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Project Completion Report Validation
Productive Initiatives Support Programme in Rural Areas
Republic of Haiti
Date of validation by IOE: December 2017
I. Basic project data
Approval (US$ m) Actual (US$ m)
Region Latin America and the
Caribbean Total project costs 28,1 38,06
Country Haiti
IFAD loan and grant per centage of total
21,7 77%
21,7 (loan)
7,5 (grant additional financing)
77%
Loan/Grant numbers
Loan 587-HT
Grant G-I-DSF-8096-HT Borrower 2,1 8% 4,3 11%
Type of project (subsector)
Rural development
Beneficiaries 4,3 15% 4,6 12%
Financing type Loan + Grant
Lending terms* Highly concessional
Date of approval
23 April 2002
Date of loan signature
17 June 2002
Date of effectiveness
20 December 2002
Loan amendments
8 August 2008
7 August 2009
11 April 2011
10 February 2012
Number of beneficiaries
111 936 (direct beneficiaries)
Around 500 000 (indirect
beneficiaries)
99 633 beneficiaries
20 015 households
Loan closure extensions
2 years
Loan closing date 30 June 2015
Country programme managers
Lars Anwandter
(since January 2016)
Esther Kasalu-Coffin (March 2013-Jan 2016)
Marco Camagni
(up to March 2013)
Phase reviews January 2006
Mai 2011
Regional director(s)
Isabel Lavadenz
Josefina Stubbs
Joaquin Lozano (current)
IFAD loan disbursement at project completion (%)
100
Project completion report reviewer
Hamdi Ahmedou
IFAD grant disbursement at project completion (%)
93,8
PCR quality control panel
Catrina Perch
Michael Carbon
Date of the project completion report
December 2014
Source: Project Completion Report (PCR), Oracle Business Intelligence, Results and Impact Management System (RIMS) 2014.
* There are four types of lending terms. This is a special loan on highly concessional terms, free of interest but bearing a service charge of three fourths of one per cent (0.75%) per annum and having a maturity period of 40 years, including a grace period of 10 years.
2
II. Project outline 1. Introduction. The Productive Initiatives Support Programme in Rural Areas in
Haiti (PAIP) was approved by the IFAD Executive Board in April 2002. The financial
agreement for the loan was signed in June 2002 and became effective in December
2002. The programme was initially supposed to be implemented in three phases
lasting ten years in total, but it was extended for two years and was completed on
31 December 2014. The loan was closed in June 2015.
2. Country context. Haiti (28,000 km2) is located between the Caribbean Sea and
the north Atlantic Ocean. In 2015, the country was divided into ten departments,
comprising 145 communes each of which is further divided into sections (571).1
Haiti is the poorest country in Latin America and the Caribbean region as well as
one of the most densely populated, and is listed as a fragile State by the OECD. In
2016, the country had a population of 10.8 million, with an average density of
around 390 inhabitant/km2 and a gross national product per inhabitant as low as
US$7402. Haiti is extremely vulnerable to natural disasters with more than 90 per
cent of the population at risk according to the World Bank. In the past ten years, a
succession of earthquakes and hurricanes have had a devastating effect on the
country's economy, leading to losses in agriculture, fishing and livestock, impacting
the livelihood of the affected communities. The country's political situation has
improved in recent years, but remains fragile and unstable. From 2004 to 2017,
Haiti hosted a United Nations Stabilization Mission (MINUSTAH).
3. Project area. The programme had a national scope in terms of policy and
institutional dialogue but was expected to cover selected sections and communes in
a few departments, chosen according to criteria such as predominance of rural
areas, concentration of rural poor, presence of dynamic grassroots organizations
(GROs) and local service providers, and synergy with other development projects
in the area. Design reports estimated that between 60 (design document) and 80
(President's report) communes could potentially benefit from the programme
throughout the country,3 but these communes were not pre identified during the
design phase. Their selection was supposed to be demand-driven, flexible and
reviewed continuously. Nonetheless, the design documents did propose the north-
east, north-west and center (northern part) departments for the first phase of the
programme. In addition, catchments of small-scale irrigation schemes rehabilitated
by the IFAD funded Small-Scale Irrigation Schemes Rehabilitation Project were also
targeted. The first phase review recommended to further concentrate interventions
in these three regions and to ensure an integral coverage of the 35 communes (24
per cent, out of 145 communes) and 105 sections (out of 571 sections). This
number was later reduced to 29 communes (20 per cent) because six communes in
the Center department were already targeted by another similar project
implemented by the Fund for Economic and Social Assistance (FAES).
4. Project goal, objectives and components. The programme goal, as stated in
the President's Report, was to contribute to poverty reduction through diversifying
and increasing incomes on a sustainable basis, improving food security and leading
to better and sustainable management of natural resources. More specifically, the
project intends: (i) to strengthen local and national capacities for grass-roots-level
planning, social and economic development management, micro project design and
implementation; and absorption of rural financing; (ii) to support productive
initiatives4 identified and prioritized by the communities, as well as cross-sectoral
1 These figures have evolved since the project conception. In 2002, there were nine departments, comprising 133
communes, according to the President's report. 2 World Bank databank.
3 PAIP, Project completion review, p. 10.
4 Productive initiatives were meant to be related to recapitalization of farms, intensification and diversification of
agricultural production, sustainable management of natural resources, processing and marketing of produce, improvement of rural infrastructure, non-agricultural and service provision microenterprises, etc.
3
activities adding value to these initiatives; and (iii) to facilitate sustainable access
to financial services for poor rural households, particularly women, the landless and
young people.
5. Project components. To reach its objectives, the programme was structured
around four components. Component 1 aimed at enhancing the planning,
management and negotiating skills of grass-roots organizations, as well as the
main local actors, both public and private, so as to create favourable conditions for
local rural development on a fully participatory basis. Component 2 aimed at
supporting productive initiatives identified and selected by the beneficiaries, in the
framework of participatory diagnosis and planning and community development
plans (CDPs), thus contributing to self-development of rural communities. To this
end, the PAIP created a participatory and decentralized mechanisms for the
selection, approval and co-financing of productive micro projects. Component 3
aimed at facilitating sustainable access of the target group to financial services
(savings, credit and micro insurance) suitable to their needs; by improving the
national legislative framework and by supporting the creation of new microfinance
institutions, where needed, and strengthening the existing ones in order to
enhance their performance and impact on the targeted population. As part of
Component 4, the executing agency (FAES) was expected to set up an Economic
Initiatives Unit, responsible for PAIP activity coordination and management and to
open FAES regional sub-branches. A monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system was
also supposed to be developed.
6. Target group. The project targeted the rural poor, with a focus on the most
vulnerable population: women including the ones heading farms, school drop-out
youths, farmers with restricted or no access to land, smallholder farmers,
especially those living in remote areas. The programme also targeted microfinance
institutions and grassroots organisations and was supposed to benefit local
authorities and concerned ministries. According to the President's Report, PAIP was
expected to target 600 grassroots organizations reaching a total population
estimated at about 500,000 (direct and indirect) beneficiaries at appraisal period.
7. Financing. The total project cost, approved by the Executive Board, was US$28,1
million, of which IFAD was expected to provide a loan of US$21,7 million (77 per
cent), the government would contribute with an amount of US$2,1 million (8,1 per
cent) and beneficiaries US$4.3 million (15 per cent). Table 1 below gives the total
planned, revised, and actual contribution of each donor in US$ and in percentage.
