Pseudo-Macedonianism or FYROM's Expansionist Designs Against Greece After the Interim Accord (1995)

7/13/2019 Pseudo-Macedonianism or FYROM's Expansionist Designs Against Greece After the Interim Accord (1995)

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acedonianismFYROMS Expansionist Designs

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THE TEAM RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS BOOK WAS

Publisher: Nikos Haidemenos

Editor in Chief: Iakovos Michailidis

Translator: Dr Richard Witt

Art Editor: Alexandra Tasoula

Giorgos Alexandrou

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Production: TROIA EKDOTIKI EMPORIKI SA

For the Soc iety for Macedonian Studies

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President: Nikolaos Mertzos

Vice-President: Haralambos Papastathis

Secretary-General: Teresa Pentzopoulou-Valala

Treasurer: Theodoros Dardavesis

Librarian: Ioannis Koliopoulos

Consultants: Konstantinos Vavouskos

Vasileios Papas

Athanasios Karathanasis

Haralambos Naslas

Philologica l supervision: Sofa Voutsidou

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Niki Theodosiou

Ioannis Mouzakis

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SocietyforMacedonianStudies

KaripisFoundationforMacedonian&ThracianStudies


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CONTENT S

Foreword by Nikolaos Mertzos, President of the Society

for Macedonian Studies ...........................................................................................11

The Soc iety for Macedonian Studies and its Work, by J ohn S. Koliopoulos................. 15

Irredentism and Plicy: FYROM Ofcial State Papers, 1944-2006,

by Iakovos D. Michailidis ..........................................................................................17

FYROM Primary School History Textbooks (version 2005),

by Stavroula Mavrogeni ...........................................................................................57

Irredentism on the Internet, by Vlasis Vlasidis .........................................................77

Ofcial Documents ..................................................................................................93

Irredenta egean acedonia....................................................................95

The Oppressed acedonian inority ........................................................135

The symbols, and the appropriation of the historical past .........................219

1.

2.

3.


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FOREWORD

The very act of the foundation of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia

(FYROM), together with all its subsequent actions as a political entity from 1944 to the

present day, show that Macedonianism is the basic totalitarian ideological tenet

of that state. With this tenet the state and the Slavic component in a population of

several different ethnic groups have constructed their existence as a nation and

their historical mission. Right at the very start, Macedonianism was proclaimed

as a sacred dogma, allowing of no discussion, let alone questioning. It has been

prac tised with all the means availab le to a State that, up to 1991, had been forced

to operate under a totalitarian Communist regime where there was but one

Truth and where the question that bulked above all others was the security of the

State. Anyone dissenting did so with the foreknowledge that he or she would be

eliminated.

When this totalitarian regime collapsed, as it was bound to do, from externalcauses, nothing changed. There has been no relaxation in the human geography of

power at FYROM, not even in the sacred dogma and the States duty to safeguard

it. The question is one about which a society trained for generations at the hard

camp of Macedonianism remains tight-lipped, phobia-prone, and trigger-happy.

An alternative view of the matter has yet to establish itself, any dialogue being

considered out of the question. Instead, every pronouncement to the international

community by every Skopje government since 1991 has insisted that even the slightest

modication to State Macedonianism would be fatal to the very existence of the

State and the people. And the outward and visible sign of this insistence is the c laim

to have a monopoly on the name Macedonia.These nal apocalyptic assertions from Skopje have effectively been espoused by

scores of other states, the USA being one example, precisely because they are well

aware how ramshackle is the whole articial but temporarily expedient structure.

They are certainly not ignorant of history. But for the time being they play down what

is a self-evident fact. Following the adoption of Macedonianism as an ideology,

FYROM has been trapped in a dead-end of its own making. Sooner or later it is

bound not only to destabilize at large a region which is still in a state of ux, but also

to place its own Balkan interests in jeopardy. Those powerful foreign interests that

protect Skopje and make use of her may be counting on exploiting for themselves

when the time comes. But the sad conc lusion from major events on the international


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stage in Iraq, say, in Palestine, in the Islamic world, or in the global context of

terrorism is that in some at least of the places where decisions are taken politics is

no longer the a rt of foresight and anticipation. For the G reat Powers of today, it is no

longer ve minutes to midnight, but ve minutes past.What are the main claims of Macedonianism, the ofcial totalitarian State

ideology cultivated in Skopje?

1) It claims that Macedonia has long been a distinct political entity; and that

during the two Balkan Wars (1912-1913) against the Ottoman Empire, master of the

region from the 14th century onwards, the latter partitioned a united (when was

she ever thus?) Macedonia among its conquerors, namely Greece, Bulgaria, and

Serbia, with a small part of it later coming into the possession of Albania.

2) It claims that Serb Macedonia what was known until 1941 as Vardarska

Banovina was liberated in 1944, to become from thence onward the metropolitancentre of the splintered and sti ll subservient Macedonian nation. It is the inalienable

national rights of this nation which the now independent State of FYROM has

been seeing to, in line with an express provision of its present constitution (a clause

necessarily revoked in1995).

3) It claims that Greek Macedonia is still under foreign occupation, viz by Greece,

which is said to have inicted genocide on the Macedonian People. (This region is

therefore always referred to as Aegean - never as Greek - Macedonia by Skopje,

which ofcially recognizes the Greek Civil War of 1944-1949 as the Macedonian

national liberation struggle to free Aegean Macedonia and to incorporate the

latter in the free motherland, meaning FYROM). It makes similar claims, though

these often uctuate, against Bulgaria, and less loudly against Albania.

4) It claims that the ancient Macedonians notable examples being Alexander

the Great and his father Philip were not Greeks. As conquerors of Aegean

Macedonia and oppressors of our brothers the Aegean Macedonians, from 1913

onwards, the Greeks have been usurping the history, the civilization, and the

name of the ancient Macedonians, the forefathers of FYROMs (Slav) Macedonian

nation.

These four central tenets of Macedonianism, given in chronological sequence

with the necessary background, are already enough to show that while feigning

legitimate irredentism, Skopje is openly and unambiguously declaring her

expansionist designs towards Greek Macedonia. The arguments themselves are fullof holes, yet they have been swallowed, wittingly, by dozens of civilized states, the

United States included. Why? Because they want to advance their own interests and

promote hidden geopolitical agendas in the region. But this is a serious blunder, and

it goes against their interests. And in politics a blunder (said Talleyrand) is worse than

a crime. Small the FYROM may be, but in the hands of powerful third parties it could

be lead to catastrophe.

It should lastly be pointed out that for the State and the Slavs of Skopje

Macedonianism has become an article of faith, a question of existence. This

question needs fodder to survive, which means constructing an equally ctitious

enemy: Greece. But at the same time this State and its Slavic population are well


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aware, since they see it in their daily l ives, of what Greece the enemy can do for

them. Better than any of Skopjes other neighbours, with more resolve, effectiveness

and credibility, Greece is assisting them with their economic development, their

orientation towards Europe, the cohesion of their ethnically dispa rate soc iety, andthe existence and the security of their State. This she does better and more credibly

than all the other Balkan countries put together; and all that she is after is peace in

the region, productive cooperation, and a common sense of dignity. The pity of it is

that the two positions are so far apart.

It is in the hope of contributing to the peace and prosperity of all the neighbouring

nations that the Soc iety for Macedonian Studies and its pa rtner the Karipis Foundation

for Macedonian and Thracian Studies have published the present volume. It is

intended for common use, to encourage open dialogue. The publishers are the

leading rm of EPHESUS Editions. My hope is that as a result of the incontestable

evidence here brought forward, the decision-making bodies concerned, andcitizens of any true democracy, will have second and perhaps wiser thoughts.

Nikolaos I. Mertzos

President

Soc iety for Macedonian Studies

Thessaloniki, J uly 2007


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THESOCIETYFORMACEDONIANSTUDIESANDITSWORK

Those were troubled times that saw the conception, the birth, and the coming of age of

the Soc iety for Macedonian Studies. Greece and its people were sorely tried, in a countrythat was under enemy occupation, and was then torn asunder and stained with blood.

Yet the Society maintained a high scholarly level of research throughout, high as the ag

that oated over the threatened country. Leading academics from the Aristotle University

of Thessaloniki served it in those dark days, and made sure that it was well supplied with

research students of quality. A host of important books and periodicals, fruit of the Societys

long years of research activity, still graces the shelves of libraries in Greece and abroad.

It was Greeces achievement that, despite the deep wounds of ten years of war and

civil strife, she was able to get back on her feet, as was the Society itself. Faced with

the threat of her scheming neighbours, she built herself a protective wall of essential

alliances to safeguard her independence, thus avoiding imminent loss of territory to theforces of totalitarian Communism. Today, as a member state of a United Europe, she

enjoys many advantages: a strong and democratic political system, a tightly-knit fabric

of nation and soc iety, enviable prosperity, and a strong defence shield that guarantees

the safety of the Greek frontier.

Not that there has been any lack of plots of foreign origin, targeted on Greeces

independence and security, and in particular on Macedonia. These plots are by and

large disguised, with the indirect but all too obvious aim of destabilizing the whole

region. The issue is a political one, and as such, responsibility for it rests on the Greek

state and government. The Society for Macedonian Studies does however have its own

duty here, which is to undertake a scholarly analysis of this political issue as the countrys

leading academic spec ialist on Macedonia.

My colleagues at the University of Thessaloniki and I have come forward solely with

the aim of giving the Society for Macedonian Studies our academic support. I have

chosen to offer my services without any other reward than the knowledge that my

name stands side by side with those of the notable scholars who have been of service

to the Society in the past, or are still so in the present.

