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Property rights and water access: Evidence from
land titling in rural Peru ∗
Robyn Meeks†
December 2015
Abstract
Insecure land tenure and property rights are an impediment to the construc-
tion of water infrastructure in many developing countries. This paper explores
whether alleviating this impediment through a land titling program in rural Peru
is associated with improvements in water access. The economics literature on the
links between property rights and investment decisions has amassed yet, due to
the unique characteristics of water, it is not obvious how water service provision
would respond to improvements in land tenure. Utilizing the phased-in program
timing in a quasi-experimental design, we exploit the differences in implementa-
tion timing across space in conjunction with the differences in program impact
across households that held property titles prior to the project and those that
did not. Results from this modified difference-in-differences method indicate that
land titling is associated with small in magnitude, but statistically significant in-
creases in water access. As a robustness check, we also perform the analysis using
propensity score matching. Results from propensity score matching methods are
consistent with the findings from the modified difference-in-differences method.
We investigate the channels through which this improved access occurs and find
evidence suggesting it is due to government or water utility investments in infras-
tructure, rather than individual household investment. This is consistent with the
hypothesis that land tenure provides households with increased bargaining power.
∗I am grateful to Erica Field for sharing the PETT survey data and many helpful discussions. Ialso thank Rohini Pande and Bill Clark for tremendous support and guidance. All errors are my own.†School of Natural Resources and the Environment, University of Michigan. Email:
1
1 Introduction
Insufficient access to safe drinking water is a problem that continues to plague many of
the world’s poorest populations, with 748 million people lacking access to safe drinking
water and, of those with water access, 1.2 billion are served by contaminated sources
(WWAP, 2015). The development literature pays much attention to the relationship
between poverty and water access and, indeed, this link is a tremendous concern.1
Much less attention is paid to the relationship between water and land rights, yet this
is a problem. The 2015 United Nations World Water Development Report highlights
this relationship, stating, “Access to water is also about access to land.” Indeed, in
many lower and middle income countries, populations living in informal settlements
and slums or on land without formal property rights are generally more likely to have
inadequate access to safe water (WWAP, 2015).
With 889 million people estimated to be living in slums and informal settlements within
the next few years (UN-Habitat 2010), understanding the relationship between land and
water access is crucial. The United Nations identified improvements in property rights
and land tenure security as a mechanism by which to increase water access. This could
happen through several paths. Land tenure improvements could increase the power of
the poor to negotiate improved water provision by the formal sector or it could increase
the poor’s own investments in building water infrastructure (WWAP, 2006).
The role of the state in setting up and protecting property rights is considered to be a
precondition for economic growth (Besley, 1995). Property rights and tenure security
improvements can come in various forms, such as land titling programs (Field and Field,
2006), land reform legislation (Besley and Burgess, 2000), and limited and full transfer
of property rights (Banerjee et al., 2002). Studies have shown that improved property
rights can have numerous economic benefits for households, such as increases in access
to credit (Field and Torero, 2004), household investments (Field, 2005), agricultural
investment (Goldstein and Udry, 2008), access to paid work (Field, 2007), and external
finance (Johnson et al., 2002. The question remains: what is the impact of property
rights on water access?
1For example, an analysis of household survey data from fifteen developing countries, showed thataccess to water services is positively and significantly correlated with households income (Komives etal., 2003).
1
In this paper, I use a quasi-experimental method to provide evidence on the follow-
ing questions: is improved land tenure security associated with improvements in water
access? If improved land tenure leads to differential access to water, what are the chan-
nels through which it occurs? Is the improved water access the result of investment by
individual households or government and/or water utilities?
Several theories have been proposed for the mechanisms through which land titles might
affect investments in agricultural land or housing infrastructure.2 First, land title pro-
vision reduces the risk of expropriation and therefore encourages longer-term immobile
investments. Second, it increases a household’s collateral and therefore their access to
credit. Third, it enables the renting and selling of land and thus increases their gains
from trade. Different impediments to investment occur through each of these paths of
investment in water infrastructure, but many are related to poor tenure security.
To answer these questions, I use a quasi-experiment in rural Peru, through which land
titles were provided to households previously lacking such land security. Historically,
impediments to gaining land tenure included expensive fees, long registration periods,
and other bureaucratic hurdles. Between 1994 and 2004, a nationwide titling program
provided households in rural Peru with improved property rights, through the Special
Rural Cadastre and Land Titling Project (PETT). PETT removed historical impedi-
ments to land tenure, making land titles available for the rural population. Due to the
administration needs of the project, PETT implementation was phased in over time.
The phased-in implementation of land title registration via the PETT program provides
a natural experiment to test the relationship between property rights and water access.
Prior to PETT, only the wealthiest households held title to their land. As a result,
a simple cross-sectional analysis comparing those households with and without titles
would be biased by unobservable factors correlated with both status of households’
property rights and water access. To overcome this identification challenge and investi-
gate the relationship between land tenure and water access, I exploit the differences in
timing of PETT program implementation across space. Specically, I use the variation
between villages in which PETT was (“program” villages) and was not implemented
2Besley (1995) discusses these three such theories in great detail.
2
(“non-program villages”) at the time of our survey, in conjunction with the variation
between households with (“non-squatters”) and without (“squatters”) titles prior to the
PETT project. I refer to this method as a modified difference-in-differences approach.
The intuition underlying this identification approach is that squatters in program areas
should be those most likely to benefit from the PETT program. In contrast, those
already holding formal property titles should see relatively little, if any, impact of the
project being implemented in their region. As a robustness check, I perform a simi-
lar analysis using propensity score matching, which provides the additional benefit of
avoiding the assumption that program effects are linear.
From these analyses, I find that the increases in land title provision are associated
with significant, albeit small in magnitude, improvements in household water access.
Title provision is associated with between five and a twelve percent increase in access
to improved water sources. Tests as to whether these improvements occur as a result
of increased investments in water infrastructure by individual households or through
changes in government or utility provision of water sources, indicate that the latter is
more likely the source of improved access. Specifically, I find increases in monthly water
payments but not in household infrastructure investments. This indicates that at least
some of this improved water access is due to investments either by the government or
utility. These results support the hypothesis that land titling provides poor households
with increased power to negotiate improved water provision, potentially due to the
the government’s or service provider’s greater willingness to serve areas where they are
more likely to recover the marginal cost of delivery.3
Due to the unique characteristics of water infrastructure and, thus the particular im-
pediments to water provision in informal settlements, ex ante it was not obvious that
investments in water infrastructure would perform similarly to other forms of invest-
ments. As such, this study contributes to the literature on property rights and invest-
ments in property by testing whether removing historic barriers to acquiring land titles
leads to improvements in water access.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 provides an overview on
3Using data on sources of household funding for water infrastructure investments, I test for evidenceof reduced risk of expropriation and increased access to credit; however, there is an insufficient numberof observations to provide clear support for either theory.
