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Protection Monitoring Task Force Protection Monitoring Quarterly Report March-June 2017

Protection Monitoring Task Force - ReliefWeb · 2017. 11. 8. · PMTF members conducted key informant interviews on a monthly basis. The interview questions measure protection risks

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Page 1: Protection Monitoring Task Force - ReliefWeb · 2017. 11. 8. · PMTF members conducted key informant interviews on a monthly basis. The interview questions measure protection risks

Protection Monitoring Task Force

Protection Monitoring Quarterly Report

March-June 2017

Page 2: Protection Monitoring Task Force - ReliefWeb · 2017. 11. 8. · PMTF members conducted key informant interviews on a monthly basis. The interview questions measure protection risks

2

About the PMTF

The Protection Monitoring Task Force (PMTF), an initiative of the Syria Protection Cluster (Turkey), is

composed of Syrian NGOs and international NGOs and aims to develop the capacity of humanitarian

actors to assess, analyze, and respond to protection needs in Syria.

As of 2017, the PMTF has a membership of 23 NGOs, international organizations and clusters. 12

members actively contribute to protection monitoring, which began in March 2017.

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3

Contents

About the PMTF ..................................................................................................................................... 2

Recommendations for Humanitarian Actors ......................................................................................... 4

Background and Overview ..................................................................................................................... 6

Data Collection Methodology ................................................................................................................ 8

Findings ................................................................................................................................................ 10

3.1 Rights .......................................................................................................................................... 10

Civil Documentation ..................................................................................................................... 10

Eviction ......................................................................................................................................... 13

Access to Justice ........................................................................................................................... 14

Social Cohesion ............................................................................................................................ 15

3.2 Basic Services ............................................................................................................................. 19

Access to Education ..................................................................................................................... 20

Access to Health ........................................................................................................................... 22

Access to Employment ................................................................................................................. 25

Specialized Services...................................................................................................................... 25

Access to Water ........................................................................................................................... 26

WASH ........................................................................................................................................... 28

Humanitarian Assistance ............................................................................................................. 29

Access to Markets ........................................................................................................................ 30

Access to Electricity ...................................................................................................................... 31

Access to Shelter .......................................................................................................................... 31

3.3 Vulnerability ............................................................................................................................... 34

Boys and girls ............................................................................................................................... 34

Child Separation ........................................................................................................................... 35

Child Labor ................................................................................................................................... 35

Violence/Exploitation ................................................................................................................... 36

Child Marriage .............................................................................................................................. 36

Impact of Conflict on Child Behavior ........................................................................................... 36

Special Needs and Elderly ............................................................................................................ 37

3.4 Demographic Groups ................................................................................................................. 38

Freedom of Movement / Movement Restrictions ....................................................................... 38

IDP Movement ............................................................................................................................. 40

3.5 Explosive Hazards and Security Incidents .................................................................................. 42

Explosive Hazards ......................................................................................................................... 42

Security Incidents ......................................................................................................................... 43

Community Structures ................................................................................................................. 44

Acronyms ............................................................................................................................................. 48

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4

Recommendations for Humanitarian Actors

Sensitize humanitarian actors and beneficiaries on access to aid despite lack or loss of

documentation – Map and improve awareness among humanitarian actors about the impact of loss

of documentation and the need for alternative systems of identification. Holding an official document

should not be a condition for receiving humanitarian aid or for registering for school.

Improve access to services and assistance for vulnerable populations – Consider the particular needs

of older persons, sick persons, and persons with disabilities to ensure equity in the accessibility of

assistance. Foresee and plan logistics and transportation accordingly, including through the use of

mobile outreach teams. In addition to improving access to existing services for older persons and

person with disabilities, provide more specialized assistance to these groups.

Reduce potential causes of tension between IDPs and host communities – Involve communities,

including both IDP and host populations, in identifying risks and vulnerabilities and prioritizing the

most vulnerable, thereby ensuring increased ownership and accountability among affected

populations. In areas with high concentrations of IDPs, improve shelter conditions and options and

increase livelihoods opportunities.

Reduce secondary displacement due to economic factors – Increase livelihood generating activities

and longer term cash-based interventions to reduce secondary displacement. (After safety concerns,

lack of employment is the second most common reason for leaving the current community.) Ensure

longer periods of tenure by improving access to quality shelter options.

Improve public information about aid distribution – Where possible, publicize beneficiary criteria

among the population as well as share information about how to access services, including through

service mapping and referrals. Raise awareness of existing feedback and complaint mechanisms.

Mitigate protection threats against boys and girls – Expand access to strong case management

activities in order to identify and address cases of worst forms of child labour, boys and girls associated

with armed forces or armed groups, or early marriage, among other threats. Integrate case

management with livelihoods initiatives and vocational trainings for family members in order to

address root causes.

Protect women and girls from disproportionate impact of restricting freedom of movement – In the

face of generalized violence and increased criminal activity, and consequently imposed restrictions on

freedom of movement, increase initiatives that can strengthen self-protection mechanisms,

particularly for women and girls. Develop community networks through structured psycho-social

support programs in hard-to-reach areas.

Mitigate threat of explosive hazards – Continue and expand risk education increase awareness on

remaining safe from mines and explosive hazards in areas where these risks are most commonly

found.

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5

1 Overview

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6

Background and Overview

The Syrian conflict, now in its seventh year, has caused the continued and staggering suffering of

civilians. In the context of armed conflict, besiegement, displacement, increasing poverty and a

reliance on harmful coping mechanisms, civilians face numerous and overlapping protection risks.

Despite the challenging security environment, humanitarian actors continue to respond to the

overwhelming scale of humanitarian and protection needs in Syria.

This report is based on data provided by 12 PMTF members between March and June 2017. It is the

first quarterly report of the PMTF. It is based on community-level key informant (KI) interviews and

observation checklists. Through KI interviews, members collect data from active and aware members

of the community who are able to assess various protection risks and concerns of all demographic

groups. Through the observation checklist,

NGO field staff record their observations of

issues affecting the safety, dignity, and rights

of men, women, girls and boys in these

communities.

This report reflects data from 1,534 Key

Informant (KI) interviews from seven

governorates located primarily in northwest

Syria. The number of interviews conducted

per governorate and community are

visualized in the accompanying graph and

map. The narrative has been supported with

quotes from Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)

conducted by the Protection Cluster during

the same period.

Idleb 55%(842)

Aleppo 31% (474)

Homs 6%(90)

Ar-Raqqa 4%(55)

Rural Damascus 2%(33)

Hama 2%(24)

Al-Hasakeh 1% (16)

Percentage of Interviews per Governorate

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7

2 Methodology

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8

Data Collection Methodology

PMTF members conducted key informant interviews on a monthly basis. The interview questions

measure protection risks in the areas of rights, basic needs, vulnerability, demographics, and

incidents. The protection indicators were decided in consultation with protection actors and other

cluster coordinators.

In order to achieve statistically significant results, members were encouraged to conduct at least 5-

10 interviews per community per month, and 1 observation checklist. Locations were selected

depending on factors such as member presence and accessibility.

The majority of the data available in this report is from Idleb, Aleppo, Homs, and Ar-Raqqa. Due to the

limited nature of data from Rural Damascus, Hama and Al-Hasakeh, significant comparisons between

all governorates are not possible. Due to the variety of data collectors and agencies participating in

this protection monitoring exercise, the type of responses can vary. In addition, conclusions of data

from the governorates cannot be generalized to represent the population as a whole. The results

reported can only be considered the opinions and perceptions of the survey participants.

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3 Findings

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10

Findings

3.1 Rights The results of protection monitoring on rights-related risks illuminate both impediments and

reinforcements to civilians’ enjoyment of stable and secure lives within their communities. For

example, lack of civil status documents places community members at risk of not being able to access

basic rights and services. Civilians also experience challenges in maintaining access to shelter and

achieving dispute resolution. However, factors such as high social cohesion can counteract these risks.

Humanitarian stakeholders should focus on maintaining and reinforcing positive social interaction,

while reducing protection risks caused by lack of identity documents, unreliable shelter arrangements,

and insufficient interaction with NGOs.

Civil Documentation

Of 978 KIs who responded to the question,

74% reported that people in their

community lack civil status documents,

such as the national ID, family booklet, or

passport. Households lack documentation

because documents were left behind

during displacement (39%), documents

were lost (19%), documents were not

obtained in the first place (16%),

documents were confiscated (13%),

documents expired (7%), documents were stolen (1%), “other” (4%), and, do not know (1%). When

asked why people in the community have been unable to obtain documents, majority of those who

responded (78%) cited security reasons.

