HEIRS OF JOSE OLVIGA VS CA

FACTS: Angelita Glor and her children filed for reconveyance of a parcel of land with the RTC of Caluag, Quezon against the heirs of Jose Olviga. The RTC ruled in favor of the Glors which led to the Olvigas to appeal with the CA arguing that the action for reconveyance has already prescribed and that they were purchasers in good faith. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. A summary of events follows because it is much easier that way: 1950 - Lot in question was still forestland when Eutiquio Pureza and his father cultivated it by introducing fruit bearing trees such as coconuts, jackfruits, mangoes, avocado and bananas. 1956 – The Bureau of Lands surveyed the land in the name of Pureza but Godofredo Olviga, a son of Jose Olviga, protested and claims that they’re entitled to 1⁄2 of the lot. 1960 – Pureza filed for homestead application over the lot. 1961 – Pureza transferred his rights to Cornelio Glor, the husband of Angelita. Neither the homestead application nor the transfer was acted upon by the Director of Lands for unknown reasons. 1967 – Jose Olviga obtained a registered title for said lot in a cadastral proceeding, in fraud of the rights of Pureza and his transferee, Cornelio Glor and family. The lot was split and transferred to the Olilas. 1988 – Glors learned of the Olvigas titleApril 10, 1989 – The Glors filed an action for reconveyance

ISSUE: W/N the action for reconveyance has already prescribed?

Held: NO. The SC has ruled in a number of cases that action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed of the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property. However such rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. If a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to property doesn’t prescribe. In the case at bar, the Glors were in actual possession since 1950 hence their undisturbed possession gave them the continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the nature of the claim of the Olvigas who, upon their discovery in 1988 of the adverse title, disturbed their possession. Added factual note: What must’ve happened was that the Glors were not notified of the registration proceedings with Angelita testifying that there’s been neither notice nor posting. Jose Olvigas falsely ommitted the fact that other persons were in possession of the land he sought to be registered.

PINGOL VS CA

FACTS:In 1969, Pingol, the owner of a lot (Lot No. 3223) in Caloocan City, executed a DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF OF AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF [his] PARCEL OF LAND in favor of Donasco (private respondent), payable in 6 years.

In 1984, Donasco died and was only able to pay P8,369 plus P2,000 downpayment, leaving a balance of P10,161. The heirs of Donasco remained in possession of such lot and offered to settle the balance with Pingol. However, Pingol refused to accept the offer and demanded a larger amount. Thus, the heirs of Donasco filed an action for specific performance (with Prayer for Writ of Prelim. Injunction, because Pingol were encroaching upon Donasco’s lot). Pingol averred that the sale and transfer of title was conditional upon the full payment of Donasco (contract to sell, not contract of sale). With Donasco’s breach of the contract in 1976 and death in 1984, the sale was deemed cancelled, and the heirs’ continuous occupancy was only being tolerated by Pingol.

ISSUE: WON the action filed by the heirs of Donasco has prescribed.

HELD: NO. Although the complaint filed by the Donascos was an action for specific performance, it was actually an action to quiet title.Under the law, there are six requisites to be complied with in an action to quiet title. In the case at bar, all the requisites are present. First, the heirs of Donasco have an equitable title on the said property because of the transfer of ownership to Francisco, their father, by Vicente. Second, there exists a cloud in the heirs’ title because the TCT of the property was still registered in the name of Vicente Pingol.Third, the cloud exists by reason of Vicente’s TCT.Fourth and fifth, Vicente’s TCT is valid in its face however in truth and in fact it is ineffective because the ½ portion of Vicente’s property was already sold to Francisco.Sixth, it is prejudicial to the heirs because the strength of Vicente’s title is stronger than the heirs and the latter may be ejected by Vicente.

TITONG VS CA

The case originated from an action for quieting of title filed by petitioner Mario Titong. The Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 44 ruled in of private respondents, Victorico Laurio and Angeles Laurio, adjudging them the true and lawful owners of the disputed land. Affirmed on appeal to the Court, of Appeals, petitioner comes to us for a favorable reversal. Petitioner alleges that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with an area of 3.2800 hectares, more or less, surveyed as Lot No. 3918, and declared for taxation purposes in his name. He claims that on three separate occasions in September 1983, private respondents, with their hired laborers, forcibly entered a portion of the land containing an area of approximately two (2) hectares; and began plowing the same under pretext of ownership. Private respondents denied this allegation, and averred that the disputed property formed part of the 5.5-hectare agricultural land which they had purchased from their predecessor-in- interest, Pablo Espinosa on August 10, 1981.

Under A476, a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owner’s title to or interest in real property. The ground or reason for filing a complaint for quieting of title must therefore be “an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding.” Under the maxim expresio mius est exclusio alterius, these grounds are exclusive so that other reasons outside of the purview of these reasons may not be considered valid for the same action.

SPS PORTIC VS CRISTOBAL

In 1968, spouses Portic acquired a parcel of land with a 3 door apartment from Sps. Alcantara even though they’re aware that the land was mortgaged to the SSS. Portic defaulted in paying SSS. The Portics then executed a contract with Cristobal and the latter agreed to buy the said property for P200k. Cristobal’s down payment was P45k and she also agreed to pay SSS. The contract between them states:That while the balance of P155,000.00 has not yet been fully paid the FIRST PARTY OWNERS shall retain the ownership of the above described parcel of land together with its improvements but the SECOND PARTY BUYER shall have the right to collect the monthly rentals due on the first door (13-A) of the said apartment; (payment is due 22 May 1985, if Cristobal will not be able to pay Portic will reimburse)A transfer certificate was executed in favor of Cristobal. Cristobal was not able to pay on the due date. A suit ensued to lift the cloud on the title.

