PubCorp Cases 3

8/12/2019 PubCorp Cases 3

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[G.R. No. L-59180. January 29, 1987.]

CLEMENTINO TORRALBA and RE L. RUGAY,petitioners,vs.THE MUNICIPALITY OF SIBAGAT,

PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR and ITS MUNICIPAL OFFICERS,respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J p:

Challenged in the instant Petition, as violative of Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, is BatasPambansa Blg. 56, enacted on 1 February 1980, creating the Municipality of Sibagat, Province of Agusan de

Sur. The pertinent provisions of BP 56 read:

"Sec. 1The barangay of Ilihan, Sinai, Sibagat, El Rio, Afga, Tabontabon, Perez, Magsaysay, Santa Cruz,

Santa Maria, San Isido, Villagit, Del Rosario, Anahauan, Mahayahay, and San Vicente, all in the Municipality

of Bayugan, Province of Agusan del Sur, are hereby separated from said municipality to form and constitute

an independent Municipality of Sibagat without affecting in any manner the legal existence of the mother

Municipality of Bayugan.

"Sec. 2.The boundaries of the new Municipality of Sibagat will be: Beginning at the point of intersection of

the Cabadbaran-Old Bayugan and Surigao del Sur boundaries; thence in a southernly direction following theOld Bayugan and Cabadbaran, Old Bayugan and Butuan City, Old Bayugan and Las Nieves boundaries, until

it reaches the point of intersection of Old Bayugan, Esperanza and the Municipality of Las Nieves; . . .

"Sec. 3.The seat of government of the newly created municipality shall be in Barangay Sibagat.

"Sec. 4.Except as herein provided, all provisions of laws, now or hereafter applicable to regular

municipalities shall be applicable to the new Municipality of Sibagat.

"Sec. 5.After ratification by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite to be conducted in the area or

areas affected within a period of ninety (90) days after the approval of this Act, the President (Prime

Minister) shall appoint the Mayor and other Officials of the new Municipality of Sibagat."

Petitioners are residents and taxpayers of Butuan City, with petitioner, Clementino Torralba, being amember of the Sangguniang Panglunsod of the same City. Respondent municipal officers are the local

public officials of the new Municipality. prcd

Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution, said to have been infringed, is reproduced hereunder:

"Sec. 3.No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its

boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government

Code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units

affected."

The thrust of petitioners' argument is that under the aforequoted provision, the Local Government Code

must first be enacted to determine the criteria for the creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantialalteration of the boundary of any province, city, municipality, or barrio; and that since no Local Government

Code had as yet been enacted as of the date BP 56 was passed, that statute could not have possibly

complied with any criteria when respondent Municipality was created, hence, it is null and void.

It is a fact that the Local Government Code came into being only on 10 February 1983 so that when BP

56 was enacted, the code was not yet in existence. The evidence likewise discloses that a plebiscite had

been conducted among the people of the unit/units affected by the creation of the new Municipality, who

expressed approval thereof; and that officials of the newly created Municipality had been appointed and

had assumed their respective positions as such.


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We find no trace of invalidity of BP 56. The absence of the Local Government Code at the time of its

enactment did not curtail nor was it intended to cripple legislative competence to create municipal

corporations. Section 3, Article XI of the 1973 Constitution does not proscribe nor prohibit the modification

of territorial and political subdivisions before the enactment of the Local Government Code. It contains no

requirement that the Local Government Code is a condition sine qua nonfor the creation of a municipality,

in much the same way that the creation of a new municipality does not preclude the enactment of a Local

Government Code. What the Constitutional provision means is that once said Code is enacted, the creation,

modification or dissolution of local government units should conform with the criteria thus laid down. In theinterregnum, before the enactment of such Code, the legislative power remains plenary except that the

creation of the new local government unit should be approved by the people concerned in a plebiscite

called for the purpose.

The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat conformed to said requisite. A plebiscite was conducted and

the people of the unit/units affected endorsed and approved the creation of the new local government unit

(parag. 5, Petition; p. 7, Memorandum). In fact, the conduct of said plebiscite is not questioned herein. The

officials of the new Municipality have effectively taken their oaths of office and are performing their

functions. A de jureentity has thus been created.

