Cawaling vs. COMELECG.R. No. 146319, October 26, 2001Cawaling vs. Executive SecretaryG.R. No. 146342, October 26, 2001

Facts:

Before us are two (2) separate petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8806which created the City of Sorsogon and the validity of the plebiscite conducted pursuant thereto. On August 16, 2000, former President Joseph E. Estrada signed into law R.A. No. 8806, an "ActCreating The City Of Sorsogon By Merging The Municipalities Of Bacon And Sorsogon In The Province Of Sorsogon, And Appropriating Funds Therefor." The COMELEC a plebiscite in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon and submitted the matter for ratification proclaimed the creation of the City of Sorsogon as havingbeen ratified and approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite. Invoking his right as a resident and taxpayer, the petitioner filed the present petition for certiorari seeking the annulment of the plebiscite on the following grounds: A. The December 16, 2000 plebiscite was conducted beyond the required 120-day period from the approval of R.A. 8806, in violation of Section 54 thereof; and B. Respondent COMELEC failed to observe the legal requirement of twenty (20) day extensive information campaign in the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon before conducting the plebiscite. Petitioner instituted another petition declaring enjoin R.A. No. 8806 unconstitutional, contending, in essence, that:1. The creation of Sorsogon City by merging two municipalities violates Section 450(a) of the Local Government Code of 1991 (in relation to Section 10, Article X of the Constitution) which requires that only "a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city"; and2. R.A. No. 8806 contains two (2) subjects, namely, the (a) creation of the City of Sorsogon and the (b) abolition of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon, thereby violating the "one subject-one bill" rule prescribed by Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution. Petitioner contends that under Section 450(a) of the Code, a component city may be created only by converting "a municipality or a cluster of barangays," not by merging two municipalities, as what R.A. No. 8806 has done.

Issue:

(1) WON a component city may be created by merging two municipalities.

(2) WON there exist a "compelling" reason for merging the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon in order to create the City of Sorsogon (3) WON R.A. No. 8806 violate the "one subject-one bill" rule enunciated in Section 26 (1), Article VI of the Constitution(4) WON R.A No 8806 is unconstitutional

Held:

Yes. Petitioner's constricted reading of Section 450(a) of the Code is erroneous. The phrase "A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city" is not a criterion but simply one of the modes by which a city may be created. Section 10, Article X of the Constitution allows the merger of local government units to create a province city, municipality or barangay in accordance with the criteria established by the Code. The creation of an entirely new local government unit through a division or a

merger of existing local government units is recognized under the Constitution, provided that such merger or division shall comply with the requirements prescribed by the Code.

(2) This argument goes into the wisdom of R.A. No. 8806, a matter which we are not competent torule. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, this Court, made it clear that "the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." In the exercise of judicial power, we are allowed only "to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," and "may not annul an act of the political departments simply because we feel it is unwise or impractical.

(3) No. There is only one subject embraced in the title of the law, that is, the creation of the City of Sorsogon. The abolition/cessation of the corporate existence of the Municipalities of Bacon and Sorsogon dueto their merger is not a subject separate and distinct from the creation of Sorsogon City. Such abolition/cessation was but the logical, natural and inevitable consequence of the merger. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation.

(4) No. Every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. This presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. The theory is that every law, being the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, has passed careful scrutiny to ensure that it is in accord with the fundamental law. This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof, unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one. In other words the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt, for to doubt is to sustain. We hold that petitioner has failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of R.A. No. 8806.

League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al.G.R. No. 176951, G.R. No. 177499& G.R. No. 178056; 24 August 2010

Facts:

The 11th Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, it did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. Subsequently, the 12th Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 20 June 2001, amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20million to P100million. Thereafter, 16 municipalities filed their individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100million income requirement of RA 9009. The cityhood bills were approved by the House of Representatives and the Senate, and lapsed into law without the President’s signature. Said Cityhood Laws directed the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each municipality approved of the conversion. Petitioners sought to declare the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the equal protection clause, lamenting that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities would reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA). On 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a majority vote, declared the 16 Cityhood Laws to be in violation of Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides that no city shall be created except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code. The Supreme Court held that since respondent municipalities did not meet the P100million income requirement under Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, the Cityhood Laws converting said municipalities into cities were unconstitutional. The Supreme Court also declared the 16 Cityhood Laws to be in violation of the equal protection clause since there was no valid classification between those entitled and those not entitled to exemption from the P100million income requirement: (1) there was no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted and municipalities that did not have such pending bills; (2) the classification criterion −mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress −was not germane to the purpose of the law, which was to prevent fiscally nonviable municipalities from converting into cities; (3) the pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11 th Congress limited the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009 – a condition that would never happen again, violating the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) limiting the exemption only to the 16 respondent municipalities violated the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated; municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities could not convert into cities. On 31 March 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, also by a majority vote, denied the respondent municipalities’ first motion for reconsideration. On 28 April 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a split vote, denied the respondent municipalities’ second motion for reconsideration. The 18 November 2008 Decision became final and executory and was recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on 21 May 2009.

However, on 21 December 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc reversed the 18 November 2008 Decision and upheld the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws. The Court reasoned that:

(1) When Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution speaks of the local government code, the reference cannot be to any specific statute or codification of laws, let alone the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. It would be noted that at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 337, and the then LGC, was still in effect. Had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to isolate the embodiment of the criteria only in the LGC, they would have referred to BP 337. Also, they would not have provided for the enactment by Congress of a new LGC, as they did in Section 3, Article X of the

Constitution. Accordingly, the criteria for creation of cities need not be embodied in the LGC. Congress can impose such criteria in a consolidated set of laws or a single-subject enactment or through amendatory laws. The passage of amendatory laws, such as RA 9009, was no different from the enactment of the cityhood laws specifically exempting a particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting laws, effectively decreased the already codified indicators.