31 86 23

71 16 10

55 21

5437 46

141 10130

2 2

548 6 36

5 275 48

2

0%

50%

100%

% o

f K

Is

Governorate-District

Are People in the Community Lacking Civil Status Documents?

Yes No Unable to Answer

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11

722 KIs responded to the question about why people in the community lack civil status documents.

39% (282) stated that the documents were left behind during displacement. 19% (140) stated that the

documents were lost. 16% (115) stated that community members never had documents. 13% (93)

stated that the documents were confiscated. 7% (51) stated that the documents expired. 1% (8) stated

that the documents were stolen. 4% (28) stated other, and 1% (5) said ‘I don’t know.’

Some KIs (115) stated that members of the community never obtained documents in the first place.

Of these, 46% (53) are currently located in Idleb, 26% (30) in Homs, 15% (17) in Aleppo, 11% (13) in

Ar-Raqqa, and 2% (2 in Rural Damascus).

79

54

21

9

16

4

3

203

86

94

84

35

24

5

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%

Left Behind When Displaced

Lost

Never Had Docs

Confiscated

Expired

Other

Stolen

Why Do People in the Community Lack Civil Status Documents?

Female Respondents Male Respondents

11

53

10

46

1

5

7

4

10

8

73

36

18

5

25

1

13

3

1

8

9

18

13

21

22

1

3

5

5

3

1

13

30

3

9

32

9

2

11

1

7

3

9

5

35

4

1

1

4

11

1

1

1

1

8

5

13

9

7

6

5

1

1

2

5

3

1

2

14

1

1

1

2

1

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Aleppo - Al Bab

Aleppo - A'zaz

Aleppo - Jarablus

Aleppo - Jebel Saman

Aleppo - Menbij

Al Hasakeh

Ar Raqqa - Tell Abiad

Hama - As Suqaylabiyah

Homs - Ar Rastan

Idleb - Al Ma'ra

Idleb - Ariha

Idleb - Harim

Idleb - Idleb

R. Damascus

% of KIs

Go

vern

ora

te-D

istr

ict

Why Do People in the Community Lack Civil Documents?

Left Behind Lost Never Had Docs Confiscated Expired Stolen Other Don't Know

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12

KIs responding to why people in the community who lack documents have been unable to obtain

them, identified security concerns as the major factor (78% of all responding KIs). The security factor

was mentioned more by men, than women. Additionally, not knowing about procedures (5% of all

responding KIs), the registrar in their area being destroyed (5%), transportation costs (2%), lengthy

procedures (3%), unaffordable administration fees (4%), discrimination or abuse by officials (1%) were

also identified as impediments to obtaining documents. The remaining 3% of responding KIs were

unable to identify a specific reason.

Official civil status documentation in Syria is absolutely vital, and is required for access to basic needs

and services. Confiscation and challenges in renewing and obtaining civil status documentation

present direct risks to conflict-affected communities in Syria.

“…lack of personal cards deprives of access to

several things such as relief, registration at

school, and getting a job”

133

15

13

10

8

5

3

1

429

22

26

1

10

26

2

18

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%

Security ConcernsProcedure Unknown

No RegistrarTransportation CostProcedure Lengthy

Administration FeesDiscrimination

Other

Why Have People in the Community Who Are Lacking Documents Not Been Able to Obtain Them?

Female Respondents

Male Respondents

(FGDs, Adolescent Female,

Idleb Governorate)

355

31

13

303

932

92

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%

Aleppo - Al BabAleppo - A'zaz

Aleppo - JarablusAleppo - Jebel Saman

Aleppo - MenbijAl Hasakeh

Ar Raqqa - Tell AbiadHama - As Suqaylabiyah

Homs - Ar RastanIdleb - Al Ma'ra

Idleb - ArihaIdleb - HarimIdleb - Idleb

R. Damascus

% of KIs

Go

vern

ora

te-D

istr

ict

Current Location of KIs Who Reported That People in the Community Never Had Documents

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13

Eviction

Between March and June, KIs were asked whether families in the community were recently asked to

leave their shelter or place of residence. 175 (18% of KIs who responded to the question) reported

positively. Specifically, 61 KIs reported that 50+ families were recently asked to leave their shelter. 40

reside in Ar-Raqqa (Tell Abiad), 15 in Aleppo (Jarablus, Al Bab, A’zaz, Menbij), 5 in Al-Hasakeh and 1 in

Idleb.

29% of responding KIs noted the increasing cost of rent in their community as the top reason for why

families have left their shelters. Sometimes authorities asked community residents to leave due to an

expected increase in conflict activity (25%). In other cases, some staying with host families were asked

to leave because their stay was longer than expected and the host family could no longer afford to

host them (10%).

Among the other causes of families leaving was the improvement in the security situation. 5 key

informants explained that some families in the community voluntarily returned to their place of origin,

including Qah, as they believed it was safe to return.

One other cause of families leaving the area recently was the fear of eviction among IDPs in camps in

Atma community of Idleb governorate due to disagreements between camp residents and private

owners of camp lands. Due to these disagreements, some camp residents have preemptively left.

“Families were asked to vacate houses because

they were unable to pay the rent.”

“Local authorities have evacuated villages

because of clashes.”

“[Families have been asked to leave shelters]

because of the lack of housing and the inability

to absorb.”

Yes 18%

No 76%

Unable to Answer 6%

Have Families Been Asked to Leave Their Shelters Recently?

29%

25%

23%

10%

7%

3%

Rent

Local Authorities

Other

Host Family

Landlord

Host Community

Why Have People Left Shelters Recently?

(KII, Male, Idleb Governorate)

(KII, Female, Aleppo

Governorate)

(KII, Male, Idleb Governorate)

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14

Access to Justice

978 KIs responded to the question

about which entity people approach

for assistance when there is a problem

or dispute in the community. 35%

(344) stated that they go to Sharia

courts. 15% (149) stated that they try

to resolve the issue themselves. 15%

(142) stated that they go to the local

authorities. 9% (89) stated that they

go to police. 9% (84) stated that they

go to law courts. 6% (61) stated that

they go to tribal leaders. 5% (47)

stated that they go to religious leaders. 4% (43) stated that they apply to family leaders. 1% (10) said

other, and 1% (9) stated NGOs.

7

23

36

18

21

57

24

14

76

60

8

3

6

8

10

3

3

22

3

7

71

12

1

17

15

4

10

15

12

4

5

8

21

19

12

1

13

2

31

0

4

6

19

12

1

0

15

11

0

0

2

16

4

30

6

0

3

11

0

1

1

36

1

0

8

2

3

14

0

1

1

0

4

10

10

2

1

11

14

3

0

0

1

4

6

3

0

0

1

1

0

1

0

5

1

1

0

1

0

2

1

1

2

2

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Aleppo - Al Bab

Aleppo - A'zaz

Aleppo - Jarablus

Aleppo - Jebel Saman

Aleppo - Menbij

Al Hasakeh

Ar Raqqa - Tell Abiad

Hama - As Suqaylabiyah

Homs - Ar Rastan

Idleb - Al Ma'ra

Idleb - Ariha

Idleb - Harim

Idleb - Idleb

R. Damascus

% of KIs

Go

vern

ora

te-D

istr

ict

Which Entity Do People Go to for Dispute Resolution?

Sharia Courts Themselves Local Authorities Police Law Courts

Tribal Leaders Religious Leaders Family Leaders Other NGOs

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15

This is consistent with findings of FGDs during this period, in which community members stated that

they generally approach Shari’a courts, i.e. court of currently existing local authorities, and other law

enforcement such as police, when they seek justice and dispute resolution. One FGD participant

stated that people reach out to whichever entity they trust, and in some cases, take justice into their

own hands: “The boys take revenge on their own. They resort to the court, to someone they trust, to

the factions.” (FGDs, Adolescent female, Idleb Governorate).

However, FGD results indicate mixed effectiveness of these entities. Some participants reported that

these efforts have been successful: “There was a recent incident in which they reported to the police

station and the police took action” (FGDs, Adult male, Idleb Governorate). Meanwhile others reported

that efforts have been futile: “Courts may not get us our rights.” (Adolescent male, Idleb governorate).

“People complain to religious courts but to no avail, they do not do us justice” (FGDs, Adolescent

female, Idleb Governorate).

