Public n Private Percptions

7/29/2019 Public n Private Percptions

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Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Inc.

Public Management Research Association

Public v. Private Perceptions of Formalization, Outcomes, and JusticeAuthor(s): Nancy B. Kurland and Terri D. Egan

Source:Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART,

Vol. 9, No. 3 (Jul.,1999), pp. 437-458Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Public Management Research AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1181651 .

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Public v. Private Perceptionsof Formalization, Outcomes, and JusticeNancyB. Kurland

Universityof SouthernCaliforniaTerri D. EganPepperdineUniversity

ABSTRACTIn this study we usedresponses rom 174 public-sectorandprivate-sector mployees o assess differences nperceived oband communicationormalization,emphasison objective-orientedresults, perceptionsof distributive nd procedural ustice, andemployees'satisfactionwiththeir immediate upervisors.Overall,public employeesperceivedsimilar ob and communicationformalizationand emphasison results, but they held weakerdis-tributiveand procedural usticeperceptionsand were less satis-fied with theirsupervisors.We also discussotherresults, implica-

tions, and limitations.Scholarscontinue o debatethe extent to which public andprivateorganizations ctuallydiffer (Rainey 1997). Researchershave developeda variety of frameworksor highlightingdifferentaspectsof organizational tructures ndprocesses (e.g., Dahl andLindblom1953; Benn and Gaus 1983; for overviews, see Lanand Rainey 1992; Perry andRainey 1988; Mitnick1980). Othershave delineated he traitsor characteristicshat are uniquetopublic organizations nd that focus on rules andjob formaliza-tion, hierarchy, nefficientdegreeof bureaucratizationPugh,Hickson, and Hinings 1969; see also Meyer 1982), andgreateramountsof red tape (e.g., Bozeman1993; Rainey, Pandey,andBozeman1995). Some investigations ield evidencethatpublicorganizations re more rule-oriented ndinefficient(e.g., Perryand Porter1982; Warwick1975), while otherssuggestthe oppo-site (e.g., BozemanandRainey1998; Rainey, Pandey,and Boze-man 1995; for a review of bothperspectives,see PerryandRainey 1988).Traditionally, ublic organizations avemultipleconflicting

goals, serve multipleconstituencies,and are not tied to market437/Journal of Public AdministrationResearch and Theory

The ZumbergeResearchand Innova-tionFund, Universityof SouthernCaliforniaprovided unding or thisstudy.We aregrateful or commentsManag-ing EditorStuartBretschneider,HalRainey,and threeanonymous eview-ers provided.We also thankTerryCooperandElizabethGraddy or theircommentson an earlierversionof thisarticle. All errorsare our own.J-PART 9(1999):3:437-458

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Public v. PrivatePerceptionsincentives.Some have argued hat these factorshave led toinflexible, bureaucratic tructures oupled with particularistpersonnelpractices for a review, see Bozeman1987; Meyer1982; on a related heme, see Pearce, Branyiczki,and Bigley1997). Suchorganizations re characterized y rigid rule struc-tures, formalizedob guidelinesand responsibilities, ormalmeans of communication, lear division of labor and hierarchicalcontrol, civil service systems, inflexible rewardsystems, strictreportingrequirements, egulations,andconstraints Weber1947; Meyer 1982; Perryand Porter 1982; Rainey 1983;PerryandRainey1988; Robertsonand Seneviratne1995). By compari-son, private-sector rganizations re drivenprimarilyby marketpreferences,which dictateflexibility andresponsivenessn bothprocess andoutcomesfor survival. In theorythen, private-sectororganizations re likely to be less encumbered y rules andregulations. n addition,organizational ffectiveness s morereadily measuredn termsof efficiency and profitabilitynprivate-sector rganizationsBozeman1987 and 1993).

Differences n organizationaltructures ssociatedwithpublic-versusprivate-sector rganizationsmay have implicationsfor organizationalustice. Researchhas demonstratedhat formalorganizationaltructures avorably mpactorganizationalusticeperceptions e.g., Leventhal1980). Organizationalustice is aperceptualandattributionalrocess by whichan individualeval-uates whathe or she receives as a resultof organizationalmem-bership n terms of a criterionof personaldeserving (Egan 1993).Conceptual ndempiricalevidencepointto two relatedbut inde-pendentdimensionsof organizationalustice perceptions:distribu-tive justiceand proceduralustice. Distributive ustice focusesonemployees' perceptionsaboutwhetheror not they receive theoutcomestheybelieve they deserve.Procedural ustice focuses onwhetheror not employeesperceiveas fair the processby whichthey receivedthe outcomes. Each of these dimensionsaffectsindividualattitudesand behaviorssuch as job satisfaction Alex-anderand Ruderman1987), organizationalommitment FolgerandKonovsky 1989), taskperformance EarleyandLind 1987;Konovskyand Croponzano1991; Egan 1993), organizational iti-zenshipbehavior Niehoffand Moorman1993; Egan 1993;Moorman1991; see also BrocknerandSiegel 1996), andorganizationaletaliatory ehavior SkarlickiandFolger 1997).

