Property Cases 12-01

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al. who is sought that inscription be decreed in their name of the parcels of land in this

plaza occupied by them, this court decided that neither the municipality nor the

objectors were entitled to inscription, for with respect to the objectors said plaza

belonged to the municipality of Cavite and with respect to the latter the said Plaza

Soledad was not transferable property of that municipality to be inscribed in its name,

because he intention of Act No. 1039 was that the said plaza and other places therein

enumerated should be kept open for public transit; herefore there can be no doubt that

the defendant has no right to continue to occupy the land of the municipality leased by

her, for it is an integral portion of Plaza Soledad, which if for public use and is reservedfor the common benefit.

According to article 344 of the Civil Code: "Property for public use in provinces and in

towns comprises the provincial and town roads, the squares, streets, fountains, and

public waters, the promenades, and public works of general service supported by said

towns or provinces."

The said Plaza Soledad being a promenade for public use, the municipal council of Cavite

could not in 1907 withdraw or exclude from public use a portion thereof in order to

lease it for the sole benefit of the defendant Hilaria Rojas. In leasing a portion of said

plaza or public place to the defendant for private use the plaintiff municipality exceeded

its authority in the exercise of its powers by executing a contract over a thing of which itcould not dispose, nor is it empowered so to do.

The Civil Code, articles 1271, prescribes that everything which is not outside he

commerce of man may be the object of a contract, and plazas and streets are outside of

this commerce, as was decided by the supreme court of Spain in its decision of February

12, 195, which says: "Communal things that cannot be soud because they are by their

very nature outside of commerce are those for public use, such as the plazas, streets,

common lands, rivers, fountains, etc."

Therefore, it must be concluded that the contract, Exhibit C, whereby he municipality of

Cavite leased to Hilaria Rojas a portion of the Plaza Soledad is null and void and of no

force or effect, because it is contrary to the law and the thing leased cannot be the

object of a contract. On the hyphotesis that the said lease is null and void in accordance

with the provisions of article 1303 of the Civil Code, the defendant must restore and

deliver possession of the land described in the complaint to the municipality of Cavite,

which in its turn must restore to the said defendant all the sums it may have received

from her in the nature of rentals just as soon as she restores the land improperly leased.

For the same reasons as have been set forth, and as said contract is null and void in its

origin, it can produce no effect and consequently the defendant is not entitled to claim

that the plaintiff municipality indemnity her for the damages she may suffer by the

removal of her house from the said land.

For all the foregoing reasons we must reverse the judgment appealed from and declare,

as we do declare, that the land occupied by Hilaria Rojas forms part of the public plaza

called Soledad, and as the lease of said parcel of land is null and void, we order the

defendant to vacate it and release the land in question within thirty days, leaving it

cleared as it was before hr occupation. There is no ground for the indemnity sought in

the nature of damages, but the municipality must in its t urn to the defendant therentals collected; without finding as to the costs. So ordered.

G.R. No. 146621 July 30, 2004

RENE P. VALIAO vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

COMMISSION-FOURTH DIVISION (Cebu City), WEST NEGROS COLLEGE, respondents.

For review on certiorari is the Decision1dated August 22, 2000 of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. SP No. 55133, and its Resolution

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dated November 22, 2000 denying themotion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari

filed by petitioner and affirmed the Resolution dated July 7, 1999 of the National Labor

Relations Commission (NLRC)-Fourth Division in NLRC Case No. V-000134-98 (RAB Case

No. 06-01-10026-95), which sustained the Decision of Labor Arbiter Benjamin E. Pelaez,

directing private respondent West Negros College (WNC) to pay petitioner Rene P.

Valiaos salary during the period of his preventive suspension and attorneys fees, while

dismissing all other claims.

The facts, as culled from records, are as follows:

On February 5, 1990, petitioner Rene Valiao was appointed by private respondent West

Negros College (WNC) as Student Affairs Office (SAO) Director, with a starting salaryof P2,800 per month. On May 14, 1990, he was assigned as Acting Director, Alumni

Affairs Office.

On July 29, 1990, petitioner was transferred to a staff position and designated as

Records Chief at the Registrars Office but was again re-assigned as a typist on June 24,

1991.
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The latest re-assignment was due to his tardiness and absences, as reflected in the

summary of tardiness and absences report, which showed him to have been absent or

late for work from a minimum of seven (7) to a maximum of seventy-five (75) minutes

for the period March to October 31, 1991, and to have reported late almost every day

for the period November to December 1991.

Copies of his tardiness/absences reports were furnished petitioner, along with

memoranda requiring him to explain but his explanations were either unacceptable or

unsatisfactory. Subsequent reports also showed that he did not change his habitsresulting in tardiness and absences. He was even caught one time manipulating the

bundy clock, thus necessitating another memorandum to him asking him to explain his

dishonest actuations in accomplishing the daily attendance logbook and in using the

bundy clock.

On December 10, 1991, petitioner received a suspension order without pay for fifteen

(15) days effective January 1, 1992, because of dishonesty in reporting his actual

attendance. After serving the suspension, the petitioner reported back to office on

January 16, 1992.

On June 15, 1992, another adverse report on tardiness and absences from the Registrar

was made against the petitioner prompting WNC to send him another memorandum

with an attached tardiness and absences report, calling his attention on his tardine ss

and absences for the period February to April 1992.

On June 20, 1992, petitioner sent a letter of appeal and explained his side to the new

college president, Suzette Arbolario-Agustin, who gave petitioner another chance. The

petitioner was then appointed as Information Assistant effective immediately. However,

the petitioner did not immediately assume the post of Information Assistant prompting

the President of private respondent WNC to call his attention. When the petitioner

finally assumed his post, he was allowed a part-time teaching job in the same school to

augment his income.

Sometime in December 1992, WNC won a case against the officials of the union before

the NLRC. Petitioner was ordered to prepare a media blitz of this victory but the

petitioner did not comply with the order on the ground that such a press release would

only worsen the already aggravated situation and strained relations between WNC

management and the union officials.

When petitioner reported for work on the first day of January 1993, he was relieved

from his post and transferred to the College of Liberal Arts as Records Evaluator. Not for

long, the Dean of the Liberal Arts sent a letter to the Human Resources Manager

complaining about the petitioners poor performance and habitualabsenteeism, as

shown in the daily absence reports.

On January 18, 1993, petitioner was again absent from work without permission or

notice to his immediate superior. It turned out that he went to Bacolod City and on

January 28, 1993, the petitioner was one of those arrested during a raid in the house of

one "Toto Ruiz," a suspected drug pusher and was brought to the Bacolod Police Station

along with four (4) other suspects. Upon further search and investigation by theNarcotics Control Division, the petitioner was found possessing two (2) suspected

marijuana roaches (butts) which were placed inside his left shoe. The event was widely

publicized, focusing on petitioners position as an Economics teacher of WNC, and

considering further that one of his fellow suspects was a member of the Philippine

Army, who was caught with an unlicensed firearm, a tooter and other "shabu"

paraphernalia. The petitioner and other suspects were then charged with violation of

the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425, as amended).

Petitioner was asked to explain within 24 hours why he should not be terminated as a

result of the raid and the charges against him for violation of Rep. Act No. 6425 as

amended. Petitioner allegedly was not able to answer immediately since he was in jail

and received said memorandum only on January 30, 1993, although his wife had earlierreceived the memorandum on January 28, 1993.

On January 29, 1993, the petitioner was dismissed for failure to answer said

memorandum.

On February 1, 1993, the petitioner wrote to the President of WNC explaining his side

and asking for due process. WNC cancelled its Notice of Termination dated January 29,

1993, and granted the petitioners request. The petit ioner was notified through a

memorandum about the grant of his request and that a hearing would be conducted. He

was then placed under preventive suspension and an investigation committee was

organized to conduct the probe. On March 6, 1993, a notice of hearing/investigation

was sent to the petitioner.