3
the theoretical relationship between property rights and property investments, a back-
ground on the general relationship between property rights and water access, and a
discussion of the unique characteristics of water that set it apart from typical house-
hold investments. Section 3 addresses related legal changes in Peru, including the PETT
program and changes related to water provision around this time. Section 4 describes
the PETT survey, the main dataset, and some initial tests. Section 5 describes the two
main empirical approaches, Section 6 covers results and Section 7 concludes.
2 Property rights and investments
2.1 Potential links: property rights and water infrastructure
In developing countries, informal settlements (clusters of households without land title)
typically face challenges in attaining basic services, including water provision. If the
impediments to government, utility, or household investment in water infrastructure are
indeed the cause of poor provision, then programs providing improved property rights,
land titles, and formal mapping and registration of properties could be associated with
an increase in formal water service provision.4 There are three main routes through
which improved access to water infrastructure in such informal settlements occurs, in-
cluding investments by: (1) the government; (2) utilities or private water companies;
and (3) households investment, through either individual investments or the collective
action of many households. Different impediments to investment occur through each of
these routes, many of which are related to poor tenure security.
Investments by government
In many countries, governments do not legally require the provision of water services
to informal settlements. Often there is concern that delivering basic services, such as
water and sanitation, could provide inhabitants with a legal claim to the land on which
they reside. As such, there can be government resistance to service provision in infor-
mal settlements (UNDESA, 2006). Another barrier to government investment may be
the wak bargaining power held by the inhabitants of the informal settlements. If these
populations lack land title, then they may alos likely lack voting rights, making the
4Such increases in services could impact households through several paths, such as lower volumetricrates for water, shorter distances to communal water standpipes, and less time spent collecting water.
4
extension of infrastructure to informal areas a low priority for politicians.
Investments by utilities
case study of water vendors in Nigeria, showed that households relying on such informal
water provision paid higher volumetric rates for their water than the populations served
by municipal water supply systems. The authors find that the willingness to pay of
such households is sufficient to cover the costs of extending municipal water supply into
these settlements (Whittington et al., 1991). What then is preventing utilities from
expanding? Many people believe the remaining barrier is legal; for utilities to ensure
returns on their investment of expanding the water supply system, they will limit them-
selves to supplying water to households with formal property titles (UNDP, 2006).
The large fixed costs of water infrastructure make utilities hesitant to expand their
services to areas with customers perceived as riskier and less reliable, particularly in-
formal settlements. Such households are considered less apt to pay their water bills or
more likely to relocate without notice. As a result, utilities must develop methods of
coping with non-payment, such as disconnecting non-payers from water supply systems
(UNDESA, 2006). In informal settlements, it can be uncertain who will be responsible
for water payments (in cases where several families or an extended family live in close
proximity), lack of official property boundaries or maps demarcating plots can make
it difficult to lay pipelines, and a lack of an official address system or record of house
locations can make payment collection difficult.
Investments by households
Poor households often face constraints in connecting to that system. To connect to the
water infrastructure typically requires households to make upfront fixed costs. In many
developing countries, water utilities may require an initial payment for the tap, a water
meter, and the pipeline extension from the main system to the individual household.
Households lacking property rights and with weak land tenure might not invest in water
infrastructure for two main reasons. Such costs may be difficult to cover for households
without access to credit. In addition, a risk of expropriation may also deter households
from investing in the fixed cost of infrastructure. Each of these could play a role in
improving access to water infrastructure.
Property rights insecurity (and the risk of expropriation) can act as a random tax on
5
a population (Besley, 1995). The presence of strong property rights, and land rights
in particular, provide individuals with the incentive to use their land efficiently and to
invest in land improvements (Feder et al., 1988). By decreasing the risk of expropria-
tion, titled households may have a greater willingness to invest in water infrastructure,
whether it be through a connection to communal water infrastructure or individual
household water storage or rainwater harvesting tanks.
If the individual’s land is easier to collateralize, that will cause the bank to charge a
lower interest rate and, as a result, individuals will invest more in their land (Besley,
1995). Land titles provide lenders with security to lend to individuals with whom they
are less knowledgeable, thereby increasing the circle of people to which they will lend
and possibly the number of people to whom they will lend. Feder formalizes these argu-
ments in his model, by assuming that credit available to a farmer is “positively related
to the value of their landholdings (as it would typically be when land is a collateral
for loans) and negatively related to their probability of land loss” (Feder et al., 1988).
In many developing countries, residents must purchase the tap, meter, and pipes to
connect to the municipal water supply systems. Households may find the upfront fixed
cost of connecting to be prohibitive. If newly titled households can access credit, they
might use it to connect to the water supply system.
Better property rights may be modeled as decreasing the cost of the exchange when
land is bought or rented. Trading costs are based on the owner’s ability to transfer the
property rights; strong property rights translate into lower costs of trade, whereas a lack
of property transfer rights is similar to infinite costs of trade. A marginal improvement
in the strength of property rights (and the ability to transfer those rights) leads to a
decrease in the cost of property transfer, thereby increasing the potential for the land
to be bought or rented (Besley, 19995). Adding a water connection or building water
infrastructure at a home would arguably increase the value of the household, thereby
increasing the potential gains from trade.
2.2 Unique aspects of water infrastructure
Existing research has empirically tested the links between property rights and invest-
ment in land and housing in numerous contexts, including the Brazilian frontier (Alston
et al., 1996), farms in Thailand (Feder et al., 1988), regions in Ghana (Besley, 1995),
6
and urban slums of Peru (Field, 2005; Field and Torero, 2004). The results of the em-
pirical studies in this literature have been mixed.5 A few features of water provision and
the associated infrastructure differentiate it from these other property improvements
previously researched, possibly complicating this relationship.
First, water can be considered to be a pure public good, a private good, or even a
common good. In places where water is only available through purchase from profit-
seekers, such as water vendors or water companies, then water is a private good and
households unable to pay will be excluded from access. When water remains in lakes
and rivers for recreational enjoyment and consumption by all who choose, then it is a
public good. When access to water is rivalrous but non-excludable, then it is considered
to be a common good. The public goods aspect of water clearly distinguishes it from
other commodities (Hanemann, 2005).
Second, humans need water to survive. This has led to much debate on whether basic
access to water should be considered a fundamental human right, which would require
governments or other parties to provide a minimum amount of the resource to people
when they are lacking access (Gleick, 2000). This issue ties into disagreements as to
how applicable economic concepts are to water. According to the fourth principle of
the Dublin Statement, created in 1992 at the United Nations Conference on Environ-
ment and Development (UNCED), “Water has an economic value in all its competing
uses and should be recognized as an economic good.” However, others in opposition
perceive water to be beyond economic analysis, as it is required by all species and is,
thus, sacred (Barlow and Clarke, 2002; Shiva, 2002).
When water provision is a service of the municipalities, views of water as a fundamental
human right make excluding non-payers from access politically infeasible. Hanemann
(2005) notes that the “special significance” of water exists in both developing and de-
veloped countries, making it politically challenging for publicly owned water utilities
to raise rates even the slightest bit. Certain situations, particularly those in which
exclusion is infeasible, can lead to a free-rider problem. Free riding, which occurs when
some of the users do not pay although they use the water provision services, tends to
5Although the articles mentioned here find some effect of improved land tenure on investment inland and/or property, there are also numerous publications presenting evidence of titles having noeffect on investments. Field (2005) provides a list of such research.
