Property Relations Filiation

CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 1

VOID DONATIONS BY THE SPOUSES: DONATIONS IN COMMON LAW MARRIAGES

MATABUENA VS. CERVANTES

BY APORTADERA

On 20 February 1956, Felix Matabuena executed a Deed of Donation inter vivos in favor of Petronila Cervantes during the time they were living as husband and wife in a common law relationship. They were later married on 28 March 1962. Felix died intestate on 13 September 1962. Cornelia Matabuena, being the sole sister and nearest and nearest relative to Felix, questioned the validity of the donation claiming that the ban on donation between spouses during a marriage applies to a common-law relationship. She had the land declared on her name and paid the estate and inheritance taxes thereon on virtue of an affidavit of self-adjudication executed by her in 1962. On 23 November 1965, the lower court upheld the validity of the donation as it was made before Cervantes’ marriage to the donor. Hence, the appeal.

Whether the Article 133 of the civil code applies to donations between live-in partners?

While Article 133 of the Civil Code considers as void a “donation between the spouses during the marriage,” policy considerations of the most exigent character as well as the dictates of morality require that the same prohibition should apply to a common-law relationship, as it is contrary to public policy. The law prohibits donations in favor of the other consort and his descendants because of fear of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the donor, a prejudice deeply rooted in ancient law. Whatever omission may be apparent in an interpretation purely literal of the language used must be remedied by an adherence to its avowed objective. It is a principle of statutory construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of it as what is written. Otherwise the basic purpose discernible in such codal provision would not be attained. The Supreme Court (1) reversed the 23 November 1965 decision of the lower court; (2) declared the questioned donation void and recognized the rights of plaintiff and defendant as pro indiviso heirs to the property; and (3) remanded the case to the lower court for its appropriate disposition in accordance with the current decision; without pronouncement as to costs.

PROPERTY RELATIONS FOR MARRIAGES BEFORE THE FAMILY CODE

DELIZO VS. DELIZO

BY APORTADERA

Nicolas Delizo contracted two marriages. The first was with Rosa Vilasfer, from 1891 until her death in 1909, a period of 18 years. The second with Dorotea de Ocampo, from 1911 until the death of Nicolas in 1957, or a period of 46 years.

The action for partition was instituted in 1957 by the 3 children and the heirs of the first marriage, all against their father, Nicolas Delizo, and his second wife, Dorotea de Ocampo, and their nine 9 children, the herein petitioners-appellants.

Involved are the properties acquired by Nicolas Delizo, among which are 66 hectares of agricultural lands in Caanawan, San Jose City, Nueva Ecija; 58 hectares of riceland in Muñoz of the same province; and a lot in Manila.

It was found by both the TC and the CA that the Caanawan lands were acquired as homesteads during the existence of the first marriage of Nicolas Delizo to Rosa Villasfer and there being no affirmative showing that they belonged exclusively to said Nicolas Delizo, should therefore correspond to the first conjugal partnership of Nicolas Delizo and Rosa Villasfer.

With regards to the other properties, the CA found that these were all acquired during the existence of the second marriage of Nicolas Delizo. However, since these properties were acquired from the produce of the Caanawan properties although such produce is the result of the labor and industry of the spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo, only eighty per cent (80%) of said properties acquired during the second marriage should appertain to the second conjugal partnership, while twenty per cent (20%) thereof adjudicated to the children of the first marriage.

Whether the property acquired by homestead is conjugal property of the 1st or 2nd

marriage?

From the findings of the Appellate Court that 66 hectares of the Caanawan properties were acquired by Nicolas Delizo as homesteads during the period of the first marriage, it does not necessarily follow that they should be considered as properties of the first marriage, considering that being homesteads they were part of the public domain, and it was not shown that all the requirements of the Homestead Law to warrant the grant of a patent to the homesteader have been complied with prior to the death in 1909 of Delizo's first wife, Rosa Villasfer. Under Act 926, which was then the applicable law, the right of the homesteader to the patent does not become absolute until after he has complied with all the requirements of the law. The decisive factor, therefore, in the determination of whether a parcel of land acquired by way of homestead is conjugal property of the first or the second marriage, is not necessarily the time of the issuance of the homestead patent but the time of the fulfillment of the requirements of the public land law for the acquisition of such right to the patent. What was transferred to Nicolas Delizo were not rights of ownership, but inchoate rights as applicants for homesteads over portions of the public domain. Having received the homestead only in 1905, Nicolas Delizo could not have perfected his rights thereon by the completion of the five-year occupancy and cultivation requirement of the law, in 1909. The CA erred in, holding that the entire Caanawan properties belong to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage of Nicolas Delizo and Rosa Villasfer. Considering, however, that about twenty (20) hectares were cultivated and rendered productive during the period from 1905 to 1909, judgment and equity demand that the rights to said properties be apportioned to the parties in proportion to the extent to which the requirements of the public land laws had been complied with during the existence of each conjugal partnership. In connection with the other properties, the CA held that "there is no controversy that these were all acquired during the existence of the second marriage of Nicolas Delizo." Since these properties were acquired from the produce of the Caanawan properties although such produce is the result of the labor and industry of the spouses Nicolas Delizo and Dorotea de Ocampo, only eighty per cent (80%) of said properties acquired during the second marriage should appertain to the second conjugal partnership, while twenty per cent (20%) thereof adjudicated to the children of the first marriage. It would have been facile to hold that those after-acquired properties belong to the second conjugal partnership in view of the statutory presumption enunciated in Article 1407 of the old Civil Code (now Article 160, New Civil Code). There are, however, important considerations which preclude Us from doing so. There is the established fact that the produce of the Caanawan lands contributed considerably to the acquisition.

CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF GAINS

APORTADERA, BALANE, BERNARDINO, GALVAN, LAGASCA, LEYNES, ORILLAZA, ROCAMORA, SANTOS, SAWIT, TRINIDAD, VALDEZUnauthorized distribution & non-submission shall merit expulsion.

CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 2BALLADOS VS.

COURT OF APPEALS

BY APORTADERA

JOCSON VS. COURT OF APPEALS

BY LAGASCA

ANSALDO VS. SHERIFF

BY LAGASCA

CASTRO VS. MIAT

BY LAGASCAWHEN CPG COMMENCES AND APPLIES?

PNB VS. QUINTOS

BY LAGASCA

EXCLUDED FROM CPG: EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY

LAPERAL VS. KATIGBAK

BY LAGASCA

BARCILLES VS. GSIS

BY TRINIDAD

Judge Pascual Berciles died of cardiac arrest. His retirement benefits, unpaid salary, retirement premiums and terminal leave and representation and transportation allowances are being contested in this case by two families. Iluminada Ponce Berciles and her four children Ilona, Ellery, England and Ione (lawful heirs) allege that they are the lawful legal heirs of the deceased. Iluminada presents as proof, evidence of her marriage with the deceased which entitled her and their legitimate children to a share in the said benefits. On the other hand, Flor Fuentebella and her four children Pascual Voltaire, Maria Luisa, Mercy and Rhoda (contending claimants) also claim a share in the benefits.

The GSIS resolved to grant the benefits in the following proportion:77/134 for Iluminada as surviving spouse;10/134 each for the legitimate children Ilona, Ellery, England and Ione;5/134 for Pascual Voltaire as acknowledged natural child;4/134 each for the illegitimate children Maria Luisa, Mercy and Rhoda.

Both parties appealed. The lawful heirs contend that the GSIS ruling is erroneous, that they are the only legal heirs under the law. The contending claimants also appealed claiming that they should be the only ones entitled to the benefits.

Is the GSIS decision valid?

NO

The marriage between Iluminada and the deceased was sufficiently proved and ruled upon by this court, fully supported by appropriate evidence as certified by the civil registry therefore the four children begotten by said spouses during their marital union are all legitimate. They are entitled to their share in the benefits. The marriage between Flor and the deceased was not proved. She only presented a certification that their marriage records could not be found or located in the civil registry. As to Pascual Voltaire, his paternity cannot be sufficiently proved. His birth certificate was not signed by either the father or mother and under the law, if the alleged father did not intervene in the birth certificate, the putting of his name by the mother or doctor or registrar is null and void. Pascual Voltaire therefore cannot be considered as an acknowledged natural child. Under the law, illegitimate children are entitled to support and such successional rights so long as there is admission or recognition of paternity. As a result, the illegitimate children of Flor cannot share in the benefits as the marriage between Flor and the deceased was not sufficiently proved and paternity was not established. The retirement benefits and the terminal leave pay, unpaid salary and allowances accruing to the deceased shall be distributed equally to the 5 heirs: Iluminada, Ilona, Ellery, England and Ione. As to the retirement premiums, the same is presumed conjugal, there being no proof that the premiums were paid from the exclusive funds of the deceased. One half belongs to the wife as her property in the conjugal partnership and the other half shall go to the estate of the deceased to be distributed to his legal heirs.



EXCLUDED FROM CPG: ACQUISITIONS BY GRATUITOUS TITLE DURING THE MARRIAGE

VELOSO VS. MARTINEZ

BY TRINIDAD

Lucia Martinez is the widow of Domingo Franco and administratrix of his estate. Before Domingo died, he borrowed Php 4,500 from Mariano Veloso secured by jewelry. Veloso claims the husband pawned the jewelry to him with full knowledge and consent of Martinez. Martinez claims that the jewelry in question was her own property, inherited from her mother.

Who is entitled to the jewelry?

MARTINEZ.

The record shows that the jewels were the sole and separate property of the wife, acquired from her mother, and in the absence of further proof, we must presume that they constituted a part of her paraphernal property. As such paraphernal property she exercised dominion over the same. (Article 1382, Civil Code.) She had the exclusive control and management of the same, until and unless she had delivered it to her husband, before a notary public, with the intent that the husband might administer it properly. (Article 1384, Civil Code.) There is no proof in the record that she had ever delivered the same to her husband, in any manner, or for any purpose. That being true, she could not be deprived of the same by any act of her husband, without her consent, and without compliance with the provisions of the Civil Code above cited.

EXCLUDED FROM CPG: ACQUISITION BY REDEMPTION

PLATA VS. YATCO

BY TRINIDAD

Amalia Plata while single, sold a parcel of land to Celso Saldaña. The latter again resold the property to “Amalia Plata, married to Gaudencio Begosa.” In consideration of a Php 3,000 loan, "Amalia Plata of legal age, Filipino, married to Gaudencio Begosa" mortgaged the identical property to Cesarea Villanueva, signed by Gaudencio Begosa as co-mortgagor. The mortgage was foreclosed extrajudicially and Villanueva obtained said property by being the highest bidder. Villanueva sued Begosa for illegal detainer and obtained judgment that became final. A writ of execution was issued but Plata resisted all efforts to eject her from her property and filed a claim averring ownership of the property.

Is Plata bound by the detainer/judgment against Begosa?

NO

She had acquired the property while still single. Evidence before us against the marriage of petitioner Amalia Plata to Gaudencio Begosa is weak. The subsequent conveyance thereof to Celso Saldaña, and the reconveyance of her several months afterward of the same property, did not transform it from paraphernal to conjugal property, there being no proof that the money paid to Saldaña came from common or conjugal funds. The deed of mortgage in favor of respondents Villanueva actually recites that the petitioner was the owner of the tenement in question and so does the conveyance of it by Saldaña to her. Since the property was paraphernal, and the creditors and purchasers were aware of it, the fact being clearly spread on the land records, it is plain that Plata's possession, therefore, was not derived from Gaudencio Begosa. The illegal detainer judgment against the husband alone cannot bind nor affect the wife's possession of her paraphernal, which by law she holds and administers independently, and which she may even encumber or alienate without his knowledge or consent.

LIM VS. GARCIA

BY SAWIT

Hilario Lim died intestate some time in the year 1903, leaving a widow (Isabela Garcia) and nine children and an interest in an estate valued at some 50,000 pesos EXCEPT:

1. A house and lot on Calle Magallanes, Zamboanga, and the sum of 10,000 pesos which, it was admitted, had been brought to the marriage by the said Hilario Lim

2. 700 pesos, the purchase price paid by said Lim for a certain lot which it was also admitted had been brought by him to his marriage, and which was sold in the course of the administration of his estate, together with improvements

TC - the entire estate as shown in the inventory prepared by the administrator was conjugal property.

Counsel for the administrator,surviving children - none of the said property should be treated as the property of the conjugal partnership, because, as they allege, the deceased Hilario Lim, brought to the marriage property worth more than double the amount of the intestate estate, and the defendant, his widow, brought nothing to the conjugal partnership, either at the time of the marriage or at any time thereafter.

Should the property be considered conjugal?

YES

The TC was of opinion that the evidence offered in support of this contention was not sufficient to overcome the presumption established in article 1407 of the Civil Code, which provides that all the estate of the married couple will be considered as conjugal partnership property ( bienes gananciales ) unless and until it is proven that it is a part of the separate estate of the husband or the wife, and we think after a careful examination of the record that this finding must be sustained. The setting aside of 700 pesos (which appears to have been taken as the value of the lot sold during the administration) as the separate property of the husband who brought the lot to the marriage, and the treatment of the balance of the price received for this lot, together with the buildings thereon, as conjugal partnership property, it appearing from the record that these buildings were constructed out of the conjugal partnership funds, was in entire accordance with the provisions of article 1404, which provides that "the buildings erected during coverture on land belonging to one of the married couple will be considered as conjugal partnership property, after allowing the owner of the land the value thereof." The foregoing disposes of all the errors assigned by counsel for the appellant, except the alleged error of the trial court in refusing to order the inclusion in the inventory of the estate of the deceased of three parcels of land, held in the name of the appellee and claimed as her separate estate. It is contended by the appellant that these parcels of land were conveyed to the appellee during the coverture (that’s marriage, incase you’re wondering) by the said Hilario Lim either as a gift or for valuable consideration, and that in either event such conveyance was void under the provisions of articles 1334 and 1458 of the Civil Code. It appears from the evidence, however, that these parcels of land were not acquired by the appellee by conveyance from her husband, and that they were in fact conveyed to her by third parties by way of exchange for certain property inherited by her from her father's estate during the coverture, and they are, therefore, her separate property under the provisions of paragraph 3 of article 1396, which provides that property acquired by exchange for other property belonging


CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 4separately to one of the married couple is the separate property of the owner of the property for which it is exchanged. The trial court speaks of this property as dowry of the appellee, but there is nothing in the record which tends to prove that it was acquired as a part of her dowry, and indeed the evidence strongly supports the presumption that it was and continued to be a part of her separate estate (paraphernalia) which never acquired the "dotal" character.