After the investigation attended by the petitioner and his counsel, with proceedings

duly recorded, the investigation committee recommended the dismissal of petitioner. A

notice of termination was then sent to petitioner informing him of his termination from

the service for serious misconduct and gross and habitual neglect of duty. The petitioner

received the notice on March 25, 1993, but did not file a grievance concerning the

notice of termination.


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On January 19, 1995, petitioner filed a Complaint against WNC for illegal suspension,

illegal dismissal, backwages, salary differential for salary increases and other benefits

granted after his dismissal as well as for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys

fees.

In its Answer, WNC alleged that petitioner was dismissed on charges of serious

misconduct, and gross and willful neglect of duty. WNC said his dismissal was effected

after due notice and prior hearing. It claimed also that since petitioner was terminated

for a valid cause after a due hearing, the lattersclaim for moral and exemplarydamages, and attorneys fees had no basis in fact and in law.

After due proceedings, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision, the decretal portion of

which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DIRECTING respondent

West Negros College to pay complainant Rene P. Valiao(a) P3,300.00 as salary for the

period of his preventive suspension, and (b) P330.00 as attorneys fees, or the total

amount of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS (P3,630.00).

Further, all other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.3

The Labor Arbiter found no justifiable reason to place the petitioner under preventive

suspension as there was no serious or imminent threat to the life or property of his

employer or co-workers.

However, the Labor Arbiter found the dismissal of the petitioner from WNC to be valid

due to absenteeism and tardiness and after he was accorded the procedural due

process aspect of the law as reflected in the records showing that the petitioner was

formally investigated and given the opportunity to refute the alleged findings by the

management of WNC. The Labor Arbiter held that frequent absenteeism and tardinessof the petitioner constituted not only willful disobedience but also gross and habitual

neglect of duties, which are valid grounds for termination of employment. He stressed

that the petitioners frequent absences without proper leave of absence was not only

unfair to WNC and the petitioners co-employees but also set an undesirable example to

the employees under his supervision, considering that the petitioner was not a mere

rank-and-file employee but one who owed more than the usual fealty to the

organization.

On appeal to the NLRC, the latter affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, sustained

the latters findings of facts, and made its own findings on the apprehension of the

petitioner for possession of prohibited drugs. The decretal portion of the decision reads

as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED and the decision of the

Executive Labor Arbiter is AFFIRMED in its entirety.

SO ORDERED.4

Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorariunder Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals

but this was dismissed for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the decision reads as

follows:

WHEREFORE, the questioned Decision and Resolution dated December 11, 1998 and

July 7, 1999, respectively, of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission are

hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.5

The Court of Appeals held that the petitioner was validly dismissed for serious

misconduct and gross habitual neglect of duties, which was aggravated by his arrest for

violation of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended [the January 28, 1993 incident] and that he

was afforded the twin requirements of notice and hearing and the opportunity to

defend himself by the investigating committee. The appellate court noted that WNC had

presented sufficient evidence to support petitioners termination from employment

after taking into consideration the totality of the infractions or the number of violations

committed by petitioner during the period of employment and stressed that it properly

exercised its management prerogative by observing due process. Finally, the Court of

Appeals ruled that the NLRC correctly denied the claim for damages and attorneys fees

for lack of evidentiary support.

Petitioner duly filed a Motion of Reconsideration, which was denied by the Court of

Appeals.

Hence, this petition alleging that:

A. THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

THE DISMISSAL OF PETITIONER WAS VALID, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THERE IS CLEAR
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AND BLATANT VIOLATION OF THE BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE HEREIN

PETITIONER BOTH SUBSTANTIVE AND PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.

B. THE HONORABLE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN (SIC) DISMISSING THE

RELIEFS FOR MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES.6

In our view, the only relevant issue for our resolution is whether or not the petitioner

was validly dismissed from employment on the ground of serious misconduct and gross

habitual neglect of duties, including habitual tardiness and absenteeism.

Petitioner claims that his outright dismissal from employment was not valid and too

harsh and that he was not dismissed from employment because of tardiness or

absences but because he was among those apprehended in a raid. Also, he was not

accorded due process because although his wife received the show causenotice, he did

not have the proper mind to reply as he was in jail and was psychologically disturbed.

Considering the submissions of the parties as well as the records before us, we find the

petition without merit. Petitioners dismissal from employment is valid and justified.

For an employees dismissal to be valid, (a) the dismissal must be for a valid cause and(b) the employee must be afforded due process.

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Serious misconduct and habitual neglect of duties are among the just causes for

terminating an employee under the Labor Code of the Philippines. Gross negligence

connotes want of care in the performance of ones duties. Habitual neglect implies

repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period of time, depending upon the

circumstances.8The Labor Arbiters findings that petitioners habitual absenteeism and

tardiness constitute gross and habitual neglect of duties that justified his termination of

employment are sufficiently supported by evidence on record. Petitioners repeated

acts of absences without leave and his frequent tardiness reflect his indifferent attitude

to and lack of motivation in his work. More importantly, his repeated and habitual

infractions, committed despite several warnings, constitute gross misconductunexpected from an employee of petitioners stature. This Court has held that habitual

absenteeism without leave constitute gross negligence and is sufficient to justify

termination of an employee.9

However, petitioner claims that he was dismissed not for his tardiness or absences but

for his arrest as a suspected drug user. His claim, however, is merely speculative. We

find such contention devoid of basis. First, the decisions of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC,

and the Court of Appeals are indubitable. They show that indeed petitioner had incurred

numerous and repeated absences without any leave. Moreover, he was not punctual in

reporting for work. These unexplained absences and tardiness were reflected on the

summary reports submitted by WNC before the labor arbiter, but petitioner failed to

controvert said reports. Second, contrary to petitioners assertion, the NLRC did not

base its conclusions on the fact of the arrest of petitioner for violation of Rep. Act No.

6425 but on the totality of the number of infractions incurred by the petitioner during

the period of his employment in different positions he occupied at WNC. Thus:

In the case of petitioner Valiao, his services were terminated by private respondentafter having been found guilty of serious misconductand gross habitual neglect of

dutywhich was aggravated by the January 28, 1993 incident. In exercising such

management prerogative, due process was properly observed. Private respondent

presented sufficient evidence to support its act in terminating the services of

petitioner. Private respondent took into consideration the totality of the infractions or

the number of violations committed by petitioner during the period of employment.

Furthermore, it hardly needs reminding that, in view of petitioners position and

responsibilities, he must demonstrate a scrupulous regard for rules and policies befitting

those who would be role models for their young charges.10

Indeed, even without the arrest incident, WNC had more than enough basis for

terminating petitioner from employment. It bears stressing that petitioners absencesand tardiness were not isolated incidents but manifested a pattern of habituality. In one

case, we held that where the records clearly show that the employee has not only been

charged with the offense of highgrading but also has been warned 21 times for

absences without official leave, these repeated acts of misconduct and willful breach of

trust by an employee justify his dismissal and forfeiture of his right to security of

tenure.11

The totality of infractions or the number of violations committed during the

period of employment shall be considered in determining the penalty to be imposed

upon an erring employee. The offenses committed by him should not be taken singly

and separately but in their totality. Fitness for continued employment cannot be

compartmentalized into tight little cubicles of aspects of character, conduct, and ability

separate and independent of each other.12

Needless to say, so irresponsible an employee like petitioner does not deserve a place in

the workplace, and it is within the managements prerogative of WNC to terminate his

employment. Even as the law is solicitous of the welfare of employees, it must also

protect the rights of an employer to exercise what are clearly management

prerogatives. As long as the companys exercise of those rights and prerogative is in

good faith to advance its interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing
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the rights of employees under the laws or valid agreements, such exercise will be

upheld.13

Still, petitioner claims that he was not afforded due process so that his dismissal from

employment should be declared invalid. This contention deserves scant consideration.