Suits to quiet title are characterized as proceedings quasi in rem. Technically, they are neither in rem nor in personam. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant. However, unlike suits in rem, a quasi in rem judgment is conclusive only between the parties.

PARDELL VS BARTOLOME

Case among co-owners, used to be three, but the survivor were strongest were two women, male did not survive. He died. They were quarrelling over their inheritance, among which is a house, in the same heritage city or village part of vigan. See how a house owned in common was to be used. One sister was asking for accounting of fruits of the house.

Each co-owner or tenant in common of undivided realty has the same rights therein as the others; he may use and enjoy the same without other limitation except that he must not prejudice the rights of his co-owners, but until a division is effected, the respective parts belonging to each cannot be determined; each co-owner exercises joint dominion and is entitled to joint use. For the use and enjoyment of a particular portion of the lower part of a house, not used as living quarters, a co-owner must, in strict justice, pay rent, in like manner as other people pay for similar space in the house; he has no right to the free use and enjoyment of such space which, if rented to a third party, would produce income.

Until a cause instituted to determine the liability of the rest of the co-owners for repairs and improvements made by one of their number is finally decided and the amount due is fixed, the persons alleged to be liable cannot be considered in default as to interest, because interest is only due from the date of the decision fixing the principal liability.

BASA VS AGUILAR

FACTS: Petitioners are owners co-pro-indiviso of a (1/2 of an undivided) parcel of land located in Barrio San Mateo, Arayat, Pampanga; whereas, respondents were the owners of the other undivided half of the same land. Genaro Puyat, with the marital consent of Brigida Mesina, sold his ONE-HALF (1/2) share of the parcel of land in question in favor of private respondents Primo Tiongson and Macaria Puyat. Primo. Seven (7) days later after the sale, petitioners filed a case praying that they be allowed to exercise the right of redemption for the sale under Article 1620 of the Civil Code.

RTC: dismissed the case. It ruled that the petitioners are not entitled to exercise the right of redemption under Article 1620 of the Civil Code, stating that there is nothing repugnant for parents to sell to their children. It could not have been intended by the framers of the Civil Code to include within the purview of the term 'third person' the children of a co-owner of a thing. For after all, these children have an inchoate right to succession to the same property. To hold otherwise, is to stretch the meaning of the law into ludicrious (sic) situations.

The logic of His Honor, the trial judge, carries more sentiment than law. It disregards the express letter of the law invoked by the petitioners and ignores the philosophy of the same. Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they may only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing owned in common.

ISSUE: W/N petitioners may validly exercise their right of redemption

HELD: Yes. Legal redemption is in the nature of a privilege created by law partly for reasons of public policy and partly for the benefit and convenience of the redemptioner, to afford him a way out of what might be a disagreeable or inconvenient association into which he has been thrust. It is intended to minimized co-ownership. The law grants a co-owner the exercise of the said right of redemption when the shares of the of her owners are sold to "a third person." A third person, within the meaning of this Article, is anyone who is not a co-owner.

Private respondent Primo Tiongson is definitely not a co-owner of the land in question. He is not even an heir of private respondents Genaro Puyat and Brigida Mesina, nor included in the "family relations" of the said spouses.

To deny to the petitioners the right of redemption recognized in Article 1620 of the Civil Code is to defeat the purpose of minimizing co-ownership and to contravene the public policy in this regard. Moreover, it would result in disallowing the petitioners a way out of what, in the words of Manresa, " might be a disagreeable or inconvenient association into which they have been thrust."

SPS DEL CAMPO VS ABESIA

DOCTRINE: When land is co-owned by two parties, but the co-ownership is terminated, Article 448 governs in case real property (like a house) encroaches the land of another. This is provided that good faith exists.

FACTS: This case involves a parcel of land of only about 45 square meters, situated IN Cebu City. An action for partition was filed by plaintiffs in the CFI of Cebu. Plaintiffs and defendants are co-owners pro indiviso of this lot in the proportion of and 1/3 share each, respectively. The trial court appointed a commissioner in accordance with the agreement of the parties. The commissioner conducted a survey, prepared a sketch plan and submitted a report to the trial court, recommending that the property be divided into two lots: Lot 1161-A with an area of 30 square meters for plaintiffs and Lot No. 1161-B with an area of 15 square meters for the defendants. The houses of plaintiffs and defendants were surveyed and shown on the sketch plan. The house of defendants occupied the portion with an area of 5 square meters of Lot 1161-A of plaintiffs. The parties manifested their conformity to the report and asked the trial court to finally settle and adjudicate who among the parties should take possession of the 5 square meters of the land in question.

ISSUE: Whether or Not Article 448 of the Civil Code is applicable to a builder in good faith when the property involved is owned in common?

HELD: When the co-ownership is terminated by the partition and it appears that the house of defendants overlaps or occupies a portion of 5 square meters of the land pertaining to plaintiffs, which the defendants obviously built in good faith, then the provisions of Article 448 of the new Civil Code should apply. 

Applying the aforesaid provision of the Civil Code, the plaintiffs have the right to appropriate said portion of the house of defendants upon payment of indemnity to defendants as provided for in Article 546 of the Civil Code.

DELIA BAILON-CASILAO VS CA

The fate of petitioners' claim over a parcel of land rests ultimately on a determination of whether or not said petitioners are chargeable with such laches as may effectively bar their present action.

