23045). Campbell shared some ofthese views and brought the Latitudinarian moderate temper to bear on theo-logical questions; throughout his life, he expressed impatience with doctrinaldebates. But Campbell never identified himself as a Latitudinarian and, indeed,in one sermon, specifically dissociates himself from our freethinkers, our spec-ulative and philosophical latitudinarians, who are too dismissive of the princi-ples and rites of religion and have, therefore, a pernicious effect on publicmorals, and are real enemies to their country, as well as to Christianity (TheHappy Influence of Religion on Civil Society 1797, 11112).

The philosopher whose influence was greatest on Campbell and othermembers of the Society was not a memberor at least was not officially so.By 1758, David Hume was the most famous and most notorious thinker inGreat Britain, and his philosophy directly threatened the reconciliation ofEnlightenment ideas and religious orthodoxy that some in the Society wereintent on developing. But for the Aberdeenians, Hume was not only a threat,

9George Campbell

he was a brilliant fellow Scotsman, and they were equally drawn to andrepelled by his work. Rarely in intellectual history has resistance to a philoso-phers ideas been the stimulus of so much work of such a high quality as thatwhich the membership of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society produced inresponse to Hume. Indeed, Hume should be thought of as a member inabsentia of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society. This possibility is captured ina note that Thomas Reid, in Aberdeen, sent to Hume, in Edinburgh:

Your friendly adversaries Drs Campbell and Gerard, as well as Dr. Gregory,return their compliments to you respectfully. A little philosophical societyhere, of which all three are members, is much indebted to you for its enter-tainment. Your company would, although we are all good Christians, bemore acceptable than that of St. Athanasius; and since we cannot have youupon the bench, you are brought oftener than any other man to the bar,accused and defended with great zeal, but without bitterness. If you write nomore in morals, politics, or metaphysics, I am afraid we shall be at a loss forsubjects. (Ulman, Minutes, 5657)

The first fruit of Campbells encounter with Hume was the Dissertationon Miracles, the work for which Campbell was most remembered during hislifetime. Campbells work, first delivered as a sermon in 1760 and then pub-lished in a revised form in 1762, is a somewhat belated response to Humesessay On Miracles, which was published as section 10 in An Enquiry Con-cerning Human Understanding in 1748. Hume advanced the view that no mat-ter how seemingly reliable testimony to a miracle is, no matter how consistentthe accounts of witnesses are, no matter how coherent a witnesss report, it isalmost always more reasonable to believe that a witness is deceived or deceiv-ing than to believe that a uniform law of nature had been violated. In his Dis-sertation on Miracles, which is discussed in chapter 9 of this study, Campbellpresents a significant philosophical challenge to Humes case. According to R.M. Burns, Campbells Dissertation was the most highly regarded of contem-porary refutations (1981, 148), almost certainly because Campbell raised theissue to a general philosophical issuethe epistemological question of thevalidity testimony. The Monthly Review commended Campbell for treatinghis subject in a more regular and methodical manner than those who had gonebefore him (Monthly Review, 499).

Campbells Dissertation on Miracles was republished many times andenjoyed a considerable reputation on the continent, as well in Britain. As Sud-erman notes, after the publication of the Dissertation on Miracles, Campbellsreputation as a writer and Christian apologist was firmly established (1996,46). Throughout his life, Campbells name was associated more with this workthan it was with any of his other, and Campbell was known primarily as adivine who had successfully met the challenge to faith mounted by theesteemed and notorious David Hume.

10 George Campbell

PUBLICATION OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF RHETORIC

Between the first meetings of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society in 1758and Campbells appointment as Professor of Divinity at Marischal in 1772,Campbell presented eighteen discourses to the Society, at least fourteen ofwhich were on eloquence.3 By 1775, Campbell had shaped and, probably, sup-plemented these discourses to create the series of Essays closely connectedwith one another that constitute the Philosophy of Rhetoric. He enlistedWilliam Rose, who had reviewed the Dissertation on Miracles positively for theMonthly Review, to serve as his representative with the prestigious printinghouse of William Strahan (Suderman 1996, 56). From Adam Smith, Strahanreceived this assessment of POR: There is good sense, and learning, and phi-losophy in Campbells Book. But it is so unfashioned that I am afraid you willnot be a great gainer by it (Smith, qtd. in Suderman, 57).

William Enfield, whose review of POR in the Monthly Review extendsover two issues and eighteen pages, acknowledged the philosophical characterof Campbells approach. According to H. Lewis Ulman (in an essay thatreviews the reviews of POR) most reviewers acknowledged the significance ofCampbells modern approachto identify the philosophical foundations of theancient art. But for the most part the reviewers do not single out those featuresof Campbells theory that are of interest to us: they neither probe its basis inempiricism, nor comment on the way Campbells work synthesizes modernand ancient perspectives. Rather, the reviews focus on Book II, which is largelyconcerned with questions of language (Ulman, Discerning Readers, 8284).For example, at the outset of his review, Enfield notes that Campbells atten-tion to questions of usage and grammar mark one of his contributions: Hisplan is much more extensive than the title he has chosen seems to promise, andleads him to the philosophical investigation, not merely of the principles ofrhetoric in the usual acceptation of the term, but of good writing in general(Monthly Review, 287). Enfield devotes most of Part II of his review to a con-sideration of Book II, in which Campbell considers what we today would referto as questions of usage, an emphasis that Ulman notes is characteristic ofreviewers. Also many of the reviewers, including Enfield, regard the Philosophyof Rhetoric as a work in progress and look forward to a subsequent volume thatwill complete the examination of the stylistic virtues (elegance, animation, andmusic, as well as vivacity and perspicuity) that Campbell mentions but does notanalyze. But, though the reviewers pay proportionately less attention to thoseparts of Book I that have been of interest to us, the reviews are quite positive,praising Campbell as an astute critic and a careful, insightful, and essentiallymodern philosopher . . . (Ulman 1990, 89).

