PUBLIC OPINION AND NATIONAL DEFENCE · Research Company Turu-uuringute AS conducted a public opinion survey on national defence during which 1,215 residents of Estonia from the age

Pärnu mnt 102, A- korpus, 10116 Tallinn Tel: +372 585 29 700

[email protected]

www.turu-uuringute.eu

PUBLIC OPINION AND NATIONAL

DEFENCE

Ordered by: Estonian Ministry of Defence

Juhan Kivirähk

Autumn 2018

Public Opinion and National Defence / Autumn 2018 Ministry of Defence

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS........................................................................................................................ 2

SUMMARY.......................................................................................................................................... 4

BACKGROUND OF THE SURVEY ....................................................................................................... 9

1 Sample .................................................................................................. 9

2 Survey ................................................................................................. 10

3 Performers........................................................................................... 12

RESULTS OF THE SURVEY ..............................................................................................................13

1 General attitudes towards life in Estonia and pride in Estonia ................ 13

2 Confidence in institutions ..................................................................... 15

2.1 Confidence in institutions ................................................................................................. 15

2.1 Confidence in defence structures ...................................................................................... 17

3 Security and threats ............................................................................. 19

3.1 Security in the world ........................................................................................................ 19

3.2 Security in Estonia ........................................................................................................... 21

3.3 Threats to world security.................................................................................................. 22 3.4 Threats to Estonia ............................................................................................................ 25

3.5 Media coverage of security threats ................................................................................... 28 3.6 Security guarantees ......................................................................................................... 29

4 Defence willingness among the population of Estonia ............................ 30

4.1 Attitudes towards the necessity of resistance.................................................................... 30

4.2 Willingness to participate in defence activities .................................................................. 32 4.3 Desire to leave Estonia in the event of a military threat .................................................... 35

4.4 Ability to act in the event of a potential attack .................................................................. 37 4.5 On which topics is more information required ................................................................... 38

5 Defence capability of Estonia ................................................................ 39

5.1 The importance of national defence capability among other areas of

public interest that need improving ............................................................................................... 39 5.2 Assessment of the defence capability of Estonia ............................................................... 40

5.3 Views on the volume of defence expenditures................................................................... 41

5.4 Assessment of state activities in view of the development of national defence................... 43 5.5 Assessments on the defence of the Estonian border.......................................................... 44

5.6 Assessment of the security of digital services and information systems of Estonia’s e -state45

6 Organisation of Estonian national defence............................................. 46

6.1 Attitude towards conscript service .................................................................................... 46

6.2 Attitudes towards the professional defence forces ............................................................. 51

6.3 Attitudes towards professional servicemen and members of the Defence League............... 52 6.4 Tasks of the Defence League ............................................................................................ 54

6.5 Exposure to national defence structures and opinions on joining the Defence League ........ 56

7 NATO ................................................................................................... 58

7.1 Attitude towards membership in NATO ............................................................................. 58 7.2 NATO’s assistance in the event of a potential threat ......................................................... 61

7.3 Assessments to the actions of NATO................................................................................. 62 7.4 Assessments on the effect of the NATO battle group stationed in Estonia .......................... 63

7.5 Assessment of NATO battlegroup troops ........................................................................... 64


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8 International military operations .......................................................... 66

8.1 Attitude towards participation in international operations .................................................. 66

8.2 Arguments for participation in international operations ..................................................... 67 8.3 Attitudes towards participation in NATO, EU and UN operations ........................................ 69

8.4 Opinion on the defence co-operation of the European Union ............................................. 70

9 Veteran policy ...................................................................................... 71

9.1 Primary associations with the word “veteran” ................................................................... 71

10 National defence instruction in schools ................................................. 73

11 Media consumption .............................................................................. 74

12 Importance of information channels ..................................................... 80


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SUMMARY

In October 2018, upon the order of the Estonian Ministry of Defence, the Social and Market

Research Company Turu-uuringute AS conducted a public opinion survey on national defence

during which 1,215 residents of Estonia from the age of 15+ were interviewed. This was already

the 44th survey in monitoring public opinion, which was started in 2000.

Assessments given to changes that have taken place in Estonian life have improved steadily since

2015. 42% of respondents believe that life in Estonia has improved while 18% think that the

situation has worsened. While the share of positive answers given by Estonians has not changed

significantly over the years (41% in October), assessments to changes in Estonian life by people of

other nationalities have improved significantly compared to the previous survey (signs of

improvement are seen by 45%).

The proportion of people who feel proud and happy over living in Estonia very often or often

enough has increased a little over the course of the last three surveys: if 55% of respondents gave

such an answer a year ago, this spring it was 59% and this October 61%.

The proportion of Estonian respondents who feel proud and happy very often or often enough has

been more or less stable fluctuating between 63 and 68%. However, we saw a significant increase

of such answers (to 49%) given by non-Estonian respondents in October, which is over 10% more

than a year ago.

Of the 10 institutions the reliability of which the respondents were asked to assess, the Rescue

Services rank the highest in trustworthiness (95% trusts them completely or rather trusts them).

They are followed by the Police (86%), the Defence Forces (75%), the Defence League (72%), and

the President of the Republic (71%). Compared to several past surveys the trustworthiness of

political institutions rose to the positive side already in fall 2016 after change in government and it

is still growing. In October, 64% had confidence in the prime minister, 57% in the government and

54% in the parliament (Riigikogu). NATO and the European Union are deemed as trustworthy by 63

and 64% of the respondents respectively. The difference in attitude towards NATO between

Estonians and non-Estonians is still vast: NATO is trusted by 75% of Estonians and only 37% of

respondents of other nationalities. The situation is similar regarding the Defence Forces (trusted by

85% and 54% respectively) and the Defence League (84% and 46%).

The belief that the world is going to become more unstable and the likelihood of military conflicts

will grow exceeded 70% in spring 2015. As from fall of 2017, when the increase of instability was

assumed by 66% of the respondents, the sense of threat has started to subside—in March 2018, an

increase in lack of security was predicted by 61%, in this survey 52% of the respondents. 13% of

the respondents think that the world will become more secure in the coming decade and 24%

believe that the situation will remain unchanged.

Respondents perceive the security situation in Estonia to be somewhat more positive than that of

the world in general: 30% of respondents believe that in 10 years, the residents of Estonia will be

living in more secure conditions than they do now; only 19% predict that the situation will grow

more unsafe and 35% think that the situation will remain unchanged.

While in 2015 Russia’s activities to restore its authority were still perceived as the main threat to

world security, the actions of the Islamic State have been deemed more dangerous henceforth.

However, this survey did not present the option of the actions of the Islamic State to the

respondents, in its place including cyber-attacks and the spread of misinformation and fake news.

The actions of terror organisations are considered the most important (87% consider it certainly or

to some degree dangerous). Cyber-attacks are considered to be just as dangerous (85%). The

migration of refugees and asylum seekers to Europe is also seen as a threat to world peace (86%),

and the spread of misinformation and fake news is the fourth most dangerous (81%).


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A worldwide economic crisis (81%) and global climate change (77%) occupy fifth and sixth place

on the ranking of threats. Although Russia’s attempts to restore its authority in neighbouring

countries received more assessments of “certainly” than the previously mentioned ones, together

with the answer “to some degree” the Russian threat has retreated to almost the end of the

ranking of threat factors (70%). Though in general, all the threat factors listed in the survey are

deemed as threatening the security of the world in the view of more than 60% of the respondents.

There are four main threats to Estonia, the realisation of which in the following years is considered

probable or rather probable by more than half of the respondents: 69% of residents think that

there may be an organised attack against the Estonian state information systems. Second place

was taken by the newly introduced spread of fake news (very or rather probable in the view of 65%

of the respondents). 58% believe that some foreign country may interfere in Estonian politics or

economy in order to influence these in their own interests . An extensive marine pollution is

considered very or rather probable by 53% of the respondents.

An extensive or limited military attack against Estonia is considered very or rather probable by 18–

20% of the respondents.

Answering the question how they assess media coverage regarding the topic of security threats—

does the Estonian media write and talk about military threats to Estonia too much and often, just

enough, or rather too little—more than half of Estonians (56%) found that military threats to

Estonia are talked and written about just enough. Russian speaking respondents think that this

topic is covered too much (43%) but the proportion of respondents who think that has decreased.

11% of respondents think that military threats are talked about too little (13% of Estonian- and 6%

of Russian-speaking respondents).

NATO membership continues to be considered Estonia’s main security guarantee (57% mention it

as one of the three most important factors). In October’s survey, we included the category of

“defence will of residents”, which rose to be the second most important security guarantee with

39%. The development of Estonia’s independent defence capability holds 3 rd place with 29%.

These three factors are followed by, mainly due to the influence of respondents of other

nationalities, cooperation and good relations with Russia, which is named among the three most

important factors by 46% of non-Estonian respondents and only 15% of Estonian-speaking

respondents.

Compared to Russian-speaking respondents, Estonians mention more frequently having good allied

relations with the US and a permanent presence of allied forces on Estonian territory; respondents

of other nationalities, on the other hand, see membership in international organisations (UN, OSCE)

as more important compared to Estonians.

79% of respondents consider armed resistance in case of a military attack by a foreign country

certainly or probably necessary. Estonian-speaking respondents consider armed resistance more

necessary than non-Estonians, but the gap is decreasing. Resistance is deemed certainly necessary

by 51% of Estonian-speaking and 42% of Russian-speaking respondents, yet only 12% of the latter

do not consider resistance necessary.

60% of the population would be willing to participate in defence activities to the best o f their

abilities and skills: 65% of Estonians and 41% of the Russian-speaking respondents (57% of

Russian-speaking citizens of Estonia). Here, the rise of the defence will of the Russian-speaking

respondents (primarily citizens) can be observed. 77% of male citizens are ready to participate in

national defence.

In a situation where Estonia is under attack, every fifth person would consider leaving Estonia. The

most likely people to leave Estonia would be women (20% certainly or probably) and younger

people: 39% of people under 20 would want to leave, 27% of people between 20 and 29 and 28%

of people between 30 and 39. 22% of non-Estonians and 16% Estonians would probably leave.

The population’s awareness about behaving in an emergency situation is low and compared to

March has declined even more. Only a little over one fifth of respondents have a basic

understanding of what they could do to defend the country in such an event, while 70% are rather

not informed or certainly not informed.


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In their own words, people would like to have more information on how the public would be

informed in case of a threat (46%), how to act in a conflict area as a civilian (34%), how

evacuation would be organised (32%), and how to solve first priority domestic and household

matters (32%). Male respondents also show slightly greater than average interest in questions

related to mobilisation and their responsibilities regarding the participation in national defence.

In this survey, respondents were asked to select up to five areas of public interest that should

receive most attention from the government from a given list. The last time this question was

asked was in March 2017. The list involved 14 different topics. The most important ones were to

increase the people’s well-being (67%), improve access to healthcare services (57%), and raise

social confidence (56%). In March 2017, second place in importance was held by ensuring

economic development, whereas now, the topic has dropped to fourth place (54%).

All other topics are held less importance to the public, strengthening the nation’s defence capability

comes in with 17% at 10th place out of 14.

53% of the respondents find that Estonia can be defended until the arrival of allies’ assistance in

case of an armed attack by a foreign country. Belief in the defensibility of Estonia is higher among

Estonians (59%) and lower among respondents of other nationalities (42%), yet, when the result

among Estonians was the same as in March, it rose by 6% among respondents of other

nationalities.

The assessments given to the volume of Estonia’s defence expenditures show that the predominant

view is that they should remain at the current achieved level (50%). One fifth of the population

favours an increase in defence expenditures, and the same percentage supports cuts.

The proportion of respondents who have provided a positive assessment to the state’s activities

regarding the development of Estonian national defence has remained around 70% throughout the

last three years. This time it was exactly 70%. Estonians have a more positive attitude towards the

development of national defence compared to non-Estonians (77% and 54% gave a positive

assessment to the development of national defence, respectively).

The assessments on the protection of the Estonian eastern border were clearly negative in autumn

2014. Yet by spring 2016, they had become overwhelmingly positive. In October 2018, 61% of the

respondents gave a positive and 21% a negative assessment on the security of the national border.

For the first time, the survey includes the topic of the security of the digital services and

information systems of Estonia’s e-state. Perhaps because cyber threats are viewed as the most

likely ones, the assessment on the security of this field is also the least positive: 55% of

respondents think that the digital services and information systems of our e -state are very or rather

secure, while 22% view their security as bad.

People in Estonia have had very favouring attitudes towards conscript service for young men

throughout the survey period. This is evident in the current survey as well: 92% of respondents

believe that young men need to undergo conscript service, with 62% finding it certainly necessary.

The majority of the respondents (63%) also think that young men with minor health disorders

should undergo conscript service with an appropriate training load.

The majority of the population disapprove of evading conscript service – 20% condemn such

behaviour and 44% consider it negative. Younger age groups express higher than average

tolerance towards evading conscript service: more than 40% of people under 30 years of age take

an understanding or approving stance on evasion.

