G.R. No. L-36610 June 18, 1976REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and DIRECTOR OF LANDS,petitioners,vs.HON. AMADO B. REYES, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch II, and ELISEO PALATINO,respondents.

FACTSOn September 6, 1972, the herein private respondent Eliseo Palatino filed with the respondent court an application for registration of title under the Land Registration Law, of a parcel of land situated in Bataan Province.

Notice of initial hearing was duly issued by the Commissioner of Land Registration.

However, respondent trial court issued an order of general default against all persons, including herein petitioner the Director of Lands, for the failure of anyone, including the said Director of Lands or his representative, to appear and oppose the application.

Consequently, notice of this order of general default was received by petitioners.

On January 5, 1973, respondent court issued its order granting the application for registration. Notice of the order was received by herein petitioners.

Petitioners filed with the trial court a motion to life order of general default and for reconsideration of the order on the ground that adjudicating the lot applied for by the applicant, respondent Palatino, is without basis in fact because the applicant could not have possessed the land applied for at least thirty years immediately preceding the application for the reason that the land was originally part of the United States Military Reservation reserved by the then Governor General under Proclamation No. 10 dated February 16, 1925 and it was only on June 10, 1967 that the President of the Philippines by Proclamation No. 210-B revoked Proclamation No. 10 and declared such portion of the area therein embraced including the land applied for, as are classified as alienable and disposable, opened for disposition under the provisions of the Public Land Act.

Trial court denied the petitioners' motion to lift the order of general default and for reconsideration of the order.

ISSUEWhether petitioners contention is tenable

RULINGThe Court had reviewed the records of this case and it is convinced that certain essential requisites of procedural law were not complied with by the herein petitioners. There was a failure to perfect an appeal and consequently this failure had the effect of rendering final and executory the judgment or final order of the trial court. This fact certainly deprives the appellate court, the Court, of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal. By actual reckoning of time, it will be seen that the period for filing and perfecting an appeal had been past overdue. Petitioners herein have procrastinated too long on their rights and on the duties imposed on them that the Court is now prevented from extending to them the relief they are now seeking. Through inexcusable neglect and laches, the Government lost its case Section 13 of the aforecited Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is crystal clear in its language and tenor: Where the notice of appeal, appeal bond or record on appeal is not filed within the period so prescribed, the appeal shall be dismissed.

The decision or final order granting the registration of the parcel of land applied for by herein private respondent Eliseo Palatino, having become final and executory, there now remains only the issuance of the decree and the certificate of title over the property. Thus, the Court declares, following its time-honored dictum: After a decision has become final, the prevailing party becomes entitled as a matter of right to its execution;that it becomes merely the ministerial duty of the court to issue the writ of execution.

Should petitioners duly establish by competent evidence these allegations, they may then raise the crucial question whether the private respondent and his predecessors-in-interest may be deemed to have validly and legally commenced occupation of the land and physically occupied the sameen concepto de dueofor thirty years or more to entitle them to registration under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act a question which cannot be resolved now in view of the finding that there is without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal since the decision or final order granting registrations has long become final and executory.

G.R. No. L-37682 March 29, 1974REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS,petitioner,vs.HON. PEDRO SAMSON ANIMAS, in his capacity as Judge of CFI South Cotabato, Branch I, General Santos City, ISAGANI DU TIMBOL and the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF GENERAL SANTOS CITY,respondent.

FACTSThe land covered by the free patent and title in question was originally applied for by Precila Soria, who transferred her rights to the land and its improvements to defendant Isagani Du Timbol. On December 12, 1969, free Patent No. V-466102 was issued by the President of the Philippines for the land in question, and on July 20, 1970, after transmittal of the patent to the Register of Deeds of General Santos City, Original Certificate of Title was issued in the name of defendant.

On August 5, 1971, the Republic of the Philippines, at the instance of the Bureau of Forestry, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato to declare subject free patent and OCT in the name of the defendant null and voidab initioand to order the reversion of the land in question to the mass of public domain on the ground that the land covered thereby is a forest or timber land which is not disposable under the Public Land Act. In the reclassification of the public lands in the vicinity where the land in question is situated made by the Bureau of Forestry on March 7, 1958, the said land was plotted on Bureau of Forestry map.

The application for free patent by defendant was filed on June 3, 1969, or more than eleven years thereafter, thus, alleging that said patent and title were obtained fraudulently as Du Timbol never occupied and cultivated the land applied for.

The respondent court dismissed the complaint on the ground that Certificate of Title based on the patent had became indefeasible in view of the lapse of the one-year period prescribed under Section 38 of the Land Registration Act for review of a decree of title on the ground of fraud.

ISSUEWhether the patent and title issued to Du Timbol is null and void.

RULINGYes. The area covered by the patent and title is not disposable public land, it being a part of the forest zone, hence the patent and title thereto are null and void.