There is a parcel of land in the names of the Bailons (Rosalia, Gaudencio, Sabina Bernabe, Nenita and Delia) as co-owners, each with a 1/6 share.

o Gaudencio and Nenita are now dead, (Nenita being represented in this case by her children)

o Bernabe went to China and had not been heard from since It appears that Rosalia and Gaudencio sold a portion of the land to Donato

Delgado. Rosalia alone, then sold the remainder of the land to Ponciana Aresgado de

Lanuza. o On the same date, Lanuza acquired from Delgado land which the

Delgado had earlier acquired from Rosalia and Gaudencio. Husband John Lanuza, acting under a special power of attorney given by his

wife, Ponciana, sold the two parcels of land to Celestino Afable, Sr. In all these transfers, it was stated in the deeds of sale that the land was not

registered under the provisions of Act No. 496 when the fact is that it is. o It appears that the land had been successively declared for taxation

first, in the name of Ciriaca Dellamas, mother of the co-owners, then in the name of Rosalia Bailon, then in that of Donato Delgado, then in Ponciana de Lanuza's name, and finally in the name of Celestino Afable, Sr.

The petitioners in this case, the Bailons, filed a case for recovery of property against Celestino Afable.

In his answer, Afable claimed that he had acquired the land in question through prescription and said that the Bailons are guilty of laches.

LC declared Afable co-owner because he validly bought 2/6 of the land (the shares of Rosalia and Gaudencio)

CA affirmed. Prescription does not apply against the Bailons because they are co-owners of the original sellers. But, an action to recover may be barred by laches.

o CA held the Bailons guilty of laches and dismissed their complaint

Issue: Applicability of the doctrine of laches

Ratio: Initially, a determination of the effect of a sale by one or more co-owners of

the entire property held in common without the consent of all the co-owners and of the appropriate remedy of the aggrieved co-owners is required.

The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in NCC 493:

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the acts and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership

SC has already ruled in other cases that even if a co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale

o By virtue of the sales made by Rosalia and Gaudencio, which are valid with respect to their proportionate shares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale to private respondent Celestino Afable, Afable thereby became a co-owner of the disputed parcel of land

Since a co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void.

o However, only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the buyer a co-owner of the property.

Re: Proper action The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for

the recovery of possession but the division of the common property Neither recovery of possession nor restitution can be granted since the

buyers are legitimate possessors in joint ownership of the common property claimed

Re: Prescription Here, prescription cannot be invoked. Pursuant to NCC 494, no co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-

ownership. Such co-owner may demand at anytime the partition of the thing owned in common, insofar as his share is concerned.

In Budiong v. Bondoc , SC has interpreted that provision to mean that the action for partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by prescription. For NCC 494 explicitly declares: No prescription shall lie in favor of a co-owner or co- heir so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership.

Also, the disputed parcel of land being registered under the Torrens System, the express provision of Act No. 496 that “no title to registered land in derogation to that of the registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession” is applicable.

Prescription will not lie in favor of Afable as against the Bailons who remain the registered owners of the parcel of land.

Re: Argument of Bailons that as to the children who represent their deceased mother, Nenita, prescription lies

It is argued, that as to the children who are not the registered co-owners but merely represent their deceased mother, prescription lies. (citing Pasion v. Pasion: "the imprescriptibility of a Torrens title can only be invoked by the person in whose name the title is registered" and that 'one who is not the registered owner of a parcel of land cannot invoke imprescriptibility of action to claim.'

Reliance on the previous case is wrong. o The ruling there applies only against transferees other than direct

issues or heirs or to complete strangers. The reason for that is: if prescription is unavailing against the registered owner, it must be equally unavailing against the owner’s hereditary successors, because they merely step into the shoes of the decedent

Re: Laches Laches is also unavailing as a shield against the action of petitioners Bailon.

o There are 4 basic elements of laches 1) Conduct on the part of the defendant or of one under whom he

claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and for which the complainant seeks a remedy;

2) Delay in asserting the corporations complainant's rights, the complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity to institute suit;

3) Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and,

4) Injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred

o First and last elements are present. o Second and third elements are missing.

The second element speaks of delay in asserting the complainant's rights. o However, the mere fact of delay is insufficient to constitute, laches. o It is required that (1) complainant must have had knowledge of the

conduct of defendant or of one under whom he claims and (2) he must have been afforded an opportunity to institute suit.

o This court has pointed out that laches is not concerned with the mere lapse of time.

Laches is defined as the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

o The doctrine of "laches" or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which requires for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and unlike the statute of limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of inequity or unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

While there was delay in asserting the Bailon’s rights, such delay was not attended with any knowledge of the sale nor with any opportunity to bring a suit.

o In the first place, the Bailons had no notice of the sale made by their eldest sister.

o In the second place, they were not afforded an opportunity to bring suit because they were kept in the dark about the transactions entered into by their sister. It was only when Delia returned that she found out about the sales and immediately, she and her siblings filed the present action for recovery of property.

The third element of laches is absent. o There was no lack of knowledge o It is actually Afable who is guilty of bad faith in purchasing the

property as he knew that the property was co-owned by six persons and yet, there were only two signatories to the deeds of sale and no special authorization to self was granted to the two sellers by the other co-owners.

A person dealing with a registered land has a right to rely upon the face of the Torrens certificate of title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautions man to make such inquiry.

Also, petitioners Bailon are relatives of his wife. As a gesture of good faith, he should have contacted the Bailons who were still listed as co-owners in the certificate of title which was already in his possession even before the sale.

o In failing to exercise even a minimum degree of ordinary prudence, he is deemed to have bought the lot at his own risk.

o Hence any prejudice or injury that may be occasioned to him by such sale must be borne by him.