CPG: ADMINISTRATION OF EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY BY THE OTHER SPOUSE

VELOSO VS. MARTINEZ

BY SAWIT

MANOTOK REALTY VS. COURT OF

APPEALS

BY SAWIT

Felipe Madlangawa claims that he has been occupying a parcel of land in the Clara de Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision since 1949 upon permission being obtained from Andres Ladores, then an overseer of the subdivision, with the understanding that the respondent would eventually buy the lot.

Apr 2,’50 - the owner of the lot, Clara Tambunting, died and her entire estate, including her paraphernal properties which covered the lot occupied by the private respondent were placed under custodia legis.

Apr 28,’50 - Don Vicente Legarda was appointed as a special administrator of the estate. Meanwhile the private respondent remained in possession of the lot in question.

Mar 13,20,’59 - Manotok Raealty became the successful bidder and vendee of the Tambunting de Legarda Subdivision pursuant to the deeds of sale executed in its favor by the Philippine Trust Company, as administrator of the Testate Estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda. The lot in dispute was one of those covered by the sale. The Deed of Sale, among others, provided for the following terms and conditions:

The VENDEE renounces the right to warranty in case of eviction with the knowledge of the risks of eviction and assumes its consequences with respect not only to the lots subject-of the above mentioned cases and claims but also with respect to any other lots subject of contracts of sale or promises to sell that may have been executed by the deceased, Clara Tambunting de Legarda and/or Vicente L. Legarda, and it hereby relieves the estate of Clara Tambunting de Legarda and the Philippine Trust Company, in its capacity as Administrator thereof, of any and all liability with respect thereto in case of eviction.

The VENDEE assumes the risk and expenses of ejecting the tenants or squatters on the said parcels of land if it decides to eject them

In its effort to clear the Tambunting Subdivision of its squatters and occupants, the Manotok Realty caused the publication of several notices in the Manila Times and the Taliba advising the occupants to vacate their respective premises, otherwise, court action with damages would follow. Madlangawa was one of the many occupants who refused to vacate the lots they were occupying

TC dismissed the petitioner's action. CA ruled that the only right remaining to the petitioner is to enforce the collection of the balance because accordingly, it stepped into the shoes of its predecessor (Don Vicente Legarda).

Manotok Realty - Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in holding that the sale by Don Vicente Legarda in favor of the private respondent is valid, binding, and enforceable against the

Whether Don Vicente Legarda could vlidly dispose of the paraphernal property?

NO

There is nothing in the records that will show that Don Vicente Legarda was the administrator of the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara Tambunting during the lifetime of the latter. Thus, it cannot be said that the sale which was entered into by the private respondent and Don Vicente Legarda had its inception before the death of Dona Clara Tambunting and was entered into by the former for and on behalf of the latter, but was only consummated after her death. Don Vicente Legarda, therefore, could not have validly disposed of the lot in dispute as a continuing administrator of the paraphernal properties of Dona Clara Tambunting.

Art. 136 NCC. The wife retains the ownership of the paraphernal property. Art. 137 NCC. The wife shall have the administration of the paraphernal property, unless she delivers the same to the husband by means of a public instrument empowering him to administer it. In this case, the public instrument shall be recorded in the Registry of Property. As for the movables, the husband shall give adequate security.

We are, therefore, led to the inevitable conclusion that the sale between Don Vicente Legarda and the private respondent is void ab initio, the former being neither an owner nor administrator of the subject property. Such being the case, the sale cannot be the subject of the ratification by the Philippine Trust Company or the probate court.

Arsenal v. Intermediate Appellate Court (143 SCRA 40, 49) - Under the provisions of the Civil Code, a void contract is inexistent from the beginning. It cannot be ratified neither can the right to set up the defense of its illegality be waived. (Art. 1409, Civil Code).

After the appointment of Don Vicente Legarda as administrator of the estate of Dona Clara Tambunting, he should have applied before the probate court for authority to sell the disputed property in favor of the private respondent. If the probate court approved the request, then Don Vicente Legarda would have been able to execute a valid deed of sale in favor of the respondent. Unfortunately, there was no effort on the part of the administrator to comply with the above-quoted rule of procedure nor on that of the respondent to protect his interests or to pay the balance of the installments to the court appointed administrator.


CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 5petitioner. Since there is no dispute that the property in question was the paraphernal property of Clara Tambunting, who died on April 2, 1950, Vicente Legarda had no authority whatsoever to sell the said property to the private respondent on May 12, 1950 since the former was appointed as administrator of the estate of Clara Tambunting only on August 28, 1950. Therefore, the questioned sale could not have bound Clara Tambunting's estate because the vendor Vicente Legarda neither acted as the owner nor the administrator of the subject property when the alleged sale took place.

Madlangawa - the provisions of the deed of sale are a declaration or admission against the interest of the petitioner, and shows that the acts of Vicente Legarda had been ratified by the Philippine Trust Company and approved by the probate court. The petitioner, therefore, is allegedly estopped from questioning the authority of Vicente Legarda in selling the property in dispute.

CPG: ENCUMBRANCE / DISPOSITION OF EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY

PALANCA VS. SMITH BELL

BY SAWIT

Smith, Bell , pending in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila obtained a judgment against the said Emiliano Boncan for a sum of money. Later the said Smith, Bell & Co. obtained an execution out of said court which was levied upon the property in question in this case, which property was known as No. 16, situated in an alley without name running toward the old Santa Mesa race track, upon property belonging to the hacienda of Tuason & Co. After said execution was levied upon the property in question, the plaintiff and appellant herein commenced an action in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila against the defendant herein, asking that said court dictate a sentence declaring her to be the only and exclusive owner of the property described in the complaint, with a right to the possession of the same, and that said attachment be dissolved. To this petition the defendants filed a general denial. After hearing the evidence adduced during the trial of the cause, the lower court denied the prayer of the petition of the plaintiff and appellant, absolving the defendants therefrom and charged the plaintiff with the costs. From this decision the plaintiff appealed to this court and made the following assignment of error - The court erred in not allowing as proven the transfer of property No. 16, above described, made on September 20, 1904, by Emiliano Boncan Yap in favor of his wife, Alejandra Palanca de Boncan, and in not finding that she is the sole and exclusive owner thereof, Emiliano Boncan Yap having no interest whatever in the property in question.

Is the property conjugal property?

YES

An examination of the evidence brought to this court shows that the said Alejandra Palanca was the owner of certain property in the city of Manila, which was given by the said Emiliano Boncan, with the consent of the said Alejandra Palanca, as a guaranty for the payment of the sum of P14,000, which Emiliano Boncan borrowed from the International Banking Corporation. With the money so borrowed the said Emiliano Boncan constructed the house in question, and later, by a public document executed on the 20th of September, 1904, conveyed the house in question to the plaintiff and appellant herein as a guaranty for the payment of the debt to the International Banking Corporation, for the guaranty of the payment of which the said plaintiff and appellant had given her private property. This P14,000, borrowed by the said Emiliano Boncan upon the credit of the property of his wife, became conjugal property (paragraph 3, art. 1401, Civil Code), and when the same was reinvested in the construction of a house, the house became conjugal property and was liable for the payment of the debts of the husband. (Art. 1408, Civil Code.) Believing that the foregoing conclusions in effect answer the assignments of error made by the appellant, and without discussing the same in detail, we are of the opinion, and so hold, that the judgment of the lower court should be affirmed, with costs. So ordered.

LIM QUENCO VS. CARTAGENE

BY SAWIT

SPANISH

PRESUMPTION OF CPG

TORELA VS. TORELA

BY ROCAMORA

Decree 440157 was issued by the CFI of Negros Occidental in favor of Felimon Torela, married to Gallego, decreeing that he is the owner of a parcel of land (Lot 3770), and ordering that the same be registered. Consequently, OCT 29257 covering lot was issued in favor of Felimon. As the certificate of title was either lost or destroyed during the last world war, he filed a verified petition for reconstitution praying that after due publication in the Official Gazette, an order be issued setting the petition for hearing. Thereafter the court, orders the Register of Deeds to reconstitute the original as well as the owner’s duplicate of OCT 29257. Thus, OCT 6898 was in favor of Felimon, in lieu of the lost and/or destroyed one. Torela, filed a Motion Ex-Parte alleging that Lot. 3770 having been acquired by him by way of inheritance prior to his marriage to his first wife, Graciana Galeego, the Cadastral court ordered that land be registered in the name of Torela, married to Graciana Galeego, that his first wife died many years ago; and that he is married by second nuptial to Marciana Gepanago. He, therefore, prayed that the court order the Register of Deeds of Negros Occidental to change his (movant’s) civil status, appearing on the face of OCT,

Whether or not the parcel of land herein involved is a conjugal property of the spouses Felimon Torela and Graciana Gallego (plaintiffs’ mother).

The property question is one of those documented in Article 1401 of the Old Civil Code. On the other hand, as it was inherited by Felimon from his parents and brought to the marriage with his first wife, the same is deemed his separate property (Art, 1396, Old Civil Code). For these reasons, defendant Felimon had lawfully disposed of his property to the exclusion of his children by his first marriage. Accordingly, plaintiffs’ complaint was correctly dismissed by the court below. Petitioners claim that since the lot in questions was registered in the name of Felimon Torela, married to Graciana Gallego, it must be presumed to be the conjugal property of Felimon and Graciana so that one-half thereof should be adjudicated to them as their inheritance from their mother. While it is rule that all property of the marriage is presumed to be conjugal, as above stated, nonetheless the party who invoke the presumption must first prove that the property was acquired during the marriage. This proof is a condition sine qua not for the application of the presumption. In the instant case there in is nothing in the record to show that the lot in question was acquired during the marriage of Felimon Torela and Graciana gallego. On the contrary, the factual finding of the CA is to the effect


CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 6from Felimon, married to Graciana Gallego to Felimon Torella married to Marciana Gepango”. The court, finding no opposition thereto and with the conformity of Clara Torela, daughter of Felimon by First marriage, granted the motion and ordered the Register of Deeds to change the civil status of the movant from “Felimon Torela, married to Marciana Gepanto which is the actual civil status of the movant, upon payment of the required fees. Felimon executed a definite deed of sale, whereby, for and in consideration of P3,000.00, he sold said lot to Marcos and Maria Luna Mahilum, He also stated in the deed of sale that he was a widower by first marriage to Graciana Gallego, and now married to Marcina Gepango, that he is the registered owner of lot, having acquired it by inheritance from his parents before his marriage to Graciana Gallego, deceased. The document was acknowledged before Notary Public. Upon its registration, Transfer Certificate was issued to spouses. According, however, to the plaintiffs while in their youth they had seen their father Felimon and their mother Graciana clean the lot in question, and when their mother died, their father married Marcina Gepango. In other words, the plaintiffs want us to believe that the parcel of land is a status and in conveying the land to another, they now assert their right to the estate appertaining to their mother. Alleging that they were deprived of their corresponding share from the property thus sold.

that Felimon acquired the land through inheritance and this conclusion is bolstered by that fact that no one of the petitioners herein, Clara Torela, gave her conformity to her father’s Ex-Parte Motion, wherein it was recited, inter alia, that Felimon had acquired the property by way of inheritance prior to his marriage to his first wife, Graciana Gallego. The circumstances that Decree 440157 of the CFI of Negros Occidental which confirmed the ownership of Felimon over the land in question described him as married to Graciana Gallego was merely descriptive of his civil status at that time and cannot be taken as proof that the land was acquired during their coverture. The further circumstances that the land was registered during their marriage cannot in itself constitute proof that it was acquired during their marriage for land registration under Act. 496 does not confer title; it confirms a title already existing and which is registerable.

PNB VS. COURT OF APPEALS

BY ROCAMORA

Clodualdo Vitug died intestate so his estate was settled and distributed in special Proceeding 422 in the CFI of Pampanga wherein Donata Montemayor, his second wife, was the Administratrix.

Meanwhile, Donata Montemayor executed a contract of lease of Lot 24, which is covered by TCT 2887-R in favor of her children Pragmacio and Maximo both surnamed Vitug. This lease was extended. By virtue of a general power od attorney executed by Donata Montemayor in favor of Pragmacio Vitug, the latter executed a contract of lease of the said lot in favor of Maximo Vitug.

Pragmacio Vitug and Maximo Vitug filed an action for partition and reconveyance with damages in the CFI of Pampanga against Marcelo Mendiola, special administrator of the estate of Donata Montemayor who died earlier, Jesus Vitug, Sr., Salvador, Natalia, Prudencio all surnamed Vitug, Antonio, Francisco, Aurora, Pedro, Honorio, Corazon, Anselmo, Benigno, Eligio Jesusand Luz all surnamed Fajardo and the PNB.

The subject of the action is 30 parcels of land which they claim to be conjugal property of the spouses Donata Motemayor and Clodualdo Vitug of which they claim a share of 2/11 of ½ thereof. They assailed the mortgage to the PNB and the public auction of the properties as null and void. They invoked the case of Vitug vs. Motemayor, decided on Oct. 20, 1953 which is an action for partition and liquidation of the said 30 parcels of land wherein the properties were found to be conjugal in nature.

Does the presumption of conjugal life of properties acquired by the spouses during coverture provided for in Article 160 of the Civil Code apply to properties covered by a Torrens certificate of title in the name of the widow?