A review, never written, is the one we most wish we hadthat of DavidHume, who was reading the recently published book of one of his friendlyadversaries, while on his death bed. James Boswell describes the scene:

11George Campbell

On Sunday forenoon the 7 of July 1776, being too late for church, I went tosee Mr. David Hume, who was returned from London and Bath, just a-dying. I found him alone, in a reclining posture in his drawing-room. He waslean, ghastly, and quite of an earthy appearance. . . . He was quite differentfrom the plump figure which he used to present. He had before him Dr.Campbells Philosophy of Rhetoric. He seemed to be placid and even cheerful.He said he was just approaching to his end. (Boswell 1970, 11)

Would that we could know what Humes response was to the only rhetoricaltheory that attempted to meld Humes rhetoric-friendly epistemology withthe classical tradition!

PROFESSOR OF DIVINITY

Campbell became a professor of divinity at Marischal in 1770, after Alexan-der Gerard left the position to assume the more prestigious professorship indivinity at Kings College. As Professor of Divinity, Campbell gave lecturesthat were intended to prepare students for the ministryto meet both theintellectual and practical demands of the profession. To prepare them intel-lectually, Campbell lectured on church history in the twenty-eight lecturespublished as Lectures on Ecclesiastical History and on interpreting the Biblein the ten lectures of Lectures on Systematic Theology. To prepare his studentsfor their ministerial duties, Campbell lectured on the pastoral character(nine lectures) and on preaching, published as twelve lectures in Lectures onPulpit Eloquence. Campbell offered his lectures on a four-year rotation sothat students attended sixteen lectures a year (some were repeated as intro-ductions to the study of divinity), which enabled each class to hear all thelectures in a four-year matriculation (Suderman 1996, 99). These lecturesare discussed in Chapter 9.

Campbells last years saw the publication of what he regarded as the greatenterprise of his lifehis translations of the four Gospels. Campbell beganthis work while a minister at Banchory Ternan in the late 1740s and 1750sand worked on it intermittently until it was published in 1789. The work,which is far more than a translation, is in two volumes, totaling fifteen hun-dred pages. It is impressive in its erudition, as Campbell draws on his knowl-edge, not only of Hebrew, Greek, and Latin, but also on French, Italian, andGerman. In the course of the twelve dissertations that constitute Book I,Campbell identifies the challenges that face the translator of ancient texts,illustrates these with numerous examples, and offers his resolution to philo-logical and hermeneutic problems. For example, he discusses how culturalcontext affects meaning, the difficulty translating moral and spiritual con-cepts, and the resultant confusion in current translations of key words, such askingdom of God, Good News, Messiah, devil, and hell. He also

12 George Campbell

offers his criticism of a number of existing translations. His translation, withfulsome notes, comprises the second volume.

The reception of the Four Gospels must have disappointed Campbell.Although Campbells scholarship was praised, the translation itself was not.Here is the judgment of the sympathetic writer in the Monthly Review:

That, in some parts, his version is more correct than that which is read in ourchurches, must be acknowledged without hesitation; and we are happy toobserve that his notes are marked by the same diligence of research, the samecandid statement of contrary opinions, and the same manly but modestdefence of his own sentiments, which we saw and admired in the Disserta-tions [of volume I]. We are compelled, however, to add, that the instances ofpartial improvement of the old version [of the Gospels] are comparativelyfew; that its simplicity and its energy have been frequently injured withoutany change, or at least any material change of sense. Colloquial and even vul-gar expressions are sometimes substituted for others less dignified yet suffi-ciently plain; while, on the other hand, many passages are obscured by wordsderived from the Latin, and unintelligible to a great part of a common con-gregation: nor can we suppress our opinion that, to readers of learning andtaste, the general effect of this translation will appear very inferior to that ofour common version. (1790, 41112)

Campbell died on April 6, 1796, about a year after his retirement fromMarischal. He lies in St. Nicolas churchyard in a grave located south and westof the church, towards the Union Street entrance, near the tomb of a JamesChalmers. But, the inscription on his grave is not legible (Suderman 1996, 90;note 32).

Campbell was eulogized by his successor as Principal at Marischal,William Laurence Brown. For Brown (as also for most of Campbells con-temporaries), Campbells most significant achievement was his Dissertation onMiracles: At an early period, he entered the lists as a champion for christian-ity (sic) against one of its acutest opponents. He not only triumphantly refutedhis arguments, but even conciliated his respect by the handsome and dexter-ous manner in which his defence was conducted. While he refuted the infi-del, he spared the man, and exhibited the uncommon spectacle of a polemicalwriter possessing all the moderation of a christian (1796, 23). Brown also sin-gles out Campbells translation of the Gospels (with a eulogists charity) as thefruit of copious erudition, unwearied application, and of clear and compre-hensive judgment (2324). The only reference to the Philosophy of Rhetoricspecifically must be inferred from Browns praise of Campbells contributionto philosophy and the fine arts and of Campbell as a man in whom thepolite scholar was eminently joined with the deep and liberal divine (24).Finally, we need concede nothing to the conventional exaggeration expectedin panegyric to accede to Browns judgment that, of George Campbell, To beuseful to mankind appears to have been the ruling passion of his mind (25).

13George Campbell

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There is some debate among historians over when they should date the begin-ning and the end of the Scottish Enlightenment. There is even more debateabout its causeshow indigenous they were or how much the result of greatercontact with France and England. But there is no arguing that by the lastquarter of the eighteenth century some remarkable Scots had made Scotlandthe teachers of Europe.1 There were many stars in this Scottish galaxy, andif some shone longer than others, all shone in their day. David Hume, arguablyBritains greatest philosopher, and Adam Smith, the founder of modern eco-nomics, changed the world. Francis Hutcheson, known as the originator ofScottish philosophy and the teacher of Hume and Smith, can make a goodclaim to setting the intellectual currents in motion. Adam Ferguson, thefounder of modern sociology, William Robertson, the founder of historiogra-phy, and John Millar, whose analysis of the relationship between law andsocial change was groundbreaking, have also made lasting contributions to theanalysis of societal development (Daiches 1986, 1). Henry Home (LordKames) and Hugh Blair were lesser stars in a Edinburgh galaxy that includedHume and Smith. Thomas Reid, Alexander Gerard, James Beattie, andGeorge Campbell comprised the most distinguished of an impressive north-ern group in Aberdeen.

