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Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

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Page 1: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Psychological models of concepts

James A. Hampton

City University London

Page 2: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

What are concepts?

“Without concepts, mental life would be chaotic.” Smith & Medin 1981

“Concepts are the glue that holds are mental world together .. They tie our past experiences to our present interactions with the world” Murphy 2002

Page 3: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

What are concepts?

“The elements from which propositional thought is constructed, thus providing a means of understanding the world, concepts are used to interpret our current experience by classifying it as being of a particular kind, and hence relating it to prior knowledge.”

(Hampton, MITECS 1999)

Page 4: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Why do concepts matter?

How concepts are defined may have serious consequences, and can be at the basis of political and legal debate:

Examples:- abortion and euthanasia - how to define

“human” and “murder”

- marriage - should it include gay relationships

- drugs - cannabis legislation

Page 5: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Lecture synopsis:

We will look more closely at the notion of a Concept largely from a Psychological point of view, based on empirical evidence: how do we represent concepts in our minds?

how do we use them in our thinking?

We will consider two models in particularClassical model (Aristotle)

Prototype model (Rosch; Hampton)

Page 6: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Two models of concepts

Classical concepts - with explicit definitions and logical taxonomies

Prototype concepts - based on similarity to an "average" or idealized exemplar

Page 7: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

SOME TERMINOLOGY

Concept: a mental representation of a class of things – a type

Category: the set of things that are included in the concept class

Exemplar (= instance) one of the set of things in the category

Attribute (= property = feature) a predicate which can be true or false of a thing (exemplar) or class of things (category or concept)

Page 8: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Frege (1848 – 1925)

Intension / Sense(logically) the criterion by which membership

of a class is determined

(psychologically) the set of attributes that you associate with a particular class

Extension / Referencethe set of members of a class

what the term refers to

Page 9: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

What defines the concept – intension or extension?

Intensions – for many terms are culturally relative, individually variable, subject to revision

Extensions – insufficient to individuate concepts since two concepts can have the same extension, or a concept may have no extension at all

Logically - triangle and trilateral

Contingently - Hollywood actor presidents and Husbands of Nancy Davis

Empty – unicorns, highest prime number

Page 10: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

KNOWLEDGE and CONCEPTS

The problem of knowledge: the dictionary and the encyclopaedia

Failure to distinguish them leads to “holism” Any new fact changes the meaning of the terms used

Different people hold different beliefs so their conceptual systems are never commensurate

“if a lion could talk, we could not understand him”

Ludwig Wittgenstein

Page 11: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Circularity

As with dictionary definitions, some models define concepts in terms of each other

Must assume there is a level of “primitives”, from which more complex terms are defined

e.g. physics has fundamental undefined concepts of mass, length, time and current

complex thoughts are derived from their elements and their means of combination – principle of “compositionality”

Page 12: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Model 1The Classical Model:attributed to Aristotle

A concept is a class of things which all have certain attributes in common

Everything which is in the class must possess all these attributes

Everything which possesses all these attributes must be in the class

Attributes are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for category membership.

Page 13: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Classical Model

What is a bachelor (scapolo)?

Classical concepts are defined by a conjunction of necessary features which are together sufficient to pick out all bachelors and just bachelors

Page 14: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Examples of classical concepts?

Biology Law Mathematics Kinship

Page 15: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Carl Linnaeus 1707-1778

Classical taxonomyGenus and differentia

Page 16: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Classical hierarchical taxonomy

Vertebrate

Mammal Reptile

Canine

Dog

Rottweiler

Fox

Chihuahua

Page 17: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Advantages of classical model:

Taxonomic Structure. Subsets in the tree are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive of the next class up. A “clean” way to divide up the world

Efficient Storage – each concept needs only its link to a superordinate plus its distinctive attributes

Inferences – many deductions can be made from the taxonomy (all rottweilers have hearts)

Page 18: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Advantages of the Classical Model

Defining features provide accounts ofAnalytic vs Contingent Truth

Dictionary vs Encyclopaedia

Page 19: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

The classical model - evidence

Collins and Quillian (1969) evaluated a hierarchical taxonomic model of concepts by measuring response times to verify or falsify sentences

Category statements “A canary is a bird”

Property statements “A canary can fly”

Page 20: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Collins & Quillian 1969A network representation of memory

Page 21: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Results

Page 22: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

The classical model - evidence

the greater the number of links in the hierarchy between the subject noun and the predicate, the slower people were to say the statement was true.