Right from the start my goal has been to make a contribution to updating our

Societys scholarly discourse and output. I have therefore asked my distinguished

colleagues on the Board for their permission to be responsible for running the section

of the Foundation responsible for research work. I am honoured that the Boards chair

and other members have entrusted me with this responsibility. I would like to take this

opportunity of expressing my gratitude to them.

The rst fruits of these efforts to produce research work geared to the needs of the

time is a Research Project on FYROM Irredentism. Projects of related interest will follow

at regular intervals. The Societys research, and the organizing of a special Research

Centre to go with it, are an integral part of modernizing its function as a respected and

important Greek scientic institution.

J ohn Koliopoulos

Professor of Modern History, Aristotle University of Thessaloniki


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akovosD. ichailiDis1

irreDentismanDPlicy:

Fyrom oFFicialstatePaPers, 1944-2006

On 2 August 1944, to mark the 41st anniversary of the Ilinden Uprising,the Anti-Fascist Council of Makedonija [AFCM]2met at the Monastery ofProhor Ptchinski, near Kumanovo. It was this Meeting that paved the wayfor the founding of the Peoples Republic of Makedonija and the Republicsinclusion in the J ugoslav Federation. The Meeting acknowledged theright of the Macedonian People to self-determination, and declared theanniversary of the Ilinden Uprising a national festival. From that day to this,the PRM, or SRM [Socialist Republic of Makedonija], as it was renamed afew years later, or FYROM as it became at the start of the 1990s after thebreak-up of J ugoslavia as a unit, has faithfully stuck to certain ideologicalprinciples, most of which have had to do with Greece.

The present work proposes to highlight FYROMs irredentist policy towardsGreece from 1944 to the present, a policy that is in agrant breach of theInterim Agreement signed by the two parties in 1995 expressly calling onthem to put an end to any mutual expressions of irredentism.3There is onebasic premise that has been consistently ignored both by the internationalcommunity in general and by most of the interested parties. What FYROMmainly relies on, not just for its prolongation or its development, but for its

very existence, is its i rredentist ambitions at Greeces expense. Should theseambitions collapse, FYROM would be hard pressed to even survive. We shallexamine the issues involved under three main headings, which put in anutshell our neighbouring countrys political and ideological principles overthe years:

1) Renaming Greek Macedonia Aegean Macedonia, and representingit as terra irre d e nta, as an integral part of FYROM.

2) Claiming the existence of an oppressed Macedonian minority withinGreece.

3) Appropriating emblems and symbols, and the Greek cultural legacy in

general (with Ancient Macedonia as the focal point).The Society of Macedonian Studies has set up a research project, under

the supervision of Professor J ohn Koliopoulos, who teaches history at the

1. Iakovos D. Michailidis is Assistant Professor of Modern and C ontemporary History in the History & Ar-chaeology Department of the Philosophy Faculty of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki.

2. AFCM was the political wing of the Communist armed resistance movement active in J ugoslavMakedonija during the German-Bulgarian Oc cupation.

3. [Irred en tism(the correct form): a collective policy of seeking, by word or action, to achieve thatones country of origin shall have restored to it territory which it has meantime lost to a neighbouringcountry. An individual pursuing this policy is an irredentist. The lost territory itself is termed i rredenta,unredeemed. The origin of this series of terms was in Italy during the late 1870s, when it was hopedto annex to the new Italian state territories that had formerly been Italian. Tran slato rs No te].


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A C E D O N I A N I S M

University of Thessaloniki, in order to document these three lines of argument.A group of scholars, as Research Fellows of the Society, have studied awhole series of ofcial documents of state, including parliamentary minutes,

ofcial speeches by government ofcials, and party political charters andmanifestoes, school textbooks, writings by historians, and Internet sites,spanning from 1944 to the present day. Auxiliary unofcial documents usedare those of non-governmental bodies and organizations (particularly of anirredentist kind), but only insofar as they relate to ofcial state policy discourse.We have not for the time being concerned ourselves with independent actionby private organizations: the project has conned itself to investigating howFYROMs apparatus of state jumped on the irredentist bandwagon.

With regard to things as they stand today, careful scrutiny of the sourcesmentioned above is enough to show that although aggressive phrasing has

been ironed out of FYROMs Constitution, although the Sun of Vergina hasbeen dropped from the ofcial national ag, in consequence of the InterimAgreement, and although the phrasing used in the international forum is nowstudiously diplomatic, irredentist language is still widespread throughout thepolitical fabric of the country. A contributory factor is the way young peopleare taught, particularly at primary and secondary school. No historian canhope to offer a solution, a magic bullet, that will deal with both sidesproblems; and in any case, even were there such a solution, it is beyond theambit of the academic community. Political problems such as the Athens-Skopje dispute call for purely political solutions. All that need be said isthat when details, data, and arguments from history are employed andfrequently appealed to by all the parties involved, we, as specialists in thiseld, have an obligation to supply Greeks and the international communityat large with the essential information that will (we hope) enable them tounderstand the individual parameters of a complex situation and aid thedialogue by putting forward their own productive views.

Irredentist Aegean Macedonia

This claim is a common one found in many of the sources. Impressivelyresistant to time, it is the most serious proposition in FYROMs irredentistpropaganda. Note that it could not have been put forward before 1940,since this use of the term Macedonia had not yet been invented: the termin use, Vardarska Banovina [Vardar Province], denoted the South Serbiandistricts.

The rst occurrence of the term is in the founding manifesto of AFCM(already cited). Here the unication of Macedonia, based on the right ofself-determination, was a primary goa l: It is essen t ia l tha t we unite the w ho leMa ced on ian pe op le o f the t h ree pa rt s o f Mac ed on ia in to o ne Ma ce do n ian

sta te Ma c ed onians f rom G ree k and Bulga ria n M a c ed onia m ust fo l low the

exa m p le o f Ma ce d on ia ns in Jugo sla v Ma c ed on ia.


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IRREDENTISM AND POLICY: FYROM OFFICIAL STATE PAPERS

This goal was not just praiseworthy ambition on the part of the localleadership of the SRM [the Socialist Republic of Makedonija] it reected,

every so often, the party line of the Federal J ugoslav Government. In theperiod from immediately after the Allies liberation of the Balkans from theAxis Powers in the last months of 1944 to the end of the Greek Civil Warin 1949, there was a spate of ofcial Jugoslav irredentist pronunc i ament i against Greece. Signicantly, only a month or two after the AFCM Manifesto,during the rst session of AVNOJ [the Anti-Fascist Council for the Liberationof Jugoslavia] in Belgrade [9-12 November 1944], General Vukmanovi,known as Tempo, representing PRM [the Peoples Republic of Makedonija],claimed that Macedonians living in Greek and Bulgarian Macedoniawere eagerly awaiting union with the mother republic. Timed to coincide

with the session, a letter of protest (published in the newspaper Politikafor13 November) from ANVOJs Vice-President Dimitar Vlahov to the GreekPrime Minister accused Greece of imperialist policy against her northernneighbour, and of oppression of the Macedonian Anti-Fascists of AegeanMacedon i a .4

The oneness of the Macedonians was clearly marked on wall mapsin various buildings in PRM; Thessaloniki appeared as the Macedonian

4. Public Record Ofce, War Ofce [henceforward PRO/WO] 204/9677, Classied Report from BritishMilitary Mission to Belgrade, 14 ovember 1944, Call No.CB-2694.

Jugoslav stamp, 1939, with the legend Vardarska [Banovina]for the southern part of Serbia.


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capital.5 Interviewed for the New Yo rk Time searly in April 1945, Josip BrozTito, president of the Federal Republic of J ugoslavia, said that though hiscountry had no territorial claims on Greece, there was nothing to prevent

the possible wish of Macedonians to unite.6On 22 July 1945, Belgrade alsosent a protest note to Athens,7accusing Greece of the persecution of ourMacedonian compatriots in Aegean Macedonia by parastatal groups andby state authorities as well. Belgrade called for these people to be grantedhuman rights and for unimpeded return of the refugees to their homes.8On11 October 1945, in a speech at Skopje during celebrations of the fourthanniversary of the J ugoslav resistance aga inst the Fascist Occupation, andin front of thousands of people including refugees from Greece, Tito himselfsaid that J ugoslavia would never renounce t he righ t o f the M ac ed on ia np eo p le to unite. There were (he said) our b re th ren in Aeg ea n Ma ce d on ia ,

to w hose fa te we a re not ind if fe rent. Ou r thoug hts a re w ith them , a nd weca re a bou t t hem. He ended: I p rom ise you tha t a ll M a c ed on ia ns w ill on eda y be un it ed i n the ir own co mm un it y, Ma ce d on ia.9

But this was not to be the end of the J ugoslavian crescendo of protestaga inst Greece. In a speech to the Constituent Assembly of J ugoslavia, on26 January 1946, Bane Andrejev spent a good deal of time talking aboutGreek terrorizing of Slav speakers within Greece, emphasizing that thelatter should go on with their ght for freedom.10At the same time, Andrejevinsisted that for Greek and Bulgarian Macedonia to unite with PRM was noact of hegemony but the consummation of the Macedonian legitimatedemand for union.11 Similar was the tenor of a speech by the veteranCommunist activist Dimitar Vlahov, leader between the two World Wars ofthe United VMRO. He referred at great length to areas not yet incorporatedinto the J ugoslavian Federation. He also had something to say about thesituation in Greek Macedonia, where (according to him) there were 129terrorist groups working to annihilate Slav speakers. Vlahov ended byadvocating the formation of a united Macedonia within the Federation.12

5. Historical Archive of the Greek Foreign Ministry [henceforward ] 1945, File 59/2, CommanderSuperior, Special Security Ofce of the Supreme Command of the West Macedonia Gendarmerie,Col. P. Anastasopoulos, Information Bulletin. Kozani. 29 May 1945. Call No. 12/1/6.