As heirs to the work of Sir Francis Bacon, Isaac Newton, and John Locke,Scottish intellectuals had confidence that they were part of a generation thatwould make great progress in applying a scientific method to the human sci-ences. At least in Britain, Francis Bacon was the first proponent of the scien-tific method. In the Novum Organum, Bacon maintained that a sound methodwas the most important requirement for progress in the sciencesmoreimportant even than genius. Newton, of course, was the great inspiration ofthe age. He proved that humans could discover and express axiomatically the

15

TWO

Intellectual Milieu

Foundations and Influences

laws of nature, leaving the way open for his Scottish successors to discover,with the right method, the laws governing human behavior and the change inhuman institutionsor, for that matter, the laws governing psychology andrhetoric. And in the Essay on Human Understanding, John Locke had begunto identify the foundations on which to build the disciplines of psychology,epistemology, and rhetoric. As equal heirs to this renaissance in learning, theScots felt with others the excitement and opportunity to rethink all the disci-plines and to establish them on firmer, more scientific foundations.

In so far as these Scottish intellectuals shared a common perspective, theydid so in large part because of social habits that brought them together forlively discussion of what progress in learning means and on what grounds itmight be achieved. The principal sites for these discussions were the numerousclubs founded in the eighteenth century in Edinburgh, Glasgow, andAberdeen. Clubs had bylaws, held regular meetings at which members pre-sented papers, and, since they typically met in a tavern or restaurant, attendedto the body and the spirit, as well as the mind. Some of the clubs were morededicated to developing the spirit and body more than the mind. At leastaccording to the bylaws, what members of the Boar Club had in common wastheir willingness to meet in what they agreed to call a sty and to grunt. Andmembers of the Pious Club shared a common passion for pies (Daiches 1986,3738). As for the Dirty Club (Daiches, 38) and the Grotesque Club (McEl-roy 1969, 21), it may be better not to ask. But most clubs had a more seriouspurpose, were, earnestly, dedicated to improvement, which in this contextgenerally meant increasing progress in a particular field by applying the spiritof Bacon, Locke, and Newton. Increased crop yields through the application ofthe scientific method concerned the agricultural clubs and progress in treatingdisease inspired clubs comprised of physicians. Many clubs were less special-ized. Members were from a wide range of disciplines, and meetings addresseda range of concernsphilosophy, language, agriculture, and medicine, forexamplesharing in common only the commitment of improvement throughthe application of science (McElroy, 9). Certainly, the most important club inAberdeen was the Philosophical Society of Aberdeen, known also as the WiseClub, founded in 1758. George Campbell was among the six original membersthat also included Thomas Reid, John Stewart, Robert Traill, David Skene, andJohn Gregory. Campbell was one of the most active members, delivering eigh-teen discourses (at least fourteen on rhetoric) between 1758 and 1771 andattending the twice-monthly meetings regularly (Ulman, Minutes, 2526).Campbells participation in the Aberdeen Philosophical Society was the mostprofound influence on his intellectual development because the Society puthim in contact with scholars working to create a science of the mind by build-ing on the work of Bacon, Locke and David Hume.2

The founding purpose of the Wise Club as set forth in its bylaws suggeststhe interests of its members and the intellectual climate that influenced them.

16 George Campbell

The Subject of the Discourses and Questions shall be Philosophical, allGrammatical [sic] Historical and Philological Discussions being conceivedto be forreign to the Design of this Society. And Philosophical Matters areunderstood to comprehend, Every Principle of Science which may bededuced by Just and Lawfull Induction from the Phenomena either of thehuman Mind or of the material World; All obser[v]ations & Experimentsthat may furnish Materials for such Induction; The Examination of FalseSchemes of Philosophy & false Methods of Philosophizing; The sub-serviency of Philosophy to Arts, the Principles they borrow from it and theMeans of carrying them to their Perfection. If any Dispute should arisewhether a Subject of a Discourse or a Question proposed falls within theMeaning and Intendment of this Article it shall be determined by a Major-ity of the Members present. (Ulman, Minutes, 78)

The statement invokes Novum Organum and, indirectly, Bacons De Augmen-tis Scientiarum (in its shorter English form, The Advancement of Learning). Inthe Novum Organum, Bacon set forth his new organon or method which heexpected would supersede the old Aristotelian organonAristotles method-ological tools of logic. Bacons goal was to reform scientific method so thattrue descriptions of nature could be arrived at, and he repeatedly argued thatworks (the experiments of the experimental method) should replace words(Aristotelian syllogizing) as the basis of method. The statements call for Justand Lawful Induction also expresses this preference for Baconian experimen-talism over Aristotelian demonstration. In seeming to exclude grammatical,historical, and philological concerns, the statement means to legislate anapproach to a subject, not to exclude the study of language or history: Camp-bells presentations before the Society obviously were concerned with lan-guage, as were some of the other presentations (by John Farquhar, forinstance). The intention of the seeming prohibition is not to limit the subjectsbut promote a method; indeed, the statement is probably expansionarytoinclude any topic that can be treated philosophically, that is, consistentlywith the Baconian and Newtonian effort to discover and then work from basiclaws of nature, including investigations not only of phenomena from thematerial world but also introspections concerning the human mind. As weshall see in the next chapter, Campbells expressed purpose is to produce aphilosophy of rhetoric that shares the reciprocal relationship with the sci-ence of the human mind expressed in the statements call for both a sub-servience of philosophy or theory to the arts or to practice and an art that bor-rows principles from that theory.

