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8/11/2019 Prospects for Soviet Naval Access to Mediterranean Shore Facilities (2 August 1976) DECLASSIFIED
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DECLASSIFIED u ~ h o r i t y NN 023211
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Prq_pects
for
Soviet
Navaf: A.ccess
t
Mediterranean
Shore Facillties
Declassified and
Approved for Releaae
by Central Intelligence
Agency
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Date;
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NIO li 76-035 .
2 August W76
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8/11/2019 Prospects for Soviet Naval Access to Mediterranean Shore Facilities (2 August 1976) DECLASSIFIED
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N TION L
SECURITY
INrORM TI
Unauthorized Disclosure Subiect to Cri al Sanctions
DISSEMINATION CONTROL
A
NOFORN
NOCONTRACT-
Foreign Nationals
o Contractors
or
PKOPiN
NFIBONLY
ORCON-
REL:.
; _ ~
Contractor
onsultants
Caution-Pr
pr_ietary lnformalion Involved
NFIB De rtments
Only
Dissemi tion and Extraction
of
Information
Co rolled by Originator
Thi nformalion
has been
Authorized for
..
elease
to
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.
_.;
. C l a s s i f l ~ b J : . , . -
empt from
General D e c l a s s i f k a t i o n ~ e d u l e
. of E.O. 11652. exemption eategory:
. 58(1). (2). and 3)
Automoticallr. declassified on:
date m p ~ l e io determine
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DECLASSIFIED Authority NND 023211
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PROSPECTS
FOR SOVIET
NAVAl
.ACCESS
TO .MEDITERRANEAN SHORE FACILITIES
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SECRET
PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET N V l ACCESS
TO MEDITERRANEAN SHORE FACILITIES
1
KEY JUDGMENTS
ND
IMPLICATIONS
FOR US POLICY
.
: The
Soviets strongly desire
to
compensate
for
their
loss
earlier
~ i s y e a ~ : ; ,
, :
' in Egypt of their only adequate Mediterranean facilities for:maJor. ..
naval rpairs and replenishment. However, with current limited-shore
access the Soviets will be able to maiiitain essentially the same
e v ~ l of :
nava.l-suiface operations and presence in the Mediterranean
that
__ .
had
supported in recent years. This will apply during crisis
periOds a5
_
well
as
for their normal low tempo of operations. Without
f u r t h e ~ ::
.
access to shore facilities,
it
will be more expensive, more
d i f f i ~ u l t to
manage, and harder on the crews, but it can be done. -
;.:;--
~ - D i e s e i st thmarl ies
on deployment to the Soviet
M e d i t e r r ~ e a ~
kadra come from the Northern Fleet, and have
mu h
more
need
of
shore access than do Soviet surface ships with their freedom to use
closer Black Sea home port facilities. Without suitable new shore
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DECLASSIFIED Authority NN 023211
SECRET
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DISCUSSION
I SOVIET NEEDS
1. The Soviet naval presence has
become
a
permanent feature of the Mediterranean since 1964.
Serving as a counter to Western naval forces, these
ships have played n role in most of the Mediterranean
area crises of recent years. Further, their very presence
has served ndtice .that the Sovi.et Union is a superpower
possessing in1portant interests in the region. This Fifth
Eskadra
2
ha,s:both a strategic defensive mssion
v i s - a - ~ i s
Western ballistic missile submarinesand carriers, and a
wider role the support of Soviet clients
and
the
symbolic .
and
actual promotion of Soviet ~ t a t e
interests.
The
Soviets are anxious to continue to
maintain the Fif th Eskadra's capabilities to perform its
roles and to soive problems connected with its
. support.
3
2. We expect that the Soviet.navy's presence in the
Mediterranean will be maintained, probably at
roughly the same levels as have existed over th e 'past
few years. Although the Soviet navy is self-sufficient in
its peace-time logistics practi
ces,
operating ships at sea
for extended periods without shore sup'port is expensive
in terms of operational efficiency. For this reaso l. as
well as for the potentiai use of any shore acceSs to
enhance their political presen and influence in the
area, the Soviets perceive naval access to. shore .
facilities as highly desirable. . ..
3.
The degree
of
Soviet' dependence to
Mediterranean shore facilities variesfof different kinds
-
of
forces: surface shiPs can o p ~ ~ a t ~ a l m o s f e o m p l e t ~ l y
independently of I9Cal sup{>9rt; . d i ~ e l u ~ m a r i n ~
1
The Fifth Eskadra is the fleet organization
of
Soviet forces
. I . .