In 2013, women were given the opportunity to undergo conscript service voluntarily and this has

been gaining increasingly more understanding in the society. Of the three options that describe

what women’s relationship with conscript service should be like, 78% of respondents chose the

option of undergoing conscript service voluntarily. 2% approved of compulsory conscript service for

women while 16% held the opinion that women should not undergo conscript service at all.

Estonians and younger respondents have a more contemporary attitude towards gender equality

compared to respondents of other nationalities and older respondents. 84% of Estonians think that

women should have the opportunity of undergoing conscript service voluntarily, whereas 66% of


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non-Estonian respondents agree. 29% of the latter think that women should not enter conscript

service at all.

The respondents who considered voluntary conscript service for women necessary or rather

necessary were asked whether this should be done based on a special programme or under the

same conditions as men. A rise in the general support towards voluntary conscript service for

women has also brought along an increase in the proportion of respondents who believe that

women’s conscript service should be conducted on the basis of a separate programme—this opinion

is held by 61% of the respondents who approve of conscripts service for women, while 35%

approve of women undergoing conscript service under the same conditions as young men.

Almost 80% of the population prefer maintaining the current concept of national defence based on

professional defence forces together with reserve forces consisting of those who have undergone

conscript service. 13% support abandoning compulsory military service and switching to a fully

professional army only.

38% of the population have a very positive and 42% a rather positive attitude toward professional

servicemen. Only 1% of the respondents feel negatively towards them.

Attitude towards professional members of the Defence League is also mostly positive: 36% of

respondents feel very positive and 35% rather positive toward them. While there is no difference

among Estonians and respondents of other nationalities in their attitude toward servicemen (very or

rather positive feelings are equally at 80%), then attitude toward members of the Defence League

are more reserved among respondents of other nationalities (82% of Estonians and 51% of non-

Estonians).

According to the population of Estonia, the main tasks of the Defence League is conducting military

training and ensuring permanent readiness for national defence—these rank first according to 28%

and 24% of the respondents, respectively. Between the three choices, permanent readiness for

military defence takes first place (53%) and the second is participating in rescue activities in the

event of accidents or disasters (both at 47%).

While Estonians perceive the Defence League’s national defence tasks as the most important, the

population of other nationalities mainly sees the Defence League as a civil defence organisation,

stressing the importance of tasks like participating in rescue activities in the event of accidents and

disasters and organising civil defence in emergency situations.

4% of the respondents participate in the activities of the Defence League, 29% of the respondents

are connected to the Defence League through a family member or friend. If the respondents who

do not belong to the organisation were to be presented with a proposal to join the Defence League

or its associated organisations, 4% would certainly and 16% probably join. The readiness to join is

higher among younger respondents.

Attitudes towards Estonia’s membership in NATO continue to be positive: 76% of the population

supports it, which is 5% more than in March. 91% of Estonians and 44% of respondents of other

nationalities support the membership in NATO. Compared to March, support for NATO has grown by

12% among non-Estonian respondents.

In this survey, respondents were allowed to give several answers to the question of what kind of

aid Estonia could expect from NATO in the event of a military threat. 53% of the respondents found

that NATO would provide direct military aid in the event of a conflict while 42% thought that NATO

membership would help Estonia to avoid a military attack entirely. 18% of the respondents thought

that NATO members would limit their help to political and diplomatic support while 9% believed

that the alliance would not help Estonia in any way.

The feeling of security towards NATO’s aid is supported by the steps that have already been taken

by the alliance to ensure Estonia’s security and which are supported by the general population:

68% of the respondents (78% of Estonians) find that NATO has already done enough to ensure

Estonia’s security and 72% of the population (89% of Estonians but only 37% of non-Estonian

respondents) favour the presence of NATO’s allied forces in Estonia.


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The question of whether having NATO battle group troops stationed in Estonia make the country

generally more secure or less secure or does it have no real effect either way was answered by

77% of Estonians that the NATO battle group has made Estonia more secure. The majority of non-

Estonians (40%) do not see NATO’s presence as having an effect on Estonia’s security, and 29%

feel more secure.

In October 2017, we wanted to know for the first time which words or phrases the respondents

would choose to describe NATO battle group troops currently stationed in Estonia. The results were

roughly the same as a year ago. The troops are mostly described with positive words, among which

“professional” is repeated the most frequently. It is followed by such descriptions as “friendly”,

“well-intentioned”, “polite”, “capable”, “committed”, and “well informed about Estonia“. Only 7%

considers the allied troops as indifferent towards Estonia and 4% as untrustworthy.

68% of the population believe that the units of the Estonian Defence Forces should, in accordance

with their capabilities, participate in international operations in different conflict areas of the world.

Estonians favour the participation of the Estonian Defence Forces in military operations more than

non-Estonians (73% and 57% respectively), though the latter has increased by 10% compared to

March.

Participation in international military operations is considered necessary primarily because it

provides our soldiers with necessary real combat experience (mentioned by 66% as one of three

reasons) and guarantees NATO’s assistance to Estonia in the event of potential threats (49%).

More than two thirds of the respondents support Estonia’s involvement in missions conducted under

the aegis of NATO, the European Union, and UN, and in missions based on co-operation of allied

countries. Whereas most of Estonians support participation in all missions, most of all NATO

missions (82%); the respondents of other nationalities put more weight on under which

organisation’s aegis the mission is carried out. Non-Estonian respondents favour involvement in the

UN missions the most (57% supports totally or rather). Missions carried out on the basis of co-

operation of allied countries are supported by 57% and EU missions by 56%. Support for NATO

missions is even lower than that (support at 47%).

If in the last survey, support for establishing an EU joint border guard was at 55% and for EU joint

military force at 45%, this time the question concerned the increase of defence co-operation

between EU Member States.

The abstractly formulated defence co-operation found more public support than the unambiguously

worded proposals for establishment of a joint border guard and military force—it is supported by

75% of the respondents.

The word “veteran” is strongly associated with the image of World War II—38% of Estonians and

67% of non-Estonians regard veterans as people who took part in the Great Patriotic War. 34% of

Estonian speaking respondents (11% of non-Estonians) have adopted the national concept of

veteran policy which regards veterans as people who have participated in missions of the Estonian

Defence Forces.

Public support for national defence instruction is comparable to that of compulsory conscription

service for young men—it remains very high and stable throughout all surveys. 84% of the

respondents find that all schools that offer secondary education should certainly or probably provide

the possibility to have national defence instruction. National defence instruction is highly supported

by both Estonian and Russian-speaking respondents.

The most important information channels for obtaining information on matters of national defence

are, predictably, television (very or rather important for 82% of the respondents) and radio (71%),

more than half of the respondents also deem news portals (63%) and newspapers (56%) as very or

rather important. But direct communication with other people still fits between them (68%), being

lower than TV, but almost as important as information obtained via radio.


Turu-uuringute AS 9

BACKGROUND OF THE SURVEY

This report has been prepared on the basis of the results of the Omnibus survey carried out by Turu-

uuringute AS from 4 till 23 October 2018 and similar earlier surveys. The report will be submitted to the

Estonian Ministry of Defence.

The purpose of the survey was to investigate:

General attitudes towards life in Estonia and pride in Estonia;

Confidence in institutions (incl. defence structures) among the population;

Assessments in connection with potential security risks in Estonia and the world;

Assessments on Estonia’s defence capability;

Defence willingness among the population and estimated behaviour in the event of potential

threats endangering Estonia

Attitudes towards NATO and its role in ensuring Estonian security

Attitudes toward the presence of NATO allied forces in Estonia and opinions of the allied troops;

Attitudes both towards compulsory conscript service for men and voluntary conscript service for

women;

Attitudes towards the Defence League and understanding its tasks;

Attitudes in connection with Estonia’s participation in international military operations;

Attitudes towards initial national defence instruction in schools.

Notions on veteran policy.

The first part of the report describes the methodology, the second part presents the results with figures

and comments; the Annex provides the used questionnaire and distribution tables by important

background characteristics.

1 Sample

The survey was carried out in the Omnibus 1000 environment. Omnibus 1000 is a regularly held survey

(following a specific schedule), whose sample comprises of the citizens of the Republic of Estonia with

the age above 15, which totals 1,100,881 people (Statistics Estonia, 01.01.2018).

The usual sample of the Omnibus 1000 is 1,000 respondents. The sample is formed according to the

proportional model of the general sample. This model is based on areas and settlement size (number of

residents), which are used for selecting 100 source addresses (sample points). Within each area, the

source address is selected randomly from the address list of the Population Register.

In addition to the main sample, this survey included an additional sample of 200 respondents to ensure

the better representation of the Russian-speaking population in the sample. Although the linguistic

composition of the population has been weighed according to the actual situation (i.e., by increasing

the effect of Estonian-speaking respondents and decreasing the effect of Russian-speaking

respondents), this additional sample allows to analyse the attitudes and opinions of single Russian-

speaking groups in detail.

The so-called principle of the young man was applied to the selection of respondents at the source

address. This means that at the address of the sample, the interview will be performe d with the

household’s youngest male member in the age above 15 who is present at home; if no men are at

home, the interview will be performed with the youngest woman. Such a method grants additional

possibility for participating in the sample to the categories of respondents who are at home less often

(younger people, males) and adjusts the sample to correspond to the population’s actual gender and

age composition.


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Use of the proportional model of the general sample ensures the representativeness of the sample, in

other words, it allows making generalizations about the whole same-age population of Estonia. The

maximum sampling error does not exceed ±3.10% in polling 1,000 persons, the error may be bigger

for smaller subgroups.

The following Table 1 provides sample error limitations at 95% confidence level in assessing the

proportion.

Table 1 Sampling error limitations

2 Survey

The survey method was personal interview, conducted on tablet computers in either Estonian or

Russian, depending on the respondent’s preference. A total of 65 pollers who had been given special

training by Turu-uuringute AS participated in carrying out the survey. A total of 1,215 interviews were

performed in 100 different sampling points. The social and demographic profile of the respondents has

been provided in Figure 1.

Summary of the results of the polling (number of addresses visited, reasons for not carrying out the

interview) have been presented in Table 2.

Table 2 Results of the polling

Reasons for not carrying out the interview Total

There are no target group persons in the family 565

Nobody is at home 2384

Target group person is not at home 83

Contact was denied 647

Target group person refused to give the interview 800

Other reasons for not performing the interview 163

Not a dwelling or address inaccessible 149

Summary

Total addresses 6006

Repeated visits 1427

Correctly filled in questionnaires 1215

50% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 3% 2%

10 30.99% 30.83% 30.36% 29.56% 28.40% 26.84% 24.79% 22.13% 18.59% 13.51% 10.57% 8.68% 20 21.91% 21.80% 21.47% 20.90% 20.08% 18.98% 17.53% 15.65% 13.15% 9.55% 7.48% 6.14% 30 17.89% 17.80% 17.53% 17.07% 16.40% 15.49% 14.31% 12.78% 10.74% 7.80% 6.10% 5.01% 40 15.49% 15.42% 15.18% 14.78% 14.20% 13.42% 12.40% 11.07% 9.30% 6.75% 5.29% 4.34% 50 13.86% 13.79% 13.58% 13.22% 12.70% 12.00% 11.09% 9.90% 8.32% 6.04% 4.73% 3.88% 60 12.65% 12.59% 12.40% 12.07% 11.60% 10.96% 10.12% 9.03% 7.59% 5.51% 4.32% 3.54% 70 11.71% 11.65% 11.48% 11.17% 10.73% 10.14% 9.37% 8.36% 7.03% 5.11% 4.00% 3.28% 80 10.96% 10.90% 10.73% 10.45% 10.04% 9.49% 8.77% 7.82% 6.57% 4.78% 3.74% 3.07% 90 10.33% 10.28% 10.12% 9.85% 9.47% 8.95% 8.26% 7.38% 6.20% 4.50% 3.52% 2.89% 100 9.80% 9.75% 9.60% 9.35% 8.98% 8.49% 7.84% 7.00% 5.88% 4.27% 3.34% 2.74% 110 9.34% 9.30% 9.15% 8.91% 8.56% 8.09% 7.47% 6.67% 5.61% 4.07% 3.19% 2.62% 120 8.95% 8.90% 8.76% 8.53% 8.20% 7.75% 7.16% 6.39% 5.37% 3.90% 3.05% 2.50% 130 8.59% 8.55% 8.42% 8.20% 7.88% 7.44% 6.88% 6.14% 5.16% 3.75% 2.93% 2.41% 150 8.00% 7.96% 7.84% 7.63% 7.33% 6.93% 6.40% 5.71% 4.80% 3.49% 2.73% 2.24% 200 6.93% 6.89% 6.79% 6.61% 6.35% 6.00% 5.54% 4.95% 4.16% 3.02% 2.36% 1.94% 300 5.66% 5.63% 5.54% 5.40% 5.18% 4.90% 4.53% 4.04% 3.39% 2.47% 1.93% 1.58% 500 4.38% 4.36% 4.29% 4.18% 4.02% 3.79% 3.51% 3.13% 2.63% 1.91% 1.49% 1.23% 750 3.58% 3.56% 3.50% 3.41% 3.28% 3.10% 2.86% 2.55% 2.15% 1.56% 1.22% 1.00%

1 000 3.10% 3.08% 3.03% 2.95% 2.84% 2.68% 2.48% 2.21% 1.86% 1.35% 1.06% 0.87% 1 500 2.53% 2.52% 2.48% 2.41% 2.32% 2.19% 2.02% 1.81% 1.52% 1.10% 0.86% 0.71%

Percentage of answers

Sam

ple

siz

e



Figure 1. Respondents’ social and demographic profile, %, n=1215

46

54

68

32

83

7

3

7

7

13

18

16

19

27

14

58

28

6

10

29

27

28

32

16

11

12

7

22

69

31

0 20 40 60 80 100

GENDER

Male

Female

LANGUAGE OF COMMUNICATION

Estonian

Other

CITIZENSHIP

Estonian

Russian

Other country

Unspecified

AGE

15 - 19 a.

