Prospects of peace negotiation in Papua.pdf

7/27/2019 Prospects of peace negotiation in Papua.pdf

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/prospects-of-peace-negotiation-in-papuapdf 1/11

O R I G I N A L P A P E R

Prospects of peace negotiation in Papua

Timo Kivimäki

Published online: 19 December 2007

# Springer-Verlag 2007

Abstract The Papuan conflict resembles the conflict in Aceh. Also some of the models

of conflict resolution can undoubtedly be imported for Papua from Aceh. However, the

existence of large migrant groups, the lack of a coherent organization of the rebel side,

and the more extreme nature of economic grievances in Papua than in Aceh, give the

conflict problem in Papua its own characteristics. This article speculates about how

much Papua could learn from its own past and how much lessons it could emulate from

other areas to establish its own mechanisms of peace negotiation.

At first sight, the conflict in Papua looks much like that in Aceh; it is a separatist war against

the Indonesian government, which has largely failed in developing the territory despite its

vast natural resources. Despite similarities, there are also very significant differences

between Papua and Aceh. The root of most of the strategic differences is that unlike Aceh,

Papua does not have a unified rebel movement, that would offer a serious military

challenge to the government and that would be subordinate to one unified leadership

structure. As a result, making peace in Papua would not give as many political points in

Jakarta as peace in Aceh did: not too many lives have been lost by the military and the

problem is not as serious in Papua, and thus there is not as much political will behind peacein Papua. Furthermore, in absence of a unified command, the Papuan rebellion cannot be

ended by persuading one organization only to abandon their armed struggle.

Papua has had negotiations on Special Autonomy Law (Law 21/2001), in 2001.1

This process could have shown the way to some improvement, but since the

commitment of the government under President Megawati Sukarnoputri and

especially civil servants under her government to the conclusion of the process

AEJ (2008) 6:69 – 79

DOI 10.1007/s10308-007-0155-x

1

An excellent analysis of this informal negotiation process can be read at McGibbon ( 2004) and Sumule(2003).

Dr. Timo Kivimäki is a Leader of ASEM Education Hub Thematic Network on Peace and Conflict Studies

(http://www.nias.ku.dk/research/timo_kivimaki/ ).

T. Kivimäki (*)

NIAS — Nordic Institute of Asian Studies, Leifsgade 33, Copenhagen, Denmark

e-mail: [email protected]

http://www.nias.ku.dk/research/timo_kivimaki/

http://www.nias.ku.dk/research/timo_kivimaki/



was very weak, it was not implemented. Thus the process did not result in ending

occasional violence, protest and repression in the territory. The new government

under Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has finally started implementing some of the

parts of the special autonomy law, but this might have been too little too late to

rebuild the confidence of Papuans. Furthermore, the negotiation process had severalweaknesses which prevented the buildup of feeling of ownership to the process

among the radical members of the independence movement.

I have previously (Kivimäki 2006) suggested the initiation of another peace

negotiation process that would emulate lessons both from the previous special autonomy

consultation of 2001, and the Aceh peace process, and apply them to the Papuan

conditions. A faction of the independence movement, Organisasi Papua Merdeka

(OPM) has started taking steps on such a path to peace and democracy and has started to

build up an organization that could facilitate communication between various

constituencies and the negotiating panel in possible internationally facilitated peacenegotiations. A coalition of the independence movement, the West Papua Coalition for

National Liberation has been created for the task of communication between fragments

of the OPM for peace negotiation purposes. But so far the government has not been

interested any of the presented formula for internationally facilitated negotiation.

This article looks at lessons that other peace processes could give to the prospect

of peace negotiations in Papua. The intention is to summarize some of the arguments

I have presented in my more comprehensive study on the Papuan peace process

(2006), update the previous construct and look at how comparative peace process

studies can contribute to the planning of peace negotiations in Papua.

What went wrong with Papua’s previous processes of conflict resolution?