:_operations are significantly
c o m p l i c a ~ e < l
if aCcess to
local facilities is unavailable; arid deploymeiitof ~ d ~
based naval aircraft would r e q _ t ~ i r e aliriost .CQntlnual
uSe of local
a i r f i e l d s ~
The Soviets .have been able to
operating In Mediterranean. Prior to 19761ts
p r e s e n ~
averaged
11
major combatants, 13 submarines (of which
about
11
were
diesel
I . .
attad c submariries), lftd minor combatan ts
and
supply
ships
for a:
total of around
so
units. It
regularly
l.ridudes same
of
the navy's
most modem and effeCtive surface combatants, and Is under the
control of a
flag
offic:uusually embarlced on a maJor surface unit..
The &lcadra's normal operational activities lndude surveillance of
Western carrieD; ASW and occasional large exercises: Although a
large portion of the Mediterranean .deployment Is spent
at
anchorages or In port visits, the Soviets have exhibited the ability to
respond quickly to aises
and
to augment the Eslcadra with
additional surfaee ships, mostly from the Blade Sea Fteet.
1
Discussion of the objecttve which have led the Soviets o have
their navy operate in the Mediterranean and other distant areas lies
largely beyond the scope of this Memorandum. For fuller tcel -tment
the .reader Is referred to NlE 1 1 ~ 1 5 - 7 4 (Soviet Naval Polldes and
. I
Programs)
and
the forthcoming
NIE
11-10-76 (Soviet Military
Policy In the nir World).
i
.
a i n t a h t
their naval fortes in the.
e d l t e ~ e a n
~ t h
access to only a few shore faCilities. They
haye
'dorie
. this by
utilizing
afloat
SUpPQrt either lit port. lri
anchorages. This effort has lnvolved a
oondnuous
presence of tenders, repair ship$,
s ~ a l l food
anci stores
ships, naval oilers, merchant tankers under contract to
the navy, and a host of other support .auxiliaries.
4
We define
aooess
to naval facilities as the routine use of
another
country's airfields, sl\ore facilities, or sheltered anchorages within
territorial waters for repairs and substantial replenishment. Port
calls, which might
afsG
Indude minor replenishment (e.g., taking on
tresh water), neither meet. fufl Soviet needs nor Involve the same
magnitude of physical or political requirements.
3
6ECRiiT
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4. Inasmuch as a
key
role
of
the Fifth Eskadm.has to and from their B l ~ c k Sea h o r r i ~ .
been reaction to Middle Eastern crises,
t
s
n o t e w ~ r t h y any necessary submarine
that the ~ n p r e c e d e n t e d buildup : which
occ rred
' : ~
during the Octob:er War
of
1973 ~ not affected
by ...
5. Since Fifth Eskadra
limited logistics support nor was there
any
need to . majority-:--()erhaps ~ much as
: increase. t ~ i r utilization.
of
then. available E g y p t i ~ n .
t ~ m e at
a n ~ o r odn port i t s 1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ t J ~ ~ : ~ i ~ i l ~ ~ ~
facilities. However, that time the Soviet were alSo
') iil -execches
their l o g i s t i c s ~
a
lucky; in that scheduled relief diesel s ~ b i n a r i n e s were . :are Somewhat less than would ntht ..nltriwo
already
enr9ute from the Northern Fleet. Both
t h ~ e
certain level ot
r e p l e n i s h m e o t ~ _ . i r i r u p t ~ n a n e e ,
.
and the d i ~ e l submarines they were scheduled to . minor repairs to combatants
c a ~ be . ~ C C ) m p l i s h e d in
relieve stayed on.station in tlie Mediterranean for
the
anchorage rather
than
in p o r t s ~ frequent Soviet; _
duration of the crisis. (Deployment f r o ~
the
Northern practice:
less
. used by other navie5.:
The
.primary. :
. Fleet requires two and one-half weeks for diesel anchorages used by the Soviets, even when access-to .
submarines
and about
ten days .. for
nuclear
Egyptian facilities was available, a ~ e l O c a . t ~ d in
:the
submarines.) Oil
was.
supplied by merchant
t a ~ k e r s A l b o ~ n
Basin, the Gulf of H a m m a ~ e t
. n e a ~
l t h e r ~ .
and by
nav -1
oilers operating out of Soviet Black Sea Island, east of Crete, and north
bf
o l l u r r i ~ Egypt (see .
ports. FurtHer, the evidence indicates that
many
Figure 1 . These anchorages a r ~
~ i t ~ a t e q - ~ e a r . t ~ e ,',,
merchant ta nkers which had p r e v i o ~ experience in principal operating areas of the Fifth Eskadra.
supporting fleet units were available.
and
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SECRH-
officers may have ;preferred to have the m e ~ s
available t6 support their own forces from their own
I .
resources rather . han come to rely on other sources
which might be denied
at
a crucial moment.