20 - 29 a.

30 - 39 a.

40 - 49 a.

50 - 59 a.

60 and above

EDUCATION

Primary or basic

Secondary, vocational or secondary vocational

Higher

NET INCOME PER FAMILY MEMBER

less than 300 €

301-400 €

401-650 €

More than 650 €

Difiicult to say / Refused

REGION

Tallinn

Northern Estonia

Ida-Viru County

Western Estonia

Central Estonia

Southern Estonia

RESIDENCE

City

Rural area



3 Performers

The persons responsible for various stages of the survey are:

Report, project management: Juhan Kivirähk

Sample/coordination of interviewing work: Kristel Merusk,

Kaja Södor,

Roman Vjazemski.

Data processing and tables: Marina Karpištšenko

Editing English translation OÜ Scriba

Customer’s contact person: Anniki Rebane

Contact information:

General phone:585 29 700

E-mail: [email protected]

Web-page: www.turu-uuringute.ee

Address: Pärnu mnt. 102, Section A, 11312 Tallinn

Survey leader’s contact information:

Telephone: 5515200

E-mail: [email protected]

http://www.turu-uuringute.ee/



RESULTS OF THE SURVEY

1 General attitudes towards life in Estonia and pride in Estonia

Among other things, people’s attitudes towards different social matters, including national defence, are

influenced by the positive or negative assessments given to life in Estonia in general. In order to find

out people’s views, the respondents were asked whether they think that the situation in Estonia is

improving or worsening.

The assessments given to changes that have taken place in Estonian life have become steadily more

positive from 2015 on. 42% of respondents believe that life in Estonia has improved while 18% think

that the situation has worsened (Figure 2). While the share of positive answers given by Estonians has

not changed much over recent years, compared to previous surveys the assessments to changes in

Estonian life provided by respondents of other nationalities have improved significantly.

Figure 2. Attitudes towards the changes in life in Estonia; 2016–2018 comparison

(%; N = all respondents)

People with higher education are more positive about Estonia’s development: 54% perceive positive

changes. 38% of people who have secondary or secondary specialized education agree, while 34% of

those who do not have secondary education think that.

Estonian life is seen as improving by younger respondents: almost half of respondents below 40 years

of age perceive improvements, the assessments of Estonian life improving or staying the same are

more or less the same among respondents 50 years of age and older.

36

39

45

44

40

41

26

32

39

41

40

42

31

36

35

37

34

34

41

38

38

35

35

34

29

17

15

17

23

20

29

26

20

21

21

18

4

8

5

2

3

5

4

4

3

3

4

6

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Other (2017/10)

Other (2018/03)

Other (2018/10)

Estonian(2017/10)

Estonian (2018/03)

Estonian (2018/10)

NATIONALITY

2016/03

2016/10

2017/03

2017/10

2018/03

2018/10

Changed for the better Remained the same Changed for the worse Don't know



Assessments are naturally influenced by the respondent’s economic situation: positive changes are felt

by 26% of people within the income bracket of 301 to 400 euros per household member per month,

39% by those whose income is 401 to 650 euros, and 51% of people whose monthly income per

household member exceeds 650 euros.

People’s attitudes towards changes in life in Estonia also depend greatly on the respondents’ emotional

relation to Estonia—whether they feel happiness and pride over living here.

The proportion of respondents who feel proud and happy over living in Estonia very often or often

enough has increased a little over the past three surveys: a year ago such an answer was given by

55% of the respondents, it had risen to 59% this spring, and currently is at 61%.

The proportion of Estonian respondents who feel proud or happy over living in Estonia very often or

rather often has not has been more or less stable, fluctuating between 63 and 68%. Among

respondents of other nationalities, we see a significant increase in such answers to 49%, which is more

than 10% compared to a year ago (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Pride and happiness over living in the Republic of Estonia; 2017–2018 comparison


Respondents of other nationalities with non-defined citizenship feel the least proud or happy over living

in Estonia—only 33% of them and 39% of Russian citizens answer often or rather often.

58% of Estonian citizens of other nationalities feel proud and happy over living here, 5% never feel that

way.

10

14

15

29

32

30

23

26

26

28

27

34

34

36

35

32

33

35

5

7

8

4

1

5

4

4

5

48

45

36

28

28

26

35

33

29

9

7

7

5

3

4

6

4

5

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Other (2017/10)

Other (2018/03)

Other (2018/10)

Estonian(2017/10)

Estonian (2018/03)

Estonian (2018/10)

NATIONALITY

2017/10

2018/03

2018/10

Very often Often enough Don't know Sometimes Never



2 Confidence in institutions

The survey addresses the population’s confidence in several state and international institutions. The

selection of institutions is based on their role in shaping, implementing, or supporting Estonian security

policy. The last survey also included local governments and the judicial system to the list of institutions.

2.1 Confidence in institutions

Respondents evaluated the trustworthiness of the institutions using a scale with four categories:

completely trust, rather trust, rather do not trust, and do not trust at all. Of the ten institutions

included in the survey, people have the greatest confidence in the Rescue Services—95% of the

Estonian population trusts them—followed by the Police (86%), Defence Forces (75%),

Defence League (72%), and the President of the Republic (71%) (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Confidence in institutions in October 2018 (%; N = all respondents)

Although political institutions traditionally have the lowest level of confidence, the balance of confidence

(the difference of proportions between people who trust and the people who distrust them) for the

parliament (Riigikogu) and government has been on the positive side for the last two years since the

time of the previous government and has increased significantly compared to March. Both the

government and parliament are trusted by over half of the population.

-37

-34

-24

-27

-26

-23

-24

-20

-11

-14

-9

-1

54

57

56

64

64

63

67

71

72

75

86

95

17

23

32

37

38

40

43

51

61

61

77

94

-60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80 100

Parliament (Riigikogu)

Government

Court system

Prime Minister

European Union

NATO

Local municipalities

President

Defence League

Defence Forces

Police

Rescue Service

Distrust compeletely/rather Trust completely/rather Balance



Local governments (trusted by 67%) and the prime minister (64%) have a somewhat higher level of

confidence compared to the government and the parliament, which are roughly at the same level as

confidence in the EU and NATO. The judicial system has a lower level of confidence than them (56%),

although this is an institution which people find hard to assess (21% of respondents answer cannot

say).

The level of confidence in institutions between Estonians and respondents of other nationalities is quite

different (Figure 5).

The difference in confidence between Estonians and respondents of other nationalities is relatively small

when it comes to the Rescue Services, judicial system, the police and border guard, and the European

Union, but the differences are significant toward NATO, the Defence Forces, and the Defence League. A

20% difference is also for confidence in the President of the Republic.

For a long time there was also a big difference between Estonians and respondents of other

nationalities when it came to confidence in the government and the parliament (Estonians had a much

greater confidence compared to respondents of other nationalities), but already in spring 2018 the

levels of confidence were equal and in October 2018 Russian-speaking respondents had a little more

confidence in the parliament, government, and the prime minister than even Estonian respondents.

However, confidence in local government is 11% higher among respondents of other nationalities

compared to Estonian respondents.

Figure 5. Confidence in institutions in the eyes of Estonians and non-Estonians:

October 2018 (% of those who trust the institutions completely and rather trust them;

N = all respondents)

57

59

52

70

61

37

75

57

46

54

81

93

52

56

57

62

65

75

64

77

84

85

89

97

0 20 40 60 80 100 120

Parliament (Riigikogu)

Government

Court system

Prime Minister

European Union

NATO

Local municipalities

President

Defence League

Defence Forces

Police

Rescue Service

Estonians Other nationalities



2.1 Confidence in defence structures

The Defence Forces, which holds 3rd place in the trustworthiness ranking after the Rescue Services,

was trusted by 75% of the population of Estonia as at October 2018. The difference in the

assessment of the Defence Forces between Estonian- and Russian-speaking respondents is still very

large—it is trusted by 85% Estonians and 54% non-Estonians (Figure 6).

The Defence League is placed among the most trustworthy institutions right after the Defence Forces—

as at October 2018, 72% of the Estonian population (71% a year ago) trusted the Defence

League, 85% of Estonians and 46 of non-Estonians. (Figure 7).



Figure 6. Confidence in the Defence Forces in 2000–2018; comparison of the assessments by Estonians and other nationalities

(% of those who trust it completely or rather trust it; N = all respondents)

Figure 7. Confidence in the Defence League in 2000–2018; a comparison of assessments by Estonians and other nationalities

(% of those who trust it completely or rather trust it; N = all respondents)

5864 59

6874 71 73 73

67

75 7579

7476 74

80 7884

79 8176

81 81 80 83 83

7679

7582

84 83 8278 78 77

7579 76 77

75

53

58

56

6773

64

74

8479 81 79

74

82 8480

85 84 8185 84 87 89 88 87

91 90 90 91 92 8891

8690 90 92 93 90 91 90 90 92

89 87 85

3935

40 40 4549

5449 52 53

61

52

6055 56

5058 60

6865

75

6066

48

5962

5862 62

4953

48

6067

6258

49 5147 45

51 5153 54

0

20

40

60

80

100

01/2

000

05/2

000

10/2

000

02/2

001

06/2

001

10/2

001

03/2

002

06/2

002

10/2

002

02/2

003

06/2

003

10/2

003

02/2

004

06/2

004

10/2

004

03/2

005

06/2

005

11/2

005

05/2

006

09/2

006

12/2

006

06/2

007

01/2

008

08/2

008

01/2

009

05/2

009

01/2

010

09/2

010

08/2

011

10/2

011

03/2

012

10/2

012

03/2

013

10/2

013

03/2

014

11/2

014

03/2

015

10/2

015

03/2

016

10/2

016

03/2

017

10/2

017

03/2

018

10/2

018

ALL Estonians Other nationalities

3945

4248

5357 58 58 56

5956 54

58 59 57

6865 66

6265 64

6864

6871

68 67 6964

74 75 73 7471 70 71 71 71 71

74 72

39 41 39

4854

5055

64 64 66 64 6568 67 66 67 67 66

7774 74

77 79 77 7975

80 82 8279

84

76

85 85 8589

86 85 86 86 87 86 8784

2023 22 22

25 2730

23

40 4045

36 3832 31

34

4138

4742

46

33 33 34

43 42 42 4337 38

35 36

4851

4642 40

36 37 36 3740

46 46

0

20

40

60

80

100

01/2

000

05/2

000

10/2

000

02/2

001

06/2

001

10/2

001

03/2

002

06/2

002

10/2

002

02/2

003

06/2

003

10/2

003

02/2

004

06/2

004

10/2

004

03/2

005

06/2

005

11/2

005

05/2

006

09/2

006

12/2

006

06/2

007

01/2

008

08/2

008

01/2

009

05/2

009

01/2

010

09/2

010

08/2

011

10/2

011

03/2

012

10/2

012

03/2

013

10/2

013

03/2

014

11/2

014

03/2

015

10/2

015

03/2

016

10/2

016

03/2

017

10/2

017

03/2

018

10/2

018




3 Security and threats

The third chapter provides an overview of how the topic of security in Estonia and the world is viewed

by the public, what are the factors threatening the security in the coming years, and what would help

to better guarantee Estonia’s security.

3.1 Security in the world

The question in which the respondents were asked to assess changes in world security is presented in

the following wording and has been asked since the year 2000: What do you think, will the world

become more secure and the risk of military conflicts reduce, or, conversely, will the

instability increase in the world and the probability of military conflicts grow in the coming

decade?

The opinion that instability and the probability of military conflicts will grow in the world in the coming

decade exceeded 70% in spring 2015. Although in the fall of 2016, the proportion of respondents who

provided such assessment decreased, it still remained high. As of fall 2017, when an increase in

instability was predicted by 66% of the respondents, the feel of threat has started to decrease—in

March 2018, 61% of the respondents thought that the world will become more unsafe, while in this

survey it was 52%. 13% believe that the world becomes safer in the coming decade and 24% think

that there will be no change (Figure 8).