It is a long-recognized principle that the power to create a municipal corporation is essentially legislative in

nature. In the absence of any constitutional limitations, a legislative body may create any corporation it

deems essential for the more efficient administration of government (I McQuillin, Municipal Corporations,

3rd ed., 509). The creation of the new Municipality of Sibagat was a valid exercise of legislative power then

vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Interim Batasang Pambansa. LibLex

We are not unmindful of the case of Tan vs. COMELEC (142 SCRA 727 [1986]), striking down as

unconstitutional BP Blg. 885 creating a new province in the Island of Negros known as the Province of

Negros del Norte, and declaring the plebiscite held in connection therewith as illegal. There are significant

differences, however, in the two cases among which may be mentioned the following: in the Tancase, the

Local Government Code a]ready existed at the time that the challenged statute was enacted on 3

December 1985; not so in the case at bar. Secondly, BP Bldg. 885 in the Tancase confined the plebiscite to

the "proposed new province" to the exclusion of the voters in the remaining areas, in contravention of the

Constitutional mandate and of the Local Government Code that the plebiscite should be held "in the unit or

units affected." In contrast, BP 56 specifically provides for a plebiscite "in the area or areas affected." In

fact, as previously stated, no question is raised herein as to the legality of the plebiscite conducted. Thirdly,

in the Tancase, even the requisite area for the creation of a new province was not complied with in BP Blg.

885. No such issue in the creation of the new municipality has been raised here. And lastly, "indecent

haste" attended the enactment of BP Blg. 885 and the holding of the plebiscite thereafter in the Tancase;

on the other hand, BP 56 creating the Municipality of Sibagat, was enacted in the normal course of

legislation, and the plebiscite was held within the period specified in that law.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 114783. December 8, 1994.]

ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and ROBERTO

R. TOBIAS, JR.petitioners,vs.HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER

WILLIAM MARCELINO, and THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong,

Metro Manila,respondents.


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D E C I S I O N

BIDIN, J p:

Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the

constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of

Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."

Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan belonged toonly one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional representative of this

legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675. President Ramos signed R.A.

No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994.

Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people of

Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of Mandaluyong into

a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the plebiscite was only 14.41% of

the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911 voted "no." By virtue of these

results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.

Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII, Section 49

thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the Constitution.

Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:

"As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district with the first

representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage of this Act. The remainder of

the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong shall become the new legislative district of San Juan

with its first representative to be elected at the same election."

Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes the "one

subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the Constitution, to wit:

"Sec. 26 (1).Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed inthe title thereof."

Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter

embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city;

and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate districts.

Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A. No.

7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as expressed

in the title of the law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that stated in the title of

the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been complied with.

Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5 (1) and (4) of the Constitution, whichprovide, to wit:

"Sec. 5 (1).The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty

members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among

the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective

inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall

be elected through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations."

"Sec. 5(4).Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a

reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this section."


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Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts under

Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of

Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5 (1) of the Constitution. Furthermore, petitioners

contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject municipalities

have attained the minimum population requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that Section 49 has the

effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts pursuant to Sec. 5 (4) as

aforecited.

The contentions are devoid of merit.

Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the statutory conversion of

Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand

indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative"provisoin the Constitution:

". . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least

one representative" (Article VI, Section 5 (3), Constitution).

Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a separate

congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No.

7675.

Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a

subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is a natural

and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A. No. 7675. "An

Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of Mandaluyong" necessarily

includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding the creation of a separate

congressional district for Mandaluyong.

Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this court

so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, inSumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]), we ruled that

the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be given a practical

rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such requirement if the titleexpresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that general subject."

The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v.

Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:

"Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment, language of

such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. It

suffices if the title should serve the purpose of the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the

persons interested in the subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequencesof the

proposed law and its operation" (emphasis supplied).

Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect that there is no mentionin the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the minimum

requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative districts, the same does

not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys the presumption of having

passed through the regular congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of

Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate legislative districts. At any rate, it

is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature must contain all relevant data considered by

Congress in the enactment of said laws.


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As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives as set

forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5 (1), as aforequoted,

shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the

House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided by

law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present composition of Congress may be

increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative enactment. Therefore, the increase in

congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.

Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have separate legislative

districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.

As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to

reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook the

glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed law,

including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to itself.

Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further arguments against the

validity thereof.

Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the plebiscite

on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention is bereft of

merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly

urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only ancillary thereto. Thus, the

inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as they had nothing to do with the

change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.

Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering," which is

the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of

credence. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo Zamora, the

author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San Juan/Mandaluyong district,

having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency

has in fact been diminished, which development could hardly be considered as favorable to him.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 89651. November 10, 1989.]

DATU FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, DATU BLO UMPAR ADIONG, DATU MACALIMPOWAC

DELANGALEN, CELSO PALMA, ALI MONTAHA BABAO, JULMUNIR JANNARAL, RASHID SABER,and DATU JAMAL ASHLEY ABBAS, representing the other taxpayers of

Mindanao,petitioners,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and HONORABLE GUILLERMO C.