When the properties were mortgaged to the PNB, they were registered in the name of Donata Montemayor, widow. Relying on the Torrens certificate of title covering properties, the mortgage loan applications of Donata were granted by the PNB and the mortgage were duly constituted and registered in the office of the Registered of Deeds. In processing the loan applications of Donata Montemaor, the PNB had the right to rely on what appears in the certificates of title and no more. On its face the properties owned by Donata Montemayor, a widow. The PNB had no reason to doubt nor question the status of said registered owner and her ownership thereof. Indeed, there are no liens and encumbrances covering the same. The well known rule in this jurisdiction is that a person dealing with a registered land gas a right to rely upon the face of the torrens certificate of title and to dispose with the need if inquiring further, except when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautions man make such inquiry. Article 160: “All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife.” The presumption applies to property acquired during the lifetime of the husband and wife. In this case, it appears on the face of the title that the properties were acquired by Donata Montemayor when she was already a widow. When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property was acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. The PNB had no reason to rely on what appears on the certificates of the title of the properties mortgaged. For all legal purpose, the PNB is a mortgagee in good faith for at the time the mortgage covering said properties were constituted the PNB was not aware to any flow of the title of the mortgagor. At any rate, although actions for recovery of real property and partitions are real actions, however, they are actions in personal that bind only the particular individuals who are parties thereto. The PNB not being a party in said is not bound by the said decisions. Nor does it appear that the PNB was aware of the said decisions when it extended the above descriptive mortgage loans. Indeed, if the PNB knew of the conjugal nature of said properties it would not have approved the mortgage applications covering said properties of Donata Montemayor without requiring the consent of all other heirs or co-owners thereof. Moreover, when said properties were sold at public auction, the PNB was a purchaser for value in good faith. So its right thereto is beyond question.

MAGALLON VS. MONTEJO

The petition seeks the annulment of a writ of execution issued by the respondent Judge. Case was instituted by the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) against Martin Lacerna to compel partition of parcel of land in Magsaysay, Davao del Sur, to which defendant had perfected a claim by

Is petitioner bound by final judgment rendered in an

This ruling presumes that petitioner is the legal wife of Lacerna though no marriage contract was presented by Lacerna to prove his marriage to the petitioner either before or after the death of Eustaquia. Indeed, it is clear that the petitioner cannot assert any claim to the land other than by


CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 7BY ROCAMORA homestead. The plaintiffs, claiming to be the common children of Martin and his wife, Eustaquia

Pichan, asserted a right to one-half of the land as their mother's share in her conjugal partnership with Martin. While said defendant denied having contracted marriage with Eustaquia — although he admitted living with her without benefit of marriage until she allegedly abandoned him — as well as paternity of two of the plaintiffs who, he claimed, were fathered by other men, the Trial Court gave his denials no credence. The Trial Court further found that Martin had begun working the homestead, and his right to a patent to the land accrued, during his coverture with Eustaquia. The plaintiffs were declared entitled to the half of the land claimed by them. The IAC affirmed.

It appears that at the time the case was brought, no certificate of title to the land had yet been issued to Martin Lacerna, although he had already complied with all the conditions necessary to a grant thereof. OCT P-11 568 was issued only while Lacerna's appeal was pending in the IAC. While it is not disputed that said certificate of title refers to the same land homesteaded by Lacerna during his coverture with Eustaquia, for reasons to which the record before the Court offers no clear clue, it states on its face that it is issued in the name of " ... MARTIN LACERNA married to Epifania Magallon," the latter being the present petitioner.

After the confirmative Decision of the IAC had become final and executory, the respondent Judge, on motion of the plaintiffs issued an alias writ of execution commanding the Provincial Sheriff to order the defendant Martin to divide and partition the property, ½ of which is the share of Eustaquia in the conjugal property, and plaintiffs being Pichan's children are also entitled thereto; and deliver portion of 5 hectares of the lot to the plaintiffs as their share to satisfy the said judgment and your fees thereon.

Apparently, said writ was served on both Martin and petitioner, the latter filed with the Trial Court a "Motion for Intervention and to Stay Execution" alleging that the land subject of the writ was conjugal property of herself and Martin under a certificate of title issued way back 1978 without legal impediments, and now incontestable," as well as valid, binding and legal unless declared otherwise in an independent proceedings, and praying that the property of herein intervenor be excluded from the enforcement of the writ of execution." Said motion was denied.

The facts found by the lower courts which, in view of the finality of the latter's decisions, are binding upon this Court and can no longer be controverted, as when as the pertinent allegations of the petition, leave no doubt that the land, which rightfully pertained to the conjugal partnership of Martin and Eustaquia, the plaintiff's mother, and should have been titled in the names of said spouses, was, through fraud or mistaken, registered in the names of Martin and petitioner Epifania. In such a situation, the property should be regarded as impressed with an implied, or a constructive, trust for the party rightfully entitled thereto.

If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. Clearly, the petitioner, as the trustee of a constructive trust, has an obligation to convey to the private respondents that part of the land to which she now claims an ostensible title, said portion rightfully pertaining to the respondents' deceased mother as her share in the conjugal partnership with Martin.

action to which she was not made a party? YES

virtue of her supposed marriage to Lacerna. As a mere mistress, she cannot pretend to any right to it.

The petitioner relies mainly, if not solely, on the fact that the certificate of title to the land carries her name as the "wife" of the owner Martin. Such entry on the certificate of title has been established by evidence no longer disputable as resulting from a mistake if, indeed, it was not procured through fraud. Moreover, the phrase "married to Epifania written after the name of Martin in said certificate of title is merely descriptive of the civil status of Martin and does not necessarily prove that the land is "conjugal" property. Neither can petitioner invoke the presumption established in Article 160 that property acquired during the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership, there being no proof of her alleged marriage to Martin except that which arises by implication from the entry in the certificate of title and for the far more compelling reason that the homestead claim on the land was shown to have been perfected during Martin's marriage to Eustaquia, mother of the private respondents.

The writ of execution, however, must be set aside, though not for the reasons urged in the petition. The judgment of the respondent Trial Court merely declared the private respondents entitled to one-half of the land, without specifically ordering partition and delivery to them the same. A writ of execution cannot vary the terms of the judgment it is issued to satisfy, or afford relief different from, or not clearly included in, what is awarded by judgment.

Both the lower courts appear to have overlooked the fact that the surviving spouse is the legal and compulsory heir of the deceased husband or wife; otherwise, consistent with the finding that the half portion of the land sued for pertained to the late Eustaquia as her share in the conjugal partnership with Martin, they should have ruled that Martin concurred with the three private respondents in the succession to said portion, each of them taking an equal share. Unfortunately, said error is beyond review because Martin allowed the judgment to become final and executory without raising that point of law, even on appeal.

The writ of execution is set aside. Instead of enforcing said writ, the respondent Trial Court is ordered to effect the partition of the land in accordance with the terms of its now final and executory decision and the provisions of Rule 69.

CUENCA VS. CUENCA

BY ROCAMORA

Private respondents Restituto and Meladora Cuenca filed a complaint for recovery of real property and damages against the petitioners before the then CFI of Davao del Norte. The lower court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. The lower court dismissed the complaint. The appellate court reversed the decision of the lower court. It rendered a decision in favor of the private respondents.

The appellate court declared Engracia Basadre as surviving spouse. There was, therefore no need to prove the legality of marriage between petitioners Engracia and Agripino much less to prove the legitimacy of the other petitioners who are undoubtedly the children of Agripino and Engracia. The petitioners also alleged the finding of newly discovered evidence to prove that the lands were conjugal properties of Agripino and petitioner Engracia. The petitioners alleged that these parcels were surveyed for Agripino and approved when Agripino was already married to Engracia as


CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 8This Case involves parcels of land which were claimed by two sets of families. Private respondents Restituto and Meladora Cuenca claimed ownership on the ground that they are the legitimate children of Agripino Cuenca and Maria Bangahon, both deceased. They alleged that some of the parcels are paraphernal property of Maria while all the others are conjugal properties of Maria and Agripino. They also alleged that Agripino and Engracia Basadre were not legally married because at the time they lived together Agripino was married to a certain Jesusa Pagar.

The petitioners (defendants below) denied the legitimacy of the marriage between Agripino and Maria as well as the legitimacy of the plaintiffs as children. They claimed that Agripino and their mother Engracia were legally married and that they are the legitimate children of the couple. They contend that the subject parcels of lands are conjugal properties of Agripino and Engracia.

The documents presented are proofs that the properties belong exclusively to Maria as her paraphernal property, a fact declared by the husband in a declaration against his interest. It was error for the trial court to brush aside the importance of the declaration in the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Maria. These public documents carry sufficient evidentiary weight to prove the origin of the properties and the nature of their ownership as properties brought into the marriage by Maria to Agripino as against the bare testimony of the defendants and their witnesses. These, and other, pieces of evidence established that the plaintiffs are the forced heirs of Maria and Agripino, who by law should succeed to the possession and ownership. On the other hand, defendants' evidence consist only of the oral testimonies which proved nothing concrete as they merely are inferences conveniently tailored to support their claim.

Agripino and Maria were legally married with Restituto and Meladora Cuenca as their issues; that Maria Bangahon brought properties into her marriage; that the couple acquired properties during the marriage; that by virtue of the extrajudicial settlement executed by Agripino Cuenca and his children, Restituto is the absolute owner of the land; that one half of the land belongs to Agripino and the other half to Maria the same having been acquired by them during their marriage-conjugal partnership property. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal relationship by the death of spouses, one half goes to Agripino which portion after the death of Agripino goes to his alleged third wife, Engracia Basadre-Cuenca together with the plaintiffs as forced heirs of Agripino.

The petitioners attached to their motion an alleged newly discovered evidence consisting of a certified true copy of the Register of Birth of petitioner first child of Agripino and petitioner Engracia which discloses that he is a legitimate child of the couple and a notarized public document which discloses that Jesusa Pagar was married to someone disproving the respondents' evidence. The dispositive portion of the CA decision states that petitioner Engracia Basadre was entitled to inherit from Agripino Cuenca together with the latter's legitimate children by Maria, the private respondents herein.

indicated in the documents, hence, there is the presumption that these are conjugal properties and therefore petitioners have hereditary rights over these properties.

Article 160: "All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife," this Court ruled that the presumption refers only to the property acquired during marriage and does not operate when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. The documents sought to be presented as newly discovered evidence do not show that the claims to the parcels were perfected during the marriage of Agripino and petitioner Engracia. The perfection of the homestead claims is considered the time of acquisition of the properties. The fact that these parcels were surveyed for Agripino and approved during their marriage is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the parcels were conjugal properties. Moreover, the documents show that 5 of the 8 parcels are titled in the name of either respondent Meladora or Restituto. The presumption cannot prevail "when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent third parties are involved. The non-applicablility of the presumption should also be upheld. The petition DISMISSED. The resolutions of the appellate court are AFFIRMED.

WHAT IS INCLUDED IN CPG?

ZULUETA VS. PAN-AM

BY ROCAMORA

In an action for damage against Pan-am, plaintiff, his wife and their daughter were awarded moral and exemplary damage as well as attorney’s fee. Said action was based on a breach of contract of carriage coupled with quasi-delict. Pending appeal, Mrs. Zulueta separated from the case insofar into compromise agreement with Pan-am wherein she settled for P50,000.00. A motion to dismiss the case insofar as Mrs. Zulueta is concerned was filed, but was denied in the ground that a wife cannot bind conjugal partnership without the husband’ consent, except in cases provided by law. Hence this motion for reconsideration.

Whether or not the damages involved in the present case are among those forming the part of the conjugal partnership.

The damages in question arose from a breach of plaintiff’s contract of carriage with defendant, for which plaintiff paid their fare with funds presumably belonging to the conjugal property. Said damages, there’re fall under Article 153(1), the right thereto having been acquired by onerous title during the marriage. The damages in the case at bar do not come also under any of the provisions of Article 148 NCC or other provisions forming part of Chapter 3, Title IV of Book I NCC, which chapter is entitled “Paraphernal Property”. What is more if “that which is acquired by right of redemption or by exchange with other property belonging to only one of the spouses” and “that” which is purchased with the exclusive money of the wife or of the husband: belonging exclusively to such wife or husband, it follows necessarily that which is acquired with money of conjugal partnership belongs thereto or forms part thereof. Motion denied.



MENDOZA VS. REYES

BY ORILLAZA

This case originated with the filing of a complaint by Ponciano S. Reyes with the CFI of Rizal, for the annulment of a deed of sale of 2 parcels of land with their improvements, executed by his wife, Julia R. De Reyes as vendor and the spouses Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza, as vendees. Ponciano S. Reyes averred that said properties were conjugal properties of himself and his wife and that she had sold them to petitioners "all by herself" and without his knowledge or consent. Petitioners Efren V. Mendoza and Inocencia R. De Mendoza alleged in their answer that the properties were paraphernal properties of Julia R. de Reyes and that they had purchased the same in good faith and for adequate consideration. In a separate answer, petitioner Julia R. De Reyes, supported the spouses Mendozas' contentions. CFI dismissed the complaint and declared the properties in question exclusive and paraphernal properties of petitioner Julia R. De Reyes. It ruled that she could validly dispose of the same without the consent of her husband and that the Mendozas are innocent purchasers. CA reversed the decision. Hence, this petition.

Whether the properties are the conjugal properties of the spouses?

YES

The applicable provision of law is Article 153 of the Civil Code which provides: The following are conjugal partnership property: That which is acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be for the partnership, or for only one of the spouses;

The presumption found in Article 160 of the Civil Code must also be overcome by one who contends that the disputed property is paraphernal Article 160 provides: All property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife. There is no question that the disputed property was acquired by onerous title during the marriage. But were the funds used to buy the lot and build the improvements at the expense of the common fund? The records show that the funds came from loans obtained by the spouses from the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation. Under Article 161 of the Civil Code, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband and the wife for the benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities of the partnership. If the fact that property acquired during marriage was registered in the name of the husband alone does not affect its conjugal nature, neither does registration in the name of the wife. Any person who buys land registered in the married name of the wife is put on notice about its conjugal nature. Furthermore, the consent of the Ponciano Reyes to the mere lease of the properties was demanded by the Mendozas allegedly for their own protection, yet when it came to the deed of sale which entailed a greater transfer of rights such consent was not required.CA ruling affirmed that properties are conjugal properties.