The Court of Appeals held that "the records reveal that petitioner was afforded the twin

requirements of notice and hearing and was likewise given the opportunity to defend

himself before the investigating committee." We find no reason to set aside these

factual findings of the Court of Appeals as they are supported by evidence on record.Besides, we may not review the appellate courts findings of fact in an appeal

via certiorari,14

since as a rule, the Supreme Courts review is l imited to errors of law

allegedly committed by the appellate court.15

Judicial review of labor cases does not go

as far as to evaluate the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter and

National Labor Relations Commission based their determinations.16

In this case, petitioner was asked to explain his several absences and tardiness on many

occasions. A notice to explain was sent to him regarding the arrest incident wherein he

was able to reply. An investigation committee was formed by WNC to investigate the

arrest incident and the absences and tardiness of petitioner. It must be emphasized that

proceedings of the committee were duly recorded, and petitioner actively participated

therein by answering the various questions interposed by the panel members. Finally, anotice of his termination was sent to petitioner, although he claims to have received it

late as he was in jail. It is an undeniable fact, however, that his wife had actually

received the notice in his house earlier, even before petitioners termination and this

matter was later communicated to him.

At any rate, petitioner was given enough opportunity to be heard, and his dismissal was

based on valid grounds. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be

heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain ones side

or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. A

formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential, as the due

process requirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable

opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is frowned upon isthe absolute lack of notice and hearing.

17

Finally, the Labor Arbiter found that petitioner is entitled to salary differentials for the

period of his preventive suspension, as there is no sufficient basis shown to justify his

preventive suspension. During the pendency of the investigation, the employer may

place the worker concerned under preventive suspension if his continued employment

poses a serious and imminent threat to life or property of the employer or of his co-

workers.18

But in this case, there is no indication that petitioner posed a serious threat

to the life and property of the employer or his co-employees. Neither was it shown that

he was in such a position to unduly influence the outcome of the investigation. Hence,

his preventive suspension could not be justified, and the payment of his salary

differentials is in order.

However, the award of attorneys fees to him cannot be sustained, in view of our

findings that petitioner was validly dismissed from employment. Said award lacks legal

basis and could not be granted properly in this case.

WHEREFORE,the assailed Decision dated August 22, 2000 and Resolution dated

November 22, 2000 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 55133 are AFFIRMED with

MODIFICATION in that the award of attorneys fees is deleted. No pronouncement as to

costs.

G.R. No. L-66575 September 30, 1986

MANECLANG VS IAC

Petitioners Adriano Maneclang, et. al. filed before the then Court of First Instance of

Pangasinan, Branch XI a complaint for quieting of title over a certain fishpond

located within the four [41 parcels of land belonging to them situated in Barrio

Salomague, Bugallon, Pangasinan, and the annulment of Resolutions Nos. 38 and 95

of the Municipal Council of Bugallon Pangasinan. The trial court dismissed the

complaint in a decision dated August 15, 1975 upon a finding that the body of water

traversing the titled properties of petitioners is a creek constituting a tributary of the

Agno River; therefore public in nature and not subject to private appropriation. The

lower court likewise held that Resolution No. 38, ordering an ocular inspection of the

Cayangan Creek situated between Barrios Salomague Sur and Salomague Norte, and

Resolution No. 95 authorizing public bidding for the lease of all municipal ferries and

fisheries, including the fishpond under consideration, were passed by respondents

herein as members of the Municipal Council of Bugallon, Pangasinan in the exercise

of their legislative powers.

Petitioners appealed said decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which

affirmed the same on April 29, 1983. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Acting on the petition, the Court required the respondents to comment thereon.

However, before respondents could do so, petitioners manifested that for lack of

interest on the part of respondent Alfredo Maza, the awardee in the public bidding

of the fishpond, the parties desire to amicably settle the case by submitting to the
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property of Miguel Fabie and brothers to point No. 12; thence N. 88 degrees 3 minutes

E., 45.35 meters along the northern boundary of the property belonging to Miguel Fabie

and brothers to point No. 13; thence S. 89 degrees 11 minutes E., 70.15 meters to a

stone monument to Miguel Fabie and brothers to point No. 14; thence S. 86 degrees 33

minutes E., 85.07 meters to a stone monument along the northern boundary of the

property of Miguel Fabie and brothers to point No. 15; thence N. 83 degrees 8 minutes

E., 14.49 meters along the northern boundary of the property owned by Miguel Fabie

and brothers to point no. 16; thence N. 47 degrees E., 158.35 meters along the

northwestern boundary of Miguel Fabie and brothers to point No. 17; thence N. 70degrees 22 minutes W., 40.74 meters along the southern boundary of the properties

owned by Charles M. Stone, Prudencio de Leon, and Asuncion Ventura (Looban) to point

No. 18; thence N. 83 degrees 22 minutes W., 7.38 meters along a stone fence and the

southern boundary of the properties belonging to Asuncion Ventura (Looban) and Petra

Garcia to point No. 19; thence S. 30 degrees 34 minutes W., 21.12 meters along a stone

fence and the western boundary of the property owned by Petra Carnero y Garcia to

point No. 20; thence S. 74 degrees 58 minutes W., 8.70 meters along the northern

boundary of the property of Evaristo Roxas and brothers to point No. 21; thence s. 22

degrees 4 minutes W., 34.75 meters along the eastern boundary of the property owned

by Evaristo Roxas and brothers to point 22; thence N. 68 degrees 47 minutes W., 26.40

meters along the southern boundary of the property belonging to Evaristo Roxas and

brothers to point No. 23; thence S. 68 degrees 47 minutes W., 85.61 meters along theeastern boundary of the properties owned by Silvestra Sarmiento and Evaristo Gonzalez

y Valdes to point No. 24; thence N. 84 degrees 58 minutes W., 12.85 meters to a stone

monument along the southern boundary of the property owned by Evaristo Gonzalez

Valdes to point No. 25; thence N. 79 degrees 37 minutes W., 11.10 meters along the

southern boundary of the property owned by Evaristo Gonzalez Valdes to point No. 0,

the point of the beginning. Containing 10,472.23 square meters of extension. Bearings

magnetic.

The said city alleged that it was the absolute owner of the said land; that said land was

assessed by the city of Manila in the sum of $1,780, United States currency; that there

existed no liens of whatever character against said land; that the land was unoccupied;

that the said city obtained title to the said land by reason of being the successor to allthe rights and actions of the old city of Manila (ayuntamiento de Manila), to which said

property formerly belonged.

To this petition of the petitioner, the Insular Government presented the following

opposition to the registration of said land:

The Solicitor-General, representing the Insular Government, appears before the court,

and states:

I. That the city of Manila, represented by its attorney, Modesto Reyes, requests that, in

compliance with the Land Registration Act, a parcel of land situated in Paco, a district of

this city, of which it claims to be the absolute owner, and the description of which is

specified in the petition be inscribed in its name.

II. That the land in question is the property of the Government of the United States

under the control of the Insular Government.

III. That by virtue thereof, the Solicitor-General opposes the inscription asked for, and

requests the court to deny the petition with the costs.

To this petition of the petitioner one Geronimo Morales also presented the following

opposition to the registration of a portion of the land described in the second paragraph

of said petition:

Now comes the undersigned before this court and says:

1. That the city of Manila, by its attorney, Modesto Reyes, has, in conformity with the

provisions of the Land Registration Act, applied for the registration of a certain parcel ofland located in the district of Paco, of this city, of which it alleges sole and absolute

ownership, and the description of which is included in the application.

2. That the plan and description of the said land as they appear in the petition are

incorrect, for there is included in the same a part of a building lot belonging to the

undersigned, and situated in the barrio of Rosario of said district, with an area of 84

meters more or less, as will be seen in the plan to be filed later.

3. Therefore, the undersigned files his opposition to the registration applied for, as far

as it has any bearing on the building lot of the undersigned which is included in the plan

and description of the applicant, and this honorable court is requested to deny the

application as far as it relates to the said building lot, with the costs against thepetitioner.

