PROCESSSAFETYMANAGEMENTPROCESSSAFETYMANAGEMENTSMPS5103SMPS5103SMPS5103SMPS5103

L bl tLearnersableto

a) explain What is Process Safety Management (PSM).a) explainWhatisProcessSafetyManagement(PSM).

b) applytheknowledgeandprinciplesofPSM.

PROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENTPROCESS SAFETY MANAGEMENTPROCESSSAFETYMANAGEMENTPROCESSSAFETYMANAGEMENT

Wh tWh tWhatWhat isPSM?

WhyWhy needPSM?WhyWhyHowHow to apply PSM?HowHow toapplyPSM?

www.csb.gov

Pasadena,TexasUS(1989)killed 23 injured 314killed23,injured314.

Flixborough,UK(1974)killed 28

WhWh

killed28,seriouslyinjured36.

WhyWhy needPSM?PiperAlpha,NorthSea(1988)kills 167 men

Bhopal,India(1984)releaseofMIC,deathtollmorethan

kills167men.totalinsuredlossUS$3.4b.

20,000.

Seveso,Italy(1976)releaseofTCDD.

Media reported the area to be densely populated,with around 5,600 families residing within 1.5 kmradius of the plant, the closest being only 600 maway. Neither the developers nor the buyers wereaware of the latent dangers of the activities at thenearby site

The first responders were unable to keep the fire from spreading.Firefighters who first arrived on the scene proceeded to douse thefire with water as they were unaware that dangerous chemicalswere stored on the site, thereby setting in motion a series of moreviolent chemical reactions and explosions.

Photographs showed extensive destruction in andPhotographs showed extensive destruction in andaround the warehouse compound, with a massivecrater at the blast site. The buildings of seven moresurrounding logistics companies were destroyed.More than 8000 new cars parked in lots located nearthe blast site, have been largely burned as a result of

August 12 2015

the initial explosion. Multiple buildings surroundingthe blast site have been called "structurally unsafe".[

August12,2015HazardousSubstanceWarehouseExplosion

Tianjin,China.As of 12 September 2015, the official casualty report was 173deaths, 8 missing, and 797 nonfatal injuries

PROCESSSAFETYLEGISLATIONEurope Seveso Directive I (1982), amended twice 1987, 1988. Seveso Directive II (1996). Seveso Directive III (July 2012). EuropeanProcessSafetyCentre

www.epsc.orgUK Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazard (CIMAH) Reg 1984. UK HSE Offshore Installation (Safety) Reg. 1992. UK HSE

Off h I t ll ti (P ti f Fi E l i d E R )

p g

Offshore Installation (Prevention of Fire, Explosion and Emergency Response)PFEER Reg 1995. UK HSE

Control of Major Accident Hazard (COMAH) Reg 1999. UK HSEHealth Safety Executive UK

US Process Safety Management 1992. US OSHA Risk Management Program 1996. US EPA U.S.DepartmentofLabor

HealthSafetyExecutiveUKwww.hse.gov.uk

g gOccupationalSafetyHealthAdminwww.osha.gov

HumanResourceMinistryDeptofOccupationalSafety&Health

Malaysia Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazard (CIMAH) Reg 1996. MY JKKP

www.dosh.gov.my

WhatWhat ?WhatWhat isPSM?

potential

something that can be trusted or believed or

potentialinvolvingorexposetodanger/ harmsomething that can be trusted or believed or

works or behaves well in the way we designed/ expected.

/harm.

Process activity involving highly hazardous chemical 1using 2storingactivity involving highly hazardous chemical using, storing,3manufacturing, 4handling, or 5transporting such hazardouschemicals at the site, or any combination of these activities.

Safety [1]condition of being protected against consequences of failure,damage, error, accidents, harm or any other which could beconsidered nondesirable where it resulting life, health oreconomical losses or ecological damageeconomical losses or ecological damage.

[2]control of recognized hazards to achieve an acceptable level ofi krisk.

Management coordination of activities to achieve defined objectives.

O ti l protecting the safety health &SAFETY OccupationalSafety&Healthprotectingthesafety,health&

welfareofpeopleengaginginworkofemployment.

Baker Panel report following the explosion at BPs TexasCity refinery in 2005 stated,

BPs executive management tracked the trends in BPs personalProcessSafety

BP s executive management tracked the trends in BP s personalsafety metrics, and they understood that BPs performance inthis regard was both better than industry averages andconsistently improving. Based upon these trends, BPs executivemanagement believed that the focus on metrics such as OSHA

preventingprocessrelatedeventssuchasfires,explosionsand

releaseoftoxicsubstancesfromprocess facilities

management believed that the focus on metrics such as OSHArecordable . . . were largely successful. With respect to personalsafety, that focus evidently was effective. BPs executivemanagement, however, mistakenly believed that injury rates,such as days away from work case frequency and recordableprocessfacilities. such as days away from work case frequency and recordableinjury frequency, were indicators of acceptable process safetyperformance. While executive management understood that theoutputs BP tracked to monitor safety were the same as thosethat the industry generally monitored, it was not until after thethat the industry generally monitored, it was not until after theTexas City accident that management understood that thosemetrics do not correlate with the state of process safety.