The consultation for Special Autonomy Law has so far been the main forum of conflict

resolution in Papua. However, before it was possible several other processes needed to

take place. Autonomy law consultation was preceded by a process of consolidation by the

independence movement. The first effort was taken already in 1998 with the

establishment of Forum for the Reconciliation of Irian Jaya Society (FORERI) on July

24, 1998. As one of its tasks, FORERI established an extensive negotiation panel, the

Team of 100. The team represented 25 areas each with four representatives (Human

Rights Watch 2000, p. 3; Sumule 2003, pp. 353 – 354; International Crisis Group 2001,

p. 12). The Team 100 of the West Papuan Community had, in principle, a mandate to

negotiate with Indonesian leadership. However, the flexible mechanisms of commu-

nication were missing between the negotiators and their constituencies. Instead the team

was an arrangement with which the independence movement managed to communicate

its position for independence to the president of Indonesia. “ Negotiations” were

initiated with President B. Jusuf Habibie in autumn 1998. According to President

Habibie (2000), the process with the Team of 100 was a shock to the Indonesian

government. However, it could have been one of the reasons why the government

eventually felt to need to compromise with Papua by offering it special autonomy.

Soon after, there was another process of consolidation of the independence

movement. But this process seemed to have been more motivated by the explicit

intention to work for independence not for negotiation with Jakarta. In early 2000,

70 T. Kivimäki



there were several meetings by people on the side of the independence movement

including a traditional mass consultation (Musyawarah Besar), and what became known

as the 2nd Papuan National Congress. From this followed the establishment of the

Papuan Presidium Council. This 22-person executive body was selected at the 2nd

Papuan People’s Congress by the 200 (later 501) member Panel Papua. The latter consisted of nearly all civil society constituencies and was established as the Papuan

legislature (International Crisis Group 2001; Alua 2002a, b). Papuan Presidium Council

sought an explicit negotiation mandate but was more seen as an organization that

already represented independent Papuan governance. As a result the process did not

manage to establish the position of the Papuan Presidium Council as the legitimate

negotiator on behalf of the independence movement. In addition to this process failing

to invite the exiled OPM leaders, and it also failed to mandate the Papuan Presidential

Council for negotiation. Finally, it ignored the wisdom of Ambassador Wiryono, related

to the need for communication between enemies, and failed to create any contact withthe “enemy” for negotiations. Yet the process did manage to create some links of

communication within the independence movement, especially inside the Papuan

province, and this could have helped the consultations for the special autonomy.

The reason why only the FORERI process led to explicit negotiation, and why other

processes led to the mobilization of independence activities, was simply the fact that in

this dialogue initiative the Papuan side dealt with their opponent from the very beginning.

Preparation for dialogue in Papua has too often meant the mobilization of one side

without an effort to kick-start a pre-negotiation process. According to many studies of

the preparation of dialogue, early contacts with“

the enemy”

are important so that the preparation will not lead to the consolidation of unilateral positions, but contributes to

the redirection of attitudes towards interests instead of positions, and to the

understanding of negotiation as an effort to fit the core interests of negotiating parties

rather than fight between opposite positions (Sounders 1991, pp. 57 – 70; Rothman

1992; Zartman 1989, pp. 237 – 253). However, with the exception of FORERI, where

the resistance movement worked closely with the Indonesian State Secretariat, “ pre-

negotiation” has often been explicitly exclusive, with preparations on one side only.

The process for special autonomy was an exception to the exclusiveness. It

involved extensive informal civil society dialogue which attempted to involve all

segments of the Papuan society. It consisted of consultation and informal dialogue

under the auspices of Governor Jacobus Solossa and his technical assistance team

from the University of Cendrawasih. Consultation of people was not limited to the

centers of the province, but it tried to reach even the most remote stakeholders.

Insider ’s analysis of the process reveals that many independence-minded people,

including members of the Papuan Presidium Council, were indeed consulted, and

some participated in the dialogue (confidential interview material). Even the leader

of the Papuan informal negotiation of special autonomy, Governor Jacobus Solossa,

could be seen as a radical, since he was one of the members of the Team of 100

Papuan leaders who in February 1999, represented Papua in a national dialogue that

demanded that President Habibie accept Papuan independence.2 Yet McGibbon

(2004, pp. 19 – 20) concludes that the most radical elements were out of the

2 For the list of Members of the Team of 100, see Human Rights Watch (2000).

Prospects of peace negotiation in Papua 71



consultation because of the setup of the process. The entire consultation took place

in Papua and thus ruled out both the exiled and jailed independence leaders and the

fighters of the movement who were hiding from prosecution in the jungles of Papua.