After the presentation of the petition on the part of the said petitioner, one of the

examiners of titles of the Court of Land Registration made an examination of the title

claimed by the petitioner and made the following report to the judge of the said court

of Land Registration.


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The examiner of titles of this judicial district, after going over the papers in the case of

the city, represented by its attorney, Modesto Reyes, states that:

1. The application filed by the city of Manila, is not accompanied by any document

relative to its alleged ownership, but sets forth that said city, as the successor in rights

and interest of the former ayuntamiento de Manila, is the owner of the land described

in the petition above referred to.

2. In the office of the register of deeds there is no record of any act or contract opposing

the claim of the applicant; nor does there appear, from the investigations held, any fact

contrary to those quoted in the application. The present limits of the land in question

may be held as correct.

3. The city of Manila, in order to acquire title to the land above mentioned, must show

the ownership which the former ayuntamiento had over said land.

OPINION.

Based on the above report, the undersigned is of the opinion that the title of the city of

Manila, represented by its attorney, Modesto Reyes, is defective and can not be

registered.

Manila, December 7, 1904.

AGUEDO VELARDE.

On the 14th of March, 1905, the cause was duly brought on for trial and during the trial

of said cause the petitioner attempted to establish by proof the following facts

First. That said land formerly belonged to the old city of Manila (ayuntamiento de

Manila) under the sovereignty of Spain.

Second. That the present city of Manila is at present the owner of said land by virtue of

being the successor of the old city of Manila.

Third. That the old city of Manila from the year 1894 until the change of sovereignty in

the Philippine Archipelago had rented said land, had received rents therefor, and in a

general way had administered the same.The respondent, the Central Government of the Philippine Islands, presented no proof

whatever in opposition to the claim of the petitioner, relying the fact that the petitioner

was not entitled to have said land registered, for the following reasons:

First. That the land in question was public land, belonging to the Central Government;

that the same had never been granted to any person or corporation or municipality by

the Spanish Government.

Second. That the city of Manila, neither the present nor the old city, was the owner of

said land.

On the 15th day of February, 1906, the judge of the said court filed h is decision by which

he denied the registration of the land claimed by the said Geronimo Morales and

granted the registration of the rest of said described property in favor of the said city.

Against this order allowing the registration of said tract of land the respondent duly

excepted and gave notice of his intention to appeal.

The Attorney-General, representing the respondent in this court, made the following

assignment of error:

There is nothing in the record which justifies the conclusion of the judgment of the court

below, to the effect that the land in question is owned by the city of Manila.The only proof presented during the trial by the petitioner which tended in any way to

support its claim was that in the year 1894 and thereafter the old city of Manila

(ayuntamiento de Manila) rented said land and received the rent therefor, and that the

present city of Manila succeeded to the rights of said old city. No proof was offered by

the plaintiff, documentary or other, to show in any way by what right said old city

exercised this right of control over said property.

We are of the opinion, and so hold, that the mere renting of property and receiving the

rent therefor can not, of themselves, in the absence of other proof, support a claim of

ownership of such property.

It has been argued that every pueblo organized by the Spanish Government in its insular

possessions has had granted to it, as a matter of course, certain lands for public

purposes, such as public commons, pasture lands, etc. Our attention has not been calledto any law or royal decree in which this contention is supported and we have searched

in vain to find such a provision. Upon the contrary we have found a royal decree of the

day of showing that the people of the pueblo of Dilao (now the barrio of Paco in

which this very land is located) had petitioned for a grant of acomunal, etc., and which

was denied.

One of the earliest provisions of law relating to the rights of pueblos in the insular

possessions of the Spanish Government is that de las reducciones, y pueblos de

indios (settlements and pueblos of natives) of December 1, 1573, as amended by that of

the 10th of October, 1618, found in Law VIII, Title III of Book VI of the Recopilacion de las

Leyes de Indias, and which it as follows:

The sites whereon the pueblos and settlements are to be bui lt must have water

facilities, lands, forests, entrances and exits, lands for cultivation, andan exido(common, public land) one league long, wherein the natives may keep their

cattle, without mingling them with those owned by Spaniards.

This provision of law seems to have been amplified in article 53 of the Ordinances of

Good Government, dated February 26, 1768, and extended to the pueblos of the

Philippine Islands by proclamation on the 11th day of September, 1801. This article

clearly indicates that these lands should be designated by the Spanish Government for

the use and benefit de las reducciones, y pueblos de los indios. Said article 53 is in part

as follows:


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It is held to be comunal (common public) the territory of the settlements and pueblos

inhabited by natives, to which, from the time of their foundation or organization, the

necessary lands were alloted in conformity with Law VII, Title III, Book VI of

the Recopilacion de las Leyes de Indias, etc.

This article 53 clearly indicates the following:

First. That the King continued to be the absolute owner of said lands;

Second. That the pueblos were only given the mere usufruct of the same;

Third. That the King might at any time annul such grant; and

Fourth. That a designation, of the particular land so granted, was a necessaryprerequisite for the holding of the same for the purposes indicated, by the said pueblo.

(SeeAutos Acordados , Vol. I, pp. 29, 48.)

As a further confirmation of the fact that the pueblos of the Philippine Islands did not

have, as a matter of right, a comunal, etc., unless the same had been expressly granted,

we find the following provision in the royal decree of February 28, 1883, which is as

follows:

On the recommendation of the minister for the colonies, and in conformity with the

opinion submitted by the council of the state, sitting in banc, I hereby decree the

following:

ARTICLE 1. The legua comunalfor the Philippine Islands, under the provisions of Law

VIII, Title III, Book VI, of theRecopilacion de Indias, as far as the pueblos already

established and those which may be established thereafter are concerned, shall be of anarea of 20,000 feet, equivalent to a league of 20 degrees, without regard to the

geometrical figure resulting from the topography of the locality, or to conditions relating

to property rights over the land itself or over land adjoining the same.

ART. 2. The pueblos not having said land alloted to them may apply and obtain the same

by means of the corresponding proceedings.

ART. 3. When the conditions so require, the pueblos may institute proceedings to obtain

an extension of said comunalland, in order that the latter may be in keeping with the

number of inhabitants, the number of heads of each pueblo. Given at the palace, on

February 28, 1883.

Following this royal decree we have the superior decreto of the 1st of August, 1883,

relating to the legua comunal, with the following provisions:

Legua comunal. In order to comply with and carry out the provisions of the royaldecree of February 28 of the current year, published in the Gaceta de Manilaon June 28

last, and relating to the legua comunal, on the recommendation of the direccion general

de administracion civil, I hereby order that the following regulations be observed:

1. The provincial chiefs shall take special care to inform the gobernadorcillos of the

towns under their control of the decree relating to the legua comunal, making them

understand that the superficial extension to be occupied by the same is that

corresponding to a square, the sides of which measure 20,000 feet, equivalent to a

square league, (de veinte al drado), and that the land should be uncultivated or untilled.

2. The towns not having said portion of land assigned may apply for the same to this

central government through the chief of the province or district, inclosing with the

petition a report of theprincipalia, stating the said circumstance and as many particulars

as may exist in their archives regarding the matter.

3. The said documents shall be forwarded to the direccion general de administracion

civil, through the provincial chief, and the said office, upon the information from the

bureau of forestry, shall recommend to me what it may deem proper.

4. After the "legua comunal" has been granted by this Government, the bureau of

forestry shall proceed to the setting up of the boundary marks of the same, executing acertificate of the land, which, after being signed by the officer conducting the

proceedings and by theprincipaliaof the town, will be submitted for my approval

through the direccion general de administracion civil.

5. For the legua comunaluncultivated land will be selected, whenever possible, which

may be in proper condition for the pasture of cattle and cultivation of building timber

and the necessary industries to meet the requirements of the inhabitants.