Decision set aside

OLIVERAS VS LOPEZ

FACTS:This case exemplifies the Filipino custom of keeping inherited property in a prolonged juridical condition of co-owner ship.

Lopez owned Lot 4685 of the Cadastral survey of Villasis, Pangasinan as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 15262. Upon death of Lopez, he left the said property to his wife and six children. Said heirs did not initiate any move to legally partition the property.

More than twenty-one years later, Tomasa Ramos and her eldest son, Candido Lopez, executed a deed of absolute sale of the lot in favor of the spouses Melecio Oliveras and Aniceta Minor. On the same day, they again executed a deed of absolute sale for the same lot in favor of the spouses Pedro Oliveras and Teodora Gaspar. Each of the said documents bear the thumbmark of Tomasa and the signature of Candido.

In his affidavit, Candido stated that a month prior to the execution of the deed of sale in favor of Melecio Oliveras, he offered his: "undivided portion" of Lot 4685 to his "adjacent owners" but none of them was "in a position to purchase" said property.

Since the execution of the two deeds of absolute sale, the vendees, brothers Melecio and Pedro, had been paying the real property taxes for their respectively purchased properties. They also had been in possession of their purchased properties which, being planted to palay and peanuts.

More than thirteen years later, the counsel of the Oliveras brothers wrote the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez reminding them of the Oliverases' demands to partition the property so that they could acquire their respective titles thereto without resorting to court action, and that, should they fail to respond, he would be forced to file a case in court.

RTC: explored the possibility of an amicable settlement between the parties without success. Hence, it set the case for trial and thereafter, it rendered a decision declaring valid the deeds of absolute sale and ordering the defendants to allow the segregation of the sold portions of Lot 4685 by a licensed surveyor in order that the plaintiffs could obtain their respective certificates of title over their portions of said lot.

In resolving the case, the lower court passed upon the issue of whether the two deeds of absolute sale were what they purported to be or merely mortgage documents.

On the issue of whether the two deeds of absolute sale were null and void considering that the land subject thereof had not yet been partitioned, the court observed that the total area of 8,514 square meters sold to plaintiffs by Candido was less than his share should Lot 4685 with an area of 69,687 square meters be divided among the six children of Lorenzo Lopez and their mother. In this connection, the lower court also found that during his lifetime, and before Candido got married, Lorenzo Lopez had divided Lot 4685 among his children who then took possession of their respective shares.

ISSUE: W/N THE TWO DEEDS OF ABSOLUTE SALE IS VALID

HELD: Yes.

The extrinsic validity of the two deeds of absolute sale is not in issue in this case in view of the finding of the trial court that the defendants admittedly do not question their due execution. What should pre-occupy the Court is the intrinsic validity of said deeds insofar as they pertain to sales of designated portions of an undivided, co-owned property.

In a long line of decisions, this Court has held that before the partition of a land or thing held in common, no individual co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All that the co-owner has is an Ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.

However, the duration of the juridical condition of co-ownership is not limitless. Under Article 494 and 1083 of the Civil Code, co-ownership of an estate should not exceed the period of twenty (20) years.

Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the in division of a property for more than twenty years, it would be contrary to public policy to sanction co-ownership beyond the period set by the law. Otherwise, the 20-year limitation expressly mandated by the Civil Code would be rendered meaningless.

In the instant case, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez maintained the co-ownership for more than twenty years. We hold that when Candido and his mother sold definite portions of Lot 4685, they validly exercised dominion over them because, by operation of law, the co-ownership had ceased. The filing of the complaint for partition by the Oliverases are legally considered as subrogated to the rights of Candido over portions of Lot 4685 in their possession, merely served to put a stamp of formality on Candido's otherwise accomplished act of terminating the co-ownership.

The action for partition has not prescribed. Although the complaint was filed thirteen years from the execution of the deeds of sale. Article 494 specifically mandates that each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common insofar as his share is concerned. Hence, considering the validity of the conveyances

of portions of Lot 4685 in their favor and as subrogees of Candido Lopez, the Oliverases' action for partition was timely and properly filed.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court insofar as it declares the validity of the two deeds of sale and directs the partition of Lot 4685, is AFFIRMED. The lower court is hereby ordered to facilitate with dispatch the preparation of a project of partition which it should thereafter approve. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.SO ORDERED.

TAGARAO VS GARCIA

Facts: Petitioners are the grandchildren of defendant Garcia’s brother. The land is a 31-ha land bought by Ventura and Marcos Garcia (defendant). Ventura has two children: Merced and Claro. Plaintiffs are the children of Merced.Plaintiffs’ parents died in 1914. This action for delivery of ¼ of the land was brought in 1928. Their ages were: Resurrecion 24, Serafin 23, Buenaventura 18.After the death of his brother Merced, Marcos claimed the land in a cadastral case and alleged that he purchased it in 1904 with his 2nd wife Tabifranca. To prevent Claro from frustrating his plans, Marcos promised him a 4-ha w/c he obtained in 1927.The certificate was issue in 1918 and stated that Marcos and Tabifranca each owned ½. In 1921, Tabifranca sold the ½ to her step daughter and step granddaughter apparently to avoid her son from a previous marriage from inheriting it.Meanwhile, Tagarao learned of her uncle Claro’s obtaining of the 4-ha share w/c prompted her to also claim. Marcos promised to give her her share but instead he sold his ½ to the brother of his son-in-law.The RTC ordered delivery of the ¼ and annulled the sales.