(2) Deliberations on RA 9009, particularly the floor exchange between Senators Aquilino Pimentel and Franklin Drilon, indicated the following complementary legislative intentions: (a) the then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the proposed P100million minimum income requirement; and (b) RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar as the pending cityhood bills were concerned. That said deliberations were undertaken in the 11th and/or 12th Congress (or before the cityhood laws were passed during the 13th Congress) and Congress was not a continuing legislative body, was immaterial. Debates, deliberations, and proceedings of Congress and the steps taken in the enactment of the law, in this case the cityhood laws in relation to RA 9009 or vice versa, were part of its legislative history and may be consulted, if appropriate, as aids in the interpretation of the law.

(3) Petitioners could not plausibly invoke the equal protection clause because no deprivation of property resulted by the enactment of the Cityhood Laws. It was presumptuous on the part of petitioner LCP member-cities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their property, as the IRA was yet to be allocated. Furthermore, the equal protection clause does not preclude reasonable classification which (a) rests on substantial distinctions; (b) is germane to the purpose of the law; (c) is not be limited to existing conditions only; and (d) applies equally to all members of the same class. All of these requisites had been met by the subject Cityhood Laws: (a) Respondent municipalities were substantially different from other municipalities desirous to be cities. They had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009, and years before the enactment of the amendatory RA9009, respondent municipalities had already met the income criterion exacted for cityhood under the LGC of 1991. However, due to extraneous circumstances (the impeachment of then President Estrada, the related jueteng scandal investigations conducted before, and the EDSA events that followed the aborted impeachment), the bills for their conversion remained unacted upon by Congress. To impose on them the much higher income requirement after what they had gone through would appear to be unfair; (b) the exemption of respondent municipalities from the P100million income requirement was meant to reduce the inequality, occasioned by the passage of the amendatory RA 9009, between respondent municipalities and the 33 other municipalities whose cityhood bills were enacted during the 11th Congress; and (c) the uniform exemption clause would apply to municipalities that had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009 and were compliant with then Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, which prescribed an income requirement of P20 million.

(4) The existence of the cities consequent to the approval of the Cityhood Laws in the plebiscites held in the affected municipalities is now an operative fact. New cities appear to have been organized and are functioning accordingly, with new sets of officials and employees. Pursuant to the operative fact doctrine, the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws in question should be upheld. Petitioners moved for reconsideration (ad cautelam) and for the annulment of 21 December 2009 Decision. Some petitioners-in-intervention also moved for reconsideration (ad cautelam).

Issues:

Whether or not the 16 Cityhood Laws violated Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause.

Held:

The 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional.

(1) Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is clear – the creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code. The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units follows the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. From the moment RA 9009 took effect (on 30 June 2001), the LGC required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100million income requirement. Section 450 of the LGC, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement, even for municipalities with pending cityhood bills in Congress when RA 9009 was passed. The uniform exemption clause in the Cityhood Laws, therefore, violated Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code. RA 9009, by amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code, embodies the new and prevailing Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law. Moreover, where the law does not make an exemption, the Court should not create one.

(2) Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the operative fact doctrine is an admission that the law is unconstitutional. Respondent municipalities’ theory that the implementation of the Cityhood Laws, which resulted in 16 municipalities functioning as new cities with new sets of officials and employees, operated to contitutionalize the unconstitutional Cityhood Laws, was a misapplication of the operative fact doctrine and would set a gravely dangerous precedent. This view would open the floodgates to the wanton enactment of unconstitutional laws and a mad rush for their immediate implementation before the Court could declare them unconstitutional. The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law. Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. Accordingly, the 16 Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by the “new cities” or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and effective, as a matter of equity and fair play, to innocent people who may have relied on the presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Court’s declaration of their unconstitutionality.

(3) There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11 th

Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. In short, the classification criterion −mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress −is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities. Moreover, the pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress, as a criterion, limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated; municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can.

* Re: the split or tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration of the 18 November 2008 Decision.

The dissenting opinion stated that “a deadlocked vote of six is not a majority and a non-majority does not constitute a rule with precedential value.” However, Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court provides that when, in appealed cases, the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court en banc on the second motion for reconsideration necessarily resulted in the denial of the second motion for reconsideration. Since the Court was evenly divided, there could be no reversal of the 18 November 2008 Decision, for a tie-vote cannot result in any court order or directive. The tie-vote plainly signifies that there is no majority to overturn the prior 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution denying reconsideration, and thus the second motion for reconsideration must be denied. Hence, the 18 November 2008 judgment and the 31 March 2009 resolution stand in full force. These prior majority actions of the Court en banc can only be overruled by a new majority vote, not a tie-vote because a tie-vote cannot overrule a prior affirmative action.

The 18 November 2008 Decision, declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional, was reinstated.