6. In order to increase the said communal land, when the requirements of the towns

may demand, it will be necessary to institute new proceedings, which will be annexed to

a statement signed by theprincipalia, showing the number of the inhabitants of the

town, the kind and number of the extension of the lands which, bearing in mind the

local conditions, they may deem necessary to meet the requirements of the former and

nourishment for the latter.7. These statements will be forwarded to the direccion general by the chief of the

province, together with his opinion, in which he will state whether or not he considers

the petition to be unreasonable.

8. The offices under the department of finance will furnish the direccion general de

administracion with the necessary documents for verifying the truth of the declarations

made by theprincipalias of the towns, regarding the number of the inhabitants and

heads of cattle.

9. The direccion general de administracion civil, with the report of the bureau of forestry

and, should it be deemed necessary, of the board of agriculture, shall recommend to me

the extension to be finally marked for the legua comunal.

10. After the area of the land has been determined by this general government, the

bureau of forestry shall proceed with the appointment and the setting of marks of thenew communal land, a certificate being executed in the same form as previously stated.

11. The expenses arising from the proceedings, as well as those arising from the setting

up of boundary marks of the legua comunaland its final establishment, must be paid by

the town to which the concession has been granted. (Gazette No. 42, August 11.)

By the royal decree of the 23rd of December, 1870, it was made necessary by

monuments or otherwise to mark the division lines of the different pueblos of the

Philippine Islands. (Gaceta de Madrid, February 24.)


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By the royal order of the 17th of January, 1885, it was provided that, when a pueblo

should show to the Government of the Philippine Islands that its legua comunalwas

insufficient, it might, upon petition, have such lines increased. (Gaceta de Madrid,

March 15, 1885.)

The royal decree of the 19th of May, 1893, relating to the municipal government

(Gaceta de Madrid, May 22, 1893) contains no provisions with reference to the granting

to pueblos of the legua comunal, etc.

The question of the right of pueblos in the insular possessions of the Spanish

Government to public lands has come before the Supreme Court of the United Statesseveral times in its relation to pueblos in the territory acquired by the United States

from the King of Spain.

In the case of Grisar vs. McDowell (6 Wallace, 363, 373) Justice Field in discussing this

question said:

These laws provided for the assignment to the pueblos, for their use and the use of their

inhabitants, of land not exceeding in extent 4 square leagues. Such assignment was to

be made by the public authorities of the Government upon the original establishment of

the pueblo, or afterwards upon the petition of its officers or inhabitants; and the land to

be measured off in a square or prolonged form, according to the nature and condition of

the country. All lands within the general limits stated, which had previously become

private property or were required for public purposes, were reserved and excepted

from the assignment.Until the lands were thus definitely assigned and measured off, the right or claim of the

pueblo was an imperfect one. It was a right which the Government might refuse to

recognize at all, or might recognize in a qualified form; it might be burdened with

conditions, and it might be restricted to less limits than the 4 square leagues, which was

the usual quantity assigned.

In the case of United States vs. Santa Fe (165 U. S., 707), in which this same question

was involved, Justice White of the Supreme Court of the United States said:

It can not be doubted that under the law of Spain it was necessary that the proper

authorities should particularly designate the land to be acquired by towns or pueblos

before a vested right or title to the use thereof could arise.

Elizondo, in his work entitled Practica Universal Forense(vol. 5, p. 226), makes the

following statement relating to the question presented here:There is nothing whatever designated by law as belonging to towns, other than that

which by royal privilege, custom, or contract between man and man is granted to them,

so that although there be assigned to the towns at the time of their

constitution territorioor pertinencias, which may be common to all the residents,

without each one having the right to use them separately, it is a prerogative reserved to

the sovereigns to divided the terminos of the provinces and towns, assigning to these

the use and enjoyment, but the domain remaining in the sovereigns themselves.

Chief Justice Fuller, speaking for the court in the case of United States vs. Sandoval and

in the case of Morton vs. United States (167 U.S., 278, 297), said:

"Under the laws of the Indies, lands not actually allotted to setters remained the

property of the King, to be disposed of by him or by those on whom he might confer

that power. As Mr. Hall says (Chap. VII, 122): "The fee of the lands embraced within

the limits of pueblos continued to remain in the sovereign, and never in the pueblo as a

corporate body."

The petitioner herein not having presented proof showing that the land in question had

been granted to it by the former sovereign in these Islands, and not having shown that itwas entitled to said lands by virtue of some law of the present sovereign of these

Islands, the Court of Land Registration was not empowered to grant the registration of

said lands in favor of said petitioner. The judgment, therefore, of the lower court is

hereby reversed. So ordered.

G.R. No. L-15829 December 4, 1967

ROMAN R. SANTOS vs HON. FLORENCIO MORENO

THE APPEAL

The Honorable Secretary of Public Works & Communications appeals from the decision

of the Court of First Instance of Manila declaring of private ownership certain creekssituated in barrio San Esteban, Macabebe, Pampanga.

The Zobel family of Spain formerly owned vast track of marshland in the municipality of

Macabebe, Pampanga province. Called Hacienda San Esteban, it was administered and

managed by the Ayala y Cia. From the year 1860 to about the year 1924 Ayala y Cia.,

devoted the hacienda to the planting and cultivation of nipa palms from which it

gathered nipa sap or "tuba." It operated a distillery plant in barrio San Esteban to turn

nipa tuba into potable alcohol which was in turn manufactured into liquor.

Accessibility through the nipa palms deep into the hacienda posed as a problem. Ayala y

Cia., therefore dug canals leading towards the hacienda's interior where most of them

interlinked with each other. The canals facilitated the gathering of tuba and the

guarding and patrolling of the hacienda by security guards called "arundines." By the

gradual process of erosion these canals acquired the characteristics and dimensions of

rivers.

In 1924 Ayala y Cia shifted from the business of alcohol production to bangus culture. It

converted Hacienda San Esteban from a forest of nipa groves to a web of fishponds. To


12/31

do so, it cut down the nipa palm, constructed dikes and closed the canals criss -crossing

the hacienda.

Sometime in 1925 or 1926 Ayala y Cia., sold a portion of Hacienda San Esteban to

Roman Santos who also transformed the swamp land into a fishpond. In so doing, he

closed and built dikes across Sapang Malauling Maragul, Quiorang Silab,

Pepangebunan, Bulacus, Nigui and Nasi.

The closing of the man-made canals in Hacienda San Esteban drew complaints fromresidents of the surrounding communities. Claiming that the closing of the canals

caused floods during the rainy season, and that it deprived them of their means of

transportation and fishing grounds, said residents demanded re-opening of those

canals. Subsequently, Mayor Lazaro Yambao of Macabebe, accompanied by policemen

and some residents went to Hacienda San Esteban and opened the closure dikes at

Sapang Malauling Maragul Nigui and Quiorang Silab. Whereupon, Roman Santos filed

Civil Case No. 4488 in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga which preliminarily

enjoined Mayor Yambao and others from demolishing the dikes across the canals. The

municipal officials of Macabebe countered by filing a complaint (docketed as Civil Case

No. 4527) in the same court. The Pampanga Court of First Instance rendered judgment

in both cases against Roman Santos who immediately elevated the case to the Supreme

Court.

In the meantime, the Secretary of Commerce and Communications1conducted his own

investigation and found that the aforementioned six streams closed by Roman Santos

were natural, floatable and navigable and were utilized by the public for transportation

since time immemorial. He consequently ordered Roman Santos on November 3, 1930

to demolish the dikes across said six streams. However, on May 8, 1931 the said official

revoked his decision of November 3, 1930 and declared the streams in question

privately owned because they were artificially constructed. Subsequently, upon

authority granted under Act 3982 the Secretary of Commerce and Communications

entered into a contract with Roman Santos whereby the former recognized the private

ownership of Sapang Malauling Maragul, Quiorang Silab, Pepangebunan, Bulacus,

Nigui and Nasi and the latter turned over for public use two artificial canals and boundhimself to maintain them in navigable state. The Provincial Board of Pampanga and the

municipal councils of Macabebe and Masantol objected to the contract. However, the

Secretary of Justice, in his opinion dated March 6, 1934, upheld its legality. Roman

Santos withdraw his appeals in the Supreme Court.