The sense of threat has declined for both Estonians and non-Estonians: from 68% to 57% among

Estonians, from 46% to 42% among non-Estonians.

Figure 8. Situation in the world in the coming decade, 2015–2018 comparison


10

15

16

9

7

12

7

10

9

10

13

24

30

31

16

19

21

16

20

19

22

24

57

46

42

70

68

57

71

63

66

61

52

9

9

11

5

6

10

6

7

6

7

10

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Other (10/2017)

Other (03/2018)

Other (10/2018)

Estonian (10/2017)

Estonian (03/2018)

Estonian (10/2018)

NATIONALITY

2015/10

2016/10

2017/10

2018/03

2018/10

Situation will become more secure

Situation is not going to change

Increased risk of military conflicts/ situation less secure



The long-term trend along with the proportions of the two opposing views is presented on Figure 9. It

shows that from the spring of 2014 when the crisis in Ukraine emerged, the proportion of respondents

fearing the increase of instability and military conflicts has stayed above 60% exceeding even 70% in

three surveys. It has only gone down to under 60% in the last survey while still remaining high.

Figure 9. Situation in the world in the coming decade; 2000–2018 comparison


2523

12141513171718

1320

1213151212141215

117

11141815

9141312

151510 8 7 7 7 1010 9 1013

40

25

53

43414750

4134

4340

5149474450

56

434848

65

56

454444

63

49

5756

4650

6266

707172

6358

6661

52

0

20

40

60

80

01/2

000

06/2

001

10/2

001

03/2

002

06/2

002

10/2

002

02/2

003

06/2

003

10/2

003

02/2

004

06/2

004

10/2

004

03/2

005

06/2

005

11/2

005

05/2

006

09/2

006

12/2

006

06/2

007

01/2

008

08/2

008

01/2

009

05/2

009

01/2

010

09/2

010

08/2

011

10/2

011

03/2

012

10/2

012

03/2

013

10/2

013

03/2

014

11/2

014

03/2

015

10/2

015

03/2

016

10/2

016

03/2

017

10/2

017

03/2

018

10/2

018

Situation will become more secure Increased risk of military conflicts/ situation less secure



3.2 Security in Estonia

The question about the security in Estonia was presented in the following word ing:

What do you think, what will the situation in Estonia be like? Will the population be living in

more secure or insecure conditions ten years from now?

The security situation in Estonia is perceived to be more positive compared to the situation

in the world in general and similarly to the situation in the rest of the world, the sense of threat has

also gone down with respect to Estonia. A more secure development is predicted by 30%, insecurity by

only 19%. The assessments are similar to March 2015. Compared to Russian-speaking respondents,

there are more respondents who predict both more security was well as security among Estonians,

Russian-speaking respondents predict more that the situation will remain the same (Figure 10).

Figure 10. Situation in Estonia in the coming decade, 2015–2018 comparison


22

19

25

30

25

32

32

23

20

27

23

30

42

43

44

29

36

31

32

31

34

33

38

35

20

19

13

28

25

21

19

31

29

25

23

19

16

19

18

13

14

16

17

15

16

15

16

16

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Other (10/2017)

Other (03/2018)

Other (10/2018)

Estonian (10/2017)

Estonian (03/2018)

Estonian (10/2018)

NATIONALITY

2015/03

2015/10

2016/10

2017/10

2018/03

2018/10

Situation will become more secure

Situation is not going to change

Increased risk of military conflicts/ situation less secure

Don't know



3.3 Threats to world security

The respondents were asked to assess the effect various factors have on peace and security in the

world. Compared to previous surveys, the list of threats presented to respondents to assess was

changed a little. The activities of the Islamic State were not included, which up to now held first place

among the threats. Cyber-attacks and the extensive spread of misinformation and fake news were

included. Both of the included categorises rose among the four most important threats.

If we consider the assessments “certainly” and “to some extent that too” together, then all the factors

listed in the survey are considered to be a threat to world security by more than 60% and five factors

by more than 80% of the respondents.

The most important threat is perceived to be activities of terrorist networks, though its threat

level is decreasing. Terrorist networks are perceived as certainly dangerous by 50% and to some extent

by 37% of the respondents.

Cyber-attacks are deemed to be equally dangerous: certainly by 50% and to some extent by 35% of

the respondents.

The migration of refugees and asylum seekers into Europe occupies third place, which back in

spring 2017 was considered to be a certain threat by 57%, and this time by 44% of the respondents.

Spread of misinformation and fake news comes fourth (certainly 37%, to some extent 44%). These are

followed by a worldwide economic crisis (certainly 36%, to some extent 45%) and global climate

change (32% and 45%).

Although Russia’s attempts to restore its authority in neighbouring countries received more

assessments of “certainly” than the previously mentioned ones (37%), together with the answer “to

some extent” the Russian threat has retreated to almost the end of the ranking of threat factors (70%).

30% of respondents also perceive organised crime as certainly dangerous. The war in Syria and East

Ukraine and North Korea’s actions have started to lose their actuality: less than 30% of

respondents think they are certainly threatening world security, although most of the respondents still

think they are dangerous to some extent.

Less serious threats are deemed to be the domination of US in the world, conflicts between rich and

poor countries, the growth of China’s power and influence in the world, and spread of epidemics.

Though these threats, too, pass the level of 60% together when combined with the answer “to some

extent” (Figure 11).

Compared to the previous survey, only the perception of the danger of global climate change has

increased, the perception of the danger of worldwide economic crisis, Russia’s influence, organised

crime, conflicts between rich and poor countries, and epidemics has stayed on the same level. The

actuality of other threats has decreased.

Russian-speaking respondents deem the activities of terrorist networks, organised crime, the influence

of the US in the world, and spread of epidemics as more dangerous compared to Estonians; a rather

similar assessment is given to the migration of refugees and asylum seekers into Europe, spread of

misinformation and fake news, worldwide economic crisis, global climate change, and organised crime

(see Figure 12).

The rest of the threats are perceived as more dangerous by Estonians compared to respondents of

other nationalities. The biggest difference is in how dangerous Russia’s activities to restore its

authority in neighbouring countries are perceived. Among Estonians, it is deemed as second most

dangerous (49% of Estonians deem it as certainly dangerous), among Russian-speaking respondents, it

holds a place among the three less important threats together with North Korea and China.



Figure 11. Threats to peace and security in the world 2017–2018 (%; N = all respondents)

505353

61

50

445049

57

37

3737

29

3636

26

322929

22

303028

27403943

273029

263030

252422

222323

2144

50

2026

19

373637

32

35

424040

36

44

3333

38

4546

52

454649

52

4648

49

46444541

4548

45

494746

5055

52

4647

44

4538

34

4646

48

6664

6

7674

8

212126

99

13

162117

19

151617

14889

1513

17

151416

1312

17

2122

24

1899

1615

20

7543

9

7443

11

997

1099

7457

966

13887

1399

1098

1299

1189

1697

181313

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

2018/102018/03

Activities of the terrorist network 2017/102017/03

Cyber attacks 2018/10

2018/102018/03

The migration of refugees to Europe 2017/102017/03

False information and fake news 2018/10

2018/102018/03

Russian activities in restoring its authority…

2018/102018/03

Global economis crisis 2017/10

2018/102018/03

Global climate change 2017/102017/03

2018/102018/03

Organised crime 2017/10

2018/102018/03

Military conflict in Syria 2017/102017/03

2018/102018/03

Economic and military capability of the…

2018/102018/03

Military conflict in Ukraine 2017/10

2018/102018/03

Contradictions between rich and poor…

2018/102018/03

Spread of epidemics 2017/10

Activities of North-Korea 2018/102018/03

Nuclear weapons in Northern Korea 2017/10

2018/102018/03

China’s growing influence 2017/10

Certainly To some extent Certainly not Don't know



Figure 12. Threats to peace and security in the world in October 2018, answers “this certainly” (%; comparison of Estonians and Non-Estonians)

24

26

20

26

28

24

31

30

33

36

49

37

45

57

47

12

10

25

23

20

34

18

30

32

35

12

38

42

34

54

0 20 40 60

China’s growing influence

North-Korea

Spread of epidemics

Contradictions between rich and poorcountries

Military conflict in Ukraine

Economic and military capability of theUSA

Military conflict in Syria

Organised crime

Global climate change

Global economis crisis

Russian activities in restoring its authority

False information and fake news

The migration of refugees to Europe

Cyber attacks

Activities of the terrorist network

Other nationalities Estonians



3.4 Threats to Estonia

The respondents were presented with 15 different potential threats to Estonia and asked to assess the

probability of their occurrence in the forthcoming years to determine the probability of threats to

Estonia. Similarly to global threats, the spread of fake news and additionally the spread of hate speech

were included in the list. Threats that were listed previously, an explosion of an oil-carrying train or fuel

terminal was replaced with a vast industrial disaster and extensive environmental pollution (Figure 13).

There are four main threats to Estonia, the occurrence of which in the following years are considered

probable or rather probable by more than half of the respondents. Year after year, the view that there

may be an organised attack against the Estonian state information systems, i.e. a cyber-

attack has increased (67% of respondents think it is very or rather probable). Second place was taken

by the newly introduced spread of fake news (65%). Third place, viewed equally probable also in

March, was taken by the belief that some foreign country may interfere in Estonian politics or

economy in order to influence these in their own interests (58%). Fourth place was taken by

extensive marine pollution which was considered very or rather probable by 53% of the respondents.

The probability of marine pollution is considered higher compared to the March survey.

Over 40% of respondents also consider probable the spread of hate speech (45%) and an extensive

environmental pollution (43%), the proportion of those who view the occurrence of other problems as

very or rather probable remains already below 30%.

An extensive or limited military attack against Estonia is considered the least probable by the

respondents (18–20% of the respondents consider it very or rather probable).

Even the assessment of Estonia’s internal threats reveals important differences between the responses

of Estonians and non-Estonians. Estonians consider most of the dangers more probable than the

Russian-speaking respondents.

An extensive marine pollution and attack against Estonian citizens in a foreign state are deemed

equally probable. The collapse of Estonia’s economy is considered a little more probable by respondents

of other nationalities compared to Estonians.

The greatest difference occurs in the assessment on the probability of cyber-attacks (76% and 48%

respectively), interference by a foreign state in Estonia’s politics or economy is a lso feared more by

Estonians (61% and 50%). While a large-scale or limited military attack is considered probable by a 19

to 23% of Estonians, the proportion of non-Estonians who consider this threat probable falls between

13 and 14% (see Figure 14).



Figure 13. Probability of different threats endangering Estonia in the forthcoming years, March/October 2018 comparison (%; N = all respondents)

1

2

2

2

5

3

2

2

3

3

3

6

3

4

4

4

5

8

11

8

10

21

20

22

29

23

20

16

18

18

18

15

19

19

21

19

21

26

23

24

24

25

23

35

34

40

43

38

38

43

40

44

10

12

6

9

6

8

5

5

8

11

7

8

13

6

8

5

7

6

12

6

7

7

9

9

9

10

45

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48

47

41

40

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49

50

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52

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40

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0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

2018/03

2018/10

Limited military attack against a strategic site

2018/03

2018/10

Large-scale military attack by a foreign country

2018/03

2018/10

Economic collapse of Estonia

2018/03

2018/10

Mass street riots

2018/03

2018/10

Nuclear disaster at a nuclear power station

2018/10

Major industrial accident

2018/03

2018/10

Attack on the citizens of Estonia in a foreign…

2018/03

2018/10

between population groups

Clashes on ethnic or religious grounds

2018/03

2018/10

Act of terrorism

2018/10

Extensive pollution of the natural environment

2018/10

Hate speech

2018/03

2018/10

Extensive marine pollution

2018/03

2018/10

policy or economy

Foreign state interfering into Estonia's

2018/10

Fake news

2018/03

2018/10

against the Estonian state information systems

Organised attacks (cyber-attacks)

Very probable Rather probable Don't know Rather improbable Completely improbable



Figure 14. Probability of different threats endangering Estonia in the forthcoming years; comparison of assessments among Estonians and non-Estonians; October 2018


1

2

2

2

5

2

3

2

4

2

42

33

54

3

5

9

7

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43

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38

47

0 20 40 60 80

other nationalities

Estonians

Limited military attack against a strategic site

other nationalities

Estonians

Large-scale military attack by a foreign country

other nationalities

Estonians

Economic collapse of Estonia

other nationalities

Estonians

Mass street riots

other nationalities

Estonians

Nuclear disaster at a nuclear power station…

other nationalities

Estonians

Major industrial accident

other nationalities

Estonians

Attack on the citizens of Estonia in a foreign…

other nationalities

Estonians

between population groups

Clashes on ethnic or religious grounds

other nationalities

Estonians

Act of terrorism

other nationalities

Estonians

Extensive pollution of the natural environment

other nationalities

Estonians

Hate speech

other nationalities

Estonians

Extensive marine pollution

other nationalities

Estonians

policy or economy

Foreign state interfering into Estonia's

other nationalities

Estonians

Fake news

other nationalities

Estonians

against the Estonian state information systems

Organised attacks (cyber-attacks)

Very probable Rather probable



3.5 Media coverage of security threats

Since the fall of 2017, the survey included an additional question on how the media coverage with

regard to security threats is assessed. The question had the following wording:

How do you feel, does the Estonian media write and talk about military threats to Estonia too

much and too often, just enough or rather too little?