Ganzon vs CAGR No. 93252 Date: August 5, 1991

Facts:

The petitions of Mayor Ganzon originated from a series of administrative complaints, ten in number, filed against him by various city officials sometime in 1988, on various charges, among them, abuse of authority, oppression, grave misconduct, disgraceful and immoral conduct, intimidation, culpable violation of the Constitution, and arbitrary detention. Finding probable grounds and reasons, the respondent (Sec of Local Government) issued a preventive suspension order for a period of sixty days. In the other case, respondent ordered petitioner's second preventive suspension for another sixty (60) days. The petitioner was able to obtain a restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction in the RTC. The second preventive suspension was not enforced. Amidst the two successive suspensions, Mayor Ganzon instituted an action

for prohibition against the respondent in the RTC. Presently, he instituted an action for prohibition, in the respondent CA. Meanwhile, the respondent issued another order, preventively suspending Mayor Ganzon for another sixty days, the third time in twenty months, and designating meantime Vice-Mayor Mansueto Malabor as acting mayor. Undaunted, Mayor Ganzon commenced before the CA, a petition for prohibition. The CA rendered judgment dismissing the cases.

Issue:

WON the Secretary of Local Government, as the President's alter ego, can suspend and or remove local officials.

Held:

Yes, It is the petitioners' argument that the 1987 Constitution no longer allows the President, as the1935 and 1973 Constitutions did, to exercise the power of suspension and/or removal over local officials. According to both petitioners, the Constitution is meant, first, to strengthen self-rule by local government units and second, by deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law," to strip the President of the power of control over local governments. It is a view, so they contend, that finds support in the debates of the Constitutional Commission. The issue consists of three questions: (1) Did the 1987 Constitution, in deleting the phrase "as may be provided by law" intend to divest the President of the power to investigate, suspend, discipline, and or remove local officials? (2) Has the Constitution repealed Sections 62 and 63 of the Local Government Code? (3) What is the significance of the change in the constitutional language? It is the considered opinion of the Court that notwithstanding the change in the constitutional language, the charter did not intend to divest the legislature of its right - or the President of her prerogative as conferred by existing legislation to provide administrative sanctions against local officials. It is our opinion that the omission (of "as may be provided by law") signifies nothing more than to underscore local governments' autonomy from congress and to break Congress' "control" over local government affairs. The Constitution did not, however, intend, for the sake of local autonomy, to deprive the legislature of all authority over municipal corporations, in particular, concerning discipline. Autonomy does not, after all, contemplate making mini-states out of local government units, as in the federal governments of the USA. Autonomy, in the constitutional sense, is subject to the guiding star, though not control, of the legislature, albeit the legislative responsibility under the Constitution - and as the "supervision clause" itself suggest - is to wean local government units from over dependence on the central government. It is noteworthy that under the Charter, "local autonomy" is not instantly self-executing, but subject to, among other things, the passage of a local government code, a local tax law, income distribution legislation, and a national representation law, and measures designed to realize autonomy at the local level. It is also noteworthy that in spite of autonomy, the Constitution places the local government under the general supervision of the Executive. It is noteworthy finally, that the Charter allows Congress to include in the local government code provisions for removal of local officials, which suggest that Congress may exercise removal powers, and as the existing Local Government Code has done, delegate its exercise to the President. The deletion of "as may be provided by law" was meant to stress, sub silencio, the objective of the framers to strengthen local autonomy by severing congressional control of its affairs, as observed by the Court of Appeals, like the power of local legislation. The Constitution did nothing more, however, and insofar as existing legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of Local Government) to proceed against local officials administratively, the Constitution contains no prohibition.

The petitioners are under the impression that the Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers, which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally, "supervision" is not incompatible with disciplinary authority The Court does not believe that the petitioners can rightfully point to the debates of the Constitutional Commission to defeat the President's powers. The Court believes that the deliberations are by themselves inconclusive, because although Commissioner Jose Nolledo would exclude the power of removal from the President, Commissioner Blas Ople would not. The Court is consequently reluctant to say that the new Constitution has repealed the Local Government Code, Batas Blg. 337. As we said, "supervision" and "removal" are not incompatible terms and one may stand with the other notwithstanding the stronger expression of local autonomy under the new Charter. We have indeed held that in spite of the approval of the Charter, Batas Blg. 337 is still in force and effect. As the Constitution itself declares, local autonomy means "a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization." The Constitution, as we observed, does nothing more than to break up the monopoly of the national government over the affairs of local governments and as put by political adherents, to "liberate the local governments from the imperialism of Manila." Autonomy, however, is not meant to end the relation of partnership and interdependence between the central administration and local government units, or otherwise, to usher in a regime of federalism. The Charter has not taken such a radical step. Local governments, under the Constitution, are subject to regulation, however limited, and for no other purpose than precisely, albeit paradoxically, to enhance self-government .As we observed in one case, decentralization means devolution of national administration - but not power - to the local levels. Thus: Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of administration when the central government delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government power and in the process to make local governments "more responsive and accountable," and "ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of national development and social progress." At the same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns. The President exercises "general supervision" over them, but only to "ensure that local affairs are administered according to law." He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own. Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments units declared to be autonomous, In that case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from central authorities. According to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts to "self-immolation," since in that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable not to the central authorities but to its contituency.