. Indicative of the Soviets' naval logistics philosophy
and practic has been their complicated effort to avoid
d e p e n d e n ~
on foreign .sources fuel oil. In the
Mediterranean some five to seven Soviet POL ships are
normally P,resent to provide fuel from their own
internal s o ~ r c e s to combatants and auxiliaries. In
general the: practice is for the merchant tankers to
refuel n a v a ~ oilers which
in
turn go from ship to ship
topping thetn off.
The
Soviets have held tenaciously to
this
a r r a n g ~ m e n t
in the Mediterranean and . any
change
w o ~ l d
require a major policy decision.
On
the
political level, the Soviets have to reconcile their naval
involvemeht in foreign countries with
their
c o n t r a d i c t o ~ desire to minimize the appearance of an
internationdl policy driven by naval expansionism.
I .
7. The e ~ p n d e d deployments of the Soviet navy
since the mid-1960s, however, have in fact been
a c c o m p a n i e ~
by
some m o d i f i c a ~ of past practices.
Since that time the Soviets have begun to seek rather
I .
limited (by Western standards) access to shore facilities
I
not only in the Mediterranean but also in the Indian
Ocean and btsewhere. Some of the port services which
are now use b Y the Soviet navy in the Mediterranean .
include routine . replenishment, minor
and
major
r e p a i . . s ~
and:crew r e s ~ . .Moreover, Soviet s ~ a n d a r d s of
control over
1
their military support have led them to
seek agreements with Httoral countries in.several ocean
areas atlow(ng them
to
establish facilities for their
exclusive use.
.1
Past
Ups
;and O o ~ n s
8. The S ~ ~ i e t S have, however, had mixed results in
their efforts obtain access ashore. Beginning in 1958
they based same 12. subma.nnes in the Albanian port of
I . . .
Vlore.
H o w ~ v e r
they had to pull out these units in
1961 with the break in Soviet-Albanian relations. In
the followirlg
yem
.the
SOviets
made a determined
effort to gaih access to Egyptian facilities,
but
despite
much importuning they were admitted only in the
wake of the jsix Day
War
of 1967 when the Egyptian
government ,was in no position to resist the strings
attached
t ?
1 Soviet offers of assistance. s indicated
below, t h e ~ e facilities in Egypt .were of great
conveniencej to the Soviets. When Egypt expelled
Soviet advisers in July 1972, however, Soviet naval
I .
support activities were curtailed.
By
early 1976 the
Soviets had been completely
~ x c l u d e d
from Egyptian
port facilities following
Sadat's abrogation of the 1971
Soviet-Egyptian Friendship Treaty.
NavaiNr
. . .
9. The most significant loss to the Soviet n ~ v y fro.m .
the 1972 ouster was the removal of their naval
a : ~ a t i o n
unit based in Egypt
at
three airfields. This . air
organization consisted of
ASW,
recom1aissanee,
and
missile- strike aircraft. The ASW and reconnaissance
aircraft conducted missions in t h ~ .
M ~ d i t ~ . : C a n e a n
against
US
and other units, and there is some evidence
that the strike aircraft were being prepared
fo
.r
operations over the Mediterranean whenSo viet use of .
Egyptian airfields was terminated. Soviet ocean.
surveillance in the Mediterranean is ~ u r r e n t l y
accomplished primarily by Soviet ship shadowing of
major Western ships, through high-frequency i r ~ c t i o n
finding (HFDF) and by satellite . reeoi:maisSance;
howev
er,
use of a Mediterranean airfield did
add
valuable flexibility and redundancy and regaining
access to such a facility probably remains
an
important
Soviet goal. Some agencies would al Q note that in a
c r i ~ i s with Syrian concurrence, the Soviets c ~ u l d also.
use the three electronic warfare :aircraft. they have
maintained in Syria since 1972
_
o
a$siSt
t h ~ i r
_
. . reconnaissance oPerations. Should the Sov.iets ~ h o o ~ e
to rotate the
K i e v - c l ~
ASW .carriers in f u t ~ t e regular
Mediterranean deployments, ~ h e y . ~ g u l d . _have
.