The proportion of respondents who feel that military threats to Estonia are too much and too often

written and talked about has gone down over the years. It is hard to tell if it is due to change in

attitude or change in the share of such information covered by the media.

While more than half of Estonians believe that the military threats to Estonia are spoken and written

about just enough, the majority of non-Estonians think that this topic is covered too much—though the

number of people who believe that has decreased significantly over the years.

Only 11% of the respondents think that military threats are spoken about too little (see Figure 15).

Figure 15. Does the Estonian media write and talk about military threats to Estonia too much and too often, just enough or rather too little? 2017/2018 (%; N = all respondents)

52

48

43

32

24

21

39

32

28

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34

33

54

58

56

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48

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0 20 40 60 80 100

10/2017

03/2018

10/2018

Other nationalities

10/2017

03/2018

10/2018

Estonians

10/2017

03/2018

10/2018

ALL

too much/ too often just enough too little cannot say



3.6 Security guarantees

All throughout previous surveys, Estonia’s membership in NATO has ranked first among important

factors that would ensure maximum security to Estonia according to the respondents. It is mentioned

by 57% of the respondents as one of the three most important factors this time as well. It is a little

less compared to previous surveys, but it can be explained by the inclusion of one additional category

among the possible answers. In October’s survey, we included the category of “defence will of

residents”, which did indeed rise to be the second most important security guarantee with 39%. The

development of Estonia’s independent defence capability holds 3rd place with 29% (Figure 16).

These three factors are followed by, mainly due to the influence of respondents of other nationalities,

cooperation and good relations with Russia, which is named among the three most important

factors by 46% of non-Estonian respondents and only by 15% of Estonian-speaking respondents.

Both Estonians and non-Estonian respondents give more or less equal support to Baltic defence

cooperation (20%), membership in the EU (18%), cooperation with the Nordic countries (12%), and

participation in international missions (7%).

Estonians mentioned the alliance with the US and the permanent presence of allied forces in Estonia

more often than Russian-speaking respondents. However, respondents of other nationalities value

memberships in international organisations (UN and OSCE) more than Estonians.

Figure 16. Security guarantees for Estonia (up to 3 of the most important factors);

comparison of assessments among the Estonians and other nationalities, October 2018 (%; N = all respondents)

6

7

13

10

14

22

7

10

17

46

32

36

29

3

8

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28

41

70

4

7

7

12

9

18

18

16

20

25

29

39

57

0 20 40 60 80

Don't know

Participation in international military

operations

Membership in OSCE

Defence cooperation with the Nordic

countries

Membership in UN

Membership in European Union

Permanent presence of allied forces in

Estonia

Good relations and cooperation with the

USA

Defense cooperation between Baltic states

Cooperation and good relations with Russia

Development of Estonia's independent

defence capabilities

Defence willingness of people

Membership in NATO




4 Defence willingness among the population of Estonia

Defence willingness among the population of Estonia is measured with three questions. So -called

passive defence willingness is expressed through the opinion on whether Estonia should be defended in

case a foreign enemy attacks (“If Estonia is attacked by any country, should we, in any case, provide

armed resistance, regardless of the attacker?”), active defence willingness is expressed through the

person’s willingness to participate in national defence with his/her own skills and competence (“If

Estonia is attacked, are you ready to participate in defence activities using your own competence and

skills?”). The proportion of those expressing the will to leave Estonia in case of an attack is also

mapped. Defence willingness is also related to the topics of how much the people are informed about

the ways in which one can protect Estonia in the event of a possible attack—if people have no

understanding of their potential role in the event of a military conflict, they cannot be expected to show

high defence willingness.

4.1 Attitudes towards the necessity of resistance

The proportion of respondents who find armed resistance necessary has remained steady near 80%,

sometimes under that threshold, sometimes over. In October 2018, similarly to March, 79% of the

Estonia’s population considered armed resistance certainly or probably necessary (Figure 17).

Estonian-speaking respondents tend to consider armed resistance more necessary than people of other

nationalities; however, while there are no differences in attitude among Estonians compared to March,

support for resistance among respondents of other nationalities has increased significantly. Resistance

is deemed certainly necessary according to 51% of the Estonians and 41% of the Russian-speaking

respondents. 11% of Estonian respondents and 10% of respondents of other nationalities believe that

resistance is not necessary, but the latter include much more respondents who answered “cannot say”

(16%).

Figure 17. Necessity for the provision of armed resistance if Estonia is attacked by any

country; 2017–2018 comparison (%; N = all respondents)

The proportion of respondents who express passive defence willingness has also been high in past

surveys, although in a chronological perspective the proport ion of the viewpoint’s supporters has been

rising steadily (See Figure 18). A comparison of the trend among Estonians and respondents of other

nationalities has been presented in Figure 19.

37

42

51

51

47

47

48

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0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

2018/03

2018/10

OTHER NATIONALITIES

2018/03

2018/10

ESTONIANS

2017/10

2018/03

2018/10

ALL

Yes, certainly Probably yes Don't know Probably not Certainly not



Figure 18. Necessity of armed resistance if Estonia is attacked by any country; 2000–2018 comparison (%; N = all respondents)

Figure 19. Proportion of the proponents of armed resistance in the event of an attack; comparison of Estonians and non-Estonians 2006–2018 (% of those considering resistance certainly and probably necessary; N = all respondents)

68

56 5966

61 64 6559

69 6964 64

71 68 64 66 67 66 69 6978 77 73 71

78 77 77 74 74 7378

7379 79 82 79 83 79 81 77

83 80 79 79

1926 29

22 24 23 23 23 25 2430 31

23 24 24 25 24 24 20 2416 12 17 19 15 14 17 18 19 17 17

2217 17 15 11 11 13 11 14

9 11 11 11

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We should certainly/probably provide armed resistance We certainly/probably shouldn't provide armed resistance

69

7780

7773

79 79 80 79 8075

81

7478 79

82 83

89

82 81 82

8884 82 81

69

80

70

6366

7773

68

62 63

68 70 71

8380

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70 71 7168

65

72 70 7074

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4.2 Willingness to participate in defence activities

The number of those willing to participate personally in defence activities (so-called active defence

willingness) is lower than the proportion of those supporting armed resistance at the state level. While

armed resistance is considered necessary by 79%, 60% of the population would be willing to

participate in defence activities personally to the extent of their own capabilities and skills

(Figure 20).

28% of the population of Estonia would be certainly willing and 32% probably willing to participate in

defence activities to the extent of their own capabilities and skills. 29% of the respondents would

certainly or probably not be willing to participate personally in defence activities.

Since conscript service is only compulsory for Estonian citizens, the difference between the attitudes of

Estonians and respondents of other nationalities in the matter of active defence willingness is

predictably greater than it is in the case of passive defence willingness. While 65% of Estonians

would be willing to participate personally in defence activities, the respective indicator for

non-Estonians is only 48%. This indicator is 57% among Estonian citizens of other nationalities (5%

higher compared to March), 37% among Russian citizens and 32% among respondents with

undetermined citizenship.

When interpreting active defence willingness, it should be considered that participation in national

defence is first and foremost seen as armed resistance that is traditionally considered the task of

reservists and men. Consequently, the readiness to contribute is inevitably lower among female and

older respondents (71% of male respondents would be willing to participate in defence activities, while

only half of women feel the same; only 48% of respondents over 60 years of age would be willing to

participate in defence activities).

Figure 20. Willingness to participate in defence activities if Estonia is attacked;

2017–2018 comparison (%; N= all respondents)

If we consider only the willingness of male citizens to participate in national defence, the picture on

active defence willingness becomes more positive. 77% of male citizens are willing to participate in

national defence, 79% of Estonians and 71% of respondents of other nationalities (see Table 3).

18

40

18

32

31

29

29

28

32

31

30

33

30

25

28

32

13

10

21

7

8

8

12

11

16

11

12

15

15

18

15

14

21

8

19

13

16

19

16

15

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Female

Male

GENDER (10/2018)

Other

Estonian

NATIONALITY (10/2018)

2017/03

2017/10

2018/03

2018/10




Table 3 – Willingness to certainly or probably participate in defence activities among male citizens by age groups; October 2018

NATIONALITY ALL 15-34 35-49 50-64 65+

Estonian 79% 76% 88% 78% 69%

Other 71% 67% 96% 63% X

ALL men / citizens 77% 73% 89% 76% 65%

X –The age group of non-Estonian men over 65 years of age included only 5 respondents, due to which

the result cannot be viewed as statistically reliable.

If we view the temporal change of participatory willingness by nationality and citizenship, it becomes

evident that in 2006, defence willingness among non-Estonians with Estonian citizenship was at a

comparable level with that of Estonians. After the Bronze Night events in 2007 this willingness dropped

significantly among non-Estonians with Estonian citizenship, those with undetermined citizenship and

those with Russian citizenship (Figure 21).

The years 2013–2014 saw an improvement in the defence willingness among non-Estonian citizens, yet

it fell under 50% again at the end of 2014. In the last two years the active defence willingness of the

Russian-speaking population has again exceeded 50% and in the last survey conducted in October has

reached the highest level since 2007



Figure 21. Proportion of the population willing to participate in defence activities in the event of an attack; comparison of Estonians, non-

Estonian citizens and non-citizens 2000–2018 (% of those certainly and probably willing to participate; N = all respondents)

67

6063

61

67

61

68 6769 73

70

6973

70 7174

71 70

64 64

6966

71 7074

6971

62

70

6266 64

6865

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60

68

6264

6266 66

64 65

53

40

52 5451

50

59 57

66

71

74

66

65 64 6358

64 6357

64

65 60

4846

53

42

54 52 51

3943

40

55 54 54

4547

4447

52 51

46

52

57

43

33

44

52

44

61

59

49

6663

6157

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5658 59

63

51 51

56

49

43 4144

52

52 52

46

36 3538 39 38 36

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Estonians Non-Estonians/citizens Non-Estonians/non-citizens



4.3 Desire to leave Estonia in the event of a military threat

In case Estonia is attacked, one fifth of Estonians would consider leaving Estonia—this

indicator has been at roughly the same level for several years now. In such a situation, 5% would

certainly endeavour to leave and 14% would probably do it. 70% of the population would certainly not

or probably not endeavour to leave Estonia in the event of a threat (Figure 22).

The people most prone to leave Estonia are women (certainly or probably 20%) and younger people:

39% of people under 20 years of age, 27% between 20 and 29 years of age, and 28% between 30 and

39 years of age would consider leaving.

From 50 years of age on, the wish to leave Estonia drops rapidly and the smallest number of potential

leavers are among people above the age of 60. 22% of non-Estonians and 16% Estonians would

probably leave.

Figure 22. Probability of leaving Estonia in case Estonia is attacked; 2017–2018 comparison


When taking into account the whole timeline from the beginning of the survey series, it can be seen

that the non-Estonian respondents have expressed increasingly higher willingness to leave since the

year 2007; the willingness rose to as high as 42% in 2013 and has remained close to 30% since then.

The proportion of those wanting to leave has been below 30% in the last three surveys.

Estonians’ willingness to leave rose to nearly 20% during the recession years from 2010 to 2013. While

it showed an increasing trend in the last surveys, the percentage of probable leavers has declined again

in October (see Figure 23).

2

2

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0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

60 +

50-59

40-49

30-39

20-29

15-19

AGE (10/2018)

Female

Male

GENDER (10/2018)

Other

Estonian

NATIONALITY…

2017/10

2018/03

2018/10




Figure 23. Proportion of those desiring to leave Estonia in the event of an attack; comparison of Estonians and non-Estonians 2000–2018 (% of those desiring to leave certainly and those who would probably do it; N = all respondents)

12 13

17 16

1315

12 12

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15 1513 13 13

1012

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4.4 Ability to act in the event of a potential attack

In order to obtain an overview of the population’s awareness in terms of defence, the respondents were

asked to tell whether they considered themselves to be adequately informed about what to do in the

event of an impending foreign attack. The results show that people consider their ability to act in

the event of a potential attack to be rather poor—only a little over one fifth of respondents

answered that they have at least general knowledge about what to do to defend the country in such a

situation, while 70% consider themselves rather or certainly not informed.

Assessments on awareness have fallen back to the 2016 level (Figure 24). This could be explained by

the fact that the need to better inform the population in a crisis situation has been publicly talked about

more than previously.