The statements insistence that science should rest on a philosophy eitherof the human Mind or the material World signals what was perhaps themembers central focusto develop a philosophy of mind, which wouldbecome the basis for the development of the human sciences (Ulman, 57). Asthe next chapter will show, consistent with this statement, Campbell maintains

17Intellectual Milieu

that a theory of rhetoric should be based on the science of the mind. Camp-bells application of the science of mind to the development of a theory ofrhetoric was probably also inspired by Bacon. In De Augmentis Scientiarum,Bacon organizes all spheres of human learning around the mental faculties. Heconsiders, for example, work done in history under Memory, the state and con-tribution of poetry under Imagination, progress in philosophy, theology, biol-ogy, psychology, and political science under Reason. Bacon placed rhetoric asan intellectual art of tradition or communication under the science of the mindwithin reason, thus linking rhetoric directly with psychology. Moreover, hisfamous definition of rhetoric underscores its relationship to the science of themind generally and to the faculties particularly. Rhetoric is subservient to theimagination, as Logic is to the understanding; and the duty and office ofRhetoric . . . is no other than to apply and recommend the dictates of reason toimagination, in order to excite the appetite and will (IX, 131). Bacons specificanalysis of rhetoric within De Augmentis would have suggested to Campbellthat a theory of rhetoric could be organized on a psychological model and thatpsychology could benefit from rhetoric, which is concerned in Bacon and tra-ditionally with the effect of language on belief.

In developing his theory of rhetoric, Campbell does not, however, pro-ceed according to a Baconian inductive program, that is, by forming hypothe-ses through the examination of specific examples of how the mind respondsto discourse. Instead, Campbell embraces philosophical empiricismtheempiricism that John Locke, this great man (POR 262), set forth in the Essayon Human Understanding.

Lockes empiricism is the heir to Bacons experimentalism but themotives of their philosophies differ. Bacon aimed to improve the proceduresof science, and he advocated systematic experimentation as a way to disciplinethe formation of hypotheses. As did Bacon, Locke begins his Essay on HumanUnderstanding seemingly claiming to make contributions to method and toepistemology. The goal of the Essay is to determine the limits of what thehuman mind can know. Again as Bacon did in identifying his idols of themind, Locke begins by clearing the ground a little, and removing some of therubbish that lies in the way to knowledge (Epistle to the Reader I: 14). Thisclearing is preparatory to inquiring into the origin, certainty, and extent ofhuman knowledge, together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, andassent (Lockes Introduction I: 26). To this point, Lockes program wouldappear to be epistemologicalan inquiry into the grounds of knowledge andthe basis for its validity. But Locke approaches the question of knowledge, notby way of defining validity, as Aristotles old organon did, nor by definingproper method, as Bacons new organon did. Rather, Locke begins by describ-ing the minds operationshow the mind forms ideas from sense data. Thepoint is this: though Locke begins with the purpose of providing a normativeepistemology, he, in fact, offers a descriptive psychology.3 From where do all

18 George Campbell

our thoughts originate, Locke asks? To this I answer in one word, fromEXPERIENCE. In that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ulti-mately derives itself (Essay, Bk. II. i: par. 3). This sentence presents the chal-lenge that Locke poses to himself in the Essay: he will dare to show the readerhow the most complex of human thoughts could originate in a simple senseimpression. The Essay has the feel of an intellectual game: no matter howabstract the idea, Locke will show the reader how it originates in experience.Such a goal requires detailed discussion of the mental machinery by which wecome to belief.

Lockes description of mental operations begins with his division of ideasinto simple ideas of sensation and reflection and complex ideas, which com-bine simple ideas. This taxonomy of ideas is based, in part, on the differentspeed of the mental operations (whether the mind forms the idea instanta-neously or deliberately) and the degree of the minds awareness of its opera-tions (whether voluntarily or involuntarily). The specific distinctions and ter-minology Locke uses are not important to us, since in the sixty years betweenthe publication of the Essay and Campbells sustained reflection on empiri-cism in the meetings of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, the terms wereconstantly changing in the work inspired by Lockes Essay. But the fact thatideas are distinguished by their phenomenological qualitiesby the way themind processes them (instantaneously or deliberately; involuntarily or con-sciously)has implications for a theory of rhetoric that would, as Campbells,derive rhetorical principles from a science of the mind.

David Hume, the most prominent member in absentia of the AberdeenPhilosophical Society, built on Lockes account of mental operations in theEssay on Human Understanding. Hume basically accepts Lockean mechanicsof mental operations but he draws very different implications from this analy-sisfar more skeptical implications. This skepticism was seen as a challengeby Campbell and his colleagues of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, whobecame Humes most dedicated and most critical readers in Britain. Campbelland his colleagues poured over Humes Treatise on Human Nature and hisEnquiry Concerning Human Understanding with fascination and fear.4 Camp-bell and some others in the Society wanted to accept the basic approach tomental operations that Locke-Hume took but to reject Humes skeptical con-clusions as a threat to the progress of knowledge and the preservation of faith.

In the tradition of Bacon, Descartes, and Locke, Hume stakes out a foun-dationalist program in the Treatise of Human Nature. All the sciences and arts,he writes, are in some measure dependent on the science of Man (Treatise ofHuman Nature, introduction, 42). Given this dependence, it is possible to pre-dict great progress in learning if we were thoroughly acquainted with theextent and force of the human understanding, and coud (sic) explain thenature of the ideas we employ, and of the operations we perform in our rea-sonings (42). Locke has taught us that the contents of the mind may be

19Intellectual Milieu

traced to experience. But how does our mind form those beliefs that it regardsas knowledge from experience? The investigator needs to approach this taskof creating a science of human nature as Newton approached the task of iden-tifying natures laws in his physics. Indeed, Hume casts himself as the New-ton of the science of the mind, who would identify the laws and forces thatinfluence mental operations.