Issue: W/N sale valid. W/N plaintiffs entitled to relief.

Held: Void. Resurrecion not entitled.

1. Sale by Tabiifranca is fictitious. She knew she was not entitled to the land as her spouse has acquired it before their marriage. The price is disproportionate to the value. The buyers are in no financial position as they are minors.

Sale by Marcos fictitious. Buyer is in no financial position-only as retailer of tuba and fresh fish. This was alleged to be a mortgage. Interest was not paid.

2. The 3-year exception under Sec. 42 of Art. 190 not yet elapsed. But Resurrecion is already 24 and the 3-year period has prescribed.o Tagarao cites Velasquez vs. Teodoro w/c held that where defendants’

interests are joint and inseparable, the others’ right is saved by the disability of another, although the former is not disabled. But SC said that case is N/A because she can dispose of her ownership in common w/o the consent of co-owners.

o Every co-owner is the absolute owner of his part although the effect of disposal is limited to his share upon partition. Any of the co-owners also has a right to partition.

o The statute of limitations protects the diligent and vigilant, not the person who sleeps on his right.

o She did nothing to protect her rights in 1915 (death of mother). After this, Marcos’ possession was in concept of an owner w/c ripened after 10 years of continued possession

Dispositive: Only 2/12 ordered transferred.

RIVERA V. PEOPLES BANK AND TRUST CO.

FACTS:

The question raised in this appeal is the validity of the survivorship agreement made by and between Edgar Stephenson, now deceased, and Ana Rivera, appellant herein, which read as follows:

SURVIVORSHIP AGREEMENTKnow All Men by These Presents:That we hereby agree with each other and with the PEOPLES BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, Manila, Philippine Islands (hereinafter called the Bank), that all moneys now or hereafter deposited by us or either of us with the Bank in our savings account shall be deposited in and received by the Bank with the understanding and upon the condition that said money be deposited without consideration of its previous ownership, and that said money and all interest thereon, if any there be, shall be the property of both of us joint tenants, and shall be payable to and collectible by either of us during our joint lives, and after the death of one of us shall belong to and be the sole property of the survivor, and shall be payable to and collectible by such survivor.And we further covenant and agree with each other and the Bank, its successors or assigns, that the receipt or check of either of us during our joint lives, or the receipt or check of the survivor, for any payment made from this account, and shall be valid and sufficient and discharge to the Bank for such payment.The Bank is hereby authorized to accept and deposit to this account all checks made payable to either or both of us, when endorsed by either or both of us or one for the other.This is a joint and several agreement and is binding upon each of us, our heirs, executors, administrators, and assigns.

Ana Rivera was employed by Edgar Stephenson as housekeeper from the year 1920 until his death on June 8, 1939. On December 24, Stephenson opened an account in his name with the defendant Peoples Bank by depositing therein the sum of P1,000. On October 17, 1931, when there was a balance of P2,072 in said account, the survivorship agreement in question was executed and the said account was transferred to the name of "Edgar Stephenson and/or Ana Rivera." At the time of Stephenson's death Ana Rivera held the deposit book, and there was a balance in said account of P701. 43, which Ana Rivera claimed but which the bank refused to pay to her upon advice of its attorneys who gave the opinion that the survivorship agreement was of doubtful validity. Thereupon Ana Rivera instituted the present action against the bank, and Minnie Stephenson, administratix of the estate of the deceased, intervened and claimed the amount for the estate, alleging that the money deposited in said account was and is the exclusive property of the deceased.

The trial court held that the agreement in question was a mere power of attorney authorizing Ana Rivera to withdraw the deposit, which power terminated upon the death of the principal, Edgar Stephenson; but that, viewed from its effect after the death of either of the parties, the agreement was a donation mortis causa with reference to the balance remaining at the death of one of them, which, not having been executed with the formalities of a testamentary disposition as required by article 620 of the Civil Code, was of no legal effect.

ISSUE: WoN the survivorship agreement was a mere power of attorney

HELD:

NO. We find no basis for the conclusion that the survivorship agreement was a mere power of attorney from Stephenson to Ana Rivera, or that it is a gift mortis causa of the bank account in question from him to her. Such conclusion is evidently predicated on the assumption that Stephenson was the exclusive owner of the funds deposited in the bank, which assumption was in turn based on the facts (1) that the account was originally opened in the name of Stephenson alone and (2) that Ana Rivera "served only as housemaid of the deceased." But it not infrequently happens that a person deposits money in the bank in the name of another; and in the instant case it also appears that Ana Rivera served her master for about nineteen years without actually receiving her salary from him. The fact that subsequently Stephenson transferred the account to the name of himself and/or Ana Rivera and executed with the latter the survivorship agreement in question although there was no relation of kinship between them but only that of master and servant, nullifies the assumption that Stephenson was the exclusive owner of the bank account. In the absence, then, of clear proof of the contrary, we must give full faith and credit to the certificate of deposit, which recites in effect that the funds in question belonged to Edgar Stephenson and Ana Rivera; that they were joint owners thereof; and that either of them could withdraw any part or the whole of said account during the lifetime of both, and the balance, if any, upon the death of either, belonged to the survivor.

Is the survivorship agreement valid? Prima facie, we think it is valid. It is an aleatory contract supported by law a lawful consideration — the mutual agreement of the joint depositors permitting either of them to withdraw the whole deposit during their lifetime, and transferring the balance to the survivor upon the death of one of them. The trial court said that the Civil Code "contains no provisions sanctioning such an agreement" We think it is covered by article 1790 of the Civil Code, which provides as follows:ART. 1790. By an aleatory contract one of the parties binds himself, or both reciprocally bind themselves, to give or to do something as an equivalent for that which the other party is to give or do in case of the occurrence of an event which is uncertain or will happen at an indeterminate time.(See also article 1255.)

