Embed Size (px)
Citation preview
Marine Policy 36 (2012) 550–558
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Marine Policy
0308-59
doi:10.1
n Tel.:
E-m
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/marpol
Public management in New Zealand and its effect on institutionalarrangements for managing fisheries
Randall Bess n
Ministry of Fisheries, PO Box 1020, Wellington, New Zealand
a r t i c l e i n f o
Article history:
Received 22 February 2011
Accepted 10 March 2011Available online 29 March 2011
Keywords:
Public management
Fisheries management
Quota management system
New Zealand
7X/$ - see front matter & 2011 Elsevier Ltd.
016/j.marpol.2011.03.004
þ64 4 819 4621; fax:þ64 4 819 4208.
ail address: [email protected]
a b s t r a c t
In the last few decades Western democracies, predominately those of British origin, have debated
vigorously about how to improve public management performance. These debates have created an
influx of new ideas and initiatives regarding the concept and practise of public management. New
Zealand implemented public management reform further and faster than most other nations. At the
same time, New Zealand implemented sweeping reforms to the management of fisheries, which led to
the quota management system based on the allocation of individual transferable quota. This article
briefly outlines the history of changes in New Zealand’s public management system and the effect these
changes have had on institutional arrangements for managing fisheries. Each institutional arrangement
has been devised to accommodate the priorities and policies of the government of the day, spanning the
Marine Department established in 1866 to recent structural changes made to the Ministry of Fisheries.
The recent structural changes have placed greater emphasis on governance to improve performance,
but have also led to substantial losses of in-house experience and institutional knowledge. This article
contributes to the broader discussion about whether structural changes provide measureable benefits
or the most cost effective way to deliver improvements in performance.
& 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In the last few decades Western democracies, predominatelythose of British origin, have implemented contemporaneouspublic management reforms aimed at modelling political andadministrative relationships based on assumptions in economictheory. While the reforms have varied in depth, scope and successacross nations, they are said to have been implemented inresponse to unproductive and inefficient government depart-ments, or bureau-pathology [1]. Departments were characterisedas centralised, rule-based systems within self-contained hierarch-ical bureaucracies with administrative rules and procedures thatseverely constrained managerial discretion. This situation led toinefficiencies in government activities and processes and unre-sponsiveness to changes in social conditions [2].
According to Scott [3], the focus of any reform should be toease the tradeoffs between policies that promote economicgrowth and those that promote equitable distribution of the fruitsof the economy. Scott maintains that these tradeoffs may requirea government to undertake incremental and continual reform ofthe public management system to avoid making changes underpressure after ‘things have drifted.’ A reform movement uses themachinery of government to remove administrative obstacles;
All rights reserved.
new departments are created as old ones are scattered orreconfigured [4]. Public management is, therefore, about wherepower arises and how it is used [5].
Changes to the New Zealand public management system areanalogous to pendulum swings from one set of extremes toanother [6]. The radical reforms that began in the mid-1980swent further and faster than in any other nation [7]. During thisperiod, New Zealand implemented sweeping reforms to themanagement of fisheries with the new and largely untested quotamanagement system (QMS) based on the allocation of individualtransferable quota (ITQ). The QMS was a radical departure fromthe previous fisheries management system, which was its attrac-tion during a period of radical economic and social reforms [8].This article explores changes in New Zealand’s public manage-ment system and the effect these changes have had on institu-tional arrangements for managing fisheries.1
The first section of this article briefly outlines the history ofNew Zealand’s public management system, highlighting theradical reforms that began in the mid-1980s. It then outlinesthe period from 1999 to 2008 when the perceived downsides tothe radical reforms were addressed by increasing public serviceexpenditure, taking steps to improve inter-departmental coordi-nation and placing greater emphasis on public engagement in the
1 The opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do
not reflect the views of the New Zealand Ministry of Fisheries.
R. Bess / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 550–558 551
development of certain policy initiatives, which had a corre-sponding influence on the way fisheries were managed. Thissection also depicts the system since the 2008 change in govern-ment that coincided with the global economic downturn. Thesecond section outlines the institutional arrangements for mana-ging fisheries in New Zealand, spanning the Marine Departmentestablished in 1866 to the Ministry of Fisheries’ structuralchanges in 2009/10. The purpose of the structural changes wasto meet the government’s expectations for more focused publicengagement and greater economic value generated from fisheries.It then outlines how the Ministry’s structural changes wereimplemented and the resulting loss of in-house experience andinstitutional knowledge. This section also discusses possiblefuture structural changes to the Ministry. This article contributesto the broader discussion about whether structural changesprovide measureable benefits or the most cost effective way todeliver improvements in performance.
2 The numbers of public servants are ‘headcount’, which includes both full-
time and part-time positions. The only exception is the numbers that make up the
core government administration, which are full-time equivalents.
2. The New Zealand public management system
New Zealand became annexed to Britain in 1840 and subse-quently adopted a constitutional monarchy with a Westminster-type system of government and a single house of Parliament.Since 1947 New Zealand has had full legislative autonomy over itsown affairs, and the Labour and National Parties have vied forpower during three-year electoral cycles. The Labour Party hasrepresented workers and unions, and the National Party hasrepresented business interests. Historically, most national policydebate occurred within known and accepted boundaries andreinforced broadly agreed societal and national objectives [9].Full employment was an objective and led to the governmentbecoming the nation’s major employer [10]. The government wasviewed as guaranteeing economic improvement and individualand social security, which led to the formation of a highlybureaucratic welfare state. The public service consisted of 35–45 departments of state based in Wellington, the nation’s capital,though it constituted a fraction of the wider public sector.The public service ethos was inculcated with impartiality in theexercise of public authority by serving and maintaining theconfidence of the government of the day [11]. The public serviceculture included employment for life, automatic progression onlength of service, expanding staff numbers and liberal andincreasing budgets [12]. All of this began to change in 1972 whenBritain entered into the European Economic Community, whichended New Zealand’s assured access to British markets forvirtually all of its primary product exports. The combination oflow international prices for agricultural commodities and highproportions of investments in social capital led to New Zealand’seconomy undergoing significant structural changes.
2.1. Radical reforms 1984–1999
Contrary to public expectations, the Labour Party, along withthe New Zealand Treasury, became the impetus for the radicalreforms [13]. The Treasury had been advocating a broad pro-gramme of market liberalisation and macroeconomic disinflation.The National Party calling a snap election in 1984, coupled withthe seriously deteriorating economy, provided the incomingLabour Party government with a ‘window of opportunity’ [14].The new government embarked on a redesign of the nation’seconomic and social structures with almost evangelical fervour byunleashing a blitzkrieg of changes that took both the public andopponents by surprise [10].
