PROPOSED REFORM ON

CONSTITUENCY

REDELINEATION

For Submission to the Parliamentary Select

Committee for Electoral Reform

12 November 2011

Kuala Lumpur

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Proposed Reforms on Constituency Redelineation

1 Overview

1.1 Democracy is based on the principle of ‘one person one vote’, which does not mean only

one person having one vote, but each vote should carry the same worth or weightage. For

constituency-based electoral system like the Single-Member Plurality (SMP) system

(commonly known as First-Past-the-Post (FPTP) system) in Malaysia, a challenge to the

attainment of the ‘one person one vote’ ideal is the vote-seat disproportionality.

1.2 Vote-seat disproportionality refers to the ratio between the seat share and vote share. If a

party’s S/V ratio is 1, it means the party is proportionally represented. If the S/V ratio is

greater than 1, it means the party is over-represented. Finally, if the S/V ratio is smaller than

1, the party is under-represented. Comparing the SV ratios of different parties, we will then

have the relative value of a vote for a party vis-à-vis a vote for another.

1.3 In 2004, BN enjoyed a S/V ratio of 1.42, while the opposition parties were all under-

represented, with DAP having a S/V ratio of 0.55, PAS 0.22 and PKR 0.05. Divide BN’s 1.42 by

PKR’s 0.05, one will get a value of 26.08, which means 1 vote for BN was equivalent to 26

votes for PKR. (See Table 1)

BN PAS PKR DAP

Popular Votes 4,472,521 1,098,994 590,658 695,996

Vote % 63.85% 15.69% 8.43% 9.94%

Parliamentary

Seats 199 7 1 12

Seat % 90.87% 3.20% 0.46% 5.48%

S/V 1.42 0.20 0.05 0.55

Table 1 Vast disparity in vote-seat disproportionality between BN and the Opposition parties in

2004.

1.4 What happened in 2004 was not anomaly but merely an extreme case. The Alliance/BN has

always been over-represented while opposition parties are constantly under-represented. In

1986, a vote for BN was equivalent to 40 votes for PAS. The worst however happened to

parties like Parti Negara (1955), National Association of Perak (1955), Pekemas (1978 and

1982) and Parti Sosialis Rakyat Malaysia (1982 and 1986) which won substantial portion of

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votes but not even a single seat. The relative value of a vote for the Alliance to a vote for

these parties is simply infinity. (see Table 2)

Table 2 Vote-seat disparity between the Alliance/BN and the main opposition parties, 1955-2008

1.5 Vote-seat disproportionality in the FPTP system has three sources:

a. the natural distribution of voters which is highly unlikely to return perfect

proportionality1.

b. mal-apportionment - difference in electorate size to affect the S/V ratios of parties by

affecting the number of voters in individual constituencies; which is possible without

gerrymandering; and

C. gerrymandering - manipulation of constituency boundaries to affect the S/V ratios of

parties by affecting composition of voters in individual constituencies; which is possible

without mal-apportionment.

1.6 The procedure for constituency redelineation is provided in the Thirteenth Schedule in the

Federal Constitution, which have some safeguards against both gerrymandering and mal-

apportionment for the constituencies that are unfortunately violated or ignored by the

Election Commission.

1 To attain perfect proportionality, for instance, a party which enjoys 40% of popular support will have to win

plurality in exactly 40% of the constituency.

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2 Mal-apportionment

Current: The Federal Constitution stipulates for approximate equal

apportionment within a state.

Proposal: The Federal Constitution should stipulate a relationship between the

sizes of parliamentary constituencies and state constituencies within a

state.

Constitutional Provision

2.1 Sub-section 2(c), Part 1 of the Thirteenth Schedule of the Federal Constitution provides

clearly for equal apportionment:

“the number of electors within each constituency in a State ought to be approximately

equal except that, having regard to the greater difficulty of reaching electors in the country

districts and the other disadvantages facing rural constituencies, a measure of weightage for

area ought to be given to such constituencies”

The “rural weightage” is not meant to be a license for mal-apportionment.