In this study,we continue he inquiry ntowhetherand towhatdegreepublicandprivateorganizations iffer. We do so byfocusingon publicandprivateemployees'perceptionsof selectedorganizationalontrolstrategies elementsof generalformaliza-tion), procedural nddistributiveustice, andthe subsequentimpact heseperceptionshave on employees'satisfactionwith4381J-PART,July 1999



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Public v. PrivatePerceptionstheirsupervisors. f the generalformalization atternsdo notdiffer, thentheseorganizationaltructural lementsmay notinfluencedistributive ndproceduralusticeperceptionsdiffer-ently in publicorganizationshanthey do in privateorganiza-tions, as previousresearchhas implied.Hence, the results of thisstudy will contributeo knowledgeregardinghe relationshipbetweengeneralformalization ndperceptionsof justice in thepublicandprivaterealms.

Scholarsdebatewhetherpublicandprivateorganizationsdiffer by definition-core approach-or only by degree, alongspecificdimensions-dimensionalapproachBozeman1987;BozemanandBretschneider 994). The core approachallows thatpublicness is a single, discreteattribute,while the dimensionalapproach rguesthatorganizations-such as government, ndus-try, nonprofit,government ontractors,and so on-are publicaccording o the degreeto whichexternalpublicauthorityimpacts hem(BozemanandBretschneider 994). FollowingLanandRainey(1992, 8), for thepurposesof this studywe definepublicorganizations s city governments,agenciesownedby thegovernment,andentitiesfundedwithpublicmonies. By compari-son, privateorganizationsa.k.a. industry)are thoseentitiesthatare ownedby private ndividuals nd thatreceive littleor nofunding hroughgovernment ontracts.In so defining, we avoidthe abovedebateby directlycomparing ity government mploy-ees to employees n profit-oriented, ublicly tradedorganizationsthat, in total, receivelittle governmentunding.HYPOTHESESOrganizational Control Strategies

Organizationalontrolshelp to alignemployees'actionswith firms' interests Tannenbaum968; Snell 1992, 293) andincludebehavioraland outputcontrols(RoweandWright1997;Snell 1992; Eisenhardt1985; Ouchi1979; OuchiandMaguire1975). Behaviorcontrolspecifieshow something s to beaccomplished ndembodiescentralization, rticulated rocedures,close supervision,andbehavioralappraisalOuchi1979; Eisen-hardt1985; Snell 1992;Rowe andWright1997). When it isdifficultto standardize ctionsa priori or whenmeans-endrelationships renot well understood,behaviorcontrol is notfunctionalbecauseappropriateworkbehavior s unknown Snell1992). In thesecases, supervisors anuse outputcontrolstrate-gies. Output ontrolspecifies whatis to be accomplished;tenablesdecentralizationndencompasses esultscriteriaandperformance-rewardinks(Ouchi1979; Eisenhardt1985; Snell1992). 1

'A thirdtype of control, clan control, isnot examined here. Clan controlembracesselective staffing, training,development,andextensive socialization,which createssharedvalues and beliefs (Ouchi 1979 and1980).

439/J-PART, July 1999



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Public v. PrivatePerceptionsEmpirical esearchand theory arguethat public organi-zations, comparedwith privateones, rely heavilyon behaviorstrategies o controlemployees.Public organizations mphasizerules, regulations, ormal ob guidelines,and otherrigid pro-

cesses (e.g., Downs 1967; Holdawayet al. 1975; Warwick1975;U.S. Office of PersonnelManagement 979; Rainey1979 and1983; Perry andPorter 1982; Perryand Rainey 1988; Baldwin1990; Lan andRainey 1992; Bozeman,Reed, andScott 1992;Rainey, Pandey,and Bozeman1995). Baldwin(1990, 10-11)reviewsseveral underlying easonsthis may be true. Extensiverules and regulations xist to ensurethatgovernmentprogramsreflectpublicwill andprotectpeoples'rights.These rulesandregulationsarise both fromdividingauthorityamongthreeseparatebranches executive,legislative,and judicial) designedtopreventabuses of power, andfrom federal emphasison civilservice rules. Moreover,these rulesand regulations hatcreatered tapedecreaseemployees'uncertainty bouthow they shouldbehave(e.g., Downs 1967).

Despitethe widespread iew thatpublicorganizations avemorerules and regulations,however, Buchanan1975) dis-coveredthatpublicmanagersperceived ess organizationalformalization.Baldwin 1990) attributedBuchanan'sunusualfinding to the failureto distinguishbetweeninternalandexternalredtape. Internal ed taperefers to "theconstrainthatis self-imposedby an agencyor a firm";externalred tape refersto "theconstraint mposedby government genciesother than itself"(Baldwin1990, 8). Hence, even though n Baldwin'sstudy publicmanagers eportedhigherlevels of all typesof red tape, Baldwinsuggeststhat Buchanan's indingsmaybe attributableo privatemanagersperceptionof more externalred tape in theirorganiza-tions. In sum, thepredominantiew persists-public organiza-tions are morestructurallyormal.

This formalization an takeat least two forms:job formali-zation andcommunicationormalization. ob formalization efersto the standardizationf theworkprocess. Communicationformalizationefersto the structure f the interpersonalommun-icationprocessbetweensupervisorsand subordinates.When it ismoredifficultto formalize obs and/orcommunication, rganiza-tionsmay rely on more resultsoriented i.e., outputcontroloriented)performance valuation ystems.

