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Agan Jr. Vs. PIATCO Case Digest

Agan Jr. Vs. PIATCO

402 SCRA 612 

G.R. No. 155001 

May 5, 2003 

Facts: Some time in 1993, six business leaders,

explored the possibility of investing in the new NAIA

airport terminal, so they formed Asians EmergingDragon Corp. They submitted proposals to the

government for the development of NAIA Intl.

Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). The NEDA

approved the NAIA IPT III project. Bidders were invited,

and among the proposal Peoples Air Cargo (Paircargo)

was chosen. AEDC protested alleging that preference

was given to Paircargo, but still the project was

awarded to Paircargo. Because of that, it incorporated

into, Phil. Intl. Airport Terminals Co. (PIATCO). The

DOTC and PIATCO entered into a concession

agreement in 1997 to franchise and operate the said

terminal for 21years. In Nov. 1998 it was amended in

the matters of pertaining to the definition of the

obligations given to the concessionaire, development

of facilities and proceeds, fees and charges, and the

termination of contract. Since MIAA is charged with the

maintenance and operations of NAIA terminals I and II,

it has a contract with several service providers. The

workers filed the petition for prohibition claiming that

they would lose their job, and the service providers

 joined them, filed and entrusted with the regulation of 

activities coming under the special technical

knowledge and training of such agencies.

Filed for motion for intervention. Likewise several

employees of the MIAA filed a petition assailing the

legality of arrangements. A group of congressmen

filed similar petitions. Pres. Arroyo declared in her

speech that she will not honor PIATCO contracts which

the Exec. Branch's legal office concluded null and

void.

Issue: Whether or Not the 1997 concession agreement

is void, together with its amendments for beingcontrary to the constitution.

Held: The 1997 concession agreement is void for

being contrary to public policy. The amendments have

the effect of changing it into and entirely different

agreement from the contract bidded upon. The

amendments present new terms and conditions which

provide financial benefit to PIATCO which may have

the altered the technical and financial parameters of 

other bidders had they know that such terms were

available. The 1997 concession agreement, theamendments and supplements thereto are set aside

for being null and void.

The petitioners have local standi. They are prejudiced

by the concession agreement as their livelihood is to

be taken away from them.

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

EMPLOYEES’ASSOCIATION (CHREA) vs.

COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS

G.R. No. 155336. November 25, 2004.

FACTS:

On 14 February 1998, Congress passed Republic Act

No. 8522, otherwise known as the General

Appropriations Act of 1998. It provided for Special

Provisions Applicable to All Constitutional Offices

Enjoying Fiscal Autonomy. On the strength of these

special provisions, the CHR promulgated Resolution

No. A98-047 adopting an upgrading and

reclassification scheme among selected positions in

the Commission. To support the implementation of 

such scheme, the CHR, in the same resolution,

authorized the augmentation of a commensurate

amount generated from savings under Personnel

Services. By virtue of Resolution No. A98-062 the CHR

“collapsed” the vacant positions in the body to provide

additional source of funding for said staffing

modification. Among the positions collapsed were: one

Attorney III, four Attorney IV, one Chemist III, three

Special Investigator I, one Clerk III, and one Accounting

Clerk II. The CHR forwarded said staffing modificationand upgrading scheme to the DBM with a request for

its approval, but the then DBM secretary Benjamin

Diokno denied the request. In light of the DBM’s

disapproval of the proposed personnel modification

scheme, the CSC-National Capital Region Office,

through a memorandum recommended to the CSC-

Central Office that the subject appointments be

rejected owing to the DBM’s disapproval of the

plantilla reclassification. Meanwhile, the officers of 

petitioner CHREA, in representation of the rank and

file employees of the CHR, requested the CSC-CentralOffice to affirm the recommendation of the CSC-

Regional Office. CHREA stood its ground in saying that

the DBM is the only agency with appropriate authority

mandated by law to evaluate and approve matters of 

reclassification and upgrading, as well as creation of 

positions. The CSC-Central Of fice denied CHREA’s

request in a Resolution and reversed the

recommendation of the CSC-Regional Office that the

upgrading scheme be censured.