The first aim of reform was to revitalise the nation byremoving subsidies and distortions in the private sector while
encouraging economic growth, efficiency and competition in aprice-stable environment [15]. The second aim was twofold; todismantle the welfare state and to extensively reform the widerpublic sector. The Treasury viewed public sector reform as ‘thesingle biggest problem’ facing the government [16, p. 8]. Onesignificant step included changing several government depart-mental trading activities into State Owned Enterprises (SOEs)under the State Owned Enterprise Act 1986 so that they operatedas close as possible to a private sector model [17]. Steps were alsotaken to improve managerial accountability in public servicedepartments by incorporating private sector management skillsand language by way of the State Sector Act 1988 and the PublicFinance Act 1989. Some reformers were hopeful that the reformswould allow government departments to run like a private sectorbusiness based on public entrepreneurship [18]. Competitionbecame the ‘guiding thread’ of public policy [19, p. 233].
The State Sector Act 1988 implemented sharper accountabilitybetween a minister and a departmental ‘chief executive’ and ledto disaggregating several multi-purpose, vertically integrateddepartments into smaller, single purpose policy or service deliv-ery departments. The Public Finance Act 1989 brought about a‘purchaser–provider’ relationship whereby the governmentdefines broader outcomes (impacts on social groups or condi-tions) and purchases outputs, including policy development, frompublic service departments, public–private partnerships or theprivate sector [20]. This relationship was designed to solveperceived problems of ‘provider capture’ of the political executiveby presumed self-interested public servants [11, p. 8].
During this time, total government expenditure continued todecrease, bringing about a long series of government operatingsurpluses [17]. However, the reforms’ focus on free markets andsmaller departments offering fewer services did not satisfy themajority of the public [21]. The disgruntled public wanted tosoften the reforms by voting out the Labour Party government inthe late 1990 election, but then found the incoming NationalParty government was more stringent in its reform agenda. Thepublic then voted for a 1993 referendum to replace the first-past-the-post electoral system with a Mixed Member Proportional(MMP) system [22]. The MMP system results in half of Parliamentcomprising constituency seats won by the first-past-the-postsystem and the other half based on a party list. This system oftenleads to no single party gaining a majority, which reduces thelikelihood of a party taking unilateral action.
Although the total number of public service departmentsremained fairly constant during this period, a flurry of changesoccurred after the State Sector Act 1988 was enacted (e.g. depart-ments were replaced or merged) [23]. The reduction in the size ofmany departments and the movement of some functions to othersectors, including SOEs, led to a 60% decline in the number ofpublic servants, from 85,423 in 1985 to 34,377 in 1996 [23].2 Theone-off payments for redundant public servants were seen as costeffective compared to prolonging ‘artificial jobs’ [24]. Furtherredundancies occurred as the number of local government autho-rities was reduced from around 850 to 86 [25].
Schick’s [26] 1996 assessment of the public managementsystem concluded that while New Zealand was the first nationto achieve several advances in public management and fiscalcontrol, management cannot be ‘reduced to a set of contract-likedocuments and auditable statements.’ Schick [26, pp. 84–85]warned that the ‘relentless pursuit of accountability can exact aprice in the shrinkage of a sense of responsibility,’ particularly
R. Bess / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 550–558552
with respect to inter-departmental coordination. Increaseddemand for public service accountability also had the effect ofoverloading departments and leading to a fragmentation ofservice delivery, with diminished communication between func-tional units creating ‘silos’ [27]. At the same time, virtually alldepartments had to contend with a superfluity of structuralchanges that were often ‘heavy on strategic objectives and lighton detailed business planning’ [28, p. 11]. The structural changesresulted in substantial losses in institutional knowledge andpolicy capability and downturns in performance as staff numbersdeclined [29]. The overall consequence was predictable; seniormanagers’ predilection for short-term decision making to attainperformance targets came at the expense of departmental cap-abilities [26].
2.2. Public management 1999–2008
The late 1999 election saw a wave of concerns about publicservice managerial excesses, the use of private sector consultantsto write important policy documents and some ethical lapses[13]. The new Labour Party government examined the state of thepublic management system and set about improving publicservices through increased public expenditure and inter-depart-mental coordination. The design of Statements of Intent (SOIs)was central to improving departmental planning and coordina-tion by reflecting broad outcomes and their links with depart-mental objectives and outputs, which shifted the focus fromefficiency (how can services be delivered better) to effectiveness(what services should be delivered and how people can worktogether to get this done) [30]. Accordingly, the Public FinanceAmendment Act 2004 emphasises both effective and efficientmanagement of public financial resources. Changes were alsomade to improve departmental training and development toenhance the capability of the wider public sector, as well as toaccommodate greater levels of public engagement in the devel-opment of certain policy initiatives [31]. The intention was tochange departmental cultures and build mutual trust over timeand without overhauling the public management system [32].
Scott [3, p. 12], who had been instrumental in the radicalreforms, observed that most SOIs and other strategic documentsdeveloped up to 2008 often appeared ‘vague and rather timeless’;some overreached their mandates and described ‘specific serviceswith grandiloquent visions of their contribution to the nation.’Scott [3, p. 12] considers these documents reflect mismatchedaccountability and responsibility caused by centralised coordina-tion that allowed ministers to reach ‘into the affairs’ of depart-ments. The trends during this period were also to reducecompetition in quasi-markets and continual departmentalchanges [25]. Despite just three new departments establishedand seven removed [23], largely to reduce policy-operational andpurchaser–provider splits, the use of departmental restructuringbecame widespread.
Norman [33, p. 34] comments that the ‘very benign economicand fiscal position’ during this period meant that Ministers foundit quite easy to provide more funds to departments. From mid-2000 to mid-2008, the total number of public servants increased53% from 30,040 to 45,934 [23]. Steadily increasing budgetsallowed restructuring to become a low-stakes exercise. Whilerestructuring was necessary in some cases, it was also used tosignal something significant was being done [34], even if onlysupported by rhetorical rationale of improving efficiency, effec-tiveness and productivity [28]. For some, restructuring wasattractive as a means of reinforcing top-down control; consul-tants’ reports and formal consultation processes could replaceface-to-face engagement, and the announcement of a final deci-sion could be a demonstration of power and managerial prowess.
Public servants came to expect chief executives to make theirmark soon after appointment and to continue ‘fiddling with theknobs’ until they left, only for this process to be repeated by thenext chief executive. The extent of restructuring-as-tinkering isshown in the results of a 2007 State Services Commission (SSC)survey [35]. The results show that 57% of public servants reportedtheir departments had been involved in a merger or restructure inthe last two years. These figures were contrasted with 18%reported in 2005 by public servants in the United States.
The widespread use of restructuring, coupled with the move-ment of senior managers between departments, provided someweight to Mintzberg’s [36] criticism of the professional manager.Mintzberg asserts that such managers are all too often ignorant ofthe subject of their management, which inclines them to con-stantly restructure even though it engenders more confusion thanclarification and breeds cynicism. Ironically, the resulting cyni-cism and dissatisfaction becomes the justification for yet anotherchange initiative [37]. From 1999 to 2008, there was scantevidence that departmental chief executives took up the ‘soft’obstacles to improved performance and coordination, such asculture, values, routines and professional beliefs and preferences,‘which are also the hardest things to change’ [38, p. 20]. Instead,restructuring was used to bring about almost all change initia-tives, despite evidence that the direct cost of a single restructur-ing was typically a two- to three-year downturn in departmentalperformance [34].