Researchdemonstrateshatpublicmanagershave a greaterneed to controltheiremployeesbecausethey are less subjected oexternalsourcesof accountability,uchas the qualityof serviceprovided Perryand Porter1982; Rainey,Pandey,andBozeman1995). Otherresearch uggeststhat, comparedwithprivate440IJ-PART,July 1999



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Public v. PrivatePerceptionsemployees,publicemployeesare moreconcernedwith statusthanwithmoney (Warwick1975;ref. in PerryandPorter1982),governmentmanagersperceivea weakerrelationship etweenpayandperformanceIngraham 993; KelloughandLu 1993; Perry,Petrakis,andMiller 1989; Perry1986; Rainey1979 and 1983;Buchanan1974 and 1975), are less oriented owardspecuniarygains(Rainey1983;Rawls, Ullrich,and Nelson 1975; Kilpat-rick, Cummings,andJennings1964), and, in general,doubtthatgood performanceeads to promotion Rainey1979; Rainey,Pandey,and Bozeman1995). For example,Rainey,Pandey,andBozemanfoundthat becausemanagersperceivelittle relationshipbetweenpay andperformance,hey issue morerules to exertgreatercontrolover employees' behavior.In sum, the prevailingview is that,comparedwithprivatemanagers,publicmanagersrely less on an incentivesystemlinked to pay andmore on jobformalization o promoteand rewardemployees.Hypothesis1: Public-sector mployeeswill reportmorejobformalizationhanwill private-sector mployees.

None of this research uggeststhatpublicorganizationsdependmoreor less on evaluations ied to outcome,however.Both public- andprivate-sectorupervisorsare likely to resorttospecified outcomesto manageout-of-sightemployeeseven ifthese sameoutcomesare not linkeddirectlyto pay. Historically,management y objectives MBO) firstappearedn the publicsector in the 1930s, and its conceptualandpracticaldevelopmentmay owe moreto governmentalhanto privateexperience(Drucker1954; SherwoodandPage 1976). Partof the MBO pro-cess requiresmanagers o provideongoing feedback o employeesto let themknowhow they aredoing (CarrollandTosi 1973). Inthis way, MBOentwinesevaluationsbased on resultswith super-visors' observations nd, in its essence, it requiresmanagersandemployeesto set objectivesandemployees to meet these objec-tives. However, the MBOprocessrestslargely on supervisors'evaluations ather han on objective,writtenrecordsof results.Therefore,we predictthe following:Hypothesis2: Public-sector mployeeswill report ess use ofobjective,writtenrecordsof resultscompared osupervisors' valuationso judgeperformancehanwill private-sectormployees.

In a studyof five executivemanagers,Mintzberg 1972)found thatcontactbetweenpublicmanagersandtheirsubordi-nates was morestructured ndformalized, or example,throughformalmeetings.Ten yearslater,KurkeandAldrich(1983)replicatedandsupportedMintzberg's tudyandfindings.In441IJ-PART, July 1999



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Public v. Private Perceptionsparticular,Kurkeand Aldrich found thatmanagers n high-techmanufacturingpent less time in meetingsthan did a publicschool superintendent;bank managers pent the least time inscheduledmeetings;and, of the two public managers tudied, theschool superintendentpent more time in large meetingsthan didthe hospitaladministrator.While Kurkeand Aldrich discovered,in contrast o Mintzberg's indings, thatthe hospital administratorspentless time in formalmeetingsthaneven the high-techmanager, hey attributedhis discrepancyo the hospital's smallersize; thatis, they concluded hat the larger the organization, hemoretime managers pent in formalcommunication. n addition,they suggested hat the bank manager pent less time in meetingsbecause the banking ndustrywas changingso quickly.In sum,the resultsof these two studies suggestthat managers n large,public organizationswill spend more timeformallycommunicat-ing than will managersn private, fast-moving ndustries.Hypothesis3: Public-sector mployeeswill reportmore formalcommunicationhanwill private-sector mployees.ORGANIZATIONALJUSTICEHYPOTHESES

Employeesseek to ensurethat they receive outcomestheybelieve they deserve(distributiveustice) and have voice in theprocess by which these outcomesare determined proceduraljustice).Distributive justice. Theoriesof workmotivation Porterand Lawler1968;Adams1963) suggestthatincreasingevaluationbasedon clear andmeasurableperformance utputsshouldenhance he individual'sbelief that one is rewardedbased uponan equitableassessmentof one's work efforts and contributions.Becausepublicorganizations ftenare noted for tenuous inksbetweenperformance ndrewards e.g., Kilpatrick,Cummings,andJennings1964; Rainey1979 and 1983;Buchanan1974 and1975; Rawls, Ullrich, andNelson 1975), we predictthatpublic

employeeswill hold weakerdistributiveustice perceptions hanwill industry mployees.Hypothesis4: Overall, public-sector mployeeswill perceivelessdistributiveusticethanwill private-sectoremployees.

Proceduraljustice. Where distributiveustice focuses onoutcomesreceived, proceduralustice diagnosesthe process bywhichtheseoutcomesare distributed: s the processfair?Doesit ensurethatI will receive the outcomesI believe I deserve?Wasmy inputrequestedand valued?Proceduralustice refersto442/J-PART,July 1999



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Public v. PrivatePerceptionsperceptions elated o structural haracteristicsf the formalandinformalorganizationalystems,policies, andproceduresused togeneratevaluedorganizational utcomes(e.g., the performanceappraisal ystem and promotionpolicies). When rules are stan-dardizedandformalizedandappliedconsistently consistencyrule), perceptionsof bias diminish.Additionally,perceptionsofproceduralustice are enhancedwhen membershave regularchannels or questioningwhether he rules themselvesare inher-ently just-correctabilityand ethicalityrules (Leventhal1980).