ISSUE: 

Whether or not the Commission on Human Rights

validly implement an upgrading, reclassification,

creation, and collapsing of plantilla positions in the

Commission without the prior approval of the

Department of Budget and Management?

HELD: 

CHREA grouses that the Court of Appeals and the

CSC-Central Office both erred in sanctioning the

CHR’s alleged blanket authority to upgrade, reclassify,

and create positions inasmuch as the approval of the

DBM relative to such scheme is still indispensable.

Petitioner bewails that the CSC and the Court of 

Appeals erroneously assumed that CHR enjoys fiscal

autonomy insofar as financial matters are concerned,

particularly with regard to the upgrading and

reclassification of positions therein. The CHR,

although admittedly a constitutional creation is,

nonetheless, not included in the genus of offices

accorded fiscal autonomy by constitutional or

legislative fiat.as the law’s designated body toimplement and administer a unified compensation

system, is beyond cavil. The interpretation of an

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administrative government agency, which is tasked to

implement a statute is accorded great respect and

ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. In

Energy Regulatory Board v. Court of Appeals,we

echoed the basic rule that the courts will not interfere

in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion

of government agencies entrusted with the regulation

of activities coming under the special technical

knowledge and training of such agencies.

Automotive industry workers v Romulo

Facts: Petitioners, composed of ten (10) labor unions,

call upon this Court to exercise its power of judicial

review to declare as unconstitutional an executive

order assailed to be in derogation of the constitutional

doctrine of separation of powers.

On 02 March 1989, Article 213 of the Labor Code

was expressly amended by Republic Act No. 6715

declaring that the NLRC was to be attached to the

DOLE for program and policy coordination only while

the administrative supervision over the NLRC, its

regional branches and personnel, was turned over to

the NLRC Chairman. The subject E.O. No. 185, in

authorizing the Secretary of Labor to exercise

administrative supervision over the NLRC, its regional

branches and personnel, allegedly reverted to the pre-

Rep. Act No. 6715 set-up, amending the latter law

which only Congress can do.

Issue: Rights and interests are allegedly violated and

prejudiced by Executive Order No. 185 dated 10 March

2003 whereby administrative supervision over the

National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), its

regional branches and all its personnel including the

executive labor arbiters and labor arbiters was

transferred from the NLRC Chairperson to the

Secretary of Labor and Employment.

Held: All things considered, whether or not E.O. No.

185 is indeed unconstitutional will have to await the

proper party in a proper case to assail its validity.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant

petition dated 27 March 2003 is hereby DISMISSED for

lack of merit.

Ratio: Petitioners have not shown that they have

sustained or are in danger of sustaining any personal

injury attributable to the enactment of E.O. No. 185.

As labor unions representing their members, it cannot

be said that E.O. No. 185 will prejudice their rights and

interests considering that the scope of the authorityconferred upon the Secretary of Labor does not extend

to the power to review, reverse, revise or modify the

decisions of the NLRC in the exercise of its quasi-

 judicial functions. 13 Thus, only NLRC personnel who

may find themselves the subject of the Secretary of 

Labor’s disciplinary authority, conferred by Section

1(d) of the subject executive order, may be said to

have a direct and specific interest in raising the

substantive issue herein.

The subject matter of E.O. No. 185 is the grant of 

authority by the President to the Secretary of Labor to

exercise administrative supervision over the NLRC, its

regional branches and all its personnel, including the

Executive Labor Arbiters and Labor Arbiters. Its

impact, sans the challenge to its constitutionality, is

thereby limited to the departments to which it is

addressed. Takingour cue from the early case of Olsen

v. Herstein and Rafferty, 18 the subject executive

order can be considered as nothing more or less than

a command from a superior to an inferior.