Total project expenditure at closure was US$38,06 million, increasing project total
cost by more than a third (35 per cent) of the estimated amount at design. PAIP
financing significantly evolved during project implementation to adapt to the
changing country context. In January 2009, US$5.9 million of project funds , upon
a request from Government, were re-allocated to another project implemented by
FAO, following the food price crisis of 2008. Also, an additional financing, through
an IFAD grant, was approved in February 2012 for project consolidation in phase 3.
4
Table 1 Project costs
Funding sources Estimated amount
(m US$)
Estimated amount
(% of total)
Expenditure
(m US$)
Expenditure
(% of total)
Disbursement rate (%)
IFAD 21.7 77% 29,2
5 77%
100%(loan) 93% (grant)
Government 2.1 8% 4,3 11% 78,7%
Beneficiaries 4.3 15% 4,55 12% 100%
TOTAL 28.1 100% 38.06 100%
Source: President’s Report 2002, PCR 2014, Oracle Business Intelligence.
8. Project Component costs. Table 2 provides a breakdown of estimated and actual
expenditures by component. The total amount of US$29,3 million is below the total
project cost in the Financing Agreement because it excludes the amount allocated
to FAO and the beneficiaries contribution. The figures show a significant increase in
programme management costs.
Table 2 Component costs
Components Estimated Estimated Expenditure Expenditure Disbursement
amount amount (m US$) (% of total) rate
(m US$) (% of total)
Strengthening of local capacities
3.4 12,1% 4,4 15% 81%
Support to productive initiatives 15.3
54,3% 8.8 30% 67%
Support to rural microfinance institutions (MFIs)
5,4
19,1%
7.9
27%
71%
Programme coordination and management
4,1 14,5% 8,2 28% 141%
TOTAL 28,2
29,3
Source: Design document 2002 (estimation), and PCR 2014 (effective).
9. Project implementation. PAIP was implemented by FAES, an autonomous
agency for development finance created in 1991 under the Ministry of Economy
and Finance. The agency manages and coordinates the implementation of a
number of development partner-financed loans and grants and implements
development projects, mainly funded by Inter-American Development Bank and
World Bank loans. An Economic Initiatives Unit was established within FAES and
served as a project coordination unit, with the support of regional sub branches. It
comprised staff assigned to the project. The programme set up regional offices to
coordinate and monitor field activities in three departments: the North-East (in Fort
Liberté), the North-West (in Jean-Rabel) and the Centre (in Hinche). Financial and
management audit was undertaken by the Financial and Administrative Direction of
FAES.
10. In 2002, when PAIP was approved, IFAD was working with cooperating institutions
for loan/grant administration and project supervision. UNOPS was the designated
cooperating institution for PAIP.6 UNOPS fielded six supervision and implementation
support missions between 2003 and 2006. As part of the overall IFAD corporate
5This amount includes 5.9 million allocated to FAO following a government request to face an emergency situation in
2008. 6 PAIP Financing Agreement, Article 1, Section 1.05.
5
shift to direct supervision, in 2006 IFAD took over from UNOPS project loan and
grant administration as well as the oversight responsibilities.
11. PAIP was implemented under the flexible lending mechanism, an IFAD lending
instrument characterized by: i) a longer implementation period (10-12 years); ii)
flexibility, to adapt more quickly to a new context and changes in in-country
priorities; iii) greater involvement of beneficiaries in project implementation
(participatory and "learning by doing" processes); and iv) clearly defined
preconditions – or “triggers” – for proceeding to subsequent cycles.
12. Project duration was expected to be ten years but was extended for two years,
lasting 12 years in total. It was divided into three phases: (i) a first phase of four
years (December 2002 - December 2006) to test programme strategy, in particular
the methodology for the elaboration of CDPs and support to micro projects; (ii) a
second phase of five years (January 2007 - December 2011) for extension of
activities; and (iii) a third phase of three years (January 2013-December 2014), for
consolidation and establishing an exit strategy. Specific performance indicators to
be met to enter Phase 2 and Phase 3 were elaborated at design stage. The
eligibility of the Programme to enter Phase 2 and Phase 3 were assessed through
two IFAD-Government joint programme reviews, that were undertaken in January
2006 and May 2011.
13. Changes and development during implementation. Changes are inherent to
the project's implementation under the Flexible Lending Mechanism (FLM). PAIP
first phase was implemented in a context of political instability, with a high level of
insecurity. IFAD suspended disbursements for nearly a year (15 April 2003 – 20
February 2004) due to arrears in debt service repayment. The project's second
phase was affected by a succession of natural disasters (hurricanes in 2008 and
earthquake in 2010). As a result the project had to contribute to relief and
humanitarian efforts and an amount of US$5,9 million were allocated to a separate
emergency programme led by FAO.
14. This turbulent context led to four loan amendments:
i. a first loan amendment in 2008 to reallocate part of the project financial
resources to respond to a humanitarian crisis;
ii. a second loan amendment in 2009 to reallocate funds between different
categories of expenditures;
iii. a third loan amendment was approved in 2011 to reallocate funds from the
third phase to the second phase in order to cover a financing gap;
iv. a fourth amendment in 2012 approved an additional financing through a
grant and extended project duration by two years.
15. Intervention logic. PAIP rationale was to support the creation of innovative tools
for the transfer of grants in support of productive projects in rural areas. The
project followed a participatory approach, consisting of the elaboration by the
targeted population of CDPs so as to identify productive micro projects. A
participatory and decentralized mechanism was adopted for the selection, approval
and co-financing of productive micro projects through matching grants.
16. In addition to the operation of a grants mechanism, the project aimed at
generating an improved national policy framework for rural finance and at
consolidating and expanding existing micro-financial service providers (credit and
savings). Through these activities, PAIP would create the necessary critical mass
regarding resources and organisational capacities, thus improving the conditions
for sustainability.
17. The combination of GRO and community capacity-building – together with the
promotion of a network of MFIs in rural areas and support to the productive
6
initiatives of communities, microenterprises and marketing activities would create a
dynamic environment for productive activities. Also, the emergence of self-
managed rural GROs dealing with economic activities, the promotion of
microenterprise, the delivery of proximity financial services and community-
managed productive infrastructure (water points, irrigation schemes, hill dams,
etc.) would allow accumulation and redistribution of incomes at the village level,
leading to the initiation of sustainable and self-sustained development in targeted
communities.
18. In order to fully attain its objectives, PAIP needed to be implemented in a stable
socio-political context. As project implementation was carried out through
partnership with communities and GROs, and with progressive transfer of
responsibility, the project relied on pre-existing GROs recognized by the authorities
and with a minimal level of maturity. In addition, the presence of specialized
service providers and partner operators in the project area was a pre-requisite.
PAIP was designed to support the decentralization process of the implementing
agency, FAES, by creating regional sub branches, to ensure a close follow-up of
project's activities in the field.
19. Delivery of outputs. Annex III indicates the delivery of outputs of the project per
component based on the Project Completion Report (PCR) and 2013-2014 Results
and Impact Management System (RIMS) data.
III. Review of findings 20. The Project Completion Report Validation (PCRV) report presents findings based on
review of the programme documents, including appraisal reports, project
completion review, Cycle implementation reviews, RIMS reports, supervision
reports, and other relevant materials (e.g. Country Strategic Opportunities Paper
[COSOP], policy documents).