Some FGD participants perceive that if one holds power, money, and influence, it is possible to

influence these entities in either obtaining dispute resolution, or averting justice. “Exploitation of

women is obvious, especially a widow who does not have any source of income. She will become an

easy prey for men with money to satisfy their desires… there is no authority that can call to account,

punish, or deter anyone responsible for these acts. If you have money, you can do anything you want…

Authorities in charge do not listen because of the lack of money and lack of highly influential social

connections” (FGDs, Adult female, Idleb Governorate). “People seek the help of some factions and

courts of law which are considered the current ruling authorities, but they do not get any positive

response from them because they (i.e. the victims of violence) are displaced and vulnerable, and they

do not have enough money to incite some of the ill-natured officials to defend their rights” (FGDs,

Adult female, Idleb Governorate).

Social Cohesion

978 KIs responded to the question about the

relationship between IDPs and the host

community. 71% (698) described a positive

social interaction between IDPs and the host

community. 17% (163) of responding KIs stated

that there is limited interaction between IDPs

and host communities, and when they do

interact, it is primarily to obtain information

about the security situation in the area or to

purchase items. 6% (60) stated that there is negative interaction and 6% (57) stated that there is no

interaction at all between the two.

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16

178

56

20

21

520

107

40

36

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%

Positive Interaction

Limited Interaction

Negative Interaction

No Interaction

How Do You Describe the Relationship Beween IDPs and Host Community?

Female Respondents Male Respondents

23

36

22

8018

6

55

1469

3941

128

138 29

3

29

0

26

5 719

2

4

55

1035

12

39

1 18

20

114 12 1

10

118 1

0%

50%

100%

% o

f K

Is

Governorate-District

How Do You Describe the Interaction Between IDPs and Host Community?

Positive Limited Negative None

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978 KIs responded to the question regarding the reasons for the type of interaction between IDPs and

the host community. KIs described these reasons as: the host community being sympathetic to IDPs

34% (331), the IDPs having lived in the area for several years 18% (171), IDPs having relatives in the

area 15% (148), increased cost of living 11% (109), IDPs having friends 10% (98), job competition

causing a strain on infrastructure 8% (75), religious reasons 3% (30) and political alignment 2%(16).

According to some KIs, IDPs who have lived in their host communities for a period of time (around 3-

4 years) and who had relatives in the host community experienced easier integration. The feeling of

solidarity based on common faith and the host community’s desire to support people in need were

cited as other driving factors of positive interaction. Many members of host communities explained

that they experienced displacement in the past and have been able to relate to and support the

currently displaced for this reason.

On the other hand, some KIs explained that some of the host community sees IDPs as competition for

resources, particularly for jobs and land, in their area. Some KIs stated that host communities perceive

IDPs as the cause of price increases because they cause increased demand on local goods. On the

other hand, some IDPs feel that the host community has an exploitative attitude towards them. For

example, KIs in the Harim community of Dana, Idleb noted limited and no interaction or negative

19

18

15

17

7

3

7

10

39

29

23

59

67

18

1

18

0

27

2

0

0

5

12

3

3

56

39

5

2

12

5

25

7

3

20

0

20

4

8

18

19

5

4

21

1

21

5

10

0

2

4

1

5

31

3

1

2

7

1

10

2

28

2

8

2

2

16

14

4

3

12

2

15

2

7

30

4

1

7

1

7

2

5

2

5

8

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Aleppo - Al Bab

Aleppo - A'zaz

Aleppo - Jarablus

Aleppo - Jebel Saman

Aleppo - Menbij

Al Hasakeh

Ar Raqqa - Tell Abiad

Hama - As Suqaylabiyah

Homs - Ar Rastan

Idleb - Al Ma'ra

Idleb - Ariha

Idleb - Harim

Idleb - Idleb

R. Damascus

% of KIs

Go

vern

ora

te-D

istr

ict

What is the Reason for the Type of Interaction between IDPs and Host Community?

Sympathy Duration Relatives Cost of Living

Friends Job Competition Religious Political

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18

interaction between host community and IDPs. Many FGD participants perceive that the IDP

community is viewed and treated as inferiors by the host community: “As displaced persons, in

general, we are marginalized, humiliated and considered inferior by the community in the neighboring

towns” (FGDs, Adult Female, Idleb Governorate.) In turn, some members of the host community feel

that IDPs are the cause of many of the problems in the community, including crime: “We are

concerned about the IDPs who came to the village. We do not know their backgrounds. They are the

cause of most of the problems and crimes in the village. Yes, they are the reason behind most of our

problems” (FGDs, Adult Female, Idleb Governorate).

Although it was not indicated in this data, the findings of FGDs conducted during this period suggest

that humanitarian assistance may also play a role in the negative interaction between host

communities and IDPs. According to one FGD participant: “[Humanitarian assistance] distributions are

only given to displaced people, whereas the residents do not get anything even if they are very poor.

Displaced people receive distributions from five organizations, and the local people get nothing”

(FGDs, Adult Male, Idleb Governorate).

Two KIs attributed the limited interaction to the simple fact everyone is busy trying to care for their

own families while some stated that do not have an opportunity to interact with the host community.

It is important to note that according to KI’s perceptions, religious reasons (3%) and political alignment

(2%) do not have significant impact on the interaction between IDPs and host community.

“The community sympathizes with the

displaced people.”

“The displaced have lived in this village for two

years; the relationship between them is

friendly.”

“Increased number of displaced persons leads

to competition with the host community for

available employment.”

(KII, Female, Aleppo

Governorate)

(KII, Female, Hama

Governorate)

(KII, Male, Idleb Governorate)

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19

3.2 Basic Services

Monitoring shows that community members experience challenges in accessing literally every type of

basic commodity and service: education, health, employment, specialized services, water,

humanitarian assistance, markets, electricity and reliable shelter. Security concerns, including physical

threats and the targeting of infrastructure, affect communities’ access to basic goods and services

such as education, health, and water. Additionally, physical risks and threats result in the restriction

of civilians’ freedom of movement, affecting their access to employment, school, food, and other basic

items. Despite the challenges, and due to increased reliance on humanitarian assistance, it is crucial

to include a growing number of persons of concern into humanitarian programming, which requires

the sustained funding of humanitarian actors. It is critical to ensure that protection services are

integrated, durable, sustainable, long-term, and community-based.

931 KIs responded to questions about the targeting of infrastructure. 53% (490) reported damage to

education infrastructure, 25% (386) reported damage to health infrastructure, and 26% (237)

reported damage to WASH infrastructure. This information is not representative of all

targeted/damaged infrastructure in Syria and does not imply any specific geographical location within

the governorates. Except for WASH infrastructure in Al-Hasakeh, all three types of infrastructures

were reported to be targeted in all seven governorates covered in this report.

0%

50%

100%

% o

f K

Is

Governorate-District

Locations and Percentage of KIs Reporting Infrastructure Damaged by Clashes/ShellingEducation: 490 / Health: 386 / WASH: 237

Education Health WASH

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20

Access to Education

931 KIs responded to the question about school attendance. 64% (599) of responding KIs stated that

boys and girls are attending school while 22% (201) stated that only some boys and girls are attending

school, and 14% (131) stated that boys and girls are not attending school at all.

131 KIs responded to the question about why boys and girls are not attending school in the area. The

top reason cited by KIs for boys’ and girls’ lack of school attendance was security concerns, mentioned

by 47% (62) KIs. 22% (29) key informants gave the reason “other.” 11% (14) stated that the boys and

girls have to work to support their families. 8% (11) KIs stated that girls are not allowed to go to school.

5% (6) stated that they cannot afford the cost of school materials. 3% (4) stated that schools are

overcrowded. 3% (4) stated that there is mistreatment at schools. 1% (1) stated that they cannot

afford the cost of school transportation.

Both boys and girls experience challenges in accessing school. The primary barriers identified for both

boys and girls are the lack of school infrastructure and the poor security situation (ongoing clashes

and shelling). Communities are also found to use negative or harmful coping mechanisms in order to

reduce protection risks for boys and girls. Some of these harmful coping mechanisms, such as asking

boys to work to financially support their families, or having girls marry early, result in boys and girls

Yes 64%

Some …

No 14%

Are Boys and girls Attending School in the Area?

8

47

4

808 5

1

72 30 41 151130

223

4

5

34

10

041

1

5 3 1 20

4

20

13

15

126

11

13

3

13 8 11 5312

11

0%

50%

100%

% o

f K

Is

Governorate-District

Are Boys and girls Attending School in the Area?

Yes No Some

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21

not attending school, among other harmful consequences (Humanitarian Needs Overview (HNO),

2018). In a few instances, the local faction has pressured families to remove their girls from school.

This was reported, for example, in a few districts of Idleb. Overall, as with many of the other protection

risks identified in this report, challenges to accessing education is another risk that is complex and

influenced by many inter-related factors caused by conflict. This is best demonstrated by a participant

of an FGD who listed some of the factors affecting boys’ and girls’ access to education as: “Boys are

being recruited, they are brainwashed, they are denied education. There is forced marriage, child

labor, and sexual exploitation” (FGDs, Adult Female, Idleb Governorate).

While security also emerged as a major factor impeding boys’ and girls’ access to school according to

the FGDs, an additional factor that FGD participants identified as an impediment was the lack of

official civil status documentation: “Boys and girls aren’t accepted in schools because they don’t have

any official documents” (FGDs, Adult Female, Dara’a Governorate).

53% of key informants who responded to the question stated that education infrastructure has been

impacted by clashes/shelling in their area. When considered in relation to the number of KIs from

each governorate, 91% of KIs from Rural Damascus, 86% of KIs from Ar-Raqqa, 70% of KIs from Homs,

31% of KIs from Al-Hasakeh, 27% of KIs from Idleb, 24% of KIs from Aleppo and 17% of KIs from Hama

reported that education infrastructure has been targeted.

42% stated that education infrastructure in their area has not been targeted. Many KIs reported that

most of the schools in their community were partially or entirely damaged during clashes, and these

schools have been subsequently shut down. 6 KIs stated that families cannot afford the cost of school

materials. 4 KIs stated that the schools are overcrowded, and another 4 stated that boys and girls are

mistreated at schools. 1 KI stated that they cannot afford transportation.

An additional reason for boys’ and girls’ lack of school attendance may be their psychological state.

Of 210 observations reporting that boys and girls in the community display behavioral changes as a

2

3

12

1

34

1

5

3

1

7

4

5

1

1

5

2

2

2

1

1

9

1

1

2

1

1

2

1

3

4

1

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Aleppo - Al Bab

Aleppo - A'zaz

Aleppo - Jarablus

Aleppo - Jebel Saman

Aleppo - Menbij

Al Hasakeh

Ar Raqqa - Tell Abiad

Hama - As Suqaylabiyah

Homs - Ar Rastan

Idleb - Al Ma'ra

Idleb - Ariha

Idleb - Harim

Idleb - Idleb

R. Damascus

% of KIs

Go

vern

ora

te-D

istr

ict

Why Are Boys and girls Not Attending School in the Area?

Security Other Work Girls Not Permitted Cost Overcrowding Mistreatment Transportation

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22

result of exposure to conflict, 12 of them stated that these boys and girls stop attending school as a

result of these behavioral changes. In turn, 7 observers also noted that the inability of boys and girls

to attend school due to insufficient infrastructure or support for education in the community

contribute to these behavioral changes. Yet another factor identified in 3 observation interviews is

that many boys and girls have witnessed schools being targeted and other students injured or killed

in airstrikes, which makes them unwilling to attend school. Therefore, it is not possible to link rates of

school attendance to a single factor, it is more likely due to a combination of many factors.

Access to Health

931 KIs responded to the question about access to health services. 57% (529) KIs stated that it is not

a challenge for community members to access health services. 40% (375) KIs stated that it is a

challenge. 3% (27) were unable to answer.

375 KIs responded to the question about the challenges to accessing health services. 44% (164) of

these KIs stated that there are no health services in the area. 18% (66) stated that they cannot afford

transportation to access health services. 13% (48) stated that health services are too expensive. 9%

No 57%Yes 40%

Unable to Answer 3%

Is It a Challenge for Members of the Community to Access Health Services?

11 16 4113 10

553

34 15

42

8935 11

2046

2478

11 6 1

46 26

9

132111 19

2 7 10 2 3 3

0%

50%

100%

% o

f K

Is

Governorate-District

Is It a Challenge for Members of the Community to Access Health Services?

Yes No Unable to Answer

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23

(35) stated that health services in the area are of poor quality. 4% (16) stated that they are unaware

of the services in the area. 2% (6) stated that there is no privacy for women in the health centers. 1%

(5) KI stated that there is discrimination and <1% (1) KI stated that there is no female staff, which

limits the ability of women to access health services. 9% (34) did not specify a particular reason.

25% of KIs stated that health infrastructure has been targeted by shelling and clashes. Health

infrastructure—various hospitals and clinics—has been noted to be targeted by shelling and clashes,

and/or has stopped functioning in many of the governorates covered in this report. Health

infrastructure is noted to be damaged in locations such as Atareb, Sheikh Ali and Jebel Saman of

Aleppo, Tell Abiad of Ar-Raqqa, and Jawadiyah of Al-Hasakeh.

931 KIs responded to the question about where community members go if they need health services.

29% (271) stated that they go to NGO clinics. 28% (261) said that they go to hospitals. 16% (146) either

said that they do not go anywhere because there are no services in the area or other. 14% (134) said

that they go to a private clinic. 11% (99) said that they go to pharmacies and 2% (20) said that they go

to medical mobile teams.

It is noted that use of NGO clinics was reported highest in Idleb governorate where 138 out of a total

of 842 (16%) key informants in Idleb stated that the community uses NGO clinics when they need

health services. Use of NGO clinics is lowest in Hama governorate where only 1 KI out of a total of 24

KIs (4%) in Hama stated that the community uses NGO clinics. A possible cause is the restricted access

that NGOs have to Hama, a governorate controlled both by the Syrian government and opposition

forces, and which continues to be a location of armed conflict. It should also be noted that 52 of a

3

25

3

49

1

14

10

7

44

8

2

6

5

0

8

2

9

22

8

4

0

2

1

5

0

1

21

3

15

5

3

3

4

5

2

2

1

8

1

2

1

2

9

2

2

10

3

2

5

5

2

2

3

1

2

1

1

1

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Aleppo - Al Bab

Aleppo - A'zaz

Aleppo - Jarablus

Aleppo - Jebel Saman

Aleppo - Menbij

Al Hasakeh

Ar Raqqa - Tell Abiad

Hama - As Suqaylabiyah

Homs - Ar Rastan

Idleb - Al Ma'ra

Idleb - Ariha

Idleb - Harim

Idleb - Idleb

R. Damascus

% of KIs

Go

vern

ora

te-D

istr

ict

Why Is It a Challenge to Access Health Services?

No Services Transportation Cost Poor Quality Other

Unaware Privacy Discrimination No Female Staff

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24

total of 55 KIs (95%) from Ar Raqqa stated that they do not attend anywhere when they need health

services because there are no services in the area.

“In cases of minor illnesses, parents go to NGO

clinics, but for more serious cases, they go to

private clinics.”

NGO Clinic 29%

Hospital 28%

Nothing/Other …

Private Clinic 14%

Pharmacy 11%

Mobile Team 2%

Where Do You Go If You Need Health Services?

4

21

0

27

2

1

48

19

4

90

25

30

5

31

13

26

2

6

21

6

8

54

89

7

28

1

5

52

14

4

28

7

18

3

7

29

9

5

2

11

5

23

20

2

0

4

12

8

3

5

4

32

28

3

0

4

2

4

2

3

1

1

2

1

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Aleppo - Al Bab

Aleppo - A'zaz

Aleppo - Jarablus

Aleppo - Jebel Saman

Aleppo - Menbij

Al Hasakeh

Ar Raqqa - Tell Abiad

Hama - As Suqaylabiyah

Homs - Ar Rastan

Idleb - Al Ma'ra

Idleb - Ariha

Idleb - Harim

Idleb - Idleb

R. Damascus

% of KIs

Go

vern

ora

te-D

istr

ict

Where Do You Go If You Need Health Services?

NGO Clinic Hospital Nothing/Other Private Clinic Pharmacy Mobile Team

(KII, Female, Idleb

Governorate)

81

42

30

37

49

7

190

219

114

97

50

13

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30%

NGO Clinic

Hospital

Nothing/Other

Private Clinic

Pharmacy

Mobile Team

Where Do You Go If You Need Health Services?

Female Respondents Male Respondents

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25

Access to Employment

According to 216 of 328 observations (66%), households are unable to access employment. Identified

causes were the restriction of men’s freedom of movement due to security concerns regarding

checkpoints, fear of arrest or kidnapping, and in some cases, regulations enforced by the local

authority.

Specialized Services

91% (847) of responding KIs stated that there are no

specialized services available for persons with

disabilities in their area. Only 7% (64) stated that there

are specialized services. The remaining 2% (20) were

unable to answer. The findings regarding specialized

services are extremely alarming in that as of 2016,

there were at least 2,000 identified men, women and

boys and girls who have suffered serious injuries

resulting in impairment and disability because of

conflict. The number is certainly higher now and

continues to increase. These victims do not have

access to health and specialized services, and nearly a

quarter of them are boys and girls under the age of 18 (AAR Japan, 2017). The impact of this significant

gap in services not only means higher mortality rates due to untreated medical conditions, and

significant reduction in the quality of their life, but it also means lack of access to basic needs and

services needed to survive. Disabilities that result in lack of or reduction in mobility naturally means

that these vulnerable individuals will face additional challenges in accessing food, water, non-food

items, and other vital humanitarian assistance. Therefore, it is of extreme importance that

humanitarian actors responsible for providing basic humanitarian assistance specifically plan logistics,

246 2

2

31 2 25

168

6

8

23

59 7

2

9 1711 15 9

6916

12

4

6 3 1 1 3 1 2

0%

50%

100%

% o

f K

Is

Governorate-District

Are Households Able to Access Employment?

Yes No Unable to Answer

No 91%

Yes 7%

Unable to Answer 2%

Are There Specialized Services Available for Persons with Disabilities?

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26

transportation, and access to ensure that persons with specialized needs—the sick and disabled, as

well as the elderly—have equal and sufficient access to these resources.

“There is a 17-year-old girl with special needs,

and no one with whom she is close. The camp

administration supports her.”

Access to Water

68% of responding KIs (637) stated that there have been

challenges to accessing water in their area, while 30% (277)

said that there haven’t been challenges, and 2% (17) were

unable to answer.

931 KIs responded to the question regarding how people

access water in the area. 44% (410) stated that they

purchase water. 23% (218) uses the

public network and 19% (173) uses

wells. 7% stated “other” and 7% stated

natural sources. Other sources of water

are NGO and INGO water tankers, a

combination of sources such as using

the public network when it runs and

25

27

30

36

24 114 22

1055 4 90

3752 206 141

26

4

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

100%

% o

f K

Is

Governorate-District

Are There Specialized Services Available for Persons with Disabilities?

Yes No Unable to Answer

(KII, Male, Aleppo

Governorate)

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27

purchasing water at other times. One KI mentioned using rain water.

637 KIs responded to the question regarding the challenges to accessing water in the area. 68% stated

that there have been challenges to accessing water in the area. The biggest challenge identified in

accessing water is that it is too expensive (63%). Additionally, water is unavailable (22%), water is

polluted (14%), and security concerns (1%). While 2 KIs identified this to be general security concerns,

4 KIs identified security concerns specifically for women located in on-camp and off-camp locations in

Idleb and Menbij.

13

25

83

10

1

3

21

35

41

92

69

17

6

15

30

4

5

6

37

2

10

48

55

18

30

9

5

9

5

1

23

3

2

36

17

15

2

7

1

4

48

5

1

5

49

5

1

1

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Aleppo - Al Bab

Aleppo - A'zaz

Aleppo - Jarablus

Aleppo - Jebel Saman

Aleppo - Menbij

Al Hasakeh

Ar Raqqa - Tell Abiad

Hama - As Suqaylabiyah

Homs - Ar Rastan

Idleb - Al Ma'ra

Idleb - Ariha

Idleb - Harim

Idleb - Idleb

R. Damascus

% of KIs

Go

vern

ora

te-D

istr

ict

How Do People Access Water in the Area?

Purchase Water Public Network Wells Other Natural Sources

9 161

73

72

3232

33

79

92 2414 16 10

7

8

7

5

1

174

48

116 13

51

5

50

1 1 3 4 321

1 1 1

0%

50%

100%

% o

f K

Is

Governorate-District

What Are the Challenges to Accessing Water in the Area?

Cost Availability Pollution Security

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28

WASH

931 KIs responded to the question regarding

whether WASH infrastructure has been targeted by

clashes or shelling. 26% (237) stated that WASH

infrastructure has been targeted while 67% (621)

stated that WASH infrastructure has not been

targeted and 7% (73) were unable to answer.

KIs reported the damage of the following water

infrastructures: the public network (67 KIs), water

pump/pumping station, water tanks and water

facilities (36), reservoirs (21), dams (17) and

electricity converters which supply water to wells. More than one type of infrastructure was hit in Ar-

Raqqa—dams, pumping stations, as well as the public network. Some KIs mentioned that these were

not a result of targeting, but rather indiscriminate bombing which caused damage to WASH

infrastructure and which were never repaired later. Water facilities were also hit in other

governorates, most notably in Aleppo, Idleb, and Rural Damascus.

No 67%

Yes 26%

Unable to Answer 7%

Has WASH Infrastructure Been Targeted by Clashes/Shelling?

29

118

31

54 4

21

20

53

25

26

5216

69

19

1661

20

40 213113

2

2 126 5

1 8 18

8 85

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

100%

% o

f K

Is

Governorate-District

Has WASH Infrastructure Been Targeted by Clashes/Shelling?

Yes No Unable to Answer

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29

Humanitarian Assistance

931 KIs responded to the question regarding

recent provision of humanitarian assistance in

their location. 46% (431) key informants stated

that humanitarian assistance has been

provided in their location recently. 50% (461)

stated that humanitarian assistance has not

been provided recently. 4% (39) were unable to

answer.

KIs who received humanitarian assistance were

asked to identify the challenges they faced in

access. An unclear process (75%) emerged as

the number one challenge faced by recipients of humanitarian assistance. Lack of documentation

(8%), discrimination (7%), inability to access the distribution (7%), particularly in Idleb and Aleppo,

and corruption (3%) were additional challenges faced by recipients.

No 50%Yes 46%

Unable to Answer 4%

Has Any Humanitarian Assistance Been Provided in this Location Recently?

1952

1038

116

1

51 24 28 105 7511

1211

1274

1310

51 4

38 17

17118 63

21

1 2 14 3 18

1 8 1

0%

50%

100%

% o

f K

Is

Governorate-District

Has Any Humanitarian Assistance Been Recently Provided in This Location?

Yes No Unable to Answer

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30

Access to Markets

932 KIs responded to the question on whether people have safe access to markets. The majority, 74%

(691) stated that people have safe access to markets. 25% (230) stated that people do not have safe

access. 1% (10) were unable to answer. Respondents who reported that they were unable to safely

access marketplaces identified the reasons to be the poor security situation and frequent bombing

and shelling of marketplaces.

“Communities fear bombardment, especially to

the markets. There is only one market and people

do not have means of transportation.”

Yes 74%

No 25%

Unable to Answer 1%

Do People Have Safe Access to Markets?

12

63

13

109 19

6

6220

41204 135

7

19

1

11

16 5

10

55 4

2621

1118 11

22

4

0%

50%

100%

% o

f K

Is

Governorate-District

Do People Have Safe Access to Markets?

Yes No Unable to Answer

(KII, Female, Idleb

Governorate)

193

66

7

498

166

30%

50%

100%

Yes No Unable toAnswer

% o

f To

tal M

en /

Wo

men

KIs

Do People Have Safe Access to Markets?

Female Respondents

Male Respondents

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31

Access to Electricity

931 KIs responded to the question of whether

people have access to electricity in the area. 33%

(309) stated that people have access to electricity.

66% (617) stated that people do not have access

to electricity. 1% (5) were unable to answer.

Access to Shelter

931 KIs responded to the question

regarding to the types of shelters that

families in the community live in. 43%

(399) stated that families live on privately

owned land. 26% (238) said that they live

in a rented home (individual dwelling off-

camp). 17% (156) said they live in an

ownership-verified camp. 4% (41) said

that community members live in an off-

camp public building, 4% (41) in an

informal camp on public land without permission, 4% (39) in a government-owned house or land, and

2% (17) in an ownership unverified privately owned land or camp.

No 66%

Yes 33%

Unable to Answer 1%

Do People Have Electricity in the Area?

6

42

9 3412

303 1

128

422

25

21

15 9211

16 55 4

6038 52

95

104

29

1 1 1 2

0%

50%

100%

% o

f K

Is

Governorate-District

Do People Have Access to Electricity in the Area?

Yes No Unable to Answer

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32

While many KIs residing in houses and apartments described the housing as being in good condition

with basic amenities, safe, and habitable; some were noted to be partially damaged by shelling and

in poor conditions. Some IDPs in Ar-Rastan of Homs, Arbin of Rural-Damascus, Ma’arrat Tamasrin of

Idleb, and Tell Abiad of Ar-Raqqa reside in homes that are partially damaged due to shelling.

IDPs residing in camps, especially in Atma of Idleb and Aza’z of Aleppo, are mostly unhappy with the

conditions of the camps and describe tents as being over-crowded, old and in need of replacement.

Due to the extended duration of conflict and large number of displacements taking place within Syria,

disputes over housing, land and property (HLP) are a growing challenge. Displaced populations are

entitled to safe, reliable housing and protection from eviction (NRC and IFRC HLP Joint Report, 2013).

The displaced are not only in need of housing that meets their needs, but also are in need of legal

counseling and support in the resolution of property disputes.

The following description by an FGD participant effectively summarizes the interlinked protection

risks that emerge from conflict-related factors such as housing, land and property issues;

displacement; vulnerable groups; and dispute resolution: “The prices are insanely high and ordinary

people cannot have houses or real estate. Women, widows, and orphans are the groups who are most

exposed to these things. There is no authority that can solve these problems. Rather, the whole thing

5

3

1

22

3

10

3

68

29

43

122

72

18

22

12

10

75

12

6

2

2

9

9

32

46

1

2

34

11

2

53

19

3

0

1

4

1

1

1

2

20

11

1

6

1

10

3

19

1

6

10

2

3

14

4

1

3

5

2

3

3

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Aleppo - Al Bab

Aleppo - A'zaz

Aleppo - Jarablus

Aleppo - Jebel Saman

Aleppo - Menbij

Al Hasakeh

Ar Raqqa - Tell Abiad

Hama - As Suqaylabiyah

Homs - Ar Rastan

Idleb - Al Ma'ra

Idleb - Ariha

Idleb - Harim

Idleb - Idleb

R. Damascus

% of KIs

Go

vern

ora

te-D

istr

ict

What Types of Shelters Do Families in the Community Live in?

Privately Owned Land Rented Home Ownership Verified Camp

Public Building Informal Camp on Public Land Government House/Land

Ownership Unverified Land/Camp

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33

is related to domination and control of displaced people by real estate and homeowners. We cannot

document anything in the agencies or courts of law because they are exposed to bombardment at

any time, and the loss of everything” (FGDs, Adult Female, Idleb Governorate).

“The displaced live in old, worn-out tents that

have not been replaced for 2 years. The mass

shelters each shelter 9 families.”

“There are no doors, windows, walls, plumbing

or electricity.”

“The houses are old, many of which were

damaged by shelling.”

(KII, Female, Idleb

Governorate)

(KII, Male, Aleppo

Governorate)

(KII, Male, Homs

Governorate)

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34

3.3 Vulnerability

Amidst generalized violence and barriers to accessing basic items and services, conflict has placed

persons with specific needs at risk of additional harm. Monitoring results indicate that communities

fear greater risk of harm for not only women, girls, boys and girls, disabled, and elderly, but also for

men. While conflict impacts all demographics of the community, its impact does show variation

depending on gender. Women and girls are found to be at greater risk of harassment than men and

boys. Communities take certain self-precautions and resort to certain negative coping mechanisms in

order to reduce these risks for girls, such as removing girls from school, and conducting early marriage.

Boys and girls

931 KIs responded to the question of

whether boys and girls in the community

are at risk of violence or exploitation. 52%

(484) stated that boys and girls are at risk.

42% (392) stated that boys and girls are not

at risk. 6% (55) were unable to answer.

484 KIs responded to the question regarding the types of risk and violence that boys and girls in the

community are affected by or at risk of. 65% (315) stated that boys and girls are at risk of child labor.

22% (107) stated that boys and girls are at risk of exploitation. 6% (31) stated that boys and girls are

at risk of physical neglect. 2% (11) stated that boys and girls are at risk of being unaccompanied or

separated. Another 2% (11) stated that boys and girls are at risk of kidnapping. And 2% (8) stated that

boys and girls are at risk of human trafficking. <1% (1) KI stated that boys and girls are at risk of

substance abuse. This KI is located in Al Bab, Aleppo.

21

25

9

44

4

11

13

1

20

21

23

65

41

17

8

5

9

9

5

39

8

3

1

8

5

7

1

5

1

2

1

2

6

3

6

4

1

1

2

1

2

1

3

4

1

3

1

2

1

4

2

1

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Aleppo - Al Bab

Aleppo - A'zaz

Aleppo - Jarablus

Aleppo - Jebel Saman

Aleppo - Menbij

Al Hasakeh

Ar Raqqa - Tell Abiad

Hama - As Suqaylabiyah

Homs - Ar Rastan

Idleb - Al Ma'ra

Idleb - Ariha

Idleb - Harim

Idleb - Idleb

R. Damascus

% of KIs

Go

vern

ora

te-D

istr

ict

What Types of Risk/Violence Are Boys and girls in the Community Affected by or at Risk of?

Child Labor Exploitation Physical Neglect UASC Kidnapping Human Trafficking

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35

Child Separation

The majority (78%) of responding KIs stated that they are not aware of separated boys and girls, while

14% stated that they are aware of boys and girls separated from their parents or usual caregivers as

result of the current situation in the last two months. The remaining KIs were unable to answer.

There are a variety of causes for separation of boys and girls, including death or detention of parents

or caregivers during the conflict, separation during displacement, or movement restrictions. For

example, it was reported in Omriyeh community of Menbij sub-district of Aleppo that while some

separated boys and girls live in the city, their families are not allowed to enter because they are not

original residents of the city. 1 KI mentioned poverty as a reason for child separation, the parents

were unable to support the child.

It was noted that the boys and girls of many divorced or widowed women who have re-married were

being cared for by relatives. There was only one report of a child being placed in an orphanage; KIs

more commonly note that extended family and relatives tend to take care of boys and girls.

Child Labor

Nearly all (90%) of KIs who responded to the question stated that there are boys and girls under the

age of 18 working in their community. Only 8% said that there is no child labor in their community,

and the remaining were unable to answer.

Key informants were asked to describe the types of work in which boys and girls are engaged. These

include a wide variety of jobs ranging from agricultural labor, carpentry and blacksmithing,

stonemasonry, handicrafts, car mechanics, electronic repair and maintenance, construction labor,

factory work, and serving at restaurants. They also work as porters, mobile vendors and salespersons,

scrap collectors, and beggars. Boys and girls are victims of worst forms of child labor—carrying out

some of the most difficult and physically demanding jobs, which jeopardizes their physical and mental

well-being. Many boys and girls are obliged to work due to poor financial situation. In some cases,

boys and girls are the sole breadwinners of the family.

104 (8% of responding KIs) mentioned that boys and girls are associated with armed forces or armed

groups (CAAFAG). These boys and girls are working to recruit for armed groups and are referred to as

recruitment representatives or volunteers. Sometimes, they do more than recruitment, such as

engaging in armed combat, or completing other errands/tasks for armed groups. Some KIs mentioned

that these boys and girls carry weapons.

“Boys and girls are under pressure from their parents to learn a

profession because of the difficult living conditions.”

“They work for survival under difficult working conditions and

are unable to go to school.”

(KII, Male,

Idleb

Governorate)

(KII, Male,

Aleppo

Governorate)

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36

Violence/Exploitation

45% of responding KIs reported that boys and girls are being mistreated at work. 17% said that they

are not mistreated and the remaining 38% were unable to answer the question. The mistreatment

described by KIs includes: verbal abuse, physical violence, underpayment, and being required to work

long hours under difficult working conditions.

Responses indicate that working boys and girls are routinely exposed to verbal abuse such as insults

and humiliating remarks. They are exposed to physical violence and are reprimanded with violence if

they make errors in their work. KIs reported that these conditions contribute to declining health of

working boys and girls. Two KIs stated that the boys and girls are practically being worked to death.

Underpayment of salaries is a very common issue, with many child laborers receiving only half the

wages for the same work. 6 KIs stated that boys and girls were being exploited, and one KI stated that

boys and girls were being sexually exploited.

Child Marriage

Although information on the rates of child marriage is not available, certain factors have been

indicated to affect and contribute to early marriage and child marriage. One of the main factors that

emerge is the perceived risk of harm and harassment for girls. Key informants and observers note that

the conflict environment, high rate of crime and security incidents, and living conditions of IDPs are

perceived to create greater risks towards girls and women. The community undertakes various steps

in order to prevent harm and harassment, such as limiting freedom of movement and requiring

women and girls to be accompanied by a male relative during movement. They perceive that free

movement of women puts them at greater risk and IDPs would prefer to have their girls married and

at home, rather than attending school or work. Marriage and home are perceived to be safer for girls,

and prevent harm such as kidnapping, rape and harassment. However, as demonstrated by FGD

findings, these harmful coping mechanisms result in further vulnerability and risk to women and girls:

“I know one of the girls whose father denied her education and

got her married at an early age. When her husband died in

battle, her father got her married to another man. Shortly after

her second marriage, her husband divorced her. Her father got

her married for the third time. When I see her, I feel that she is

mentally ill, and very depressed”

Impact of Conflict on Child Behavior

210 of 328 community-level observations indicate that boys and girls in the community display

behavioral changes, such as aggression and self-isolation, as a result of exposure to conflict.

Responses indicate that boys and girls who are exposed to conflict exhibit marked change in their

(FGD, Female

Adolescent,

Idleb

Governorate)

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37

behavior such as aggression or self-isolation. Persistent fear resulting from extended exposure to

violence, particularly shelling and bombardments, as well as displacement, is believed to contribute

to these behavioral changes. Boys and girls react differently to family and friends. Some boys and girls

display introversion and disinterest in general activities while others display hyperactivity. Boys and

girls experience extreme sensitivity to loud voices and noises. They experience nightmares, and

enuresis (bedwetting). It is noted that many boys and girls are unwilling to attend school for fear of

shelling. They associate many things with war, including their play-time activities and games. A toy

plane, for example, reminds boys and girls of shelling and death. Observers note that boys and girls

play games that simulate war. They often pretend to be in combat, using weapons, or carrying bodies

of martyrs. They demonstrate aggressive behavior and foul language towards playmates. The trauma

these boys and girls have experienced and their mental health are also perceived to manifest itself in

other physical health concerns.

Special Needs and Elderly

Nearly all (91%) of responding KIs stated that there are no dedicated services for persons with special

needs in their community. Similarly, nearly all (96%) of responding KIs stated that there are no

dedicated services for elderly people.

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38

3.4 Demographic Groups

Security is the major factor shaping protection risks regarding movement and displacement. All

demographic groups experience restrictions in freedom of movement in the community, most

primarily due to security concerns. Frequent and vast movements and displacements continue to

impact these communities. While reasons of movement can vary considerably, the security situation

remains as the number one factor. It should be noted that all demographic groups are perceived to

be at greater risk of harm from criminal activities such as kidnapping or abduction, and harassment.

Data indicates that increased protection risks due to insecurity are not limited to generalized violence

from armed combat, but also includes smaller and specific criminalized activity in these communities.

Increased rates of crime and violence are caused by a combination of factors related to conflict,

including insufficient or non-existing rule of law, disintegration of community structures, high strain

on limited resources, proliferation of weapons, and the negative psychological consequences

experienced by members of society because of high-intensity, long-duration conflict (Protection

Cluster HNO, 2018).

Freedom of Movement / Movement Restrictions

Restrictions and impact for men and boys:

933 KIs responded to the question about men’s ability to move freely in the community. 75% (698)

KIs stated that men are able to move freely in their community. 24% (223) said that men are not able

to move freely. Remaining 1% (12) were unable to answer.

221 KIs responded to the question about why men are not able to move freely in the community. 78%

(172) stated security concerns, 10% (23) stated fear of crime, 6% (13) stated lack of identity document,

4% (8) stated local regulations, 1% (2) stated tension with the host community, <1% (1) stated

tradition, <1% (1) stated other, and <1% (1) stated fear of harassment or abuse.

15 KIs explained that the rate of abduction or kidnapping cases of men and boys have risen in their

area. 12 of these KIs are located in communities of Idleb governorate. One KI stated that boys are at

greater risk than men, as they are more vulnerable. Families often hear of these incidents in the area

and take preventative measures by limiting their movement outside of the home, neighborhood, or

camp. Additionally, men reported they were at risk of detention at security checkpoints. In some

communities, freedom of movement of men is sometimes restricted by the regulations of the local

authority. The restrictions to men’s freedom of movement impact families’ earning power and access

to services.

Restrictions and impact for women and girls:

933 KIs responded to the question about women’s ability to move freely in the community. 67% (628)

of KIs stated that women are able to move freely in their community and 30% (284) stated that they

cannot. The remaining 2% (21) KIs were unable to answer.

283 KIs responded to the question about why women are not able to move freely in the community.

55% (155) stated security concerns, 22% (61) stated tradition, 11% (30) stated fear of harassment or

abuse, 9% (25) stated fear of crime, 2% (6) stated lack of identity document, 1% (4) stated local

regulations, <1% (1) stated other, and <1% stated tension with the host community.

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39

It is noted that men were more likely to report security concerns and tradition as causes of restriction

of movement of women. While 12% of all male KIs reported security concerns as a cause, only 5% of

all female KIs reported it. Similarly, while 5% of all male KIs reported tradition as a cause, only 2% of

all female KIs reported this as a cause.

According to the perception of KIs, women’s restricted freedom of movement has various

consequences, such as difficulty or inability to access medical services. Women are unable to lead

normal lives and face restricted access to education and work, which may contribute to isolation and

depression.

25 7 20 10 9 10 5521

16 1012

4

24

25 6 23 13 10 10 5548

22 1326

16

17

0%

50%

100%

% o

f K

Is

Governorate-District

KIs Stating That Men and Women Are Not Able to Move Freely in the Community

Men are not able to move freely Women are not able to move freely

172

23

1 1

155

25

61

30

0%

20%

40%

Security Concerns Fear of Crime Tradition Fear of SexualHarassment

% o

f K

Is

Reasons for Restrictions on freedom of movement

Perceived Reasons for Restrictions on freedom of movement

Men/Boys Women/Girls

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40

IDP Movement

933 KIs responded to the question on whether there have been any recent arrivals to their location in

the past month. 61% (567) said that there have been recent arrivals in the past month. 34% (313) said

that there have not been recent arrivals in the past month and 5% (53) were unable to answer.

567 KIs responded to the question on reasons why people left their previous location 49% (278) stated

insecurity, 25% (141) stated violence, 8% (46) stated recruitment, 6% (35) stated other, 6% (33) stated

property loss or damage, 3% (16) stated economic hardship, 2% (11) stated lack of services, 1% (6)

stated lack of humanitarian relief and <1% (1) stated lack of infrastructure.

3 1 1

13

2 3

1

7

2

1

2

1

5 11

19

4

188

1

5

53 21

3

10

7

4 19

21

0%

50%

100%

% o

f K

Is

Governorate-District

Why Are Men Not Able to Move Freely in the Community?

Fear Crime Fear Harassment Local Reg Lack ID Other Security Host Community Tradition

1 3

15

2 33

3

4

4

2

10

1

3

3

1

15

19

1

188

15

54

21

3

9

5

2

9

13 2 1

26

23

9

13

2

0%

50%

100%

% o

f K

Is

Governorate-District

Why Are Women Not Able to Move Freely in the Community?

Fear Crime Fear Harassment Local Reg Lack ID Other Security Host Community Tradition

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41

933 KIs responded to the question on whether there have been any departures from their location in

the past month. 33% (312) stated that there have been departures in the past month. 58% (541)

stated that there have not been departures in the past month and 9% (80) were unable to answer.

Lack of access to employment (34%) and poor living conditions (26%) were stated to be the main

reasons for IDPs’ departure from the location. Next were safety reasons (9%), cannot afford rent (9%),

security (3%) and evicted by the host community (2%). 17% responded “other.”

48% of responding KIs stated that IDPs would like to live in the current locations, while 41% of KIs

stated that IDPs would not.

Safety was the number one factor reported by KIs as influencing their decision to remain in or leave

their current location. Safety is referred to the absence of bombardments or clashes, and a stable

security environment. After safety, the availability of work opportunities in the area was mentioned

as the second most important factor. Some KIs also mentioned that IDPs stay because of the

hospitality, compassion, and good treatment from the host community and the bond formed with

them.

3069

24

53

2311 44

37

37

22 88105 24

11

665 10

49

4

20111

28 91 6 6 4

1112 12

0%

50%

100%

% o

f K

Is

Governorate-District

Have there been any recent arrivals to the location in the past month?

Yes No Unable to Answer

2248 14

54 11

10 39 8

848

3812

6 35 1061 8

21

9

15

30

3

3 3 10 4 19

15 303

0%

50%

100%

% o

f K

Is

Governorate-District

Have There Been Any Departures From This Location in the Past Month?

Yes No Unable to Answer

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42

3.5 Explosive Hazards and Security Incidents

Explosive hazards and security incidents continue to pose protection risks to communities. While

these risks do not impact every community monitored in this report, they presented a high occurrence

in certain areas, such as the presence of explosive hazards in Ar-Raqqa and Al-Hasakeh, and the

presence of security incidents in Rural Damascus. This is undoubtedly shaped by ongoing conflict in

these areas. Ar-Raqqa and al-Hasakeh governorates have been a location for Coalition-led operations

against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), while Rural Damascus remains a location of continued

armed conflict between opposition groups and the Syrian Arab Armed Forces.

An alleviating factor is that most of the communities covered in this report have a structure to which

they can apply to address community issues and needs. While community structures receive some

support, data indicates the entities perceived as legitimate would benefit to receive greater financial

and capacity-building support.

Explosive Hazards

895 KIs responded to the question of whether their

community is contaminated with explosive

hazards. 36% (318) stated that the community is

contaminated with explosive hazards. 61% (550)

stated that the community is not contaminated and

3% (27) were unable to answer. When considered

in relation to the number of KIs from each

governorate, all KIs from Ar-Raqqa (55) and Al-

Hasakeh (16) stated that their community is

contaminated with explosive hazards. 70% of KIs

from Rural Damascus, 28% of KIs from Homs, 23%

of KIs from Aleppo, and 11% of KIs from Idleb also

stated that their community is contaminated with

explosive hazards. It should be noted that this data

does not identify or confirm exact locations contaminated with explosive hazards. It reflects the

perceptions of community members, and cannot be generalized for the entire governorate, or for

governorates not covered by monitoring. (Please refer to UNMAS sources for comprehensive data on

location and risks of explosive hazards.)

No 61%

Yes 36%

Unable to Answer 3%

Is the Community Contaminated with Explosive Hazards?

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43

31

16

24

2710

16 55

25

32

139

37

23

39 8912 64

7

40193

1024

7 1 66

0%

50%

100%

% o

f K

Is

Governorate-District

Is the Community Contaminated with Explosive Hazards?

Yes No Unable to Answer

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44

Security Incidents

895 KIs responded to the question on whether there

have been any security incidents in their

community. 31% (274) stated that there have been

security incidents. 57% (514) stated that there have

not been any security incidents. 12% (107) were

unable to answer.

85% of all KIs from Rural Damascus, 31% of all KIs

from Ar-Raqqa, 23% of all KIs from Aleppo, 13% of

all KIs from Idleb and 11% of all KIs from Homs

stated that there have been security incidents in

their communities.

Clashes between different armed groups in the community, and kidnapping/abductions are the most

mentioned security incidents by KIs. Kidnapping (for extortion) was mentioned by KIs 89 times,

majority of whom are located in Idleb, Aleppo and Ar-Raqqa governorates. Additionally, incidents of

murder, robbery, disappearance and arbitrary arrest or detention were noted.

KIs indicated that there have been frequent cases of kidnapping in their area, most frequently

mentioned for Idleb, in which members of prominent and wealthy households were targeted for

ransom. Cases of missing persons were also noted by some KIs.

Community Structures

895 KIs responded to whether there is a community structure, organization, association or group of

leaders that meets or is organized to discuss and address issues and needs of the community. 77%

No 57%Yes 31%

Unable to Answer 12%

Have There Been Any Security Incidents in this Community?

31

21

24

28 417

10

26

2147

17

28

2987

12

6

77

13

26 155106

35 8

7

10 38

3 6 22

0%

50%

100%

% o

f K

Is

Governorate-District

Have There Been Any Security Incidents in This Community?(Clashes, Kidnapping and Disappearance, Extortion)

Yes No Unable to Answer

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45

(693) stated that there is such a structure. 10% (89) stated that there is no structure and 13% (113)

were unable to answer.

Organizations providing humanitarian

assistance (55%) and supporting for

social interaction (31%) were the most

commonly reported purposes of these

community structures. A smaller

number cited child protection (3%) as

a purpose of this structure, and even

fewer said that advocacy (1%). Most

KIs cited the local council as the

community-based structure which

supports the community and works to secure humanitarian assistance.

IDPs in camps often mentioned this structure to be the camp management. In some cases, the

structure is a group of village elders or tribal elders who help solve problems in the community and

work to strengthen relations within the community. A few KIs mentioned structures such as a “Shura

Council” or a “Sharia committee” who work to resolve differences within the community.

672 KIs responded to questions about whether their communities feel that the structure is legitimate,

representative and useful. 83% (560) stated that the community feels that the structure is legitimate,

10% (69) stated that the structure is not legitimate, and 6% (43) were unable to answer. 73% (488)

KIs stated that the community feels that the structure is representative of the community, 18% (120)

stated that it is not representative and 10% (64) were unable to answer. 87% (584) stated that the

community feels that the work of the structure is useful, 9% (57) stated that it is not, and 5% (31)

were unable to answer.

When considered in relation to the number of KIs from each governorate, 18% of KIs from Rural

Damascus, 13% of KIs from Homs, 6% of KIs from Aleppo and 3% of KIs from Idleb perceive that their

community structure is illegitimate.

19 34 16103

22

4 8

7039

45 179 125 29

213 1

41

20 5 23 16 410

87

16

12 47

3 6 4

0%

50%

100%

% o

f K

Is

Governorate-District

Is There Any Community Structure That Addesses Issues and Needs of the Community?

Yes No Unable to Answer

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46

It is noteworthy that KIs who stated that the structure is not legitimate, not representative and not

useful, are located in opposition-held areas of Syria. Zamalka, Saqba and Ein Terma of Rural Damascus,

Ar-Rastan of Homs, Jebel Saman of Aleppo and Harim of Idleb are all under the control of armed

opposition groups, predominantly, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and Ahrar al-Sham (AAS). HTS is a group

that broke off from Jabhat al-Nusra and re-branded itself as HTS. AAS is a rival organization to HTS in

these areas where active conflict continues not only between these armed groups, but also with the

Syrian Armed Forces (SAF).

It is known that various types of entities, such as local councils, are present in HTS and AAS controlled

areas through which they provide services and make decisions in matters relating to the community.

The fact that some KIs who reside in these areas find these structures to be illegitimate may indicate

that these community members are unable to contribute to the decision-making procedures of these

entities. It underlines the importance of having community members as active participants in the

establishment of local governance structures making decisions that will affect the community.

12

17 16

7315

47 55

38 44152 116

11

1

252 12 19

6

7

5 1 1 3 7 6

12

0%

50%

100%

% o

f K

Is

Governorate-District

Do Communities Feel that the Structure is Legitimate?

Yes No Unable to Answer

128

16

68

6

47

41

34

26146 108

12

26

28

8

27

4

5

27 4

9

5 47

4 1 2 1

14

5 138

0%

50%

100%

% o

f K

Is

Governorate-District

Do Communities Feel that the Structure is Representative?

Yes No Unable to Answer

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47

672 KIs responded to whether the structure receives support. 30% (201) of KIs stated that the

structure receives material support. 17% (117) stated that the structure receives financial support.

14% (93) stated that the structure receives capacity building support. 39% (261) stated that the

structure receives other types of support.

8

22

12

12

34

16

40

54

3

8

1

9

27

5

3

3

4

5

16

25

11

0

3

3

16

1

21

30

12

7

11

6

4

38

1

8

0

55

1

3

92

34

8

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Aleppo - Al Bab

Aleppo - A'zaz

Aleppo - Jarablus

Aleppo - Jebel Saman

Aleppo - Menbij

Al Hasakeh

Ar Raqqa - Tell Abiad

Hama - As Suqaylabiyah

Homs - Ar Rastan

Idleb - Al Ma'ra

Idleb - Ariha

Idleb - Harim

Idleb - Idleb

R. Damascus

% of KIs

Go

vern

ora

te-D

istr

ict

What Type of Support Does the Structure Receive?

Material Financial Capacity Other

1316 16

8418 4 7

0

59 39 44 146 11919

1

1 12 11 28 2

25

1 7 1

0

1 4 48

0%

50%

100%

% o

f K

Is

Governorate-District

Do Communities Feel that the Structure is Useful?

Yes No Unable to Answer

134

31

29

354

89

35

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60%

Yes

No

Unable to Answer

Does the Community Feel that the Structure is Representative?

Female Male

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48

Acronyms

CAAFAG Boys and girls associated with armed forces or armed groups

FGD Focus group discussions

HLP House, land, and property

HNO Humanitarian needs overview

IDP Internally displaced people

INGO International non-governmental organization

KI Key informant

KII Key informant interview

NGO Non-governmental organization

PMTF Protection monitoring task force

PNO Protection needs overview

UASC Unaccompanied and separated boys and girls

UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service

WASH Water, sanitation, and hygiene