6. Records of the U.S. Department of State [henceforward DS]. Greece 1945-1949, 868.00/4-3045,Reel No.2, Ofce. To Greek Foreign Ministry. Athens, 30 pril 1945, Call No. mb. 1154. See also

, 24 April 1945.7. DS Greece 1945-1949, 868.00/7-2445, Reel No. 3, Telegram from Kirk to the State Department, Caz-

erta, 24 July 1945, Call No. mp. 3046 The contents of this Note were published in the Greek newspa-pers at the beginning of September: see, 2 September 1945.

8. Public Record Ofce, Foreign Ofce [henceforward PRO/FO] 371/48389, The Jugoslav Note toGreece is attached to Caccias reply to the Foreign Ofce, Athens, 24 July 1945, Call No. 373.

9. Halkias Archive, Parts of Titos speech at Skopje on 11 October 1945. See also, 14 Oc-tober 1945, See also , 25 ovember 1945, , 25 ovember 1945,with photo of the nal paragraph of Titos speech. See also A. Kyrou,

[The conspirac y aga inst Macedonia] 1940-1949(thens, 1950, in Greek), p. 143.10.PRO/FO 371/58615, Stevenson to the Foreign Ofce, Belgrade, 22 January 1946, Call No. 125.11.Andrejevs speech was published in the 20 February 1946 issue of Bilten(). See G.Modis,

[Neighbours Plans and Appetites], Thessaloniki, 1947, pp. 17-18.12.PRO/FO 371/58615, Stevenson to Foreign Ofce, Belgrade, 22 January 1946, Call No. 124.


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At the beginning of April 1946, Dimitar Vlahov made a speech at Monastir,present day Bitola, about Aegean Macedonia, expressing the longings ofthe Macedonian people. His local audience was swelled by a thousand

or so refugee Slavophones [speakers of any Slavonic language] from G reekMacedonia.13The Parliamentary Vice-President called on them to continuedevoting their labour to the work of renewing and rebuilding J ugoslavia.14On 26 April 1946, Col. Peo Trajkov, Skopjes army commander, gave aninterview to a Toronto newspaper in which he said that PRM had indeedbeen incorporated into the J ugoslav Federation, but that this was notthe end of the matter. Goe Delevs slogans of a co mp le te a nd un itedrepubl ic still rang in their ears (he said); and this would be achieved byuniting Pirin Macedonia and Aegean Macedonia (regarded by Trajkovas occupied territory) with PRM itself.15

On 2 July 1946 the Congress of the Union of Macedonian Women washeld in Skopje. Ourania Perovski, as representative of refugee women fromGreece, made a reference to the peoples of Aegean Macedonia who (shesaid) still languished under mona rc hist-fa sc ist te rro rism.16The celebrationsof Ilinden began on this very same day in Skopje, as did the 1st Congressof the Macedonian Popular Front. Among the VIPs taking part were LazarKolievski, the President of the Peoples Republic of Makedonija; M. Neskovi,the President of the Republic of Serbia; and the Federal Minister of Justice,Frane Frol. There were also delegations from Pirin Macedonia, headed bythe Bulgarian parliamentary deputy Hristo Stoichev; and delegates fromGreek Macedonia and from Trieste.17 In the citys Stadium, named for Tito,was a banner with the words We have never de n ied the Mac ed on ia nPeo p les r ig ht to un ite. We w ill no t d eny o ur princ ip les b ec a use o f pe rson a l

sympathies, then, quoting Titos speech of 11 October the previous year, Weha ve b rethren in Aege a n M ac ed onia , to w hose fa te w e a re no t ind if fe rent .

Our thoughts a re w ith them , a nd w e c a re a b out them.18This was the cuefor ery oratory in favour of the union of the Macedonian People. The keyspeech was Frols. To the plaudits of the assembled crowd, he gave his pledgethat J ugoslavia would strive to this end.19PRMs president, Kolievski, invokedthe example of the unication of Italy in the 19th century. He referred to thePeoples Republic of Makedonija as our ow n Pied m ont , fo r the lib erat ion

and un ion o f a ll Ma ce do n ia. He expressed his belief that the struggle forAegean Macedonia would wipe out the monarchist-fascist [Greek]regime and would give the people back their freedom. Similar in tone was

13. 1946, File 67/2, Dalietos telegram in code to Greek Foreign Ministry, Belgrade, 16 April 1946, CallNo. 296.

14. 1946, File 67/2,Dalietos report to Greek Foreign Ministry, Belgrade, 25 April 1946, Call No. 650.The Greek Ambassador got his information from the issue of Borbafor 17 April 1946.

15.Halkias Archive.16. 1946, File 67/2, Dalietos report to Greek Foreign Ministry, Belgrade, 2 July 1946, Call No. 1206.17.PRO/FO 371/58615, Clutton to Bevin, Belgrade, 22 August 1946, Call No. 310.18.Halkias Archive.19. Halkias Archive.


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Vlahovs speech. He underlined the need for unremitting struggle so thatthe other two parts of Macedonia, the Greek and the Bulgarian, be joinedto PRM. As representative of the refugees from Greek Macedonia, Mihail

Keramiiev spoke of his fellow-combatants distress. We Ma ce do n ians o f theAegean (he said) a re m ore unce rta in than ever tod a y whic h roa d to go ifwe a re to g a in our f ree d om a nd enter the Peo p le s Rep ub lic of Ma ked oni ja.The Congress then resolved to send a memorandum to the Paris PeaceConference including the words: in a nothe r Pa r t of the c ountry, Aeg ea nMa c ed on ia , there is ra g ing terro rism O ur pe op le a sk that the p rinc ip les of

t he A t lan t ic Cha rt e r be ap p lied in Aeg ea n Ma ce do n ia.20Simultaneously thefollowing declaration was published in the newspapers: Women a nd menof Ma c ed on ia ! Ta king p a rt in the 1st Cong ress of the M a c ed on ia n Pop ula r

Front we re d ea r friend s a nd d eleg a tes f rom Pirin [ i.e. Bulg a ria n] a nd Aeg ea n

[ i.e. G ree k] Ma c ed on ia . This turned the Co ng ress into a d em on st ra t ion of theunsha kea b le d eterminat ion o f the M a c ed on ia n Peo p le, f rom a ll the Pa rts of

Ma c ed onia , to b e c om p le te ly f ree a nd at un it y w ith our own PRM, wi th in the

Fed eral Jug osla v Rep ub lic . It ha s b ee n a b a sic item on the a g end a of the

Popular Front, from the very rst day of its existence, that the Macedonian

Peop le (in its entiret y) mu st b e un ited w ith its Rep ub lic.21A further step forward in Skopjes irredentist actions was the publishing, in

the 26 August 1946 issue of the ofcial State news organ Borba[The Strug g le],a map showing Jugoslavias borders, as in force and as determined byethnic group. It is immediately obvious that the ethnic boundaries takein very nearly the whole of Greek Macedonia, Thessaloniki included.Along with the map which, it is important to note, was then publishedin many Jugoslav newspapers and journals was an extensive a rticleattacking the te rro r ism p ra c t ised in G ree c e a g a inst d em oc ra t ic c it izen s,22esp ec ia lly Sla vop ho ne s. More than twenty thousand fe l low-nat ionals had,according to Borba, been obliged to leave Greece and ee to Jugoslaviaand Bulgaria. The reader needs to be aware here that the original of thismap is to be found among Bulga rian nationalists of the period between thetwo World Wars, when Soa had a virtual monopoly on Slav irredentism inthe Macedonian Question. In 1933, for instance, the Macedonian Institutein Soa attempted to reinforce Bulgarian expansionist plans by circulating

a Geographical Map of Macedonia (see illustrat io n b e low). This samemap, showing the Geographical and Ethnic Boundaries of Macedonia,was subsequently reproduced at Skopje, as an i llustration for a Histo ry of theMa ce do n ian Peop lepublished in 1969 and reissued by the State Publishing

20. 1946, File 67/2, Telegram from Dalietos to Greek Foreign Ministry, Belgrade, 7 August 1946, CallNo. 1461. See also Halkias Archive. See also , op .c i t, pp. 40-41.

21. 1946, File 1/4, Letter from Dalietos to Greek Foreign Ministry, Belgrade, 10 August 1946, Call No.1513 See also Halkias Archive, 1946, File 1/10, Letter from Lieut.Col. of Artillery K. Iatros toGreek Foreign Ministry, 902, 23 September 1946, Call No. Classied /3392203/2/. See also FO371/58615, Clutton to Bevin, Belgrade, 22 August 1946, Call No. 310.

22. [This carefully-chosen expression would also have been capable of the meanings republican citi-zens and citizens of the Republic (i.e. PRM). Tran slato rs No te].


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House in 1992. It was published in tandem with a book

entitled Macedonia: a Natura l a nd Ec ono m ic Unity(Soa 1945), reissued byFYROMs Institute of National History (Skopje 1978).

From the beginning of September 1946, the war of words betweendiplomats in Athens and Belgrade heates up. The opening shot was redin Skopje on 12 September 1946, at the ceremony for the transfer of GoeDelevs remains. Vlahov delivered an inammatory oration in which hedenounced the policy of the G re ek fa sc ists. It was aimed (he said) atannihilating the Ma ce do n ian Peop le and at driving them out. Greecehad no ethn ic , po lit ic a l, or ec ono m ic rig hts over Aegean Macedonia.23

23.Halkias Archive.