A. Core criteria
Relevance 21. Policy relevance. The programme’s objectives were broadly aligned to the
Government priorities, as outlined in the appraisal report and in various policy
documents. The National strategy for growth and poverty reduction 2008-2010
gives priority to: (i) improvement of access to basic services; (ii) creation of
assistance systems for the most vulnerable groups through NGOs; and (iii)
development of participatory activities. PAIP objectives were fully coherent with
these priorities. In parallel, PAIP was also supporting an ongoing process of
administrative decentralization, with reallocation of powers and responsibilities
among central, departmental and local governments. The project's flexible design
allowed it to stay aligned to changes in Government priorities and to adjust to an
unstable context, including vulnerability and natural hazards. The project
objectives became somewhat less aligned with Government policy with the advent
of an Agricultural Development Policy for 2010-2025 which promoted watershed
and value chain approaches, implemented in five-year programmes.7 However, it
would not have been feasible to adjust PAIP focus and approaches so close to the
end of the second phase.
22. The programme was designed in accordance with the COSOP 1999 priorities.
IFAD's COSOP had a strategic focus on food-security enhancement and increased
income through the creation of a suitable mechanism for financing productive
initiatives in rural areas. The strategy also aimed at consolidating the support to
the small-scale irrigation subsector that was provided by previous projects such as
the Small-Scale Irrigation Schemes Rehabilitation Project. PAIP intervention logic
was aligned with the COSOP 1999 which promoted a participatory approach and
7 Government of Haiti, Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Rural Development, Agricultural Development
Policy, p.19.
7
strengthening of GROs, integration of a gender approach, and targeting of the
poorest areas and most deprived groups.8 PAIP remained coherent with the
COSOPs 2009 and 2013 strategic objectives to promote productive initiatives and
improve small-scale producers' access to both markets and financial services.9
23. Relevance of design. The project aimed through a participatory approach to
enhance sustainable access to financial services. Given the weak institutional
capacities, it was necessary to strengthen GRO's and main stakeholders' capacities
for planning and managing project activities. The participatory approach, through
which the population developed CDPs and identified micro projects was relevant to
address the many and diverse challenges faced by the target group. By making
decentralized rural financial services available to beneficiaries, PAIP was also
aiming at addressing specific financing needs of the targeted population. As such,
PAIP was relevant to national and local needs.
24. As stated in the PCR, the project was approved in due course to support the
Government's efforts in decentralization, by strengthening local and national
capacities for grass-roots-level planning. However, without an adequate legislative
framework, PAIP efforts in strengthening GRO's were, at first, dispersed and
implemented without an established territorial approach. In 2006, a decree was
adopted to empower development committees at the level of communes (CDC) and
sections (CDSC) as the main local structures in charge of planning and piloting
development initiatives.10 PAIP could therefore focus its support to selected CDC's
and CDSC's, with a more coherent approach.
25. PAIP was conceived as a national programme. The project design was too
ambitious and its costs were underestimated according to various project
documents, including the PCR. Risks identified in the appraisal reports did not
include natural hazards and political instability, which, in addition to inadequate
management of resources, considerably affected project implementation and
increased project management costs. Also, PAIP harmonization with other
development interventions implemented by FAES was not anticipated in the
appraisal document. The project had to adjust its geographical targeting to stay
harmonized with FAES implemented projects funded by other donors.11
26. Relevance of targeting. The geographical targeting of PAIP is questioned by the
PCR and phase review reports, as it led to the resources being spread thinly and
compromised the achievement of the project objectives. The project area was not
clearly determined at design phase. The project targeted 60 to 80 communes but
they were later selected according to specific criteria (poverty, potential, demand)
(see paragraph 3 on project area). The number of targeted communes (60 to 80
communes) was reduced following the first phase review (from 2007 onwards),
when it appeared that the project was too ambitious.12 It was also decided to
promote cross-cutting activities which could benefit many communal sections at
the same time, to increase the impact and reduce resource dispersion.
27. While it appears that PAIP targeted the poorest communes, there was no
mechanism or strategy in the design to effectively reach the most vulnerable within
the project area. Issues of social targeting and elite capture are reported in project
documents, including phase reviews and the PCR.13 Up to 2009, the project did not
carry out any poverty study or targeting strategy. It was then decided, after seven
years of implementation, to introduce an "innovative" self-targeting approach14
8 COSOP 1999.
9 See COSOP 2009 and COSOP 2013-2018 strategic objectives.
10 There is no indication in project documents that the project played a role in this policy decision.
11 PAIP, First phase Implementation review, p. 12.
12 In comparison, another IFAD funded project in Haiti, PICV 2, with a similar approach and budget, targeted six
communes. 13
PAIP, Project completion review, P.43-44. 14
This approach is called in French "Différentiel de Bénéfices Négocié".
8
aiming at selecting the most vulnerable within a project area (communities,
hamlets). The targeting was done by the beneficiaries themselves, who identified
the most vulnerable among them (refer to effectiveness, paragraph 35). Due to the
absence of a targeting strategy and the late implementation of a self-targeting
mechanism, PAIP has failed to reach part of its targeted population (e.g. larger
numbers of women and youth).15
28. The project completion report rates relevance exclusively in terms of relevance to
local needs. The project is well aligned with IFAD and Government strategies and
policies. However, the project was too ambitious and there was no specific strategy
at design to reach out to the most vulnerable. Hence, the satisfactory (5)
assessment of relevance given by the PCR can be nuanced by the above-mentioned
factors and the PCRV rates the project's relevance as moderately satisfactory
(4), which is one point below the PCR.
Effectiveness
29. This section presents the effectiveness of the project in respect to its objectives,
and considering the delivery of outputs presented in annex VI. The analysis is
however limited by the weak M&E system, partly due to the absence of quantitative
targets in the project design document (including in the log frame). No quantitative
targets were defined from one phase to the other and there are no details about
the triggers required to move from one phase to another under the FLM.
30. The effectiveness of PAIP was negatively affected by external factors. In its first
years, the project evolved in an unstable political and social context, characterized
by demonstrations against the ruling President and a high level of insecurity in the
project area.16 In 2009, upon a Government request following the food crisis, US$
5,9 million from the IFAD loan were allocated to support an FAO-led project. This
led to a financing gap in the project's second phase. Furthermore, a succession of
hurricanes in 2008 and a devastating earthquake in 2010 (more than 300,000
deaths) significantly impacted project implementation in the targeted area
(especially North East and North West regions) during the second phase.17
(i) Strengthening of local and national capacities
31. As part of PAIP activities to strengthen management capacities for local and rural
development, training sessions were organized and reached 67,241 individuals
according to the PCR and RIMS data. Beneficiaries benefited from functional
literacy (9,833), strengthening of skills in GRO management (43,395) and
community development (13,787) as well as information and participatory planning
activities (226). The programme also supported the elaboration and validation of
130 CDPs, though very below target (22 per cent), which became an effective tool
for local development and are still updated by beneficiaries, according to PCR. The
PCR notes that project achievements were satisfactory, particularly for literacy
interventions. PAIP created 150 functional literacy centres in three departments
with support from the State Secretary for literacy and 958 facilitators/teachers and
30 supervisors were trained under the programme.
32. However, functional literacy only started in 2009, five years before programme
completion and it is important to note that this activity was a prerequisite to
strengthening the communities technical and managerial capacity and therefore
should have taken precedence over other capacity building activities of
communities or groups. The PCR also notes that trainings were delivered in a
sporadic and inconsistent manner. Indeed, the project cash flow problems affected
the payment of partner NGOs leading to demotivation of trainers and supervisors
(who were not paid regularly) and subsequent disruption of training activities.
15
PAIP, Project completion review, P.40. 16
PAIP, First phase Implementation review, p.10. 17
PAIP, Project completion review, P.9.