With respect to the portion of Hacienda San Esteban still owned by the Zobel family, the

municipal authorities of Macabebe filed in 1930 an administrative complaint, in the

Bureau of Public Works praying for the opening of the dikes and dams across certain

streams in Hacienda San Esteban. Whereupon, the district engineer of Pampanga and a

representative of the Bureau of Public Works conducted investigations. In the

meantime, the Attorney General, upon a query from the Secretary of Commerce and

Communications, rendered an opinion dated October 11, 1930 sustaining the latter's

power to declare streams as publicly owned under Sec. 4 of Act 2152, as amended by

Act 3208.

On September 29, 1930 the investigator of the Bureau of Public Works, Eliseo Panopio,submitted his report recommending the removal of the dikes and dams in question. And

on the basis of said report, the Secretary of Commerce and Communications rendered

his decision on November 3, 1930 ordering Ayala y Cia., to demolish the dikes and dams

across the streams named therein situated in Hacienda San Esteban. Ayala y Cia., moved

for reconsideration, questioning the power of the Secretary of Commerce and

Communications to order the demolition of said dikes.

Days before the Secretary of Commerce and Communications rendered his

aforementioned decision, Ayala y Cia., thru counsel, made representations with the

Director of Public Works for a compromise agreement. In its letter dated October 11,

1930, Ayala y Cia., offered to admit public ownership of the following creeks:

Antipolo, Batasan Teracan, Biuas or Batasan, Capiz, Carbon, Cutut, Dalayap,

Enrique, Iba, Inaun, Margarita, Malauli or Budbud, Matalaba Palapat, Palipit

Maisao, Panlovenas, Panquitan, Quinapati, Quiorang, Bubong or Malauli

Malati, Salop, Sinubli and Vitas.

provided the rest of the streams were declared private. Acting on said offer, the

Director of Public Works instructed the surveyor in his office, Eliseo Panopio, to proceed

to Pampanga and conduct another investigation.

On January 23, 1931 Panopio submitted his report to the Director of Public Works

recommending that some streams enumerated therein be declared public and some

private on the ground that they were originally dug by the hacienda owners. The private

streams were:

Agape, Atlong, Cruz, Balanga, Batasan, Batasan Matlaue, Balibago, Baliti, Bato,

Buengco Malati, Bungalin, Bungo Malati, Bungo Maragui, Buta-buta,

Camastiles, Catlu, Cauayan or Biabas, Cela, Dampalit, Danlimpu, Dilinquente,

Fabian, Laguzan, Lalap Maburac, Mabutol, Macabacle, Maragul or Macanduli,

Macabacle or Mababo, Maisac, Malande, Malati, Magasawa, Maniup, Manulit,


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Mapanlao, Maisac, Maragul Mariablus Malate, Masamaral, Mitulid, Nasi, Nigui

or Bulacus, Palipit, Maragul, Pangebonan, Paumbong, Pasco or Culali, Pilapil,

Pinac Malati, Pinac, Maragul or Macabacle, Quiorang Silab or Malauli Maragul,

Raymundo, Salamin, Salop Maisac, Salop Maragul, Sermon and Sinca or

Mabulog.

He therefore recommended revocation of the decision already mentioned above, dated

November 3, 1930 of the Secretary of Commerce and Communications ordering the

demolition of the dikes closing Malauling Maragul, Quiorang, Silab, Pepangebonan,Nigui, Bulacus, Nasi, and Pinac. On February 13, 1931 the Director of Public Works

concurred in Panopio's report and forwarded the same the Secretary of Commerce and

Communications.

On February 25, 1935 the municipality of Macabebe and the Zobel family executed an

agreement whereby they recognized the nature of the streams mentioned in Panopio's

report as public or private, depending on the findings in said report. This agreement was

approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications on February 27, 1935

and confirmed the next day by the municipal council of Macabebe under Resolution No.

36.

A few months later, that is, on June 12, 1935, the then Secretary of Justice issued anopinion holding that the contract executed by the Zobel family and the municipality of

Macabebe has no validity for two reasons, namely, (1) the streams although originally

dug by Ayala y Cia., lost their private nature by prescription inasmuch as the public was

allowed to use them for navigation and fishing, citing Mercado vs. Municipality of

Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592; and (2) at the time the Secretary of Commerce and

Communications approved the said contract, he had no more power so to do, because

such power under Sec. 2 of Act 2152 was revoked by the amending Act 4175 which took

effect on December 7, 1934.

Despite the above ruling of the Secretary of Justice, the streams in question remained

closed.

In 1939 administrative investigations were again conducted by various agencies of the

Executive branch of our government culminating in an order of President Manuel

Quezon immediately before the national elections in 1941 requiring the opening of

Sapang Macanduling, Maragul Macabacle, Balbaro and Cansusu. Said streams were

again closed in 1942 allegedly upon order of President Quezon.

THE CASE

Roman Santos acquired in 1940 from the Zobel family a larger portion of Hacienda San

Esteban wherein are located 25 streams which were closed by Ayala y Cia., and are now

the subject matter in the instant controversy.

Eighteen years later, that is in 1958, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 20562following

a congressional inquiry which was kindled by a speech delivered by Senator Rogelio de

la Rosa in the Senate. On August 15, 1958 Senator de la Rosa requested in writing the

Secretary of Public Works and communications to proceed in pursuance of Republic Act

No. 2056 against fishpond owners in the province of Pampanga who have closed riversand appropriated them as fishponds without color of title. On the same day, Benigno

Musni and other residents in the vicinity of Hacienda San Esteban petitioned the

Secretary of Public Works and Communications to open the following streams:

Balbaro, Batasan Matua, Bunga, Cansusu, Macabacle, Macanduling, Maragul,

Mariablus, Malate, Matalabang, Maisac, Nigui, Quiorang Silab, Sapang

Maragul and Sepung Bato.

Thereupon, the Secretary of Public Works and Communications instructed Julian C.

Cargullo to conduct an investigation on the above named streams.

On October 20, 1958 Musni and his co-petitioners amended their petition to include

other streams. The amended petition therefore covered the following streams:

Balbaro, Balili, Banawa, Batasan Matua Bato, Bengco, Bunga, Buta-buta,

Camastiles, Cansusu, Cela, Don Timpo, Mabalanga, Mabutol, Macabacle,

Macabacle qng. Iba, Macanduling, Maragul, Malauli, Magasawa, Mariablus

Malate Masamaral, Matalabang Maisa, Mariablus,3Nigui, Pita, Quiorang,

Silab, Sapang Maragul, Sepung Bato, Sinag and Tumbong.

On March 2, 4, 10, 30 and 31, and April 1, 1959, the Secretary of Public Works and

Communications rendered his decisions ordering the opening and restoration of the

channel of all the streams in controversy except Sapang Malauling, Maragul, Quiorang,Silab, Nigui Pepangebonan, Nasi and Bulacus, within 30 days on the ground that said

streams belong to the public domain.

On April 29, 1959, that is, after receipt of the Secretary's decision dated March 4, 1959,

Roman Santos filed a motion with the Court of First Instance of Man for junction against

the Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Julian C. Cargullo. As prayed for

preliminary injunction was granted on May 8, 1959. The Secretary of Public Work and

Communications answered and alleged as defense that venue was improperly laid; that


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Roman Santos failed to exhaust administrative remedies; that the contract between

Ayala y Cia., and the Municipality of Macabebe is null and void; and, that Section 39 of

Act 496 excludes public streams from the operation of the Torrens System.