Map of Greater Macedonia, published in 1933by the Macedonian Institute in Soa.

Map published in Borba, the Jugoslav Communist Partys ofcial newspaper,on 26 August 1946.


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Covers (in photocopy) of the book Ma ce don i a as a na t u ra l and e co nom i c un it (Soa 1945, in Bulgarian, republished Skopje 1978, in Slavmacedonian).


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He virtually repeated these assertions a few days later at Monastir, whenaddressing a large gathering of some ten thousand people. Greec e ha sno rig h t to Aege a n Ma ce d on ia he sa id wh i ch has a lwa ys b een m ad e

up of Sla vs. He went on: The Ma ce do n ia n Peop le ha s, acc ord ing to theAtlant ic Ch a rte r, eve ry rig ht to un ite.

A Uni ted Macedonia exhibi ts [s ic ]

fu l l and per fec t ethn ic , rac ia l and

ec on om ic uni ty. Ea c h p a r t of it see ks

noth ing other than union w ith in the

c ontext a nd b o rd ers of Jug osla via.24At the end of September, Andrejev

returned to the theme of acts ofterrorism against the Slavophone

population. He declared his rmintention of ghting to save themfrom imminent extinction.25 Atthe Paris Peace Conference, theJ ugoslav delegate to the Political &Territorial Committee on Bulgaria,Moa Pijade, dec lared in committeesession that Aegean Ma ced on ia was going through t he m ost t ra g icera of i ts history due to brutal

v io lence,26 and asked the GreatPowers to intervene immediatelyto p ut a stop to this reg im e so that

the op p ressed Ma ce do n ia n pe op le c ou ld b e f reed f rom the Greek yokea nd form a state w ith in the Jugo sla v Fed erat ion.

Throughout the 1940s, the verba l pronunc i ament i about the oneness ofthe Macedonian area and about i r redenta Aegean Macedonia weretranslated into action. It is now accepted that J ugoslavia was activelyinvolved in the Greek Civil War, and that it openly incited, not so muchthe resistance ghters of Markos Democratic Army, as those Slavophoneorganizations vowed to the secession of Greek Macedonia. One such

was the secessionist movement led by Ilias Dimakis known as Goe. InNovember 1944 he made Monastir his headquarters and worked hard atreorganizing his band, recruiting widely from refugees in Greece. Beforevery long he had a body of about a thousand men, which he namedthe First Aegean Strike Brigade. Dimakis himself became the Brigades

24.Nova Ma kedo n ija, 22 September 1946.25.Halkias Archive.26. 1946, File 43/4, Session Minutes of the Political & Territorial Committee on Bulgaria, 6 September

1946, 1946, File 1/4, Telegram from Dragoumis to Greek Foreign Ministry, Paris, 6 September1946, Call No. 1426. See also , 7 September 1946, , 7 September 1946, , 7September 1946.


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commander. As his second-in-command he chose Naum Pejov, a veteranof the SNOF [Slavomacedonian Peoples Liberation Front] and a native ofthe village of Gavros, near Kastoria: Pejov had ed to the PRM in June 1944.

Dimakis Political Commissar was Mihail Keramiiev, from the same village asPejov, with Vangel Ajanovski-Oche from the Edessa region as Keramiievsdeputy.27

There is also today evidence for the view that NOF [Peoples LiberationFront]28 was organized at the instance of PRM, the Communist Party ofMakedonija, and its overt aim was the union of Greek Macedonia with theJ ugoslav Federation. Very revealing indeed is the content of a conversation

between Kolievski and NOF leaders in Skopje, at the very end of the year1946. Kolievski gives them orders to go down into Greece and ght alongsidethe Greek Communists. You w ill now g o d ow n the re The KKE [Communist

Pa rty of G re ec e] w ill d irec t you r strug g le The [p a rty] line of the KKE ha s

27. A few days later, the Aridaia & Edessa Battalion went the same road, under the leadership of an-other SNOF veteran, the schoolmaster Pavle Rakovski, See the article by Sp. Sfetas, 1944, [Slavophones separatist moves in 1994, the Greek Communist Partys position, and themaintenance of the Greek and Jugoslav borders], pp. 105-124 (in Greek) in:

, 1941-1944. [Proceedings oft he In te rna t iona l Co n fe renc e M ac ed on ia & Thrac e : O cc upa t ion , Resistanc e , Libe ra t ion ]. Thessa-loniki, 1998.

28. NOF [Popular (or Peoples) Liberation Front] = [ ]. Activist or-ganization of Slavophones in Greece. Founded a t the instance of the J ugoslav Communists. Activethroughout the Greek Civil War, its aim being the secession of Greek Macedonia.

The First Aegean Strike Brigade marching through Monastir.


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b ee n p ut rig ht you c a n t rust them a ny p rob lem s you ha ve, you c a n sor t

them out with the KKE leadership ght whole-heartedly along with the

G ree k Peo p le ag a inst c ha uvinism , sep a ra t ism , a nd loc a l t rend s.29

It is clear that these pro-J ugoslav elements in NOF had a single professedaim: the secession of Greek Macedonia and its union with the J ugoslavFederation. Supporting evidence of this is an article published by theorganization in its periodical Bilten[The Bulletin] on 15 March 1946, in whichNOF denies accusations of collaboration with the Bulgarians. We a re notO hra nites [G ua rd s ] it re a d s, sti ll le ss a re we sep a ra tists. This is p rove d b y the

line w e ta ke. Our strug g le is a g a inst sep a ra t ism , fo r tw o re a so ns: it lea d s the

Ma c ed onian Peo p le to the p rec ip ic e , to new sla very, and sep a rat i sm is the

line taken b y the forces of in terna t iona l rea c t ion, which wa nt to b rea k up the

unit y of the Jugo sla v p eo p les. This disclaimer was however accompanied

by an afrmation of the policy of secession for Greek Macedonia and enosiswith PRM: The Ma c ed onian Peo p le ha ve the rig ht to un i te a nd th is rig ht theyhave wo n w it h the gun . The Ma ce do n ia n Peop le o f Aegea n Ma ce d on ia

ha ve, by jo ining th e ran ks of ELAS [the Na tion a l Po p ula r Lib e ra t io n A rm y] a nd

by ghting Fascism, at the same time been ghting for national freedom

The M ac ed on ia n Peop le o f Aege a n M a ce d on ia ha s every righ t to a sk to

b e un ited w ith its p illa r a nd p rop , p rog ressive Va rd a r M a c ed on ia We w ish

to live w ith our f ree b rethren o f Va rd a r Ma c ed onia , to b e a b le to e njoy the

f ru it s that the g rea ter p a rt of our pe op le ha s wo n.30The PRMs and Jugoslavias ir redentist claims continued unabated for the

duration of the Greek Civil War. Elections for the Popular Front of Macedoniawere held in Skopje, on 7 March 1948. As president of, respectively, thePresidium of the Peoples Parliament of Jugoslavia, and the Council of thePopular Front of Macedonia, Dimitar Vlahov condemned monarchist -fa sc ist Greece and referred to our Ma c ed on ian b re th ren in Aeg ea n

Macedonia, alongside the Democratic Army, ghting for its overthrow.31Ina speech to the 2nd Congress of the Macedonian Popular Front, Kolievskicriticized Bulgarias Patriotic Front for ideas of aggrandisement, andin the same breath proclaimed the right of the Macedonian people tounite within the J ugoslav Federation.32 Commenting on his statements,and on the dissonance between Belgrade and Soa, the Greek daily

newspaper Kathimeriniobserved that Serbia and Bulgaria were bickeringnot just amongst themselves, but like the proverbial two cocks ghting oversom eo ne elses b a rn the barn being, Greek Macedonia. 33Vlahov thenwent on to make new speeches in which he insisted that Greece had no

29. Tashko Mamurovski, (1912-1978) [Paskal Miitrevski (i.e. Paskh-alis Miitropoulos) and his times (1912-1978)], Skopje, 1992, pp. 73-74 (in Slavmacedonian). For NOFactions, the author cites a note from Fotev: this is now in his family archives.

30.Modis, op .c i t, pp. 12-13.31. 1948, File 52, Sub-File 3, Report by P. Gerolymatos, 1st Secretary, directing the Greek Consulate

at Skopje, to Greek Foreign Ministry, Skopje, 8 March 1948.32., 15 June 1948.33., 16 June 1948.


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sovereign rights over Aegean Macedonia, which, he said belonged fromthe ethnological point of view to the Slavomacedonians.34

The year 1949 came in, and the drama of events in Greece reached itshigh point. Since the autumn of 1948 it had gradually emerged that relationsbetween the KKE, the Greek Communist Party, and its J ugoslav counterpartwere becoming increasingly strained. This very soon became c lear for all tosee; and it was the direct consequence of the rupture between Stalin andTito, and Titos expulsion from the Cominform in the summer of 48. At thevery beginning of 1949, a close associate (Petros Roussos) of the senior Greekcommunist Nikos Zahariadis was summing up the work done outside G reeceby the Party in 1948. He referred to Tito s trea c he ry, and called it a stab inth e b a c k for Greeks.35There was a double sequel: rstly, a split within the

ranks of the NOF,36

with a c leavage between pro-Jugoslavs and others whoremained loyal to the G reek Communist Party, and secondly, a resolution bythe Party at its 5th Plenary Session (30-31 January 1949), adding fuel to theames. The Partys Secretary-General, Zahariadis, gave his audience a taste

34., 15 June 1948.35. Anna Matthaiou & Popi Polemi. 1948:

[Petros Roussos report, The foreign relations of the Republic of Greecein 1948],, 2 (June 2000, in Greek), 8.