IMPROVEMENTS ON CPG PROPERTY

CALIMLIM VS. FORTUN

BY ORILLAZA

MARAMBA VS. LOZANO

BY ORILLAZA

CHARGES UPON & OBLIGATIONS OF CPG: WITH CONSENT

JAVIER VS. OSMENA

BY ORILLAZA

VDA. DE STA. ROMANA VS. PCIB

BY ORILLAZA

DBP VS. ADIL

BY LEYNES

Spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte obtained a P2k agricultural loan from the Agricultural and Industrial Bank, now the Development Bank, as evidenced by a PN whereby they bound themselves solidarily to pay in 10 equal yearly amortizations. But the obligation remained unpaid and had prescribed.

Whether the execution of the 2nd

PN by the husband alone, confirming the

Prescription has set in as to the 1st PN as of February 10, 1940. However, when Confesor executed the 2 nd PN on April 11, 1961 whereby he promised to pay the amount covered by the previous PN on or before June 15, 1961, and upon failure to do so, agreed to the foreclosure of the mortgage, he thereby effectively and expressly renounced and waived his right to the prescription of the action covering the first promissory note. This is not a mere case of


CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 10Confesor, then a member of Congress, executed a 2nd PN acknowledging the loan and promising to pay on or before June 15, 1961 otherwise he would agree to the foreclosure his mortgage and he would pay the amount if he can secure a certificate of indebtedness from the government of his back pay. Still, the amount remained unpaid. DBP sued the spouses for the payment of the loan.

MTC – ORDERED the spouses to pay P5,760.96 plus additional daily interest of P1.04 from September 17, 1970 (date of filing of complaint), P576 equivalent to 10% of the total claim by way of AF and incidental expenses plus interest at the legal rate as of September 17, 1970, until fully paid and the costs of the suit.

CFI – REVERSED and DISMISSED the complaint and counter-claim, holding that Confessor cannot bind the CPG without his wife’s consent under Art. 166, NCC. DENIED DBP’s MR.

DBP: Judge Midpanto Adil refused to recognize that the right to prescription may be renounced or waived; and that in signing the 2nd PN, Patricio Confesor can bind the conjugal partnership or otherwise became liable in his personal capacity.

loan by the spouses, can bind the CPG?

YES

acknowledgment of a debt that has prescribed but a new promise to pay the debt. The consideration of the new PN is the pre-existing obligation under the 1st PN. The statutory limitation bars the remedy but does not discharge the debt.

Under Art. 165, CC, the husband is the administrator of the CPG. As such administrator, all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the CPG are chargeable thereto. Confesor signed the 2nd PN for the benefit of the CPG. Hence the conjugal partnership is liable for this obligation.

CHARGES UPON & OBLIGATIONS OF CPG: WITHOUT CONSENT

LUZON SURETY VS. DE GARCIA

BY LEYNES

Ladislao Chavez, as principal, and Luzon Surety Co. executed a surety bond in favor of the PNB to guaranty a crop loan of P9k to Chavez. Vicente Garcia, together with Chavez and Ramon Lacson, as guarantors, signed an indemnity agreement binding themselves solidarily for any and all damages and other burdens Luzon Surety Co. may at any time sustain. The PNB sued Chavez and Luzon Surety Co. to recover the amount of P4,577.95. Luzon Surety Co. filed a third-party complaint against Chavez, Lacson and Garcia, based on the indemnity agreement.

CFI – ORDERED Chavez and Luzon Surety Co. to pay and likewise ordered Chavez, Garcia, and Lacson, to pay Luzon Surety Co. the total amount to be paid by it to PNB. Then, it issued a writ of execution against Garcia for the satisfaction of the claim of Luzon Surety Co. Thereafter, the sugar quedans of the Sps. Garcia were levied and garnished from their sugar plantation. The Sps. Garcia filed for preliminary injunction, which was made permanent

CA – AFFIRMED the permanent preliminary injunction.

Whether the CPG, in the absence of any showing of benefits received, could be held liable on an indemnity agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a third party in favor of a surety company?

NO

The husband, as such administrator, the only obligations incurred by him that are chargeable against the CPG are those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career, profession or business with the honest belief that he is doing right for the benefit of the family. The husband in acting as guarantor or surety for another in an indemnity agreement did not act for the benefit of the CPG. There must be the requisite showing then of some advantage which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. There is no proof that Vicente Garcia in acting as surety or guarantor received consideration therefor, which may redound to the benefit of the CPG. Nor could there be, considering that the benefit was clearly intended for a third party, Ladislao Chavez. While the husband by thus signing the indemnity agreement may be said to have added to his reputation or esteem and to have earned the confidence of the business community, such benefit, even if hypothetically accepted, is too remote and fanciful to come within the express terms of the provision. To make the CPG respond for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate the avowed objective --- solidarity and well-being of the family as a unit.

REYES, concurring: I concur in the result, but the words "all debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the CPG" in describing the charges and obligations for which the CPG is liable, do not require that actual profit or benefit must accrue to the CPG from the husband's transactions; but that it suffices that the transaction should be one that normally would produce such benefit for the partnership. Obligations incurred by the husband in the practice of his profession are collectible from the CPG.

BA FINANCE VS. COURT OF APPEALS

BY LEYNES

CARLOS VS. ABELARDO

BY LEYNES

Honorio Garcia claims that Maria Theresa Carlos-Abelardo approached him and requested him to advance $25k for the purchase of a house and lot. To enable and assist the spouses conduct their married life independently and on their own, Carlos issued a check in the name of Pura Vallejo, seller of the property, who acknowledged its receipt. When Carlos inquired the status of the loan, the spouses acknowledged their obligation but pleaded they were not yet in a position

Whether a written instrument by the wife, acknowledging the loan for the conjugal home, without the signature

According to the records: (1) there was a check in the amount of US$25k issued by Carlos; (2) the spouses received it and gave it to Vallejo as full payment of a house and lot; (3) this house and lot became the spouses’ conjugal dwelling; and (4) only the wife executed an instrument acknowledging the loan but which the husband did not sign.

All the checks of the husband were all in the account of H.L. Carlos Construction. On the other hand, the $25k


CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 11to make a definite settlement. He made a formal demand but they failed to comply, hence the collection suit. Since the spouses were separated in fact for more than 1 yr. prior to the filing of the complaint, they filed separate answers. The wife admitted securing a loan together with her husband, however, it was payable on a staggered basis. The husband claimed that the money was not a loan since he offered his services for Carlos’ construction company and such was his share of the profits from the contracts he obtained for Carlos.

RTC – ORDERED the spouses to pay $25k, plus legal interest thereon and P100k AF and the husband to pay P500k as MD and P50k ED.

CA – REVERSED and DISMISSED the complaint for insufficiency of evidence to show that the subject amount was indeed loaned to the spouses because there was evidence that the $25k was the husband’s share in the profits of H.L. Carlos Construction.

Carlos: To prove his claim, he showed an instrument executed by the wife acknowledging her and her husband’s accountability.

Manuel Abelardo: To prove his claim, he presented 10 BPI checks allegedly given to him by Carlos and argued that if indeed, he and his wife were indebted to him, the latter could have easily deducted the amount of the said loan from his share of the profits.

of the husband can bind both?

YES

check was drawn from the personal account of Carlos. Assuming to be true that the checks presented were his profits from the corporation, then all the more does this prove that the $25k was not part of such profits because it was issued by Carlos from his own account. Moreover, the husband failed to substantiate his claim that he is entitled to the profits and income of the corporation.The payment of personal debts contracted by the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall not be charged to the CPG except insofar as they redounded to the benefit of the family. The spouses never denied the money was used to purchase the conjugal dwelling. Hence, the acknowledgment of the loan by the wife binds the CPG since its proceeds redounded to the benefit of the family so both are solidarily bound to pay the loan. While the husband refused to sign the acknowledgment executed and signed by his wife, undoubtedly, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family because it was used to purchase the conjugal home. Notwithstanding the alleged lack of consent of the husband, under Art. 21, FC, he shall be solidarily liable for such loan together with his wife.

CHARGES UPON & OBLIGATIONS OF CPG: PERSONAL DEBTS

PEOPLE VS. LAGRIMAS

BY LEYNES

The heirs of the victim, sued Froilan Lagrimas for murder and subsequently, moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment on his property, which was granted.

LC – GUILTY of MURDER and ordered to indemnify the heirs P6k plus P10k as damages, AF and burial expenses.

A levy was had on 11 parcels of land under the name of the accused. The sale thereof at public auction was scheduled, but before which, the wife of the accused, Mercedes, moved to quash the writ of attachment and execution because the property belonged to the CPG which cannot be held liable for the pecuniary indemnity of the husband.

LC – GRANTED MTQ under Art. 161, NCC.

What practical effect would be given this particular liability of the CPG for the payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife?

Fines and indemnities imposed upon either husband or wife may be enforced against the partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Art. 161 have been covered, if the spouse who is bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be insufficient. The period during which such a liability may be enforced presupposes that the conjugal partnership is still existing. Partnership assets contemplates that the responsibilities to which enumerated in Art. 161 chargeable against such assets, must be complied with first. The termination of the CPG is not a prerequisite.

Considering that the obligations mentioned in Art. 161 are peculiarly within the knowledge of the husband or of the wife whose conjugal partnership is made liable, the proof required of the beneficiaries of the indemnity should not be of the most exacting kind, ordinary credibility sufficing. Otherwise, the husband or the wife, as the case may be, representing the CPG may find the temptation to magnify its obligation irresistible so as to defeat the right of recovery of the family of the offended party. The case was remanded for the proper receipt of evidence for recovery.

CPG: JOINT ADMINISTRATION

YSASI VS. FERNANDEZ

BY VALDEZ

Juan Ysasi, petitioner, and Maria de Ysasi, one of the respondents, are husband and wife. Juan concedes Hacienda Manucao-A is conjugal property. Since 1948, the spouses have been commuting between the Philippines and Spain where they also own real properties. But the husband shuttled more frequently between the two countries on account of the management of the hacienda. Hacienda Manucao-A was managed by Valentin Bilbao, from 1952-1965 but Juan maintained overall supervision. Then in 1965, Jon, their son, took over as manager. Juan instructed their younger son, Jose, to assist in the management. Jon did not allow him to participate. He also refused to let Jose act as Cashier even as the latter was so designated by the father. Dissension between the two developed. This prompted

Whether a husband may be deprived of his powers of administration over conjugal partnership properties upon mere allegations of abuse of such powers?

NO

The changes introduced by the code have not relegated the husband to the position of an ordinary administrator of another's property. He himself has an interest in the community property. Although certain rights are now recognized in the wife, authorizing her to intervene in and question some acts of the husband, the code still assumes the existence of a residuary authority in the latter with respect to the administration of community property. The grant of certain rights to the wife is specific, and must be restrictively construed, so that all others not granted expressly cannot be considered as enjoyed by her. The right to require the husband to render an accounting is not among those granted to her. Neither may the husband be divested of his administration upon mere assertions of fraud. These must first be proven. The law presumes good faith. The husband, accordingly, is entitled to take over possession and management of the hacienda.


CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 12Maria to leave for the Philippines to iron out the differences between the two brothers and to inquire into the affairs of the hacienda. Juan claims Maria never made any such report. When Jon resigned, Juan designated Bilbao as manager. Jon refused to turn over the hacienda because Maria already took possession and administration of the hacienda since his resignation. Subsequently, Maria filed for administration of the CPG or, in the alternative, a separation of property with ex parte petition that she be appointed receiver pendente lite because her husband was already 77 yrs. and has a blind left eye and he abandoned her and their conjugal properties without just cause.

LC – GRANTED ex parte petition on the same day.

Juan moved to set aside the order appointing his wife receiver pendente lite. Maria filed a supplemental petition asking to appoint a disinterested person, preferably BPI, as receiver.

Juan set up affirmative defenses and counterclaim and filed a third-party complaint against Jon and moved for a writ of preliminary mandatory and preventive injunction to compel his wife and son to turn over to Bilbao Hacienda Manucao-A.

The BPI, mortgagee of the hacienda, filed an Urgent Motion to Authorize Crop Loan Releases. Juan asked the court that the releases be made to him.LC – DENIED writ of preliminary injunction but reserved for a later date the decision for the release of the crop loan lines. Meanwhile BPI was ordered to give monthly allowance of P1,500 to the spouses. And declared BPI to be the receiver.

Juan: The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. The wife is not entitled — as of right — to joint administration. The husband may even enforce right of possession against the wife who has taken cover the administration without his consent. And, the wife may be punished for contempt for her refusal to deliver to him the conjugal assets. She may be required to render full and complete accounting of such properties.

At stake here are the husband's power of administration and the wife's right to be protected from abuse thereof. The wife's right rests upon proof of such abuse. Absent that proof, the wife's right does not exist. The husband may not be forced to surrender his statutory right to administer the conjugal properties by the simple expedient of merely charging him with the naked averment that he has forfeited that right. Receivership at this stage is improper.

Because of the possible abuses that may ensue from the husband’s administration, which may result in damage to the wife, mandatory injunction should issue but only upon bond.

Maria and Jon are to turn over to Juan the possession and control of Hacienda Manucao-A, and all the agricultural machinery, implements, work animals, and other properties used in the operation of the hacienda, as well as its records, papers, documents and books of accounts, upon Juan's filing, and Judge Jose Fernandez' approval, of a bond in the sum of P50k to answer for any and all damages which private respondents or any of them may suffer by reason of the issuance of said injunction.

CPG: DISPOSITION & ENCUMBRANCE

FELIPE VS. HEIRS OF ALDON

BY VALDEZ

Maximo Aldon married Gimena Almosara and they bought parcels of land. Later, the lands were divided into 3 lots of the San Jacinto Public Land Subdivision. Gimena sold the lots to Sps. Eduardo and Hermogena Felipe without the consent of her husband. The heirs of Maximo Aldon, namely his widow Gimena and their children sued the Sps. Felipe claiming they orally mortgaged the lots and they offered to redeem the mortgage, but was refused, hence the complaint. The Sps. Felipe claimed they acquired the lots by purchase and subsequent delivery.

