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Protecting People and ThingsProtecting People and ThingsDifferent But the SameDifferent But the Same
DYCOR USADYCOR USASpecial Applications DivisionSpecial Applications Division
BackgroundBackground
We cannot protect everything, all the time, against We cannot protect everything, all the time, against every threatevery threat
Our ability to protect is a function of time, place, Our ability to protect is a function of time, place, determination, design, and circumstancesdetermination, design, and circumstances
Protective strategies cannot be static, they must Protective strategies cannot be static, they must evolve as the threat evolvesevolve as the threat evolves
Our ability to protect is diminished by a “rule Our ability to protect is diminished by a “rule based” mentalitybased” mentality
Primary ThreatsPrimary Threats
Intentional actsIntentional acts Terrorists / Insiders / CriminalsTerrorists / Insiders / Criminals
Methods of attackMethods of attack Explosives / ContaminationExplosives / Contamination
TargetsTargets
Government buildingsGovernment buildings Commercial buildingsCommercial buildings Infrastructure facilitiesInfrastructure facilities Transportation hubsTransportation hubs Public venuesPublic venues
Facility DynamicsFacility Dynamics
Changes in population and concentration Changes in population and concentration over a given period of timeover a given period of time Generally predictableGenerally predictable Can be studied and analyzedCan be studied and analyzed
Exploitable for attackExploitable for attack Commuter operationsCommuter operations Workplace arrival and departureWorkplace arrival and departure Gathering placesGathering places Security queuing areasSecurity queuing areas
Facility Population DynamicsFacility Population Dynamics
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
0:00
7:00
9:00
12:0
0
16:0
0
18:0
00:
00
Lobby
Cafeteria
Total Population
Explosive ThreatsExplosive Threats
VERY
SMALL SMALL MEDIUM LARGE VERY LARGE EXTRA LARGE
0 1 25 250 1,000 5,000 40,000
LETTER
PIPE BOMB
HIDDEN
BRIEFCASE
PIPEBOMB
BOX
HAVERSACK
HIDDEN
LARGEBOX
CAR
PICKUP
VAN
EXPLOSIVESIZE
CAR
VAN
PICKUP
VAN
TRUCK
LARGETRUCK
SEMITRUCK
LBS TNT
OPM/SANG (5))
METHODOF
IMPLACEMENT
WORLD TRADE CENTER
OK CITY (168)
KHOBAR TOWERS (19)
BEIRUT (241)
TYPICAL LETTER BOMBS
PIPE BOMBS
PAN AM 103 (274)ATLANTA (1)
Personal Injury From BlastPersonal Injury From Blast
> 80% of injuriesfrom a blast are caused by impactfrom objects,especially flying glass
PRESSURE 800 psi.
YIELD (TNT Equiv.) 20,000 lb. YIELD (TNT Equiv.) 4000 lb.
STANDOFF 80 feet STANDOFF 15 feet
PRESSURE 9600 psi.
Standoff vs. EffectStandoff vs. Effect
19 dead 168 dead
Blast Analysis – Personnel Range to EffectsBlast Analysis – Personnel Range to Effects
Blast Analysis – Personnel Protective StandoffBlast Analysis – Personnel Protective Standoff
Blast Analysis – Structural ResponseBlast Analysis – Structural Response
Structural Damage Predictions
High damage Medium damageLow damage No damage
1000 lbexplosive
Structural response can bemodeled and estimated for a specific explosive threat
Protective Strategies - BlastProtective Strategies - Blast
Standoff – standoff – standoff !!Standoff – standoff – standoff !! Distance = protection from a blast Distance = protection from a blast
eventevent Restrict vehicle traffic around Restrict vehicle traffic around
the facilitythe facility Re-route deliveries, inspect Re-route deliveries, inspect
vehiclesvehicles Enforce restriction with barriers Enforce restriction with barriers
and landscapingand landscaping
Protective Strategies - BlastProtective Strategies - Blast
Establish sacrificial space in the facilityEstablish sacrificial space in the facility Move critical operations away from the most Move critical operations away from the most
accessible and vulnerable areasaccessible and vulnerable areas
Threat
Before After
Mission Support
Public access
Mission Critical
Utilities
Protective Strategies - BlastProtective Strategies - Blast
Identify structural elements that could be exploited in an Identify structural elements that could be exploited in an attackattack
Protective Strategies - BlastProtective Strategies - Blast
Observe personnel flow and concentration Observe personnel flow and concentration Building design and facility functions channel trafficBuilding design and facility functions channel traffic
Open facility earlier, use more entrances if possibleOpen facility earlier, use more entrances if possible Stagger employee work hoursStagger employee work hours Minimize exposure time in non-secure areasMinimize exposure time in non-secure areas Anticipate crowds – assign sufficient security resources to minimize Anticipate crowds – assign sufficient security resources to minimize
processing delaysprocessing delays
Improve structural and physical security in areas where Improve structural and physical security in areas where people congregatepeople congregate Install fragment retention film or blast curtains to reduce glass injuriesInstall fragment retention film or blast curtains to reduce glass injuries Consider use of visual obscuration (reflective film on windows)Consider use of visual obscuration (reflective film on windows) Splinter protection barriersSplinter protection barriers
Contamination ThreatsContamination Threats
ChemicalChemical Toxic industrial chemicals (TICs)Toxic industrial chemicals (TICs) Lethal agents (Sarin)Lethal agents (Sarin)
Biological (Anthrax)Biological (Anthrax) Radiological (Radium)Radiological (Radium) Delivery methodsDelivery methods
Aerial dispersal (aerosol cloud)Aerial dispersal (aerosol cloud) Contact (mail, package)Contact (mail, package) Manually placedManually placed By-product of explosionBy-product of explosion
Damages - ContaminationDamages - Contamination
Effects on personnelEffects on personnel Depends on agent and amount of exposureDepends on agent and amount of exposure Physical effects show in seconds to days Physical effects show in seconds to days
DeathDeath Protracted illnessProtracted illness Unable to return to workUnable to return to work
Effects on facilitiesEffects on facilities Widespread contamination possibleWidespread contamination possible Lengthy decontamination processLengthy decontamination process Loss of use / serviceLoss of use / service Financial disaster (Est. $42 M USD – Hart Bldg.)Financial disaster (Est. $42 M USD – Hart Bldg.)