The fact that the consultation took place inside Indonesia made it difficult for the

Indonesian government to speak to their real enemies. Most radical elements stayedout, and those that stayed did not dare to express views that were considered illegal by

the Indonesian party to the process. Like the conclusion in the Burma/Myanmar

chapter of this special issue, exclusion and negotiation under coercion does not

necessarily produce results that the constituencies of negotiating parties can live with.

Furthermore, the fact that these consultations were on special autonomy and not open

for more radical solutions, meant that the preconditions of dialogue were harsh for the

independence movement. The option they were fighting for was out of the menu of

choice. Yet the Papuan leaders of the consultation tried to make the agenda as inclusive

as was possible within the framework set for them by the Indonesian government.Member of the Governorial Assistance Team, Mr. Agus Sumule (2003, p. 358)

describes the approach of the special autonomy negotiations as follows: “We proposed

that the Seminar should not treat the issues of M (‘merdeka’ or independence) and O

(‘otonomi’or special autonomy) as M or O, or M against O, or O against M, but

should be M and O — meaning both M and O were the rights of the people and should

not be made to conflict with each other.” While the approach of the facilitators was

inclusive and focused on the core interests of the stakeholders the mandate of the

negotiation was too strict to allow independence movement ’s full participation. Many

of the OPM ruled themselves out: they wanted independence and since that was not onthe menu, there was nothing to talk about. As a result, both the fact that negotiations

were held in Indonesia, and due to the limitations of the negotiation agenda, the

benefit from negotiation were limited: OPM violence was not significantly reduced.

On the Indonesian side the negotiation on the Special Autonomy was neither totally

inclusive. The process sidelined the bureaucracy of the ministry of the interior, and this

proved to be a failure. Furthermore, the negotiations were conducted under President

Abdurrahman Wahid, whose policies towards separatist territories were part of the reason

for his later impeachment. As a result even the new president, Megawati Sukarnoputri did

not fully commit to the autonomy law. Special Autonomy Law was often objected to by

her administration. For example the Jakarta-appointed governor of Irian Jaya (Papua) in

1998, Freddy Numberi openly attacked the law by saying that Irian Jaya was not ready

for it (AFP: “Indonesian Governor says Irian Jaya not ready for greater autonomy”,

August 25, 1998). However, due to the limitations of the negotiation process, the main

resistance to the law came from the central government, especially the ministry for the

interior under President Megawati. This resistance effectively rendered the implemen-

tation of the law impossible. Some of the other laws implemented afterwards were in

clear contradiction with the special autonomy law, and these contradictions in the legal

governance of the province were not even seriously raised by Megawati’s government.

Article 1 of Chapter 1 of the Special Autonomy Law, for example, refers to Papua as the

former province of Irian Jaya, which covered the entire Papuan area, and Chapter 1

defines the instruments of autonomy as instruments of a single province. Article 4 of the

Chapter IV of the law negatively defines authority over issues related to the division of

the province to the province of Papua. Yet, later the province was divided into three by

the Presidential Decree 1/2003. In other words, the presidential decree was unlawful.

72 T. Kivimäki



However, the President referred to an earlier legislation in her decree, Law 45/1999 on

The Establishment of Central Irian Jaya Province, West Irian Jaya Province, Paniai

Regency, Mimika Regency, Puncak Jaya Regency, and Sorong City. But even so, the

legal setting is confusing: if we consider Papua being divided before the special

autonomy law, then why did the autonomy law treat Papua as one province?In addition to the ministry of the interior, also the Indonesian military was

sidelined from the negotiations of special autonomy. At the time of its negotiation

the president and the military were in deep disagreement about most of the issues

regarding Papua. It seems that the military did not respect the president but considered

his actions with great suspicion: at times the president was seen as a threat to

Indonesia’s unity. For example, while President Abdurrahman Wahid lend his support

to the forum that created the Papuan Presidium Council, the Papuan police and the

Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) later pursued and jailed most of the leadership of

this civilian organization. While the murder of Theys Hiyo Eluway, the Chair of thePapua Presidium Council, was prosecuted in accordance with the Indonesian judicial

system, the number two in the Indonesian Armed forces’ hierarchy, General Ramizard

Riyacudu, said that the TNI soldiers responsible for the murder were “heroes” of

Indonesia and that the act of murder was a normal “military act in the service of the

nation” (‘“Special” Testimony’, Tempo, January 7 – 13, 2002). Clearly, the special

autonomy consultations did not pacify the Indonesian military, and thus the result of

the process was not very promising.