2.3. Public management 2008–present
The National Party government came to power in late 2008 justas the downturn in the global economy unfolded. The economicdownturn led to lower prices for several New Zealand primaryproduct exports, which account for around half of total exports[17]. The previous 15 years of fiscal surpluses rapidly changed to alarge deficit [39]. New Zealand’s economy is forecasted to experi-ence a prolonged period of weak economic growth. To avoid higherlevels of public debt, the government reduced the forecast publicexpenditure from 2009 to 2013 [17]. Early on the government senta strong message that New Zealand could not afford to continuethe growth in the public service that had occurred in recent years[40], and that rises in public expenditure would be less thaninflation until the budget was back in surplus [39]. The govern-ment had also made an election promise to cap the public service.The core government administration, which makes up most of thepublic service, was capped at 38,859, the total number as of 31December 2008. Some exceptions were made for particular depart-ments’ ‘front line’ services [41].
The government signalled some machinery of governmentchanges that included six departments either merging togetheror with other existing departments to improve efficienciesthrough shared ‘back office’ services [42]. The government hassignalled that it has a high threshold for Cabinet-approvedstructural changes, and that future change will only occur in afew cases where the benefits exceed the costs [40]. That aside, the2010 SSC survey results show that 64% of public servants reportedtheir departments had been involved in a merger or restructure inthe last two years, up from 57% in 2007 [43]. These recent resultsshow that chief executives continue to have the freedom torestructure departments, as long as departmental operationsremain within budget and outcomes are regarded as met.
The government has also expressed resolve to replace what itconsiders to be a deeply embedded public service culture ofcaution and risk management with new experiments. For exam-ple, the government is changing the policy-making process byusing a mix of public servants and experts in their fields from theprivate sector and academia. The government considers this
R. Bess / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 550–558 553
mixed model has led to ideas being publicly discussed anddebated before reaching consensus on problem identificationand workable solutions. The government’s directive to depart-ments has been to use their expertise and professionalism to meetpublic expectations for more results over process, decisions overdiscussion and professionalism over politics [40] by providing‘active, vigorous and disruptive’ debate on public services [44].
3. Effects on institutions for managing fisheries
Changes to the public management system have affected theinstitutional arrangements for managing fisheries. The first insti-tutional arrangement commencing in 1866 reflected New Zealandforming as a new nation and the need for increased institutionalcapabilities as fisheries developed. The radical reforms from 1984to 1999 brought a more business-like approach to managingfisheries, which led to implementation of the QMS and relatedchanges to institutional capabilities. The business-like approachwas tempered by subsequent efforts from 1999 to 2008 toimplement a whole-of-government approach that includedgreater levels of public engagement in certain policy initiatives,which was reflected in increased levels of engagement for allfisheries sectors. Since 2008 the government’s expectations formore focused public engagement and greater economic valuegenerated from fisheries were the purpose for the 2009/10structural changes made to the Ministry of Fisheries. These effectson fisheries institutions are discussed as follows.
3.1. Marine Department 1866–1972
The first predecessor to the Ministry of Fisheries was theMarine Department established under the Marine Act 1866. TheDepartment was set up to administer legislation for the maritimeinfrastructure, which was vital to a new nation comprising threemajor islands and numerous smaller islands. The Department’sfunctions included lighthouses, enquiries into ship wrecks, quar-antine, pilotage, the examination of ships, the regulation of loadsand the control of harbours [45]. The Department first cameunder the responsibility of the Postmaster-General and then theCommissioner of Customs [46]. The Shipping and Seamen’s Act1877 established a Minister of Marine and a Secretary for theDepartment position.
The Department took responsibility for regulating fisheriesunder the Fish Protection Act 1877 [46]. The Fisheries Act 1908consolidated several pieces of legislation and set the parametersfor managing fisheries based largely on unrestrained access. Atthat time, most inshore fisheries developed slowly with littlethreat of overfishing [47]. Fishing activities could be regulatedthrough the use of licensing and input and species controls [48].In 1937 more stringent licensing provisions were implemented,and around one dozen enforcement officers were appointed; theirnumbers remained fairly constant until the mid-1960s [47].
Under the Fisheries Amendment Act 1963 the Departmentestablished the Fisheries Management and Fisheries ResearchDivisions. The Fisheries Management Division carried out fish-eries surveillance and enforcement, monitored landed quantitiesand values of marine and freshwater species and provided adviceto the fishing industry. The Fisheries Research Division undertookstudies of marine and freshwater fisheries to maintain optimalyields [45]. The Fishing Industry Board Act 1963 established theFishing Industry Board (FIB) to promote and oversee the fishingindustry. The FIB was similar to agricultural producer boards thathad assisted the development of pastoral farming. From 1867 to1966 the steady build up of departmental capabilities increasedthe number of public servants from 17 to 432 [46].
3.2. Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries 1972–1995
In 1972 the Marine Department was abolished, and the Fish-eries Management and Fisheries Research Divisions were trans-ferred to the Ministry of Agriculture, establishing the Ministry ofAgriculture and Fisheries (MAF), a Minister of Agriculture, aMinister of Fisheries and a Director-General of Agriculture andFisheries position. The rationale for combining agriculture andfisheries was, amongst other things, their close associations withprimary product industries and both having maintained researchcapabilities vital to resource development [47]. The FisheriesResearch Division was divided into freshwater and marine fisheriesgroups. The Fisheries Management Division was divided into Fish-eries Management and Fisheries Surveillance and Enforcement,with both Divisions operating mainly in regional offices. The non-fisheries functions of the Marine Department were transferred tothe Marine Division of the Ministry of Transport [45].
The scale of fisheries management expanded significantly afterestablishment of the 12-nautical mile Territorial Sea and 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (200-nm EEZ) under theTerritorial Sea, Contiguous Zone, and Exclusive Economic ZoneAct 1977 [45]. The domestic commercial fishing fleet expandedinto the inshore and deepwater fisheries through a series ofpolicies to encourage investment and expansion of the fishingindustry. However, by the early 1980s both the inshore anddeepwater fisheries were showing signs of depletion [48].
The Fisheries Act 1983 introduced measures to limit access andreduce catch levels. These measures included a permit scheme thatdramatically reduced the number of part-time fishers, many ofwhom were Maori, the indigenous people [8]. Furthermore, the200-nm EEZ was divided into ten fisheries management areas(FMAs), with each area having its own controls. The intention wasto provide long-term management of each FMA by way of fisheriesmanagement plans designed by MAF and all fishing sectors.However, the ensuing public planning process left many partici-pants less than enthusiastic about developing such plans, whichwere viewed as complex systems of controls [48].
The political environment during the mid-1980s focusingprimarily on market forces as the solution to economic and socialproblems affected the options available for managing fisheries.This time proved to be optimal for implementing a radically newand untested system for managing fisheries. The QMS washeralded as a change in thinking from a hunting mentality tothe concept of farming or harvesting, coupled with incentives forITQ holders to extract the maximum economic return whiletaking up a stewardship role in managing fisheries [48]. Theintroduction of the QMS and ITQ allocations prompted claims byMaori to large areas of fisheries, and the QMS proved to be aneffective means of resolving these claims [8].