TC - DECLARED the Sps. Felipe to be the lawful owners thereof

CA – REVERSED and ordered the Sps. Felipe to surrender the lots and muniments of title, make an accounting of the produce derived and to solidarity turn over the NET monetary value of the profits, after deducting the sum of P1,800.

Whether the sale of conjugal property by the wife without the consent of the husband is valid?

YES

The husband is the administrator of the conjugal partnership. (Art. 165, CC) Subject to certain exceptions, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real property of the CPG without the wife's consent. (Art. 166) And the wife cannot bind the CPG without the husband's consent, except in cases provided by law. (Art. 172). Here, Gimena, the wife, sold lands belonging to the conjugal partnership without the consent of the husband and the sale is not covered by the phrase "except in cases provided by law." Hence, the sale made was a voidable contract. Gimena had no capacity to give consent to the contract of sale. The capacity to give consent belonged not even to the husband alone but to both spouses.

The voidable contract of Gimena was subject to annulment by her husband only during the marriage because he was the victim who had an interest in the contract. Gimena, who was the party responsible for the defect, could not ask for its annulment. Their children could not likewise seek the annulment of the contract while the marriage subsisted because they merely had an inchoate right to the lands sold. The termination of the marriage and the dissolution of the CPG by the death of Maximo did not improve the situation of Gimena. What she could not do during the marriage, she could not do thereafter.

The case of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is different. After the death of Maximo they acquired the right to question the defective contract insofar as it deprived them of their hereditary rights in their father's share in the lands. The father's share is one-half (1/2) of the lands and their share is two-thirds (2/3) thereof, one-third (1/3) pertaining to the


CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 13widow. The Sps. Felipe have been in possession of the lands since 1951. It was only in 1976 when the heirs filed action to recover the lands. In the meantime, Maximo Aldon died. Anent the first question, We quote with approval the following statement of the Court of Appeals:

Since the Sps. Felipe acted in BF because as relatives they never sought the consent of Maximo, the period for extraordinary prescription (30 years) should be applied and it had not yet lapsed. The children filed action within the period so their shares of the lands was awarded.

AQUINO, concurring: I concur in the result. With more reason, the wife cannot make such a disposition without the husband's consent since the husband is the administrator of the conjugal assets. In the instant case, the CA did not err in voiding the wife's sale of the conjugal land without the husband's consent. As that sale is contrary to law, the action to have it declared void or inexistent does not prescribe. Moreover, there are indications that the contract between the parties was an antichresis, a transaction which is very common in rural areas.

AGUILAR- REYES VS. MIJARES

BY VALDEZ

Vicente and Ignacia were married in 1960, but had been separated de facto since 1974. The disputed lot and the apartments built thereon were part of the spouses’ conjugal properties having been purchased using conjugal funds from their garments business. In 1984, Ignacia learned that in 1983, Vicente sold the lot to Sps. Cipriano and Florentina Mijares for P40K and that Vicente filed a petition for administration and appointment of guardian, he had misrepresented that his wife died in 1982, and that he and their 5 minor children were her only heirs.LC – APPOINTED Vicente as the guardian of their minor children and authorized Vicente to sell the estate of Ignacia.

Ignacia demanded the return of her ½ share in the lot. Failing to settle the matter amicably, Ignacia filed in 1996 an annulment of sale.

Sps. Mijares:They claimed to be purchasers in good faith and that the sale was valid because it was duly approved by the court.

Vicente: He contended to have sold his share only and never represented she was already dead. He claimed that the Sps. Mijares took advantage of his illiteracy by filing a petition for the issuance of letters of administration and appointment of guardian without his knowledge.

LC – DECLARED the sale void with respect to the share of Ignacia. The purchase price of the lot was P110k and ordered Vicente to return ½ thereof to the spouses.

Ignacia prayed the sale be declared void in its entirety and that the respondents be ordered to reimburse the rentals they collected on the apartments built thereon.

LC – DECLARED the sale void in its entirety and ordering Vicente Reyes to reimburse the spouses the purchase price of P110k, but did not award the rentals.

Ignacia and the spouses appealed. Pending the appeal, Ignacia died and she was substituted by her compulsory heirs.CA – REVERSED, notwithstanding the absence of Ignacia’s consent to the sale, it is still valid because the spouses were innocent purchasers for value.

Whether the sale of conjugal property by husband without consent of the wife can be annulled?

YES

The husband could not alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent, express or implied, of the wife otherwise, the contract is voidable. Ignacia’s action to annul the March 1, 1983 sale which was filed on June 4, 1986, before her demise is perfectly within the 10 yr. prescriptive period under Art. 173,CC. Even if reckoned from November 25, 1978 which was the date when Vicente and the spouses entered into a contract, Ignacia’s action would still be within the prescribed period.The spouses are not purchasers in good faith because of circumstances that should have placed them on guard. The death certificate of Ignacia, shows that she died on March 22, 1982. The same death certificate, however, reveals that – (1) it was issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Lubao Pampanga on March 10, 1982; (2) the alleged death of Ignacia was reported to the Office of the Civil Registrar on March 4, 1982; and (3) her burial or cremation would be on March 8, 1982. These obvious flaws in the death certificate should have prompted them to investigate further, especially so when Florentina Mijares admitted on cross examination that she suspected Ignacia was still alive.

The prayer for payment of rentals should be denied. In awarding rentals which are in the nature of actual damages, the Court cannot rely on mere assertions, speculations, conjectures or guesswork but must depend on competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable regarding the actual amount of loss.

(1) The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is ordered to issue a new certificate of title over Lot No. 4349-B-2, in the name of petitioners as co-owners thereof;

(2) Vicente Reyes is ordered to reimburse the respondent spouses the amount of P110,000.00 as purchase price of Lot No. 4349-B-2, with interest at 6% per annum from June 4, 1986, until finality of this decision. After this decision becomes final, interest at the rate of 12% per annum on the principal and interest (or any part thereof) shall be imposed until full payment.

(3) Vicente Reyes is ordered to pay the heirs of the late Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes, the amounts of P25,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.

CPG: EFFECT OF ABANDONMENT


CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 14DE LA CRUZ VS. DE LA CRUZ

BY VALDEZ

Estrella de la Cruz complained her husband, Severino, had not only abandoned her but as well was mismanaging their conjugal partnership properties, and prayed for (1) separation of property, (2) monthly support of P2,500 during the pendency of the action, and (3) payment of P20k as AF and costs.

LC – GRANTED alimony pendente lite, which however, upon Severino's motion, was reduced to P2,000. ORDERED the separation and division of the conjugal assets, and directing Severino to pay P20k AF.On appeal to the CA, the same was certified to the SC because of the hefty amount involved.

Estrella: She claimed that her husband did not sleep in the conjugal dwelling, but paid short visits during which they engaged in brief conversations and left her for his concubine.

Severino: He denied having a concubine and admitted that they were living separately but explained that he was never amiss in his obligation to support his family and manage the conjugal property.

Did the separation of the husband and wife constitute abandonment in law that would justify a separation of the conjugal partnership properties?

NO

Was Severino's failure or refusal to inform the state of their business enterprises such an abuse of his powers of administration of the conjugal partnership as to warrant a division of the matrimonial assets?

NO

The extraordinary remedies afforded to the wife by Art. 178 when she has been abandoned by the husband for at least 1 yr. are the same as those granted to her by Art. 167 in case of abuse of the powers of administration by the husband. To entitle her to any of these remedies, under Art. 178, there must be real abandonment, and not mere separation. The abandonment must not only be physical estrangement but also amount to financial and moral desertion. Therefore, physical separation alone is not the full meaning of the term "abandonment", if the husband, despite his voluntary departure from the society of his spouse, neither neglects the management of the conjugal partnership nor ceases to give support to his wife. The fact Severino never ceased to give support to his wife and children negatives any intent on his part not to return to the conjugal abode and resume his marital duties and rights.If there is only physical separation between the spouses (and nothing more), engendered by the husband's leaving the conjugal abode, but the husband continues to manage the conjugal properties with the same zeal, industry, and efficiency as he did prior to the separation, and religiously gives support to his wife and children, the wife's petition for separation of property must be denied. Consistent with its policy of discouraging a regime of separation as not in harmony with the unity of the family and the mutual affection and help expected of the spouses, the CC requires that separation of property shall not prevail unless expressly stipulated in marriage settlements before the union is solemnized or by formal judicial decree during the existence of the marriage and in the latter case, it may only be ordered by the court for causes specified in Art. 191, NCC.

There is absolutely no evidence to show that he has squandered the conjugal assets. Upon the contrary, he proved that through his industry and zeal, the conjugal assets at the time of the trial had increased to a value of over a million pesos. The mere refusal or failure of the husband as administrator of the conjugal partnership to inform the wife of the progress of the family businesses does not constitute abuse of administration. For abuse to exist, it is not enough that the husband perform an act or acts prejudicial to the wife. Nor is it sufficient that he commits acts injurious to the partnership, for these may be the result of mere inefficient or negligent administration. Abuse connotes willful and utter disregard of the interests of the partnership, evidenced by a repetition of deliberate acts and/or omissions prejudicial to the latter.

SUPPORT DURING CPG LIQUIDATION

SANTERO VS. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

BY BALANE

The petitioners Princesita, Federico and Winy are the children begotten by the late Pablo Santero with Felixberta Pacursa while private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel are four of the seven children begotten by Pablo Santero with Anselma Diaz. Both sets of children are the natural children of the late Pablo Santero since neither of their mothers, was married to Pablo. Pablo Santero was the only legitimate son of Pascual Santero and Simona Pamuti Vda. de Santero. During the intestate proceedings the respondents moved for allowance on the ground they were of schooling age.

CFI – GRANTED the motion without conducting a hearing thereon

Whether allowance to the respondents should be on the mere allegation that they are still schooling without conducting a hearing thereon?

YES

Petitioners argue that private respondents are not entitled to any allowance since they have already attained majority age, two are gainfully employed and one is married. Petitioners allege there was misrepresentation on the part of the guardian in asking for allowance for tuition fees, books and other school materials and other miscellaneous expenses for school term. They further allege that the administrator does not have sufficient funds to cover the allowance because whatever funds are in the hands of the administrator constitute funds held in trust for the benefit of whoever will be adjudged as owners of the Kawit properties from where these funds now held by the administrator are derived.

The fact that private respondents are of age, gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and should not be regarded as the determining factor of their right to allowance under Art. 188. While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased, the New Civil Code gives the surviving spouse and his/her children without distinction. Hence, the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are entitled to allowances as advances from their shares in the inheritance from their father Pablo Santero. Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the right to receive support during the liquidation of the estate of the deceased, such right cannot be impaired by Rule 83 Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a procedural rule. Be it noted however that with respect to "spouse," the same must be the "legitimate spouse" (not common-law spouses who are the mothers of


CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 15the children here).

JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF PROPERTY: FOR SUFFICIENT CAUSE

GARCIA VS. MANZANO

BY BALANE

Gonzalo Garcia sued his wife Consolacion for the judicial declaration of the separation of their CPG. Gonzalo claimed they have been living separately from each other and all attempts at reconciliation have failed. He claimed that during the separation, his wife had assumed complete management and administration of the CPG and enjoyed its fruits without filing any ITRs.Consolacion MTD for lack of cause of action because none of the grounds under Art. 191, NCC for decreeing a judicial separation of properties was alleged.

LC – DISMISSED the complaintWherefore, the judgment appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant. So ordered.

Whether the complaint establishes a sufficient cause for judicial separation of property?

NO

Under Art 191, there must be abuse of powers of administration of the conjugal partnership property of the husband, or in case of abandonment by the husband, separation of property may also be ordered by the court according to the provisions of Arts. 167 and 173(3). In all these cases, it is sufficient to present the final judgment which has been entered against the guilty or absent spouse. The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership, shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons. After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of Arts. 214 and 215 shall apply. The provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in Arts. 498 to 501 shall be applicable. This enumeration must be regarded as limitative, in view of the Code's restrictive policy.In the event of such maladministration by the wife (and disregarding the case of judicial authorization to have the wife manage the partnership, since such a case is not involved), the remedy of the husband does not lie in a judicial separation of property but in revoking the power granted to the wife and resume the administration of the community property and the conduct of the affairs of the conjugal partnership. He may enforce his right of possession and control of the conjugal property against his wife and seek such ancillary remedies as may be required by the circumstances, even to the extent of annulling or rescinding any unauthorized alienations or incumbrances, upon proper action filed for that purpose. For this reason, the articles above quoted contemplate exclusively the remedies available to the wife (who is not the legal administrator of the partnership) against the abuses of her husband because normally only the latter can commit such abuses.

JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF PROPERTY: VOLUNTARY SEPARATION OF PROPERTY

LACSON VS. SAN JOSE-LACSON

BY BALANE

Carmen San Jose-Lacson left the conjugal home to reside in Manila and filed for custody of her children with Alfonso. The Sps. succeeded in reaching an amicable settlement respecting custody of the children, support, and separation of property.

JDRC – GRANTED the compromise

Alfonso delivered all the four children to Carmen and remitted money for their support. Carmen wanted to modify the arrangement regarding their children and the compromise regarding the separation of their property.

Whether the agreement to voluntarily dissolve the CPG is valid?

YES

The law allows separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their conjugal partnership provided judicial sanction is secured beforehand. The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the CPG during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership, shall be notified of any petition for judicial approval of the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such creditors may appear at the hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as may protect the creditors and other third persons. The spouses obtained judicial imprimatur of their separation of property and the dissolution of their CPG. It does not appear that they have creditors who will be prejudiced by these arrangements. Being separated in fact for at least 5 yrs., there is propriety of severing their financial and proprietary interests is manifest.However, in so approving the regime of separation of property of the spouses and the dissolution of their CPG, the Court does not thereby accord recognition to nor legalize the de facto separation of the spouses.

LIVE IN PARTNERS OR THOSE UNDER A VOID MARRIAGE

MAXEY VS. COURT OF APPEALS

BY BALANE

Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales (both deceased) were married in a “military fashion” and thereafter, lived together as husband and wife and had 6 children. During their cohabitation, Melbourne acquired the parcels of land and sold it to the Sps. Monday. The Maxey children sued for the annulment of the documents of sale claiming these were common properties of their parents, having been acquired during their lifetime and through their joint effort and capital. The sale by their father after the death of their mother was without their knowledge and consent. The Sps. Monday claim to be purchasers for value.