a
continual afloat naval air capability, .but they _would
. also want
at
least emergency airfield. acce 5 11,5hore.
soviet use of airfields of Mediterranean littoral
~ t s
f ~ r reconnaissance,.A.SW. and strike a i ~ ~ ~ t is
an:
even
more polltically sensitive issue .than ~ c c e s s to ship
repair facilities. Thus the Soviets are Jikely to .seek
- naval air access,
h o w ~ v e r
desirable; ' only after .any
improved ship ~ they might manage, f o ~ all
Mediterranean countries would
be
far less likely to
grant naval
air
aCcess
than ship facilities.
Other Egyptian Conveniences
10. The AI Gabbari shipyard
at
Alexandria provided
major replenishment and repair services both routine
arid emergency to the Fifth Eskadra, particularly to
its diesel submarines, in conjunction with Soviet
support ships stationed in the harbor as a floating base.
The Soviets had constructed this yard where some 350-
SECRET
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400 Soviet personnel worked on Soviet ships under the Mediterranean ~ i n c e they began nearly
control of a Soviet admiral. Untill972 the Soviets had submarine deployments there in H]64
. .
Exce:pHoru
managerial control of the shipyard; after .that" they
have .:.,
b ~ e n
Black Sea Fleet
~ u b m a
r i l l
apparently lost control of
and
even access to facilities . conducted Mediterranean patrols l > e f o r ~ ~ u ~ d
ashorC-except
for
_he graving
dockS a ~ d
perhaps
the ;. :
\ .overhauls in the Baltic.) :
: : : ; ~ ) . ( ?
: : _ . ~
; : : ~ : ; r ~ : : : ; l ~ t : r r ~ : ~ i ~ ~ ~ ~ : : n ~ ~ ~ : ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ _ . ia.use of Alexandria s u b ~ ~ ~ : ~ : i ~ ~ 1 ~ 7 : b ._....
_,,
.. c
.
to ~ 9 7 2 the Soviets had .been developing additional . . diesel submarines for major repair
a n ~
overhaul . ..
and more secure facilities
for
their own use further west therefore a significant expansion;
of
Soviet use
of
.
along the Egyptian coastiine
at
Mersa Matruh, .
but
the foreign
f a c i l i t ~ e s
Of the average
11
. iiesel .attack '.
Egyptian government also quashed these Soviet plans. submarines deployed, about three used .this
pOrt
at.any .
11.
Alexandria
was
also eonvenient in connection
with the important operating
r e q u i r e ~ e n t
.
for
fresh
water. The presence of at least one water tender in the
Mediterrar:tean suggests th.
at
Soviet naval combat
ants-espe
pially the .older
units-have
a restricted .
capacity distill their own water in adequate
quantities. Fresh water
is
also transferred to Soviet
combatants by oilers and by merchant tankers under .
naval chatter. When the Soviet navy had
aCcess
to
Alexandria, a water tender frequently operated from
this port
~ n d
resupplied naval units in :he eastern
Mediterranean. To date the Soviets have apparently
not found acceptable
s h o r ~
substitute and so have .
had
to
deploy water tenders from the Black Sea,
The Diesel Submarine Problem
:
:
i2. Logistical support
is
inuch more a problem
f n
Soviet diesei
submarines
in the Mediterranean .than for' .
surface s h t p ~ . Since the s u r f a ~ ships primarily_deploy.
.from the Black Sea .Fleet; major repair facilities
hi. .
.
home waters are more r ~ < ; I U y available. A d , d i t i 9 n a J i y ~ \ : : ::
crews of surface ~ h i p s do not h ~ v e to face the 5ame
habitability.problems as found on submarines;
sOViet
.
submarines
which
routinely deploy
to th e
.
Mediterranean, however, came from the Noitherr\ .
rather than, ~ l a c k
Sea
Fleet. In part the Soviets seem to
have chosen this arrangement became
of
provisioils
o f
the Montreux Convention; Article 12 states
that
submarines belonging to Black
Sea
powers riay exit_
the Turkish Straits only for overhaul outside the Black
.Sea, that Aotiee must be given to the Turkish .
government,
1
and that the submarines must transit on
the surface. No provision allows passage of submarineS
based elsewhere into the Black
Sea.
Transit through
the carefully monitored Straits inhibits flexibility
and
compromises security. For these reasons the Soviets
have chosen to deploy Northern.