On April 29 and June 12, 1969, Roman Santos received the decision of the Secretary of

Public Works and Communications dated March 10 and March 30, March 31, and April

1, 1959. Consequently, on June 24, 1959 he asked the court to cite in contempt

Secretary Florendo Moreno, Undersecretary M.D. Bautista and Julian Cargullo for

issuing and serving upon him the said decisions despite the existence of the preliminaryinjunction. The Solicitor General opposed the motion alleging that the decisions in

question had long been issued when the petition for injunction was filed, that they were

received after preliminary injunction issued because they were transmitted through the

District Engineer of Pampanga to Roman Santos; that their issuance was for Roman

Santos' information and guidance; and, that the motion did not allege that respondents

took steps to enforce the decision. Acting upon said motion, on July 17, 1959, the trial

court considered unsatisfactory the explanation of the Solicitor General but ruled that

Secretary Florencio Moreno, Undersecretary M.D. Bautista and Julian Cargullo acted in

good faith. Hence, they were merely "admonished to desist from any and further action

in this case, observe the preliminary injunction issued by this Court, with the stern

warning, however, that a repetition of the acts complained of shall be dealt with

severely."

On July 18, 1959 the trial court declared all the streams under litigation private, and

rendered the following judgment:

The Writ of preliminary injunction restraining the respondent Secretary of

Public Works & Communications from enforcing the decisions of March 2 And

4, 1959 and all other similar decisions is hereby made permanent.

The Secretary of Public Works and Communication and Julian Cargullo appealed to this

Court from the order of July 17, 1959 issued in connection with Roman Santos' motion

for contempt and from the decision of the lower court on the merits of the case.

ISSUES

The issues are: (1) Did Roman Santos exhaust administrative remedies? (2) Was venue

properly laid? (3) Did the lower court err in conducting a trial de novo of the case and in

admitting evidence not presented during the administrative proceeding? (4) Do the

streams involved in this case belong to the publ ic domain or to the owner of Hacienda

San Esteban according to law and the evidence submitted to the Department of Public

Works and Communications?

DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES

1. Respondents maintain that Roman Santos resorted to the courts without first

exhausting administrative remedies available to him, namely, (a) motion for

reconsideration of the decisions of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications;

and, (b) appeal to the President of the Philippines.

Whether a litigant, in exhausting available administrative remedies, need move for the

reconsideration of an administrative decision before he can turn to the courts for relief,

would largely depend upon the pertinent law,4the rules of procedure and the usual

practice followed in a particular office.5

Republic Act No. 2056 does not require the filing of a motion for reconsideration as a

condition precedent to judicial relief. From the context of the law, the intention of the

legislators to forego a motion for reconsideration manifests itself

clearly.1awphil.netRepublic Act No. 2056 underscores the urgency and summary nature

of the proceedings authorized thereunder. Thus in Section 2 thereof the Secretary of

Public Works and Communications under pain of criminal liability is duty bound to

terminate the proceedings and render his decision within a period not exceeding 90

days from the filing of the complaint. Under the same section, the party respondent

concerned is given not than 30 days within which to comply with the decision of the

Secretary of Public Works and Communications, otherwise the removal of the dams

would be done by the Government at the expense of said party. Congress has precisely

provided for a speedy and a most expeditious proceeding for the removal of illegal

obstructions to rivers and on the basis of such a provision it would be preposterous to

conclude that it had in mind to require a party to file a motion for reconsideration an

additional proceeding which would certainly lengthen the time towards the final

settlement of existing controversies. The logical conclusion is that Congress intended

the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to be final and

executory subject to a timely review by the courts without going through formal andtime consuming preliminaries.

Moreover, the issues raised during the administrative proceedings of this case are the

same ones submitted to court for resolution. No new matter was introduced during the

proceeding in the court below which the Secretary of Public Works and Communications

had no opportunity to correct under his authority.


15/31

Furthermore, Roman Santos assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 2056 and

the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications to order the

demolition of dams across rivers or streams. Those questions are not within the

competence of said Secretary to decide upon a motion for reconsideration.itc-alfThey

are purely legal questions, not administrative in nature, and should properly be aired

before a competent court as was rightly done by petitioner Roman Santos .

At any rate, there is no showing in the records of this case that the Secretary of Public

Works and Communications adopted rule of procedure in investigations authorizedunder Republic Act No. 2056 which require a party litigant to file a motion for the

reconsideration of the Secretary's decision before he can appeal to the courts. Roman

Santos however stated in his brief that the practice is not to entertain motions for

reconsideration for the reason that Republic Act No. 2056 does not expressly or

impliedly allow the Secretary to grant the same. Roman Santos' statement is supported

by Opinion No. 61, Series of 1959, dated April 14, 1959 of the Secretary of Justice.

As to the failure of Roman Santos to appeal from the decision of the Secretary of Public

Works and Communications to the President of the Philippines, suffice it to state that

such appeal could be dispensed with because said Secretary is the alter ego of the

President.itc-alfThe actions of the former are presumed to have the implied sanction of

the latter.6

2. It is contended that if this case were considered as an ordinary civil action, venue was

improperly laid when the same was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila for

the reason that the case affects the title of a real property. In fine, the proposition is

that since the controversy dwells on the ownership of or title to the streams located in

Hacienda San Esteban, the case is real action which, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 5 of the

Rules of Court should have been filed in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.

The mere fact that the resolution of the controversy in this case would wholly rest on

the ownership of the streams involved herein would not necessarily classify it as a real

action. The purpose of this suit is to review the decision of the Secretary of Public Works

and Communications to enjoin him from enforcing them and to prevent him frommaking and issuing similar decisions concerning the stream in Hacienda San Esteban.

The acts of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications are the object of the

litigation, that is, petitioner Roman Santos seeks to control them, hence, the suit ought

to be filed in the Court of First Instance whose territorial jurisdiction encompasses the

place where the respondent Secretary is found or is holding office. For the rule is that

outside its territorial limits, the court has no power to enforce its order.7

Section 3 of Rule 5 of the Rules of Court does not apply to determine venue of this

action. Applicable is Sec. 1 the same rule, which states:

Sec. 1. General rule. Civil actions in Courts of First Instance may be

commenced and tried where the defendant any of the defendants residents or

may be found or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the

election of the plaintiff.

Accordingly, the Petition for injunction who correctly filed in the Court of First Instanceof Manila. Respondents Secretary of Public Works and Communications and Julian

Cargullo are found and hold office in the City of Manila.

3. The lower court tried this case de novo. Against this procedure respondents objected

and maintained that the action, although captioned as an injunction is really a petition

for certiorarito review the decision of the Secretary of Public Works and

Communications. Therefore they now contend that the court should have confined itself

to reviewing the decisions of the respondent Secretary of Public Works and

Communications only on the basis of the evidence presented in the administrative

proceedings. On the other hand, Roman Santos now, submits that the action is a

proceeding independent and distinct from the administrative investigation; that,

accordingly, the lower court correctly acted in trying the case anew and renderingjudgment upon evidence adduced during the trial.

Whether the action instituted in the Court of First Instance be for mandamus, injunction

or certiorariis not very material. In reviewing the decision of the Secretary of Public

Works and Communications, the Court of First Instance shall confine its inquiry to the

evidence presented during, the administrative proceedings. Evidence not presented

therein shall not be admitted, and considered by the trial court. As aptly by this Court

speaking through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, in a similar case:

The findings of the Secretary can not be enervated by new evidence not laid

before him, for that would be tantamount to holding a new investigation, and

to substitute for the discretion and judgment of the Secretary the discretion

and judgment of the court, to whom the statute had not entrusted the case. It

is immaterial that the present action should be one for prohibition or injunction

and not one for certiorari; in either event the case must be resolved upon the

evidence submitted to the Secretary, since a judicial review of executive

decisions does not import a trial de novo, but only an ascertainment of whether

the "executive findings are not in violation of the Constitution or of the laws,


16/31

and are free from fraud or imposition, and whether they find reasonable

support in the evidence. . . .8

The case at bar, no matter what the parties call it, is in reality a review of several

administrative decisions of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Being

so, it was error for the lower court to conduct a trial de novo. Accordingly, for purposes

of this review, only the evidence presented and admitted in the administrative

investigation will be considered in our determination of whether on the basis thereof

the decisions of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications were correct.