Issue:

WON the several suspensions imposed upon Mayon Ganzon are proper

Held:

No, the successive sixty-day suspensions imposed on Mayor Ganzon is albeit another matter. What bothers the Court, and what indeed looms very large, is the fact that since the Mayor is facing ten administrative charges, the Mayor is in fact facing the possibility of 600 days of suspension, in the event that all ten cases yield prima facie findings. The Court is not of course tolerating misfeasance in public

office (assuming that Ganzon is guilty of misfeasance) but it is certainly another question to make him serve 600 days of suspension, which is effectively, to suspend him out of office. The plain truth is that this Court has been ill at ease with suspensions, for the above reasons, and so also, because it is out of the ordinary to have a vacancy in local government. The sole objective of a suspension, as we have held, is simply "to prevent the accused from hampering the normal cause of the investigation with his influence and authority over possible witnesses" or to keep him off "the records and other evidence." It is a means, and no more, to assist prosecutors in firming up a case, if any, against an erring local official. Under the Local Government Code, it cannot exceed sixty days, which is to say that it need not be exactly sixty days long if a shorter period is otherwise sufficient, and which is also to say that it ought to be lifted if prosecutors have achieved their purpose in a shorter span. Suspension finally is temporary, and as the Local Government Code provides, it may be imposed for no more than sixty days. As we held, a longer suspension is unjust and unreasonable, and nothing less than tyranny. We reiterate that we are not precluding the President, through the Secretary of Interior from exercising a legal power, yet we are of the opinion that the Secretary of Interior is exercising that power oppressively, and needless to say, with a grave abuse of discretion.

1. Local autonomy, under the Constitution, involves a mere decentralization of administration, not of power, in which local officials remain accountable to the central government in the manner the law may provide;2. The new Constitution does not prescribe federalism; 3. The change in constitutional language (with respect to the supervision clause) was meant but to deny legislative control over local governments; it did not exempt the latter from legislative regulations provided regulation is consistent with the fundamental premise of autonomy; 4. Since local governments remain accountable to the national authority, the latter may, by law, and in the manner set forth therein, impose disciplinary action against local officials; 5. "Supervision" and "investigation" are not inconsistent terms; "investigation" does not signify "control" (which the President does not have); 6. The petitioner, Mayor Rodolfo Ganzon, may serve the suspension so far ordered, but may no longer be suspended or the offenses he was charged originally; provided: a) that delays in the investigation of those charges "due to his fault, neglect or request, (the time of the delay) shall not be counted in computing the time of suspension." [Supra, sec. 63(3)]b) that if during, or after the expiration of, his preventive suspension, the petitioner commits another or other crimes and abuses for which proper charges are fled against him by the aggrieved party or parties, his previous suspension shall not be a bar to his being preventively suspended again, if warranted under subpar. (2), Section 63 of the Local Government Code.

Garcia vs Mojica[G.R. No. 139043. September 10, 1999]

Facts:

On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city. The contract covers the period 1998-2001, which period was to commence on September 1998 when the first delivery should have been made by F.E. Zuellig. Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out regarding the alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the contract signed by petitioner. This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter. [1] Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution officer of the Office of the Ombudsman, was assigned to conduct the inquiry, docketed as INQ-VIS-99-0132. After his investigation, he recommended that the said inquiry be upgraded to criminal and administrative cases against petitioner and the other city officials involved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved this recommendation.

Issue:

WON Garcia may be held administratively liable.

Held:

NO. “In a number of cases, we have repeatedly held that a reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of office. [24] The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him back in to office, it is presumed that it did so with full

knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, and then such reelection is considered a condo nation of his past misdeeds. However, in the present case, respondents point out that the contract entered into by petitioner with F.E. Zuellig was signed just four days before the date of the elections. It was not made an issue during the election, and so the electorate could not be said to have voted for petitioner with knowledge of this particular aspect of his life and character. For his part, petitioner contends that “the only conclusive determining factor” as regards the people’s thinking on the matter is an election. On this point, we agree with petitioner. That the people voted for an official with knowledge of his character is presumed, precisely to eliminate the need to determine, in factual terms, the extent of this knowledge. Such an undertaking will obviously be impossible. Our rulings on the matter do not distinguish the precise timing or period when the misconduct was committed, reckoned from the date of the official’s reelection, except that it must be prior to said date.” The above ruling in Salalima applies to this case. Petitioner cannot anymore beheld administratively liable for an act done during his previous term, that is, his signing of the contract with F.E. Zuellig. The agreement between petitioner (representing Cebu City) and F.E. Zuellig was perfected on the date the contract was signed, during petitioner’s prior term. At that moment, petitioner already acceded to the terms of the contract, including stipulations now alleged to be prejudicial to the city government. Thus, any culpability petitioner may have in signing the contract already became extant on the day the contract was signed. It hardly matters that the deliveries under the contract are supposed to have been made months later. While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the contract with F. E. Zuellig, however, this should not prejudice the filing of any case other than administrative against petitioner. Our ruling in this case, may not be taken to mean the total exoneration of petitioner for whatever wrongdoing, if any, might have been committed in signing the subject contract. The ruling now is limited to the question of whether or not he may be held administratively liable there for, and it is our considered view that he may not.

2. WON the Ombudsman was stripped of its powers by virtue of the LGC.No.

Indeed, there is nothing in the Local Government Code to indicate that it has repealed,whether expressly or impliedly, the pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act. The twostatutes on the specific matter in question are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable,as to compel us to only uphold one and strike down the other. The decision of theOmbudsman (6 month suspension) will prevail over the LGC (60day suspension) if theevidence of guilt is strong.* The power to preventively suspend is available not only to the Ombudsman but also tothe Deputy Ombudsman. “SEC. 24. Preventive Suspension.– The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventivelysuspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in hisjudgment the evidence of guilt is strong,”

Socrates vs. Sandiganbayan

Facts:

Before us are two consolidated original actions for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner Salvador P. Socrates assailing the orders and resolution issued by respondent Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 18027 and 18028, both entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Salvador P. Socrates."