F1eet
submarines to the
I
6
one ,time. Most work was .performed on submarines :
afl;at
in the harbor, but the yard's graving docks were
.
::
also utilized for more e ~ t e n s i v e repilirs la.Sting 'for
several months. Further, submarine crews eould get .:.
away from the confined and uncomfortable quarters .
found on these diesel boats. Now Soviet submannes
can only
male
limited
use
of repair facilities in Syrian .
arid
Yugoslav
ports. . .
..
14 .
Having been expelled from Alexandria, the
Soviets must make alternate arrangements to maintain
the previous level of submarine operations and
presence in the
Mediterranean;
A t
a minimum the Soviets will probably seek to .,
maintain their previous level of d i e s ~ l a ~ t a c k . , : .
submarine operation,s. They .
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I
t -
~ ~ i l l l l i l l i i l l l l l i l l
l 1 l i l i
i l i ~ i l l i
~ t ~ ~
_ i [ ~ t i k : U
t i i { U ; ; : y ; : ; j : : J
JJ
tib
UH.:.: : : __ ~ : : ~ L ~ i i l i l l i t i i l i i i M i l l i l l l ~ i l i i l l l i l l l l i l l l l i i l l l i
...
-5ECRET
he
: most preferable alternative for the Soviets .
would be success in orie or more of their efforts to
a c q ~ i r e
additio' .,B:
.shore facilities, as major repair
of diesel submarines at sea is impossible, and even
l e s s e ~ support is far from easy.
I .
Curreht
SOviet
Port
Access
15. cu:rrent access by Soviet n a v ~ l units . o shore
based facilities (other than as part of official port visits)
is e s s e n t i ~ l l y limited to
Syria
and, for repair facilities
only,
Yugoslavia.
Syrian port facilities in both Tartus
and Latakia, d ~ p i t e improvements, are limited.
Neither of these
two
crowded harbors can be used on
the same scale as Alexandria since they lack graving
docks
and
other. requisite facilities. There has been,
however, near continuous presence
of
a support ship
in one ori the other Syrian ports since the 1973 war,
providing
1
services to visiting Soviet diesel submarines
and m i n ~ w e e p e r s In addition, most of the Soviet
support ships which were until recently stationed in
Alexandria :).re now stationed in Tartus. Replenish
ment of
\ ~ a t e r and
prov'isions is probably available to
the Soviets calling in Syria; however, there are
currently
bo
indications that Soviet naval units obtain
fuel oil id Syrian ports. There is evidence
that
the
Soviets h ~ v e been pressuring the .Syrians, thus far
unsuceess(uUy, for some additional access.
.
.
1 . . .
16. T h ~ S ~ v i e ~ have long . been interested in
Yugoslavia s facilities on the Adriatic,
but
Tito' s
g o v e r n m e ~ t has so far strictly limited Soviet ~ c c e s s .
Nevertheless, by late 1973 the Soviets .were granted
limited . ~ and . began to send unamled naval
auxiliaries 'to_ Yugoslav shipyards for overhaul.
10,
April
1974
Y u g o
l a v
mari.time law was revised' to permit the
repair .of
i
oreign combatants and _uxiliaries in
. Yugoslav ports. The provisions of the law are strict,
however, limiting the number of ships to two of the
same nati9n under repair at any one time in
any
one
port. Foreign c o m b a t a n ~ can be repaired only
in
a
Yugosla:v
n'ttlitary shipyard; currently,
Tivat
is
the only
Yugoslav port so designated. Furthermore, work must
be done exclusively by Yugoslav personnel, using
I .
Yugoslav material
and
repairs
and
must
be
completed
within six fuonths. Munitions and armaments must be
unloaded ~ n d placed in the care of Yugoslav military
authorities, and only one third of the foreign crew is
allowed tolstay
on
board. The law also specifically
prohibits foreign installations or fuel depots on
Yugoslav t ~ r r i t o r y . Finally, a size limitation of 4,000
tons for warshiPs
and lO,QOO
tons for auxiliaries is ' : : ~ '
imposed. The Soviets apparently h ~ ~ e accepted aiL: ':\
these restrictions.