36.On the founding and ac tivities of NOF the classic work on the Slavomacedonian side is still the studyby Risto Kirjazovski [ ], (1945-1949) [The Peoples Liberation Front and other orga-

nizations of Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia (1945-1949)], Skopje, 1985, in Slavmacedonian.

Front page of [Bilten], issued by NOF during the Civil War.


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of what was to come in his opening remarks. In o ur Pe op le s new rising, hesaid, t he M a c ed onian p eo p le ha ve g iven the i r a ll. With the ir b loo d theyha ve wo n the rig ht to f ree a nd ind ep end ent life a nd d eve lop m ent . There

c a n b e no d oub t that a s a resu lt of the v ic tory of the p op ula r revo lu t ion inGreec e the M a ce d on ia n pe op le w ill w in the rig h t to f ree a nd ind ep end en t

life a nd d eve lop m ent. This was a frank confession of a change of directionon the minorities issue, and it was certainly due to the tight corner in whichthe KKE found itself at the start of 1949. Therefore, despite the objections ofmany leading Party members, the 5th Plenary resolved to nally recognizethe right of the Macedonian People to national reconstruction and self-determination:

In no rthern Gree c e the M a c ed onian Peo p le ha ve g iven thei r a ll for thestruggle and are ghting on with admirable and total heroism and self-sacrice.

It c a nnot b e d oub ted that a s o result of vic tory by the DSE [Democ ra t ic Armyof G ree c e] a nd the Peo p les Revolut ion, the M a c ed onian Peo p le w ill ha ve full

na tio na l re stitution, as the y them se lves wa nt it, w inn ing it tom o rrow by g iving

thei r life -bloo d tod a y. Ma c ed on ia n Com munists w ill a lwa ys b e a t the hea d

of thei r p eo p les st rugg le. At the same t im e Ma c ed onian Com mun ists mu st

b ew a re of the d ivisive a nd d isrup t ive a c t ivit ies fostered b y a lien elem ents in

ord er to d isrupt the unit y be twee n the M ac ed onia n a nd the G ree k Peo p le ,

a d isrupt ion tha t c a n o nly a ssist thei r c om m on enemy, m ona rc hism a nd

fasc ism , an d Am eric a n a nd Eng lish imp eria lism . At the sam e t im e, the KKE

must ro ot o ut a ll ob sta c le s a nd must strike a t a ll c ha uvinist dem onstra tio ns

of G ree k exp a nsionism , that a re c au sing resentm ent a nd d isc om for t am ong

the M a c ed on ia n Peo p le, thus he lp ing the d isrup ters w ith their trea c he rous

a c t ivity a nd st if fen ing the force s of resistan c e. The Sla vom a c ed on ia n a nd the

G ree k Peo p le c a n o nly win if united . If d ivid ed , al l they c a n d o is lo se. So the

two p eo p les unity in the st rugg le mu st b e jea lously gua rd ed , as the a p p le of

their eye, an d streng then ed lit t le b y lit t le, da y by d a y.The resolutions of the 5th Plenary Session were followed by a whole series

of Party initiatives in pursuit of the new policy. The 2nd Plenary Session ofthe Central Committee of NOF was held on 3 February 1949. In his speech,Zahariadis set out what the Slavophones were being offered in exchange:essentially a reshufe of the Republics Provisional Government to promote

a Slavophone to a ministerial post; NOF representation on the DSEs GeneralStaff; the renaming of the DSEs 11th Division as the Macedonian Division;and the founding of a Macedonian Communist organization. In the hopeparticularly of pushing the group round the pro-Tito Keramiiev further tothe sidelines, Zahariadis promoted to the NOF Secretariat two of his oldbuddies among the Slavomacedonian activists, Paskal Mitrevski and PavelRakovski. The KKE leadership was indisputably breaking new ground withthese decisions, as was noted by the bourgeois Press, which spoke of thePartys ir revo c a b le sp litfrom the b od y of the Na t ion.37

37., 4 March 1949.


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It was not many weeks later, on 25-26 March 1949, that the 2nd Congressof the NOF was held, at Psarades on the Prespa Lakes district of Florina. Toan audience of seven hundred delegates, Zahariadis acknowledged the

part played by the Macedonian people, and then harped on the need forunity with the Greek People if victory was to be achieved. At the end of itsdeliberations, the Congress condemned Keramiievs pro-Yugoslav group,and declared the Macedonian peoples right to self-determination. In thep resent c rit ic a l m om ents of the 2nd NO F Co ng ress an the Declaration, t heene m ies of ou r p eo p le a re t ry ing on a ll sid es to d isrup t the un ity b etw ee n

the Ma ce do n ia n Peo p le a nd the m ilit an t un it y be twe en the Ma ce do n ia n

Peo p le a nd the G ree k Peo p le, a u nity essent ia l fo r the v ic tory of b oth Peo p les.

Enemies of our People, of every sort, are exploiting military difculties and

the other difculties stemming from them, and are exploiting the situation

in Jugo sla via , ut ter ing va r ious d if fe rent slog a ns tha t m a ke he a d wa y w ithc er ta in c ra ven a nd d roo p ing eleme nts, inc it ing them to b rea k ra nks. We,

the seven hund red d eleg a tes to the 2nd C on g ress of the Peo p les Lib e ra t ion

Front , do b ra nd these c on sp ira tors w ho a re sow ing d isrup t ion a nd d eser t ion

in ou r lines, t rea d ing on the b loo d of ou r thousa nd s of he roe s, a s c om m on

tra itors a nd m ise ra b le d ese rte rs from ou r Peo p les strugg le. Al l w ho ha ve

b ee n led a st ra y by the p rea c h ing of the e nem y a nd the d isrupte rs subve rsive

manoeuvres, and who have taken the easy road of ight and desertion,

ha ve d one a hel lish d ee d of co unter-pop u la r t rea c hery that w i ll he lp none

b ut the ene m y, the m on a rc hist -fasc ists, and the im p er ia list c a m p.38On the very next day, 27 March, Zahariadis pledge to the 2nd NOF

Congress was put into effect, with the founding of KOEM [the CommunistOrganization of Aegean Macedonia]. A week later, on 3 April, Mitrevskibecame Minister of Supplies in the Provisional Government, Vangel Kojchevbecame a member of the DSEs Supreme War Council and Kochev becamepresident of Directorate of National Minorities.

Throughout the spring of 1949 there were various different contacts, of adesperate kind, between the KKE and NOF, and Slavomacedonians who hadtaken refuge in Skopje. The purpose was to persuade these latter to changetheir minds and join the DSE, even were it only at the eleventh hour.39In May

38. For the resolutions taken at the 5th KKE Congress and the actions of NOF, the standard works are st illEvangelos Kofos book The Impact of the Macedonian Question on Civil Conict in Greece (1943-1949), (Athens, 1989, in English), and Spyridon Sfetas article : NOF (1946-1949) [Undesirable allies anduncontrollable opponents: the relations between the KKE and the NOF during the Civil War (1946-1949)], in: Spyridon Sfetas [ed], 20 [Aspects of theMa ce do n ian Ques tion in the 20 th cen tu ry ](Thessaloniki, 2001, in Greek), 157-203. See also SpyridonSfetas. . [The forming oft he Slavo ma ce do n ian ide n t it y ], Thessaloniki, 2003 (in Greek), pp. 257-268.

39.An exhaustive account of the negotiations between the Greek and J ugoslav C ommunists andthe part played by the Slavomacedonians is to be found in a study by Risto Kirjazovski [], 1945-1949 [The Macedonians and relationsbetween the Jugoslav and Greek and Communist Parties, 1945-1949], Skopje, 1995, in Slavmacedo-nian.


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1949 the Keramiiev-Dimakis group sent the KKE a letter that put an end toall attempts to play the go-between.40It made a blanket criticism of KKEpolicy on the Macedonian Question as in error and biassed against theMacedonian People. Per contra, the letter lauded the Communist Partiesof J ugoslavia and Makedonija, and Tito himself, to the skies for their policy.The Slavomacedonian guerrillas naturally included among the conditions

of their assistance to the KKE that they should receive an apology in writingfor the injustices done to NOF; that independent Macedonian units shouldbe created, with a Macedonian cadre at the head of each; that anti-Tito propaganda should be discontinued; and that free communicationbetween Greek and J ugoslav Macedonia should be restored. These weredemands to which the KKE obviously had no choice but to assent.41

On 28 July 1949, a month or so before the end of the Greek Civil War, anend which was already in sight, addressed a convention of pro-JugoslavNOF cadres in Skopje.42The majority of them were refugees from Greece.43Tito launched a erce attack on the KKE. He accused it of never having

been remotely interested in the rights of Slavomacedonians in Greece.44He

40. There is a blow-by-blow account in the Memoirs of two leading Slavomacedonian activists, NaumPeyov, [The M ac ed onians an d the Civ il wa r inG reece], Skopje, 1968, in Slavmacedonian. Vangel Ajanovski-Oche, [Storm s in the A e-g e a n ], Skopje, 1975, in Slavmacedonian.

41. The c omplete c orrespondenc e, and the contac ts between pro-J ugoslav e lements and loyal KKEcadres of the NOF, are to be found in: , 1949,Vol. 6, Skopje, 1983, in Slavmacedonian.

42. 1949, File 34, Sub-File 2, Telegram from Baizos to Greek Foreign Ministry, Skopje, 28 July 1949, CallNo. 571.

43.Evangelos Kofos, Nat iona lism a nd C om mun ism in Ma ce do n ia, Thessaloniki, 1964, p. 185, ,30 July 1949.