But may we not hope, that philosophy, cultivated with care, and encouragedby the attention of the public, may carry its researches still farther, and dis-cover, at least in some degree, the secret springs and principles, by which thehuman mind is actuated in its operations? Astronomers had long contentedthemselves with proving, from the phaenomena, the true motions, order, andmagnitude of the heavenly bodies: till a philosopher [Newton], at last, arose,who seems, from the happiest reasoning, to have also determined the laws andforces, by which the revolutions of the planets are governed and directed. . . .And there is no reason to despair of equal success in our enquiries concern-ing the mental powers and economy, if prosecuted with equal capacity andcaution. (An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, sect. 1: 17)

Hume offers a descriptive psychology in the tradition of Locke, but theimportance of the phenomenological quality of stimulithe way the mindexperiences themis even greater in his description than in Lockes. Accord-ing to Hume, the mind is constituted of two types of perceptions: impressionsand ideas. Impressions are the result of primary experience. Ideas are faintcopies of impressions. They are the product of memory when we recall anabsent impression or imagination when we construct an idea based on impres-sions. As faint copies, ideas do not carry the force of impressions:

All the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into distinctkinds, which I shall call IMPRESSIONS and IDEAS. The differencebetwixt these consists in the degrees of force and liveliness, with which theystrike upon the mind, and make their way into our thought or consciousness.Those perceptions which enter with most force and violence, we may nameimpressions; and under this name I comprehend all our sensations, passions,and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul. By ideas I meanthe faint images of these in thinking and reasoning; such as, for instance, areall the perceptions excited by the present discourse, excepting only, thosewhich arise from the sight and touch, and excepting the immediate pleasureor uneasiness it may occasion. (Treatise I. i. i: 49)

It is not only that impressions have a greater impact on the understandingthan ideas, but that belief depends on impact. According to Hume, we believethose ideas that we experience as impressions, including not only sensationsbut passions and emotions, or ideas presented in such a way that they resem-ble impressions. Thus, the difference between belief or non-belief rests on

20 George Campbell

how we experience something, not on some test of logic: Wherein consiststhe difference betwixt incredulity and belief? Hume asks (I. iii. vii. 143). It isevident, Hume goes on to state, that belief consists not in the nature andorder of our ideas, but in the manner of their conception, and in their feelingto the mind . . . (I. iii. vii. 146).

To describe ideas that resemble sense impressions, Hume employs termsmost familiar to rhetoricians. Ideas that resemble impressions are lively, aremore vivid: Belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady,conception of an object [or relationship], than what the imagination alone isever able to attain. . . . [I]t is evident that belief consists not in the peculiarnature or order of ideas, but in the manner of their conception, and in theirfeeling to the mind (Enquiry V. ii: 4849).5 This is surely a most rhetoric-friendly account of belief, for making ideas vivid and lively is traditionally oneof rhetorics offices. Hume is aware of rhetorics legitimate claims:

Nothing is more capable of infusing any passion into the mind [and apassion is an impression for Hume], than eloquence, by which the objects arerepresented in their strongest and most lively colours. We may of ourselvesacknowledge, that such an object is valuable, and such another odious; buttill the orator excites the imagination, and gives force to these ideas, theymay have but a feeble influence either on the will or the affections. (TreatiseII. vi: 473)

As the Newton of mental operations, Hume also would need to explainnot only how an idea derives its influence, but also how complex ideas areformed. How do we come to believe that one thing causes another? Humestheory of how the mind forms ideas is a theory of the imagination. Ideas arecombined by the imagination, and while the imagination is free to combineideas willy-nilly, it generally follows three principles of association: As allsimple ideas, Hume writes, may be separated by the imagination, and maybe united again in what form it pleases, nothing would be more unaccount-able than the operations of that faculty, were it not guided by some universalprinciples, which render, it in some measure, uniform with itself in all timesand places (Treatise I. i. iv: 58). The uniting principle that guides the imag-ination functions not coercively but as a gentle force; that is, the imaginationfunctions not in necessary ways but in ways that are generally predictable. Theimagination tends to associate ideas on one or a combination of these threeprinciples: Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause and Effect(Treatise I. iv. iv: 58); that is, the imagination associates ideas that resembleeach other, are near to each other temporally or proximately, and that followone another in an apparent relationship of cause and effect.

Humes principle of the association of ideas has implications for a theory ofrhetoric derived from the science of the mind. It would, for example, have impli-cations for a theory of arrangement: the orator might order ideas to conform to

21Intellectual Milieu

the way mind naturally processes them. Useful as it may be to the theoreticianof rhetoric, the principles of association do not seem particularly radical, but infact the implications are. Hume maintains that our knowledge or belief of allrelationships rests on these principlesare the product of the imagination, afaculty that combines ideas according to its own laws or none. Even the rela-tionship between cause and effectand establishing causes is at the heart of sci-enceare known, at least initially, through the imagination that infers from aseemingly constant conjunction a causal relationship:

I shall venture to affirm, as a general proposition that admits of noexception, that the knowledge of this relation [cause/effect] is not, in anyinstance, attained by reasonings a priori but arises entirely from experience,when we find that particular objects are constantly conjoined with eachother. Let an object be presented to a man of ever so strong natural reasonand abilities; if that object be entirely new to him, he will not be able by themost accurate examination of its sensible qualities, to discover any of itscauses or effects. Adam, though his rational faculties be supposed, at the veryfirst, entirely perfect, could not have inferred from the fluidity and trans-parency of water, that it would suffocate him, or from the light and warmthof fire that it would consume him. (Enquiry, sect. VI. i: 30)

On the empiricist account, Adams descendants have come to understandcause through a seeming constant conjunction between two eventsthat is,through experience, through custom, habitfrom which, by the association ofideas, a causal relationship is inferred. Custom, habit, imagination: these arethe bane of philosophy, but they are the very basis of rhetorical knowledge.