Contamination Analysis – Material TransportContamination Analysis – Material Transport
Computer modelsComputer models Exterior environmentExterior environment
HPAC (Hazard Prediction & Assessment Capability)HPAC (Hazard Prediction & Assessment Capability) Can run with predicted or actual weather informationCan run with predicted or actual weather information
Interior environmentInterior environment Limited availabilityLimited availability Labor intensiveLabor intensive
Material specificMaterial specific CompositionComposition AmountAmount PersistencePersistence
Vulnerabilities - ContaminationVulnerabilities - Contamination
LocationLocation Proximity or downwind to hazardous production or storage sites Proximity or downwind to hazardous production or storage sites
and transportation routesand transportation routes Air handlingAir handling
Fresh air intakes located near ground levelFresh air intakes located near ground level Limited filtration capabilities (large particulates)Limited filtration capabilities (large particulates) Multiple air handling systems without central controlMultiple air handling systems without central control
Limited or no hazard sensing capabilityLimited or no hazard sensing capability Package and mail handlingPackage and mail handling
Direct deliveries to lobby and other public access areasDirect deliveries to lobby and other public access areas Poor inspection and isolation protocolsPoor inspection and isolation protocols
No inspection of personal itemsNo inspection of personal items Limited situational awareness (warning & procedures)Limited situational awareness (warning & procedures)
Protective Strategies - ContaminationProtective Strategies - Contamination
Know your neighborhoodKnow your neighborhood Check with government & Check with government &
commercial sourcescommercial sources Fire DepartmentFire Department Emergency planning & permitting Emergency planning & permitting
agenciesagencies Railroad and trucking companiesRailroad and trucking companies
Research material hazard dataResearch material hazard data Understand general propertiesUnderstand general properties Protective methodsProtective methods Decontamination issuesDecontamination issues
Protective Strategies - ContaminationProtective Strategies - Contamination
Facility improvementsFacility improvements Identify location of fresh air Identify location of fresh air
intakesintakes Relocate intakes to top of Relocate intakes to top of
building if possiblebuilding if possible Understand capabilities of air Understand capabilities of air
filter unitsfilter units Consider adding additional Consider adding additional
filtration stagesfiltration stages Install master shut-off for all Install master shut-off for all
air handling systemsair handling systems Isolate/dedicate air handling Isolate/dedicate air handling
unit for mail roomunit for mail room Determine hazard sensing Determine hazard sensing
capabilitycapability Install additional sensingInstall additional sensing
Protective Strategies - ContaminationProtective Strategies - Contamination
Procedural improvementsProcedural improvements Employ a trans-shipment facility, Employ a trans-shipment facility,
isolate the mail/package isolate the mail/package receiving area within the facilityreceiving area within the facility
Establish comprehensive inspection Establish comprehensive inspection protocolsprotocols
Obtain equipment to contain Obtain equipment to contain suspicious articlessuspicious articles
Obtain materials for immediate Obtain materials for immediate decontaminationdecontamination
Spot inspection of employee Spot inspection of employee personal itemspersonal items
100% inspection of visitor 100% inspection of visitor personal itemspersonal items
Protective Strategies - ContaminationProtective Strategies - Contamination
Crisis operations planningCrisis operations planning Connect to local emergency notification networksConnect to local emergency notification networks
Reverse “911”Reverse “911”
Establish internal emergency notification proceduresEstablish internal emergency notification procedures Incorporate contamination events into crisis response Incorporate contamination events into crisis response
planningplanning Determine capabilities to provide “shelter in place” Determine capabilities to provide “shelter in place”
protectionprotection Consider “urge to flee” responseConsider “urge to flee” response Assign assets to secure the facility until cleared to leaveAssign assets to secure the facility until cleared to leave
SummarySummary
The addition of people to any facility complicates the The addition of people to any facility complicates the protection processprotection process
Effective protection planning depends on an understanding of Effective protection planning depends on an understanding of the environment, facility functions, and population dynamicsthe environment, facility functions, and population dynamics
Reorganization of building space and functions can offer Reorganization of building space and functions can offer substantial protective benefitssubstantial protective benefits
Procedural and facility improvements can greatly enhance Procedural and facility improvements can greatly enhance personnel security and safetypersonnel security and safety
Contact DataContact Data
Dycor USA, Inc.Dycor USA, Inc.Corporate HeadquartersCorporate Headquarters401-A Cooley Mill Road401-A Cooley Mill Road
Havre de Grace, MD 21078-1319Havre de Grace, MD 21078-1319 Phone: 410-734-9414Phone: 410-734-9414Fax: 410-734-0334Fax: 410-734-0334Email:Email: [email protected]@dycorusa.com