Petitioner who is the incumbent governor of Palawan, was first elected governor of the said province in 1968 and was again reelected in both the 1971 and 1980 elections, until he was replaced by private complainant Victoriano Rodriguez as Officer-In-Charge Governor after the EDSA Revolution in February 1986. Subsequently, both petitioner and Rodriguez ran for governor in the 1988 elections where the latter emerged victorious. In the 1992 synchronized national and local elections, the two again contested the gubernatorial post; and this time, it was petitioner who won.

Issue:

Is the preventive suspension of Socrates valid?

Held:

There is reasonable ground to believe that Congress did really apprehend danger should the power of suspension in consequence of a criminal case under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act be lodged in any authority other than the court. Quite apart from the fact that the court has a better grasp of the situation, there is one other factor, and that is, the rights of the person accused. The court could very well serve as a lever to balance in one equation the public interests involved and the interests of the defendant. And then, there is the danger that partisan politics may creep in. The hand of political oppression cannot just be ignored especially if the majority members of the Provincial Board and the defendant public local elective officer are on opposite sides of the political fence. Power may be abused. Conversely, if both are of the same political persuasion, the suspending authority will display reluctance in exercising the power of suspension. It is thus that the statute should catch up with the realities of political life. There is indeed the

dispiriting lesson that in a clash between political considerations and conscience it is the latter that quite often gets dented. . . .

Therefore, since suspension is incident to removal and should proceed from one who should logically do so, and considering that in the operation of a given statute fairness must have been in the mind of the legislators, we brush aside needless refinements, and rule that under Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, once a valid information upon the provisions thereof is lodged with the Court of First Instance, that court has the inescapable duty to suspend the public official indicted thereunder.

Bolastig vs. Sandiganbayan235 SCRA 103 August 4, 1994

Facts:

Antonio M. Bolastig is the governor of the province of Samar. Information was filed against him and two others –Pedro Ason the provincial treasurer and Prudencio Macabenta the property officer of the province- for alleged overpricing of 100 reams of onion skin paper in violation of Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Sandiganbayan acting upon the motion of the Special Prosecutor suspended the Petitioner for 90 days with the strength of the provision of sec. 13 of the Anti graft and corrupt practices act which provides for the preventive suspension of public officers if they are under criminal prosecution under valid information under the same act or under title 7, Book II of the RPC, or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property as basis. However, herein petitioner contends that his suspension was a mindless and meaningless exercise and it was imposed without regard to the spirit and intent of the law in which it is based. He further contends that his suspension may deprive his constituents of the services of an elected official elected by them. Sandiganbayan rejected the motion of the accused hence this petition.

Issue:

Whether the Sandiganbayan is correct in suspending herein petitioner as Governor withthe strength of Sec. 13 of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

Held:

Yes, it is now settled that sec 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 makes it mandatory for the Sandiganbayan to suspend any public officer against whom a valid information charging violation of the law, Book II, Title 7 of the RPC, or any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property is filed. The fact that an elected official’s preventive suspension may deprive his constituents of the official elected by them is not a sufficient basis for reducing what is otherwise a mandatory suspension provided by law.

Libanan vs Sandiganbayan233 SCRA 163 G.R. No. 112386 June 14, 1994

Facts:

Petitioner Libanan is the incumbent vice-governor of Eastern Samar and was a former member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan prior to the 1992 elections. He was charged in conspiring to other members to prevent and exclude Docena (Respondent), a qualified replacement of a deceased member, from exercising his rights and prerogatives as a member of the said body. In effect, the SANDIGANBAYAN issued a resolution suspending their respective public position and office for ninety(90) days. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging three grounds: [1] Order of Suspension if executed shall affront the petitioners’ right for due process; [2] the suspension would assault his covenant to the people of Samaras their vice-governor; and [3] the reasons sought to be prevented by the suspension no longer exist. Petitioner contends that the order of suspension, being predicated on his acts supposedly committed while still a member of the Sangguniang Bayan, can no longer attach to him now that he is the duly elected and incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar.

Issue:

Whether or not the Order of Suspension given by the SANDIGANBAYAN is valid?

Held:

Yes. The Court ruled that the term “office” used in the law could apply to any office which the officer charged might currently be holding and not necessarily the particular office under which he was charged. The suspension order cannot amount to a deprivation of property without due process of law. Public office is “a public agency or trust,” and it is not the property envisioned by the Constitutional provision which petitioner invokes. Hence, SC dismissed the petition. SANDIGANBAYANs decision is affirmed.

Yabut vs Ombudsman

Facts:

Petitioner Nemesio Arturo S. Yabut, Vice Mayor of the municipality, was directing traffic at the intersection of Sen. Gil Puyat Avenue and Makati Avenue, he being concurrently the commander of the Traffic Management Division of Makati. On that day, traffic was unusually heavy because of the

re-routing of the vehicular flow from the Edsa-Pioneer-Boni area. Private respondent Paul Doran, an American national and a permanent resident in the Philippines, was on board his car in the innermost lane of Makati Avenue, apparently intending to make a left turn to Gil Puyat Avenue towards Pasay City. Since priority was given to vehicles coming from Mandaluyong, Doran and the others in his lane had been made to wait for several turns. When the "go" signal was finally given, Doran stopped where Yabut was and asked "why (it took) so long to make a left turn?" Petitioner Yabut answered "Sorry, sir, its traffic." This did not satisfy Doran who exclaimed, "who the hell are you," and stuck a dirty finger sign at Yabut. Angry words soon turned into an exchange of punches between the two. Ultimately, Yabut's traffic officers joined the fray. They pulled out Doran from his car and started beating him until three men rescued Doran and brought him to the nearby Pacific Star Building. Both Yabut and Doran suffered injuries as a result of the scuffle.