Page 23: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

But…. for false sentences, Collins & Quillian found the time to

say they were false was faster the further apart the two concepts were

A canary is a fish vs. A canary is a flower

Smith, Shoben & Rips (1974) showed that there are hierarchies where more distant categories can be faster to categorize than closer ones A chicken is a bird

was slower to verify than

A chicken is an animal

Animal

Bird

Chicken

Page 24: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

General problems for the model

People find it very difficult to give explicit definitions of most concepts. Either they don’t know the defining features, or those defining features do not exist.

(Hampton, 1979, McNamara & Sternberg, 1983)

There is vagueness and uncertainty in many concept classes – what exactly is a bug or a fish, what differentiates a spaniel from a terrier?

Many domains do not have any obvious taxonomy

The model doesn’t explain why we have the concepts that we do, and not others

Page 25: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Model 2: Prototypes

Eleanor Rosch Carolyn Mervis

Page 26: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Second Model - The Prototype Model

Concepts are represented in the mind by “prototypes” which are summary representations of the average or ideal members of a class

Membership in the conceptual category is determined by similarity to the prototype

Page 27: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Four prototype phenomena

1. people cannot give explicit definitions of the concepts (Hampton, 1979; Wittgenstein, 1953)

2. when asked to list attributes that are relevant to the definition, they include attributes which are not true of all category exemplars (Hampton, 1979)

3. people cannot agree on whether some cases fall in the concept class or not, and change their minds from one occasion to the next (McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978)

4. people reliably judge that some exemplars are better, more representative examples of the concept than others - "typicality" (Rosch, 1975)

Page 28: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Prototype model of concepts

A prototype consists of a set of attributes (an intension)

These are attributes which are mutually predictive within a particular general domain

Items belong to the concept class if they possess enough of these attributes

Page 29: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Example - creatures

creatures differ in their number of legs, mode of locomotion, skin covering etc.

having two legs, flying and being covered in feathers are strongly correlated - if a creature has one, then the likelihood of it having the others is increased.

Concepts reflect this pattern of correlation

Page 30: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Example: BIRDAn object is a bird if it has a sufficient similarity

to the prototype of the class, as defined in terms of the following attributes:flies

has feathers

has wings

has two legs

has a beak

lays eggs

Page 31: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

The Prototype Model - Evidence

Rosch and Mervis (1975) "Family resemblances”Typical category members have more features in

common with the other members, and fewer in common with contrasting categories

Rosch (1975)Typical category members are faster to categorize,

and more similar to the general notion of the category

Hampton (1979)

Page 32: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Hampton (1979)1. Interviewed people about the meaning of concepts like “fruit”

“furniture” “vehicle”, and produced a feature list

Fruit1. Contains seeds2. Has an outer layer of skin or peel3. Is edible, is eaten4. Is juicy, thirst quenching5. Is sweet6. Is eaten as a dessert, snack or on its own7. Grows Is a plant, organic, vegetation8. Grows above ground, on bushes or trees9. Is brightly coloured10. Is round11. Is a protection for seeds

Page 33: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Hampton 19792. People judged a list of words according to how confident they

were that the word was a kind of fruit or not Orange 100%

Raisin 87%

Tomato 71%

Rhubarb 54%

Gourd 43%

Marrow 23%

Garlic 12%

Mushroom 5%

3. People judged whether each word (e.g. garlic) had each feature (e.g. contains seeds)

Page 34: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Hampton 1979

For most categories, there was no classical definition

There are many borderline cases Degree of category membership reflects the

number of features that an exemplar possesses

Page 35: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Rosch 1975 – substitutability test.

Ss generated a sentence using the category name “Birds fly past my window in the morning”. Then replace “BIRD” with either a typical or an atypical exemplar, and see if the sentence is still meaningful – more likely to be meaningful for a typical member.