CARAGUE, DEPARTMENT SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT,respondents.

[G.R. No. 89965. November 10, 1989.]

ATTY. ABDULLAH D. MAMA-O,petitioner,vs. HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as the

Secretary of the Budget, and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

Abbas, Abbas, Amora, Alejandro-Abbas & Associatesfor petitioners in G.R. Nos. 89651 and 89965.


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Abdullah D.Mama-ofor and in his own behalf in 89965.

SYLLABUS

1.CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6734 (AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR

AUTONOMOUS REGION IN MUSLIM MINDANAO); STANDARD FOR INQUIRY INTO ITS VALIDITY,

PROVIDED FOR IN THE CONSTITUTION, NOT THE PROVISIONS OF THE TRIPOLI AGREEMENT. It is

now the Constitution itself that provides for the creation of an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao. The

standard for any inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734 would therefore be what is so provided in theConstitution. Thus, any conflict between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and the provisions of the Tripoli

Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining the implementation of the Organic Act. cdasia

2.ID.; ID.; AN AMENDMENT TO THE TRIPOLI AGREEMENT. Assuming for the sake of argument that the

Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty or international agreement, it would then constitute part of the law of

the land. But as internal law it would not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of the Congress of the

Philippines, rather it would be in the same class as the latter [SALONGA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 320

(4th ed., 1974), citing Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) and Foster v. Nelson, 2 Pet. 253 (1829)].

Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would be amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement, being a subsequent law.

3.ID.; ID.; CREATION OF THE AUTONOMOUS REGION SHALL TAKE EFFECT ONLY WHEN APPROVED BY A

MAJORITY OF THE VOTES CAST BY THE CONSTITUENTS UNITS IN A PLEBISCITE. Under the

Constitution and R.A. No. 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect only when

approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces

and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous region.

4.ID.; ID.; ID.; MAJORITY VOTE IN EACH CONSTITUENT UNITS, EMPHASIZED. Comparing Article XVIII,

Section 27 of the Constitution with the provision on the creation of the autonomous region under Art. X,

sec. 18. parag. 2, it will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region made to depend, not on

the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and

the proviso underscores this. For if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority

of the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the

ratification of the Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved

by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose." It is thus clear that what is required

by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units

and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put together, as well as in the individual

constituent units.

5.ID.; ID.; ASCERTAINMENT BY CONGRESS OF THE AREAS THAT SHOULD CONSTITUTE THE

AUTONOMOUS REGION, A POLITICAL QUESTION. The Constitution lays down the standards by which

Congress shall determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these

constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common attributes is within

the exclusive realm of the legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into

the wisdom of the law. This the Court cannot do without doing violence to the separation of governmental

powers. cdll

6.ID.; BILL OF RIGHTS; EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE; PERMITS OF REASONABLE CLASSIFICATION; CASE

AT BAR. Equal protection permits of reasonable classification. InDumlao v.Commission on

Elections[G.R. No. 52245, January 22, 1980, 95 SCRA 392], the Court ruled that one class may be treated

differently from another where the groupings are based on reasonable and real distinctions. The guarantee

of equal protection is thus not infringed in this case, the classification having been made by Congress on

the basis of substantial distinctions as set forth by the Constitution itself.


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7.ID.; JUDICIAL POWER; ACTUAL CONTROVERSY, ESSENTIAL. As enshrined in the Constitution, judicial

power includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and

enforceable [Art. VIII, Sec. 1]. As a condition precedent for the power to be exercised, an actual

controversy between litigants must first exist.

8.ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. In the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists.

There are no conflicting claims involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of

religious freedom. This being so, the Court in this case may not be called upon to resolve what is merely a

perceived potential conflict between the provisions of the Muslim Code and national law.

9.ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS, CONSTRUED. Administrative regions are not territorial and political

subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays [see Art. X, sec. 1 of the Constitution]. They

are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative purposes [Integrated Reorganization Plan

(1972), which was made as part of the law of the land by Pres. Dec. No. 1, Pres. Sec. No. 742].

10.ID.; PRESIDENT; POWER TO MERGE ADMINISTRATIVE REGIONS; NOT IN CONFLICT WITH THE

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION REQUIRING A PLEBISCITE IN THE MERGER OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT

UNITS. While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution,

it is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of

general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, sec. 4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflictbetween the power of the President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision

requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a

merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative

regions.