The defense of indefeasibility of a certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent does not lie against the state in an action for reversion of the land covered thereby when such land is a part of a public forest or of a forest reservation. As a general rule, timber or forest lands are not alienable or disposable. Although the Director of Lands has jurisdiction over public lands classified as agricultural under the constitution, or alienable or disposable under the Public Land Act, and is charged with the administration of all laws relative thereto, mineral and timber lands are beyond his jurisdiction. It is the Bureau of Forestry that has jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, occupancy and use of all public forests and forest reservations and over the granting of licenses for the taking of products therefrom, including stone and earth.

The area in question is a forest or timber land, hence it is clearly established by the certification made by the Bureau of Forest Development that it is within the portion of the area which was reverted to the category of forest land and approved by the President.When the defendant Isagani Du Timbol filed his application for free patent over the land in question, the area in question was not a disposable or alienable public land but a public forest. Titles issued to private parties by the Bureau of Lands when the land covered thereby is not disposable public land but forest land are voidab initio.

The complaint alleges that applicant Isagani Du Timbol was never in possession of the property prior to his filing the application, contrary to the provisions of law that the applicant must have been in possession or cultivation thereof for at least 30 years. After diligent search of the Acting Chief of the Survey-Party, alleged circumstances are indicative of fraud in the filing of the application and obtaining title to the land, and if proven would override respondent Judge's order dismissing the case without hearing. The misrepresentations of the applicant that he had been occupying and cultivating the land and residing thereon are sufficient grounds to nullify the grant of the patent and title under the Public Land Law.

A certificate of title that is void may be ordered cancelled. A title will be considered void if it is procured through fraud, as when a person applies for registration of the land under his name although the property belongs to another.

G.R. No. L-9865 December 24, 1915VERGO D. TUFEXIS,plaintiff-appellant,vs.FRANCISCO OLAGUERA and THE MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF GUINOBATAN, represented by its president, Agapito Paulate,defendants-appellees.

FACTSIt was alleged that on September 30, 1911, plaintiff acquired at a public sale held in execution of a judgment rendered against Ricardo Pardo y Pujol, a piece of property situated in the municipality of Guinobatan, consisting of a frame building of strong materials with a galvanized-iron roof, erected on a parcel of land belonging to that municipality and intended for a public market. The plaintiff also acquired at the sale all the right, interest, title, and participation in the said property that appertained or might appertain to Pardo y Pujol. The said building was constructed by virtue of a concession granted by the former Spanish government to Ricardo Pardo y Cabaas, father of the judgment debtor.

On January 2, 1912, the said building was totally destroyed by an accidental fire. For several months thereafter the municipal council of Guinobatan negotiated with plaintiff for the purchase of his rights in the said concession but such could not be brought to a conclusion because the municipal council had allegedly acted deceitfully, fraudulently, and in bad faith for the sole purpose of beguiling, deceiving, and prejudicing plaintiff in order to prevent him from exercising his right to reconstruct the burned market building and utilize it in accordance with the terms of the said concession. The defendant municipal council with the other defendant, Francisco Olaguera, had authorized the latter to take possession of all the land and to occupy the same with booths or stores for the sale of groceries and other merchandise, for billiard tables, and other analogous.

The plaintiff proposed to construct another public market building on the same land, but that the defendants had prevented him from using the land and reconstructing thereon the said public market building, and refused to recognize plaintiff's right and to vacate the land that had been occupied by the burned edifice.

After filing a petition before the CFI of Albay, the provincial fiscal alleged as a ground for the demurrer that in no part of the instrument of concession did it appear that the privilege granted to the father of the judgment debtor had likewise been granted to his successors or assignees, and that therefore such rights and actions could not be conveyed to nor be acquired by any other person. It was alleged that the building was completely destroyed by fire and that if plaintiff's right to the possession of the land was conditioned by the existence thereon of the said market building, such right had terminated by the disappearance of the building.

ISSUEWhether a the subject building on land belonging to the municipality of Guinobatan which was intended for a public market, by virtue of a concession could be attached and sold for the payment of a certain debt owed by Ricardo Pardo y Pujol to a third person who had obtained a final judgment.

RULINGNo. The land on which the building was erected and which is referred to in the foregoing articles of the concession granted by the Government of the former sovereignty belongs to the municipality of Guinobatan. Although the building was constructed at the expense and with the money of the grantee, Ricardo Pardo y Cabaas, it is, nevertheless, the property of the state or of the said municipality, and was temporarily transferred to the grantee, Pardo y Cabaas, in order that he might enjoy the usufruct of its floor space for forty years, but on the termination of this period the said right of usufruct was to cease and the building was to belong finally and absolutely to the state or the municipality in representation thereof.

For these reasons, there is no question that the building and the land, on which it was erected, since they did not belong to the grantee, nor do they belong to his son and heir, Ricardo Pardo y Pujol, could not be attached or sold for the payment of a debt contracted by the latter. The concession granted by the former Spanish Government is personal and transferable only by inheritance, and in no manner could it be conveyed as a special personal privilege to another and a third person.Ricardo Pardo y Pujol is bound to pay his debts and his property can be attached on petition of his creditors. However, his personal privilege of usufruct in the floor space of the public market building of Guinobatan cannot be attached like any ordinary right, because that would mean that a person who has contracted with the state to furnish a service of a public character would be substituted, for another person who took no part in the contract, and that the regular course of a public service would be disturbed by the more or less legal action of the creditors of a grantee, to the prejudice of the state and the public interests.It is indeed true that the building erected out of the private funds of the grantee, however, judging from the agreement between him and the Government authorities, he was granted the right to usufruct in the floor space of the said building in order that, during the period of forty years, he might reimburse himself for and collect the value of the building constructed by him.