4. We come to the question whether the streams involved in this case belong to the

public domain or to the owner of Hacienda San Esteban. If said streams are public, then

Republic Act 2056 applies, if private, then the Secretary of Public Works and

Communications cannot order demolition of the dikes and dams across them pursuant

to his authority granted by said law.

First, we come to the question of the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 2056. The

lower court held Republic Act No. 2056 constitutional but ruled that it was applied by

respondents unconstitutionally. That is, it held that Roman Santos was being deprived of

his property without due process of law, for the dikes of his fishponds were ordered

demolished through an administrative, instead of a judicial, proceeding. This conclusionand rationalization of the lower court amount in effect to declaring the law

unconstitutional, stated inversely. Note that the law provides for an expeditious

administrative process to determine whether or not a dam or dike should be declare a

public nuisance and ordered demolished. And to say that such an administrative

process, when put to operation, is unconstitutional is tantamount to saying that the law

itself violates the Constitution. In Lovina vs. Moreno,supra, We held said law

constitutional. We see no reason here to hold otherwise.

Discussing now the applicability of Republic Act 2056, the same applies to two types of

bodies of water, namely (1)public navigable rivers, streams, coastal waters, or

waterways and (b) areas declared as communal fishing grounds, as provided for in

Section 1 thereof:

Sec. 1. . . . the construction or building of dams, dikes or any other works which

encroaches into any public navigable river, stream, coastal waters and any

other navigable public waters or waterways as well as the construction or

building of dams, dikes or any other works in areas declared as communal

fishing grounds, shall be ordered removed as public nuisances or as prohibited

constructions as herein provided: . . .

We are not concerned with communal fishing grounds because the streams here

involved have not been so declared, but with public navigable streams. The question

therefore is: Are the streams in Hacienda San Esteban which are mentioned in the

petition of Benigno Musni and others, public and navigable?

Respondents contend that said streams are public on the following grounds:

(1) Hacienda San Esteban was formerly a marshland and being so, it is not susceptible to

appropriation. It therefore belongs to the State. Respondents rely on Montano vs.Insular Government, 12 Phil. 572.

(2) The streams in question are natural streams. They are tributaries of publ ic streams.

Cited are the cases ofSamson vs. Dionisio, et al., 11 Phil. 538 and Bautista vs. Alarcon, 23

Phil. 636.

(3) The streams have for their source public rivers, therefore they cannot be classified as

canals.

(4) Assuming the streams were artificially made by Ayala y Cia., said titleholder lost

ownership over them by prescription when it allowed the public to use them for

navigation for a long time. Respondents cite Mercado vs. Municipal President of

Macabebe, 59 Phil. 592.

(5) Assuming the streams in question are not mentioned as public in the certificates of

title held by Ayala y Cia., over Hacienda San Esteban, still they cannot be considered as

privately owned for Section 39 of Act 496 expressly excepts public streams from private

ownership.

(6) The Panopio Report, which found the streams in question of private ownership was

nullified by the Secretary of Justice in his opinion dated June 12, 1935.1awphil.netAnd,

the contract between Ayala y Cia., and the Secretary of Commerce and Communications

agreeing on the ownership of the streams in question is ultra vires.

The doctrine in Montano vs. Insular Government, supra, that a marshland which is

inundated by the rise of the tides belongs to the State and is not susceptible to

appropriation by occupation has no application here inasmuch as in said case the

land subject matter of the litigation was not yet titled and precisely Isabelo Montano

sought title thereon on the strength of ten years' occupation pursuant to paragraph 6,

section 54 of Act 926 of the Philippine Commission. Whereas, the subject matter in this


17/31

case Hacienda San Esteban is titled land and private ownership thereof by Ayala y

Cia., has been recognized by the King of Spain and later by the Philippine Government

when the same was registered under Act 496.

Respondents further cite Bautista vs. Alarcon, 23 Phil. 631, where the plaintiff sought

injunction against the defendants who allegedly constructed a dam across a public canal

which conveyed water from the Obando River to fishponds belonging to several

persons. The canal was situated within a public land. In sustaining the injunction granted

by the Court of First Instance, this Court said:

No private persons has right to usurp possession of a watercourse, branch of a

river, or lake of the public domain and use, unless it shall have been proved that

he constructed the same within in property of his exclusive ownership , and such

usurpation constitutes a violation of the legal provisions which explicity exclude

such waterways from the exclusive use or possession of a private party.

(Emphasis supplied)

As indicated in the above-cited case, a private person may take possession of a

watercourse if he constructed the same within his property.itc-alfThis puts Us into

inquiry whether the streams in question are natural or artificial. In so doing, We shall

examine only the evidence presented before the Department of Public Works and

Communications and disregard that which was presented for the first time before the

lower court, following our ruling in Lovina vs. Moreno, supra.

(1) Sapang Macanduling Maragul or Macanduli is presently enclosed in Fishpond No. 12

of Roman Santos. Its banks cannot anymore be seen but some traces of them could be

noted by a row of isolated nipa palms. Its water is subject to the rise and fall of the tides

coming from Guagua and Antipolo Rivers and it is navigable by light watercrafts. Its inlet

is Antipolo River; another dike at its outlet along the Palapat River.9It is closed by four

dikes: One dike at its inlet along the Antipolo River; another dike at its cutlet along the

Palatpat River; and, two dikes in between. Then exist channel at the Palapat River where

the fishpond gate lies has been filled up with dredge spoils from the Pampanga River

Control Project.

(2) Sapang Macabacle is found in Fishpond No. 13. Its banks are still evident. This

stream is about 30 meters wide, two meters deep and one and one-half to two

kilometers long. Its source is Rio Cansusu. Like Macanduli, its channel is obstructed by

four dikes. One of them was constructed by the engineers of the Pampanga River

Control Project.

(3) Sapang Balbaro which is found in Fishpond No. 13, runs from Canal Enrique near Rio

Cansusu to Sapang Macabacle, a distance of about one-half kilometer. It is passable by

banca. The closures of this stream consist of two dikes located at each ends on Canal

Enrique and Sapang Macabacle.

(4) Sapang Cansusu is a continuation of the Cansusu River. The Cansusu River opens at

the Guagua River and allegedly ends at the Palanas River in front of Barrio San Esteban.

At a point near the mouth of Sapang Balbaro, the owners of Hacienda San Esteban built

a canal leading straight to one end of Barrio San Esteban. They called th is canal "CanalEnrique." And at the point where Canal Enrique joins Cansusu they built a dike across

Cansusu, thus closing this very portion of the river which extends up to Palanas River

where they built another closure dike. This closed portion, called "Sapang Cansusu," is

now part of Fishpond No. 1.

Sapang Cansusu is half a kilometer long and navigable by banca.

Appellant's witnesses, Beligno Musni, 41, Macario Quiambao, 96, Roman Manansala, 55

and Castor Quiambao, 76, all residents of Barrio San Esteban, testified that prior to their

closure, Sapang Macaduli, Macabacle, Balbaro and Cansusu were used as passageway

and as fishing grounds; that people transported through them tuba,10

wood

and sasa,11and that the tuba was brought to the distillery in Barrio San Esteban.Macario Quiambao testified also that said four streams "were created by God for the

town people"; and that if any digging was done it was only to deepen the shallow parts

to make passage easier. According to witness Anastacio Quiambao said streams were

navigable, even Yangco's ship "Cababayan" could pass through. Simplicio Quiambao, 36,

and Marcelino Ocampo, 55, stated on direct examination that before closure of the

above named four streams, people from the surrounding towns of Guagua, Bacolor,

Macabebe, Masantol and Sexmoan fished and navigated in them.

Against the aforementioned, testimonial evidence Roman Santos presented the

testimony of Nicanor Donarber, 80, Mariano Guinto, 71, and his own. Donarber, who

started working as an arundin12

testified that Ayala y Cia., dug Sapang Macanduli,

Balbaro

Documents

Property Cases 12-01