9
(ii) Supporting productive initiatives identified and prioritized by the
communities
33. Under this component, 480 micro projects were formulated through 77 CDPs18 and
PAIP funded 230 commune initiative projects (46 per cent of the initial target,
mainly due to budget constraints). The activities benefitted 64,000 rural poor and
around half of them were women. Main projects funded were: livestock (goat
breeding) (30 per cent of financing); fruit cultivation and; soil conservation and
reforestation (16 per cent of financing). The PCR, based on RIMS data, reports high
implementation rates and sometimes achievements beyond objectives for livestock
(103-214 per cent), natural resources management (82-250 per cent) and
agriculture (106-133 per cent) projects, which shows high demand and interest for
these types of projects. However, fisheries and infrastructure projects were less
numerous with, for instance, only one irrigation project funded out of 15 expected.
34. The PCR states that, as a result of the micro projects, conditions for (non-)
agricultural production have improved. Equally, crop processing and marketing was
enhanced. However there are no quantitative data to support this conclusion. The
project supervision reports raise the issue of the lack of capacity for the GROs to
manage the funded micro projects effectively and transparently. For instance it is
reported that some GROs do not systematically follow up on project
implementation and that they lack accountability towards their members.19
35. It is also noted that some project's eligibility criteria have excluded the most
vulnerable from benefitting. For instance, it was required to own land to benefit
from livestock projects. Overall, there is no guarantee that the most vulnerable
within GROs could benefit from the projects. Issues of social targeting and elite
capture were reported in projects documents, including the PCR, and the self-
targeting mechanism introduced in 2009 did not improve the situation, according
to the final workshop report.
(iii) Facilitating sustainable access to financial services
36. As part of its efforts to improve access to financial services (savings, credit and
microfinance), PAIP supported the creation of 4,207 saving and credit groups (125
per cent of the initial target) within 25 proximity MFIs (called Caisse Rurale
d'Epargne et de Prêt - CREP). According to the PCR these interventions provided
proximity financial services adapted to beneficiary needs. The CREP counted
21,023 active members including 59 per cent women. The outstanding amount for
credit was 67 million of HTG20 in September 2013. The component was
implemented with technical support from two specialized local partners,21 which
were in charge of cash management of CREP sites, as well as training CREP
managers and sensitizing the savings and credit group members.
37. However, the PCR notes that a significant amount (13) of CREPs and CREPs sites
(42) created were closed because of fiduciary problems or internal management
issues. In addition, the creation of new MFIs in the project area with financial
services more adapted to the population, have affected the adhesion to CREPs
(only 8 per cent of communes residents are members) and it became more
challenging to keep the existing members. Therefore, CREPs might not reach the
critical mass necessary for them to create a network supervised and accredited by
the Central Bank. The PCR questions the reliability of the financial data (e.g.
portfolio at risk, expense ratio) provided by the CREPs and their audited accounts.
None of the CREPs visited by the completion mission were autonomous and they all
relied heavily on the project's funds. There are also serious concerns about their
institutional anchoring.
18
Only 77 CDPs were funded out of 130 CDPs prepared. 19
PAIP, supervision report, p. 6. 20
Equivalent to approximatively USD 1,05 million in November 2017. 21
Called "Opérateurs de mise en oeuvre" in French.
10
38. In conclusion, the project, implemented in a difficult context, was successful in
strengthening management capacities for local development. However, results
from PAIP's support to productive initiatives were more mixed and the project
could not develop sustainable financial services. As a result, effectiveness is rated
as moderately unsatisfactory (3), same as the PMD rating.
Efficiency
39. PAIP was approved in April 2002 and became effective in December of the same
year. The time lapse between approval and effectiveness (7,9 months) was
significantly less than the Latin American and the Caribbean regional average of
17,8 months and the IFAD overall average of 12,4 months. Having said that, the
project did not take advantage of this relatively short period to quickly implement
its first phase activities.
40. Disbursement performance. Disbursement of funds allocated to the first cycle
only reached 50 per cent. According to the first phase review, the programme had
difficulties adhering to its annual work plan and budget because of the insufficient
flow of funds to special and operational accounts. Factors contributing to this
included delays in submission of withdrawal applications and unsatisfactory loan
administration and supervision by the cooperating institution (UNOPS). Also,
disbursements were suspended for nearly a year (15 April 2003 – 20 February
2004) due to arrears in debt service repayment. However, since IFAD took over
direct supervision from March 2006, disbursement efficiency and the flow of funds
to the programme account improved due to a more regular presentation of
withdrawal applications, and an increase in the special account allocation.
41. Fund reallocations. There were three reallocations of funds, two among them
aimed at balancing funds between different expenditures (2009 and 2014) and
another reallocation covered the financing gap of phase II with phase III funds.
Part of these reallocations are inherent to the flexible lending mechanism.
However, the PCR notes that these measures were insufficient and that the project
costs should have been updated and reassessed to the changing context, including
climatic variation costs. The PCR states that the project costs were overall under
estimated. Most important costs included financing productive initiatives (US$8,6
million) and support to the creation of proximity village banks (MFIs). However, to
determine and verify that there was need for additional recurrent budget, it is
worth examining what the additional 100 per cent of project management and
coordination resources were spent on.
42. Cost per beneficiary. Given the project's weak M&E system, it was not possible
to determine key efficiency indicators such as the internal rate of economic return.
Nonetheless, the PCR included a cost per beneficiary analysis. Figures used to
calculate this indicator included total number of beneficiaries as reported by RIMS
data, which was 99,633 beneficiaries, members of 20,015 households, and a
project total cost of US$29,4 million. Therefore, the PCR estimated PAIP cost per
household at US$1, 469 per household which is relatively similar to other regional
IFAD funded projects.22 However, if we consider that the project total cost was
US$34 million, including the beneficiaries contribution, the project costs raise to
US$1,700 per household which positions the project in the high end range.
43. Project coordination and management. PAIP management costs doubled over
the course of the project duration. The component represented 28 per cent of
project total costs and US$8,2 million at completion against respectively 14 per
cent and US$4,1 million at appraisal. PAIP was too ambitious covering a large
geographical area spread between various departments. Project costs were also
22
PCR compares PAIP efficiency with two IFAD funded projects in Dominican Republic (PROPESUR, Phase II) and Colombia (PADEMER). It is however not clear on which basis this comparison was made, and to what extent these projects can be compared. For example, none of them were implemented under the FLM, as was the case with PAIP, and conditions in Haiti cannot be compared with Colombia or Dominican Republic.
11
affected by external factors such as natural disasters.23 The PCR also notes that
there was a high turnover among project staff which is likely to have affected
project implementation and sustainability.
44. PAIP efficiency was affected by issues of disbursement during the first phase and
high management costs. In addition, given the weak M&E system, the financial
analysis carried out by the PCR was not enough to assess this criteria in depth. In
light of the above, the PCRV rates efficiency as moderately unsatisfactory (3),
which is the same rating given by the PCR.
Rural poverty impact
45. Given the weak M&E system which did not provide third-level data (impact), it is
difficult to assess rural poverty impact. The PCR based its analysis on data
collected from the impact study report (2015) and the final stakeholder workshop.
Both are explicitly questioned by the PCR but there was limited efforts by the
completion mission to collect additional data and provide additional analysis for the
impact section. The project impact study is based on a limited number of surveys
(270) without a clear sampling strategy. The results are therefore not statistically
reliable and can only highlight some trends. As for the final stakeholder workshop,
the process was not inclusive and the evidence was collected from a limited
number of beneficiaries (29), mainly communities leaders.
46. According to the PCR, PAIP impact was limited due to the large geographical area
which led to dispersion of activities. Also, the presence of various other
development programmes in the targeted area, made it difficult to attribute impact
to PAIP.