Figure 24. Being informed about the possibilities of what to do for defending Estonia in the event of an impending foreign attack; 2016–2018 comparison (%; N = all respondents)

Men consider their awareness to be higher than women (31% vs. 15%), which could be explained by

more contact with national defence structures (undergoing conscript service, Defence League).

However, assessment of one’s awareness has declined among both men and women.

Difference in awareness between Estonians and respondents of other nationalities is decreasing,

although it is slightly better among Estonians (24% vs. 20% respectively).

Respondents below 30 years of age consider themselves as best informed (33%), yet the awareness

drops as the age increases and only 16% of respondents over 60 years of age consider themselves

informed.

3

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Female

Male

GENDER (10/2018)

Other

Estonian


2016/10

2017/03

2017/10

2018/03

2018/10

Yes, sufficiently Generally yes Don't know Rather not Certainly not



4.5 On which topics is more information required

Throughout the surveys, the population has assessed its level of being informed as very low in view of

the topic of what to do in the event of a foreign attack and consequently, since November 2014, the

survey has included a question about the topics on which people require the most information.

Respondents had to choose three topics that are the most important to them out of the nine given.

The ranking and level of importance of the topics has not changed by much during this survey period.

The four most important topics highlighted in all of the last surveys are related to the role of civilians in

the case of a conflict: how the general public is informed (46%), how to act when one has

entered a combat zone as a civilian (34%), how evacuation is organised (32%), and how to

solve basic household problems (32%). The rest of the topics are already less relevant: a fifth of

the respondents are interested in what are their duties in national defence and how mobilisation is

organised, and these topics are more important to male respondents to an above average degree

(Figure 25).

Figure 25. On which topics do you require more information? Comparison of men and women

October 2018 (%; N = all respondents)

The difference in information needs of male and female respondents is noticeable. Even though men

are also concerned with the three topics listed as the most important in the general ranking, they show

greater than average interest in how the mobilisation will be organised, their duties in national defence,

and the ways in which civilians can contribute to supporting the military

Women would like more information on how to act as a civilian, about evacuation, on how to solve

basic everyday problems.

14

24

24

19

28

26

30

31

44

10

13

16

21

17

37

34

37

48

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46

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

What are my obligations concerning

national defence in my workplace

What are you obligations in national

defence

How can I support the military as civilian

How will public services be available and

which ones

How is the mobilisation organised

How are primary household problems

solved

How will the population be evacuated from

the battle area

How to act in the event when you have

entered a battle area as a civilian

How will the public be informed

ALL Female Male



5 Defence capability of Estonia

The fifth chapter reflects attitudes within the population in relation to Estonia’s defence capability, the

volume of defence expenditures, and the state’s activities regarding the development of national

defence.

5.1 The importance of national defence capability among other

areas of public interest that need improving

In surveys conducted since 2000, the respondents have been asked a few of times to choose up to five

areas of public interest that should receive the most attention from the government from a given list .

The list included 14 different topics. This question was last asked in March 2017.

There have been no major changes as to which areas of public interest are deemed important. The

most important ones were to increase the public well-being (67%), improve access to healthcare

services (57%), and increase social security (56%). While in March 2017 ensuring economic

development came in second, now the topic has dropped to fourth (54%). People know that the

economy is growing but the question is how much does the ordinary person gain from that (Figure 26).

All other topics are already less important in the view of the public, strengthening the nation’s defence

capability comes in with only 17% at 10th place out of 14. For example, improvement of environmental

protection is deemed more important (22%), while regulation of immigration, integration policy,

democratic governing of the state are deemed less important.

Figure 26. Which of these areas in the Estonian society should the government pay most

attention to at the present time? March 2017/ October 2018 (%; N = all respondents)

11

12

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28

28

30

54

56

57

67

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33

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55

66

0 20 40 60 80

Integration of different nations

Immigration regulation

Democratic government

Increasing population growth

Increasing national defence capability

Improvement of environmental protection

Harmonious regional development of Estonia

Development of education and culture

Rural and agricultural development

Ensuring collective security, fighting with crime

Ensuring economic development

Increasing social security

Availability of health services

Public well-being, living standard

Mar-17 Oct-18



5.2 Assessment of the defence capability of Estonia

Respondents were asked to say whether they think Estonia is defendable until help arrives from the

allies in the event of an armed foreign attack. Since autumn 2014, the proportion of respondents who

believe that it would be possible to defend Estonia in the event of an armed foreign attack has

exceeded 50%. In this survey, 53% of respondents believed that defending Estonia is certainly or

probably possible. The percentage of respondents who answered that way was the same in March.

The proportion of respondents who find that Estonia cannot be defended is 31% (Figure 27).

Figure 27. Assessment of the defence capability of Estonia in the event of an armed foreign

attack; 2017–2018 comparison (%; N = all respondents)

Estonians have more faith in Estonia’s independent defence capability than respondents of other

nationalities: 59% and 42% respectively. This indicator has dropped among Estonians by 2% (61% in

March), but increased by 6% among respondents of other nationalities (36%).

The opinions of Estonian citizens of other nationalities differ greatly from the ones held by Russian

citizens and those with undetermined citizenship. While 47% of Estonian citizens of other nationalities

believe that Estonia is defendable, only 32% of Russian citizens and 30% of respondents with

undetermined citizenship agree.

8

16

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34

43

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40

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0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Other

Estonian


2017/03

2017/10

2018/03

2018/10




5.3 Views on the volume of defence expenditures

Support for national defence funding has been high among the Estonian population since the beginning

of the survey.

After joining NATO, there was a period of a few years (primarily during the period of 2006–2008) when

a third or even greater proportion of the population considered an increase in defence expenditures

necessary. At the time, there was a lot of talk about the necessity to conform to NATO requirements

and raise defence expenditures to 2% of the GDP

After the 2% criterion was met and even exceeded in recent years, the support for an increase in

defence expenditures has dwindled in the recent surveys and the majority of the respondents wish to

keep the expenses at the current level. Support for an increase in defence expenditures also fell during

the period of 2009–2013 due to the recession.

Assessing the volume of Estonian defence expenditures today, half of the respondents think that

defence expenditures should be kept at the current level (50%) (Figure 28). An increase as

well as decrease in defence expenditures is favoured equally by one fifth of the population.

10% of the respondents do not have an opinion.

The attitudes of Estonians and Russian-speaking respondents differ greatly. In the last three years, the

proportion of Russian-speaking residents who favour cuts in defence expenditures has been at over

40%. In October, 44% of non-Estonians desired a decrease in defence expenditures.

However, the number of those in favour of increasing defence expenditures among Russian-speaking

respondents is equal to Estonians wishing for a decrease—8% and 7% respectively.

While in 2015, the proportion among Estonians supporting an increase in defence expenditures was still

at over 40%, it has now come down to 26% and the view that defence expenditures should be

maintained at the current level is dominating (Figure 29).



Figure 28. Views on the volume of defence expenditures; 2004–2018 comparison (%; N = all respondents)

Figure 29. Views on the volume of defence expenditures; comparison of Estonian and non-Estonian population 2006–2018 (%; N = all respondents)

5 5 4 6 7 6 9 9 6 7 8 124 3 4 4 6 6 4 5 4 6 7 7 8 5 5 4 3 4 3 4

25 23 2126 27 27

3527 33 30 26

28

2215

22 23 1521

17 18 18 2025 22 25

20 20 2015

19 16 17

45 50 5345 46 44

3745 40 39 45

43

4752

51 4848 35 45 44 48 45

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44 43 4652 47

4850

11 10 9 10 9 12 8 9 10 13 119

9 109 10

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9 119 10

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Increase significantly Increase by a certain amount Maintain at the current level Don't know Decrease by a certain amount Decrease significantly

41

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49

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3033

27

3529 28 29

33

4037

43

33 32 31 23 31

26 2623

18 15 1519 11

4

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Estonians favouring an increase in expenditures Non-Estonians favouring an increase in expenditures

Estonians favouring defence cuts Non-Estonians favouring defence cuts



5.4 Assessment of state activities in view of the development of national defence

In the last three years assessment of state’s activities in view of development of national defence have

been predominantly positive—70% of the respondents did view it as very or rather good also in October

2018 (Figure 30).

Similarly to most of the other assessments on national defence or state institutions, the Estonian -

speaking population provides more positive assessments compared to non-Estonians: 77% of Estonians

and 54% of non-Estonian respondents regard the development of national defence as good or very

good. However, even the latter segment does not have many more respondents who give the

development of national defence a negative assessment compared to Estonians (only 8%), yet there

are more respondents choosing the answer “cannot say” (38%).

Figure 30. Assessment of state activities in the recent years in view of the development of

Estonia’s national defence; 2016–2018 comparison (%; N = all respondents)

12

8

9

11

15

12

11

9

42

69

58

57

58

60

58

61

38

16

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0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Other

Estonian


2016/03

2016/10

2017/03

2017/10

2018/03

2018/10

Very well Rather well Don't know Rather badly Very badly



5.5 Assessments on the defence of the Estonian border

In 2014, the kidnapping of the Estonian Internal Security Service officer Eston Kohver by the Russian

special services on the Estonian-Russian border resulted in the public discussion on how well the border

line between Estonia and Russia was guarded.

Whereas in autumn 2014, right after the incident at the border, the majority of the assessments given

to this question were negative, then already by spring 2016, the assessments were once again

predominantly positive (Figure 31). In October 2018, defence of the border was assessed positively

by 61% and negatively by 21% of respondents. The assessments have turned more positive compared

to spring.

The defence of the border is still viewed more critically by Estonians compared to respondents of other

nationalities. If 27% of Estonians view the defence of the border negatively, the same is held by only

10% of non-Estonians. Yet, the proportion of positive assessments is higher among respondents of

other nationalities compared to Estonians (Estonians 59% and other nationalities 67%).

The assessment differed most drastically in the fall of 2014, when only 27% of Estonians assessed the

defence of the border positively, 67% viewed it as bad or very bad. At that time, only 26% of

respondents of other nationalities viewed the defence of the eastern border as bad or very bad.

Figure 31. Assessment on the defence of the Estonian border; 2014–2018 comparison (%; N = all respondents)

16

6

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Other

Estonian


2014/11

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2017/03

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2018/03

2018/10




5.6 Assessment of the security of digital services and information systems of Estonia’s e-state

For the first time the survey includes the topic of the security of Estonia’s e -state. As we have seen

previously, cyber-attacks are viewed as the most acute factor threatening Estonia’s security. Perhaps

because such a threat is viewed as the most likely one, the assessment on the security of this field is

also the least positive: 55% of respondents think that the digital services and information systems of

our e-state are very or rather secure, while 22% view their security as bad (Figure 32).

Of course, this is an area which many respondents are unable to assess—almost 25% provide the

answer “cannot say”.

Figure 32. Assessments of the security of digital services and information systems of

Estonia’s e-state (%; N = all respondents)

If we compare the assessments to the three areas given under the same spectrum, the largest number

of respondents provide a positive assessment to the development of national defence in general,

followed by defence of the border, and the least positive assessments are given to the e -state (Figure

33).

Figure 33. Comparison of assessments on development of Estonia’s national defence, border

defence, and security of digital service and information systems (%; N = all respondents)

15

6

9

46

47

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ALL


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0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

security of digital services

Estonian border

development of national defence




6 Organisation of Estonian national defence

The sixth chapter discusses various aspects of national defence organisation in Estonia: the attitudes

towards conscript service (including the necessity of it being compulsory to young men and voluntary

for young women, evasion of conscript service and inclusion of young people with minor health

disorders), whether it is more appropriate for Estonia to maintain its current defence concept or switch

to a fully professional army, opinions on comprehensive national defence and the main tasks of the

Defence League.

6.1 Attitude towards conscript service

6.1.1 Necessity of conscript service for young men

The Estonian population’s attitude towards conscript service for young men has been very favourable

throughout the survey period: in October 2018 as well, 92% of all respondents believed that

young men need to undergo conscript service. Only 7% of the population considers conscript

service rather or totally unnecessary. Undergoing conscript service is considered certainly necessary by

69% of the Estonians respondents and 48% of respondents of other nationalities (Figure 34).

The most dedicated supporters of conscript service are people over 60 years of age, 78% of whom

consider it certainly necessary. More than 60% of respondents 40 years of age and older are convinced

of the necessity of conscript service and more than half of respondents between 30 and 39 years of age

agree. Conscript service is considered certainly necessary by a little over 40% of the respondents below

30 years of age, who are affected most directly by conscript service, while 15% of them consider it

unnecessary.

Figure 34. Attitude towards the necessity of conscript service in October 2018


78

66

62

56

43

40

48

69

62

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Other

Estonian

NATIONALITY

ALL

Certainly necessary Rather necessary Don't know

Rather unnecessary Completely unnecessary



The proportion of the people who consider undergoing conscript service certainly necessary or rather

necessary for young men has remained at a very high level throughout the years—since 2008, it has

constantly been at 90% and higher (Figure 35).