Issue:

1. misappreciated the evidence; 2. erred in not crediting petitioner's period of preventive suspension; and 3. erred in imposing the penalty of two-month suspension from office, without pay, for not being commensurate with the bare finding of simple misconduct.

Held:

The incident of 16 February 1993 was most unfortunate. The attendant circumstances, it might be said, could have well caused tempers to rise and patience to break; nevertheless, they served no excuse for the mauling and shooting incidents that followed. While we certainly would not condone the act of provocation made by Doran, which in the words of petitioners was no less than "an act of spite, degradation and mockery," it did not, however, justify an equally abhorrent reaction from them. Petitioners were public officers; Doran was not. We second the Solicitor General in this observation:

A public official, more especially an elected one, should not be onion skinned. Strict personal discipline is expected of an occupant of a public office because a public official is a property of the public. He is looked upon to set the example how public officials should correctly conduct themselves even in the face of

extreme provocation. Always he is expected to act and serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain accountable for his conduct to the people.

Petitioner Yabut urges that his preventive suspension of 82 days should be credited to the penalty of 2-month suspension imposed on him. A preventive suspension decreed by the Ombudsman by virtue of his authority under Section 21 of Republic Act No. 6770, in relation to Section 9 of Administrative Order No. 07, is not meant to be a penalty but a means taken to insure the proper and impartial conduct of an investigation. We have ruled, in a number of times before, that a preventive suspension may be ordered even before the charges are heard, as well as before the official concerned is given an opportunity to prove his innocence, being merely a measure that is precisely designed in order not to hamper the normal course of an investigation through the use of influence and authority.

Dela Cruz vs CAGr. 126183 March 25, 1999

Facts:

Petitioners are public school teachers from various schools in Metro Manila who were simultaneously charged, preventively suspended, and eventually dismissed in October 1990 by the Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) in connection with the administrative complaints filed before its office by their respective principals for participating in a mass action/strike and subsequently defying the return-to-work order by DECS constituting grave misconduct., gross neglect of duty, gross violation of Civil Service Law, Rules and Regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to perform official duty, gross insubordination conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and absence without official leave (AWOL), in violation of Presidential Decree 807, otherwise known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines. Petitioners contend they are merely participating in a peaceful assembly to petition the government for redress of their grievances in the exercise of their constitutional right and insist their assembly does not constitutes as a strike as there is no actual disruption of classes.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioners’ exercise of their right to freedom to assembly and petition were valid.

Held:

The court held that previous jurisprudence laid down a rule that public teachers in the exercise of their right to ventilate their grievances by petitioning the government for redress should be done within reasonable limits so as not to prejudice the public welfare. The conduct of mass protests during school days while abandoning classes is highly prejudicial to the best interest of public service. The court stresses that teachers are penalized not because they exercised their right to peaceably assemble but because of the manner by which such right was exercised, i.e., going on unauthorized and unilateral absences thus disrupting classes in various schools in Metro Manila which produced adverse effects upon the students for whose education the teachers were responsible.

Malinao vs Reyes255 SCRA 616, February 29, 1996

Facts:

On February 24, 1994; Petitioner filed an administrative case against respondent Mayor Red in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque, charging him with abuse of authority and denial of due process. The result of the voting was subsequently embodied in a “Decision” dated September 5, 1994, signed by only one member of the Sangguniang, Rodrigo V. Sotto, who did so as “Presiding Chairman, Blue Ribbon Committee, Sangguniang Panlalawigan” Copies of the “Decision” were served on respondent Mayor Red as well as on respondent Governor Luisito Reyes on September 12, 1994.

On September 14, 1994, respondent Mayor filed a manifestation before the Sangguniang, questioning the “Decision” on the ground that it was signed by Sotto alone, “apparently acting in his capacity ans designated as Presiding Chairman, Blue Ribbon Committee, Sangguniang Panlalawigan.” On October 21, 1994, the Sanggunian, voting 7 to 2, acquitted respondent Mayor of the charges against him. The vote was embodied in a Decision of the same date, which was signed by all members who had thus voted.

Issue:

Is the dismissal of the respondent valid?

Held:

Petitioner’s basic contention is that inasmuch as the “Decision” of September 5, 1994 had become final and executor, for failure of respondent Mayor to appeal, it was beyond the power of the Sanggunian to render another decision on October 21, 1994 which in effect reversed the first decision. These contentions are without merit. What petitioner claims to be the September 5, 1994 “Decision” of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan bore the signature of only one member (Rodrigo V. Sotto) who signed “Decision” as “Presiding Chairman, Blue Ribbon Committee, Sangguniang Panlalawigan.”

Neither may to so-called “Decision” prepared by Sanggunian Member Rodrigo V. Sotto on September 5, 1994 be regarded as the decision of the Sanggunian for lack of the signatures of the requisite majority.

At all events, this case is now moot and academic as a result of the expiration of respondent’s term during which the act complained of was allegedly committed, and further proceedings against respondent Mayor are barred by his reelection on May 8, 1995.

Pursuant to Sec. 66(b) of the Code, the penalty of suspension cannot exceed the unexpired term of the respondent or a period of six (6) months of every Administrative Offense. On the other hand, any administrative disciplinary proceeding against respondent is abated if in the meantime he is reelected, because his reelection results in a condonation of whatever misconduct he might have committed during his previous term.