47. Household income and assets. According to the financial assessment of
productive initiatives funded by PAIP, carried out by the PCR, the project
contributed to an increase in household incomes. The level of increase in household
incomes differed according to the type of micro project funded. Thus, it appears
that livestock projects (cattle or goats) were among the most profitable. The PCR
speculates that this increase in income might have led households out of poverty
and increased their assets. This conclusion was not supported by quantitative
and/or qualitative data. In addition, there is no data on the number of beneficiaries
whose income has increased.
48. According to the PCR, the programme also had a positive impact on physical assets
by financing 28 infrastructure and crop processing projects which improved access
to water and irrigation systems (in a 100 ha perimeter) and enhanced processing
of raw materials (milk, cereals, fruits…). It is, however, not possible to assess to
what extent the project has contributed to better access to basic social services.
49. Human and social capital and empowerment. By promoting a participatory
approach, PAIP strengthened GRO's managerial capacity and introduced an
inclusive decision-making process within communities. According to the PCR,
project beneficiaries have benefited from functional literacy activities which
enhanced the presence of the most vulnerable, mainly women, in GROs and their
participation in the management of their organization. PAIP has contributed to
introduce a culture of participatory management of local development, with some
beneficiaries (those surveyed by the final workshop) noting more leadership and
entrepreneurship initiatives after they learned to read and write.
50. Food security and agricultural productivity. Support to micro projects in
agriculture, livestock and fisheries, together with improved access to water and
irrigation may have led to better household food security and nutrition, however
23
It is worth noting that not all natural disasters affected PAIP geographical project area, such as the 2010 devastating earth quake. The effects on the project came from secondary effects of the earth quake such as internal displacement of people from Port-au-Prince to project regions.
12
concrete data is missing. Neither the PCR nor the supervision reports provide data
in order to quantify the magnitude of this impact domain. With regard to
agricultural productivity, both the PCR and supervision reports are weak in
analyzing increased production and productivity.
51. PAIP provided training to producers on enhanced agricultural techniques for the
three main crops (rice, maize, beans). The PCR assumes that these trainings have
led to an increase in production and subsequently to improved household food
security. But there are no indications to suggest that beneficiaries improved access
to land, labour, inputs (seeds, fertilizers, phytosanitary products), equipment and
water, which are prerequisites in order for the training to lead to increased
agricultural productivity.
52. Institutions and policies. The PCR provides a very limited analysis regarding the
programme’s impact on institutions and policies. However, we can note that PAIP
had an impact on rural community organizations and strongly supported the
decentralization process at local level through capacity strengthening. The
programme provided the methods and tools for dealing with development issues at
different levels and the PCR notes improved partnerships between GROs and locally
elected representatives in dealing with local development issues.
53. The programme also supported the creation of proximity MFIs (CREP), self-
managed and funded by beneficiaries, which relatively enhanced access to rural
finance services for the most vulnerable, including women. The fact that
beneficiaries are involved in managing these MFIs is key to their success and
sustainability, according to project documents.
54. The programme also contributed to strengthen the capacities of the executing
agency and support its decentralization process. Regional sub branches were
created in three departments and PAIP was behind the creation of a Directorate for
Economic Initiatives within FAES.
55. It is likely that the project has contributed to an increase in household incomes
through the financing of selected micro projects (mainly livestock) and that it has
enhanced the participation of rural poor in local development. However, given the
lack of evidence and analysis available in project documents, it is challenging to
assess the project's rural poverty impact. In light of the above, the PCRV rates
rural poverty impact as moderately unsatisfactory (3), which is the same rating
as PMD.
Sustainability of benefits
56. Institutional sustainability. The PAIP's third phase aimed at establishing an exit
strategy and to consolidate and emancipate supported communities, GROs and
MFIs. PAIP sustainability is favoured by the emphasis on decentralization and
participatory development and capacity building of GROs to plan and manage
development projects. According to the PCR, FAES worked with GROs towards the
end of the project so they could have full financial and technical autonomy in the
management of their projects. However, the level of ownership can be very
different from one GRO to another, depending on its level of maturity. The PCR
adds that CDPs are continuously updated by trained elected representatives, who
use them to mobilize additional financing for local development initiatives.
Additionally, PAIP sustainability is favoured by the strategic choice of FAES as an
executing agency. FAES showed great resilience and stability as an institution and
PAIP supported the agency's decentralization process.
57. However, the PCR notes that there are no guarantees that supported MFIs will
survive after project completion. The programme did not succeed in creating the
institutional environment for their sustainability. The national operator which aimed
at gathering supported MFIs and obtaining accreditation from central authorities
was not established and the PCR notes that MFIs still rely heavily on project
13
support. In 2014, out of 68 supported MFIs, only 26 were still effective, the others
closed due to unpaid debt and/or because of internal tensions among members.24
58. Economic sustainability. There is no data about the number of micro projects
funded by PAIP that remain effective after the first year of implementation. This
makes it difficult to assess their sustainability. Nonetheless, according to the PCR,
the sustainability of these micro projects is affected by the level of technical
support carried out by local NGOs. Most of the executing NGOs did not provide
continued support to beneficiaries and disappeared after project implementation.
This affected in particular the fisheries micro projects where the need for technical
expertise was higher. The PCR also adds that the sustainability of livestock projects
was affected by high risks such as various diseases. Overall, the micro projects
funded by PAIP were not market oriented which limited their insertion in the value
chains and hence their sustainability.
59. Technical sustainability. Project interventions for natural resources management
(ravine correction works) were implemented at the level of plots, with no
watershed management approach, which significantly limited their impact and
sustainability. The PCR added that infrastructure projects implemented by PAIP
(irrigation, water sources) were not sustainable as they were already affected by
soil erosion and no maintenance was carried out by beneficiaries or the
Government.
60. The participatory approach and the choice of FAES as an executing agency has led
to some sustainability of benefits (e.g. ownership? ). However, there are some
issues regarding the sustainability of MFIs, the lack of infrastructure maintenance
and the absence of data about funded micro projects. As a result, the overall
project sustainability is rated as moderately unsatisfactory (3), which is the
same as the PMD rating.
B. Other performance criteria
Innovation
61. The PCR provides limited analysis of innovations introduced by PAIP. The main
innovative feature of PAIP was the introduction of development plans at the level of
Communes while previous IFAD funded projects targeted a lower territorial level
(hamlets). The project participatory approach also included systematically signing
of tripartite contracts (with the programme, the beneficiaries and the service
provider) for micro project implementation. PAIP contributed to the creation of
proximity village banks (CREP), self-managed and capitalized by villagers, with
procedures and products geared to target the entire community, including the
poorest. This represented an innovation in the rural finance sector. Another
innovation was the self-targeting mechanism introduced in 2009 to reach the most
vulnerable population, but there is no evidence that the mechanism has
successfully reached its objectives.
62. The project appraisal report listed other innovative features, especially in the field
of rural finance, such as the establishment of a national financial mechanism (for
productive initiatives in rural areas) with clear legal status, financial and
administrative autonomy. However, given the ineffective performance of
component 3 (support to rural MFIs), there was no solid basis for establishing the
national mechanism. Also, there is no evidence, from project documents, of
innovations introduced by PAIP in the fields of agriculture, fisheries and/or livestock
through the productive initiatives that were financed by the project.
63. In light of the above, the PCRV rates innovation as moderately unsatisfactory
(3), same as PMD rating.
24
PAIP, Project completion review, p. 36.