GATCHALIAN V. CIR

15 individuals made contributions to purchase a sweepstakes ticket registered in

Gatchalian’s name. the ticket won 3rd prize. G was then required to file the corresponding ITR covering the prize. They failed to pay. CIR issued a warrant of distraint and levy, to avoid embarrassment the 15 paid under protest. This happened

a 2nd time for the balance. The 15 then demanded refund.

If the plaintiff formed a partnership, they are liable for the payment of the IT; whereas of there was merely a community of property, they are exempt. According to the facts, the plaintiffs organized a partnership fo civil nature because each of them put up money to buy a sweepstakes ticket for the sole purpose of dividing equally the prize which they may win.

MELENCIO V. DY TIAO LAY

After the death of the owner of land in Q, his widow and 3 of his children executed a contract of lease of the land in favor of the predecessor-in- interest of DTL. The term was for 20 years, extendible for a like period at lessee’s option. Further stipulated that at the termination of the original period or its extension, lessors might purchase all the buildings on the land at a price to be fixed by experts, but if the lessors should fail to do that, the lease would continue for another 20.

The lease contract was not signed by 2 of the co-heirs. In 1920, the heirs made an EJ partition of the inheritance, and among other things, the land here in Q fell to the share of plaintiffs.

The co-heirs that didn’t sign the lease contract brought this action to recover possession.

In this case only a small majority of the co-owners executed the lease here in Q.

LAVADIA V. COSME DE MENDOZA

6 pious women (A, B, C, D, E, F) bought jewelry from the Image of Our Lady of Guadalupe. D had initial custody, then E, then the various descendants of E, and finally C. C wanted to make the Bishop of Lipa custodian, the plaintiffs (F and the heirs of A, B, C) objected and designated F as the custodian thereof.

TC: inasmuch as the plaintiff are the owners of 4/6 parts pro indiviso of the jewels, and defendants (heirs of D & E), only 2/6, they have the right to determine who should be entrusted with the custody.

Plaintiffs have such right. With the amount of individual contribution undetermined, the law presumes that all of them contributed proportionately. Simple majority rule.

TUASON V. TUASON, JR.

Angela, Nieves and Antonio co-owned a parcel of land. They entered into a MoA that no CO shall sell, alienate, or dispose of his co-ownership without first giving preference to the other CO. Angela asked that the contract be rescinded and the property be partitioned stating the at MoA is void

T he MoA, far from violating the legal prohibition that forbids a CO from being obliged to remain a party to the community, precisely has for its purpose and object the dissolution of CO and of the community by selling the parcel held in common and dividing the proceeds among the CO. the obligation imposed in the MoA to preserve the CO until all lots shall have been sold is a mere incident to the main object.

MARIANO V. CA

Gosengfiao owned a parcel of land. During his lifetime, he obtained a loan secured by a REM over the land. Upon his death, he was survived by his wife and children. The loan was unpaid and thus, the REM was foreclosed. The land was redeemed by the mother and later sold the same, together with the other children. Grace knew of the sale and sought annulment of the sale.

1. The right to redeem is not lost in the absence of any written notice of the sale by the vendors. The 30-day period has not begin to run.2. The redemption of a co-owner inures to the benefit of all co-owners.

ARCELONA V. CA

Doctrine:SC stressed that when the IAC and the SC affirmed the RTC decision, theywere not given the occasion to rule on the issue of the TC’s jurisdiction over thepersons of the indispensable parties as they are limited by the issues raised beforethem. Thus substantial justice requires that SC be allowed to nullify the RTC decisionfor lack of jurisdiction even if previously affirmed by them.

FACTS: Petitioners are co-owners pro-indiviso of a fishpond which they inherited

from their deceased parents. 6 siblings are co-owners some of which live abroad (3 in the Philippines and 3 abroad).

A lease contract was executed over the fishpond between Tandoc and Olanday (siblings in the Philippines). Upon termination of the lease, the premises were surrendered to Olanday by the caretaker of the lessee.

Three days after, respondent Farnacio instituted a case for peaceful possession against Olanday intended to maintain himself as tenant of the fishpond.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of Farnacio. Olanday then elevated the decision to the IAC which affirmed with

modification the RTC decision. On appeal, the SC sustained the IAC decision after remand of the case to

the court of origin, private respondent was placed in possession of the entire property.

Petitioners filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment against private respondent and the implementing sheriff.

Dissatisfied with the CA resolution, a petition for review was filed with the SC.

Note: the 3 Arcelona sisters who were abroad were not impleaded as indispensable parties, only the other sisters (Olanday) were impleaded.

ISSUES:(1) May a final judgment be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction (overthe subject matter and/or over the person of indispensable parties) anddenial of due process, aside from extrinsic fraud?-YES

(2) May extraneous matters, not found in the records of the original case, beused in voiding or defending the validity of such final judgment?-NO(3) Will an independent action for annulment of the decision of the regionaltrial court (which was affirmed both by the CA and the SC) filed before theCA prosper, or is intervention before the court of origin the only remedy? - YES

RATIO:1.Fraud is not only the ground to attack a final and executory judgment. According to the SC in the Makabingkil case there are three ways to attack a judgment.

a. First, by petition for relief under R38 when judgment has been taken against the party through fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which case the petition must be filed w/in 60d after petitioner learns of judgment but not more than 6 months after entry of judgment.b.Second is direct action to annul and enjoin the enforcement of the judgment on the ground of extrinsic fraud.c.Third is either a direct action, as certiorari, or by collateral attack to annul a judgment that is void upon its face or void by virtue of its own recitals.