44. Kofos, op .c i t ., p. 185.

The newspaper [Ma ked onikos Frouros], 24 July 1949.


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The newspaper [Ma ked onikos Frouros], 15 May 1949 and 5 June 1949.

The NOF and the Cominform greatly wanted to detach Greek Macedonia.Ove r my dead bod y ! , says the Evzone. Nobody knew this better than Tito.

From the newspaper[Makedon i a], 24 April 1949.


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called on refugees from Greece to work for their peaceful integration intoJ ugoslavia which was interpreted in Greek circles as meaning that he hadgiven up his territorial claims on Greek Macedonia. Tito also met deputations

of refugees from Greece and wounded guerrillas, a meeting which wasgiven an ofcial atmosphere by the presence of numerous high-rankingmembers of the Federal and local Party ofcials. The refugees apparentlythanked Tito for his help, while condemning the revanchist language of KKEbroadcasts against J ugoslavia.45Tito a llowed a day or two to pass, then on2 August 1949, on the occasion of the 5th anniversary of the proclamationof the PRM, and in front of a very large audience of perhaps as many as35,000 people, according to foreign diplomats46 he delivered his bombshell.He accused the KKE of not behaving properly towards the Macedonians ofthe Aegean. It had not placed them in senior Party positions; and it had not

permitted Macedonian schools to function in free Greece. Immediatelyafterwards, Makedonijas president, Kolievski, described his Republic ast he Pied m ont of a fu ture United Ma c ed onia.47The above phraseology wasa mirror of the revaluation of J ugoslav policy towards Greece. While thegoal remained the same, to wit the secession of Greek Macedonia andthe shielding of the Macedonian minority in Greece, the means were nowdifferent, since virtually all the Slavomacedonian activists had by now edto the PRM.

Once the Greek Civil War came to its close, PRM propaganda onbehalf of Macedonia i r redenta increased. Now it was spearheaded bySlavophone ex-guerrillas who had taken refuge en masse in J ugoslaviaafter the War ended. Their efforts were aided and abetted by variousdifferent academic bodies in the PRM, giving them the necessary touch ofauthority and impetus to keep going. At the start of 1950, for instance, withthe encouragement and economic assistance of the local Party leadership,the Union of Refugees from Aegean Macedonia [UR] was set up in Skopje.Its aim was to pull into its ranks all the refugees from Greece who had madetheir way to the PRM. Membership of UR was open to any refugee living inJ ugoslavia. Run by a General Council, it had branches, each with its ownlocal council, in various parts of the country. The Unions interest was by nomeans conned exclusively to refugees in PRM, however; it extended to

the Slavophone residue in Greece. In his summary to the general assemblyone year after the inception, the Unions Secretary General stated that URhad a duty to keep a close eye on developments in Greek Macedonia,and to denounce the monarchist-fascist Greek governments policy ofdiscrimination against Slav-speakers.48

45. 1949, File 34, Sub-File 2, Report from Baizos to Greek Foreign Ministry, Skopje, 7 August 1949, CallNo. 602//1.

46. 1949, File 34, Sub-File 2, Report from Baizos to Greek Foreign Ministry, Skopje, 7 August 1949, CallNo. 589//1.

47. Elizabeth Barker, Ma c ed onia: its plac e in Balkan Pow er Pol it ic s(1950), pp. 209-210.48. , 996: [Organizational Report].


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In June 1951, it was put on record in a resolution of URs Assembly that it wasthe Unions duty not to be indifferent to the terr ible sufferings of their Peoplein Greece.49A codicil to the same resolution read: We m ust reg ula rly keep

the [Jugo sla v ] G overnme nt in forme d of the Athens Go venrment s p o l ic y ofg en oc id e, and enc ou ra g e i t to ta ke init ia t ives in internat iona l forum s.

These observations placed the irredentist issue on the a genda of theSRMs and hence Jugoslavias - relations with neighbouring countriesfrom the very first. The same purpose was also served by the use of theterm Aegeans [] to describe refugees from Greece, in placeof the non-specific Macedonians. It was clear, in other words, that theuse of the term in question promoted the concept of the unity of theMacedonian People, while also pointing to the existence of enslaved,unredeemed brethren and keeping alive the prospect of their future

union under the leadership of the J ugoslav Communists. The sameSeptember, UR issued its own monthly newspaper, Vo ic e o f th e Aeg ea ns[ ].

This newspaper was one of several ac tivities by which the UR hatched,and then gradually systematized and codied an irredentist campaignto the detriment of Greece. Dozens of articles were published by Voice oft he Aeg eansbefore its demise in 1954, a sacrice on the altar of the triplerapprochement between Greece, J ugoslavia, and Turkey. All attemptedto construct and bring to the fore a history of Aegean Macedonia, linkingit with the broader historical superstructure of the SRM. The story of the

closure of this activist organ is some indication of how organically it wasconnected with the ofcial local political establishment. The stake of PRMsgovernment in UR is also attested by the fact that in the summer of 1951Dimi Mire, president of the local parliament, was a member not only of URsCouncil General but also of the committee responsible for the newspaper.The reason why URs activities were being encouraged by the FederalGovernment was, according to an evaluation by the British Embassy atAthens, that Belgrade wanted t o keep Ma c ed onian c onsc iousness a live ,sinc e it m ig ht p rove useful in th e future. This might, the evaluation added,

49. , No. 11, 17 June 1951.

The newspaper Vo ice o f the Aeg ea ns [ ].


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be a way of discouraging refugees who were not eager to stay in J ugoslaviaand wanted to return to G reece.50

From the very rst moment, the URs Slavomacedonian activists regarded it

as of the greatest urgency to write their own history, which (they insisted) hadbeen deliberately passed over in silence by Balkan historians; and they alsolaid great weight on the political education of the young. Construction of aSlavomacedonian myth: this was their ultimate goal. The Slav Macedonianway of thinking had by now cottoned on to the unique advantage, for thispurpose, of actually living in PRM, friendly mother and homeland. Whatwas needed for success was to mobilize all the available forces of thepolitical nomenk la tura among the Slavomacedonian political refugees.Their writing of a constructed history proceeded along three main lines.First they recorded the military events of the past ten years, the German

Occupation, and the Greek Civil War, and set them in a connected chainof Slavomacedonian history. Second, they linked this whole period with theremoter past, and above all with the Ilinden Uprising of 1903. Third, theysingled out Slavomacedonian heroes from the more recent historical pastand set them among the pantheon of other Slavomacedonian heroes ofthe Federal Republic.

The method of achieving the rst of these aims preoccupied the editorialstaff of Vo ic e o f the Aeg ea nsthroughout the papers existence. At the URsannual General Assembly in June 1951, there was lengthy discussion amongthe organizations leading cadres about what goals were advisable. NaumPejov made a keynote speech in which he said:

Out of our young p eo p le m ust be c rea ted a v igo rousna t io na l intel lig e ntsia tha t w ill d efe nd the inte rests of o ur

Peop le . We have never ye t had the cha nce to deve lop

a n inte llig e ntsia , b ec a use i t ha s b ee n d o ing its stud ies in

ne ighb our ing c ount ries a nd ha s b ee n sha p ed in a m ould

ho st ile to ou r na t ion a l lib erat ion st rug g le We d o n ot ha ve a ny

ofcial conrmation for the lives laid down and the material

d est ruc t ion suf fered b y ou r Peo p le, an d this is on e p a r t of our

na t ion a l history that ou r young on es must be ind oc t rina ted

w ith. It is on e wa y o f show ing ou r f riend s a nd ou r enem ies

that w e m ea n to l ive f ree . So m em oi rs must b e c om p iled , thelives la id d ow n m ust b e reco rd ed , a nd b roc hures a nd b oo ks

m ust b e w ritte n w ith p ro fessio na l skill.51Another delegate, Basil (not to be confused with Naum) Pejov, observed

that the Union of Macedonian Writers ought to take steps to publish materialabout the life and struggles of the Macedonian People of AegeanMacedonia. The need to raise the refugees cultural and academic level

50. FO 371/95163: Condential Report from the British Embassy at Athens to the British Embassy at Bel-grade, Athens, 7 August 1951, Call No. Emb.1041/43/51.

51. , No. 11, 17 June 1951.


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was pointed out by Risto Andonovski and the UMWs secretary MichoTerpovski singled out childrens education as the central focus of this need.

At the start of 1952, Voic e of the Aeg ea nsacted on Naum Pejovs prompt,

putting out a request to any Aegeans with photographs of different parts ofMakedonija, and in particular with photographs of dead bodies, to send themto the editorial team for publication in a planned album.52The Unions CouncilGeneral was simultaneously collecting details about lives lost. The intentionwas to put out a kind of White Book about Aegean Macedonia. A collateralmanoeuvre was a move to erect a War Memorial to SlavomacedonianAegean heroes killed in the 1940s. 53 In July 1953 the editorial board wascompelled to admit, to its evident discomture, that the results had notcome up to its expectations, and that the only publication so far had been abrochure on Greek Macedonia.54

It was also at this time that leading Slavomacedonian cadres shoulderedthe task of recording the bloody details of recent history, to be made public inthe columns of the refugee newspaper. There were a great many contributors,but the main names were those of (Naum) Pejov, Andonovski, Andreas Tsipas,and Keramiiev. As can be seen from the articles, Pejov, the ex-separatist,had not only contrived to heal the scars of the wound to his authority in 1944,but had outgunned, in the ideological sense, all others who thought like him.His various speeches at different refugee assemblies, his stream of articles onevents during the Occupation and the Civil War: these were patiently hostedin Voice s of the Aeg ea n, even when, as often happened, they made up onehalf of its reading matter. It was on the Occupation and the Civil War thatPejov concentrated, for the most part or on what the SNOF55and the NOFwere up to, their relations with the G reek Communist Party, and the doldrumsof the Slavomacedonian minority that obstinately stayed in Greece.56Tsipas57and Keramiiev58covered much the same ground as Pejov. Andonovski59

52. e, No. 22, May 1952.53. , No. 11, 17 June 1951.54. , No. 36, July 1953.55. SNOF [Slavomacedonian Peoples Liberation Front] = [

]. Activist organization of Slavomacedonians in Greece. Active throughoutthe Occupation of Greec e, its aim being the secession of Greek Macedonia.