7
cause a commodity to be under-supplied (Hanemann, 2005).
The large fixed costs associated with water supply provision also make it unique from
other commodities. Water is expensive to transport, requiring extensive networks of
pipes and other infrastructure to be constructed prior to water provision. In addi-
tion, there are economies of scale for water provision. The large fixed costs associated
with water infrastructure lend themselves to a natural monopoly and thus a sole water
provider for a given location (Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky, 2005). Or, as noted
by Hanemann (2005), these aspects of water supply lend themselves to public provision
(by a collective or by a monopoly seller) rather than individual, self-provision. House-
hold self-provision, such as is provided through wells, rainwater harvesting, and other
small-scale methods, is often prohibited by high costs (Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrod-
sky, 2005).
Finally, there are positive externalities associated with the provision of safe drinking
water and treatment, as it decreases the spread of contagious water-related diseases and
the spread of water pollution.6 Such positive externalities increase the incentives for
municipalities to ensure safe drinking water provision and invest in water infrastruc-
ture. For all of these reasons water infrastructure investments might not best be made
by individuals, but instead by municipalities or utilities. As a result, we may see no
significant household water infrastructure investments associated with property titles.
Other reasons also exist as to why we might not see evidence of individual household
investments in water infrastructure following titling. First, people might expect the
government or utility to provide such services and that acquiring title makes them
more entitled to formal water provision. Thus, titled households might be less willing
to invest their own time and resources into infrastructure construction. Second, certain
beliefs about water (including water as a human right and religious concepts of water)
might make people less willing to pay for water themselves. Finally, water infrastruc-
ture takes time to construct and thus the time period for which our data covers might
not provide enough time after titling to see investments to occur.
There are reasons to believe that titling might lead to improvements in water access
6Evidence on this is provided in Galiani, Gertler, and Schargrodsky (2005) and Watson (2006).
8
even if households are not investing themselves. The utility may be more willing to
serve households that are now perceived as less risky, as they are less likely to abruptly
move and are easier to bill with legal titles to their land. It is also possible that the
titled households better able to negotiate for coverage by the utility, as they are more
likely to cover the utility’s marginal cost of serving them.
3 Legal changes in Peru
3.1 The PETT Program
In the second half of the twentieth century, land ownership laws in Peru underwent a
series of changes that contributed to the scarcity of property titles in the early 1990s.
During the 1960s, a redistribution of land to peasants in the form of agricultural co-
operatives occurred. This land, received through the nationwide Agrarian Reform, was
prohibited from sale due to legislation changed in the 1970s. This was altered through
Legislative Decree 02, which allowed for the dissolution of cooperatives and the division
of land amongst cooperative members, however, this typically occurred without the re-
ceipt of property titles. In the early 1990s legislation was passed to legalize the sale of
land, but property titles were still relatively rare (Torero and Field, 2005).
In 1991, the Peruvian government passed Legislative Decree 25902, which led to the
onset of the Special Rural Cadastre and Land Titling Project (PETT). Initially this
project was designed to assist a subset of the country’s population;7 however, the titling
process was extended to include all rural estates in 1996 (Torero and Field, 2005). The
goal of PETT was to reduce the cost and duration of registration procedures required
to acquire land title and increase the proportion of titled rural estates. For this to
occur, PETT focused on surveying rural parcels of land and registering new property
titles (Field and Field, 2006).
The project was phased in through the following process. Beginning in 1993, PETT
initially focused on the country’s coastal region, before extending into the highlands
7This includes groups such as the recipients of the Agrarian Reform, owners of uncultivated land,and campesino and native communities.
9
and finally into the jungle in 2000 (Field and Field, 2006). By 2000, 1.9 million parcels
of rural land had been surveyed and 900,000 new property titles had been registered
(Torero and Field, 2005). Since receipt of land title prior to PETT required time-
consuming and costly registration, holding title prior to PETT is highly endogenous
to other household characteristics that also might determine access to water sources.
The aim of PETT was to increase property titles for all rural estates, therefore we
have no reason to believe that acquisition of title via PETT is endogenous to specific
household characteristics correlated with water access. However, the timing of PETT’s
introduction at a village-level might be endogenous. The concerns posed by this source
of endogeneity are discussed in greater detail below.
3.2 Water infrastructure in Peru
Over the past few decades, Peruvian water legislation underwent numerous alterations
and attempted changes, including a transfer of water administration and distribution to
user groups in the 1980s. Between 1991 and 1996, several attempts at privatizing water
services were made (Zegarra, 2004); however, numerous groups mobilized in opposition
to privatization (Isarra and Donner, 2004) and ultimately these privatization attempts
were defeated (Zegarra, 2004). As of the end of our study period in 2004, many of
the country’s water supply systems remained publicly managed.8 As a result, we need
not be concerned of any water policy changes that might simultaneously impact water
infrastructure and affect our estimations.
4 Data
4.1 PETT Survey
The data used for this study were collected through the 2004 Land Titling Special
Project Survey, a rural household survey implemented throughout Peru in the spring
and summer of 2004. The coastal, highlands, and jungle regions are all represented in
the survey sample, as the sample was stratified by the three regions (Field and Field,
8In 2004, the Inter American Development Bank (IADB) arranged a $60 million multiyear loan forthe Peruvian Government to reform priority regions of the country, primarily via privatization reforms(Isarra and Donner, 2004). This change, however, is outside our study period.
10
2006). At the time of the 2004 survey, PETT had been implemented in all three regions
of the country. The survey was developed specifically to be representative of areas in
which PETT was implemented and those in which it was not, in order to use the non-
program areas as a control group.
The survey sample includes 3,204 rural households. Data include household demo-
graphics, basic house characteristics, such as type of house and access to electrical,
water, and sanitation services, household assets and investments, participation in so-
cial programs, family health, household expenses and income, household titles, and
estate security. Data on water access and costs in the survey include: (1) the method
by which water is supplied to the home; (2) the cost of a household’s monthly payment
for water consumption, for the particular month; and (3) whether or not the household
purchased a connection to the rural water supply system, the cost of such a connection,
and whether the purchase occurred before or after the PETT titles was acquired.
4.2 Summary statistics
We calculate summary statistics for all households in out sample.9 According to the
survey data, approximately twenty percent of households in the sample have a PETT
title, whereas thirty-four percent of households in the sample have some sort of title
other than the PETT title. In total, nearly half of the surveyed population has some
form of title to their land. There is substantial heterogeneity in access to basic utility
services: forty-eight percent of the sampled households have access to tap water (ei-
ther indoor or outdoor tap) and an even smaller proportion (forty percent) of sampled
households have access to proper sanitation.
The average household size is 4.5 people with approximately one member of the house-
hold working. Households are highly literate, with eighty-seven percent of household
heads able to read and write. The average age of the household head is fifty-two and
approximately ten percent of household heads are female.