However, the process had two main strengths that could be utilized in the future.

Since the implementation of the special autonomy required the cooperation of the parliament, it was probably wise for the consultation process also to involve

parliamentary delegations. During Special Autonomy negotiations the parliament

(Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat) established a Special Committee on Papuan Special

Autonomy (Panitia Khusus, Pansus)3, which was specially mandated to look after

the interests of the parliament in the consultation on the law. The special committee

consisted of representatives of the main parties, roughly in their parliamentary

proportion. As a result of their work, the law on special autonomy was easily passed

in the form that it had been negotiated. Compared to the process of Aceh peace

negotiations, the involvement of the parliament in Papuan special autonomy

consultations made the parliamentary implementation of the consensus easier.

Furthermore, the autonomy consultations innovated an interesting concept of regional

consultations that made it easier for even remote areas to feel ownership of the process. In

Papua, where the independence movement is fragmented, and the people’s opinions are

not easy to collect into a common position, such a time-consuming process of regional

consultations seems necessary and should be considered in any future negotiation between

Papua and Jakarta on the relationships between the province and the national center.

However, the process in the future has to be made less coercive, more inclusive,

and mechanisms need to be built to guarantee that the agreements are being

implemented.

3 For a good insider ’s analysis of the process leading to the adoption of the Special Autonomy Bill, see

Agus Sumule (2003). On the Parliamentary committee, see, p. 366. Mr. Agus Sumule was a member of

the Assistance Team to the Governor, in the drafting of the Special Autonomy Law.




How can we learn from the past and from the experiences of other peace

processes

In order to end violence one needs to initiate a process that all parties with guns can feel

ownership of (Kelman 1990, p. 199 – 215). Those organizations that have a control over violence need to be taken into account for the sake of realism, in order to stop the

violence (Zartman and Touval 1985, pp. 27 – 45). One cannot pick and choose parties

that one wants to reward, because for conflicts to end you have to talk to the enemy, not

to your friends, as Ambassador Wiryono concludes in his article in this special issue.

Furthermore, in order to reach agreement that the constituencies of the negotiators

can live with, one also needs to make sure that the negotiation process is not

coerced. Since the Indonesian government is a party to the conflict, it might be

necessary for the government and the independence movement to invite an

independent third party to facilitate negotiations, as Indonesia’s chief negotiator in

Aceh, Ambassador Wiryono explains in his article of this special issue. For Papua,

this might be necessary also because of the fact that many of the conflict issues in

Papua are related to economic grievances. Involvement of the donor community

could be useful already at a stage when Papuan peace is on the drawing board. This

could secure that all the instruments of economic conflict transformation could be

mapped. Further, an international fund for Papua could be established for the benefit

of the economic transformation process. This could also offer an opportunity for the

exiled Papuans and any diaspora Papuans to contribute to peace rather than to war in

Papua. Too often, the only way to show loyalty to a conflict area one has had to leave,has been the option of contributing money to the militias and violent groups of the

area. An independently managed international fund for Papua that would define its

objectives strictly to serve the aim of addressing the pre-agreed list of economic

grievances of Papuans should be useful and it could be utilized in a similar manner as

in the case of Northern Ireland, as Willy McCarter explains in this special issue.

As the case of Aceh, also the experience of Papua shows that for the peace

agreement to be durable one also needs to make sure that those parties that can

control the implementation of the terms of the agreement feel ownership of the

process, or at least can be made to comply with it. The consultation for the special

autonomy law broke against both of these principles and failed to make the

agreement acceptable for the OPM or the civil servants that were supposed to

implement it. As a result the process did little to limit violence.

Thirdly, it seems important that in addition to purely military and security-oriented

negotiations, where the stakeholders controlling the guns can talk, broader talks could also

take place once the security situation has improved. Broader circles of the society should

also be involved in the settlement of disputes, in order to create democratic legitimacy for

the solutions of negotiation. The military peace process should not be the end of reform in

the relationship between the center and the province. It should be the beginning of a more

open and democratic reformation of this relationship (see Ahtisaari in this issue).