14
Scaling up
64. The PCR does not include scaling up criteria in its analysis. The PCRV notes that
there is no evidence in the project documents (PCR, phase reviews and supervision
missions) about specific measures taken to ensure that the limited number of
innovations mentioned by the PCR could be scaled up in wider Government policies
or programmes funded by the Government or other development partners. For
instance, the MFIs created and/or supported by the project are working without a
clear legal framework and they are yet to be recognized by the competent
authorities (Ministry of Finance, Central Bank).25
65. Furthermore, no evidence is available to show that specific efforts were made to
document and share innovations, or to engage in specific dialogue with
Government or other development partners to scale up the successful innovations
promoted under PAIP.26
66. In light of the above, and given the limited evidence available, the PCRV rates
scaling up as unsatisfactory (2), one point below PMD rating.
Gender equality and women’s empowerment
67. The project design included a gender-sensitive approach to ensure that women
were effectively targeted by the project and that they were an integral part of the
decision-making related to programme activities. However, the first phase review
mission (2007) noted that the project had not implemented any strategy or
approach for gender targeting and, as a result, recommended to update the gender
strategy included in the project design.27 From 2010, a strategy for gender equality
was finally developed and implemented within the project.
68. The PAIP approach was to support women’s groups micro projects and increase
women's presence and decision making within GROs. In 2013, according to the
PCR, out of 435 GROs supported by PAIP, 313 (72 per cent) included women
among their management board. In order to strengthen their skills, women were
the main beneficiaries of the project's functional literacy activity and they were
trained on participatory planning and local development. PAIP beneficiaries were
also sensitized about the importance of women participation. The PCR adds that,
since project implementation, women are participating more dynamically in local
development and women leaders are emerging. They are more autonomous and
their presence is also widely accepted by men. However, it is not clear what
evidence was used to support these conclusions.
69. It appears from project documents that some types of productive initiatives were
less attractive than others for women. In addition, women who were able to benefit
from credit had already entrepreneurship experience and therefore had a minimal
level of assets, which excluded de facto the most marginalized. Also, the PCR final
workshop report stated that one of the most profitable micro projects (according to
beneficiaries), goat breeding, excluded the most vulnerable beneficiaries, mainly
women and youth, as it included land ownership among its eligibility criteria. This
statement is however contrary to observations made on supervision missions which
report that the beneficiaries visited were all women, who prioritized giving the first
animals to the most vulnerable among them.
70. In light of the above, the PCRV rates this criterion as moderately satisfactory
(4), the same as PMD's self-rating.
25
PAIP, Project Completion Review, p. 37, p. 39. 26
Nonetheless, under the Small-Scale Irrigation Schemes Rehabilitation Project-2, FAES was requested to provide support for the Rural Finance component. This was an effort to scale up this component, even if it was not particularly successful. 27
PAIP, First phase Implementation review, P. 59.
15
Environment and natural resources management
71. The PCR does not cover this criteria in its analysis. There is also limited evidence in
the project documentation about PAIP impact on environment and natural
resources management. The financing agreement introduced environmental
assessments as a key criterion when selecting the micro projects funded by PAIP.
However, the second phase review reported that micro projects were approved
with no assessment of their environmental impact. The phase review recommended
the executing agency to carry out a systematic assessment of the micro project's
negative effects on the environment, especially given the high environmental risk
of some funded micro projects such as cassava processing units. The supervision
mission report (June 2012) indicates that FAES, through its newly created
environmental unit, only started to use environmental assessment tools from 2012
onwards, when two livestock projects were about to start.28
72. According to the latest supervision report (June 2014), some micro projects funded
by PAIP contributed to protect the environment by: i) implementing agroforestry
and soil conservation activities; ii) creating protection barriers through the
production of various crops (pineapple, cassava and sweet potato) in the Center;
and by iii) correction works of water courses in the North East.29
73. The project documents do not include additional analysis about natural resources
management which was necessary, considering that the sustainable management
of natural resources is part of the project goal and impact objective. PAIP intended
to reduce the pressure on the natural resource base, but given the weak M&E
system which has no data about impact level indicators, it is difficult to assess
project performance in this area.
74. Given the lack of concrete evidence, the PCRV agrees with the PMD rating and
rates this criterion as moderately unsatisfactory (3).
Adaptation to climate change
75. A succession of hurricanes in 2008 has affected project implementation and
climatic variations are an important issue in the country context. The COSOP 2013-
2018 introduced, as a specific objective, "the promotion of climate-smart
agriculture through proven, sustainable farming technologies and systems that
build resilience to the effects of adverse climatic conditions and foster high
productivity".30 However, this aspect is entirely missing from the PCR's analysis.
There is also no mention about climate change adaptation efforts in other project
documents. It is therefore not possible to assess this criterion, though the PCRV
takes note of the moderately unsatisfactory (3) rating given by the PCR.
C. Overall project achievement
76. PAIP was implemented under an FLM approach, which adopted a demand-driven
approach, with limited precision about the scope, quantities, costs and benefits of
the project at design. It is worth mentioning that these flaws are common among
IFAD funded projects under the FLM approach.31 The M&E system was particularly
weak providing limited data to assess the project performance. There was also
limited evidence provided by other studies, including the PCR. Thus it is challenging
to assess the project achievements related to increasing and diversifying income,
improving food security and better and sustainable management of natural
resources.
77. Despite a turbulent country context and the difficulties encountered during the first
and second phase of programme implementation, PAIP raised the level of
28
PAIP, Supervision report, June 2012, p. 30. 29
PAIP, Supervision report, June 2014, p. 13. 30
COSOP 2013-2018, strategic objectives. 31
IFAD, Self-assessment of the Flexible Lending Mechanism, December 2017.
16
community development capacity, contributed to increasing social capital,
empowerment and motivation, and impacted on interpersonal skills and self-
confidence. Some results were achieved in increasing beneficiaries income through
micro projects in livestock, agriculture and fisheries. The programme also actively
promoted gender equality, particularly in terms of a stronger inclusion of women,
in decision making processes within GROs and in access to training and productive
activities.
78. The project impact was however limited by the geographical dispersion of its
activities and there are concerns about sustainability of benefits. PAIP did not
succeed in enhancing sustainable access to financial services, which was crucial for
the sustainability. The lengthy implementation period (12 years) and FLM was
necessary given the difficult national context. However, it did not result in higher
effectiveness and the project management absorbed relatively high costs. The
project implementation was also affected by IFAD's unstable institutional
arrangements (from UNOPS to Rome-based CPM), high turnover of staff and a
reduction in project budget (due to reallocation to FAO).
79. In view of the above, and taking into consideration the challenging country
context, the PCRV rates the overall project achievement as moderately
unsatisfactory (3), which is the same rating given by the PMD.
D. Performance of partners
IFAD
80. IFAD took over the implementation support and oversight role from UNOPS in 2006
and went on to carry out 14 supervision and implementation support missions as
well as two inter-cycle missions (2006 and 2011), providing the triggers for the
successive phase. However, the PCR questions the work of these missions, noting
that the set of indicators to move from one phase to another were not clearly
predetermined and evaluated rigorously, leading IFAD to validate triggers without
ensuring that the conditions were met to implement the following phase (e.g. M&E
system and rural finance component). In addition, it also took IFAD seven years to
provide the implementation support required to establish a mechanism to ensure
effective targeting of the most vulnerable population, without much success. The
frequent changes in IFAD CPM and lack of country presence until 2008 has likely
constrained project implementation support.
81. IFAD’s design under the FLM provided the flexibility to adapt to the changing
context, opportunities and challenges. It is noted that throughout the programme
life cycle, IFAD was flexible and willing to adjust project implementation to support
the country when it faced natural disasters. The project was extended for two
further years with IFAD providing a grant to finance the third phase. However,
IFAD must assume responsibility for project design which appeared to be over
ambitious and unrealistic, which is also confirmed in the PCR. The country context,
including political instability and environmental risks were not sufficiently taken
into account.