They
delivered a large
1 2 , ( ) ( ) ( ) . t o ~
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they would prefer to avoid . a busy commercial
e n ~ r e p o t
19. More ptoblematical is the
political
aspect of the
.Soviets'
problkm-the
likelihood
of
various littoral
countries allowing Soviet shore access, and what l c i ~ d ..
under what conditions. For the near teim, we believe
that Soviet. prospects for increased access
to
Mediterraneart shore facilities for substantial repairs
and regular replenishment are dim, except in the case
of Yugoslavia, where they are marginally better but
still p r o b l e m a ~ i c a l . Over the longer teim, major
political variables in countries all around the littoral
could dramatibally affect Soviet p r ~ p e c t s In the
meantime the : o ~ i e t s are likely to plug -away
at
insinuating themseJves
and
their Mediterranean ships
into more modest port arrangements with the more
. promising pote:ntial hosts.
Unlikely
Prospects
20.
An
otherwise
disparate
collection of
Mediterranean :countries is unlikely
in
the near term to
be actively wooed by the Soviets for their shore
facilities. Port calls by Soviet combata,nts to France
and l t ~ l y , for example, appear .to be motivated m ~ r e
by
broader political
.
objectives-the
USSR's
demonstration
pf
its legitimacy as a M ~ i t e r r a n e a n
power, weakening NATO, and improving s t a t e - t q ~
:
. .state
e ~ a t i o r l s - : - - - ~ h a E
a ~ y r ~ o n a b l e e x p e c t S . t i ~ h o
- securing access to naval facilities in those countries.
Increased Communist Party influence, OC evenfor'mal
participation, in the government of Italy
is ~ n l i k e l y
for .
the foreSeeable , future to change this situation. The
party would presumably want to_avoid the sart of
political-military f ~ t v o r to the USSR _ that" would
validate NATO:govemments' concerns and stimulate
a sharply negative reactio_. . .
21. Greece or Turkey present equally unlikely short-.
tenit possibilitieS for Soviet navalaccess. Any SoViet
effort to acquire (acUities in , one
~ o u l d
greatly
complicate r e l ~ t i o n s with the other, of course.
Moreover, the Soviets appear to be playing for much
higher stakes tpan naval facilities in both these
countries-namely, enticing them out of the Western
camp into
at
least the nonaligned Third World. Any
premature attempt to obtain naval access to facilities
_n Greece or Turkey, and the unwanted attention it
would surely d'raw, might very well be counter
productive to this larger objective. In the case
of
Turkey, other Soviet military
p r i o r i t i e s - r ~ r
transit through the Turkish Straits
and
. utaLrv-related
overflights through T,urkish air s ~ l c e . . . . . . , : e > u t r a n
access. 8oth Greece
and
Turkey c o n t a i ~
c o n s t a e l r a c , t e < i ' . i i ' ~
anti-foreign b ~ sentiment in general. t o r ~ l r ~ r J > : < ~ ~ ~
have
expresSed
concern in NATO .
naval presence in the Mediterranean,; .
hiLdic: tiin9.:
both would probably
be
~ e l u c t a n t
pc;.,rriiV
..
--
...
(.;
.
more than periodic Soviet naval ~ i s i t s s u c h a { t h ~ s e
France and Italy. . . . '
22. There are three ports in
Cypnis-Larnaca,
.
Limassol: and Famagusta; only the last deep water .. ;
.
port. The island ~ a s no graving docks pr bther major .
shipyard facilities. This unpromising physical base, . .
plus the continuing uncertainty
over.
the .political
future of Cyprus, make it unlikely that the
USSR
sees :
any
hope for significant naval facilities there .
Moreover, the
USSR
would be reluctant to set in
motion naval access gambits which might risk direct
:
Soviet involvement in the event of renewed .conflict.
Additionally, Greece and Turkey would probably be
no more willing to accept Soviet access to C)pdot ports
than
to
their own, and even Makarios
~ o u l d
be
unwiliing to contemplate such action.
23. In three other Mediterranean countries-:-Spairi;
Alb{lnia, and Lebarion Soviet naval ~ s
by
.
c o r n b ~ t a n t "ships is a . remote (>ossibility for- the. . .
. foreSeeable future. lri order to transform
any
:
f t h e s e
: . < : ~
:
~ u n t r i e s into vial>le . high
~ o r i t y
. ~ o s p e ~ t S
:: '
: :
drastic ~ o m e s t i c
l;lnd
regional politieal s h . i f t s w , o u l ~
?( ...,\
.
: .
required.
.-:
. . .
..
.
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EGRET
Some Soviet Effort
I
I
25.
Morocco s
location
:.
in
the
far western
Meditertanean probably reduces its t t r a c t i o n .
at
least
for use by .the Mediterranean Eskadra as presently
. deployed; .to Soviet naval planpers .