TC – DECLARED that the rules on co-ownership should govern because there was only a live in relationship and held that justice demands that the woman

Whether the NCC should apply retroactively as to award the household efforts of the wife and allow her a claim on the property gathered during the live in relationship?

YES

The new article in the CC recognizes that it would be unjust and abnormal if a woman who is a wife in all aspects of the relationship except for the requirement of a valid marriage must abandon her home and children, neglect her traditional household duties, and go out to earn a living or engage in business before the rules on co-ownership would apply. No matter how large the income of a working wife compared to that of her husband, the major, if not the full responsibility of running the household remains with the woman. She is the administrator of the household. The fact that the two involved in this case were not legally married at the time does not change the nature of their respective roles. It is the woman who traditionally holds the family purse even if she does not contribute to filling that purse with funds.The "real contribution" to the acquisition of property must include not only the earnings of a woman from a profession, occupation, or business but also her contribution to the family's material and spiritual goods through caring for the children, administering the household, husbanding scarce resources, freeing her husband from


CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 16should be entitled to the share of the property and ORDERED the return of the lands.

CA – REVERSED because the lands were the exclusive properties of the late Melbourne.

household tasks, and otherwise performing the traditional duties of a housewife. Thee disputed properties were owned in common by Melbourne Maxey and the estate of his late wife, Regina Morales, when they were sold. The Sps. Monday are ordered to return one-half of the properties to the heirs of Regina Morales.

BIGAMOUS MARRIAGES, ADULTEROUS / CONCUBINAGE RELATIONSHIPS, RELATIONSHIPS WHERE BOTH ARE MARRIED TO OTHERS, MULTIPLE ALLIANCES OF THE SAME MAN

JUANIZA VS. JOSE

BY BALANE

Eugenio Jose was the registered owner and operator of the passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision with a freight train of the PNR, which resulted in the death of 7 and physical injuries of 5 passengers. At the time of the accident, Eugenio was legally married to Socorro Ramos but had been cohabiting with Rosalia Arroyo, for 16 yrs.

CFI - ORDERED Eugenio Jose and Rosalia Arroyo to indemnify the victims solidarily and DENIED the MR of Rosalia (insofar as it condemns her to pay damages solidarily with her co-defendant) because of her liability as co-owner of the jeepney under Art. 144, CC.

Whether the concubine, who is not a registered owner of the jeepney, can be held solidarily liable for damages with her live in partner?

NO

Art. 144, CC requires that the man and the woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Since Eugenio Jose is legally married to Socorro Ramos, there is an impediment for him to contract marriage with Rosalia Arroyo. Under Art. 144, CC, Arroyo cannot be a co-owner of the jeepney. The jeepney belongs to the CPG of Jose and his legal wife. There is therefore no basis for the liability of Arroyo for damages arising from the death of, and physical injuries suffered by, the passengers of the jeepney which figured in the collision. Rosalia Arroyo, who is not the registered owner of the jeepney can neither be liable for damages caused by its operation. Only the registered owner of a public service vehicle is responsible for damages that may arise from consequences incident to its operation, or maybe caused to any of the passengers therein.

GOMEZ VS. LIPANA

BY BERNARDINO

VDA. DE CONSEGUERA VS.

GSIS

BY BERNARDINO

YAP VS. COURT OF APPEALS

BY BERNARDINO

CARINO VS. CARINO

BY BERNARDINO


CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 17FAMILY: WHAT GOVERNS FAMILY RELATIONS?

ALVADO VS. CITY OF TACLOBAN

BY BERNARDINO

ARROYO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

BY SAWIT

FAMILY: FAMILY RELATIONS

GAYON VS. GAYON

BY SAWIT

WAINWRIGHT VS. VERSOZA

BY SAWIT

FAMILY HOME: EXEMPTIONS

MODEQUILIO VS. BREVA

BY SAWIT

SIARI VALLEY VS. LUCASAN

BY SAWIT

PATERNITY & FILIATION: LEGITIMATE CHILDREN

PERIDO VS. PERIDO

BY APORTADERA

DE LA PURTA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

BY APORTADERA


CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 18TAN VS. TROCIO

BY APORTADERA

PATERNITY & FILIATION: RIGHTS OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN

MOORE VS. REPUBLIC

BY APORTADERA

NALDOZA VS. REPUBLIC

BY APORTADERA

MANGULABNAN VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT

BY GALVAN

Petitioner filed in the QC RTC an action for actual, compensatory and moral damages and support for her child Alfie Angelo.

Pending the litigation, an application for support pendente lite was filed to which an opposition was filed by private respondent.

TC ordered private respondent to pay monthly support in the amount of P1,500.00 to the minor child

Private respondent moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied

CA annulled the orders of the TC.

Whether the minor child, an illegitimate child, is entitled to support?

YES

Petitioner established the paternity of the child not only by her own affidavit but also by the affidavits of two (2) witnesses. In addition, petitioner submitted a birth certificate of the child. The private respondent claims that the same is spurious as it was sworn before a notary public in Manila when the child was born in Cavite Maternity Clinic in Las Pinas Rizal. There must be a declaration of the status of the child from which the right to support is derived and before support can be ordered. Such a declaration may be provisional, that is, by affidavits. While the appellate court claims that the birth certificate is prima facie evidence of acknowledgment of the child, and that until it is finally proved to be spurious it must be upheld, it nevertheless observed that its probative value is impaired by the verified opposition of the private respondent. The requirement for recognition by the father or mother jointly or by only one of them as provided by law refers in particular to a natural child under Article 276 of the Civil Code. Such a child is presumed to be the natural child of the parents recognizing it who had the legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of conception. Thus, an illegitimate child like the minor Alfie in this case whose father, the private respondent herein, is married and had no legal capacity to contract marriage at the time of his conception is not a natural child but an illegitimate child or spurious child in which case recognition is not required before support may be granted. Under Article 887 of the Civil Code, in all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be proved. Such filiation may be proved by the voluntary or compulsory recognition of the illegitimate (spurious child). Recognition is voluntary when made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any authentic writing. It is compulsory when by court action the child brings out his recognition. As above related the affidavits of petitioner and the two (2) witnesses were presented to prove the paternity of the child, and a birth certificate was also presented to corroborate the same. The Court agrees with the court a quo that the status of the minor child had been provisionally established.

OSMENA DE VALENCIA VS. RODRIGUEZ

BY GALVAN

The plaintiffs prayed for an injunction restraining the defendants, from using the surname "Valencia." The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, and this sustained by the lower court. Hence this appeal by the plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs allege that they (except Catalina Osmeña) are the legitimate children of the defendant Pio E. Valencia in the latter's lawful wedlock with plaintiff Catalina Osmeña and contend that they alone have the right to bear the surname "Valencia," in accordance with article 114 of the Civil Code which provides that legitimate children have the right to bear the surname of the father. And under articles 139 and 845 of the Civil Code, illegitimate children (who are not natural) are entitled only to support. Defendants, (except Emilia Rodriguez and Pio E. Valencia) are the illegitimate children of Pio E. Valencia with his common-law-wife, defendant Emilia Rodriguez.

Whether the defendants can use the surname of their father, “Valencia”?

YES

We concede that the plaintiffs may use the surname of their farther as a matter of right by reason of the mere fact that they are legitimate children; but we cannot agree to the view that article 114 of the Civil Code, without more, grants monopolistic proprietary control to legitimate children over the surname of their father.

Said article has marked a right of which legitimate children may not be deprived, but it cannot be interpreted as a prohibition against the use by others of what may happen to be the surname of their father. If plaintiff's theory were correct, they can stop countless inhabitants from bearing the surname "Valencia."The defendants' case becomes the stronger when it is remembered that, from all appearances, Pio E. Valencia (the father) acquiesces in the adoption of his surname by the defendants. But even if he objects, the defendants can still use the surname "Valencia," in the absence of any law granting exclusive ownership over a surname.



ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY: PHYSICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF ACCESS

ANDAL VS. MACARAIG

BY GALVAN

Mariano Andal, a minor, assisted by his mother Maria Dueñas, as guardian ad litem, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur for the recovery of the ownership and possession of a parcel of land

The complaint alleges that Mariano Andal is the surviving son of Emiliano Andal and Maria Dueñas; that Emiliano Andal died on September 24, 1942; that Emiliano Andal was the owner of the parcel of land in question having acquired it from his mother Eduvigis Macaraig by virtue of a donation propter nuptias executed by the latter in favor of the former; that Emiliano Andal had been in possession of the land from 1938 up to 1942, when Eduvigis Macaraig, taking advantage of the abnormal situation then prevailing, entered the land in question.

LC rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs

Defendant took the case to this Court upon the plea that only question of law are involved.

Can Mariano Andal be considered as the legitimate child of Emiliano Andal?

If the son born to the couple is deemed legitimate, then he is entitled to inherit the land in question. If otherwise, then the land should revert back to Eduvigis Macaraig as the next of kin entitled to succeed him under the law. The determination of this issue much depends upon the relationship that had existed between Emiliano Andal and his wife during the period of conception of the child up to the date of his birth in connection with the death of the alleged father Emiliano Andal. Since the boy was born on June 17, 1943, and Emiliano Andal died on January 1, 1943, that boy is presumed to be the legitimate son of Emiliano and his wife, he having been born within three hundred (300) days following the dissolution of the marriage. This presumption can only be rebutted by proof that it was physically impossible for the husband to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child. There was no evidence presented that Emiliano Andal was absent during the initial period of conception, specially during the period comprised between August 21, 1942 and September 10, 1942, which is included in the 120 days of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child Mariano Andal. On the contrary, there is enough evidence to show that during that initial period, Emiliano Andal and his wife were still living under the marital roof. Even if Felix, the brother, was living in the same house, and he and the wife were indulging in illicit intercourse since May, 1942, that does not preclude cohabitation between Emiliano and his wife. Emiliano was already suffering from tuberculosis and his condition then was so serious that he could hardly move and get up from bed, his feet were swollen and his voice hoarse. But experience shows that this does not prevent carnal intercourse.

MACADANGDANG VS. COURT OF APPEALS

BY GALVAN

Respondent Elizabeth Mejias is a married woman, her husband being Crispin Anahaw.

She allegedly had intercourse with petitioner Antonio Macadangdang; she also alleges that due to the affair, she and her husband separated; that she gave birth to a baby boy named Rolando Macdangdang.

Respondent (then plaintiff) filed a complaint for recognition and support against petitioner (then defendant)

Lower court dismissed the complaint; the decision invoked positive provisions of the Civil Code and Rules of Court and authorities

CA reversed and denied appellant's motions for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Whether there was physical impossibility of access between respondent and her husband?

NO

Whether or not respondent and her husband were separated would be immaterial to the resolution of the status of the child Rolando. What should really matter is the fact that during the initial one hundred twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the renamed child, no concrete or even substantial proof was presented to establish physical impossibility of access between respondent and her spouse. From her very revealing testimony, respondent declared that she was bringing two sacks of rice to Samal for her children; that her four children by her husband in her mother's house in the said town; that her alleged estranged husband also lived in her mother's place It should also be noted that even during her affair with petitioner and right after her delivery, respondent went to her mother's house in Samal for treatment. Since respondent and her husband continued to live in the same province, the fact remains that there was always the possibility of access to each other. As has already been pointed out, respondent's self-serving statements were never corroborated nor confirmed by any other evidence more particularly that of her husband. The baby boy subject of this controversy was born on October 30, 1967, only seven (7) months after March, 1967 when the "incident" or first illicit intercourse between respondent and petitioner took place, and also, seven months from their separation (if there really was a separation). As of March, 1967, respondent and Crispin Anahaw had already four children; hence, they had been married years before such date. The birth of Rolando came more than one hundred eighty 180 days following the celebration of the said marriage and before 300 days following the alleged separation between aforenamed spouses. Under Article 255 of the Civil Code, the child Rolando is conclusively presumed to be the legitimate son of respondent and her husband.

TAN VS. TROCIO

BY GALVAN

Complainant is a married woman with 8 children and a school directress. She filed an administrative case against respondent was the legal counsel of her school. She alleged that after classes were dismissed, Respondent overpowered her and against her will succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her. As a result, she begot a son – Jewel Tan. Respondent denies that he had sexually assaulted the complainant. OSG reported that respondent had committed acts violative of his professional decorum and it recommended disciplinary actions against him. Provincial Fiscal of Lanao also found the respondent guilty of the charge.

Whether the respondent had sexually assaulted the complainant?

NO

We find insufficient basis to sustain Complainant’s charge. Respondent’s threat to cause the deportation of her alien husband should she report to anyone made her desist from filing a charge is not credible as she had admitted having lost contact with him. Another factor is that she continued having dealing with the respondent as if nothing had happened. The testimonies of complainant and her witness, like playing with him and giving him toys, are not convincing enough to prove paternity. More importantly, Jewel was born in 1972 during the wedlock of complainant and her husband alien and the presumption should be in favor of legitimacy unless physical access between the couple was impossible. From the evidence on hand, that presumption has not been overcome by adequate and convincing proof.

ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY: BIOLOGICAL / SCIENTIFIC GROUNDS

JAO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

1968: Petitioner Janice Jao, then a minor, represented by her mother and guardian-ad-litem Arlene Salgado filed a case for recognition and support with the

Whether the result of blood grouping test is

In this jurisdiction, the result of blood tests, among other evidence, to affirm paternity was dealt with in Co Tao v. CA where the court held that the NBI expert’s report stating that “from their blood groups and types, the defendant Co



BY GALVANJuvenile and Domestic Relations Court (JDRC) against Perico Jao.

Perico denied paternity so they agreed to a blood grouping test duly conducted by the NBI upon the trial court’s order. Result: Janice could not have been that possible offspring of Perico and Arlene

The trial court found the test result legally conclusive

Janice filed MFR, and court ordered trial on merits where Janice was declared Perico’s kid and thus entitled to monthly support.