11.ID.; REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6734; ORGANIZATION OF THE OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE, WILL NOT DELAY

THE CREATION OF THE AUTONOMOUS REGION. Under the Constitution, the creation of the autonomous

region hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. If the Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes

cast by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation of the autonomous region immediately

takes effect. The questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an Oversight Committee to supervise the

transfer do not provide for a different date of effectivity. Much less would the organization of the OversightCommittee cause an impediment to the operation of the Organic Act, for such is evidently aimed at

effecting a smooth transition period for the regional government.

12.REMEDIAL LAW; BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS; EVERY LAW HAS IN ITS FAVOR THE

PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY; CASE AT BAR. Every law has in its favor the presumption of

constitutionality. Those who petition this Court to declare a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must

clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise, their petition must fail.

D E C I S I O N

CORTES, J p:

The present controversy relates to the plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao

and Palawan,1scheduled for November 19, 1989, in implementation of Republic Act No. 6734, entitled "An

Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao."

These consolidated petitions pray that the Court: (1) enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from

conducting the plebiscite and the Secretary of Budget and Management from releasing funds to

the COMELEC for that purpose; and (2) declare R.A. No. 6734, or parts thereof, unconstitutional.

After a consolidated comment was filed by the Solicitor General for the respondents, which the Court

considered as the answer, the case was deemed submitted for decision, the issues having been joined.
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Subsequently, petitioner Mama-o filed a "Manifestation with Motion for Leave to File Reply on Respondents'

Comment and to Open Oral Arguments," which the Court noted.

The arguments against R.A. No. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized into either of the

following:

(a)that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and

(b)that certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.The Tripoli Agreement, more specifically, the Agreement Between the Government of the Republic of the

Philippines and Moro National Liberation Front with the Participation of the Quadripartite Ministerial

Commission Members of the Islamic Conference and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic

Conference" took effect on December 23, 1976. It provided for "[t]he establishment of Autonomy in the

Southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of the

Philippines" and enumerated the thirteen (13) provinces comprising the "areas of autonomy." 2

In 1987, a new Constitution was ratified, which for the first time provided for regional autonomy. Article X,

section 15 of the charter provides that "[t]here shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao

and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common

and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevantcharacteristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial

integrity of the Republic of the Philippines." cdasia

To effectuate this mandate, the Constitution further provides:

Sec. 16.The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that the laws

are faithfully executed.

Sec. 17.All powers, functions, and responsibilities not granted by this Constitution or by law to the

autonomous regions shall be vested in the National Government.Sec. 18.The Congress shall enact an organic act for each autonomous region with the assistance and

participation of the regional consultative commission composed of representatives appointed by the

President from a list of nominees from multisectoral bodies. The organic act shall define the basic structure

of government for the region consisting of the executive department and legislative assembly, both of

which shall be elective and representative of the constituent political units. The organic acts shall likewise

provide for special courts with personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with the provisions

of this Constitution and national laws.

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by

the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only the provinces, cities, and

geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.

Sec. 19.The first Congress elected under this Constitution shall, within eighteen months from the time of

organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the

Cordilleras.

Sec. 20.Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws,

the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:

(1)Administrative organization;


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(2)Creation of sources of revenues;

(3)Ancestral domain and natural resources;

(4)Personal, family, and property relations;

(5)Regional urban and rural planning development;

(6)Economic, social and tourism development;

(7)Educational policies;

(8)Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and

(9)Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the people

of the region.

Sec. 21.The preservation of peace and order within the regions shall be the responsibility of the local police

agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and utilized in accordance with applicable laws.

The defense and security of the region shall be the responsibility of the National Government. llcd

Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, R.A. No. 6734 was enacted and signed into law on August 1, 1989.

1.The Court shall dispose first of the second category of arguments raised by petitioners, i.e. that certain

provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement.

Petitioners premise their arguments on the assumption that the Tripoli Agreement is part of the law of the

land, being a binding international agreement. The Solicitor General asserts that the Tripoli Agreement is

neither a binding treaty, not having been entered into by the Republic of the Philippines with a sovereign

state and ratified according to the provisions of the 1973 or 1987 Constitutions, nor a binding international

agreement.

We find it neither necessary nor determinative of the case to rule on the nature of the Tripoli Agreement

and its binding effect on the Philippine Government whether under public international or internal Philippine

law. In the first place, it is now the Constitution itself that provides for the creation of an autonomous

region in Muslim Mindanao. The standard for any inquiry into the validity of R.A. No. 6734 would therefore

be what is so provided in the Constitution. Thus, any conflict between the provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and

the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining the implementation of the

Organic Act. Assuming for the sake of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty or

international agreement, it would then constitute part of the law of the land. But as internal law it would

not be superior to R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of the Congress of the Philippines, rather it would be in the

same class as the latter [SALONGA, PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 320 (4th ed., 1974), citing Head Money

Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884) and Foster v. Nelson, 2 Pet. 253 (1829)]. Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734 would

be amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement, being a subsequent law. Only a determination by this Court

that R.A. No. 6734 contravenes the Constitution would result in the granting of the reliefs sought.32.The Court shall therefore only pass upon the constitutional questions which have been raised by

petitioners.

Petitioner Abbas argues that R.A. No. 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region in Mindanao,

contrary to the aforequoted provisions of the Constitution on the autonomous region which make the

creation of such region dependent upon the outcome of the plebiscite. LexLib

In support of his argument, petitioner cites Article II, section 1(1) of R.A. No. 6734 which declares that

"[t]here is hereby created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of provinces and
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cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the purpose, in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the

Constitution." Petitioner contends that the tenor of the above provision makes the creation of an

autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an

autonomous region would still be created composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were

obtained.

The matter of the creation of the autonomous region and its composition needs to be clarified.

First, the questioned provision itself in R.A. No. 6734 refers to Section 18, Article X of the Constitutionwhich sets forth the conditions necessary for the creation of the autonomous region. The reference to the

constitutional provision cannot be glossed over for it clearly indicates that the creation of the autonomous

region shall take place only in accord with the constitutional requirements. Second, there is a specific

provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which incorporates substantially the

same requirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details, thus:

SEC. 13.The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take effect when approved by a

majority of the votes cast by the constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this

Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty

(120) days after the approval of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in

such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and citieswhich in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing

administrative regions: Provided,however, That the President may, by administrative determination, merge

the existing regions.

Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect

only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those

provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous

region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the

autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13)

provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1(2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein.

The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be determinative of(1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which provinces and cities,

among those enumerated inR.A. No. 6734, shall comprise it. [See III RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL

COMMISSION 487-492 (1986)].

As provided in the Constitution, the creation of the autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao is made

effective upon the approval "by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for

the purpose" [Art. X, sec. 18]. The question has been raised as to what this majority means. Does it refer

to a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or a majority in each of the

constituent units, or both?

We need not go beyond the Constitution to resolve this question.

If the framers of the Constitution intended to require approval by a majority of all the votes cast in the

plebiscite they would have so indicated. Thus, in Article XVIII, section 27, it is provided that "[t]his

Constitution shall take effect immediately upon its ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite

held for the purpose. . . ." Comparing this with the provision on the creation of the autonomous region,

which reads:

The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved by majority of the votes cast by

the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities and


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geographic areas voting, favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. [Art. X,

sec. 18, para. 2]. prcd

it will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total

majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of the constituent units and the

proviso underscores this. For if the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the majority of

the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply adopted the same phraseology as that used for the

ratification of the Constitution, i.e. "the creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved

by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose."

It is thus clear that what is required by the Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving the Organic

Act in individual constituent units and not a double majority of the votes in all constituent units put

together, as well as in the individual constituent units.

More importantly, because of its categorical language, this is also the sense in which the vote requirement

in the plebiscite provided under Article X, section 18 must have been understood by the people when they

ratified the Constitution.

Invoking the earlier cited constitutional provisions, petitioner Mama-o, on the other hand, maintains thatonly those areas which, to his view, share common and distinctive historical and natural heritage, economic

and social structures, and other relevant characteristics should be properly included within the coverage of

the autonomous region. He insists that R.A. No. 6734 is unconstitutional because only the provinces of

Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Lanao del Sur, Lanao del Norte and Maguindanao and the cities of Marawi and

Cotabato, and not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act, possess

such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics. By including areas

which do not strictly share the same characteristics as the others, petitioner claims that Congress has

expanded the scope of the autonomous region which the Constitution itself has prescribed to be limited.

Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall

determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional criteria,the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of

the legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law.

This the Court cannot do without doing violence to the separation of governmental powers. [Angara v.

Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936); Morfe v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20387, January 31, 1968, 22 SCRA

424].

After assailing the inclusion of non-Muslim areas in the Organic Act for lack of basis, petitioner Mama-o

would then adopt the extreme view that other non-Muslim areas in Mindanao should likewise be covered.

He argues that since the Organic Act covers several non-Muslim areas, its scope should be further

broadened to include the rest of the non-Muslim areas in Mindanao in order for the others to similarly enjoy

the benefits of autonomy. Petitioner maintains that the failure of R.A. No. 6734 to include the other non-Muslim areas denies said areas equal protection of the law, and therefore is violative of the Constitution.

Petitioner's contention runs counter to the very same constitutional provision he had earlier invoked. Any

determination by Congress of what areas in Mindanao should comprise the autonomous region, taking into

account shared historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant

characteristics, would necessarily carry with it the exclusion of other areas. As earlier stated, such

determination by Congress of which areas should be covered by the organic act for the autonomous region

constitutes a recognized legislative prerogative, whose wisdom may not be inquired into by this Court.


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Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable classification [People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1936); Laurel v.

Misa, 76 Phil. 372 (1946); J.M. Tuason and Co. v. Land Tenure Administration, G.R. No. L-21064, February

18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413]. In Dumlao v.Commission on Elections[G.R. No. 52245, January 22, 1980, 95

SCRA 392], the Court ruled that one class may be treated differently from another where the groupings are

based on reasonable and real distinctions. The guarantee of equal protection is thus not infringed in this

case, the classification having been made by Congress on the basis of substantial distinctions as set forth

by the Constitution itself.

Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates the constitutional

guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers on a provision in the Organic

Act which mandates that should there be any conflict between the Muslim Code [P.D. No. 1083] and the

Tribal Code (still to be enacted) on the one hand, and the national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah

courts created under the same Act should apply national law. Petitioners maintain that the Islamic Law

(Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran, which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any

"man-made" national law. Petitioner Abbas supports this objection by enumerating possible instances of

conflict between provisions of the Muslim Code and national law, wherein an application of national law

might be offensive to a Muslim's religious convictions. prcd

As enshrined in the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving

rights which are legally demandable and enforceable [Art. VIII, Sec. 1]. As a condition precedent for the

power to be exercised, an actual controversy between litigants must first exist [Angara v. Electoral

Commission, supra; Tan v. Macapagal, G.R. No. L-34161, February 29, 1972, 43 SCRA 677]. In the present

case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no conflicting claims involving the

application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom. This being so, the Court in

this case may not be called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict between the

provisions of the Muslim Code and national law.

Petitioners also impugn the constitutionality of Article XIX, section 13 of R.A. No. 6734 which, among

others, states:

. . . Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in theAutonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for

inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative regions: Provided, however,

that the President may, by administrative determination, merge the existing regions.

According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge regions, a power which is

not conferred by the Constitution upon the President. That the President may choose to merge existing

regions pursuant to the Organic Act is challenged as being in conflict with Article X, Section 10 of the

Constitution which provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary

substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and

subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.

It must be pointed out that what is referred to in R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of administrative regions, i.e.

Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region, which are mere groupings of contiguous provinces for

administrative purposes [Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was made as part of the law of the

land by Pres. Dec. No. 1, Pres. Sec. No. 742]. Administrative regions are not territorial and political

subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays [see Art. X, sec. 1 of the Constitution].

While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a

power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of

general supervision over local governments [see Art. X, sec. 4 of the Constitution]. There is no conflict


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between the power of the President to merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision

requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a

merger expressly applies only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative

regions.

Petitioners likewise question the validity of provisions in the Organic Act which create an Oversight

Committee to supervise the transfer to the autonomous region of the powers, appropriations, and

properties vested upon the regional government by the Organic Act [Art. XIX, Secs. 3 and 4]. Said

provisions mandate that the transfer of certain national government offices and their properties to the

regional government shall be made pursuant to a schedule prescribed by the Oversight Committee, and

that such transfer should be accomplished within six (6) years from the organization of the regional

government.

It is asserted by petitioners that such provisions are unconstitutional because while the Constitution states

that the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect upon approval in a plebiscite, the requirement

of organizing an Oversight Committee tasked with supervising the transfer of powers and properties to the

regional government would in effect delay the creation of the autonomous region.

Under the Constitution, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. If

the Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes cast by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite,the creation of the autonomous region immediately takes effect. The questioned provisions in R.A. No.

6734 requiring an Oversight Committee to supervise the transfer do not provide for a different date of

effectivity. Much less would the organization of the Oversight Committee cause an impediment to the

operation of the Organic Act, for such is evidently aimed at effecting a smooth transition period for the

regional government. The constitutional objection on this point thus cannot be sustained as there is no

basis therefor. LibLex

Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality [Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387

(1925); Salas v. Jarencio, G.R. No. L-29788, August 30, 1979, 46 SCRA 734; Morfe v. Mutuc, supra; Peralta

v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30]. Those who petition this Court to declare a

law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise,their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of R.A.