Page 36: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Examples of prototypes:

Evidence has been found for prototype structure in:Biological kind categories (fish, insects etc)

Food categories (fruit, vegetables, flavours)

Artifacts (tools, furniture, weapons, vehicles)

Diagnostic categories (in psychiatry)

Personality trait concepts (extrovert, shy)

Activity concepts (sport, game, science, lying, art)

Page 37: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Advantages of the Prototype Model

The model captures all four phenomena: the lack of explicit definitions

the relevance of attributes which are not common to all exemplars

the existence of borderline cases

the existence of differences in typicality among exemplars

Page 38: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Learning

Unlike classical concepts, prototypes can be learned from the environment provided that a starting set of attributes is selected as likely to be relevant

It explains why have have these concepts and not others

Prototypes can be easily learned by simple neural mechanisms that learn the statistical properties of the environment

Page 39: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

PDP Model for concept learning

McClelland & Rumelhart (1985)Neural network linking feature nodes

to category nodes

Start with random weights on links and change links by error feedback

Rogers & McClelland (2003)models concept learning in children –

global distinctions first Jay McClelland

Page 40: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Conceptual structure becomes

represented here

Used the taxonomy from Collins & Quillian 1969

Page 41: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

SIMILARITY CLUSTERS

Page 42: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Rosch Simpson and Miller 1976

Experiments on learning categories of artificial stimuli. Similarity to the prototype and distance from a contrasting prototype dictatedSpeed of learning

Speed of verification

Accuracy of verification

Recall of category exemplars

Page 43: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Evidence for prototypes in reasoning

The classical model provides a firm basis for logical reasoning, and is preferred by some philosophers for this reason

The prototype model provides an explanation for non-logical reasoning, as demonstrated in many psychology experiments

Page 44: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Hampton (1982): Intransitivity in categorical reasoning

Subjects agreed that "Car-seats are a kind of chair"

and that

"Chairs are a kind of furniture"

but not that

"Car-seats are a kind of furniture"

Page 45: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Tversky & Kahneman (1985): Conjunction fallacy

Subjects were told a story about a woman, Linda, who had been involved in liberal politics at college. Later they had to judge which was more probable about Linda now:

1. Linda is a bank teller

2. Linda is a feminist

3. Linda is a feminist bank teller

They preferred (3) to (1), although (1) includes (3). They were influenced by the similarity between the

description of Linda and their prototype of a feminist

Page 46: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

The Prototype model - evaluation

The main criticisms of the model relate to its failings to provide a rich enough representation of conceptual knowledge how can we think logically if our concepts are so vague?

Why do we have concepts which incorporate objects which are clearly dissimilar, and exclude others which are apparently similar (e.g. mammals)?

how do our concepts manage to be flexible and adaptive, if they are fixed to the similarity structure of the world?

if each of us represents the prototype differently, how can we identify when we have the same concept, as opposed to two different concepts with the same label?

Page 47: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Concepts as theories

A development of the prototype idea to include more structure in the prototype

Concepts provide us with the means to understand our world

They are not just the labels for clusters of similar things They contain causal/explanatory structure, explaining

why things are the way they are They help us to predict and explain the world

Page 48: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

What information do our concepts include?

AttributesBirds:

Two wings Two legs Flies Eats insects or worms or grain…etc

Relational InformationRelations between attributes

Relations between concepts

Page 49: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Sloman, Love & Ahn, 1998

Has wings Has feathers

Light weightFlies

Has two legs

Lays eggs

Hops

Builds nests

Centrality of a feature is based on its links to other features

Page 50: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Concepts need to help us explain things

Page 51: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Choosing a concept for its explanatory value

What do correct concepts have that more naïve ones lack? EG VOLUME

Concepts like volume are embedded in a web of inter-related concepts

Each is part of the whole, and is defined at least partly by the role it plays in the theory which the whole structure represents.

Page 52: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Defining a concept of physical volume:

Different naive definitions of volume are possiblehow high up a glass the liquid comes

the height in the glass times the width of the glass

postal regulation (e.g. length plus circumference)

Page 53: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Naive concepts of "size" and "amount"

Example of measurements of parcel size: USA = a + 2(b+c), where a is the longest side

France = a.(b+c)

Correct definition = a.b.c

ab

c

Page 54: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

What makes a concept “correct”?

What does the correct concept of volume have that more naive ones lack?stability under transformation

e.g. conservation tasks (Piaget)

link with underlying theory of matter

e.g. atomic theory internal consistency

e.g. thought experiments - breaking a cube into smaller cubes relation to other concepts

e.g. area, displacement volume (Archimedes)

Page 55: Psychological models of concepts James A. Hampton City University London

Conclusions Classical model provides the basis for logic

and reasoning – but people are not very good at logic and reasoning

Prototypes capture the way that our minds adapt to the similarity of things in the world

Deeper structure is needed to allow us to use concepts to explain the world, to go beyond surface appearance of things and discover underlying principles.