In 1987 MAF was one of the first departments to undergo‘major bureaucratic change’ as the radical reforms commenced[12, p. 22]. MAF’s nine divisions became four ‘business’ groups,with the majority of the Fisheries Management and FisheriesResearch Divisions’ functions placed within the MAF FisheriesGroup, along with part of MAF’s Economic Division. The MAFFisheries Group retained a regional management focus and strongregional presence. Some of the senior managers appointed lackedprior fisheries experience, though some brought extensive experi-ence in the agriculture sector. The 1987 restructuring wasdescribed as ‘the biggest change in y nearly 100 years’ andincluded substantial reductions in funding and a correspondingscheme to recover some administrative costs from the fishingindustry [49, p. 373]. MAF underwent further restructurings in1990, 1992 and 1994 that were driven by the changing needs ofagriculture and government policies to bring about a morebusiness-like approach to its functions [12].
R. Bess / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 550–558554
3.3. Ministry of Fisheries 1995–2008
In 1995 MAF’s responsibility for managing fisheries wastransferred to the new Ministry of Fisheries, which established aMinister of Fisheries and a chief executive position. The MAFFisheries Research Group was also separated and transferred tothe National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research Ltd.established under the Crown Research Institutes Act 1992. CrownResearch Institutes were established as financially viable institu-tions with less stringent profit-motives than SOEs to undertakeresearch for the benefit of New Zealand. Prior to 1987 MAFemployed around 5600 public servants. By 1995 the privatisationand restructurings along with internal drives for efficiency andactivity reduction reduced the number of public servants in thenew Ministry of Agriculture to around 2300 [12]. As of 1996 theMinistry of Fisheries’ public servants totalled around 297 [23],with almost half responsible for surveillance and enforcement.
The Ministry of Fisheries was established as a relatively small,single-purpose department to administer the Fisheries Act 1996.The purpose of this Act is to provide for sustainable utilisation offisheries resources. This responsibility includes, amongst otherthings, processes for setting catch levels and managing catch andeffort data and registry services (issuance of fishing permits,vessel registration, etc.). The Ministry also delivers on the Crown’sobligations under the settlement of Maori claims to fisheries inaccordance with the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries Claims) Settle-ment Act 1992 and subsequent fisheries legislation. The Ministrywas restructured in 2000, which for the first time separatedfisheries management operational functions from policy develop-ment. In 2003 and 2007 less substantive structural changesoccurred, leaving the functional structure largely intact andcomprising Fisheries Management, Policy, Compliance, CorporateServices and Science Groups. The science function was largelylimited to processes for setting catch levels and contestableresearch contracts. Many of the public servants, including mostsenior managers, had longstanding service that began at theMarine Department. Collectively they perpetuated a culture ofexploring innovative ways to address common challenges andproblems associated with managing fisheries, which overseascounterparts watched with interest [8].
3.3.1. Strategic direction
Early on, the Ministry of Fisheries’ strategic direction wasdepicted in the 1997 document Fisheries 2010 [50] that sets out acollaborative approach for building consensus among all fishingsectors on long-term management goals to be implemented byway of five-year strategic plans. This approach was based on 12guiding principles to minimise conflicts between environmental,economic, and social objectives for the purpose of achievingsustainable fisheries and healthy ecosystems. Long-term manage-ment by way of multi-sector involvement in formulating objec-tives and plans is in line with international fisheries managementguidance [51] and the widening understanding of who has aninterest in or is affected by management decisions [52].
The Ministry’s strategic direction also implicitly reflected theradical reforms. This direction focused largely on processes thatprovided efficiency gains for the fishing industry and contributedtoward the industry taking up responsibility for self-regulationand certain devolved fisheries management services. This direc-tion became more explicit during the National Party governmentuntil 1999. The political signals for devolution were sufficientlystrong that the industry restructured to disestablish the FIB andreplace it with the levy-funded Seafood Industry Council (SeaFIC)to promote the overall and specific interests of commercial fishersand processors. SeaFIC comprises several ITQ holding companies
designed to take up devolved responsibility for management oftheir respective fisheries and to explore possible public–privatepartnerships. However, the only partnership established is for theMinistry’s registry services and other contract functions devolvedto a fully owned subsidiary of SeaFIC, referred to as FishServe.This partnership has led to steady reductions in the cost ofregulatory services that are recovered from ITQ holders.
Devolution was the driving force for the 1999 amendment to theFisheries Act 1996 that included broad concepts for the develop-ment of fisheries plans based on management objectives. Althoughthe legislative provisions do not stipulate who should preparefisheries plans, such plans were intended to provide the processesand framework for ITQ holders to agree on and have certainmanagement responsibilities devolved to them [53]. However, soonafter the Labour Party government came to power in late 1999, thenew government reasserted central authority for decision making inthe management of fisheries. The Minister of Fisheries consideredthe fisheries plan direction was too aligned with the National Party’spreference for industry self-regulation and devolution. Instead,wider public engagement was the preferred approach for managingfisheries [54]. This more inclusive approach was depicted in theMinistry’s goal to ‘maximise the value New Zealanders obtainthrough the sustainable use of fisheries resources and protectionof the aquatic environment’, as set out in the 2003 SOI [55].
In 2005 the Ministry embarked on developing three ‘proof ofconcept’ fisheries plans by mid-2006 before developing a five-yearprogramme for a total of 29 fisheries plans. The development offisheries plans would include the assistance of all fishing sectorswith the aim of reaching consensus on management objectives. Thisconsensus approach featured in the 2005 SOI as a ‘worthy invest-ment of time and energy’ with the aim of achieving what each sectorwanted from a fishery [56, p.11]. Similarly, in 2005 the Ministryembarked on establishing regional forums for meeting with recrea-tional fishers, and separate regional forums were established tomeet with Maori. While the number of Ministry staff had averaged316 from 1999 to 2003, the number increased to 445 by 2007 [23];this increase of over 40% in four years was largely due to theresourcing requirements for higher levels of public engagement inthe development of fisheries plans and the various regional forums,as well as increased information technology support.
The National Party government formed after the late 2008election expressed dissatisfaction with the level of public engage-ment in fisheries management processes and their apparent lack ofdirection and purpose. To some extent, all fishing sectors hadexpressed concern about the strain these processes had placed ontheir ability to engage. The government listened to these concerns asit sought ways to support the fishing industry during difficult exporttrading conditions, while also emphasising the need for all fishingsectors to cooperate to improve the management of fisheries [57].
Historically, the Ministry’s structure has included the chiefexecutive and two deputy chief executives responsible for settingthe strategic direction, oversight of business planning and mon-itoring the external environment and relationships. Prior to thelate 2007 appointment of a new chief executive, the structure waschanged to form the strategic leadership team that comprised thechief executive, the two deputies and the seven third-tier man-agers who were technical experts in their fields, including fish-eries management and science. The senior leadership team hadformal responsibility and authority to provide better coordinationbetween governance and fisheries management responsibilitiesand to improve the timeliness of strategic decision making.