Perico appealed to CA, contesting trial court’s error to appreciate result of blood test and CA reversed trial court decision

Hence this appeal by Janice

admissible and conclusive to provePaternity?

YES

Tao is apossible father of the child” could not give any assurance that Co Tao was the father,only the possibility. There is now an almost universal agreement that blood grouping tests are conclusive as to non-paternity, although inconclusive as to paternity (As shown in Co Tao). The fact that the blood type of the child is a possible product o the mother and the alleged father does not conclusively prove that the child is born by such parents, but, if the blood type of the child is not the possible blood type when the bloods of the mother and the alleged father are cross matched, then the child cannot possibly be that of the alleged father. In jurisdictions like the U.S., the admissibility of blood tests results to prove non- paternity has already been passed upon in several cases (Gilpin v. Gilpin, Cuneo v.Cuneo and Clark v. Rysedorph). The important doctrine from such cases is that toreject competent medical testimony would be tantamount to rejecting scientific factand to deny progress. Legislation expressly recognizing the use of blood tests is also in force in several states. Tolentino affirms this rule on blood tests as a proof of non-paternity. Petitioner attempts to discredit the result of the blood grouping tests by impugning that qualification of the NBI personnel who conducted the tests and the conduct of the tests themselves. However, the NBI forensic chemistry who conducted the tests is also a serologist, and has extensive practice in this area for several years. The tests were conducted6 times using 2 scientifically recognized blood grouping systems: MN test and ABOsystem, under witness and supervision. Even the allegation that Janice was too young at five months to have been a proper subject for accurate blood tests must fall, since nearly two years after the first bloodtest, she, represented by her mom, declined to undergo the test to prove or disprove their allegations, even as Perico was willing to undergo the test again.

AMURAO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

BY ROCAMORA

Petitioner Amurao was sued for support by the offspring of his illicit relations with a 19-year old college student. He denied paternity and refused to give support. At the commencement of the trial, the trial court made a last-minute effort to simplify the issues by calling the parties for an agreement – the parties agreed to submit themselves to a blood-grouping test to determine the paternity of plaintiff before the National Bureau of Investigation; and to be bound by the results of the said government agency in the following manner: a) if finding is to be the effect that herein plaintiff may be the offspring of defendant, paternity shall be admitted and this case will proceed for trial only on the issue of amount of support; and b) if the finding is negative, then this case shall be dismissed without further trial. The Court finds the same well taken.

The defendant and the natural mother were ordered to submit themselves to a blood-grouping test before the National Bureau of Investigation for a determination of plaintiff’s paternity. On the basis of the blood-grouping tests performed by the NBI, it found that: The said child is a possible offspring of the alleged father Romeo Amurao with Fe Rosario Buenaventura as the natural mother. Exactly one year later, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the court’s order impugning its validity. The motion was denied by the trial court. The petitioner sought a review of the order by the Supreme Court through a petition for certiorari but the petition was denied.

Whether or not the petitioner made an admission of paternity under the terms of the trial court’s order binding him to give support to his child, is a finding of fact.

The Supreme Court held that the determination of the amount of support payable to the private respondent. It was perfectly proper for the Court to consider the evidence presented by the parties at the hearing of the plaintiff’s contempt motion against the defendant, as evidence also on the merits of the main case. The defendant (herein petitioner), by failing to appear at the hearing of the main case, waived his right to adduce additional evidence. Hence, he may not be heard to complain that he was denied due process. Whether or not the Court Appeals correctly determined that the minor, who filed his action for support in 1977 when he was only an infant five months old, is now (as an 11-year old student) entitled to an increase in the amount of support awarded to him by trial court, is also a factual issue which we may not re-examine and review. In any event, it finds no reversible error in the decision of the CA. The increase in the child’s support is proper and is sanctioned by the provisions of Articles 290, 296 and 297 of the Civil Code.

ACTION TO IMPUGN LEGITIMACY: CONTRARY DECLARATION BY THE MOTHER

CHUA KENG GIAP VS. PAC

BY ROCAMORA

This case arose when Chua Keng Giap fiels a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Sy Kao in the RTC of Quezon City. The private respondent moved to dismiss for lack of a cause of action and of the petitioner’s capacity to file the petition. The latter, it was claimed, had been declared as not the son of the spouses Chua Bing Guan and Sky Kao for the settlement of the estate of the late Chua Bing Guan. The decision in that case had long become final and executory. The motion was by Judge Jose P. Castro, who held that the case invoked decided the paternity and not the maternity of the petitioner. Holding that this was mere quibbling, the respondent court reversed the trial judge in a petition for certiorari filed by the private respondent. The motion fro reconsideration was denied for late filing. The petitioner then came to this Court to challenge these rulings.

The petitioner argues at length that the question to be settled in a motion to dismiss based on lack of a cause of action is the sufficiency of the allegation itself and not whether these allegations are true or not, for their truth is hypothetically admitted. That is correct. He also submits that an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and therefore reversible not in a petition for on appeal. That is also correct. Even so the petition must be and is hereby denied.

Whether or not filiation could be claimed if the supposed mother flatly and unequivocally declared that she was not the petitioner’s mother?

The Supreme Court held in an earlier case, petitioner Sy Kao denied that respondent Chua Keng Giap is her son by the deceased Chua Bing Guan. Thus, petitioner’s opposition is based principally on the ground that the respondent was not the son of Sy Kao and the deceased, and therefore, had no lawful interest in the estate of the latter and no right to institute the intestacy proceedings. The respondent tried to appeal the courts resolution but his appeal was denied by the lower court for having been filed out of time. He then filed a mandamus case with the Court of appeals but the same was dismissed. Respondent, therefore, sought relief by filing a petition for certiorari, before this Court but his petition was likewise dismissed on January 30, 1982, for lack of merit.

Who better than Sy Kao herself would know if Chua Keng Giap was really he son? More than anyone else, it was Sy Kao who could say – as indeed she has said these many years – that Chua Keng Giap was not begotten of her womb.


CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 21WHO MAY IMPUGN LEGITIMACY?

LIM VS. IAC

BY ROCAMORA

Esperanza Frianeza – Cabatbat was survived by her husband Proceso Cabatbat, her sisters, and the children of her deceased brothers. In their complaint, the private respondents alleged that Violeta Cabatbat Lim is not a child of Esperanza but is only a ward (ampon) of the spouses Esperanza and Proceso Cabatbat who sheltered and supported her from childhood, without benefit of formal adoption proceedings.

Whether or not Violeta Cabatbat – Lim is a legitimate child of the deceased?

The Supreme Court held the absence of a record of the birth of petitioner Violeta Cabatbat in the Office of the Civil Registrar General, puts a cloud on the genuiness of her exhibit. This is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent’s child at all. Being neither a legally sdopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child, nor a child by illegal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.On May 26, 1948, the day defendant Violeta Cabatbat was alleged to have been delivered by Esperanza Frianeza in the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, the records of the hospital show that only one woman by the same of the Benita Lastimosa of Tagudin, Ilocos Sur, not Esperanza Frianeza, gave birth to an illegitimate child who was named by her mother Benita Lastimosa as Baby Girl Lastimosa (Exhibit S Plaintiff’s Folder of Exhibits, p.39, Record on Appeal, pp. 117-118). Furthermore, the record of birth certificates of Pangasinan Provincial Hospital for the years 1947 and 1948 does not carry the birth certificate of defendant Violeta Cabatbat and only birth certificate in the file of birth certificates of the hospital for May 26, 1948 is that of Baby Girl Lastimosa whose mother’s name is Benita Lastimosa.WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack of merit. The appealed decision is affirmed, but with modification of paragraphs 2 and 4 of the dispositive portion thereof, by excluding the widows Adela B. Vda de Frianeza and Decideria Q. Vda. De Frianeza, who are not legal heirs of Esperanza Frianeza Cabatbat from participating with their children and the surviving sisters of the deceased in the one-fourth share of the estate pertaining to the latter under Article 1001 of the Civil Code.

LAYAO VS. TANHOTI- LAYAO

BY ROCAMORA

Corazon Garcia is legally married but has been living separately from Ramon Yulo for more than 10 years. She cohabited with William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of Liyao’s death. Some witnesses, however, testified that Corazon and her husband were seen in each other’s company during the supposed time Corazon cohabited with William Liyao.

In 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao Jr. Since birth, William Jr, also known as Billy, had been in continuous possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/ or acknowledge child of William Liyao by the latter’s direct and overt act. During William Liyao’s birthday he was carrying Billy and told everybody present, including his daughters, “Look, this is my son, very guapo and healthy”. He talked about grand plans for the baptism of Billy. Unfortunately, it did not happen due to his untimely death on December 2, 1975.

On November 29, 1976, William Liyao, Jr, represented by his mother Corazon G. Garcia filed a civil action for compulsory recognition as “the illegitimate son the late William Liyao. The RTC granted his petition, however the Court of Appeals reversed the decision saying that the law favors the legitimacy rather than the illegitimacy of the child. The petition was filed for review on certiorari.

Whether or not the petitioner may impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his supposed father William Liyao.

No. Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. Impugning the legitimacy of the child, is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal. Only in exceptional cases may his heirs allowed to contest such legitimacy. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the time of the initiation of proceedings. The Court held that it is settle that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress; the child himself cannot choose his own affiliation – if the husband, presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child if fixed, and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mother’s paramour.

PROOF OF FILIATION OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN: RECORD OF BIRTH

REYES VS. COURT OF APPEALS

BY ROCAMORA

On January 29, 1967, private respondent as plaintiffs field a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas praying that defendant Irene Reyes be ordered to execute a deed of reconveyance in favor of plaintiffs over parcels of lands located in Quezon and Batangas. It was alleged in the complaint that the defendant’s thru abuse of confidence, fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and other falsifications succeeded in registering in the offices of the Register of Deeds of Quezon and Batangas a document of self adjudication, wherein defendant Irene Delgado alleged that she was the sole child of Francisco Delgado and entitled to inherit the parcels of lands described in the complaint. Irene Delgado filed an answer to the complaint and set-up the affirmative defense that she is the illegitimate daughter of the defendant Genoveva Ramero and the deceased Francisco Delgado. She also set up a counterclaim that as the illegitimate daughter of Francisco Delgado, she

Whether or not the petitioner has the right to inherit as an illegitimate child of the deceased Francisco Delgado.

No. The Court of Appeals found that although Irene Delgado was the spurious daughter of Francisco Delgado, she nevertheless cannot inherit from the estate because she was not recognized either voluntarily or by court action. The counterclaim of Irene that she has the share to the inheritance of Benigna Castillo, Francisco Delgado’s mother, need not to be ruled upon because of the findings that Irene is not an heir of Francisco Delgado. What Irene have to proved is that she had been in continuous possession of a status of an illegitimate child who is not natural. But such fact alone without valid recognition in a record of first will, statement before a court of record, or authentic writing does not make Irene a recognized illegitimate child who is not natural. She nevertheless possesses the right to compel judicial recognition and the action for this must be had not presented any discovered document wherein be presumed father recognized her, the action to


CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 22has the right to represent her father to the inheritance left by her grandmother. compel recognition is already barred.

CASTRO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

BY ORILLAZA

MENDOZA VS. INTERMEDIATE

APPELLATE COURT

BY ORILLAZA

PROOF OF FILIATION OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN: FINAL JUDGMENT

RAMOS VS. RAMOS

BY ORILLAZA

PROOF OF FILIATION OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN: ADMISSION IN A SIGNED PUBLIC DOCUMENT

LIM VS. COURT OF APPEALS

BY ORILLAZA

PROOF OF FILIATION OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN: SIGNED & HANDWRITTEN PRIVATE INSTRUMENT

RANAS VS. RANAS

BY ORILLAZA

PROOF OF FILIATION OF LEGITIMATE CHILDREN: OPEN & CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF STATUS

MENDOZA VS. COURT OF APPEALS

BY SANTOS

The private respondent claimed she was the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza, but the latter denied her claim. He denied it to his dying day. The trial court believed him and dismissed her complaint for compulsory recognition. The appellate court did not and reversed the judgment of the lower court.

The complaint was filed on August 21, 1981, RTC. Teopista Toring Tufiacao, the herein private respondent, alleged that she was born on August 20, 1930, to Brigida Toring, who was then single, and defendant Casimiro Mendoza, married at that time to Emiliana Barrientos. She averred that Mendoza recognized her as an illegitimate child by treating her as such and according her the rights and privileges of a recognized illegitimate child.

Casimiro Mendoza, then already 91 years old, specifically denied the plaintiffs allegations.

Teopista testified that it was her mother who told her that her father was Casimiro. She called him Papa Miroy. She lived with her mother because Casimiro was married but she used to visit him at

The rules on compulsory recognition are embodied in Article 283 of the Civil Code, which has been held to be applicable not only to natural children but also to spurious children. Art. 283. In any of the following cases, the father is obliged to recognize the child as his natural child: (1) In cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the conception; (2) When the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family; (3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father. (4) When the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.

This article has been substantially reproduced in Art. 172 Family Code

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:


CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 23his house. When she married Valentin Tufiacao, Casimiro bought a passenger truck and engaged him to drive it so he could have a livelihood. Casimiro later sold the truck but gave the proceeds of the sale to her and her husband. In 1977, Casimiro allowed her son, Lolito Tufiacao, to build a house on his lot and later he gave her money to buy her own lot from her brother, Vicente Toring. On February 14, 1977, Casimiro opened a joint savings account with her as a co-depositor at the Mandaue City branch of the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank. Two years later, Margarita Bate, Casimiro's adopted daughter, took the passbook from her, but Casimiro ordered it returned to her after admonishing Margarita.

Gaudencio said he was a cousin of Casimiro and knew Brigida Toring because she used to work with him in a saltbed in Opao. Casimiro himself told him she was his sweetheart. Later, Gaudencio acted as a go-between for their liaison, which eventually resulted in Brigida becoming pregnant in 1930 and giving birth to Teopista. Casimiro handed him P20.00 to be given to Brigida at Teopista's baptism. Casimiro also gave him P5.00 every so often to be delivered to Brigida.