Wh tWhatconstituteaProcessIncident?

*involvehazardousb tIncident? substance

*occur at

*abovereporting

*occuratprocesslocation*release

mustbeacute

threshold

*interpretationbyCenterforChemicalProcessSafety(CCPS),US.www.aiche.org/ccps

PSM concern with processoriented issues such as runaway reactions,inadvertent mixing of hazardous substances, failure of equipment,corrosion, etc., that have high consequences.

PROCESSSAFETYMANAGEMENTPROCESSSAFETYMANAGEMENTPSM is a comprehensive framework of activities formanaging the integrity of a hazardous operating system &g g g y p g yprocesses by applying good design principles, engineering& operating practices.

Its goal is to identify,li ieliminate,

&mitigate

loss of containment accident (LOCA) that lead to fire,explosion or toxic effects resulting serious injuries or largenumbers of casualties, and / or catastrophic damage toproperty and environment.

PSM

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OSHA3132P S f t OSHA 3133( MProcessSafetyManagementRequirements

OSHA3133PSM GuidelinesforCompliance

EngineeringDisciplineInvolvementg g p

1) CHEMICAL Process selection; Operating conditions;Safe operating envelope; Process design; Processcontrol; Safeguards; Monitoring, etc.

2) CIVIL Site layout; Elevated structures; Drainage;Buildings & facility sitting; Infrastructure, etc.

3) MECHANICAL Pressure envelope design; Rotatingequipment; Codes & Standards Monitoring etcequipment; Codes & Standards, Monitoring, etc.

4) ELECTRICAL Reliable power; Arc flash protection;) p pArea classification, etc.

WhyWeNeedRiskManagementy g

LEGAL REQUIREMENTS duty of care.

COMMERCIAL REQUIREMENTS any mishap may cause loss of production (profit) loss of production (profit).

loss of asset / revenue.

loss of reputation, public image.loss of reputation, public image.

legal claims.

compensation due to injury, loss of life, damage to property &environment.

MORAL / ETHICAL REQUIREMENTSMORAL / ETHICAL REQUIREMENTSTBpg 48

PRINCIPLESofRISKMANAGEMENT1) DEFINECONTEXT statutoryrequirements,expectationof

stakeholders,levelofperformance.

2) IDENTIFYTHEHAZARD orPOTENTIALHAZARD toprocess,people,property&environment.p p p p y

3) ESTABLISHTHECONSEQUENCES.

4) EVALUATE&RANKTHERISK inorderofitsmagnitude/severity.

5) DECIDEACTION/CONTROL.

6) DOCUMENTATION&REVIEWEFFECTIVENESS.TBFig14,pg 1220,SGpg1618

TYPEofMAJORACCIDENTinPROCESSPLANT

1) Fire liquidfire;gasfire;flashfire;BLEVE.

2) Explosion dustexplosion;vaporcloudexplosion.

3) Toxic release what3) Toxicrelease.

4) Collapseofstructure.

5) Di t ( t f GOD) th k t i t

whatcauseit?

5) Disaster(actofGOD) earthquake,tsunami,etc.

6) Dominochain.

When hazardous material inventory or hazardous energysource suffers loss of containment (loss of control).

TBpg 2143

THEIMPACT

Deathorinjurytopeople(onsite;offsite).

Damagetoproperty.

Damagetoenvironment.

Lossofproduction/profit.

Lossofexpertise/workers.

Lossofreputation.

Legal claimsLegalclaims.

Financiallosses.

R l Revenuelosses.TBpg21,6669

THE CHRONOLOGY of DISASTER**Geoff, W. Hazard Identification & Risk Assessment, Institute of Chemical Engineers, 1996. (modified)

Failure to recover

Release of material byrupture or discharge toxicrelease, fire or explosion.

Event path or chain leading from the initiating events to the certain specific consequences.

Failure to recoverthe situationDangerous disturbance

Process parameter passed over thehigh-high alarm level & trip systemfailed to correct the situation.

COMMUNITYEMERGENCYRESPONSE

PLANTEMERGENCYRESPONSECOMPLIANCE

Failure of emergencycontrol

Hazardous deviationProcess parameter alarmedthe high-high alarm level & Further emergency control

ProcessIncidentACCIDENTINVESTIGATION

RESPONSECOMPLIANCEAUDIT

the high high alarm level &emergency control might beeffected.

Further emergency controlsystem i.e. automaticshutdown, process reliefor action by operatorfollowing set of procedurehave failed to control thesituation

Failure to controlProcess deviation

The root cause that constitute

Process parameter increase to higher thannormal design and the alarm signify theneed for intervention by operator.

Corrective system failedto prevent the trend andfurther steps taken byoperator to correct the

situation.

INCIDENTINVESTIGATION

Inadequate of normal controlImmediate cause

process incident / event : inadvertent mixing. equipment failure. personnel error. external disturbance.

Normal control system failed to correct. Personnel failed to act.

situation also failed.