82. The PCR also notes that PAIP activities frequently faced disbursement issues and
cash flow problems. During the first phase, there were important delays (three to
four months) for obtaining an authorization for withdrawal applications. The
situation improved when IFAD took over direct supervision from UNOPS in 2006,
but the final years of project implementation were still hampered by fiduciary
issues caused by a lack of coordination between technical and fiduciary services
within FAES and a mismanagement of funds.
83. In view of the above, IFAD’s performance is rated as moderately satisfactory
(4), the same as the PMD rating.
17
Government
84. The PCR notes that the Government of Haiti provided 78,7 per cent of its financing
despite facing various financial crises and natural disasters. The Government
allowed FAES to run the project without political interference, although there were
frequent changes in FAES management. While the PCR rates government
ownership of the project as satisfactory, other project documents mention limited
involvement and ownership from the Ministry of Agriculture (MARNDR). For
instance, the Government did not participate in the PCR process or provide any
comments on the final report. Also, as stated in supervision reports, decentralized
services of MARNDR showed limited involvement in the implementation of
component 2, support to productive initiatives.32
85. The PCR notes that FAES showed great resilience in implementing the project in a
turbulent context. The choice of FAES as an executing agency was relevant and
strategic. PAIP strengthened local staff skills and supported the decentralization of
the government agency by creating sub regional branches and building
partnerships with GRO's and local actors. The agency is thus well positioned to
support project sustainability. PAIP implementation benefited from FAES
experience in implementing other donor funded projects and the agency's pre-
existing partnerships at different levels. However, the PCR noted that FAES did not
effectively contribute to the output "functional literacy", even though it provided
material support (i.e. offices, electricity). Also, while acknowledging that FAES staff
diligently followed up on supervision recommendations, the PCR noted that the
government agency did not document some key changes recommended by phase
reviews. This was mainly due to the weak M&E system for which the executing
agency shared the responsibility with IFAD. In addition, the frequent staff mobility
mentioned in supervision reports affected project implementation and sustainability
due to the loss of "institutional memory". Last but not least, a poor coordination
between the Project coordinator and the Director of finance department within
FAES was reported and resulted in increased management issues.
86. In view of the above, the Government performance is rated as moderately
unsatisfactory (3), the same as the PMD rating.
IV. Assessment of PCR quality 87. Scope. The PCR covers part of the key questions and follows broadly the PCR
guidelines. However, some criteria, mainly relevance, environment and natural
resource management, adaptation to climate change, innovation and scaling up are
insufficiently analyzed or completely missing from the analysis. The project impact
section is also superficially covered, using evidence questioned by the PCR itself
(project impact study and final stakeholders workshop). In addition, inconsistent
figures about project costs are presented in the PCR, as a result of disjointed
management of the project within FAES between technical and fiduciary aspects.33
Therefore, PCRV rates PCR scope as moderately unsatisfactory (3).
88. Quality. The PCR process was not inclusive as it was mainly led by IFAD with little
or no ownership from the Government, as stated in the PCR CPMT minutes.
According to IFAD, FAES did not assume its responsibility to undertake the PCR,
citing financial constraints. The PCR also questions the validity of the final
stakeholders workshop. Participants, selected by the implementing agency, were
mostly leaders of their communities who showed little interest in discussing the
project's shortcomings. Besides, their limited number, 29, do not allow to draw
conclusions that can be generalised.34 The reliability of the project impact study is
also questioned by the PCR, but the completion mission, due to time and resources
32
The Ministry of Agriculture was supposed to provide technical support for implementation of component 2. 33
The allocated amount to FAO and the beneficiaries contribution are not systematically included in project total costs, leading to discrepancies between figures. 34
PAIP, Project completion report, appendix 8.
18
constraints, did not collect more credible and reliable additional data, to assess the
project impact. As a result, the PCR quality is rated as moderately
unsatisfactory (3).
89. Lessons. The PCR identified a number of relevant key lessons learned from PAIP,
based on the available evidence. The PCR's lessons are rated satisfactory (5).
90. Candour. The analysis produced by the PCR was objective, acknowledging the
limits of the available evidence and explicitly reporting negative and weak aspects
throughout the document. This analysis was also reflected on the PCR project
ratings. The PCR was also critical of the phase reviews and previous supervision
missions. Therefore, the PCR's candour is rated as satisfactory (5).
V. Lessons learned
91. Key lessons to be learned from PAIP are as follows:
Flexible lending mechanism. Many of the key lessons learned from the PCR are
linked to the project FLM. While it is true that the FLM has allowed PAIP to be more
flexible and to adapt to a changing context, the project was approved with no
precision about the scope, quantities, costs and benefits of the project at design.
PAIP was too ambitious and costs were underestimated. Project design must be
more rigorous and based on a sound analysis of country context, including natural
hazards and political instability. Quantitative targets should be set in the project
logframe and the M&E system should be strengthened, which is essential to keep
track of trigger indicators. In addition, more attention should be given to phase
assessment, and all conditions must be met to move from one phase to another.
Support to productive initiatives. PAIP interventions did not tackle some of the
main limitations faced by the targeted population, which are the lack of transport,
processing and storage infrastructure, insufficient markets access and high
production costs. It is therefore necessary to adopt a more integrated approach,
addressing all issues along the value chains, based on sound knowledge of
opportunities and bottlenecks, and by identifying areas where conditions are
already decent and where a marginal intervention can make a difference.
Rural Finance. PAIP aimed at enhancing access to financial services without a
prior assessment of the realities and limitations in the sector. The project
supported the creation of proximity MFIs but they lacked institutional anchorage
and remained heavily reliant on the project resources. It is therefore necessary to
address the sector bottlenecks by relying on existing institutions in order to ensure
the sustainability.
Targeting approach. The project did not successfully reach the most vulnerable
and the self-targeting mechanism introduced by PAIP did not produce effective
results. There are lessons to be learned from IFAD experience in Haiti in order to
refine the strategy and ensure in the future, that it is used from the beginning of
the project. In addition, the project's geographical targeting needs to be more
concentrated, in order to avoid spreading resources too thinly and increase the
impact.
Annex I
19
Definition and rating of the evaluation criteria used by IOE
Criteria Definition * Mandatory To be rated
Rural poverty impact Impact is defined as the changes that have occurred or are expected to occur in the lives of the rural poor (whether positive or negative, direct or indirect, intended or unintended) as a result of development interventions.
X Yes
Four impact domains
Household income and net assets: Household income provides a
means of assessing the flow of economic benefits accruing to an individual or group, whereas assets relate to a stock of accumulated items of economic value. The analysis must include an assessment of trends in equality over time.
No
Human and social capital and empowerment: Human and social
capital and empowerment include an assessment of the changes that have occurred in the empowerment of individuals, the quality of grass-roots organizations and institutions, the poor’s individual and collective capacity, and in particular, the extent to which specific groups such as youth are included or excluded from the development process.
No
Food security and agricultural productivity: Changes in food
security relate to availability, stability, affordability and access to food and stability of access, whereas changes in agricultural productivity are measured in terms of yields; nutrition relates to the nutritional value of food and child malnutrition.
No
Institutions and policies: The criterion relating to institutions and
policies is designed to assess changes in the quality and performance of institutions, policies and the regulatory framework that influence the lives of the poor.