No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these

two petitions is, therefore, inevitable.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 148622. September 12, 2002.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by HON. HEHERSON T. ALVAREZ, in his capacity

as Secretary of the DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES (DENR),

CLARENCE L. BAGUILAT, in his capacity as the Regional Executive Director of DENR-Region XI

and ENGR. BIENVENIDO L. LIPAYON, in his capacity as the Regional Director of the DENR-

ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT BUREAU (DENR-EMB), Region XI,petitioners, vs. THE CITY OF

DAVAO, represented by BENJAMIN C. DE GUZMAN, City Mayor,respondent.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.


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The City Legal Officer for respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Respondent filed an application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) for its proposed project, the Davao

City Artica Sports Dome, with the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB), Region XI. The same,

however, was denied on the ground that the proposed project was within an environmentally critical area;

that the City of Davao must first undergo the environmental impact assessment (EIA) process to secure an

Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC). Respondent then filed a petition for mandamuswith theRegional Trial Court (RTC), and the latter ruled in favor of respondent.

As the project in issue is not classified as environmentally critical or within an environmentally critical area,

the DENR has no choice but to issue the CNC. It becomes its ministerial duty, the performance of which can

be compelled by writ of mandamus, such as that issued herein by the trial court. The petition filed by the

Republic was denied.

SYLLABUS

1.POLITICAL LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNIT;

FUNCTIONS. Section 15 of Republic Act 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, defines a

local government unit as a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it inconformity with law. As such, it performs dual functions, governmental and proprietary. Governmental

functions are those that concern the health, safety and the advancement of the public good or welfare as

affecting the public generally. Proprietary functions are those that seek to obtain special corporate benefits

or earn pecuniary profit and intended for private advantage and benefit. When exercising governmental

powers and performing governmental duties, an LGU is an agency of the national government. When

engaged in corporate activities, it acts as an agent of the community in the administration of local

affairs. ASDTEa

2.ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT EXCLUDED FROM THE COVERAGE OF PD 1586 (ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT

STATEMENT SYSTEM). Found in Section 16 of the Local Government Code is the duty of the LGUs to

promote the people's right to a balanced ecology. Pursuant to this, an LGU, like the City of Davao, can notclaim exemption from the coverage of PD 1586. As a body politic endowed with governmental functions, an

LGU has the duty to ensure the quality of the environment, which is the very same objective of PD 1586.

Further, it is a rule of statutory construction that every part of a statute must be interpreted with reference

to the context, i.e., that every part must be considered with other parts, and kept subservient to the

general intent of the enactment. Section 4 of PD 1586 clearly states that "no person, partnership or

corporation shall undertake or operate any such declared environmentally critical project or area without

first securing an Environmental Compliance Certificate issued by the President or his duly authorized

representative." The Civil Code defines a person as either natural or juridical. The state and its political

subdivisions, i.e., the local government units are juridical persons. Undoubtedly therefore, local government

units are not excluded from the coverage of PD 1586. Lastly, very clear in Section 1 of PD 1586 that said

law intends to implement the policy of the state to achieve a balance between socio-economic development

and environmental protection, which are the twin goals of sustainable development. The first paragraph of

the Whereas clause of the law stresses that this can only be possible if we adopt a comprehensive and

integrated environmental protection program where all the sectors of the community are involved, i.e., the

government and the private sectors. The local government units, as part of the machinery of the

government, cannot therefore be deemed as outside the scope of the EIS system.

3.REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT, GENERALLY RESPECTED;

EXCEPTIONS. The trial court, after a consideration of the evidence, found that the Artica Sports Dome is

not within an environmentally critical area. Neither is it an environmentally critical project. It is axiomatic


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that factual findings of the trial court, when fully supported by the evidence on record, are binding upon

this Court and will not be disturbed on appeal. This Court is not a trier of facts. There are exceptional

instances when this Court may disregard factual findings of the trial court, namely: a) when the conclusion

is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures; b) when the inference made is

manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; c) where there is a grave abuse of discretion; d) when the

judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; f) when the

Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same are contrary to

the admissions of both appellant and appellee; g) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary tothose of the trial court; h) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on

which they are based; i) when the finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed

absence of evidence but is contradicted by the evidence on record; and j) when the Court of Appeals

manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered,

would justify a different conclusion. None of these exceptions, however, obtain in this case.

4.ID.; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; MANDAMUS; PROPER FOR THE PERFORMANCE OF A MINISTERIAL DUTY.