Institutionalized,tandardized, ndformal decisionmakingandcommunicationystems serve as an indication hat decisionsmade in the organization re not the result of idiosyncraticindividuals; ather hey are madein an open, unbiased,andconsistentmanner ThibautandWalker1975; Leventhal1980).Therefore,rulesandregulationsattributedmostlyto publicorganizations hould enhanceprocedural ustice perceptionsbecausethey ensuredemocraticprocessesandaccountabilities(e.g., Downs 1967; Kaufnan 1977; Goodsell1985). Forexample,civil servicerules ensure that thepublicemployeeisless vulnerable o capriciouspersonneldecisions(Campbell1978), while, in general, red tapeassuresemployeesthattheywill be treated airlyandequitably n the distribution f rewardsandpenalties(Baldwin1990). Indeed,whenmechanisms omonitorandcontrolemployeebehaviorbecomestandardized ndformalized,control can be profferedby way of offices androlesrather hanby individuals;goals are thenclearly specified andembedded n the organizationtself rather han in fluctuating ela-tionships,enablingmoreopportunitiesor perceivedobjectiverules to governrelationships Scott 1992).Hypothesis5: Overall, public-sector mployees will perceivemoreproceduralustice than will private-sectoremployees.

Supervisor/EmployeeSatisfaction. Finally, in line withTsui's (1994) mutualresponsivenessramework,employees whohold favorabledistributive ndprocedural ustice perceptionsshouldbe more satisfiedwith theirsupervisors.Mutualrespon-siveness describesan environmentn whichorganizationalmem-bers meet each other'sexpectationsor are responsive o oneanotherregarding ach one's responsibilities ndroles.Employeeswho believe thatthey receive the outcomes theydeserve and who believe the processis fairwill in turn besatisfied with theirsupervisors.

As we arguedabove, we expectpublic-sector mployees tohold strongerproceduralusticeperceptionsandprivate-sector4431J1-PART,uly 1999



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Public v. PrivatePerceptionsemployeesto hold strongerdistributiveusticeperceptions.Accordingly,we argueherethat for public-sector mployees,proceduralusticewill be a moreimportantontributoro super-visor satisfaction; or private-sectormployees,distributivejusticewill be moreimportant.Hypothesis6a: As comparedwithprivate-sectormployees,public-sector mployeesperceivethatproceduraljusticewill contributemoreto satisfactionwiththeirsupervisors.Hypothesis6b: As comparedwithpublic-sector mployees,private-sectormployeesperceivethatdistributivejusticewill contributemoreto satisfactionwiththeirsupervisors.METHODSSample

As partof a largerstudy, we accesseda conveniencesampleof publicandindustry mployeesthrougha national elecommut-ing tradeassociation.Ourfinal sampleconsistedof 206 public-and 210 private-sectormployeesfromtwo public-andfiveprivate-sector rganizations.The public-sector rganizationsincludedone California ity governmentandone not-for-profitCaliforniagovernmentagencythatmediatedrelationshipsbetweenthe city government ndindustry.The private-sectororganizationsonsistedof two technology,two leisure, and onefinancialservicescompany,whose respondentswere locatedeitherin NorthCarolina,California,or Arizona.Exhibit1 showsthe size in numberof employeesof the organizations, achorganization'sprimary unction,andthe rangeof respondents'job categories.The respondents epresenta wide rangeof roleswithin eachorganization.

Oursurveyingof 426 employees n seven organizationsmakes this project,in effect, a quantitativease study(Rainey1983). Muchof the areaof researchon whichwe focus in thisarticlehasbeen builton smallsamples(e.g., Rainey1983;Rainey,Pandey,and Bozeman1995). Incremental dditionswiththe sampleswell describedwhich we include n this articleshouldcontributeo the alreadyexistingset of findingsandprovideasmuchvalueas traditional ase studiesandqualitative esearch.2For the purposesof the largerstudy,we targetedemployees

who telecommute,matching he sampleon job type with theircolleagueswho did not telecommute. Formore on this focus of2We thankthe reviewer who made thispoint.444/J-PART,July 1999



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Public v. PrivatePerceptions

Exhibit1OrganizationSize,

Function,and

RespondentJob

Categories

City

Nonprofit

Leisure

Leisure

High

Technology

High

Technology

Financial

Services

Government

City

Agency

Company1

Company2

Company1

Company2

Company

(n=86)

(n=16)

(n=22)

(n=10)

(n=10)

(n=26)

(n=5)

Organizational

9,921

406

375

2,000

160,000+

100,000+

80,000+

size

(employees)

California

California

U.S.only

U.S.only

worldwide

worldwide

worldwide

Organization's

Largecity

Not-for-profit

Leisure

Leisure

Analyzes,

designs,

Designs,manu-

Creditcard

services,

primary

function

government

publicIT

travel

travel

implements,

factures,services

investment

counseling,

services

manages

integrated

electronic

products

international

banking

provider

voice,data,

and

systems

network

products

Representative

Accountant;

Engineer;GIS

Salesrep

Sales;

Sales

manager;

Accountant;

Creditanalyst

job

categories

Sales;

Clerical;

analyst;HRrep;

Customer

Buyer;

Director;

Administration

for

respondents

Engineer;

Planner;

Network

support;

service;

Directinstall

clerical;

Analyst;

Propertyagent;

Personnel

analyst;

Agent

manager;