No
Project performance Project performance is an average of the ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits. X Yes
Relevance The extent to which the objectives of a development intervention are consistent with beneficiaries’ requirements, country needs, institutional priorities and partner and donor policies. It also entails an assessment of project design and coherence in achieving its objectives. An assessment should also be made of whether objectives and design address inequality, for example, by assessing the relevance of targeting strategies adopted.
X Yes
Effectiveness The extent to which the development intervention’s objectives were achieved, or are expected to be achieved, taking into account their relative importance.
X
Yes
Efficiency
Sustainability of benefits
A measure of how economically resources/inputs (funds, expertise, time, etc.) are converted into results.
The likely continuation of net benefits from a development intervention beyond the phase of external funding support. It also includes an assessment of the likelihood that actual and anticipated results will be resilient to risks beyond the project’s life.
X
X
Yes
Yes
Other performance criteria
Gender equality and women’s empowerment
Innovation
Scaling up
The extent to which IFAD interventions have contributed to better gender equality and women’s empowerment, for example, in terms of women’s access to and ownership of assets, resources and services; participation in decision making; work load balance and impact on women’s incomes, nutrition and livelihoods.
The extent to which IFAD development interventions have introduced innovative approaches to rural poverty reduction.
The extent to which IFAD development interventions have been (or are likely to be) scaled up by government authorities, donor organizations, the private sector and others agencies.
X
X
X
Yes
Yes
Yes
Environment and natural resources management
The extent to which IFAD development interventions contribute to resilient livelihoods and ecosystems. The focus is on the use and management of the natural environment, including natural resources defined as raw
X Yes
Annex I
20
Criteria Definition * Mandatory To be rated
materials used for socio-economic and cultural purposes, and ecosystems and biodiversity - with the goods and services they provide.
Adaptation to climate change
The contribution of the project to reducing the negative impacts of climate change through dedicated adaptation or risk reduction measures.
X Yes
Criteria Definition * Mandatory To be rated
Overall project achievement
This provides an overarching assessment of the intervention, drawing upon the analysis and ratings for rural poverty impact, relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, gender equality and women’s empowerment, innovation, scaling up, as well as environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change.
X Yes
Performance of partners
IFAD
Government
This criterion assesses the contribution of partners to project design, execution, monitoring and reporting, supervision and implementation support, and evaluation. The performance of each partner will be assessed on an individual basis with a view to the partner’s expected role and responsibility in the project life cycle.
X
X
Yes
Yes
* These definitions build on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Development Assistance Committee (OECD/DAC) Glossary of Key Terms in Evaluation and Results-Based Management; the Methodological Framework for Project Evaluation agreed with the Evaluation Committee in September 2003; the first edition of the Evaluation Manual discussed with the Evaluation Committee in December 2008; and further discussions with the Evaluation Committee in November 2010 on IOE’s evaluation criteria and key questions.
Annex II
21
Rating comparisona
Criteria
Programme Management
Department (PMD) rating
IOE Project Completion Report Validation (PCRV)
rating
Net rating disconnect
(PCRV-PMD)
Rural poverty impact 3 3 0
Project performance
Relevance 5 4 -1
Effectiveness 3 3 0
Efficiency 3 3 0
Sustainability of benefits 3 3 0
Project performanceb 3,5 3,25 -0,25
Other performance criteria
Gender equality and women's empowerment 4 4 0
Innovation 3 3 0
Scaling up 3 2 -1
Environment and natural resources management 3 3 0
Adaptation to climate change 3 NA NA
Overall project achievementc 3 3 0
Performance of partnersd
IFAD 4 4 0
Government 3 3 0
Average net disconnect -2/11=-0,18
a Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 =
satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable. b Arithmetic average of ratings for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency and sustainability of benefits. c This is not an average of ratings of individual evaluation criteria but an overarching assessment of the project, drawing upon
the rating for relevance, effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability of benefits, rural poverty impact, gender, innovation, scaling up, environment and natural resources management, and adaptation to climate change. d The rating for partners’ performance is not a component of the overall project achievement rating.
Ratings of the project completion report quality
PMD rating IOE PCRV rating Net disconnect
Candour - 5 -
Lessons - 5 -
Quality (methods, data, participatory process) - 3 -
Scope - 3 -
Overall rating of the project completion report - 3 -
Rating scale: 1 = highly unsatisfactory; 2 = unsatisfactory; 3 = moderately unsatisfactory; 4 = moderately satisfactory; 5 = satisfactory; 6 = highly satisfactory; n.p. = not provided; n.a. = not applicable.
Annex III
22
Review of outputs
Outputs Unit Targets Actuals Achieved (against targets)
Component 1 strengthening of local capacities
Communal Development Plans created Number 600 130 22%
Facilitators/ teachers trained Men 105 668 636%
Facilitators/ teachers trained Women 45 290 644%
Number of person that received training in literacy Men 6 000 1 140 19%
Number of person that received training in literacy Women 9 000 7 735 86%
Number of GROs supported or strengthened Number 500 1 392 278%
Members of GROs supported or strengthened Men 37 500 20 884 56%
Members of GROs supported or strengthened Women 25 000 22 511 90%
Component 2 support to productive initiatives
Number of productive initiatives funded Number 500 230 46%
Person trained in enhanced production technics Men 22 000 22 456 102%
Person trained in enhanced production technics Women 16 750 17 539 105%
Person trained in post-production and commercialization
Men 310 219 71%
Person trained in post-production and commercialization
Women 350 443 127%
Storage and processing units built Number 20 14 70%
Component 3 support to rural MFIs
Groups of saving and credit created Number 3 360 4 207 125%
Members of groups of saving and credit created Men 6 720 8 482 126%
Members of groups of saving and credit created Women 10 080 12 541 124%
Local saving and loan association created Number 50 26 52%
Outreach
Households that benefited from the project Number 9 000 25 287 281%
Number of person that benefited from the project Men 28 000 63 713 228%
Number of person that benefited from the project Women 12 000 48 223 402%
Source : PCR 2014, RIMS 2014
Annex IV
23
Bibliography
International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD). 1999. COSOP.
____. 2001. Appraisal Report.
____. 2002. President’s report.
____. 2006. First Phase joint review IFAD and Government.
____. 2007. Implementation of the second cycle, under FLM, EB 2007/90/INF.3.
____. 2007. Report to the Executive Board, on Self-assessment of FLM.
____. 2009. COSOP.
____. 2011. Second Phase joint review IFAD and Government.
____. 2006 up to 2014. Supervision missions reports.
____. 2015. Impact Report. 2015
____. COSOP, 2013-2018.
____. 2014. Project Completion Report (PCR).
____. 2014. PCR Appendix 8, workshop conclusions.
____. 2016. PCR CPMT Minutes.
République de Haiti. 2008. Document de stratégie nationale pour la croissance et la
réduction de la pauvreté 2008-2010, Ministère de la planification et de la coopération
externe.
____. 2011. Ministère de l’Agriculture, des Ressources Naturelles & du Développement
Rural (MARNDR), Politique de développement agricole 2010-2025.
Annex V
24
Acronyms
CDP Community development plan CDC Community development committee (level of communes)
CDSC Community development committee (level of sections)
COSOP Country Strategic Opportunities Paper
CREP Caisse rurale d’épargne et de prêt
FAES Fund for Economic and Social Assistance
FLM Flexible Lending Mechanism
GRO Grassroots organization
MARNDR Ministère de l’agriculture, des ressources naturelles et du développement
rural
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation System
MFI Microfinance Institution
PAIP Productive Initiatives Support Programme in Rural Areas (in French)
Programme d’appui aux initiatives productives en milieu rural
PCR Project Completion Report
PCRV Project Completion Report Validation
RIMS Results and impact management system