2. Thus, Macabingkil  did not preclude the setting aside of a decision that is patently void  where mere inspection of the judgment is enough to demonstrate its nullity on grounds of want of jurisdiction or non-compliance with due process of law.

3.SC stressed that when the IAC and the SC affirmed the RTC decision, they were not given the occasion to rule on the issue of the TC’s jurisdiction over the persons of the indispensable parties as they are limited by the issues raised before them. Thus substantial justice requires that SC be allowed to nullify the RTC decision for lack of jurisdiction even if previously affirmed by them.

4.On the second issue, SC held that the CA erred in annulling or declaring null the decision in considering extraneous matters. In an action to declare a  judgment void because of lack of jurisdiction over the parties or subject matter, only evidence found in the records of the case can justify the  annulment of  the said judgment.

5.On the third issue, SC stated that intervention is not the only remedy  to assail a void final judgment.

6. A direct action is available in assailing final judgments grounded on extrinsic fraud, while a direct or a collateral action may be used to show lack of   jurisdiction.

7.In any event, jurisprudence upholds the soundness of an independent action to declare as null and void a judgment rendered without jurisdiction as in this case.

ADLAWAN V. ADLAWAN

FACTS:Petition for review.Dominador Adlawan, who died without any other issue, is the owner of a lot and a house built thereon registered in the Registry of Property. Petitioner (Arnelito Adlawan) is an acknowledged illegitimate son and the sole heir of Dominador. He executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself the house and lot. Out of respect and generosity to respondents who are the siblings of his father, he granted their plea to occupy the subject property provided they would vacate the same should his need for the property arise. When he verbally requested respondents to vacate the house and lot, they refused and filed instead an action for quieting of title with the RTC.Finally, upon respondents’ refusal to heed the last demand letter to vacate dated August 2, 2000, petitioner filed this ejectment case.In response Narcisa and Emeterio, 70 and 59 years of age, respectively, denied that they begged petitioner to allow them to stay on the questioned property and stressed that they have been occupying lot and the house standing thereon since birth. That the lot was originally registered in the name of their deceased father,Ramon Adlawan and the ancestral house standing thereon was owned by Ramon and their mother, Oligia Mañacap Adlawan. The spouses had nine children including the late Dominador and herein surviving respondents Emeterio and Narcisa. Petitioner, on the other hand, is a stranger who never had possession of the lot. They further alleged that the transfer of the title to Dominador was simulated. It was done so that their parents will be able to obtain a loan for the renovation of their house. Respondents also contended that Dominador’s signature atthe back of petitioner’s birth certificate was forged, hence, the latter is not an heir of Dominador and has no right to claim ownership of the lot. They argued that even if petitioner is indeed Dominador’s acknowledged illegitimate son, his right to succeed is doubtful because Dominador was survived by his wife, Graciana.

MTC decision: dismissed the complaint.

RTC decision: reversed the decision of the MTC

Meanwhile, the RTC granted petitioner’s motion for execution pending appeal which was opposed by the alleged nephew and nieces of Graciana in their motion for leave to intervene and to file an answer in intervention. They contended that as heirs of Graciana, they have a share in the lot and that intervention is necessary to protect their right over the property. In addition, they declared that as co-owners of the property, they are allowing respondents to stay in the lot until a formal partition of the property is made.

CA decision: set aside the RTC and reinstated the MTC decision.

ISSUE:WON petitioner can validly maintain the instant case for ejectment.

RULING:Petitioner averred that he is an acknowledged illegitimate son and the sole heir of Dominador. He in fact executed an affidavit adjudicating to himself the controverted property. In ruling for the petitioner, the RTC held that the questioned January 31,

1962 deed of sale validly transferred title to Dominador and that petitioner is his acknowledged illegitimate son who inherited ownership of the questioned lot. The Court notes, however, that the RTC lost sight of the fact that the theory of succession invoked by petitioner would end up proving that he is not the sole owner of Lot 7226. This is so because Dominador was survived not only by petitioner but also by his legal wife, Graciana, who died 10 years after the demise of Dominador on May 28, 1987. By intestate succession, Graciana and petitioner became co-owners of Lot 7226. The death of Graciana on May 6, 1997, did not make petitioner the absolute owner of Lot 7226 because the share of Graciana passed to her relatives by consanguinity and not to petitioner with whom she had no blood relations. The Court of Appeals thus correctly held that petitioner has no authority to institute the instant action as the sole owner of Lot 7226.Petitioner contends that even granting that he has co-owners over Lot 7226, he can on his own file the instant case pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code which provides:ART. 487. Any one of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment.This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession. Article 487 includes forcible entry and unlawful detainer (accion interdictal), recovery of possession (accion publiciana), and recovery of ownership(accion de reivindicacion). A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because the suit is presumed to have been filed to benefit his co-owners. It should be stressed, however, that where the suit is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession of the litigated property, the action should be dismissed. xxxIn Baloloy v. Hular, respondent filed a complaint for quieting of title claiming exclusive ownership of the property, but the evidence showed that respondent has co-owners over the property. In dismissing the complaint for want of respondent’s authority to file the case, the Court held that – Under Article 487 of the New Civil Code, any of the co-owners may bring an action in ejectment. This article covers all kinds of actions for the recovery of possession, including an accion publiciana and a reinvidicatory action. A co-owner may bring such an action without the necessity of joining all the other co-owners as co- plaintiffs because the suit is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in favor of the co-owner will benefit the others but if such judgment is adverse, the same cannot prejudice the rights of the unimpleaded co-owners. If the action is for the benefit of the plaintiff alone who claims to be the sole owner and entitled to the possession thereof, the action will not prosper unless he impleads the other co-owners who are indispensable parties.In this case, the respondent alone filed the complaint, claiming sole ownership over the subject property and praying that he be declared the sole owner thereof. There is no proof that the other co-owners had waived their rights over the subject property or conveyed the same to the respondent or such co-owners were aware of  the case in the trial court. The trial court rendered judgment declaring the respondent as the sole owner of the property and entitled to its possession, to the prejudice of the latter’s siblings. Patently then, the decision of the trial court is erroneous.Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the respondent was mandated to implead his siblings, being co-owners of the property, as parties. The respondent failed to comply with the rule. It must, likewise, be stressed that the Republic of the Philippines is also an indispensable party as defendant because the respondent