In practice, it seems that the formula of peace negotiation in Papua would require

the participation of the military. This would be needed in order to increase the

military ownership of the process. Success in the Papuan peace process would

depend, as was the case in Aceh, on the civilian subordination of the military. This is

especially so since the military violence is not always of the nature that can be

74 T. Kivimäki



resolved by agreeing on principles of peace. In many of the cases of military

violence, the motive has been opportunistic and illegal. Motives of violence have not

always had anything to do with principles that soldiers feel committed to. In cases

violence has been used to enforce the military’s monopoly of illegal drug trade, or

unauthorized road tolls. This is why the soldiers simply have to be controlled better so that they do not contribute to gainful violence. The use of transparency against peace

spoilers among the military is not be readily possible in Papua, as the province is still

largely closed off from international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and the

media. Creating transparency and allowing the media, NGOs and scholars to the

territory would therefore be good initiatives for the creation of an environment

conducive for peace-making. The ban in the area on activities of international

researchers and NGOs clearly contributes to the lack of transparency and the intensity

of military violence. In order to create an atmosphere conducive for military discipline,

the military’s sense of ownership of the peace process could be ensured by offering the

military a part in the negotiation. If the process was “owned” by the territorial

commanders, it would be more embarrassing for them if the peace achieved is sabotaged

by gainful violence by individuals of the military establishment.

Due to the fact that the stakeholders of the Papuan conflict include large numbers of

migrants to the territory, it is necessary to somehow involve migrant communities in the

peace process. This would be necessary both for reasons of fairness and of effectiveness.

Migrants represent a large portion of the Papuan population, and their collaboration is

necessary for the stability of peace. Already now there have been expressions of

religious grievances of the mostly Muslim migrants towards the primarily Christianlocal Papuans. The existence of migrant-based militias suggests that in addition to the

government and the military, migrants control part of the violence in Papua. According

to Laksmana.net, the patriotic militia, Satgas Merah Putih has thousands of members in

Papua. It has a history of attacking and intimidating pro-independence supporters

(Laksamana.net, April 2, 2003). Also clandestine militant organizations such as Laskar

Jihad, Satgas Merah Putih, and Islamic Defenders Front, have still recently been

operating in Papua as defenders of the group interests of Muslim migrants in Papua.

However, the participation of migrants is challenged by the fact that there is no unified

migrant organization in Papua. Yet, it could be imagined that the community of migrants

could be mobilized for some kind of representation in a consultative group for the

government negotiation panel. A migrant consultative committee could then involve the

main ethnic organizations of the migrant communities.

Finally, on the government ’s side, a similar parliamentary committee that was

used in the special autonomy consultations, could be established for a future peace

process in Papua. This committee could be a consultative body for the government

negotiation panel. Since any future negotiation process should involve extreme

elements on the side of the resistance, it would be important that the work of this

consultative body is confidential, so that parties do not seek the nationalist votes by

competing in toughness against the much hated separatists. With a confidential

parliamentary consultancy mechanism the parliament would be involved in the

peace process from the beginning, and yet the process would not be politicized too

much.

On the Papuan side and on the side of the independence movement any future

Papuan peace dialogue should also involve the radical supporters of independence,




the main party and opponent of the Indonesian government in the conflict. After

Indonesian democratization many analysts have emphasized that Papuan resistance

has transformed from sporadic localized military activities of the OPM into a civilian

mass movement (International Crisis Group 2001; Sumule 2003). Much of the new

type of resistance is based on human rights organizations, environmental groups andChristian organizations. However democratization has not opened up political space

for separatist organizations like the OPM. Since the OPM is often felt as the

umbrella of the widespread popular desire for West Papua to secede from Indonesia,

the fact that the independence movement is operating on many platforms, including

legal ones, should not mean the marginalization of the OPM. One should not forget, that

the battle for the illegal objective of independence is mostly centered on the OPM. The

OPM still commands ideological power that can mobilize or prevent violence. It is now

tactically wiser to conduct the Papuan struggle by publicly taking distance from the

OPM, and using the sanctity of human rights organizations (until the recent escalation of the harassment of human rights organizations, including Elsham Papua) and religious

organizations. Yet the OPM is still an umbrella of the Papuan resistance4, and it

commands crucial importance both for war and peace in Papua. As many foreigners

hear when in Papua, on the level of ideas “Papuans are all OPM.”