Figure 35. Attitude towards the necessity of conscript service; 2005–2017 comparison (%; N = all respondents)

6.1.2. Attitudes towards undergoing conscript service with minor health disorders

Since 2012, the respondents have been additionally asked to assess whether young men with minor

health disorders should also undergo conscript service. 12% believe that such young men should

certainly undergo conscript service; however, 63% think that young men with minor health

disorders should undergo conscript service with an appropriate training load (Figure 36). The

public opinion has remained very stable in this matter over the past three surveys.

Among Estonians, support for extending conscript service duty to young men with minor health

disorders is widespread, respondents of other nationalities are more conservative in this regard—37%

of them think that young men with minor health disorders should not undergo conscript service at all.

71% of Estonians and 46% of respondents of other nationalities find that young men with minor health

disorders should undergo conscript service with an appropriate training load.

Figure 36. Attitudes towards undergoing conscript service regarding young men with minor

health disorders; 2017–2018 comparison (%; N = all respondents)

87 88 88 86 8590 91 90 93 94 93 89 92 92 93 95 93 92 94 94 93 91 90 93 92 94 92

11 10 10 11 138 6 8 6 6 6 8 7 7 7 5 6 7 5 6 6 7 7 5 6 4 7

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Other

Estonian


2017/10

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2018/10

Yes, certainly Yes, but with appropriate load No Don't know



6.1.3. Evasion of conscript service

Bearing in mind the favouring attitudes of the population towards conscript service, it is fully

anticipated that a great share of the population in Estonia disapproves of the evasion of

conscript service—20% condemn such behaviour and 44% consider it negative (Figure 37). 28% of

the respondents have an understanding attitude towards the evasion of conscript service, wh ile only

1% of the respondents approve of this.

The difference between Estonians and respondents of other nationalities is almost 20% in this matter:

a respective 70% and 51% see evasion negatively.

However, seniors tend to have a more negative attitude towards the evasion of conscript service. More

than 40% of respondents below 30 years of age have an understanding or approving attitude towards

the evasion of conscript service. However, a condemning attitude increases together with age and 76%

of people over 60 years of age view evasion of conscript service negatively.

Figure 37. Attitude towards the evasion of conscript service; 2016–2018 comparison

(%; N = all respondents))

27

24

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AGE (10/2018)

Other

Estonian

NATIONALITY(10/2018)

2016/10

2017/10

2018/03

2018/10

You condemn it You have a negative attitude

Don't know You understand it

You approve it



6.1.4. Conscript service for women

The opportunity for women to undergo conscript service voluntarily has been gaining

increasingly more understanding in the society—already since March 2015, more than a half of the

respondents have thought it certainly necessary or rather necessary.

As from fall 2016, the question about conscript service for women has been presented in the following

wording: “What do you think, what should women’s relationship with conscript service be

like?”

The respondents were offered a choice between three answers: conscript service should be compulsory

for women as well, women should have the opportunity to undergo conscript service voluntarily, or

women should not undergo conscript service at all, not even voluntarily (see Figure 38).

Figure 38. Attitude towards the necessity of conscript service for women;

2017–2018 comparison (%; N = all respondents)

Support for voluntary conscript service for women is predominant—it is supported by 78% of the

respondents and this attitude is stable.

As much as 84% of Estonians support voluntary conscript service for women, while the respective

indicator for respondents of other nationalities is 66%. Of the latter, 29% believe that women should

not undergo conscript service at all, whether it is compulsory or not. However, there is 2–3% support

for compulsory conscript service for women among both Estonians and non-Estonians.

Compulsory conscript service for women is supported by 7% of respondents under 20 years of age.

There is still one third among respondents above 50 years of age who would like to keep women away

from conscript service.

It can be seen that conservative notions of gender roles have started to slowly disappear also among

older people and respondents of other nationalities.

1

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2017/10

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conscript service should be compulsory for women

women should have the opportunity to undergo conscript service voluntarily

women should not undergo conscript service at all

Don't know



The respondents who considered voluntary or compulsory conscript service for women certainly or

rather necessary were asked about the form in which the conscript service should take place:

whether under the same conditions as applied to young men or through a separate

programme, which would take the different physical abilities of women into account.

The prevailing view is that conscript service for women should be conducted according to a separate

programme (Figure 39). This view is more prevalent among respondents of other nationalities (68%).

Such a solution has above average support also among older respondents (66%) and women (65%).

Figure 39. Which form should conscript service for women take? 2016–2018 comparison

(%; N = all respondents who considered conscript service for women necessary)

32

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Female

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GENDER (10/2018)

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AGE (10/2018)

Other

Estonian


2016/10

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2018/10

under the same conditions as applied to young mendon't knowaccording to a separate programme



6.2 Attitudes towards the professional defence forces

Despite the fact that more than 90% of respondents find undergoing conscript service necessary, the

topic of making the transition to a professional army is sometimes raised in political debates. This

became topical after Estonia joined NATO, when a professional defence force was also preferred at the

government level and when Latvia and Lithuania abandoned compulsory conscript service.

Respondents were asked to tell whether they think Estonia should waive compulsory conscription

service and maintain a professional army only, or maintain the current system in which the professional

army is combined with a reserve force consisting of persons who have undergone conscript service.

The results of the survey reveal that 80% of the population would prefer maintaining the

current system based on reserve forces (Figure 40). Switching to a fully professional army and

waiving compulsory conscript service is favoured by only 13% of Estonia’s population.

Figure 40. Options preferred for the development of Estonia’s defence concept; 2006–2018

comparison (%; N = all respondents)

* In surveys conducted in 2011, another wording of the question was used, with the reply options: “Estonia should maintain the general obligation for military service based on conscription” and “Estonia should switch to a professional army”.

Transitioning to professional defence forces is supported more by respondents of other nationalities,

but regardless of nationality, support for the current system is prevalent (Figure 41).

Figure 41. Options preferred for the development of Estonia’s defence concept –

comparison of Estonian and non-Estonian population, October 2018

63

77 7871

77 7583 81

7263

79 80 81 7883 84 82 82 79 81 84 84 82 79

32

19 19 2316 19

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Maintain the current system in which the professional army is combined with a reserve forceconsisting of persons having undergone consript service

Waive the obligation for military service based on conscription and maintain a professional armyonly

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1422

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Maintain the current system inwhich the professional army iscombined with a reserve force

consisting of persons havingundergone consript service

don't know Waive the obligation for militaryservice based on conscriptionand maintain a professional

army only




A professional defence force has an above average support also among respondents below 30 years of

age: 25% by people between 15 and 19 of age, and 23% by people between 20 and 29 of age.

6.3 Attitudes towards professional servicemen and members of

the Defence League

Whereas in previous surveys respondents were asked what is society’s general attitude towards

professional servicemen (this question was last asked in March 2018), this time we wanted to know the

attitude of the respondents themselves.

In March the question was: How do you feel, what is the attitude of Estonian people towards

professional servicemen? (Figure 42)

Figure 42. Attitudes towards professional servicemen; March 2018 (%; N = all respondents)

In this survey, the question was responder-based: What is your attitude towards professional

servicemen? (Figure 43)

Figure 43. Attitudes towards professional servicemen; October 2018 (%; N = all respondents)

As the figure shows, the respondents slightly underrate the general attitude society has towards

servicemen: the respondents’ personal attitude is much more positive than the society’s assumed

general attitude.

Respondents’ attitude toward members of the Defence League is also mostly positive (Figure 44).

15

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0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

ALL

Estonians

Other nationalities

Very good Rather good Neither good nor bad, neutral Don't know Rather bad

38

42

29

42

38

51

17

16

19

2

3

1

1

1

0

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ALL

Estonians

Other nationalities

Very well Rather well Neutral Don't know Rather badly



Figure 44. Attitude towards voluntary members of the Defence League – October 2018 (%; N = All respondents)

While the attitude among Estonian respondents toward voluntary members of the Defence League is

even more positive than toward professional servicemen (although both have overwhelming support),

respondents of other nationalities are a little more reserved toward voluntary members of the Defence

League compared to Estonians. Yet, more than half of them still have a positive attitude.

36

47

15

35

35

36

19

14

30

8

3

15

2

1

4

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

ALL

Estonians

Other nationalities

Very well Rather well Neutral Don't know Rather badly



6.4 Tasks of the Defence League

The respondents were asked to pick the three most important tasks of the Defence League from a

given list. The results were fixed in sequence, i.e., the most important reason first, followed by the

second and the third.

The Defence League’s most important tasks are considered to be maintaining permanent readiness

for military defence or conducting military training with its members — these tasks are listed

as first by respectively 28% and 24% of the respondents. One tenth of the respondents rank

participation in rescue operations or raising defence willingness among the population as first.

Permanent readiness for military defence (53%) ranks first in the overall summary of the three

tasks and participation in rescue operations in the event of emergencies and disasters ranks

second (47%).

The third most important task of the Defence League is considered to be conducting military

training for its members (39%) which is closely followed by raising defence willingness among

the population (36%).

More than one fourth of the respondents consider organising protection of civilians in emergency

situations (30%), organising recreational activities for young people (28%) or participating in

resolving domestic security crises (26%) among the three most important tasks.

Participation in military operations outside Estonia was the least popular choice pointed out among the

tasks of the Defence League (see Figure 45).

Figure 45. Main tasks of the Defence League, October 2018 (%; N = all respondents)

The tasks of the Defence League have been ranked in that way throughout several surveys. The views

of Estonians and population of other nationalities still differ when it comes to understanding the

Defence League’s tasks.

1

5

4

4

5

9

24

10

28

4

4

12

10

7

16

8

18

19

4

6

10

14

18

11

7

19

6

9

15

26

28

30

36

39

47

53

Participation in military missions outside Estonia

Creation of broad support for the defence forces in

the civil society

Participation in national crisis management

Organisation of the military education of the youth

Organised preparation for protecting the civilian

population in emergency situations

Raising the defence willingness among the

population

Conducting military training among members of

organization

Participation in rescue operations in the event of

emergencies and disasters

Permanent readiness for the military defense

First Second Third TOTAL



While Estonians mainly consider the Defence League a national defence organisation, the main task of

which is maintaining constant readiness for the military defence of the state (58% place it among the

three most important tasks), conducting military training (44%), participating in rescue operations in

emergencies and disasters (44%) and raising defence willingness among the population (41%), the

Russian-speaking population see the Defence League primarily as a civil defence organisation, deeming

participation in rescue operations in the event of emergencies and disasters (54% of respondents of

other nationalities place it among the three most important tasks) and organised protection of civilians

in emergency situations (40%) its most important tasks (Figure 46).

Figure 46. The three main tasks of the Defence League, comparison of Estonian and non-Estonian population; October 2018, (%; N = all respondents)

13

18

25

25

40

26

27

54

39

9

14

26

29

27

40

44

44

58

9

15

26

28

30

36

39

47

53

Participation in military missions outside Estonia

Creation of broad support for the defence forces in

the civil society

Participation in national crisis management

Organisation of the military education of the youth

Organised preparation for protecting the civilian

population in emergency situations

Raising the defence willingness among the

population

Conducting military training among members of

organization

Participation in rescue operations in the event of

emergencies and disasters

Permanent readiness for the military defense

ALL Estonians Others



6.5 Exposure to national defence structures and opinions on joining the Defence League

Every survey also establishes the exposure respondents and the persons they are close to have to

national defence structures (Figure 47).

Figure 47. Exposure to national defence structures, October 2018 (%; N = all respondents)

Respondents have been most frequently exposed to conscript service (11%) and national defence

training (6%). More than half of the respondents’ acquaintances or friends have undergone conscript

service, while 22% of the respondents’ close ones have had contact with the Defence League.

However, 3/4 of the respondents have not had any contact with national defence and 1/3 do not have

such contact even at the level of people close to them.

4% of the respondents (5% of Estonians; 6% men) participate in the activities of the Defence League

themselves, 29% of Estonians and 26% of men have contact to the Defence League through a family

member or friend.

The number of respondents of other nationalities connected to the Defence League is marginal—only

8% have a friend or a family member who is connected to the Defence League and only 2% participate

in the activities of the Defence League themselves.

11

4

2

4

1

4

6

75

51

16

11

22

6

10

10

32

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

participated in conscript service

Training excercises / Rehearsals /

Volunteer Reserve Officers Courses

Regular service in Estonian Defence

Forces

participated in the activities of the

Defence League

participated in Naiskodukaitse (Women’s Voluntary Defence …

participated in Noored Kotkad (Young

Eagles) / Kodutütred (Home Daughters)

National Defence Course at school

do not have any connections to national

defence structures

Respondent Family members or friends



The respondents who were not members of the Defence League or related organisations were asked

their opinion on joining the Defence League.

4% of the respondents would certainly join and 16% would probably join if they received a

proposal to join the Defence League (Figure 48). Readiness to join has slightly decreased.