Practice by the Election Commission

2.2 Unfortunately, the Election Commission openly violates the Federal Constitution and

shamelessly come out with a three-tiered “Mal-apportionment Guide” on a false criterion of

urbanisation, as revealed in its booklet published in June 2011. (See Table 3)

Table 3 The Mal-apportionment Guide Formulated by the Election Commission

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2.3 If the EC has honestly applied its mal-apportionment guide based on its

understanding of urbanisation, then this is the geography of Selangor according to

the EC (according to the electorate data in 2008) (See Chart 1):

(a) Meru (29,745), Sementa (29,382) and Selat Klang (28,908) at the outskirts of

Klang were urban while Sungai Pinang (24,189) and Kota Alam Shah (24,168) at the

heart of Klang city were semi-urban.

(b) The town of Sekinchan (13,573) was rural while Sungai Panjang (20,500) and

Sungai Burong (18,988) were urban.

Chart 1 Malapportionment of Selangor State Constitutencies and

Geography According to the Election Commission

2.4 The shamelessness of the EC in arbitrarily malapportioning constituencies is shown

in these two cases (based on the electorate size in 2008)

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(a) The state constituency of Sri Serdang (49,757) was almost twice as large as its

neighbour Kinrara (25,868), while both urban constituencies make up the Puchong

parliamentary constituency.

(b) The rural district of Hulu Selangor (added with a small part of Sabak Bernam

district) was made a parliamentary constituency (63,593) and become ‘urban’ while

its neighbouring district Sabak Bernam was allocated two ‘semi-urban’

constituencies, Sungai Besar (34,073) and Sabak Bernam (31,381). (see Chart 2)

Chart 2 Arbitrary Malapportionment of Two Rural Districts, Sabak

Bernam and Hulu Selangor

2.5 The most outrageous outcome is that 17 out of 56 state constituencies in Selangor

have more constituents than the smallest parliamentary constituency in the state,

Sabak Bernam. (See Chart 3)

Chart 3 One third of state constituencies in Selangor have more seats

than a parliamentary constituency

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2.6 The deliberate malapportionment at the federal level results is even shocking: At

2008, 33.79% of registered voters resided in the smallest 112 constituencies, which

would make up a simple majority. Since the FPTP system requires only winning a half

of the voters to carry a seat, forming a simple majority government requires only

winning 17% of the voters nationwide. To put things in context, perfect

apportionment under the FPTP system will still allow a solid 25% to control a simple

majority.

Chart 4 Winning a simple majority requires only winning minimum 17% of voters

2.7 In reality, BN secured its simple majority of 112 constituencies (out of the smallest

140 constituencies) with mere 22.75% of the turnout. (See Charts 5a and 5b)

Reform Proposal

2.8 The EC must abide the requirement of ‘approximately equal’ apportion stipulated by

the Federal Constitution and abandon its malapportionment guide.

2.9 Section 2, Part I of the Thirteenth Schedule of the Federal Constitution should be

amended to add a new principle that “a state constituency must not be larger than

half of the smallest parliamentary constituency in the same state” to check on the

malapportionment trend.

0.00%

0.20%

0.40%

0.60%

0.80%

1.00%

1.20%

1 9

17

25

33

41

49

57

65

73

81

89

97

10

5

11

3

12

1

12

9

13

7

14

5

15

3

16

1

16

9

17

7

18

5

19

3

20

1

20

9

21

7

22

5

50 % + 1 seat

33.79% 66.21%

Parliamentary Constituencies Ranked by Electorate Size

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Chart 5a The 222 parliamentary constituencies sorted by electorate size

Chart 5b BN winning its smallest 112 parliamentary constituencies with 22.75% of

turnout.

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3 Gerrymandering

Current: The Federal Constitution requires the consideration of local ties in

redelineation.

Proposal: The Federal Constitution should stipulate that (i) constituencies should

not cross the boundaries of local authorities (ii) no arbitrary

combination of local communities is allowed (iii) no arbitrary

partitioning of local authorities is allowed

Constitutional Provision

3.1 Sub-sections 2 (a), (b) and (d), Part 1 of the Thirteenth Schedule of the Federal Constitution

provides clearly for preservation of community of interest:

(a) while having regard to the desirability of giving all electors reasonably convenient opportunities of going to the polls, constituencies ought to be delimited so that they do not cross State boundaries and regard ought to be had to the inconvenience of State constituencies crossing the boundaries of federal constituencies;

(b) regard ought to be to the administrative facilities available within the constituencies for the establishment of the necessary registration and polling machines;

(d) regard ought to be had to the inconveniences attendant on alterations of constituencies, and to the maintenance of local ties.