Hume also posits the association of the passions as a parallel to the asso-ciation of ideas. The passions are impressions and Hume maintains thatimpressions too associate with each other in ways that are subject to analysis,as are the forces that regulate the natural world:

The second property I shall observe in the human mind is a like associ-ation of impressions. All resembling impressions are connected together, andno sooner one arises than the rest immediately follow. Grief and disappoint-ment give rise to anger, anger to envy, envy to malice, and malice to griefagain, till the whole circle be compleated. In like manner our temper whenelevated with joy naturally throws itself into love, generosity, pity, courageand pride and the other resembling affections. Tis difficult for the mind,when actuated by any passion, to confine itself to that passion alone, with-out any change or variation. Human nature is too inconstant to admit of anyregularity. Changeableness is essential to it. And to what can it so naturallychange as to affections or emotions, which are suitable to the temper, andagree with that set of passions, which then prevail? Tis evident then, thereis an attraction or association among impressions, as well as among ideas;tho with this remarkable difference, that ideas are associated by resemblance,contiguity, and causation; impressions only by resemblance.

22 George Campbell

In the third place, tis observable of these two kinds of association, thatthey very much assist and forward each other, and that the transition is moreeasily made where they both concur in the same object. (Treatise II. i. iv: 335)

For orators, knowing the sequence of related emotions could guide rhetoricalchoice in their efforts to build up or moderate the vectors of emotional response.

Finally, Hume has a theory of the communication of emotion from oneperson (a speaker, for example) to others (an audience, for example). Emotionsare transferred through sympathy, as one person comes to identify with theresponse of another: No quality of human nature is more remarkable . . . thanthat propensity we have to sympathize with others, and to receive by commu-nication their inclinations and sentiments, however different from . . . ourown, Hume writes (Treatise II. i. xi: 367). At first, we experience whatanother person feels as an ideaand therefore faintly. But as we increasinglyidentify with the other through sympathy that idea becomes emotionallyfreighted. A passion is an impression for Hume, so that sympathy is a vehiclefor converting an idea into an impression: When any affection is infusd bysympathy, it is at first known only by its effects, and by those external signs inthe countenance and conversation, which convey an idea of it. This idea ispresently converted into an impression, and acquires such a degree of forceand vivacity, as to become the very passion itself, and produce an equal emo-tion, as any original affection (II. i. xi: 36768). Note that the emotions arefirst known through the external signs in the countenance and conversation.Thus, implicit in Humes analysis is an explanation for the transfer of emotionfrom speaker to listener through a speakers person and action.

Moreover, the passions play a central role in Humes psychology. They arethe basis for all motivation. For Hume, the prospect of pleasure or pain cre-ates an emotional response that determines preference and ultimately values.Reason plays only the limited role of judging the means to the ends that thepassions choose; reason cannot, according to Hume, even retard a passion,which is subject to restraint only by another passion: We speak not strictlyand philosophically when we talk of the combat of passion and of reason. Rea-son is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretendto any other office than to serve and obey them (Treatise II. iii. iii. 462). Wecannot determine a hierarchy of values through reason: Tis not contrary toreason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of myfinger (Treatise II. iii. 463).

With imagination playing the crucial role in inferring from experience andtherefore in shaping belief and with the passions as the basis for desire andvalue choice, reason is dramatically dethroned in Humes psychology. From oneperspective, this radical reevaluation of reason would not shock Campbell: afterall, he would have placed Revelation above reason as the basis for value, andfaith above reason as the arbiter of beliefs. But within the Judeo-Christian and

23Intellectual Milieu

classical synthesis that Campbell accepted, reason, Revelation, and faith couldnot only be reconciled, but ideally were consonant one with the other. Humemade reason irrelevant and, of course, was even more dismissive of Revela-tionas his critique of belief in the miracles made clear. Attractive as Humesanalysis was to Campbell, the rhetorician, the implications were disturbing toCampbell, the Divine. It was this attraction and repulsion to Humes work thatmade it the focus of the Aberdeen Philosophical Society, especially of the mostphilosophical thinker among the members, Thomas Reid. Campbell ultimatelyaccepts much of Reids critique.

Reids An Inquiry into the Human Mind (1764) is an attempt to counterthe implications of Humes system. At the outset of the Inquiry, Reidreflects on the way Hume had exposed the skeptical direction of seven-teenth-century philosophy:

Des Cartes no sooner began to dig in this mine, than skepticism wasready to break in upon him. He did what he could to shut it out. Male-branche and Locke, who dug deeper, found the difficulty of keeping out thisenemy still to increase; but they laboured honestly in the design. ThenBerkeley, who carried on the work, despairing of securing all, bethoughthimself of an expedient: by giving up the material world, which he thoughtmight be spared without loss, and even with advantage, he hoped, by animpregnable partition, to secure the world of spirits. But, alas! the Treatise ofHuman Nature wantonly sapped the foundation of this partition, anddrowned all in one universal deluge [of skepticism]. (Inquiry 1970, 18)

Reid saw Humes Treatise as historians of philosophy have come to present it:as a work that rigorously and coherently traced the implications of Lockeanempiricism to inevitable skeptical conclusions. On Lockes description of ourmental operations in the Essay, the mind forms ideas based on sense impres-sions; these ideas and the minds reflections on them constitute the contentsof the mind; the mind has no direct contact with reality.6 This epistemologydoes not lead to skeptical conclusions in the Essay on Human Understandingbecause, according to Locke, an idea based on sense impressions has all theconformity it can have, or ought to have to the objects themselves. This con-formity between our simple ideas and the existence of things, is sufficient forreal knowledge (Essay IV. iv: 230). But this conclusion seems more groundedin Lockes optimistic temper than anything that Locke demonstrates in theEssay. When Hume exposed the shaky foundations of knowledge claims thatrest on Lockean empiricism, Reid, who had earlier accepted Lockes account,became alarmed: I thought it unreasonable upon the authority of philosophyto admit an hypothesis which in my opinion overturns all philosophy, all reli-gion, all intuition, all commonsense (qtd. in Fraser 1898, 63).