sought the nullification of OCT No. P-16540 which was issued based on Free Patent No. 384019. Unless the State is impleaded as party-defendant, any decision of the Court would not be binding on it. It has been held that the absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment.The absence of the respondent’s siblings, as parties, rendered all proceedings subsequent to the filing thereof, including the judgment of the court, ineffective for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.In the instant case, it is not disputed that petitioner brought the suit for unlawful detainer in his name alone and for his own benefit to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana as he even executed an affidavit of self- adjudication over the disputed property. It is clear therefore that petitioner cannot validly maintain the instant action considering that he does not recognize the co-ownership that necessarily flows from his theory of  succession to the property of his father, Dominador.In the same vein, there is no merit in petitioner’s claim that he has the legal personality to file the present unlawful detainer suit because the ejectment of respondents would benefit not only him but also his alleged co- owners. However, petitioner forgets that he filed the instant case to acquire possession of the property and to recover damages. If granted, he alone will gain possession of the lot and benefit from the proceeds of the award of damages to the exclusion of the heirs of Graciana. Hence, petitioner cannot successfully capitalize on the alleged benefit to his co-owners. Incidentally, it should be pointed out that in default of the said heirs of Graciana, whom petitioner labeled as “fictitious heirs,” the State will inherit her share and will thus be petitioner’s co-owner entitled to possession and enjoyment of the property.The present controversy should be differentiated from the cases where the Court upheld the right of a co-owner to file a suit pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code. In Resuena v. Court of Appeals, and Sering v. Plazo, the co-owners who filed the ejectment case did not represent themselves as the exclusive owner of the property.In Celino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa Santiago, the complaint for quieting of title was brought in behalf of the co-owners precisely to recover lots owned in common. Similarly in Vencilao v. Camarenta, the amended complaint specified that the plaintiff is one of the heirs who co-owns the controverted properties.In the foregoing cases, the plaintiff never disputed the existence of a co-ownership nor claimed to be the sole or exclusive owner of the litigated lot. A favorable decision therein would of course inure to the benefit not only of the plaintiff but to his co-owners as well. The instant case, however, presents an entirely different backdrop as petitioner vigorously asserted absolute and sole ownership of the questioned lot. In his complaint, petitioner made the following allegations xxxxClearly, the said cases find no application here because petitioner’s action operates as a complete repudiation of the existence of co-ownership and not in representation or recognition thereof. Dismissal of the complaint is therefore proper. As noted by Former Supreme Court Associate Justice Edgrado L. Paras understood, of course, that the action [under Article 487 of the Civil Code] is being instituted for all. Hence, if the co-owner expressly states that he is bringing the case only for himself, the action should not be allowed to prosper.” HELD: petition denied. /adsum

PUNSALAN V. LIAT

22 fishermen agreed to be the sole owners of 2 1⁄2 sacks of ambergris found in the belly of a whale and they agreed that none could sell without the others’ consent. Teck, who knew of the ambergris proposed the seizure of contraband opium, which was actually the ambergris. The ambergris having been seized and loaded and brought to Zamboanga along with Ahmad, who was left in charge. Teck then proceeded to offer to purchase the A to which Ahmad refused but was later on convinced as he was promised protection from his co-owners.

Sale not valid. The A was undivided common property of the plaintiffs and one of the defs. This common ownership was acquired by occupancy. None of them had any right to sell, there being an express agreement to the contrary. Sale having been made without others’ consent, the same shall have no effect except as to the portion pertaining to those who made them.

TWIN TOWERS CONDO CORP. V. CA

TTCC filed a complaint with the SEC against ALS and Litonjua praying that the latter be ordered to pay solidarilty the unpaid condominium assessments and dues with interests and penalties covering the 4 quearters of 1986 & 1987 and the first qtr of ’88.

Petitioner’s Master Deed provides that a member of the Condominium corporation shall share in the common expenses of the condominium project. This obligation does not depend on the use or non-use by the member of the common areas and facilities of the Condominium. Whether or not a member uses the common areas or facilities, these areas and facilities will have to be maintained. Expenditures must be made to maintain the common areas and facilities whether a member uses them frequently, infrequently or never at all.

A co-owner may bring an action to exercise and protect the rights of all. When the action is brought by one co-owner for the benefit of all, a favorable decision will benefit them, but an adverse decision cannot prejudice their rights. Resp’s action for ejectment against petitioners is deemed to be instituted for the benefit of all co-owners of the property since the petitioners weren’t able to prove that they are authorized to occupy the same.