The
two major
ports M o r O c c o ~ s Mediterranean coastline, Ceuta
and M ~ l i l l a , are enclaves - m ~ e r Spanish control.
Casablanca ori
the
Atlantic has better facilities
including a graving dock of some 150 meters (490.
feet). Rabat" may
have
agreed in 1975 to allow
the
Soviets more freedom in using its ports in exchange for
expanded militar)' assistance. But; even before the
USSR's
u p p o r t
for Algeria over Morocco in the
Spanish 'Sahara dispute cast a pall over Soviet
Moroccan
relations, Morocco
tended
to regard
I . .
Western naval visits .more favorably than Soviet port
calls. And since the Sahara crisis Morocco's attitude
toward us navy has become even more favorable.
While this favor could certainly deteriorate, Moroccan
caution
i(l
dealing with the Soviets will probably be
more lasting. And, in the near term, the Soviets will
probably not press for naval access there.
26.
Ma fta
offers an excellent location for central
Mediterranean naval
operations, and Valetta s
extensive :facilities include five graving dockS-'-the
larges t 292 meters (962 feet) l o n g ~ a n d well trained,
.experienCed personnel. Prime Minister
Mintoff
s
w_llingness to discomfit Western. p(,wers is also
celebrated,
but M a l t a ~
overall (>olitical relations with
the USSI(\have. been too poor to offer much present
hope .for Soviet naval access there. Indeed,
Malta
now
has better relations with the PRC t h ~ m the USSR Any
future
a t t ~ ~ p t s by
Mintoff to exploftJears.in: the West
of Soviet naval access to Malta \ ~ o u l d complicate his
desire to . figure prominently . in the nonaligned
movement\
and
would alienate Libya. Malta s entry
into the nonaligned group in 1973 was . apparently
conditioned on a promise that no foreign military
presence would
be
allowed
aftet
the British lease
expired in ' 1979.
The
1979 expiration
of
.
the
b.ase
agreement ;awkwardly (for Mintoff) coincides with a
triennial nieeting of the.nonaligned conference. Any
continued : foreign military presence (Western or
Soviet) in his country would also discredit Mintoffs
attempt to set himself up as the spokesman for the.
Mediterranean world in any expanded follow-on
European security conference. Nevertheless, the
Soviets will
1
presumably be alert to any signs of further
shifts in ~ i n t o f f s foreign priorities
that
they might
exploit for even conditional naval access.
M e a n w h l l ~
they may play on Mintoffs nonaligned pretensions to '.
argue for greater equality of treatment vis-a-vis British /:)
and other Western ships.
The
economiccoiiseq"uences .:.
. of British
w i t h d r a w a ~
particularly if sufficient
Ubyan
' :
financial aid is not forthcoming, may also: o f f e r
. . . .
. Moscow some leverage. A Soviet promise
of
regular:
1
:
dockyard revenues, perhaps. initially associated
with
'
service for noncombatants,
could
prove attrac-
tive-particularly as Western ships . will probably
continue to use
the
facilities, allowins Mintoff to
argue the case of impartiality. Malta is one of $everal
Mediterranean countries that might in some
circumstances choose to develop the Yug95lav model
of port access that is strictly regulated but available to
both Soviet
and
Western ships.
Some Active
Effort
27. Algeria is rather well endowed with port .and
related facilities:
: of some ei
ght ~ q u i p p
major commercial
ports, seven (Annaba, Arzew, Bejaia, Ghazaouet,
Mostagnem, Skikda, and
Oran)
have faidy
. extensive anchorages and berthing facilities ~ u t
lack shipyards for major rei?air work. , A i g i ~ r s has
one of the largest ports. the A f r i ~ n ~ n t i n e r i t
with
t ~ o
shipyards, the larger.having
two
graving
docks and extensive related q u i p m e n t .
-Mers-el-Kebir, once a French
n a . ~ l
base but now
i n ~ c t i v e , has a d ~ e p and .well protected harbor.
Although it now possesse
no
major repair
facilities, M e ~ - e l - K e b i r ' , in ciQ.mbinaHon With the
excellent commercial faciiities at nearby
oran,
has the potential for a majot western Mediter-.
ranean complex.
. .
28. Although the Algerian government has for
many
years permitted periodic port calls by Soviet ships
at
Algiers . and Annaba for showing the flag and
replenishment,
it
has steadfastly
~ b u f f e d ,
all
Soviet
attempts to obtain any access to Mers-el-Kebir and to
repair facilities at Algiers. There
have
been no
indications of any shift in Algeria's position.