Engineerproject

Management

Project

manager;

reservations

Techwriter;

manager;

Attorney;

analyst;

Biologist;

Systems

analyst;

Vice

president;

Sales

Building

inspector;

Traininganalyst

Engineer;

Datasystem

Salesrep

coordinator;Deputy

director;Economic

develop-

ment

specialist;Contract

specialist;

Librarian;

Lawyer;

Zoning

investigator

4451J-PART, uly 1999



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Public v. Private Perceptionsthe study, see KurlandandEgan forthcoming.)To maintain on-fidentialityof employees,our companycontactsrequired hatwemail themthe surveys,which theythendistributedo employees.Seventy-twoprivate-sectormployeesand 102 public-sectoremployeesreturned ompleted,usablesurveysfor responseratesof 35 percentand49 percent, respectively,andan overallresponserate of 42 percent.

Publicemployeesrespondinghad worked n their currentjobs on averagefor 4.85 yearsand theircurrentorganizationsor9.76 years;on average ndustry mployeeshadworkedin theircurrent obs for 4.48 yearsandtheir currentorganizationsor8.32 years. On average,publicemployees were 41.18 yearsoldand industry mployeeswere 42.09 yearsold. Fifty-ninepercentof the public employeesand 73 percentof the industryemployeeswho respondedwere female. Respondentsn both groupshad onaveragebetween3.5 and4 yearsof post-highschool education.Ethnicityof the samplebroke down as follows: public-sectoremployees-69 percentwhite, 8 percentHispanic,9 percentAsian,4 percentAfrican American,4 percentArab-Iranian, per-cent other; private-sectormployees-91 percentwhite, 2 percentHispanic,3 percentAsian, 2 percentAfricanAmerican,2 per-cent Arab-Iranian.We recorded wenty-fourob types in thepublicsample,withmanager 22 percent),support 13 percent),professional 12 percent),technical 10 percent),and adminis-trativeservices(8 percent),accounting or 65 percentof therespondents. n the private-sectoramplewe recorded ifteen jobtypeswith sales (44 percent),support 10 percent),andmanager(7 percent),accounting or 61 percentof the respondents.Measures

To measure he use of outcome-basedvaluations,we used afive-pointscale anchoredat one end with "My supervisor'seval-uationis of greatest mportance" ndat the other with "Writtenrecordsof resultsare of greatest mportance."For all other vari-ables, we relied on Likert-type,multi-item cales drawnfromwell-validatedmeasures see below). These scales are in theappendix.

Jobformalization onsistedof fouritemswe developedbasedon a conceptualdefinitionof formalizationwe drew fromInkson,Pugh, and Hickson(1970) andHage (1974). Outcome-basedevaluationconsistedof eight itemsadapted rom Ouchi(1977), Greenhaus,Parasuraman,ndWormley (1990), andTouliatoset al. (1984) and measured he extentto whichrecordsof output,rather hansupervisor'sobservationsof behavior,formedthe basis for evaluations.Communicationormnalization4461J-PART,July 1999



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Public v. PrivatePerceptionsconsistedof two itemsadapted romBurgoonand Hale (1987[alpha= .82]). Distributiveustice consistedof the six itemsfrom Priceand Mueller's(1986) Distributive usticeIndex.Proceduralustice consistedof six itemsusingproceduralcharacteristics rawn romLeventhal 1976) anddevelopedbyMoorman 1991) andNiehoff andMoorman 1993). To measureemployees'satisfactionwiththeirsupervisors,we drew two itemsfromHackmanandOldman's 1980) JobDiagnosticSurveyandseven items, whichfactoredandrelated o satisfactionwiththeirsupervisors, romWayne'sresearchon leader-memberxchange(WayneandFerris 1990; WayneandGreen1993; Liden,Wayne,andStilwell 1993).RESULTS

By using SPSS, the means, standard eviations,Pearsoncorrelations,andCronbach lphaswere computed or the inde-pendentanddependent ariables exhibit2). We used indepen-dentsampleT-tests to test for differencesbetweenpublic- andprivate-sectormployees'reportsof job formalization,ormalcommunication, utcome-based erformance valuations,proce-dural ustice, anddistributiveusticeperceptions hypotheses1,2, 3, 4, and5). The data thenwere split to runseparateregres-sion analyses o examinerelationships etweenpublicemployees'justiceperceptionsand theirsatisfactionwiththeirsupervisors(hypothesis6a) andbetweenindustry mployees'justicepercep-tionsandtheirsatisfactionwiththeirsupervisors hypothesis6b).In the regressionanalyses,we controlled or age, education,ethnicity,gender,job type,job years, organizationdentity,andyears in organization.Resultssuggest thatpublicemployeesdid not perceivehigherlevels of job formalizationhypothesisone),

Exhibit 2Means, SD, and CorrelationsVariable Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 61) Public or private 1.41 .49 1.0002) Distributive ustice 3.17 1.08 .130+ 1.0003) Procedural ustice 3.16 .87 .187* .523*** 1.0004) Outcomeevaluations 2.58 .80 .054 .048 .055 1.0005) Formalcommunication 3.73 1.03 -.090 .232*** .104 -.108 1.0006) Job formalization 3.53 .98 .004 .174* .301*** .090 .094 1.0007) Supervisorsatisfaction 3.74 .85 .155* .403*** .435*** -.174* .216*** .270******p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05; +p < .10