Yet organizationally, the OPM’s fragmentation is a problem for any peace

negotiation. If an OPM negotiator makes a concession, all factions should submit to

that compromise. This is not possible without larger negotiation panels, consisting of

representatives of several factions, and consensual decision-making within panels.

Furthermore, there should be continuing communication between factions of theindependence movement to enable ownership of compromises among all factions.

According to some key individuals in the independence movement any dialogue

between independence and integration supporters should be preceded by dialogue

among supporters of independence (Tebay 2004). Such activities have indeed

already taken place in Sydney, in August 2004 in Holland in June 2003, and for

2007 there is a plan for a consolidation meeting in Vanuatu. Meanwhile during

2006 – 2007 a consolidation has taken place virtually (in the internet) inside and

outside Papua. The West Papua Coalition for National Liberation is at least one of

the coalitions that have been trying to act as an umbrella that could act as a

communication forum for the independence movement under a peace process. By

selecting international locations, the participants of these meetings have tried to

involve the forces marginalized and exiled by Indonesia. At the same time, by

operating virtually and secretly inside Papua, the umbrella-activity has tried to avoid

excluding the greater masses of Papuans. The development of a Papuan umbrella

organization seems necessary in order to consolidate the agency of the radical

Papuan resistance movements.

In addition to the umbrella of independence organizations and exile groups;

perhaps the West Papua Coalition for National Liberation, ordinary Papuans can also

be mobilized for a peace process by using already existing political channels. The

4 The idea of the OPM as an umbrella of Papuan resistance can be seen for example in Amnesty

International (2002).

76 T. Kivimäki



closest Papuans come to legal representation is the Papua Peoples’ Assembly

(MRP). This body was established in November 2005, according to Law No. 21/

2001 on special autonomy for Papua. This 42-member organization has the power to

approve candidates standing in governor ’s elections and for the People’s Consulta-

tive Assembly, as well as to make recommendations and give its approval for cooperative projects between the Papua administration and third parties. Within the

framework of Special Autonomy of the provincial order, the MRP is established to

represent ethnic Papuans. The MRP’s links with existing legal NGOs, human rights

groups and church leaders could also offer an important channel for consultations on

negotiations. If the MRP gets a role in peace negotiation, it could be one of the two

Papuan negotiators vis-à-vis the Indonesian government. While the MRP could

emulate the regional consultations introduced in the special autonomy consultations,

the coalition of the organizations, marginalized and exiled by the Indonesian

government would need to hold consultations with various independence organ-izations and exiled Papuans.

Still there will always be stakeholders that cannot be included in Papua peace

process. If the solution in Papua aims at something that would be democratic and

decentralized (so that Papua could decide on its own fate), the peace process could

be seen as open-ended. As was the case in Aceh, Papua’s relations could develop

even after political decisions had been reached to allow safe political mobilization

instead of violent military mobilization. A process similar to the one explained by

Ahtisaari in his essay, to allow the process to continue and different stakeholders to

have their chance, appears even more important in Papua, due to the fragmentationof Papuan society.

In summary, the structure of peace negotiation in Papua could look like the

following:

WPCNL MRP

Mandate/participation:

OPM &other illegal

pro-independence

groups, marginalized

secessionist Pa uans

Consultation:

unofficial mechanism

within and outside

Papua to the

secessionists.

Mandate/participation:

Legal democratic

mandate from Papuans

who have not

marginalized frompolitics.

Formal regional

consultation similar to

the one during the

drafting of Special

Autonomy Law.

GOI

Mandate: Legal

Mandate and

Participation of

the bureaucracy

involved in theimplementation of

Papuan administration,

including the TNI. Ideological

mandate of all

ro-Indonesians.

Consultation:

Ethnic and

religious

consultativecouncil of the

migrant groups.

Consultation:

Special

Committee of the

Parliament.

WPCNL = The West Papua Coalition for National Liberation

MRP = Papua Peoples’ Assembly

GOI = Government of Indonesia

OPM = Free Papua Movement

TNI = Military Forces of Indonesia




Conclusions

Peace-makers in Papua could find the experiences of Aceh and other peace processes

useful and inspirational. At the same time, some of the solutions in the Papuan

Special Autonomy consultations could serve as inspiration also in a future peace-making in Papua.