3.4. Ministry of Fisheries 2009–present
Beginning in 2009 the Ministry of Fisheries underwent astructural change for the purpose of improving alignment with
R. Bess / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 550–558 555
the government’s expectations for more focused public engage-ment and greater economic value generated from fisheries, asreflected in the 2008 document Fisheries 2030 [58]. Fisheries 2030
updates Fisheries 2010 and sets out 15 objectives as the basis forpursuing the Ministry’s revised goal to ‘maximise benefits fromthe use of fisheries within environmental limits,’ which is in linewith the goal set out in the 2003 SOI noted above. The structuralchange applied primarily to the fisheries management functionfor the following reasons:
�
The scale of efforts to engage all fisheries sectors in discussionsaround fisheries management had raised expectations that hadplaced unsustainable pressure on the Ministry. � More work had occurred in silos and with decentraliseddecision making than was desirable, leading to priorities beingestablished and actioned in ways that were counterproductive.
� The diffused prioritising effort had led to work being under-taken with inadequate resources.
� There had been a lack of clarity regarding the impact thatadditional or reduced resourcing would make in completingthe work [59].
Some of the above reasons for change were apparent to somewithin the Ministry and are not uncommon among departmentsthat experience conflicts in priority setting and associated chal-lenges in defining accountability. Some had expressed concernsabout the approach taken to developing fisheries plans and thenumber of plans. The development of fisheries plans had beenprolonged due to differences over key tenets, such as managementobjectives guiding fisheries plans versus objectives being formedduring plan development. The lack of management objectives meantthat Ministry scientists had to second guess those objectives. Aswell, the policy-operational split that had occurred in 2000remained incomplete, as the operational function continued to beinfused into much of the strategic policy. At times, there wereideological policy-operational standoffs. This situation raised ques-tions regarding the feasibility of this split within a relatively small,single-purpose department. Although the chief executive appointedin late 2007 had signalled a Ministry-wide review was underway,few contemplated the extent of the ensuing structural changes.
3.4.1. Structural changes
The fisheries management function was restructured so thatindividual fisheries managers are held accountable for the perfor-mance of their fisheries by way of five fisheries plans; highlymigratory/pelagic, deepwater and three inshore species groups (shell-fish, finfish and freshwater). National-level management objectivesare the focus of fisheries plans, with a regional focus taken wherejustified on a value basis. Fisheries plans must be consistent withFisheries 2030 and other relevant national objectives. The five fisheriesplans are more standardised than the previous design for 29 plans inorder to reduce the amount of public engagement required for theirdevelopment without the need to reach consensus across all sectors.Fisheries managers also have responsibility for associated annualoperating plans that set out the results of monitoring performanceagainst objectives and prioritising fisheries interventions and research[60]. The perceived need to better align the science and fisheriesmanagement functions led to the movement of most scientists fromthe previous Science Group to the new Fisheries Management Group.However, the Chief Scientist was repositioned into the former PolicyGroup, rebranded the ‘Strategy’ Group, to ensure the overall integrityof the science research (i.e. research results not captured by non-scientific influences).
The other main structural changes included the surveillanceand enforcement function expanding into a new Field Operations
Group. This Group has been tasked with a wider liaison role tosupport fisheries management processes in the regions, includingpublic education, and to be better aligned with certain manage-ment objectives. Changes were also made to a function set up in2004 to assist all Ministry functions in meeting Crown obligationsarising from the settlement of Maori claims to fisheries. Thisfunction now develops operational policy to assist fisheries plansdeveloped by individual iwi (tribes) to fit within Maori forumfisheries plans based on FMAs, which then align with thenational-level fisheries plans noted above. A further changeincluded establishment of the new office of the chief executivewith staff dedicated to strategic projects and risk managementand evaluation [59]. In addition, the new structure established anew Aquaculture Unit to help meet the government’s objective todevelop the aquaculture sector, which is considered the bestopportunity for further economic growth [61]. The importance ofthis objective is reflected in the new Minister of Fisheries andAquaculture title.
The structural changes increased the number of deputy chiefexecutives from two to five, plus a manager of the new office ofthe chief executive. The chief executive, deputies and officemanager, which make up the senior leadership team, did nothave fisheries experience prior to their appointments. Theybrought significant experience in public sector management,which some had acquired at the Treasury and SSC. Their role issimilar to that of the previous deputy chief executives in provid-ing leadership, strategic decision making and related delegations,with greater emphasis placed on governance. Some third-tiermanagers that made up the previous senior leadership teamretained positions, while others were not re-hired.
3.4.2. Implementation of structural changes
The 2009 structural change and the speed with which it wasimplemented was reminiscent of the previous ‘crashing through’style of the radical reforms, except that it was not about costsavings or downsizing. The intended net loss was only 16positions or less than 4% of total staff numbers [59], which weremostly vacant at that time. The details of the proposed restructurewere not disclosed prior to formal consultation, and the extent ofthe proposed changes took almost all at the Ministry by surprise.Almost all of the fisheries management positions at Head Officeand regional offices were disestablished, causing existing staffand managers to compete for fewer, similar or related positions. Itwas presumed that the ‘best and the brightest’ in fisheriesmanagement needed to be centralised at Head Office. Thispresumption was at odds with the frequency with which staffand managers travelled between regional offices and Head Officeand the significant investment in video conferencing technologyin the main regional offices.
Within the following year, virtually all Ministry functions weresubject to at least one formal review, with some areas subject totwo or three reviews holding the prospect of further structuralchanges that could disestablish positions or relocate them. Thissituation, along with some of the review proposals relying onlittle more than familiar rhetorical rationale for change, had aconsequential effect on morale and productivity. Even thoughmost identified problems were more symptomatic of the ‘soft’obstacles to improved performance and coordination, ongoingstructural change was used as an instrument to bring aboutchanges in behaviour and assert control.
The unintended consequence was that more opted to leave theMinistry than was anticipated, though further attrition wasreduced by retaining a few positions in the regional offices. Theaccumulated experience and institutional knowledge of thosewho left the Ministry in 2009/10 totalled over 400 years, with
R. Bess / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 550–558556
around half from the fisheries management function. These lossesexclude those who opted to retire at that time. Despite nosignificant loss in the total number of Ministry staff, there arenow few who were at MAF when the QMS was introduced in 1986and very few who have an in-depth understanding of the opera-tions of the QMS.
3.4.3. Review of structural changes
Mid-2010 the Ministry commissioned the consultants who haddesigned the structural changes to meet with key staff and middleand senior managers to identify progress to date and possibleadjustments to improve further progress, while being mindful of‘exasperating a sense of change and review fatigue’ [62]. This‘cheque in’ review found that, amongst other things, improvementswere needed to ‘integrate’ the fisheries management and sciencefunctions. The reviewers also found a need to increase staffing levelsfor managing both inshore and deepwater fisheries, and some ofthese positions were placed in the regional offices. Additional workwas required to clarify the new public engagement approach, theservicing of further Treaty-based settlements and the role of theoffice of the chief executive in relation to other functions.