Table 1 shows the differences between PETT-titled households and those with either no
title or those with other forms of property titles. For variables such as amount received
9These are not baseline summary statistics in that they are not calculated using data prior to thePETT program onset.
11
from social programs, number of household members, household savings, and house-
hold assets, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between
households with no title and those with PETT titles. Similarly, I cannot reject the null
hypothesis that there is no difference between the households with a PETT title and
those with a non-PETT title.
Evidence indicates that the groups of households are statistically significantly different
from each other on many characteristics. Households with titles prior to the PETT
program implementation are expected to differ substantially from those without, as the
previous process to obtain title was costly. PETT, however, sought to make land titles
available to all rural households, and therefore it is less clear as to how households
with PETT titles should differ from households with no title (no PETT or other title).
Regarding differences in well-being, the results are mixed. Differences in the size of the
household’s land, the number of workers per household, whether the household head is
female, and the household head’s monthly income are all statistically significant.
4.3 Tenure security
To understand the incentives to participate in the PETT titling program, I analyze
data regarding household members’ perceptions about land tenure. As shown in the
Table 2, there is a statistically significant difference between household members’ per-
ceptions of tenure security depending on the property title types. Households with a
PETT title are more certain than households with no title that their house will not
be expropriated by the government or by another person and that their children will
inherit the house. Households with a non-PETT title feel even more confident than
PETT households that their house will not be expropriated by the government or by
another person. This supports our argument that households with property titles prior
to PETT had no incentive to join. It is not obvious that one type of PETT title is
stronger than another. However, the direction of the statistically significant differences
between PETT households and those without titles supports our assertion that non-
titled households had an incentive to participate in the program.
Of those households that have some property title, either PETT or other, fifty-eight
percent believe that having the title has increased the security level of their house
and seventy-four percent of respondents believe the title increases the probability of
12
protection in the court system. Tenure security is not perceived to impact neighborhood
safety; only six percent of respondents believe that acquiring title has reduced the
level of robberies. Most of these households also do not believe that acquiring title
has increased their access to public services or police protection. Of households with
property titles, one in five believe that acquiring title increased the taxes that they pay.
4.4 Differential access to water sources
Average access to the different water sources for PETT titled, non-PETT titled, and
non-titled households is depicted in the Table 3. Using the responses to the survey
question regarding the household’s water source, I create binary indicators for different
levels of water access. First, I create binary variables for each of the main types of water
sources: (1) indoor tap; (2) outdoor tap; (3) sink, (4) well; (5) river; (6) vendor; (7)
other. In addition, I created a combined indicator variable for all tapped water sources,
both indoor and outdoor, in addition to a variable to indicate access to an “improved
source” as defined by the development community’s standard for water projects.10
There is a statistically significant difference in access to all types of water, except for
outdoor taps and other sources, between (1) households with PETT titles versus house-
holds with no title, and (2) households with PETT titles versus households with other
types of titles. These results suggest that there is a relationship between land titles
and access to water sources, thus motivating this research as to whether acquiring land
title leads to improved household water access. Also, the lack of difference in access to
outdoor taps between the titled and non-titled households indicates that the presence of
communal (outdoor) taps may be better indicated by community characteristics rather
than household characteristics. In other words, it may be community action, or action
on the part of the municipality, that determines the presence of outdoor taps.
These results are supplemented with probit regressions and marginal effects regressions,
which test the impact of the PETT title on access to all types of water sources listed
above. The results from these regressions are shown in Table 4, panels A and B respec-
10According the HDR 2006, “improved” access is definition based on three dimensions: water quality,proximity, and quantity. The threshold for acceptable water source proximity is less than one kilometerand that for acceptable quantity is at least 20 liters per day. The definition of “improved” includesin-house connections, shared standpipes, pumps, and protected springs and wells; water provided byvendors, tanker trucks, streams, or unprotected wells and spring is not (HDR 2006).
13
tively.
The preferred specification (i.e. controlling for the abovementioned household char-
acteristics and the existence of an alternative type of title) provides evidence of a
significant relationship between acquisition of a PETT title and improvements in water
access. A household with a PETT title is five percent more likely to have access to an
indoor tap (statistically significant at the 95% level), four percent more likely to have
access to an outdoor tap, nine percent more likely to have access to any type of tap
water, and eleven percent more likely to have access to an improved water source (all
of which are statistically significant at the 99% level) than if they did not have such a
title. These results are preliminary evidence of a relationship between PETT titles and
water access.
5 Empirical Approach
I treat the PETT program as a quasi-experimental program, motivated by the fact that
PETT aimed to survey and register land for all rural landholders, regardless of wealth,
education, and other such household characteristics. As such, the program reduced the
endogeneity of land titles that had existed previously. The two overarching research
questions are explained below.
Is land titling via PETT associated with differences in access to water?
To answer this question, I investigate a subset of questions including: Is there a differ-
ence in overall access to water due to titling differences? Are there changes in the types
of water provision?
Through which pathways might differences in water access occur?
It is possible that provision of land titles could lead to greater investment in water
infrastructure, by the government, water utilities, or individual households. Changes in
certain types of water infrastructure, such as communal outside taps, might signify in-
vestments by the municipality and/or utility, whereas other investments, such as indoor
taps, would most likely indicate a private household investment. I look for evidence
as to whether infrastructure improvements occurred via individual households or mu-
nicipality/utility investments. I test whether titling is associated with an increase in
14
household investments in water infrastructure and/or larger monthly water bills. With-
out access to records of land sales transactions or property value estimates, I cannot
test for evidence of the gains-from-trade theory in this context.
I investigate the following questions: Is there a difference as to whether households
invest in a water connection? Is there a difference in the amount that households in-
vest in the water infrastructure? Results could indicate greater individual household
investments, which would be in line with the theory that titling leads to investments in
property. It would, however, identify whether investment occurred due to reduced risk
of expropriation or increased access to credit.
Finally, I investigate the possibility of water infrastructure investments by municipali-
ties or utilities. If a utility invested in new water pipelines or wells, one might expect
that to be reflected in the households’ monthly cost of water. We use responses to
the following questions as evidence as to whether utilities and/or municipalities make
investments. Is there a difference in whether or not a household makes monthly water
payments that is associated with title provision? Is there a difference in how much a
household spends in monthly water payments that is associated with title provision?
5.1 Difference-in-differences estimates
To determine if there is an effect of the PETT titling program on improved water
access, I use a modified difference-in-differences (DD) approach. A modified DD, com-
paring differential impacts across regions in which a policy is implemented with regions
in which the policy has not yet reached is similar to the methods used in Morduch
(1998) and Field (2005).11 I exploit the differences in the variation between villages
that PETT had reached (“program villages”) and those it had not yet reached (“non-
program villages”), in addition to the variation between the households that had no
titles prior to PETT (“no prior title”) and those that did (“prior title”). As the project
was implemented earlier within the coastal region than the other two regions, some
11Morduch (1998) assesses the impact of micro-credit provided by the Grameen Bank. To investigatethe effect of land titles on investment in urban slums in Peru, Field (2005) used a similar modified DDapproach in which a control group comprised of future program beneficiaries residing in neighborhoodsnot yet reached by the program.
15
program impacts may differ based on location. To control for this, I include regions
fixed effects. In addition, to account for the differential impacts of PETT over time, I
control for PETT title implementation year.
To measure the impacts of the PETT titling program on water access using this modified
difference-in-differences approach, I follow estimate the following equation:
qiv = τProgramv ∗NoPrioriv + βProgramv + δNoPrioriv + αXiv + γr + εiv (1)
where qiv is the water source of household i in village v, Program is an indicator equal
to 1 if the PETT program had reached village v at the time of the survey, NoPrioriv is
an indicator of whether household i in village v had title prior to the onset of the PETT
program, Xiv is a vector of household-level control variables, and γr are region fixed
effects. The coefficient on our interaction term Program ∗NoPrioriv is our estimated
treatment effect.
A standard difference-in-differences approach would require that the trends in water ac-
cess amongst “program” households are parallel to the trends in water access amongst
the “non-program” group prior over time. Our modified difference-in-differences method
requires a slightly altered parallel trends assumption: the households titled prior to
PETT and those not titled prior to PETT need not be the same; they just must not
systematically differ across early and late program villages. With only cross-sectional
data, I am unable to test the parallel trends assumption using pre-intervention peri-
ods. If the relationship between the titling program and water access is confounded by
wealth variables, the difference-in-differences estimate would be biased.12 Given these
potential biases of our modified difference-in-differences method, we test these same
questions using propensity score matching instead as well.
12For example, if richer villages, which would be more likely to have better water access regardless oftitles, were more likely to be program villages, then the difference-in-differences estimate would likelyoverstate the impact of the titling program on water access and the bias would be positive. Conversely,if poorer villages, which would be likely to have worse access to water services, were more likely to beprogram villages, then the difference-in-differences estimate would be downward biased and would belikely to understate the effect of the program.
16
5.2 Propensity score matching estimates
Propensity score matching methods have been used in several studies investigating the
impact of water access on child health (Jalan and Ravallion, 2003; Galdo and Briceno,
2005), an area of research in which randomizing access to treatment is often difficult due
to cost constraints, political feasibility, and implementation issues. Similarly, random-
izing access to the PETT titles would have been politically challenging to implement.
The propensity score is the probability of being assigned to the PETT program, condi-
tional on a vector of observed variables. Using propensity score matching to estimate
the causal effects of the PETT program on water access requires a two-step procedure.
First, we estimate the propensity score, which is the probability of participating in the
PETT program, based on the selected covariates. Second, we match households with
PETT titles to households without titles based on the scalar propensity score.
Using a propensity score to match, instead of matching on a vector of observables,
is particularly advantageous when there are many observables or when the indepen-
dent variables are continuous rather than binary (Angrist and Krueger, 1999). Also,
modifying for the propensity score balances the distribution of the observed covariates
between the treatment and control groups, based on their predicted probability of par-
ticipation, and removes bias due to the unobserved covariates (Rosenbaum and Rubin,
1983). Propensity score matching addresses one of the primary weaknesses of conven-
tional matching, the assumption that selection of the PETT and non-PETT households
does not occur on unobservables. Thus, instead of matching on all of the observable
characteristics, as in conventional matching, I match here on the scalar propensity score.
In our case, propensity score matching is preferred to conventional matching, for sev-
eral reasons.13 First, there are many observables on which to match, making PSM a
better fit. Second, there are possibly some unobservable factors that contributed to
the selection of the PETT and non-PETT households. I compare the PETT and non-
PETT households to estimate both the average treatment effect (ATE) and average
treatment on the treated (ATT), using nearest matching with replacement. I perform
these calculations for one, three, and six matches. PSM provides the additional benefit
of allowing the relationship between land titles and water access to be non-linear.14
13As a robustness check, we also performed conventional matching methods and found that resultswere not qualitatively different.
14Akin to the issues that Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky (2005) faced in their analysis of the
17
6 Results and Analysis
6.1 Land titling and differences in water access
The modified difference-in-differences results are shown in Table 5. The coefficient on
the interaction term for program and squatter gives us the effect of the PETT titling
program on access to water access. Results for two types of water sources are of partic-
ular interest: river water and improved water sources. When controlling for household
characteristics, whether the household had another title, and region, the results indi-
cate that access to titles leads to a four percent decrease in river water use (significant
at the 90% level) and six percent increase in improved source use (significant at the
95% level). However, when we include controls for year of titling, only improved water
sources remain significant, albeit the size of the effect is nearly the same.
Results from propensity score matching, which are shown in Table 6, serve as a check
for the difference-in-differences results. Matching results show a greater number of
significant results, all of which are with are in the expected direction. Overall, these
results provide similar estimates of the relationship between PETT titles and outdoor
tap water. The small increase associated with PETT could be a signal of communal
water supply systems and therefore a sign of community investment through either
collective action or, more likely, investment by the municipality or utility. An increase
in access to water through outdoor taps does not necessarily signify construction of an
altogether new water supply system, but could indicate the extension of an old system
to reach areas not previously connected.
Importantly, river water use shows a decline between nine and twelve percent and im-
proved water sources show an increase of between eight and twelve percent (all at the
impacts of privatization on child health, it is quite plausible that impact of titling are heterogeneousacross villages. For example, some villages may have stronger leadership or institutions and alreadyhave a high-level of water provision for its residents. In such a village, the PETT program may haveless of an impact on water access because the strong leadership has ensured that the people have ahigh level of water provision already. In contrast, a village that is without a strong organizer maybenefit more from the PETT program as it has much more to gain with respect to water provision.
18
99% significance level) due to titling. River water and improved water source use are
particularly important indicators of changes in water access. Increases in access to
improved water sources indicate steps towards achieving the water-related MDG. Ar-
guably the most interesting result in this section is for the binary variable indicating
use of rivers for water sources. This is perhaps the strongest indication that there are
improvements made in water access. Untreated river water tends to be the source of
last resort, when there is no access to formal water services in the area or if present
they are unaffordable to a particular household. The fact that people would be shifting
away from river water is a good indication that some other better source is replacing
river water for them, either due to improved reach of a formal water supply system or
lower relative prices for water provided by an existing one.
In addition, there is a slight decrease (albeit not always statistically significant) in ac-
cess to water via vendors. Water vending, as discussed previously, is typically more
expensive than access through municipal water systems. It would therefore be logical
that households would switch away from water vendors if presented with another al-
ternative; however, these results are not clear enough to make a claim in this regard.
Results for the variable encompassing other water sources are positive and statistically
significant, but it is difficult to make any greater assessments from that result, as “other
sources” can represent a wide variety of service provision, ranging from rainwater har-
vesting to use of polluted irrigation canals for drinking water.
Improved access to water sources was a designated outcome measures to meet goal
seven of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). It appears as though land titling
is indeed associated with the overall improvements in access to water that the MDGs
seek to cause. And, second, land titling could provide one possible method of working
towards improving water access. Thus, it appears as though land tenure insecurity is a
constraint to household access to improved water sources.