StUI,
the
physical attractiveness of Algerian facilities; combined
with the USSR's large political inves tment in that
country, will probably motivate the Soviets to some
level of continued effort. Should the Soviets at some
future time move toward expanded naval activity in
the western Mediterranean, the attraction of Algeria's
9
&ECAH
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excellent facilities would obviously increase. M o s c o w
status as Algeria's principal arms supplier gives the
USSR potential leverage.
The unhappy
Soviet
experience
with
Egypt,
h o w ~ v e r
has
probably
made
the USSR more conscious
of
the hazards
of
(although
not
necessarily wisedn)
manipulatingan
anns
supply
,
relationship
. Moreover, the USSR's reliance
on
Algerian overflight rights
an d
. landing privilege$ to
. support its southwes t African interests provides Algeria
with
signifidnt
bargaining power o( its own. A
deterioration in
the
Algerian-Moroccan situation
might provide. Moscow with some opportunities to
press its case
by
exploiting Algeria's probable desire for
greater military and political support. But even
in
this
case,
barring
an
Algerian debacle of unlikely
proportions there seems little prospect that Moscow
would gain t ~ e kind of access it wants to Algiers or
Mers-el- Kebir.
29.
Libya doc: not have
developed port facilities or
natural harbors. The three principal ports, Benghazi,
Tripoli, and Tbbruk. lack shipyards
and
other facilities
of the sort available in Egypt. Benghazi and Tripoli
do
have shipyards with limited facilities, and Tripoli
. apparently has recently acquired a floating drydock.
For relatively low levels
of
usage, various
other Libyan
s i t ~ offet p o ~ s i p i l i t i e s b u
it
would still be necessary t
e o n ~ t n i d
facilities neai-ly from scratch. along
the
lines
of
the Soviets' endeavors in Berbera: Somalia,
oi:
as
they
stl -rted
t() do
at Mersa Ml -truh. .
30.
The
Soviet-
Libyan
courtship . of
the
last two
years has not flourished in the naval access area.
Despite some reports from_ time.
to time
[
J of
impending access, there
have
been no visits
by
Soviet
nayal combatants
Libya since
the
September
1969
revolution.
Other
evidence indicates that
Libya is
still resisting SOviet
overtUres fot some degree of navaraccess. Nevertheless,
in the
long terrii
Libya is
probably destined to remain
attractive to
the
Soviet navy.
In
the last two
years
,
Moscow has
substantially
increased its
involvement
in
Libya's military development. Along . with large
quantities of Soviet
armor
, aircraft,
and other land-
based
equipment
Libya is to acquire naval ships.
Soviet training
of Libyan
naval personnel,
the
probable growth
of
substantial requirements for Soviet
technical/training support to maintain Li_bya's Soviet
supplied ships, .
and
assistance in developing
port
facilities, all
may
provide Soviet personnel
with
greater
opportunities for influence in Libya. We think it
highly probable that M o s c o ~ . .u;;irig
~ h o s e
nattue
' .was clearly in its
i>wri
~ ~ t i o n a l
i ~ t ~ r e s t ~ < "
'".
::
And Sy{ia.
. cO(ltinues to r e j e ~ t .Soviet reque5ts
f4?r
.: .
increased ~ s . i:\
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opportunities.: While the eventuality of severe strains any deterioration of
the
Yugosla
. I
in Yugoslav cohesion would favor possible augmented Belgrade deal with the Soviets
a:t c r ~ o a t i a r t . . ~ J c o e : n s ~ ~ : ~
....... . ,...
.
Soviet
l e v e r ~ g e ,
this. might not pertain
on
the naval orderly transfer of power and
s t r i ~ t a
d h l e n ~ n < : e J : i f ~ f i t . o s . : : , , , . , , . , . , ,
acceSs issue. 1The Croatian Republic contains most of policies of nonalignment 'buld . : 'u ' '
the attractive port real estate, and Croatians might be Moscow no better off in
naval_
. . _
..
_-...-.-
more rather ~ h n less resistant to Soviet port access in present.
i
I
val
Repai r
acil i t ies
and
Rai l Links
I
International boundary
Re
1
public boundary
....._ - AJtonomous area boundal)'
N ~ t i o n a l capital
Railroad
I
I
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. Figure 2
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BL NK P GE
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Authority
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023211
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eeret
: