Protection of Sources of Safety-Protection of Sources of Safety-Related InformationRelated Information

Doug Churchill

EVP Professional

IFATCA

Protection of Sources of Safety-Protection of Sources of Safety-Related InformationRelated Information

Doug Churchill

EVPP IFATCA

… “ safety must continue to be the highest priority in the planning and implementation of the future ATM

system."

a) the dedication to safety by aviation organizations and their people

b) a continuous learning process, based on safety information; and

c) the ability to turn errors into preventive actions.

To be successful the industry must:To be successful the industry must: - re-think methods of doing businessre-think methods of doing business

- move beyond a blame culture that move beyond a blame culture that singles out individuals and criminalizessingles out individuals and criminalizes error(s)error(s)

… “Just Culture” can be described as an environment that is free from threat of punishment, does not focus blame on system components (operators), and ensures comprehensive and systematic safety occurrence reporting.

”A culture in which front line operators or others are not punished for actions,

omissions or decisions taken by them that are commensurate with their experience and

training, but where gross negligence, wilful violations and destructive acts are not

tolerated.”

1. it less likely that similar errors would be made again (Error Prevention), and

2. understanding the circumstances might make it possible to developstrategies to minimise the negative effect of the error (Error Recovery).

... that voluntary reporting systems are essential however,

… we do not encourage incident reporting systems unless there is “protection” for the individuals who are providing the information.

1. a confidential reporting system

2. a non-punitive environment

… admitted as evidence in judicial proceedings.

… resulted in criminal charges being brought against individuals.

Old view …

Complex systems are OK, humans are erratic, unreliable Human error causes accidents Humans should be held accountable

Blame …

* Focuses on defects of individuals, no * Focuses on defects of individuals, no account for all system account for all system components components

* Leads to defensive attitudes* Leads to defensive attitudes

* Encourages an ineffective reporting * Encourages an ineffective reporting systemsystem

* We learn from accident/incidents* We learn from accident/incidents or punish individualsor punish individuals

criminalization of error

is a key contributor to adversarial relationships

if it plays a role in incidents/accidents the “real” truth may never surface..

PUNISHMENT …

• characterizes characterizes humans as humans as unreliableunreliable

• emphasizes emphasizes failure failure

• concerned concerned with closurewith closure

• about moving about moving away from the away from the eventevent

- The objective of any investigation is the prevention of accidents and/or incidents

- The investigation process must not apportion blame or liability!

1)1) Error is a normal component of humanError is a normal component of human performanceperformance

2)2) Human error cannot be avoided byHuman error cannot be avoided by “ “designing it out of the system”designing it out of the system”

3)3) This fact must be incorporated into This fact must be incorporated into complex systems where safety is the complex systems where safety is the expected outcome.expected outcome.

a) Resolution A33-17 (2001) - Non-disclosure of certain accident and incident records, urges States to review and amend legislation regarding protection of accident/incident records

b) Resolution A33-16 - ICAO Global Aviation Safety Plan asked ICAO to help States improve safety information reporting and exchange, with due consideration toprotection of privileged information,

c) urges States to review and amend relevant Legislation

d) Annex 6 — Operation of Aircraft, paragraph 3.2.4, establishes that flight data analysis programs shall be non-punitive and shall contain safeguards to protect sources of data

e) Annex 13 — Aircraft Accident and Incident Investigation, paragraph 5.12, says: “The State conducting the investigation of an accident or incident shall not make the following records available for purposes other than accident or incident investigation …”

all statements taken from persons by the investigation authorities in the course of their investigation

all communications between persons involved in the operation of the aircraft

medical/ private information regarding persons involved in the accident/incident

cockpit voice recordings and transcripts

opinions expressed in the analysis of information

FROM … TO …

• A “don’t get A “don’t get caught” culturecaught” culture

• Few reports are Few reports are made made

• Little systemic Little systemic improvements improvements occuroccur

• An open culture An open culture

• Errors/incidents Errors/incidents are reported for are reported for analysisanalysis

• SystemicSystemic improvementsimprovements

• threat of disciplinary action/regulatory enforcement is a major obstacle to reporting and investigation

• the role of disciplinary action must be addressed!

• must make better use of human error events

ANC 11: IFATCA –

• invited ICAO to develop guidelines promoting the concept of a “just culture”

• ensure that judicial aspects adequately addressed in ICAO guidance material on SMS.

• to encourage ICAO Member States

a) review existing aviation laws aiming to remove deterrents to the collection/ analysis of safety-related information

b) develop legislation adequately protecting all persons involved in the reporting, collection/analysis of safety-related information in aviation.

People fail to perform – ?

• they work in a flawed system.

• simply blaming an individual(s) removes blame from the organization

• masks latent flaws !

Sole objective of any investigation –

the prevention of accidents/ incidents

investigation process must not apportion blame or liability.

ConclusionConclusion