Practice by the Election Commission

3.2 The election commission does not respect the maintenance of local ties and results

in three types of gerrymandering:

(a) Constituencies crossing the boundaries of local authorities

(b) Arbitrary combination of local communities

(c) Partitioning of local communities

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3.3 Gerrymandering Type I: Disregarding the inconveniences and obstacles to political

representation, parliamentary and state constituencies are carved out regardless of

the boundaries of local authorities. This results in a parliamentarian or a state

assemblyperson having to dealing with two or three municipalities to represent

his/her constituents on issues involving local authorities. The examples of such

gerrymandering are shown in Map 1, Map 2 and Table 4.

Map 1 Parliamentary Constituencies Crossing Boundaries of the Local Authorities in

Selangor

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Map 2 State Constituencies Crossing Boundaries of the Local Authorities in Selangor

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Parliamentary/

State

Constituencies

Local Authorities Total of LAs

Ku

ala

Se

lan

go

r

Hu

lu

Se

lan

go

r

Kla

ng

Sh

ah

Ala

m

Se

lay

an

g

Su

ban

g

Ja

ya

Pe

tali

ng

Ja

ya

Ku

ala

Lan

ga

t

Se

pan

g

Kaja

ng

Am

pan

g

Ja

ya

P95 Tanjung Karang

X X 2

N9 Permatang X X 2

P98 Gombak X X 2

P102 Serdang X X X 3

N26 Bangi X X 2

P104 Kelana Jaya

X X X 3

N32 Seri Setia X X 2

P107 Subang X X X 3

N37 Bukit Lanjan

X X 2

N38 Paya Jaras X X 2

N39 Kota Damansara

X X 2

P108 Shah Alam X X 2

N40 Kota Anggerik

X X 2

N41 Batu Tiga X X 2

P109 Kapar X X 2

N42 Meru X X 2

P111 Kota Raja X X X 3

N49 Seri Andalas

X X 2

N50 Sri Muda X X X 3

P113 Sepang X X X 3

N54 Tanjung Sepat

X X 2

N55 Dengkil X X X 3

Table 4 List of Parliamentary and State Constituencies Crossing the Boundaries of Local Authorities

3.4 Gerrymandering Type II: Some constituencies, while not crossing the boundaries of

local authorities, are arbitrary combination of communities with heterogeneous or

irrelevant interests. One example is the state constituency of Selat Klang in Selangor,

which is a combination of islands and a part of Klang township. A better way to

delineate would be to combine the islands with other islands in the neighbouring

constituency of Pelabuhan Klang. (see Map 3)

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Map 3 Selat Klang (dark green) is a weird combination of islands and township

3.4 Gerrymandering Type III: Some local communities are partitioned by electoral

boundaries, resulting in members of the same neighbourhood voting in different

constituencies and being represented by different representatives. Such clear

examples of broken local ties are shown in Map 4.

From left to right: the communities of Puchong Intan, Pusat Bandar Puchong and Bandar

Kinrara are segmented into N.30 Kinrara (east) and N.29 Seri Serdang (west).

PUCHONG INTAN

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MAP 4 Puchong-Kinrara communities being partitioned by electoral boundaries

Reform Proposal

3.5 Section 2, Part I of the Thirteenth Schedule of the Federal Constitution should be

amended to add three new principles that

(i) constituencies should not cross the boundaries of local authorities

(ii) no arbitrary combination of local communities is allowed

(iii) no arbitrary partitioning of local communities is allowed

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4 Redelineation Process

Current: Redelineation proposal needs to be approved only with a simple

majority.

Proposal: Redelination proposal should be approved with a two-third majority

Constitutional Provision

4.1 Section 10, Part 2 of the Thirteenth Schedule of the Federal Constitution allows the approval

of redelineation with a simple majority, which explains the widespread malappotionment

and gerrymandering in violation of the Federal Constitution:

“If any draft Order referred to in section 9 is approved by the House of Representatives by

resolution supported by the votes of not less than one-half of the total number of members

of that House, the Prime Minister shall submit the draft Order to the Yang di-Pertuan

Agong.”

Reform Proposal

4.2 Section 10, Part 2 of the Thirteenth Schedule of the Federal Constitution should be

amended to the effect that the redelineation proposal needs to be approved with two-third

majority.