Lapid vs. CA

334 SCRA 741

Facts:

On the basis of an unsigned letter dated July 20, 1998, allegedly originating from the “Mga Mamamayan ng Lalawigan ng Pampanga,” addressed to the NBI, the latter initiated an “open probe” on the alleged illegal quarrying in Pampanga and exaction of the exorbitant fees purportedly perpetrated by unscrupulous individuals with the connivance of high-ranking government officials. The NBI Report was endorsed to the respondent Ombudsman and was docketed as OMB-1-98-2067.

On October 26, 1998, a complaint was filed charging petitioner Gov. Manuel M. Lapid, Vice-Governor Clayton Olalia, Provincial Administrator Enrico Quiambao, Provincial Treasurer Jovito Sabado, Mabalacat Municipal Mayor Marino Morales, and Senior Police Officer 4 Nestor Tadeo with alleged “ Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service” for allegedly “ having conspired between and among themselves in demanding and collecting from various quarrying operators in Pampanga, a control fee, control slip, or monitoring fee of P120.00 per truckload of sand, gravel, or other quarry material, without a duly enacted provincial ordinance authorizing the collection thereof and with issuing receipts for its collection.

The said amount was over and above the P40.00 prescribed as sand fee under the present provincial ordinance.

The Ombudsman issued an Order dated January 13, 1999 preventively suspending the petitioners for six (6) months without pay pursuant to Sec. 24 of R.A. 6770. On Jan. 19, 1999, the DILG implemented the suspension of petitioner Lapid.

On Nov. 22, 1999, the Ombudsman rendered a decision in the Administrative Case finding the petitioner administratively liable for misconduct for which they are meted out the penalty of one (1) year suspension without pay pursuant to Section 25 (2) of R.A. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989).

Issue:

Whether or not the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman finding petitioner administratively liable for misconduct and imposing upon him a penalty of 1 year suspension without pay is immediately executor pending appeal.

Held:

NO. Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act provides that any order, directive or decision of the Office of the Ombudsman imposing a penalty of public censure or reprimand, or suspension of not more than one month’s salary shall be final and unappealable. It is clear from the above provision that the punishment imposed upon petitioner, i.e. suspension without pay for one month, is not among those listed as final and unappealable, hence, immediately executory. The clear import of these statements taken together is impose penalties that are not enumerated in the said section 27 are not final, unappealable and immediately executory. An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate implementation of the decision.

Garcia vs MojicaGR No, 139043 Sept, 10, 1999

Facts:

On May 7, 1998, petitioner, in his capacity as Cebu City mayor, signed a contract with F.E. Zuellig for the supply of asphalt to the city. The contract covers the period 1998-2001, which period was to commence on September 1998 when the first delivery should have been made by F.E. Zuellig.

Sometime in March 1999, news reports came out regarding the alleged anomalous purchase of asphalt by Cebu City, through the contract signed by petitioner. This prompted the Office of the Ombudsman (Visayas) to conduct an inquiry into the matter.[1]

Respondent Jesus Rodrigo T. Tagaan, special prosecution officer of the Office of the Ombudsman, was assigned to conduct the inquiry, docketed as INQ-VIS-99-0132. After his investigation, he recommended that the said inquiry be upgraded to criminal and administrative cases against petitioner and the other city officials involved. Respondent Arturo C. Mojica, Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, approved this recommendation.

Issue:

Does a reelected local official my not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of office?

Held:

In a number of cases, we have repeatedly heal that a reelected local official may not be held administratively accountable for misconduct committed during his prior term of office. The rationale for this holding is that when the electorate put him back into office, it is presumed that it did so with full knowledge of his life and character, including his past misconduct. If, armed with such knowledge, it still reelects him, then such reelection is considered a condonation of his past misdeeds.

However, in the present case, respondents point out that the contract entered into by petitioner with F.E. Zuellig was signed just four (4)days before the date of the elections. It was not made an issue during the election, and so the electrorate could not be said to have voted for petitioner with knowledge of this particular aspects of his life and character.

For his part, petitioner contends that “the only conclusive determining factor” as regards the people’s thinking on the matter is an election. On this point, we agree the petitioner. That the people voted for an official with knowledge of his character is presumed, precisely to eliminate the need to determine, the factual terms, the extent of this knowledge. Such an undertaking will obviously be impossible. Our rulings on the matter do not distinguish the precise timing or period when the misconduct was committed, reckoned from the date of the official’s reelection, except that it must be prior to said date.

The Salalima ruling applies to this case. Petitioner cannot anymore be held administratively liable for an act done during his previous term, that is, his isgning of the contract with F.E. Zuellig. The assailed retainer agreement in Salalima was executed sometime in 1990. Governor Salalima was reelected in 1992 and payments for the retainer continued to be made during his succeeding term.

The agreement between petitioner (representing Cebu City) and F.E. Zuellig was perfected on the date the contract was signed, during petitioner’s prior term. Thus, any culpability the petitioner may have in signing the contract already became extant on the day the contract was signed. It hardly matters that the deliveries under the contract are supposed to have been made months later.

While petitioner can no longer be held administratively liable for signing the contract with F.E. Zuellig, however, this should nit prejudice the filing of any case other than administrative against petitioner.

SBMA vs. COMELEC 262 SCRA 492 September 26, 1996

Facts:

In April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by Section 12 of R.A. 7227, (Bases Conversion and Development Act) to join the Subic Special Economic Zone. On September 5, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan submitted the Kapasyahan to the Office of the President.