The reviewers concluded there was an ‘overall sense’ that thenew structure was working, and there was a greater sense ofpurpose and stronger and more coherent leadership. Furthermore,they concluded there was an ‘overall impression’ that productiv-ity, collaboration and communication had improved. In addition,while the senior managers were viewed as functioning better as ateam, there was a perceived need for them to ‘continue to reachout and be seen.’ The reviewers acknowledged this perceivedneed might be due to staff not being familiar with the seniormanagers, which contrasts with the ‘long and personal historiesthat many past leaders have had’ [62].
3.5. Future of the Ministry of Fisheries
The chief executive who implemented the formal reviews andstructural changes in 2009/10 left the Ministry of Fisheries in late2010, after almost three years, to take up the Director-General roleat the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, which retained the MAFacronym after the Ministry of Fisheries was created in 1995 and theforestry portfolio merged with agriculture in 1998. The consequencefor the Ministry of Fisheries is the prospect that the next chiefexecutive could embark on a somewhat different approach andrestructure accordingly. In addition, the de-coupling of seniormanagement from the direct management of technical activitiesmakes the Ministry a possible candidate for a merger to reduce bothmanagement costs and ‘back office’ services. It is likely that thegovernment will merge the Ministry with another departmentresponsible for managing natural resources, such as MAF, as hasrecently occurred with the three-year old New Zealand Food SafetyAuthority. The possible merger of the Ministry of Fisheries and MAFhas been an ongoing rumour, and this merger may be integral to thegovernment’s consideration of a new Ministry for primary industries[63]. Alternatively, some could argue the Ministry should becomepart of a new Marine Department that consolidates a range ofmarine activities scattered across several departments and statutes.
The 2009/10 structural changes reflected the ‘take charge’management approach that Schick highlighted in 1996, which isstill prevalent amongst chief executives and those who aspire tothese positions. Norman [6, p. 29] comments that this hard-edgeapproach is potentially appealing in response to complex andpolitically charged problems, which is why it was used during theradical reforms to ‘clear out the clutter of nearly a century ofbureaucratic tradition.’ Norman [6] contrasts this approach withHampden-Turner’s [64] ‘encompassing reason’ that is characterised
by probing, discovering something of interest, reflecting, cogitat-ing, and probing again. The Ministry of Fisheries largely operatedwith this circular and iterative approach prior to the 2009/10restructure. At that time, this approach could have been perceivedas lacking efficiency and effectiveness by those who may not haveappreciated the extent to which the Ministry had used it toresolve fisheries challenges and problems that most other nationswould have abandoned [8]. However, this approach contributedto some things drifting, including legislative barriers to aqua-culture growth, which did not sit well with the current govern-ment. According to Norman [6], in the future both the hard-edgeand iterative approaches will be needed for departments tonavigate between the rocks and whirlpool-like problems thatoften cannot be solved but only managed.
3.5.1. Public management system
The future of the Ministry will continue to be shaped bychanges to the public management system, including the currentemphasis placed on departments working with experts in theirfields from the private sector and academia in policy developmentand implementation. There may well be benefits arising from theprivate sector gaining a better appreciation of the extent to whichthe public service is eclectic and intensely political. Few in theprivate sector probably appreciate how the ‘inevitable babble ofcompeting and conflicting voices’ causes the public service towork without readily calculated and measureable facts [65, p. 75].Many activities are within the public service precisely becausetheir benefits are unclear and not so attributable. According toMinztberg [36], if the benefits of these activities were so clear,they would have been in the private sector long ago.
Similarly, the public service may be intrigued by the extent towhich parts of the private sector have moved beyond assumed self-interested and utility-maximising behaviour to cooperation thatcan mobilise the knowledge individuals create and apply tobusiness activities [66]. This knowledge-based approach has beeninfluencing the public management literature in the exploration of‘policy networks’ that place public servants in new relationships[67], the concepts of ‘co-production and co-design’ that harness theknowledge and creativity of the public and public servants [68] anddepartments seeking unique ways to create public value [69].
These explorations have led to the concept of ‘public-value-seeking leadership’ to address the new combinations of hierar-chies, networks and markets in the delivery of goods and servicescreated by reform movements, which has caught the attention ofthe Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development(OECD) [70]. However, the private sector version of this type ofleadership only works when top-down hierarchical coordinationand positional authority are abandoned [71]. The primary reasonis that the integration of knowledge, primarily tacit knowledge,can only be done by those who possess it [72]. The challenge forthe public service counterpart is to utilise informal authority innetworks while exploring and realising possibilities implicitwithin formally delegated authority [70]. The required inspira-tional dimension to this type of public service renewal mightexplain why the OECD first promoted it in nations where outputaccountability measures have not been strongly institutionalised.Such measures, along with an obsession with their more negativedimensions, have remained integral to public management inNew Zealand [70]. The government’s resolve to undertake newexperiments and replace the public service culture of caution andrisk management may be an acknowledgement of the uninten-tional consequences of what Schick [26] referred to as a ‘relent-less pursuit of accountability.’
The government’s position that it has a high threshold formachinery of government changes may be in recognition of the
R. Bess / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 550–558 557
increasing awareness of how little evidence exists to supportassertions that restructuring provides measureable benefits orthat it is the most cost effective way to deliver improvements inperformance [73]. In Britain, for example, questions are beingraised regarding political imperatives to ‘periodically shake up’departments and the need to have well-considered, plannedstructural changes that reduce downturns in performance andother costs [74]. This awareness, coupled with increasing fiscalconstraints, should incline the New Zealand government to beattentive to the potential waste of public funds and humancapability when departmental overhauls and restructuring-as-tinkering are supported with little more than familiar rhetoricalrationale. However, as the late 2011 election draws near, thegovernment is campaigning on ‘better results from public ser-vices’ and that ‘bloated and inefficient’ departments can expectfurther budgetary cuts, staff reductions and increased use ofpublic–private partnerships [75]. The electoral preferences arisingfrom the 2011 election and the potential ensuing formation of acoalition government, along with the upcoming referendum onwhether New Zealand retains the MMP system will no doubt havean effect on the institutional arrangements for managing fisheriesand natural resources in general.
4. Conclusion
In the last few decades there has been vigorous debate abouthow to improve public service performance [76]. Inevitably, thisdebate has been highly complicated and emotional [77]. Funda-mental questions have been asked about what constitutes publicgoods and services, how far public intervention should go, howpublic goods and services should be provided and delivered andby whom, and how providers should be held accountable [77]. Atthe same time, the public has demanded smaller, less costly andmore effective government while desiring more and better goodsand services [78].
The radical reforms in New Zealand from 1984 to 1999 wereprincipally about bringing a runaway fiscal deficit into balanceand were based predominately on the National Party principles ofself-reliance and private enterprise, irrespective of the LabourParty having begun the reforms. Some took up the reforms as ifthey were a moral mission, and with a sense of conviction thatsometimes lost sight of the fact that the electorate knows what isbest for the nation [21]. The frenetic search for departmentalefficiencies also lost sight of the role of moral or ethical con-siderations in the practise of public management.