56. See, for a sample, ve of Pejovs articles in e(in Slavmacedonian): Put a stop to theviolent terrorizing of our brethren in Aegean Macedonia, No. 3, ov. 1950, SNOFs work in the ranksof ELAS [the Greek National Liberation Army] in Aegean Macedonia, No. 4, Dec. 1950, The situationof our People in Aegean Macedonia, No. 11, 17 June 1951, A contribution to the truth stemmingfrom the 1st Congress of the NOF in Aegean Macedonia, No. 18, Jan. 1952, Hundreds of thousandsof Macedonians demand their minority rights, No. 40, ov. 1953.

57. Tsipass articles in e(in Slavmacedonian): On my own, No. 19, March 1952, The KKEand the Macedonian ethnic question, No. 29, Dec. 1952, No. 30, Jan. 1953, No. 31, Feb. 1953.

58. See Keramiievs art icles in e(in Slavmacedonian): We are ghting for the minorityrights of our People No. 4, Dec. 1950. See also his rst editorial leader for August 1951; he remainededitor until June 1953.

59. See Risto Andonovskis articles in e(in Slavmacedonian): Vodena and its inhabit-ants, No. 9, ay 1951, Irina Gionova-Mrka, No. 12, July 1951, In the hills of Aegean Macedonia,No. 18, Jan. 1952, No. 19, Feb. 1952, No. 22, May 1952, Is there or is there not a Macedonian Ques-tion for Greece in Aegean Macedonia?, No. 39, Oct. 1953, No. 40, ov. 1953, No. 42, Jan. 1954, No.43, Feb. 1954, No. 44, March 1954, Well-loved folksongs of Aegean Macedonia, No. 45, pr. 1954.


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and imovski60were chiey interested in folklore and are valuable in thatthey preserve much information about life in Greek Macedonia in the yearsbetween the two World Wars.

Articles from the newspaper were cannibalized for a book entitled [Aegean Macedonia], published by the Union of Refugees Pressin 1951, under Andonovksis name. Also in 1951, Keramiiev contributed anarticle to the collective work [Aeg ea n Ma c ed onia in our na t iona l h istory]. The newspapersdirectorate undertook the placing of his book and its distribution to refugeeorganizations. In August 1952, the URs Secretariat decided to set up an adhoc committee to opine on whether or not it was worth publishing two newbooks about the Occupation and the Greek Civil War, one by Andonovskiand one by Pejov.

It was as the Aegeans were compiling their own history that the rstyoung students entered the University of Skopje, newly founded in 1949. InJanuary 1952, the newspaper was able to report, with evident satisfaction,

60.See Todor imovskis articles in e(in Slavmacedonian): On the occasion of the forti-eth anniversary of the death of Risto Bataniev, teacher and revolutionary, No. 36, July 1953, In ourbirthplace of Dibeni, No. 39, ct. 1953, No. 40, ov. 1953, Goe Delev at Goumenissa, No. 46,May 1954.

The co-authored bookAege an Ma ce don i a in ou r

na tiona l histo ry.


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that there were now a total of ve students in the Universitys Faculty ofPhilosophy. These were Gjorgji Sevriev, Dimitar Velikov, Krste Bitovski, SpiroStojanski, and Kuzma Gjorgjevski. In 1952, Todor imovski became the rst

Aegean from the Faculty to take his degree, and at the start of the yearthe student roll included 47 Aegeans, with scholarships from PRM eachworth 4200 dinars a month.

The basic thing to note is that production of an ideological armoury of textsabout the Greek Civil War and the Ilinden Uprising lasted until 1954. Thesetexts were mainly for internal consumption by Aegean refugees. After 1954there followed a period in which the older stock of historical commentarieswas being legitimated and incorporated into PRMs collective nationalideology. It was also the year 1954 which saw the denitive settlement, evenif not quite the actual nish, of the issue about whether refugees should

remain in the country. Not that the production of history books specially forAegeans came to a halt. , theCentre for Macedonians in Exile, founded in 1951, continued the work ofthe UR, particularly in the political domain. And if Vo ice o f the Aeg ea nsdidfall silent in 1954, it was at once replaced by a monthly called Makedon i j a[], whose rst editor was none other than Andonovski, and anannual called The Exile s Ca le nd a r[ ].

It was not only ex-guerrillas fromGreece who were looking into thehistory of Aegean Macedonia

with interest. Before very longthis subject was introduced,as a separate category ofreference and research, into therepertoire of the SRMs ofcialorgan for such studies, IEE, theInstitute of National History.he had been founded bySRMs government in 1948, withone clear aim t o w rite a nd

publicize the ofcial history oft he Mac ed on ia n Peo p le, andto incorporate it into J ugoslavhistory as a whole.61On 1 J uly1956, delivering a speech forthe IEEs rst anniversary, infront of Party ofcials andacademic VIPs, imovski a

61.Vlado Ivanovski [B ] (ed.), 30 , [30 Yearsof the Institute of National History], [n.pl.], 1978.

Cover of the magazine,with the waterfalls at Edessa.


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refugee from the Kilkis district who had been the rst Aegean to join theInstitute, in 1952 said that one of the IEEs basic obligations ought to beto collect historical material, not just about the distant past, but about the

recent struggle of the Macedonians from Aegean Macedonia. Here (hesaid) events of great importance had taken place struggles worthy ofinclusion in the ofcial history, lest they be forgotten. 62imovskis promptingseems to have had its effect, for over the coming years a series of Aegeanhistorians were to join the Institute, their one and only task being to compile ahistory of Aegean Macedonia. In 1964, a post was found for Risto Poplazarov,from Kalohori near Kastoria, who four years earlier had graduated from thePhilosophical Faculty of the University of Prague in Czechoslovakia. In 1967,it was the turn of Krste Bitoshki, from the village of Gavros, also near Kastoria,who had completed his studies in the Philosophical Faculty of the University

of Skopje in 1956. They were joined in 1970 by Risto Iliovski, a child of thePa idomazoma,63who had studied in Budapest; in 1972 by Stojan Kiselinovski,another child of the Pa idomazoma, who had studied in Romania; in 1974by a Democratic Army veteran, Risto Kirjazovski; in 1976 by Vasil Gotevskifrom Idroussa, a history graduate of the University of Warsaw; and in 1977 byEleftheria Bambakovska, from Kardia near Kozani, a history graduate of theUniversity of Skopje.64Signicantly, by the end of the 1980s a quarter of allthe Institutes research fellows were of Greek extraction; and it was they whomonopolized the discussion of research on subjects of Greek interest. TheBalkanology Section was well known to be packed with Aegean staff. It washeaded by Rastislav Terzjovski from Perlepe [Prilep], and all its researcherswithout exception were of Aegean Macedonian origin: imovski, Kirjazovski,Kiselinovski, and Theodoros Papanagiotou.65In 1976 imovski was drafted tothe editorial team of the Institutes review [The M esse ng e r], to befollowed in 1979 by Iliovski and in 1983 by Bitoshki. (It is a striking fact thateven in todays FYROM, no historian hailing from any other region has writtenabout historical developments in Greek Macedonia). Thus their texts arefatally loaded with sentimental effusion, hyperbole, and hostile innuendotowards Greece. It is further interesting to note how the Aegean lobby, asthey call themselves, has imposed itself, with regard to Party legitimacy andpolitical approach, even on history as written in the J ugoslav Federation.

The rise of the Aegeans as academics in the 1960s and 70s went hand inglove with the war of words between the diplomats of Athens and Belgradeduring these two decades. The battle over the Macedonian Question, a

62. c, [The Annual Assembly of the Insti-tute of National History], , 1/1 (1957), 339.

63.[Pa i domazoma: the collecting up of minors. A term current during Seljuk and Ottoman occupationof Greece to denote the occupying powers seizure and reculturing of (male) children, some des -tined for high military or civilian ofce. Now more usually applied, by transference, to Greek Com-munist guerrillas abduction by of children from Greek territory to neighbouring Communist countries(contested by revisionist historians). Translators Note].

64. Ivanovski, op .c i t., pp. 46, 93, 101, 104, 112-113, 118.65. ibid, p. 30.


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battle as often as not fomented by the J ugoslavs, could now be based ona rich fund of reserves supplied by the Aegeans persevering though inthe wrong, and now with the legal blessing of the State.66A three-volumework, [The History of the M a c ed on ia nPeople], was published to great applause by the Institute of National Historyin 1969. It included extensive references to Aegean Macedonia, the textshaving been written by the troika Andonovski, imovski, and Bitoshki.