So, if neither the land nor the building in question belongs to Pardo y Pujol, it is evident that they could not be attached or sold at public auction to satisfy his debt and, consequently, the attachment and sale of the said Government property executed on petition of the creditor of the said Pardo y Pujol are notoriously illegal, null and void, and the acquisition of the property by plaintiff confers upon him no right whatever based on the said concession.The usufruct of the floor space of the public market of Guinobatan, granted to Ricardo Pardo y Pujol's father was not subject to attachment on account of its being of a public character. The only right to which the creditor was entitled was to petition for the attachment of the income and proceeds obtained from the use of the floor space of the market, but he did not avail himself of this right. Therefore, the order of dismissal appealed is in accordance with law and the merits of the case.G.R. No. L-6098 August 12, 1911THE INSULAR GOVERNMENT,plaintiff-appellee,vs.ALDECOA AND COMPANY,defendant-appellant.

FACTSThe Attorney-General filed a written complaint in the CFI of Surigao against the firm of Aldecoa & Co., alleging that the defendant, a mercantile copartnership company with a branch office in Surigao, continues to operate as such mercantile copartnership company under the name of Aldecoa & Co.,; that the said defendant, knowing that it had no title or right whatever to two adjoining parcels of land has been occupying them illegally for the past seventeen years, more or less, having constructed on the land a wharf, located along the railroad, and built warehouses of light material for the storage of coal all for its exclusive use and benefit. These lands, situated in Surigao, belonged to the late Spanish Government in the Philippines and are now the property of the Government of the United States and were placed under the control of the Insular Government

Since the year 1901, the defendant has been requested repeatedly by the Attorney-General, in representation of the Insular Government, to recognize the latter's right of dominion over the same and to deliver to it the said property, and that, by reason of such demands, Aldecoa & Co. agreed to return the land, but that later, after several delays, it concluded by persisting in its attempt illegally to continue occupying the said land and refused to return it to the Insular Government.

The defendant alleged that it held and possessed, as owner, and had full and absolute dominion over, the lands claimed by the plaintiff.

CFI rendered judgment and found that the land in question was public land and belonged to the State, and ordered the defendant to return it to the plaintiff.

ISSUEWhether the subject lands as claimed by the defendant is a part of the public dominion.

RULINGYes. It is incontrovertible that the land in question is of the public domain and belongs to the State, inasmuch as at the present time it is partly shore land and in part, was such formerly, and now is land formed by the action of the sea.On the supposition that Aldecoa & Co. commenced to occupy the land and shore herein concerned, prior to the enforcement of the Civil Code in these Islands, it is unquestionable that the issue must be determined in accordance with the provisions of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866, inasmuch as the shores, as well as the lands united thereto by the accretions and alluvium deposits produced by the action of the sea, are of the public use and domain.All this said land, together with the adjacent shore, belongs to the public domain and is intended for public uses. Thus, the defendant, in construction on the two aforementioned parcels of land a retaining wall, a pier or wharf, a railway, and warehouses for the storage of coal, for its exclusive use and benefit, did all this without due and competent authority and has been illegally occupying the land since 1901.

Aldecoa & Co. endeavored to prove that the land, consisting of the two united parcels, belonged to them in fee simple, on account of their having begun to occupy it through a verbal permit from the then politico-military governor of Surigao. The said permit was a verbal authorization to occupy the land on condition that the defendant should later on prepare title deeds thereto, and that this authorization was granted for the purpose of furnishing facilities to, and benefiting the merchants of Surigao, in view of the backward condition of things in those regions at the time. It is certain, however, that Aldecoa & Co. did not obtain or solicit permission from the Government to establish themselves there and erect thereon their buildings and works, nor did they endeavor to obtain any title of ownership to the said land.

Defendant has not proven that it obtained for itself, in conformity with the provisions of the said Law of Waters.

The Civil Code, which went into effect in these Islands on December 7, 1889, confirms the provisions of the said Law of Waters. The shores and the lands reclaimed from the sea, while they continue to be devoted to public uses and no grant whatever has been made of any portion of them to private persons, remain a part of the public domain and are for public uses, and, until they are converted into patrimonial property of the State. Inasmuch as, being dedicated to the public uses, they are not subject of commerce among men, in accordance with the provision of the Civil Code.The record does not disclose that Aldecoa & Co. had obtained from the Spanish Government of the Philippines the requisite authorization legally to occupy the said two parcels of land of which they now claim to be the owners. Wherefore, the occupation or possession which the allege they hold is a mere detainer that can merit from the law no protection such as is afforded only to the person legally in possession.