447/J-PART,July 1999



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Public v. PrivatePerceptionsExhibit 3T-tests of Public-PrivateDifferencesVariables t (df) Means [SD] (N)

Public Sector Private SectorOutcomeevaluations -.699 (166) 2.512 [.79] (97) 2.598 [.76] (71)Formalcommunication 1.187 (173) 3.814 [.99] (102) 3.630 [1.03] (73)Job formalization -.056 (168) 3.542 [.95] (101) 3.551 [1.04] (69)Distributive ustice -1.717+ (172) 2.995 [1.07] (102) 3.278 [1.07] (72)Procedural ustice -2.461 * (167) 2.997 [.90] (98) 3.319 [.75] (71)Satisfactionwith supervisor -2.035* (169) 3.596 [.83] (99) 3.863 [.87] (72)*p < .05; +p < .10

Exhibit 4The Relative Contribution of Procedural Justiceand Distributive Justice to Public- and Private-SectorEmployees' Satisfaction with Their SupervisorVariables Public-Sector Employeesa Private-Sector Employeesa

ControlsAge -.130 -.024Education -.035 .039Ethnicity -.095 .003Gender .005 -.093Job type -.145 -.029Job years .144 -.081OrganizationID .046 -.142Organizationyears -.066 .057Independent VariablesDistributive ustice .302** .273Procedural ustice .238* .416*Model R2 .314 .359Model F 3.302*** 2.466*Degrees of freedom 10, 72 10, 44aStandardizedoefficients are provided.Significance levels (two tailed): ***p < .001; **p < .01; *p < .05

4481J-PART, July 1999



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Public v. Private Perceptionscommunicationormalization hypothesis wo), or lower use ofoutcomesto evaluateperformance hypothesis hree) than didindustry mployees. Therefore,we find no support or our firstthree hypotheses exhibit3).

We found moderate upport or hypothesis4-overall,public employeeshold weakerdistributiveustice perceptions.We found strong support hat public employees, as comparedwith industry mployees, hold weakerproceduralustice percep-tions-the oppositeof what we hadpredicted n hypothesis5.Our resultsof the tests of hypotheses6a and 6b were also sur-prising. The result of the test for 6a suggests that distributivejustice perceptions ontributedmorethan did procedural usticeperceptions o public employees' satisfactionwith theirsuper-visors, althoughbothforms of justice perceptions ontributedsignificantly.The result of the test for 6b reveals thatonlyproceduralustice perceptions ontributed ignificantly o industryemployees'satisfactionwiththeirsupervisors exhibit4).Lastly, althoughnot formallyhypothesized,we testedwhetherpublic employeeswere moreor less satisfiedwith theirsupervisors omparedwithprivateemployees.Our results showthatpublic employeeswere significantlyess satisfied.Below, wediscuss implications nd limitationsof thesefindings.

DISCUSSIONAND LIMITATIONSThis study addsfuel to the debateabout whetherand to whatdegree public organizations iffer fromprivateorganizations.Here we focus on differencesbetween ob formalization, ormalcommunication, nd results-orientederformance valuationandalso on publicandprivateemployees' organizationalusticeperceptionsand satisfactionwith theirsupervisors.We found no differencesbetweenpublicandprivateemployees' perceptions f job formalizationndcommunicationformalization,which adds to the puzzle. Are public organizationsmorestructurallyormalthanprivateorganizations? orexample,research uch as the Aston studies n England Pughet al. 1968; Pugh, Hickson,andHinings 1969)revealedthatcontrary o the authors'predictions, hey found no differences nformalization etweenthepublicandprivateorganizationsntheirsample.3Elsewhere,organizationheoristshave consideredsuchvariablesas size, environment, nd taskmore importantndetermining tructure, ncluding ormalizationRainey 1997).Hence, our findings,or lack of findings,furtherreinforce hese

earlier conclusions. Stateddifferently, he general interpretationthathigher generalformalizationr more intensiverulestructures

3Indeed, Pugh et al. (1969) questioned theutility of distinguishingbetween publicand private, prompting hem to develop asevenfold taxonomyof organizationstruc-tures. They labeled these seven structures:full bureaucracy,nascentfull bureau-cracy, workflow bureaucracy,nascentworkflow bureaucracy,pre-workflowbureaucracy,personnel bureaucracy,andimplicitlystructuredorganization.




15/23

Public v. Private Perceptionsexist in public organizationss not supportedn our empiricalresearch,even thoughpublic managersmay face more intenserule constraints n some ways.4

Our findingsmay be limitedbecauseof the type of formali-zation upon which we chose to focus. We specificallytested forjob and communicationormalization nd found no differences.Otherresearchersdid finddifferencesbetweenpublic and privateorganizations, hough,whenthey examined he degree to whichpersonnelrules constrain he administration f pay, firing, andmerit-based romotion e.g., Rainey 1983and 1997; Rainey,Pandey, and Bozeman 1995; Bozemanand Bretschneider 994;Marsden,Cook, and Knoke 1994). Additional esearchneeds tofocus on these and other elementsof formalization.Moreover,our resultsmay have been influencedby a num-ber of otherfactors.First, we collecteddata from a nonrandomsample-a smallnumberof public andprivateorganizations ndemployees-and we hadlittleaccess to examinenonresponsedata,whichmaylimit the generalizabilityf the findings.Second,we focusedon only threetypesof behaviorand outputcontrolstrategies,andthe alphafor the outcome-basedmeasurewas lower thandesired.A more extensive inductivesearch iswarrantedn subsequent esearch.Third, we used general, albeitwell-validated,measuresof distributive nd procedural ustice.

As designed,the measurecan drawin considerations f how theemployeeis treated nside the organization,but it also maycaptureperceptionsnfluencedby externalpolitics, unionrelations,or generalcutbacks hat aremade for politicalandbudgetary easons withlittleconcernfor employees.This limit-ationof the organizationalusticemeasuresunderscores he needfor moreanalysisof otherpotentialcontributors o organizationaljustice perceptions.Notwithstandingheselimitations,as predicted,publicemployeesperceived ower levels of distributiveustice,

comparedwith industry mployees.With a more tenuous inkbetweenpay andperformancen public organizationshan inindustry, t wouldhavebeen startlinghadwe foundanythingelse. Ourfindingsmayshow that ittlemoneyis available opublic employeesfor pay increasesof any kind, or thatmanagersarenot able to set pay directly (Ban1995). The attempt oemulatepay for performance ractices n the industry ectormaycontributeo deep cynicismandperceptions f gross injustices fthemoneyfor suchperformances not available, f there is notenoughto go around,or if managersare not empowered o dis-tribute t (e.g., Pearce andPerry 1983).5

4We thankthe reviewer who made thispoint.5We thankTerry Cooper for raisingtwoof these possibilities.

450IJ-PART,July 1999



16/23

Public v. PrivatePerceptionsFurther,we were surprisedo find that given that moreindustryrespondents dentified hemselvesas in sales thanin anyotherjob, we found no differencebetweenindustry upervisors'andpublic supervisors'use of results-orientedvaluation trate-

gies-even though he use of quotasand commission s commonto the sales profession.This may reflect an attemptby managersin public-sector rganizations o adoptpractices n order toappear somorphicwith the private-sector rganizationshat areheld up as standard earersof efficiencyandeffectiveness. Thisis an interesting ondition,given that recent studies of servicesthat have undergoneprivatization uggest that the marketmaynotbe as efficient and effective as proponents f privatization ssert.Moreover,in contrast o our prediction,publicemployeesheldweakerproceduralusticeperceptions handid industryemployees.These findingsreflect the debatewe cited earlier,thatpublic organizations ave not realizedthe ideal bureaucracies hatWeberdescribed.Onemightargue,in fact, that modernpublicorganizations re tyranniesof pettybureaucracy nd are vastlyless fair than areindustryorganizations, speciallywith respectto policiesandprocedures.Thesepoliciesandprocedures-redtape-are ends in themselves,merefacades, thatdo not ensurefairness. Nor is there any counterpower locatedin good per-formance,the elusivepay-performanceink (Perry1986). Hence,the supervisor'spower expandsandred tape assumesmore

salience.Pearce et al. (1997), Ban(1995), andThompson 1975) sup-portthis reasoning.Pearce et al., in theirstudyof managersnformercommunist ountries,suggestthatwhenbureaucratic ro-ceduresaremerely ritualistic, he actualsystembecomeshighlyidiosyncratic ndthe antithesisof procedurallyair. Similarly,both Ban andThompsonprovide evidence that formalrulesrestrictpublicmanagers'abilityto do their obs effectively,forcingthemto resort nstead o informalmeans. For example,inorder to deal with a problememployee, public managershavebeen found to transfer he person-and thusthe problem,dimin-ish the person'sabilityto causeproblemsby reducing heemployee'sworkload,send the employeeto a so-calledturkeyfarm(organizationalnitsengaged n low-prioritywork), or insome rare(and quite ironic)cases, promote he person-and thusthe problem.Further tudyis required o determine he extent towhichthis faux bureaucratizationields organizational rocessesthataredecidedlyunfair.Notwithstandinghesecomments,industryorganizationsmaybe as fraughtwithproblems Jackall1988).




17/23

Public v. Private PerceptionsOn a relatednote, our findingsthat procedural usticeperceptionsappear o contributemore to industryemployees'satisfactionwith their supervisors,while distributive usticeperceptionsappear o contributemoreto public employees'satis-factionprovidesfurtherevidence thatthe patternsof relationsdifferbetween the two types of organizations. ndeed, we derivefurtherevidence from the finding thatdistributive ustice percep-tions do not significantlycontribute o industryemployees'satis-faction at all, while it is more important o public employees. Wecouplethis finding withthe earlier findingthat, overall, publicemployeesheld weakerperceptionsof both forms of justice andwere less satisfied with theirsupervisors han were industryemployees.Clearly, this evidence suggeststhat publicemployeesmightvalueorganizationalustice in partbecause of its apparentabsence.This latterconclusionmay lend some insight into our find-ing that publicemployeesare less satisfiedwith theirmanagersthanareprivateemployees.Are publicemployeesdissatisfiedbecause they do not see that theirefforts yield appropriaterewards,as evidencedby their lower distributive ustice percep-tions? Are industry mployeesmore satisfiedbecause they do seethis link?Futureresearch houldexaminethese questions ngreaterdetail.Still further,our results end some support o Bozeman's(1987) proposition hat all organizations re public. Rather hanbeing definitionallydistinct, organizations ary along specificdimensions ome of the time; that is, we cannotassume that acity governmentwill have more formalized ob standardshanwill a publiclytradedhigh-tech irm.In summary,given that humanbeingshave a high need forjustice, it is interestingo note thatpublic-sectororganizations,which are by design intended o be fair, do not generatesignifi-cantly greaterperceptions f either distributive r procedural

justice. One implicationof theseperceptionsof unfairness srelated o the willingnessof employeesto feel committed oandto work towardorganizationaloals-especially those thatinvolve creativityand initiative.Organizationalustice researchsuggeststhatindividualswho perceivethat the institution'sproceduresandoutcomesare fairare more willingto accepttemporarynequities,more likely to exerteffort towardorgani-zationalgoals, andmore likely to acceptthe legitimacyof theorganizatione.g., Moorman,Blakely,andNiehoff 1998). Thismaybe especially importantwhenconsidering he differentcir-cumstances hat surroundhe employer-employeeontract, npublicas comparedwithprivateorganizations.4521J-PART,July 1999



18/23

Public v. PrivatePerceptionsWhile the changingnatureof the employment ontract n theprivate sectorhas been widelynoted anddiscussed,little hasbeen said aboutthe changingnatureof the employee-employerrelationshipn the public sector. Currently,private-sectoremployeesin certain ndustrial ectorsareenjoyinga labormarket hat distinctly avors the employee. In addition,oldnotions of loyalty, as defined by the "man n the gray flannelsuit," have died a painfuldeath.The businesspress now crowsabout the powerof generationX to call their own shots, evendownto bringing heirpets to the workplace Monk 1998). Incontrast, he same periodhas seen public-sector mployeesincreasinglyunder fire for inefficiencyand, in the case of theIRS, malfeasance.Since funds for public-sectorpositions andinstitutions re shrinking ather hangrowing,and the "employ-ment-at-will"doctrine s eroding in the private sector, the

questionarises whetherpublic employees really do have moreprotection Rainey 1997). In short, being a memberof a public-sectororganizationmaybe characterized y a hostile externalenvironment, carcityof internalresources,and few immediateprospects or a brighter uture.Thus, public-sector mployeesmay find themselves n distinctlyunfavorable ircumstances.Ironically, his may be the time that the mythical airness of thesystemin public-sector rganizationss most importantn termsof employee loyaltyandmotivation.However, our researchsug-gests that the opposite s true. The implicationhere is that majorinternalreformsare necessary o provide this and futuregenera-tions of women and men witha just environment hat encouragescommitment o a careerin publicservice.




19/23

Public v. Private Perceptions

APPENDIXonitoring,

Organizational

Justice,and

Supervisor

Satisfaction

SampleItems

Number

ScaleName

ofItems

SampleItems

Alpha

Distributive

six

Notatall...

Somewhat...

Completely:

.9403

justice

Towhatextentareyoufairly

rewarded

consideringthe

responsibilitiesthatyouhave?


rewardedtakinginto

accountthe

amountof

educationand

trainingyouhavehad?


rewardedinviewofthe

amountof

experiencethatyou

have?


rewardedforthe

amountofeffortthatyouputforth?


rewardedforworkthatyouhavedonewell?


rewardedforthe

stressesandstrainsofyourjob?

Procedural

six

Strongly

disagree...

Stronglyagree:

.8804

justice

Overall,when

decisionsabout

employeesin

general,oryouin

particular,aremadeinthis

company:

requestsfor

clarificationand

additional

informationare

allowed

allthesides

affectedbythe

decisionsare

represented

the

decisionsare

appliedwith

consistencytothe

parties

affected

accurate

informationuponwhichthe

decisionsare

basedis

collected

complete

informationuponwhichthe

decisionsarebasedis

collected

opportunitiesare

providedtoappealor

challengethe

decisions




20/23

Public v. PrivatePerceptions

Outcome-basedeight

My

supervisor's

evaluations...Both...

Written

recordsofresultsareof

greatest

importance:

.84

evaluations

when

evaluatingthe

qualityofmy

responseto

customers

when

evaluatingthe

qualityofmy

responseto

co-workers

when

assessingmy

innovativeworkideas

when

evaluatingmy

overallskilllevel

when

evaluatingthetimely

completionofmywork

when

evaluatingthe

qualityofmywork

when

providingmewithtimely

feedbackonmy

performance

when

evaluatingthe

overall

qualityofmyjob

performance

Formal

two

Strongly

disagree...

Stronglyagree:

.86

communication

My

supervisor

wantedthe

discussiontobecasual

(reverse

scored).

My

supervisor

wantedthe

discussiontobe

informal

(reverse

scored).

Job

four

Strongly

disagree...

Stronglyagree:

.7960

formalization

Job

descriptionsare

availableformy

position.

Job

descriptions

accuratelyreflecttheduties

requiredto

performthisjob.

Thereare

written

performance

standardsformy

position.

Written

performance

standardsareusedin

guidingmywork

activities.

Supervisor

nine

Strongly

disagree...

Stronglyagree:

.92

satisfaction

Allinall,Iamnothappywithmy

supervisor

(reverse

scored).

Generally,Iam

satisfiedwiththe

overall

qualityofthe

supervisionI

receive.

Iam

satisfiedwithwhatmy

supervisordoesforme.

My

supervisor

understandsmyneeds.

Ithinkmy

supervisoruses

his/her

positionpowertohelpmesolvemy

problems.

My

supervisorwillhelpmeoutathisorher

expensewhenIreallyneed

him/her.

Ithinkmy

supervisorcancountonmeincaseof

emergency.

My

working

relationshipwithmy

supervisoris

effective.




21/23

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Public n Private Percptions