Petitioner SMBA seeks to nullify the respondent COMELEC’s Orders denying the petitioner’s pleas\ to stop the holding of a local initiative and referendum on the proposition to recall the Kapasyahan.

Issue:

Did respondent Comelec commit grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and implementing Resolution No. 2848?

Held:

To begin with, the process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent COMELEC made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below, the word “referendum” is repeated at least twenty-seven (27) times, but “initiative” is not mentioned at all. The COMELEC labeled the exercise as a “referendum” the counting of votes was entrusted to a “referendum committee” the documents were called “referendum returns” the canvassers, “Referendum Board of Canvassers” and the ballots themselves bore the description “referendum”. To repeat, not once was the word “initiative” used in said body Resolution No. 2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE.

Prescinding from the definitions under Secs. 120 and 126 of the Local Government Code, we gather that initiative is resorted to (or initiated) by the people directly either because the law-making body fails or refuses to enact the law, ordinance, resolution or act that they desire or because they want to amend or modify one already existing. On the other hand, in a local referendum, the law-making body submits to the registered voters for approval or rejection any ordinance or resolution duly enacted by it.

From the above differentiation, it follows that there is need for the COMELEC to supervise an initiative more closely, its authority thereon extending not only to the counting and canvassing of votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or act submitted to the people is in proper form and language so it may be easily understood and voted upon by the electorate this is especially true where the proposed legislation is lengthy and complicated, and should thus be broken down into several autonomous parts, each such part to be voted upon separately. Care must also be exercised that “no petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate,” although “two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative.”

In sum, we hold that the respondent Commission should be given an opportunity to review and correct its errors in promulgating its orders and in preparing – if necessary – for the plebiscite and that said Commission had administrative and initiatory quasi-judicial jurisdiction to pass upon the question or whether the proposal is sufficient in form and language, and whether such proposal or part/parts thereof are clearly and patently outside the powers of the municipal council of Morong to enact, and therefore violative of law.

Resolution No. 2848 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The initiative on PAmbayang Kapasyahan Blg. 101, Serye 1993 is REMANDED to the COMELEC for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing discussion.

GARCIA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (237 SCRA 279)

Facts:

In Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan agreed to the inclusion of the municipality of Morong as part of the Subic Special Economic Zone(SSEZ) in accord with RA no. 7227, otherwise known as the Bases Conversion Development Actof 1992. May 24, 1993: Petitioners filed a petition to annul the Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye1993. In the said petition, they set some conditions which they want to be complied with before they include their municipality with SSEZ. Municipality of Morong did not take any action on the petition within 30 days after its submission, which prompted the petitioners resorted to their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991 whereby they started to solicit the required number of signatures to cause there peal of said resolution. Hon. Edilberto M. de Leon, Vice- Mayor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Bayan Morong, wrote a letter to the Executive Director of COMELEC requesting the denial of the petition for a local initiative as it will just promote divisiveness, counter productive and futility. July 6, 1993: COMELEC

en banc resolved to deny the petition for local initiative on the ground that its subject is “merely a resolution” and not an ordinance July 13, 1993: COMELEC further resolved to direct Provincial Election Supervisor, Atty.Benjaminn Casiano, to hold on the authentication of signatures being gathered by the petitioners

Issue:Is Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong Bataan the proper subject of an initiative? (i.e. Whether or not the power of initiative can be exercised even what is questioned is only a resolution and not an ordinance?)

Held:

Petition is GRANTED and COMELEC Resolution 93-1623 are ANNULED and SET ASIDE. In a Republican system, there are 2 kinds of legislative power: 1. ORIGINAL - possessed by the sovereign people 2. DERIVATIVE - delegated by the sovereign people to legislative bodies and is subordinate to the original power of the people. One of the lessons the people learned is the folly of completely surrendering the power to make laws to the legislature. Thus, in the new Constitution, a system of people’s initiative was thus installed which endows the people with the power to enact or reject any act or law by congress or local legislative body. COMELEC was also empowered to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an initiative and referendum. Thus, on Aug 4, 1989, it approved RA no.6735 entitled “An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating

Funds Therefor.” Which spelled out the requirements for the exercise of the power of initiative and referendum; procedure of the local initiative and referendum; and their limitations. It was also intended for the acts to be included as appropriate subjects of local initiatives.

LOCAL INITIATIVES - legal process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance. It does not, however, deal with the subjects or matters that can be taken up in a local initiative. The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinance but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local initiative. An act includes a resolution. Black defines an act as "an expression of will or purpose...it may denote something done...as a legislature, including not merely physical acts, but also decrees, edicts, laws, judgments, resolves, awards and determinations." The law should be construed in harmony with and not in violation of the Constitution. Jan 16, 1991: COMELEC also promulgated RA 2300 where it was stated in Sec 5, Art 1that the power of initiative may be exercised to amend the Constitution, or to enact a national legislation, a regional, provincial, city, municipal or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. Sec 124 of the Local Government Code of 1991 does not limit the application of local initiatives to ordinances, but to all subjects or matters which are within the legal powers of the Sanggunians to enact. Resolution vs. Ordinance RESOLUTION- used whenever the legislature wishes to express an opinion which to have only a temporary effect ORDINANCE- intended primarily to permanently direct and control matters applying to persons or things in general.

Considering the lasting changes that will be wrought in the social, political, and economic existence of the people of Morong by the inclusion of their municipality in the SSEZ, it is logical to hear their voice on the matter via an initiative