Isaac testified that his uncle Casimiro was the father of Teopista because his father Hipolito, Casimiro's brother, and his grandmother, Brigida Mendoza, so informed him. He worked on Casimiro's boat and whenever Casimiro paid him his salary, he would also give him various amounts from P2.00 to P10.00 to be delivered to Teopista. Isaac also declared that Casimiro intended to give certain properties to Teopista.

Vicente, who professed to be Casimiro's only illegitimate child by Brigida Toring, declared that Teopista's father was not Casimiro but a carpenter named Ondoy, who later abandoned her. Vicente said that it was he who sold a lot to Teopista, and for a low price because she was his half sister. It was also he who permitted Lolito to build a house on Casimiro's lot. This witness stressed that when Casimiro was hospitalized, Teopista never once visited her alleged father.

RTC- rejected the plaintiff' s claim that she was in continuous possession of the status of a child of the alleged father by the direct acts of the latter or of his family

CA- appellant has sufficiently proven her continuous possession of such status.

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.

Both the trial court and the respondent court, in arriving at their respective conclusions, focused on the question of whether or not Teopista was in continuous possession of her claimed status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza. This was understandable because Teopista herself had apparently based her claim on this particular ground as proof of filiation allowed under Article 283 of the Old Civil Code.

To establish "the open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child," it is necessary to comply with certain jurisprudential requirements. "Continuous" does not mean that the concession of status shall continue forever but only that it shall not be of an intermittent character while it continues. The possession of such status means that the father has treated the child as his own, directly and not through others, spontaneously and without concealment though without publicity (since the relation is illegitimate). There must be a showing of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his own, by continuous and clear manifestation of paternal affection and care.

With these guidelines in mind, we agree with the trial court that Teopista has not been in continuous possession of the status of a recognized illegitimate child of Casimiro Mendoza, under both Article 283 of the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code.

Although Teopista has failed to show that she was in open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child of Casimiro, we find that she has nevertheless established that status by another method.

What both the trial court and the respondent court did not take into account is that an illegitimate child is allowed to establish his claimed filiation by "any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws," according to the Civil Code, or "by evidence or proof in his favor that the defendant is her father," according to the Family Code. Such evidence may consist of his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a family Bible in which his name has been entered, common reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

The trial court conceded that "the defendant's parents, as well as the plaintiff himself, told Gaudencio Mendoza and Isaac Mendoza, that Teopista was the daughter of the defendant." It should have probed this matter further in light of Rule 130, Section 39, of the Rules of Court, providing as follows:

Sec. 39. — Act or declarations about pedigree. — The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.

The statement of the trial court regarding Teopista's parentage is not entirely accurate. To set the record straight, we will stress that it was only Isaac Mendoza who testified on this question of pedigree, and he did not cite Casimiro's father. His testimony was that he was informed by his father


CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 24Hipolito, who was Casimiro's brother, and Brigida Mendoza, Casimiro's own mother, that Teopista was Casimiro's illegitimate daughter.

The persons who made the declarations about the pedigree of Teopista, namely, the mother of Casimiro, Brigida Mendoza, and his brother, Hipolito, were both dead at the time of Isaac's testimony. The declarations referred to the filiation of Teopista and the paternity of Casimiro, which were the very issues involved in the complaint for compulsory recognition. The declarations were made before the complaint was filed by Teopista or before the controversy arose between her and Casimiro. Finally, the relationship between the declarants and Casimiro has been established by evidence other than such declaration, consisting of the extrajudicial partition of the estate of Florencio Mendoza, in which Casimiro was mentioned as one of his heirs.

We hold that by virtue of the above-discussed declarations, and in view of the other circumstances of this case, 'reopista Toring Tufiacao has proved that she is the illegitimate daughter of Casimiro Mendoza and is entitled to be recognized as such. In so holding, we give effect to the policy of the Civil Code and the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of "the paternity of illegitimate children, without prejudice to the right of the alleged parent to resist the claimed status with his own defenses, including evidence now obtainable through the facilities of modern medicine and technology

Judgment is hereby rendered DECLARING Teopista Toring Tuñacao to be the illegitimate child of the late Casimiro Mendoza and entitled to all the rights appurtenant to such status.

PROOF OF FILIATION OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN

VDA. DE ALBERTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

BY SANTOS

The case originated from a complaint for acknowledgment and partition filed on September 8, 1960 with the then Court of First Instance of Manila by the herein private respondent, a minor, 18 years of age, assisted by his mother, Andrea Jongco, as his natural guardian, against the herein petitioners.

In the said Complaint, private respondent alleged, in substance, that in 1941 his alleged father, Antonio C. Alberto, and his mother, Andrea Jongco, lived together as husband and wife and as a result of which, he was born on September 10, 1942.

During the time that his alleged father and mother lived together as husband and wife and up to the time of his birth, both were single and had no legal impediment to marry each other; that after his birth, his father and mother continued living together as husband and wife, his father supporting them and introducing him to the public as his natural child; that even the family of his father recognized him as such; that on or about the year 1944, his father and mother separated, and subsequently, his father married herein petitioner Natividad del Rosario; that as a result of the marriage, two (2) children were born—herein petitioners Lourdes Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr.;

Although his father was separated from his mother, he continued to support him and recognized him as his own child.

On July 3, 1949, his father died, and without notice to him, petitioner Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto, on July 17, 1949, instituted before the then Court of First Instance of Manila an intestate proceedings for the estate of his deceased father.

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS; ACTION FOR RECOGNITION OF NATURAL CHILD TO BE BROUGHT ONLY DURING LIFETIME OF PRESUMED PARENT. — The action for recognition of natural child may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parent. And if the presumed father or mother died during the minority of the child, the latter may file the action within four (4) years from the attainment of majority (Art. 285 [1]).

ACTION FOR RECOGNITION OF NATURAL CHILD TO BE BROUGHT WITHIN FOUR (4) YEARS AFTER DEATH OF THE NATURAL FATHER IN CASE THE LATTER DIED DURING MINORITY OF THE CHILD WITH A GUARDIAN. — If the minor has a guardian as in this case, prescription runs against him even during minority. In such case, the action for recognition must be instituted within four (4) years after the death of the natural father. Antonio C. Alberto, Sr., the alleged father, died on July 3, 1949. The complaint for acknowledgment and partition was filed eleven (11) years later, on September 8, 1960. Hence, prescription had set in.

EVIDENCE; UNSIGNED BIRTHDAY CERTIFICATE, INCOMPETENT PROOF OF PATERNITY. — a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father therein indicated, like in the instant case, is not competent evidence of paternity.


CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 25On the said intestate proceedings, petitioners deliberately omitted him as one of the heirs and for this reason they succeeded in having the properties of his deceased father adjudicated and partitioned among themselves; that the said intestate proceedings were terminated on November 9, 1953; that his father left properties valued at P74,963.81, and accordingly, as a natural child of his father, he is entitled to at least P18,000.00; and that he had absolutely no previous knowledge of the intestate proceedings and came to know about it only recently and thereupon made a demand from the petitioners who refused to give him his share. Accordingly, he prays that the petitioners be ordered to acknowledge him as the natural child of Antonio C. Alberto; that his one-fourth share be turned over to him.

BALUYOT VS. BALUYOT

BY SANTOS

PATERNO VS. PATERNO

BY SANTOS

PROOF OF FILIATION OF ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN: COMPULSORY RECOGNITION

GAPUSAN VS. COURT OF APPEALS

BY SANTOS

Felisa Gapusan Parcon died intestate and without legitimate issue on April 6, 1966 in Bacolod City. Neither her surviving spouse, Prospero Parcon, nor her other known relatives — three (3) sisters and a nephew — made any move to settle her estate judicially.

It was Ligaya Gapusan-Chua, claiming to be an acknowledged natural daughter of Felisa Gapusan Parcon, who instituted judicial proceedings for the settlement of the latter's estate. About a year and eight months after Felisa's demise, or on January 15, 1968, Ligaya filed with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a petition for the settlement of the estate and for issuance of letters of administration in her favor. 1 She also sought her designation as Special Administratrix pending her appointment as regular administratrix. 2

By Order dated January 16, 1968, the Court appointed Ligaya Special Administratrix of Felisa Parcon's estate.

On April 22, 1968, Prospero Parcon, Felisa Parcon's surviving husband, filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order of January 16, 1968. He denied that Ligaya was an acknowledged natural child of his deceased wife, and applied for his own appointment as administrator of his wife's estate.

Hearings were had on the issue of Ligaya claimed affiliation. Ligaya presented, among other proofs, the following documents:Exh. a) Felisa Parcon's sworn statement of assets and liabilities wherein Ligaya is named and described as the daughter of Felisa;Exh. b) Felisa Parcon's application for GSIS life insurance in which Ligaya is set out as her (Felisa's) daughter;

Whether or not Felisa's sworn statement of assets and liabilities and her application for insurance are "authentic writings" which effectively operated as a recognition of Ligaya Gapusan-Chua as her natural child, even if no action was brought by the latter to compel the former, during her lifetime, to recognize her as such.

Recognition of natural children may be voluntary or compulsory.

Voluntary recognition, it has been said, "is an admission of the fact of paternity or maternity by the presumed parent, expressed in the form prescribed by the Civil Code. Its essence lies in the avowal of the parent that the child is his; the formality is added to make the admission incontestable, in view of its consequences." The form is prescribed by Article 278 of the Civil Code, earlier adverted to; it provides that a voluntary recognition "shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing."

Compulsory recognition is sometimes also called judicial recognition, to distinguish it from that which is a purely voluntary act of the parent. It is recognition decreed by final judgment of a competent court. It is governed by Articles 283 and 284, setting forth the cases in which the father or mother, respectively, is obliged to recognize a natural child, and Article 285 providing that generally, the action for recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents.

The matter of whether or not judicial approval is needful for the efficacy of voluntary recognition is dealt with in Article 281 of the Civil Code.

Art. 281. A child who is of age cannot be recognized without his consent.When the recognition of a minor does not take place in a record of birth or in a will, judicial approval shall be necessary. A minor can in any case impugn the recognition within four years following the attainment of his majority.

In other words, judicial approval is not needed if a recognition is voluntarily made —1) of a person who is of age, only his consent being necessary; or2) of a minor whose acknowledgment is effected in a record of birth or in a will.

On the other hand, judicial approval is needful if the recognition of the minor is effected, not through a record of birth or in a will but through a statement in a court of record or an authentic document. In any case the individual


CIVIL LAW REVIEW DIGESTS: PROPERTY RELATIONS TO FILIATION 26Exh. c) Check No. 44046 of the Government Service Insurance System in the sum of P505.50 paid to her (Ligaya) as her share in the death benefits due the heirs of Felisa Parcon.

The Probate Court found for Ligaya. Declared that petitioner is the acknowledged natural child of the late Felisa Gapusan, and for being the next of kin of the deceased (Rule 78, Rules of Court), she is hereby appointed regular administratrix of the properties of the above-mentioned deceased with the same bond given by her as special administratrix, with costs against the oppositors. CA- reversed.

Here, Ligaya insists that the evidence submitted by her does indeed sufficiently establish her status as the acknowledged natural child of Felisa Parcon, and that her appointment as regular administratrix is justified by law and jurisprudence.

More particularly, she contends that the sworn statement of assets and liabilities, a public document submitted by the decedent pursuant to a legal requirement therefor, and the latter's application for life insurance were in law indubitable recognition by her mother of her status as an acknowledged natural child, voluntarily made, and were adequate foundation for a judicial declaration of her status as heir. These statements, she alleges, were "authentic writings" in contemplation of Article 278 of the Civil Code:

recognized can impugn the recognition within four years following the attainment of his majority.

Exhibits (a), (b), and (c) are undoubtedly an "authentic writing" within the contemplation of Article 278.

It is admitted on all sides that no judicial action or proceeding was ever brought during the lifetime of Felisa to compel her to recognize Ligaya as her daughter. It is also evident that Ligaya's recognition as Felisa's daughter was not made in a record of birth or a will, a circumstance which would have made judicial approval unnecessary, only her own consent to the recognition being required. The acknowledgment was made in authentic writings, and hence, conformably with the legal provisions above cited, judicial approval thereof was needed if the writings had been executed during Ligaya's minority. In other words, the question of whether or not the absence of judicial approval negated the effect of the writings as a mode of recognition of Ligaya is dependent upon the latter's age at the time the writings were made.

The point need not be belabored, however. For whether Ligaya were still a minor or already of age at the time of her recognition in the authentic writings mentioned, that circumstance would be immaterial in the light of the attendant facts.

In the first place, the consent required by Article 281 of a person of age who has been voluntarily recognized may be given expressly or tacitly. Assuming then that Ligaya was of age at the time of her voluntary recognition, the evidence shows that she has in fact consented thereto. Her consent to her recognition is not only implicit from her failure to impugn it at any time before her mother's death, but is made clearly manifest and conclusive by her assertion of that recognition in the judicial proceeding for the settlement of her mother's estate as basis for her rights thereto. Assuming on the other hand, that she was a minor at the time of her recognition, and therefore judicial approval of the recognition was necessary, the absence thereof was cured by her ratification of that recognition, after having reached the age of majority, by her initiation of the proceedings for the settlement of her deceased mother's estate on the claim precisely that she was the decedent's acknowledged natural daughter. The requirement of judicial approval imposed by Article 281 is clearly intended for the benefit of the minor. "The lack of judicial approval can not impede the effectivity of the acknowledgment made. The judicial approval is for the protection of the minor against any acknowledgment made to his prejudice." "Therefore, the lack, or insufficiency of such approval is NOT a defect available to the recognizing parent but one which the minor may raise or waive. If after reaching majority the minor consents to the acknowledgment, the lack of judicial approval should make no difference. Implied consent to the acknowledgment may be shown (e.g.,) by such acts as keeping, even after reaching the age of majority, the acknowledgment papers and the use of the parent's surname.

Upon the foregoing facts and considerations, Ligaya Gapusan Chua must be held to be a voluntarily acknowledged natural child of Felisa Gapusan Parcon. She is therefore entitled, in accordance with Article 282 of the Civil Code, to bear her mother's surname, and to receive the hereditary portion accorded to her by the Code.

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