Due to the fragmentation of Papuan society, and due to the problem of

implementing decisions, several consultation mechanisms will have to be innovated

to link stakeholders to the bargaining process on the terms of peace. Consultation

mechanisms between negotiators and their constituencies have been useful in several

negotiations. Also the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka used such a mechanism successfully

in the Aceh peace talks. The ongoing consolidation of the independence movement

is useful for the creation of an agency of the independence movement in peace

negotiation. But it is also useful for the creation of mechanisms of consultation for the potential negotiation process.

The Peace process in Papua should also require the attention of the international

community. Assistance is needed in the dispute resolution effort in order to

overcome the lack of trust between the warring parties. In order to avoid coercive

and authoritarian negotiations as in the case of Burma/Myanmar, the venue of

negotiation should optimally be outside Indonesia. Furthermore, as was seen in Aceh

and in Mindanao, the government as a conflicting party cannot be simultaneously a

negotiator and the source of good services of negotiation (see Ambassador Wiryono

in this special issue). Thus, international involvement is needed.Given that part of the grievances behind the motivation to fight for independence

are related to the extreme underdevelopment of the province, dialogue on Papuan

peace should involve the donor community from the outset. Due to the presence of

more complicated problems than in Aceh, related to the Indonesian and international

corporations operating in Papua, some level of involvement or representation of

these stakeholders should also be considered. In any case an international fund for

the transformation of conflict structures should be established to tackle the poverty-

related roots of violence. Here an international role is important as the Papuan

suspicion towards Indonesian development efforts often render Indonesian projects

less than useful in Papua. Peace in Papua requires political will on both sides of the

dispute; political will to negotiate, to compromise and to take risks for peace. But it

also requires some economic resources to demonstrate the benefits of peace.

References

Alua AA (2002a) Dialogue Nasional, Papua dan Indonesia. Februari 26, 1999. Kembalikan Kedaulatan

Papua Barat, Pulang dan Renungkan Dulu. Seri Pendidikan Politik Papua, No. 2. Sekretariat

Presidium Dewan Papua, JayapuraAlua AA (2002b) Mubes Papua 2000. 23 – 26 Februari. Jalan Sejarah, Jalan Kebenaran. Seri Pendidikan

Politik Papua No. 3. Sekretariat Presidium Dewan Papua, Jayapura

Habibie BJ (2000) Interview by Timo Kivimäki, on 7.11. 2000, in Kakerbeck, Germany

Human Rights Watch (2000) Indonesia: human rights and pro-independence actions in Papua, 1999 – 2000.

HRW, New York, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/papua/

International Crisis Group (2001) Indonesia: ending repression in Irian Jaya. Report 23. ICG, Brussels

78 T. Kivimäki

http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/papua/

http://www.hrw.org/reports/2000/papua/



Kelman HC (1990) Interactive problem-solving: a social – psychological approach to conflict resolution. In:

Burton J, Dukes F (eds) Conflict: readings in management and resolution. St. Martin ’s, New York, pp

199 – 215

Kivimäki T (2006) Initiating a peace process in Papua: actors, issues, processes, and the role of the

international community. Policy Studies 25. East – West Center Washington, Washington DC

McGibbon R (2004) Secessionist challenges in Aceh and Papua: is special autonomy the solution? PolicyStudies No. 10. East – West Center Washington, Washington DC

Rothman J (1992) Conflict management policy analysis. In: Rothman J (ed) From confrontation to

cooperation. Sage, Newbury Park

Sounders HH (1991) We need a larger theory of negotiation: the importance of pre-negotiation phases. In:

Breslin W, Rubin JZ (eds) Negotiation Theory and Practice. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard School of

Law

Sumule A (2003) Swimming against the current. J Pac Hist 38(3):353 – 369

Tebay N (2004) Toward a constructive dialogue between the government of Indonesia and the Papuans.

An unpublished paper

Zartman IW (1989) Pre-negotiation: phases and functions. Int J 44:237 – 253

Zartman IW, Touval S (1985) International mediation: conflict resolution and power politics. J Soc Issues

41(2):27 – 45


Documents

Prospects of peace negotiation in Papua.pdf