In his Inquiry, Reid offers his version of a philosophy of mind, a view thattransforms Lockes theory of ideas and contests Humes skepticism. Reid

24 George Campbell

maintains that the mind does have direct contact with sense data, and he offersan account of cognition to support his claim. Lockes analysis separates ourideas of sensation from our idea that the object of the sensation exists. OnLockes description, the mind first has an idea of dog given through thesenses; then the mind separately and belatedly (even if also virtually instanta-neously) affirms the reality of the idea. Reid maintains that the sensation itselfcarries with it the notion of existence: we see and believe or, rather, know, atonceknow, not simply that something prompted the sensation, whichLocke grants, but that the something is what our sensations present. Reidwrites as follows:

We have shown, on the contrary, that every operation of the senses, in itsvery nature, implies judgment or belief, as well as simple apprehension.Thus, when I feel the pain of the gout in my toe, I have not only a notion ofpain, but a belief of its existence, and a belief of some disorder in my toewhich occasions it; and this belief is not produced by comparing ideas, andperceiving their agreements and disagreements; it is included in the verynature of the sensation. . . .

Such original and natural judgments are therefore a part of that furni-ture which nature hath given to the human understanding. They are theinspiration of the Almighty no less than our notions of simple apprehen-sions. (Inquiry, 268)

For Reid, it is an empirical fact that experiencing and judging are one, andthis fact is the basis for the first principle of the cognitive process as he under-stands it, the first principle of what Reid calls common sense: that the sensesgive the mind access to reality, not to an idea of reality. As a first principle, thisaxiom is unprovable but as self-evident as a mathematical equation:

I conclude further, that it is no less a part of the human constitution, tobelieve the present existence of our sensations, and to believe the past exis-tence of what we remember, than it is to believe that twice two make four.The evidence of sense, the evidence of memory, and the evidence of the nec-essary relations of things, are all distinct and original kinds of evidence,equally grounded on our constitution: none of them depends upon, or can beresolved into another. To reason against any of these kinds of evidence, isabsurd; nay to reason for them, is absurd. They are first principles; and suchfall not within the province of reason, but of common sense. (Inquiry, 30)

On this description, the reliability of our senses is self-evident: we neverdoubted that our senses were reliable; our belief in them is prior to our beingtaught (original); belief in them is grounded in our humanness, our consti-tution. Reid maintains that these criteria meet the traditional logicians testof self-evidencenot necessarily that to doubt them is a contradiction interms but that to doubt them is absurd (1970, 32), is, in fact, madness (40).

25Intellectual Milieu

That our senses provide us with a reliable knowledge of reality; that thethoughts and feelings of which we are conscious are our thoughts; that whatwe remember happened; that we have a degree of freedom of will; that thelaws of nature are uniform over time and place: these propositions that, Reidclaims, seem to be a part of the framework by which humans think and rea-son and that no one except a philosopher ever doubted are the common senseof mankind.7

Campbell accepts Reids ontology and Humes psychology. For Campbellat least some of Reids common sense principles must be accepted as such.8

They are essential to orators establishing the truth of what they communicate.But he also would accept Humes empiricist psychology. For example, fromCampbells viewpoint, an orator might argue that we would know that a riveron a flood plain will overflow its banks by Reids common sense principle ofthe uniformity of natures laws, not merely believe it because the imaginationhas imputed causality to a temporal sequence. But Humes erroneous, skepti-cal analysis would not invalidate the application of Humes psychology torhetoric. The orator could heighten that belief of occurrence of a floodthrough a vivid presentation and persuade an audience of a causal relationshipby citing past instances in which flood followed rain. Humes psychologicalprinciples would hold as warrant and explanation for rhetoric, even if Reid iscorrect on the ultimately more important question of the ground of ourknowledge. The orator tests the truth by Reid and can persuade by Hume.This is Campbells view.

The Enlightenments analysis of mental operations was not exhausted bythe work of Locke, Hume, and Reid. Their work offered an account of therelationship of ideas to the sensory world, the formation of complex ideas, andthe influence phenomenological qualities of an idea have on belief. Theperiods concerns with mental operations also included analysis of the natureof response. In processing ideaswhatever their origin or truthwe are alsomore or less aware of the mind at work. Readers working through a chain ofsyllogisms to secure belief are very conscious of their mental process; readersabsorbed in a novel might also be coming to a belief but are likely to be muchless aware that they are reaching conclusions. Does the speed, the degree ofvolition and awareness by which we process ideas influence belief? This ques-tion has implications for a theory of rhetorical efficacy based on a psychology.

The concern with the nature of reception has its origin in French aes-thetic theory of the late seventeenth and early-eighteenth centuries. Amongthe influential French theorist is Jean-Baptiste Dubos, whom Campbell citesat several points in POR. In Dubos, we can see the movement of aesthetic the-ory away from a focus on the artifact itself to a reflection on the readersresponse to the worka shift in perspective that changed the understandingof mimesis. In the work of neoclassical critics such as Nicolas Boileau, the testof whether an art work or poem imitated nature was whether it met criteria of

26 George Campbell

universality and reason: for example, did the work reflect what was permanentabout human character? But for Dubos, the focus of critical theory shifts fromthe work itself to an analysis of response. Unconscious and immediateresponse was thought of as natural, because it was seemingly less influencedby a conscious judgment shaped by education and because it imitated the waywe respond to ordinary (non-artistic) sense impressions. Nature continued tomean universal, but it was now associated with the nature of universal,human response, not the nature of external reality (Cassirer 1955, 275330).