I test whether this difference in water access is likely due to the wealth effect of the
title or due to a substitution effect, by repeating the abovementioned regressions with
binary variables indicating ownership of certain household “luxury” goods, such as a
television and radio. The ownership of these items is significantly greater in PETT
households. Therefore we consider the changes in water access to be a wealth effect.
19
6.2 Pathways: land security influences water access
Given the evidence that improvements in water access occurred, both through an in-
crease in use of formal water provision via improved water sources and through the
decrease in unsafe water sources in the form of river water, I investigate whether in-
vestments in infrastructure might have been made by individual households or the
municipalities or utilities.
Evidence of improved water services
To investigate whether households differ with respect to investments in connections to
water services, I compare the dates on which the household received title with the year
in which the water supply connection was made. If the connections tend to occur after
or around the time that a household received title, then this reinforces the argument
that reducing the risk of expropriation will lead a household to increase its investment
in the land and household infrastructure.
I use difference-in-differences and matching estimates to see if the PETT title is associ-
ated with an increase in the probability of a household investing in water infrastructure
as well as the amount invested in water infrastructure, controlling for the region and
other household characteristics. In Table 7, difference-in-differences estimates show
that title provision is associated with a three percent increase in investments in wa-
ter infrastructure (statistically significant at the 10% level). However, when I include
dummies for year of titling this result is no longer statistically significant. Matching
results, as shown in Table 8, do not show much effect of titling on investments in water
infrastructure.
These results do not strongly support the development theory that land titles would
lead to increased investment in the household. However, given the unique aspects of
water this result is not surprising. These findings provide evidence that the PETT
title is leading to community improvements in water infrastructure, perhaps by the
municipality or utility, rather than through many individual investments in household
infrastructure. Together these results all support the hypothesis that although title
does lead to improved access to water sources, these improvements are not necessarily
occurring due to the private household investments.
20
Evidence of utility or government improvements to water services
Thus far, results indicate that titling is associated with improved water access, but
there is only weak evidence that households themselves increase their investments in
water infrastructure. What then is driving the improvements in water services?
Titling might enable investment through channels other than individual households,
such as utilities or governments. The data do not include such information, so I cannot
directly test for this. I can, however, test to see if there are differences in monthly water
bill payments, which might indicate improvements by a water utility or government.
The DD results in Table 9 show little effect of PETT titles on the probability that peo-
ple make monthly water payments. The propensity score matching results, shown in
Table 10, show impacts of a much greater scale than the DD results and are considered
an upper bound.
Although we have evidence that water access is improving and that it is occurring as
a result of municipality or utility investment, such improvements may translate into
a slightly greater proportion of households having to pay for their water and a larger
payment per month. The most likely explanation for this result is that whatever the
prior and current water sources, they probably both incur a fee and the newer one is
just slightly more expensive. This is the likely result if people are transferring away
from rivers, from which people tend to collect water for free, as one of their primary
water sources to a more formal water source, for which they have to pay for their water.
If this is the case, then it would be quite plausible that we would see an increase in
the proportion of households making monthly water payments associated with PETT
titles.
6.3 Credit-access or risk of expropriation hypotheses
Although we cannot test the gains-from-trade model here, we seek evidence of either
improved credit access or decreased risk of expropriation by investigating whether title
acquisition impacts the method of payment used (such as, formal or informal credit or
own household finances) for investments in water infrastructure. To test for any differ-
ences in access to credit, I look to survey responses regarding financing for household
connections to the public water supply. Respondents may reply to any of six types of
financing: (1) banking credit, (2) another type of formal credit, (3) informal credit, (4)
21
loan from family or friend, (5) own resources, (6) in exchange for a debt or service.
Unfortunately, the number of responses is too few for all categories of financing, except
for respondents replying “own resources.” Therefore, I am not able to test the access
to credit hypothesis with this data. However, I do test for impacts of PETT title on
whether a household uses their own finances to pay for connections to public water
supply systems. If I were to see a positive change in the use of own resources for water
infrastructure improvements associated with PETT titles, this would provide evidence
in support for the risk of expropriation hypothesis. It would signify that households
indeed had the ability to make the investments in water infrastructure but do not do
so until they have greater property security, as provided by the PETT title.
The difference-in-differences results, as shown in Table 11, do not show much of a
relationship between the titling program and using one’s own resources. These results
do not seem to provide evidence for or against either the credit access or security of
tenure models for investment.
7 Conclusions
The results presented within this paper support the hypothesis that land title provision
is associated with better water access, specifically increases in access to improved water
sources. One of the strongest indications of overall improvements in water access is the
significant decrease in the use of river water as a household source. The results appear
to indicate that at least some portion of this improved infrastructure is actually due
to public investments or investments by the utility in improving water infrastructure,
rather than investments by the individual households. We see significant positive effects
of titling on improved water sources, such as outdoor taps, which tend to be the result
of community or public financing. In comparison, we see no effect on the improved
sources that tend to be private and associated with one particular household, such as
indoor taps or wells.
The relationship found here between land title and water access could also be due to a
shift in the households’ attitudes towards access to services, particularly water. Newly
titled households might expect public investment in water infrastructure and formal
22
water service provision now that they have proper legal title to their land. This relates
to our discussions as to how investments in water infrastructure differ from other results
that find an effect of land titles on individual household investments in land and hous-
ing. Conversely, the positive relationship between PETT land titles and water access is
consistent with the hypothesis that newly-titled populations gain increased negotiating
powers, particularly with respect to demands for water services.
Although there are significant improvements in access to particular types of water
sources, the improvements measured by the modified difference-in-differences method
are small. We view these results as the conservative estimates, whereas the propensity
score matching results are perhaps an upper bound. It possible, however, that esti-
mates of the relationship between PETT land titles and water access are small due to
the amount of time between the PETT project implementation and the survey, which
is relatively short in comparison to the time it takes to plan and construct water in-
frastructure. Therefore, the magnitude of this relationship could potentially be larger
after more time has passed after the titling program.
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25
Tab
le1:
Mea
ns
ofE
xpla
nat
ory
Var
iable
s
Var
iabl
ePE
TT
No
Titl
eO
ther
TIT
LE
No
Titl
e O
ther
Titl
e A
mou
nt re
ceiv
ed fr
om so
cial
pro
gram
s 61
8.57
551
6.30
961
10.
825
0.98
9Si
ze o
f HH
land
(sq
met
ers)
1276
465
1804
3618
4717
0.01
70.
004
Wor
king
HH
mem
bers
0.98
10.
959
0.96
80.
003
0.01
HH
mem
bers
4.5
4.60
84.
537
0.27
30.
718
Chi
ldre
n ag
ed 5
-11
0.60
80.
918
0.76
20
0.00
1C
hild
ren
aged
12-
160.
577
0.62
30.
638
0.21
90.
125
Fem
ale
HH
hea
d 0.
168
0.11
80.
113
0.00
30.
001
HH
hea
d ag
e56
.148
.952
.91
0H
H h
ead
liter
ate
0.86
0.87
60.
871
0.31
80.
506
HH
hea
d ye
ars o
f edu
catio
n 5.
202
5.74
15.
627
0.00
40.
035
HH
hea
d in
com
e 46
8.9
372.
845
8.6
0.01
0.80
2H
H sa
ving
s 0.
341
0.32
20.
374
0.38
30.
173
Ow
n ho
use
0.63
0.21
20.
658
00.
233
Val
ue H
H a
sset
s67
50.1
9757
.572
30.5
10.
892
Not
es: M
eans
cal
cula
ted
usin
g da
ta fr
om th
e 20
04 L
and
Titli
ng S
peci
al P
roje
ct S
urve
y.
Mea
ns o
f HH
Cha
ract
eris
tics (
By
Titl
e T
ype)
T-T
EST
S w
ith B
ase
Cas
e of
"P
ET
T T
itle"
26
Tab
le2:
Per
cepti
ons
ofE
xpro
pri
atio
nR
isk
T-T
EST
: T
-TT
EST
:
Surv
ey Q
uest
ion
SQue
stio
n P
ET
T T
itle
Oth
er T
itle
No
Titl
ePE
TT
vs.
NO
TIT
LE
T
ITL
E v
s. PE
T
How
cer
tain
are
you
that
you
r hou
se w
ill
not b
e ex
prop
riate
d by
the
gove
rnm
ent?
85.0
494
.14
73.7
20.
000
0.00
0
How
sure
are
you
that
you
r hou
se w
ill
not b
e ex
prop
riate
d by
ano
ther
per
son?
88.5
796
.45
76.8
90.
000
0.00
0
How
sure
are
you
that
you
r hou
se w
ill
be in
herit
ed b
y yo
ur c
hild
ren?
96.5
988
.48
76.2
0.00
00.
000
Not
es: M
eans
cal
cula
ted
usin
g da
ta fr
om th
e 20
04 L
and
Titli
ng S
peci
al P
roje
ct S
urve
y.
Perc
ent h
ouse
hold
s rep
lies:
"cer
tain
" or
"ve
ry c
erta
in"
27
Tab
le3:
Pro
por
tion
ofH
ouse
hol
ds
wit
hA
cces
sto
Wat
erSou
rces
by
Diff
eren
tT
itle
s
Var
iab
leP
ET
TN
o T
itle
TIT
LE
No
Tit
le
Oth
er T
itle
tap
indo
or0.
210.
426
0.36
40.
000
0.00
0ta
p ou
tdoo
r0.
305
0.34
50.
351
0.51
20.
455
Fou
ntai
n0.
204
0.40
60.
389
0.00
00.
000
Wel
l0.
218
0.48
90.
293
0.00
00.
017
Riv
er0.
114
0.64
50.
241
0.00
00.
000
Ven
dor
0.07
70.
558
0.36
50.
000
0.01
2im
prov
ed s
ourc
e0.
217
0.42
90.
354
0.00
00.
000
tap
wat
er
0.22
10.
417
0.36
20.
000
0.00
0
Not
es: M
eans
cal
cula
ted
usin
g da
ta f
rom
the
2004
Lan
d T
itli
ng S
peci
al P
roje
ct S
urve
y.
Pro
por
tion
of
HH
s u
sin
g w
ater
sou
rce
T-T
ES
TS
wit
h B
ase
Cas
e
28
Tab
le4:
Pro
bit
and
Mar
ginal
Eff
ects
Res
ult
s:L
and
Tit
les
and
Acc
ess
toW
ater
Sou
rces
Indo
or
ta
pO
utdo
or
ta
pS
hare
d
ta
pIm
prov
ed
sour
ceS
ink
Wel
lV
endo
r R
iver
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
Pan
el A
: P
robi
t Res
ult
s: T
itli
ng
and
Acc
ess
to W
ater
Sou
rces
PE
TT
-0.0
20.
210.
050.
330.
170.
080.
06-0
.47
(0.0
6)(0
.10)
**(0
.06)
(0.0
8)**
*(0
.07)
**(0
.07)
(0.2
3)(0
.09)
***
TIT
LE
0.11
0.11
0.14
0.35
0.22
-0.0
90.
19-0
.38
(0.0
5)**
(0.0
9)(0
.05)
***
(0.0
6)**
*(0
.06)
***
(0.0
6)(0
.14)
(0.0
7)**
*
Pan
el B
: M
argi
nal
Eff
ects
Res
ult
s: T
itli
ng
and
Acc
ess
to W
ater
Sou
rces
PE
TT
-0.0
10.
020.
020.
070.
050.
020.
00-0
.08
(0.0
2)(0
.01)
*(0
.03)
(0.0
2)**
*(0
.02)
**(0
.02)
(0.0
0)(0
.01)
***
0.04
0.01
0.06
0.08
0.06
-0.0
20.
00-0
.07
TIT
LE
(0.0
2)**
(0.0
1)(0
.02)
***
(0.0
1)**
*(0
.02)
***
(0.0
1)(0
.00)
(0.0
1)**
*
Obs
3182
3182
3182
3182
3182
3182
3182
3182
Not
es: S
tand
ard
erro
rs in
par
enth
eses
(*
sign
ific
ant a
t 10%
; **
sign
ific
ant a
t 5%
; ***
sig
nifi
cant
at 1
%).
All
regr
essi
ons
incl
ude
regi
on
fixe
d ef
fect
s an
d co
ntro
ls f
or h
ouse
hold
cha
ract
eris
tics,
incl
udin
g: y
ears
of
HH
hea
d’s
educ
atio
n, w
heth
er th
e H
H h
ead
is f
emal
e,
num
ber
of p
eopl
e li
ving
in th
e H
H, n
umbe
r of
wor
kers
livi
ng in
the
HH
, num
ber
of c
hild
ren
betw
een
5 an
d 11
yea
rs o
ld, w
heth
er th
e fa
mil
y ow
ns a
hom
e bu
sine
ss, w
heth
er th
e H
H r
ecei
ves
any
inco
me
from
ren
ts.
29
Table 5: Difference-in-differences: Water Sources
Improved source
Outdoor tap
Indoor tap
All taps River Sink Well
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
program*no prior 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.05 -0.04 0.03 -0.01(0.03)** (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)* (0.03) (0.03)
program 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.00 -0.04 0.02 0.01(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)** (0.02) (0.02)
no prior title -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.07 -0.05 0.01(0.02)*** (0.01)* (0.02) (0.02)* (0.02)*** (0.02)** (0.02)
Obs 3182 3182 3182 3182 3182 3182 3182
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions confixed effects and controls for household characteristics, including: years of HH head’s education, whether the HH head is feof people living in the HH, number of workers living in the HH, number of children between 5 and 11 years old, whether thowns a home business, whether the HH receives any income from rents.
30
Tab
le6:
Pro
pen
sity
Sco
reM
atch
ing:
Wat
erSou
rces
1mat
ch3
mat
ches
6 m
atch
es
1mat
ch3
mat
ches
6 m
atch
es
tap
wat
er
0.02
9.0
86**
*
.100
**
.094
***
.095
***
.0
97**
*
tap
indo
or-0
.012
.050
**
.067
**
.0
56*
.
064*
*
.062
**
tap
outd
oor
.041
***
.0
36**
*
.034
**
.037
**
.031
**
.035
***
sink
.045
**
0.03
1.0
38*
.0
42*
.0
42*
.0
37*
wel
l 0.
004
-0.0
07-0
.018
-0.0
2-0
.005
-0.0
03
rive
r-.
087*
**
-.12
1***
-.
129*
**-.
118*
**
-.1
29**
* .
-.13
1***
vend
or-0
.005
-0.0
01-0
.003
-0.0
07-.
010*
*
-.00
9*
impr
oved
sou
rce
.078
***
.1
10**
*
.121
***
.1
15**
*
.132
***
.1
30**
*
AT
TA
TE
Not
es: V
aria
bles
use
d to
det
erm
ine
prop
ensi
ty s
core
s in
clud
e: y
ears
of
HH
hea
d’s
educ
atio
n, w
heth
er t
he H
H h
ead
is
fem
ale,
num
ber
of p
eopl
e li
ving
in th
e H
H, n
umbe
r of
wor
kers
livi
ng in
the
HH
, num
ber
of c
hild
ren
betw
een
5 an
d 11
ye
ars
old,
whe
ther
the
fam
ily
owns
a h
ome
busi
ness
, whe
ther
the
HH
rec
eive
s an
y in
com
e f
rom
ren
ts.
31
Table 7: Difference-in-differences: Titles and Water Infrastructure Investments
(1) (2) (3) (4)
program*no prior 0.04 0.03 5.57 5.34(0.02)** (0.02)* (7.77) (7.87)
program 0.01 0.01 -1.57 -2.17(0.01) (0.01) (5.25) (5.32)
no prior title -0.03 -0.03 -10.96 -10.57(0.01)*** (0.01)*** (4.80)** (4.91)**
Obs 3204 3182 3204 3182
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. "Water connect" is a binary variable for whether or not the HH invested in water infrastructure. "Water invest" is the amount a HH invested in water infrastructure. All regressions include region fixed effects and controls for household characteristics, including: years of HH head’s education, whether the HH head is female, number of people living in the HH, number of workers living in the HH, number of children between 5 and 11 years old, whether the family owns a home business, whether the HH receives any income from rents. In April 2004, 1 USD = 3.5739 Peruvian Nuevo Sol; all amounts reported in Sol.
Water connect Water invest
32
Tab
le8:
Pro
pen
sity
Sco
reM
atch
ing:
Tit
les
and
Wat
erIn
fras
truct
ure
Inve
stm
ents
1mat
ch3
mat
ches
6 m
atch
es
1mat
ch3
mat
ches
6 m
atch
es
Indi
cato
r fo
r w
heth
er H
Hs
inve
sted
in w
ater
con
nect
ion
0.00
50.
010.
011
0.01
0.00
80.
007
Tot
al a
mt i
nves
ted
in w
ater
co
nnec
tion
2.34
92.
676
1.12
82.
175
2.07
1.15
6
Am
ount
inve
sted
in w
ater
co
nnec
tion
if in
vest
ed a
t all
72.7
23*
33
.916
31.3
845.
866
11.0
5220
.64
AT
TA
TE
Not
es: V
aria
bles
use
d to
det
erm
ine
prop
ensi
ty s
core
s in
clud
e: y
ears
of
HH
hea
d’s
educ
atio
n, w
heth
er t
he H
H h
ead
is f
emal
e,
num
ber
of p
eopl
e li
ving
in th
e H
H, n
umbe
r of
wor
kers
livi
ng in
the
HH
, num
ber
of c
hild
ren
betw
een
5 an
d 11
yea
rs o
ld, w
heth
er
the
fam
ily
owns
a h
ome
busi
ness
, whe
ther
the
HH
rec
eive
s an
y in
com
e f
rom
ren
ts. I
n A
pril
200
4, 1
US
D =
3.5
739
Per
uvia
n N
uevo
Sol
; all
am
ount
s re
port
ed in
Sol
.
33
Table 9: Difference-in-differences: Titles and Payment for Water Access
(1) (2) (3) (4)
program*noprior 0.05 0.06 -6.95 -6.39-0.04 -0.04 (4.14)* -4.17
program 0.03 0.03 6.07 6.41-0.02 -0.02 (2.79)** (2.82)**
nopriortitle -0.08 -0.07 1.47 0.61(0.02)*** (0.02)*** -2.55 -2.61
Observations 3204 3182 3204 3182
Has monthly water bill payments
Monthly payment amount
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses: * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include region fixed effects and household characteristics, including: years of HH head’s education, whether the HH head is female, number of people living in the HH, number of workers living in the HH, number of children between 5 and 11 years old, whether the family owns a home business, whether the HH receives any income from rents. In April 2004, 1 USD = 3.5739 Peruvian Nuevo Sol; all amounts reported in Sol.
34
Tab
le10
:P
rop
ensi
tySco
reM
atch
ing:
Tit
les
and
Pay
men
tfo
rW
ater
Acc
ess
1mat
ch3
mat
ches
6 m
atch
es
1mat
ch3
mat
ches
6 m
atch
es
Indi
cato
r fo
r w
heth
er H
H m
akes
m
onth
ly w
ater
pay
men
ts
.060
*
.084
***
.
106*
**
.091
***
.0
70**
*
.0
80**
*
Am
ount
of
mon
thly
pay
men
ts8.
931*
*
8.30
1**
8.14
8**
18
.030
**
10.8
37 1
0.15
3**
AT
TA
TE
Not
es: V
aria
bles
use
d to
det
erm
ine
prop
ensi
ty s
core
s in
clud
e: y
ears
of
HH
hea
d’s
educ
atio
n, w
heth
er t
he H
H h
ead
is f
emal
e, n
umbe
r of
pe
ople
livi
ng in
the
HH
, num
ber
of w
orke
rs li
ving
in th
e H
H, n
umbe
r of
chi
ldre
n be
twee
n 5
and
11 y
ears
old
, whe
ther
the
fam
ily
owns
a
hom
e bu
sine
ss, w
heth
er th
e H
H r
ecei
ves
any
inco
me
fro
m r
ents
. In
Apr
il 2
004,
1 U
SD
= 3
.573
9 P
eruv
ian
Nue
vo S
ol; a
ll a
mou
nts
repo
rted
in
Sol
.
35
Table 11: Difference-in-differences: Titles and Financing Household Investments
(1) (2)
program*no prior 0.03 0.02-0.02 -0.02
program 0.01 0.01-0.01 -0.01
no prior title -0.03 -0.03(0.01)*** (0.01)***
Observations 3204 3182
Whether household invested own money in infrastructure
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include region fixed effects and controls for household characteristics, including: years of HH head’s education, whether the HH head is female, number of people living in the HH, number of workers living in the HH, number of children between 5 and 11 years old, whether the family owns a home business, whether the HH receives any income from rents.
36