The Artica Sports Dome in Langub is not classified as environmentally critical, or within an

environmentally critical area. Consequently, the DENR has no choice but to issue the Certificate of Non-

Coverage. It becomes its ministerial duty, the performance of which can be compelled by writ

of mandamus, such as that issued by the trial court in the case at bar.

D E C I S I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO,J p:

Before us is a petition for review1on certiorariassailing the decision2dated May 28, 2001 of the Regional

Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 33, which granted the writ ofmandamus and injunction in favor of

respondent, the City of Davao, and against petitioner, the Republic, represented by the Department of

Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The trial court also directed petitioner to issue a Certificate of

Non-Coverage in favor of respondent.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On August 11, 2000, respondent filed an application for a Certificate of Non-Coverage (CNC) for its

proposed project, the Davao City Artica Sports Dome, with the Environmental Management Bureau (EMB),

Region XI. Attached to the application were the required documents for its issuance, namely, a) detailed

location map of the project site; b) brief project description; and c) a certification from the City Planning

and Development Office that the project is not located in an environmentally critical area (ECA). The EMB

Region XI denied the application after finding that the proposed project was within an environmentally

critical area and ruled that, pursuant to Section 2, Presidential Decree No. 1586, otherwise known as the

Environmental Impact Statement System, in relation to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 1151, also

known as the Philippine Environment Policy, the City of Davao must undergo the environmental impact

assessment (EIA) process to secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC), before it can proceed

with the construction of its project.

Believing that it was entitled to a Certificate of Non-Coverage, respondent filed a petition

for mandamusand injunction with the Regional Trial Court of Davao, docketed as Civil Case No. 28, 133-

2000. It alleged that its proposed project was neither an environmentally critical project nor within an

environmentally critical area; thus it was outside the scope of the EIS system. Hence, it was the ministerial

duty of the DENR, through the EMB-Region XI, to issue a CNC in favor of respondent upon submission of

the required documents.
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The Regional Trial Court rendered judgment in favor of respondent, the dispositive portion of which reads

as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, judgment granting the writ of mandamusand

injunction is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner City of Davao and against respondents Department

of Environment and Natural Resources and the other respondents by:

1)directing the respondents to issue in favor of the petitioner City of Davao a Certificate of Non-Coverage,

pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1586 and related laws, in connection with the construction by the Cityof Davao of the Artica Sports Dome;

2)making the preliminary injunction issued on December 12, 2000 permanent.

Costsde oficio.

SO ORDERED.3

The trial court ratiocinated that there is nothing in PD 1586, in relation to PD 1151 and Letter of Instruction

No. 1179 (prescribing guidelines for compliance with the EIA system), which requires local government

units (LGUs) to comply with the EIS law. Only agencies and instrumentalities of the national government,

including government owned or controlled corporations, as well as private corporations, firms and entitiesare mandated to go through the EIA process for their proposed projects which have significant effect on

the quality of the environment. A local government unit, not being an agency or instrumentality of the

National Government, is deemed excluded under the principle of expressio unius est exclusio alterius.

The trial court also declared, based on the certifications of the DENR-Community Environment and Natural

Resources Office (CENRO)-West, and the data gathered from the Philippine Institute of Volcanology and

Seismology (PHIVOLCS), that the site for the Artica Sports Dome was not within an environmentally critical

area. Neither was the project an environmentally critical one. It therefore becomes mandatory for the

DENR, through the EMB Region XI, to approve respondent's application for CNC after it has satisfied all the

requirements for its issuance. Accordingly, petitioner can be compelled by a writ of mandamusto issue theCNC, if it refuses to do so.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, however, the same was denied. Hence, the instant petition for

review.

With the supervening change of administration, respondent, in lieu of a comment, filed a manifestation

expressing its agreement with petitioner that, indeed, it needs to secure an ECC for its proposed project. It

thus rendered the instant petition moot and academic. However, for the guidance of the implementors of

the EIS law and pursuant to our symbolic function to educate the bench and bar,4we are inclined to

address the issue raised in this petition.

Section 15 of Republic Act 7160,5otherwise known as the Local Government Code, defines a localgovernment unit as a body politic and corporate endowed with powers to be exercised by it in conformity

with law. As such, it performs dual functions, governmental and proprietary. Governmental functions are

those that concern the health, safety and the advancement of the public good or welfare as affecting the

public generally.6Proprietary functions are those that seek to obtain special corporate benefits or earn

pecuniary profit and intended for private advantage and benefit.7When exercising governmental powers

and performing governmental duties, an LGU is an agency of the national government.8When engaged in

corporate activities, it acts as an agent of the community in the administration of local affairs.9
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