The same period saw the publication by the Institute of a whole seriesof books by other Aegeans. The great majority of them were by veteranguerrillas who had, rather late in the day, discovered that writing historycould be a road to rehabilitation.67Aegean historians were also now cominginto closer touch with the public in the rest of the J ugoslav Republics, as aresult of the printing of their own works in Belgrade, their appearances in

J ugoslav books of multiple authorship, and publication of their articles inJ ugoslav journals.68Aegean Slavomacedonian guerrillas could well afford

66.The passage of words between Konstantinos Karamanlis, then Greek Prime Minister, and uranovi,Federal Prime Minister of J ugoslavia, at Spilt in March 1979, afford a typical instance. The discussionsturned to the subject of cultural exchanges, whereupon uranovi remarked: In the d om a in o f b i -la te ra l co op era t ion the re is the m at te r o f the M ac ed on ian e thn ic m inor it y. Karamanlis immediatelyreplied that that was a reg retta b le issue in bilateral relations. He asked what the point was of theMacedonians digging up the Macedonian Question forty years on. uranovi answer was: Thereare no d i f fe rences be tw een Be lg rad e and Skop je on ma t te rs o f fo re ign po licy. The atmosphere wasdangerously charged. Karamanlis refused to discuss the subject any further, and the two leadersturned their attention to other matters. It was however plain that this skirmish about the Mac edonian

Question had overshadowed the summit talks. See Konstantinos Svolopoulos (ed.), . . [The Karam a nlis Arc hives], Vol. 11 1977-1980[G reec e in Europ e 1977-1980]. 1 1979 - 15 1980[Period II :1.1.1979-15.5.1980], thens, 1997, in Greek, pp. 64-68.

67.Good examples are Naum Pejovs , [The Mac edo -nians an d the C iv il War in G ree c e], Skopje, 1968, in Slavmacedonian; Ajanovski-Oches , [Storms in the A eg ea n], Skopje, 1975, in Slavmacedonian; and imovskis , [The inhab i ted reg ions o f Aeg ea n Ma ce do n ia], Vol. 1, Skopje, 1978, in Slav-macedonian.

68. Krste Vitoshki [ ], (1878-1908), [The Resistance of the Macedonians to attemptsby the armed Greek propaganda to assimilate them], , 4 (Bel-grade, 1969, in Slavmacedonian), 125-128; Risto Poplazarov [ ], - I ( 1888) [Some key moments in the Macedonians struggleagainst Greek and Bulgarian religious and educational domination in the later 19th century, up to

The newspaper[Makedon i a], Thessaloniki, 30 August 1953.


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to speak with pride of their pa rtin the Resistance, their workalongside Titos Partizani, andthe rectitude with which theytoed the J ugoslav Party line.These were very considerablevirtues when taken in relation

to the building of the J ugoslavFederal State.In the decades to come,

the slogan of an i r redentaAegean Macedonia wouldbe PRMs agship, usedwhenever the international

situation warranted it, a serviceablebludgeon at ofcial discussions between Greece and Jugoslavia. Thiswas the era of the non-existent Macedonian Question, the long haul ofthe Cold War. The allies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization found itexpedient to give preferential treatment to a J ugoslavia that did not toethe Soviet line. At the same time they put pressure on the powers that be inGreece not to rock the boat but to keep their mouths shut, since that waswhat the interests of the Western world dictated. The then Prime Minister ofGreece, Constantine Karamanlis, and his Foreign Minister, Averof, tasted thefruits of this Realpoli t ikea rly in the 1960s, when their Jugoslav counterpartsprecipitously withdrew the issue of unredeemed Macedonian regions fromthe conference agenda.

In the summer of 1960 one Slavomacedonian newspaper after anotherpublished articles attacking an alleged G reek policy against Slavophones

in Greek Macedonia. The lead was taken by the ofcial Government pressorgan, [New Ma ked on ija]. The campaign was reinforcedby speeches from Titos Foreign Minister, Drago Kun. Diplomatic reexeswere immediately triggered by these developments. On 2 J une 1960,

1888], , 4 (Belgrade, 1969, in Slavmacedonian), 103-110; Idem, XIX XX, [The writings of Macedonian historians on the history of the Macedonian people in the 19th andearly 20th century]; The Historiogra p hy o f Jugo slavia1965-1975 (Belgrade, 1975, in Slavmacedonian),298-323; Idem, - 1876 ., ,[Macedonian volunteers in the Serbo-Turkish War of 1876], 1-2 (Belgrade, 1976,in Slavmacedonian).

The three-volume Historyo f t he Ma ce don i an Peop le.


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The newspaper[Makedon i a],Thessaloniki, 20 J une

1950.

The newspaper[Makedon i a],Thessaloniki, 20 J une1950.

The newspaper[Make - don ia], Thessaloniki,9 September 1950.


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Dimitrios Nikolareizis, the Greek Ambassador to Belgrade, had a meetingwith the then Jugoslav Foreign Minister, Kosta Popovi, their agenda beingthe recent speeches by Kun, and the resuscitation of the Macedonian

Question by J ugoslav circles more generally. The meeting was revealing asto the Jugoslavs approach to the question and the arguments advancedby them. Popovi told his Greek guest quite frankly that in Jugoslaviasview there did exist a Macedonian minority in Greece. Taken aback,the Greek Ambassador replied that this was a se riou s thing to sa y. Hewent on: We ha ve a lwa ys b ee n und er the im p ression tha t it wa s on lyc irc les in Skop je tha t b roug ht up a ny que st ion o f a M a c ed on ia n m ino rit y ;

and t ha t t he Gove rnmen t in Be lg rad e neve r encou rag ed t hem t o b ring

suc h a q uest ion up. He assured Popovi that his Government would reactviolent ly when it heard this piece of news; and that Premier Karamanlis

would be enraged, especially since he was just about to pay an ofcialvisit to Belgrade.69Popovi rejoined drily, no doubt hoping to play down theunfortunate impression he had made, that his government could hardlyoverlook the existence of a Macedonian minority in Greece, since thiswould be a departure from their principles. At the same time, (he said), hequite understood the Greek position.

One month later, in J uly, the Foreign Ministers of the two countries,Averof and Popovi, met at Titos bower, the Brijuni Islands. At the topof their agenda was the Macedonian Question. Popovi repeated thefamiliar position of J ugoslavia: it was impossible for Belgrade to ignore theexistence of a kindred,Macedonian minority in Greece, without saying

a word, when Greece was involved in acts of provokats iato this minoritysdetriment. This was a position rooted (he said) in rm Jugoslav convictions.The Federal Government could not exercise control of statements by localgovernments, or of w hat the p a p ers sa id. He did however accept thatthis would not have occurred to the same degree by comparison withGreece. Averof, visibly annoyed by what his counterpart had just said,replied with emphasis that the minority question m ig ht wel l b low G ree k-Jug o sla v relat io ns sky-hig h. He advised Popovi to be more prudent. Therewere, after all, SRM documents which referred to Greek Macedonia asAegean Macedonia. Wha t is Skop je im p ly ing he re? (he enquired). Tha t

G ree k Ma c ed on ia d oe s not e x ist? O r tha t it oug ht not to ex ist? This wo uldm e a n w a r . But despite this verbal sparring, the two Ministers meetingappears to have ended in a gentlemans agreement to avoid any actionthat might poison bilateral relations.

At the beginning of October 1960, in a speech to the Peoples Parliamentof Makedonija, with the J ugoslav Federal Vice-President Kardelj inattendance, Prime Minister Kolievski insisted that the presence of aMacedonian minority in Greece was an incontrovertible historical fact.

69.Kofos Archives. Talks between Nikolareizis and Popovi, 2 June 1960.


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No one (he said) could prevent his People taking an interest in their fate. 70These irredentist speeches in SRM were not without their consequences.

This time the fuse was an answer that the new Prime Minister, Aleksandar

Grilo, gave an American journalist at a reception for members of the Press,on 14 November 1961. Greece was (he said) taking c e r ta in d isq uiet ingmeasures to the detriment of the Macedonian minority. Grilo also toldthe journalist that Athens ultimate policy aim was to efface the minoritysethnic consciousness.71Finally, he repeated his countrys xed position thatthe only way bilateral relations between Makedonija and G reece could beimproved was by Greeces recognizing minority rights. Two days later, theJ ugoslav Ambassador at Athens was summoned by Averof for a friendlyrap over the knuckles for Grilos indiscreet remarks. The ambassador madelight of them, and, in the hope of showing that they were not espoused by

Belgrade, he assured the Greek Foreign Minister that they had not beenpublished in Borba[the ofcial Party paper] or transmitted by Ta n jug[theState News Agency].72

Now that there was a bush war of speeches, Averof himself entered thefray, on 7 December 1961. In an address to the Greek Parliament, the ForeignMinister described the Grilo speech as unac cep t ab l e , and repeated thexed Greek position, that no Macedonian minority existed in the country. Aweek later, on 15 December, a spokesman for the Jugoslav Foreign Minister,Kun, made use of Averofs address for a whitewash of Makedonijas PrimeMinister, repeating his countrys rm position that there was indeed aMacedonian minority in Greece and adding that nothing but giving thisminority their rights would normalize bilateral relations.

Generous measures were taken by the local SRM government at thistime for the benet of their refugees from Greece. A law was passedin 1961 recognizing service in the ranks of NOF or SNOF as a period ofemployment. (This measure had been in force earlier, but only for service inthe DSE: it had been discontinued in 1956 in deference to Greek-Jugoslavfriendship). Many refugees had also been given awards for servicesrendered to their country; and a fair number of others had got a pension.Three leading Aegean cadres had been elected Peoples Deputies. Twoof them went on to hold a ministerial post: Pejov, as Minister of Farming

and Forests, and Mitrevski, as Deputy Minister of Peoples Legislation.Keramiiev became a Deputy and, like Ajanovski-Oche, a senior ofcialin the Ministry of the Interior. Tako Hadjijanev became a seni