By the late 1990s there was increasing concern that the radicalreforms had led to fragmented services and lacked consistency inethics across the wider public sector, causing the pendulum toswing back towards more centralised coordination of services [6].Effort was made to implement a whole-of-government approachto improve departmental coordination and create synergies bybuilding public sector capability and including more publicengagement in certain policy initiatives [79]. However, thisapproach proved problematic, given the political nature of nego-tiation and compromise, which leads to inherently vague out-comes that are difficult to measure [80].
Currently, the government is rethinking the core function ofthe public service within increasing fiscal constraints. At the sametime, the government is turning to the private sector andacademia for innovative policy and strategic advice and reconsi-dering the role that departments can play in sustaining nationalprosperity. The government must also be cognisant of publicdemands that the concept of prosperity reflects new ways ofmeasuring wealth that account for individual and social wellbeingand limits on available ecological services [81].
The changes made over time to New Zealand’s public manage-ment system have been reflected in the institutional arrange-ments for managing fisheries. Each institutional arrangement hasbeen devised to accommodate the priorities and policies of thegovernment of the day. More recently, the Ministry of Fisherieshas undergone a structural overhaul that was reminiscent of theradical reforms’ strong emphasis on managerial control and thehard edge of accountability. Some changes were needed because‘some things had drifted’, but the need for change had little to dowith the previous structure being ineffective. Although the knownproblems related more to aspects of the culture, values, routinesand professional beliefs and preferences, ongoing structuralchange was used as an instrument to bring about changes inbehaviour and assert control. The restructuring had a consequen-tial effect on morale and productivity and led to substantial lossesof in-house experience and institutional knowledge, particularlywithin the fisheries management function, and the inclusion of‘new blood’ in senior management positions that place greateremphasis on governance arrangements. While significant pro-gress has subsequently been made on fisheries plan development,aquaculture legislative reform and other priority work, it is toosoon to tell if the structural changes have improved the wayfisheries are managed.
Acknowledgements
The author acknowledges all those who provided helpfulfeedback on of this drafts article.
References
[1] Nagel JH. Radically reinventing government: editor’s introduction. Journal ofPolicy Analysis and Management 1997;16(3):349–56.
[2] Norman R. Obedient Servants? Management Freedoms and Accountabilitiesin the New Zealand Public Sector Wellington: Victoria University Press;2003.
[3] Scott G. After the reforms: some questions about the state of the state in NewZealand. Policy Quarterly 2008;4(2):3–14.
[4] Davis G, Weller P, Craswell E, Eggins S. What drives machinery of governmentchange? Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom 1950–1997 PublicAdministration 1999;77(1):7–50.
[5] Peters BG. The Future Of Governing: Four Emerging Models. Lawrence, KS:University of Kansas Press; 1996.
[6] Norman R. New governance, new dilemmas: post-reform issues in NewZealand’s public sector. Policy Quarterly 2006;2(3):24–31.
[7] Pallot J. Beyond NPM: developing strategic capability. Financial Account-ability & Management 1999;15(3–4):419–26.
[8] Bess R. Expanding New Zealand’s quota management system. Marine Policy2005;29:339–47.
[9] James C. New territory: The Transformation of New Zealand 1984–92.Wellington: Bridget Williams Books Ltd; 1992.
[10] Kelsey J. The New Zealand experiment: A World Model for StructuralAdjustment? Auckland: Auckland University Press; 1995.
[11] Whitcombe J. Contributions and challenges of ‘new public management’:New Zealand since 1984. Policy Quarterly 2008;4(3):7–13.
[12] Ballard R. Ministry of agriculture—New Zealand. Agricultural Science1996;9(1):21–3.
[13] Goldfinch SF. New Zealand: reforming a new public management exemplar?In: Goldfinch SF, Wallis JL, editors. International Handbook of Public Manage-ment Reform. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Inc.; 2009.p. 155–72.
[14] Aberbach J, Christensen T. Radical reform in New Zealand: crisis, windows ofopportunity and rational actors. Public Administration 2001;79(2):403–22.
[15] Carew E. New Zealand’s Money Revolution. Wellington: Allen and Unwin;1987.
[16] The Treasury. Government Management: A Report to the Incoming Govern-ment. Wellington: The Treasury; 1987.
[17] The Treasury. New Zealand Economic and Financial Overview. Wellington:The Treasury; 2010.
[18] Osborne D, Gaebler T. Reinventing Government: How the EntrepreneurialSpirit is Transforming the Public Sector. Reading, MA: Addison WesleyPublishing; 1992.
[19] Entwistle T, Martin S. From competition to collaboration in public servicedelivery: a new agenda for research. Public Administration 2005;83(1):233–342.
R. Bess / Marine Policy 36 (2012) 550–558558
[20] Chapman J, Duncan G. Is there now a ‘New Zealand model’? Public Manage-ment Review 2007;9(1):1–25.
[21] James, C., 2007. Ruth amid the alien corn. Paper at the Victoria UniversityPolitical Studies Department and Stout Centre Conference on ‘The BolgerYears’ 28 April 2007. /http://www.colinjames.co.nz/speechesS.
[22] James C., 2000. The issues. In: Proceedings of the NZ politics and researchgroup election conference, 18 February 2000. /http://www.colinjames.co.nz/speechesS.
[23] SSC data. Wellington: State Services Commission. /www.ssc.govt.nzS.[24] Prebble R. I’ve Been Thinking. Auckland: Seaview Publishing; 1996.[25] Gill D. By accident or design: changes in the structure of the state of New
Zealand. Policy Quarterly 2008;4(2):27–32.[26] Schick A. The spirit of reform: managing the New Zealand state sector in a
time of change. Wellington: State Services Commission; 1996.[27] Halligan J. Reform design and performance in Australia and New Zealand. In:
Christensen T, Laegreid P, editors. Transcending New Public Management:The Transformation of Public Sector Reforms. Hampshire, England: AshgatePublishing Ltd.; 2007. p. 43–64.
[28] Di Francesco M. Do state sector restructures deliver? applying an evidence-based approach Public Sector 2010:10–2.
[29] Boston, J., Eichbaum, C, 2005. State sector reform and renewal in NewZealand: lessons for governance. Paper presented at the Repositioning ofPublic Governance—Global Experiences and Challenges Conference, Taipei,National Taiwan University, 18–19 November, 2005.
[30] Gill D, Eppel E, Lips M, Ryan B. Managing for joint outcomes—the break-through from the front line. Policy Quarterly 2007;3(4):39–43.
[31] Advisory Group,; 2001. Report of the Advisory Group of the Review of theCentre. Presented to the Ministers of State Services and Finance. Wellington:State Services Commission.
[32] Christensen T, Laegreid P. The whole-of-government approach to publicsector reform. Public Administration Review 2007;67(6):1059–66.
[33] Norman R. At the centre or in control? central agencies in search of newidentities Policy Quarterly 2008;4(2):33–8.
[34] Braithwaite J, Westbook J, Iedema R. Restructuring as gratification. Journal ofthe Royal Society of Medicine 2005;98:542–4.
[35] SSC. Integrity and conduct survey. Wellington: State Services Commission;2007. /www.ssc.govt.nzS.
[36] Mintzberg H. Managing government, governing management. Harvard Busi-ness Review 1996:75–83.
[37] Diefenbach T. New public management in public sector organizations: thedark side of managerialistic ‘enlightenment’. Public Administration 2009;87(4):892–909.
[38] Ryan B, Gill D, Eppel E, Lips M. Managing for joint outcomes: connecting upthe horizontal and the vertical. Policy Quarterly 2008;4(3):14–21.
[39] English Hon B., 2009, Budget speech. Media release. /http://www.beehive.govt.nzS.
[40] English Hon, B., 2009. Public policy challenges facing New Zealand. Speech tothe institute of public administration. /http://www.beehive.govt.nzS.
[41] Ryall Hon T., 2009. Government Caps Core Government Administration andPledges Better Performance. Media release, 26 March 2009. /http://www.beehive.govt.nzS.
[42] Ryall Hon, T., 2010. State sector changes to improve performance. Mediarelease, 25 March 2010. /http://www.beehive.govt.nzS.
[43] SSC. Integrity and Conduct Survey. Wellington: State Services Commission;2010. /www.ssc.govt.nzS.
[44] James, C., 2010. Bill Brings Tidings of Caution, Constraint, and a ‘NewNormal’. 13 December 2010. /http://www.colinjames.co.nz/speechesS.
[45] Archives. Wellington: New Zealand Archives. /http://www.archway.archives.govt.nzS.
[46] Martin ER. Marine Department Centennial History 1866–1966. Wellington:AR Shearer, Government Printer; 1969.
[47] Nightingale T. White Collars and Gumboots: A History of the Ministry ofAgriculture and Fisheries 1892–1992. Palmerston North: The Dunmore PressLtd.; 1992.
[48] Harding R. New Zealand Fisheries Management: A Study in Bureaucrati-sation. Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Victoria University of Wellington,Wellington; 1991.
[49] Johnson D, Hooked Haworth J. The Story of the New Zealand Fishing Industry.Christchurch, NZ: Hazard Press Ltd.; 2004. completed by.
[50] Ministry of Fisheries. Changing Course—Towards Fisheries 2010. Well-ington: Ministry of Fisheries; 1997.
[51] FAO. Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing. Rome: Food and AgricultureOrganization of the United Nations; 1995.
[52] Jentoft S. Institutions in fisheries: what they are, what they do, and how theychange. Marine Policy 2004;28:137–49.
[53] Bess, R., 2003. The Building of Strategic Capabilities for Sustainable Compe-titive Advantage: Case Studies in the New Zealand Seafood Industry.Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis. Massey University, Auckland.
[54] Hodgson Hon, P., 2000. Speech at the New Zealand Seafood Industry CouncilConference. Rutherford Hotel, Nelson, 17–19 May, 2000.
[55] Ministry of Fisheries. 2003/08 Statement of Intent. Wellington: Ministry ofFisheries; 2003.
[56] Ministry of Fisheries. 2005/08 Statement of Intent. Wellington: Ministry ofFisheries; 2005.
[57] Key Hon, J., 2009. Prime Minister’s Speech at the Seafood Industry Con-ference. Te Papa Museum, Wellington, 6–7 May, 2009.
[58] Ministry of Fisheries. Fisheries 2030—Vision, Result Areas And Action Plan,Unlocking the Potential of the New Zealand Fisheries Sector. Wellington:Ministry of Fisheries; 2008.
[59] Ministry of Fisheries. Delivering on 2030 and Government Priorities: Pro-posed Ministry Organisation Designed, Chief Executive Consultation WithStaff. Wellington: Ministry of Fisheries; 2009.
[60] Ministry of Fisheries. Delivering on 2030 and Government Priorities: Ministry ofFisheries Organisation Design Decision. Wellington: Ministry of Fisheries; 2009.
[61] Heatley Hon, P., 2009. Budget Support for Fisheries and Aquaculture. Mediarelease, 28 May 2009. /http://www.beehive.govt.nzS.
[62] LECG. Ministry of Fisheries Organisation Development ‘Check In’Review—Consolidated Comment Incorporating MFish Response. Wellington:Law & Economic Consulting Group; 2010.
[63] NZPA. Govt has ‘Bloated’ Public Service in its Sights. Wellington: NewZealand Press Association; 2011. /http://www.nspa.co.nzS.
[64] Hampden-Turner C. Charting the Corporate Mind: Graphic Solutions toBusiness Conflicts. London: The Free Press; 1990.
[65] Gregory R. New public management and the politics of accountability.In: Goldfinch SF, Wallis JL, editors. International Handbook of Public Manage-ment Reform. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Inc; 2009. p. 66–87.
[66] Conner KR, Prahalad CK. A resource-based theory of the firm: knowledgeversus opportunism. Organization Science 1996;7:447–501.
[67] Ryan B. Beyond Westminster: thinking the Aotearoa/New Zealand way ofgoverning. Policy Quarterly 2006;2(3):40–7.
[68] Gill D, Pride S, Gilbert H, Norman R, Mladenovic A. The future state project:meeting the challenges of the 21st century. Policy Quarterly 2010;6(3):31–9.
[69] Bryson JM, Ackermann F, Eden C. Putting the resource-based view of strategyand distinctive competencies to work in public organizations. Public Admin-istration Review 2007;67(4):702–17.
[70] Wallis J, Gregory R. Leadership, accountability and public value: resolving aproblem in ‘new governance’? International Journal of Public Administration2009;32:250–73.
[71] Hamel G, Prahalad CK. Competing in the new economy: managing out ofbounds. Strategic Management Journal 1996;17:237–42.
[72] Grant RM. Toward a knowledge-based theory of the firm. Strategic Manage-ment Journal 1996;17:109–22.
[73] National Audit Office, 2010. Reorganising central government. Report by thecomptroller and auditor-general HC 452. /http://www.nao.org.uk/publicationsS.
[74] Institute for Government. Making and Breaking Whitehall Departments: aGuide to Machinery of Government Changes. Public Policy Group: LondonSchool of Economics; 2010. /http://www.lse.academic.eduS.
[75] Key Wields axe Over Public Jobs: More State Sector Cuts and Mergers toCome, says PM. The Dominion-Post, 9 February 2011, A1.
[76] Boyne GA. What is public service improvement? Public Administration2003;81(2):211–27.
[77] Caiden GE, Sundaram P. The specificity of public service reform. PublicAdministration & Development 2004;24(5):373–83.
[78] Kettl DF. The Global Public Management Revolution. Washington, D.C:Brookings Institution Press; 2005.
[79] Pollitt C. Joined up government: a survey. Political Studies Review2003;1:34–49.
[80] Noordegraaf M. Meanings of measurements: the real story behind therotterdam safety index. Public Management Review 2008;10(2):221–39.
[81] Morrison A., 2010. Speech at Lincoln University 7 October 2010. /http://www.doc.govt.nzS.