In an important book, The Sixth Canon: Belletristic Rhetorical Theory andIts French Antecedents, Barbara Warnick has traced the influence of Frenchaesthetic theory in the seventeenth and eighteenth century on belletristicrhetoric. Warnick points out that Campbell cites fifteen French theorists inthe Philosophy of Rhetoric. Certainly, the influence of Dubos is direct and sig-nificant in Campbells chapter on tragic response. Moreover, the indirectinfluence of the French theory through Hume and others is even more sig-nificant. But although Campbell shared with belletristic theory an interest inthe nature of response, he showed no interest in developing the receptivecompetence (taste) of students, which followed with the new attention toreception. Campbells interest in rhetoric was generally within the context oforatory, not criticism: he was first attracted to rhetoric as an art useful tolawyers and ministers. His sole concern with criticism is limited to questionsof appropriateness and usage, not as a critic of literature or the other arts. Heis, therefore, a peripheral figure to the tradition that Warnick traces. Never-theless, for Campbell a theory of rhetoric is a theory of reception, and hewould bring to his reading of these response critics his interests in provid-ing an account of how we process discourse. Although Campbell was aninterested reader of the French theory that Warnick analyzes, the aesthetictheorist who most influenced Campbell was not in France but much closerto homeCampbells colleague in the Aberdeen Philosophical Society,Alexander Gerard.

With works by Joseph Addison, Francis Hutcheson, William Hogarthand Edmund Burke, Gerards Essay on Taste is part of a British century-longexamination of aesthetic response as it relates, especially, to literature andrhetoric. Gerards Essay takes up some of the standard issues relating to thequestion of taste: the qualities in objects that elicit aesthetic response (novelty,grandeur or sublimity, beauty, imitation, harmony, ridicule, and virtue); theimportance of taste in, for example, the refinement of character; whether,given the great diversity of opinion about aesthetic matters, there is a standardfor good taste and if so what the basis for it is. But what Campbell drew fromGerards work is his detailed analysis of the Lockean mental operations thatconstitute different types of response to aesthetic stimuli. Understanding theanatomy of response is important to a theory of rhetoric that is grounded inreception, as Campbells is.

27Intellectual Milieu

Gerards most detailed analysis of response occurs in a chapter entitledHow Far Taste depends on the Imagination in Part III of the Essay. Thechapter introduces a vocabulary relating to reception that Campbell adopts inPOR: internal senses, reflex senses, and reflex view, for example. The vocabu-lary refers to types of response. The purpose of Gerards analysis is to justifyreferring to the imaginations response to aesthetic and moral stimuli as inter-nal senses on analogy with the external senses. Gerard first describes whatcharacterizes the response of the external senses:

The obvious phaenomena of a sense are these. It is a power which sup-plies us with such simple perceptions, as cannot be conveyed by any otherchannel to those who are destitute of that sense. It is a power which receivesits perception immediately, as soon as its object is exhibited, previous to anyreasoning concerning the qualities of the object, or the causes of the percep-tion. It is a power which exerts itself independent of volition; so that, while weremain in proper circumstances, we cannot, by any act of the will, prevent ourreceiving certain sensations, nor alter them at pleasure; nor can we, by anymeans, procure these sensations, as long as we are not in the proper situationfor receiving them by their peculiar organ. These are the circumstanceswhich characterize a sense. Sight, for instance, conveys simple perceptionswhich a blind man cannot possibly receive. A man who opens his eyes atnoon, immediately perceives light; no efforts of the will can prevent his per-ceiving it, while his eyes are open; and no volition could make him perceiveit at midnight. These characters evidently belong to all the externalsenses. . . . (An Essay on Taste, 14546)

Gerard maintains that we are justified in referring to our response to aestheticstimuli as an internal sense because such response is similarly universal, imme-diate, and involuntary. What characterizes the response of the external senseslikewise belong to the powers of taste: harmony, for example, is a simple per-ception, which no man who has not a musical ear can receive, and which everone who has an ear immediately and necessarily receives on hearing a good tune.The powers of taste are therefore to be reckoned senses (146; my emphasis).Our response to aesthetic stimuli are simple, involuntary, and immediate.

Gerard subsequently distinguishes his analysis from some unidentifiedothers work, probably from the analysis of Francis Hutcheson, who first madethe analogy between aesthetic and moral response to sensory response andidentified our response to beauty and to goodness as internal senses. Gerardessentially agrees with Hutcheson but he maintains, in contrast to Hutcheson,that the internal sense builds on the external sense: the pleasure we receivefrom beauty follows sight. Because the response of an internal sense dependson a prior response of an external sense, the internal senses are derived andcompounded, not ultimate and original (1780, reprint 1963, 145; also 91).Internal senses are, therefore, sometimes referred to as subsequent or reflexsenses, Gerard has noted earlier (footnote, p. 2). But they are senses nonethe-

28 George Campbell

less: we may continue to term them senses since it does not contradict anyphenomena, on account of which this name was originally bestowed uponthem (147); that is, they are universal, immediate, and involuntary.

Equally important as the relatively minor differences between externaland internal senses is the significant difference between a sensory response(whether internal or external) and a reasoned response of judgment. Thepowers of the mind can be reduced into classes, according to their real dif-ferences, a fact of real moment, notes Gerard (footnote, p. 145). The plea-sure that constitutes our response to beautiful forms, is prior to our analyzingthem or discovering by reason that they have these qualities [uniformity, vari-ety, and proportion] (footnote, p. 147). The workings of reason contrast withthose of the internal sense:

It is scarce necessary to observe, that our ascribing the sentiments oftaste to mental processes is totally different from asserting that they aredeductions of reason. We do not prove, that certain objects are grand byarguments, but we perceive them to be grand in consequence of the naturalconstitution of our mind, which disposes us, without reflection, to be pleasedwith largeness and simplicity. Reasoning may, however, be employed inexhibiting an object to the mind; and yet the perception it has, when theobject is once exhibited, may properly belong to a sense. Thus, reasoning maybe necessary to ascertain the circumstances, and determine the motive, of anaction; but it is the moral sense that perceives it to be either virtuous orvicious, after reason has discovered its motive and its circumstances. (foot-note, p. 148)

The distinctions Gerard makes here are important because they stand behindimportant principles of Campbells theory. A reasoned response is voluntary,deliberate, and delayed in contrast to a sensory response, whether internal orexternal. This is true whether we are responding to virtue or beauty. The rea-soned responses of judgment are necessary to determine the motive for am