4% of Estonian respondents would certainly be ready to join and 19% would probably be ready to join,

the respective indicators for non-Estonian respondents are 4% and 10%.

The Defence League is viewed primarily as an organisation for men, thus, readiness to join is also

higher among men (28%). Higher readiness to join is expressed by younger respondents: more than

half (52%) of those below the age of 20 and ¼ on average by those between 20 and 49 years of age

express this view.

Figure 48. Willingness to join the Defence league; 2017–2018 comparison (%; N = those who are not yet members of the Defence League)

1

3

6

6

4

14

2

7

4

4

6

4

4

8

11

21

20

19

38

12

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19

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28

25

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21

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11

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14

31

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33

27

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28

26

27

25

67

38

30

20

22

3

45

28

48

32

40

35

37

60+

50-59

40-49

30-39

20-29

15-19

AGE (10/2018)

Female

Male

GENDER

(10/2018)

Other

Estonian

NATIONALITY

(10/2018)

2017/10

2018/03

2018/10

will certainly join will probably join don't know probably will not join certainly will not join



7 NATO

The seventh, NATO-related chapter provides an overview of the population’s attitude towards Estonia’s

membership in NATO, their views on the role of NATO in providing security to Estonia and the ways in

which the steps NATO has taken to ensure Estonian security in the world’s new security situation are

assessed. The respondents were also asked to assess allied troops stationed in Estonia by way of pre -

provided adjectives.

7.1 Attitude towards membership in NATO

In October 2018, Estonian membership in NATO was favoured by 76% of the population,

which is 5% more than in March. 42% are certainly in favour of and 34% rather in favour the NATO

membership. 16% of Estonian residents are against NATO membership while 9% of the population

have no opinion in this matter (Figure 49)

While 90% and more of Estonian respondents have been in favour of NATO membership for a long

time, support for NATO among respondents of other nationalities is considerably lower and more

volatile, depending significantly on political events in the world and the media coverage thereof.

Between March 2015 and March 2018, the share of non-Estonian respondents supporting NATO

membership was slightly above 30%—as it was after the Bronze Night events in 2007 and the Arab

Spring in 2011.

In October 2018, the proportion of supporters of NATO membership of other nationalities had increased

to 44%; 38% are against NATO membership. Almost 1/5 (18%) have no opinion in this matter (Figure

50).



Figure 49. Attitudes towards joining NATO / membership in NATO, comparison of 2000–2018; (%; N = all respondents)

Figure 50. Proportion of the proponents of joining NATO / membership in NATO; comparison of Estonians and Non-Estonians 2000–2018 (% of those certainly and rather in favour of the aforementioned; N = all respondents)

4554 54

6369 66 69

74 72 74 7873 74 76 75 71 73 75 73 71

80 78 7671 75 72

79 76 79 75 72 72 71 71 72 74 7176

28 2632 28

23 2621

16 18 18 14 18 19 17 17 17 15 17 18 2013 13 14

19 20 1915 17 17 18 21 19 19 20 19 19 19 16

0

20

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80

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/200

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8

Certainly/rather in favour Certainly/rather against it

4554 54

6369 66 69

74 72 7478

73 74 76 7571 73 75 73 71

80 78 7671

75 7279 76 79 75 72 72 71 71 72 74 71

7656

66 6573 76

81 8387 86 88 89

84 87 86 88 89 90 89 90 8993

8983

8793

86 89 8894 93 91 91 89 89 91 92 89 91

2431 33

39

52

3338

44 4642

51 4843

5144

33 37 39 3531

50 4844

34 3440

5247 44

3731 31 33 31 31 33 32

44

0

20

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80

100

10

/200

0

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/200

1

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/200

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/200

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06

/200

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10

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8

ALL Estonians Others



Through observing the attitudes among different groups of the population of other nationalities with

regard to NATO membership, it can be concluded that the better a person is integrated and the more

proficient they are in Estonian, the more positive is their attitude towards NATO membership (Figure

51).

Non-Estonians over the age of 50 not proficient or only a little proficient in Estonian who do not have

Estonian citizenship expressed the most aversion towards NATO membership.

However, almost half of non-Estonians with proficiency in Estonian under 20 years of age support

Estonia’s NATO membership.

Figure 51. Attitudes towards membership in NATO among non-Estonians October 2018 (N = non-Estonians)

24

29

50

59

24

20

57

48

40

60

40

38

44

45

54

75

55

48

38

23

49

60

28

37

43

19

46

48

39

32

18

9

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

no knowledge at all

understands but don't speak

understands and speaks a little

good knowledge

ESTONIAN LANGUAGE SKILLS

undefined

Russian

Estonian

CITIZENSHIP

higher

secondary (vocational)

primary or basic

EDUCATION

60 +

50-59

40-49

30-39

20-29

15-19

AGE




7.2 NATO’s assistance in the event of a potential threat

The majority of the population considers NATO Estonia’s main security guarantee (see Chapter 3.6).

Over the years, people have become increasingly more certain that NATO will provide military aid in the

event of Estonia facing a military threat. An increase in the actual presence of allied forces in Estonia

has contributed to this sense of security.

In the earlier surveys, respondents were asked to select only one of the four options, but starting from

spring 2017 they were given the opportunity to pick several, since different answers were not mutually

exclusive.

In November 2016, the respondents had to pick only one option and the results were as follows: 44%

of the respondents found that NATO would provide direct military assistance in the event of

an impending threat to Estonia, 21% believed that membership in NATO would be able to prevent a

military conflict completely. 14% thought that NATO would limit its aid only to political and diplomatic

support and 11% believed that there is no hope for help from NATO.

In the case of several answers more than half of respondents found that NATO would provide direct

military assistance in the event of a conflict while 40% thought that membership in NATO would be

able to prevent a military attack against Estonia completely. 18% of the respondents found that NATO

members would limit their help to political and diplomatic support while 9% thought that there is no

hope for help from NATO. Thus, the population’s belief in NATO’s assistance or preventive power has

slightly increased compared to spring (Figure 52).

Figure 52. Role of NATO in ensuring Estonia’s security if Estonia is exposed to military threat

2017/2018; (%; N = all respondents)

The Estonian-speaking respondents’ trust in NATO’s support is considerably higher than that of

respondents of other nationalities, which originates from the attitude towards the membership in the

alliance. These two first answers were provided by respectively 63% and 52% of Estonians, which is at

the same level compared to March (Figure 53).

Only 32% (26% in March) of non-Estonian respondents believe in NATO’s military assistance. 22%

(26% in March) of respondents find that NATO will not help Estonia or that NATO would limit its aid to

political and diplomatic support. The share of those non-Estonians who do not expect any aid from

NATO has decreased steadily.

53

42

18

9

10

51

40

19

11

11

49

39

17

13

8

50

39

20

12

9

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

provide direct military assistance

would prevent a military conflict

limit to political and diplomatic support

no hope of help from NATO

don't know

10/2018 03/2018 10/2017 03/2017



Figure 53. Role of NATO in ensuring Estonia’s security if Estonia is exposed to military threat, October 2018, comparison of Estonians and non-Estonians (%; N = all respondents)

7.3 Assessments to the actions of NATO

Since November 2014 we have studied the attitude of the Estonian population towards actions already

taken by NATO to ensure better security for Estonia.

The respondents were asked whether NATO has taken sufficient measures to ensure the security of

Estonia in today’s security situation (Figure 54) and how the presence of NATO allied forces in Estonia

is perceived (Figure 55).

Figure 54. Has NATO taken sufficient measures to ensure the security of Estonia?


The assessments given to steps taken by NATO for ensuring security in Estonia have been

predominantly positive throughout all the surveys, staying near 70%. Almost 80% of Estonians

consider NATO’s measures as sufficient. More than one third of the respondents of other nationalities

give the answer “cannot say”, and 47% consider NATO’s actions as sufficient.

63

52

15

3

7

32

21

26

22

16

0 20 40 60 80

provide direct military assistance

would prevent a military conflict

limit to political and diplomatic support

no hope of help from NATO

don't know


14

22

19

22

21

19

33

56

48

48

50

49

35

16

21

19

20

22

10

5

8

6

6

7

8

1

4

5

3

3

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Other

Estonian

NATIONALITY

(10/2018)

2017/03

2017/10

2018/03

2018/10

completely sufficient sufficient in general don't know rather not sufficient completely not sufficient



However, Russian-speaking respondents are predominantly negative about the presence of

NATO allied forces in Estonia (46%), whereas almost 90% of Estonians are in favour of it

(Figure 55). This is directly related to the attitudes toward NATO membership in general. However, it

must be noted that the share of non-Estonians with a negative attitude has decreased by 8% (54% in

March), and support has increased by 6% (from 31% to 37%).

Figure 55. What is your attitude towards the presence of NATO allied forces in Estonia?


7.4 Assessments on the effect of the NATO battle group

stationed in Estonia

In October 2017 another question was added: Do you think having NATO battle group troops

stationed in Estonia generally makes the country more secure or less secure or does it have

no real effect either way. While 77% of Estonians find that the NATO battle group has made Estonia

more secure, only 29% of non-Estonians agree with that; the majority do not see that it has an effect

on Estonia’s security (40%) (Figure 56).

Figure 56. What effect does the stationing of NATO battle group troops have on Estonia’s

security? 2017-2018 comparison (%; N = all respondents))

7

48

35

37

36

35

30

41

34

33

33

37

17

5

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25

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8

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Other

Estonian


2017/03

2017/10

2018/03

2018/10

fully support rather support don't know rather do not support do not support at all

29

77

60

58

61

40

12

21

23

21

15

5

11

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8

16

6

8

9

10

0 20 40 60 80 100

Other

Estonian


2017/10

2018/03

2018/10

more secure does not have an effect either way less secure don't know



7.5 Assessment of NATO battlegroup troops

In the second question added in October 2017, we asked the respondents to select four words among

the pre-selected adjectives that would characterise the troops of the NATO battle group stationed in

Estonia the best in the respondents’ assessment (Figure 57).

Figure 57. Which, if any, of the following words or phrases would you choose in general to

describe NATO battlegroup troops currently stationed in Estonia: October 2017/2018


Mostly positive words are used to describe the NATO battle group troops, out of which “professional” is

repeated most frequently.

This is followed by such characterisations as “friendly”, “well intentioned”, “polite”, “capable”,

“committed” and “well informed about Estonia”. Compared to last fall, the words “frie ndly”, “polite”,

and “committed” are used slightly more, “professional”, “capable”, and “well informed about Estonia”

less—but those changes of a coupe percentage points remain within the limits of a statistic error.

Only 7% deem the troops of the allied forces as ignorant about Estonia, and 4% deem they are not to

be trusted.

Negative characterisations are more common among respondents of other nationalities (See Figure

58).

46

28

21

19

16

14

13

9

7

7

5

2

2

1

1

1

1

0

3

25

44

30

22

21

13

17

10

7

9

7

4

4

1

1

1

1

1

1

2

31

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50

Professional

Friendly

Well intentioned

Polite

Capable

Commited

Well informed about Estonia

Ignorant about Estonia

Outgoing

Hidden away

Not to be trusted

Disrespectful

Uncommited

Happy

Hostile

Unprofessional

Resentful

Incapable

None of these

Don't know

10/2017 10/2018



Figure 58. Which, if any, of the following words or phrases would you choose in general to

describe NATO battlegroup troops currently stationed in Estonia;

October 2018 , comparison of Estonians and non-Estonians (%; N = all respondents)

26

1

1

2

2

7

12

12

18

17

27

27

37

51

41

5

12

7

16

8

4

6

13

4

9

11

13

28

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Don't know

None of these

Not to be trusted

Disrespectful

Ignorant about Estonia

Hidden away

Outgoing

Well informed about Estonia

Commited

Capable

Polite

Well intentioned

Friendly

Professional

Other nationalities Estonians



8 International military operations

The eighth chapter maps the attitudes towards participation in international military operations: how

necessary Estonia’s participation is in such operations according to the population, what the reasons for

Estonia to participate are, and what the respondents’ attitudes towards the Estonian Defence Forces’

operations as part of NATO, European Union, and UN units are. We also observe attitude toward a more

tight defence co-operation between EU Member States.

8.1 Attitude towards participation in international operations

Positive attitudes toward Estonia’s participation in international military operations is always prevalent

and is in the last survey at the highest level ever. 68% of the population of Estonia believe that

the Estonian Defence Forces’ units should, within their capabilities, participate in

international military operations; 24% of respondents feel that it should be certainly done (Figure

59). 22% of the respondents think that the Defence Forces should probably or certainly not participate

in these operations.

The difference between attitudes of Estonians and respondents of other nationalities towards

international military operations is decreasing. 73% of Estonians are in favour of participating in

international operations, 57% of non-Estonians feel the same way, which is 10% more compared to

March.

Figure 59. Should Estonian units participate in international military operations?


11

15

32

27

24

25

23

36

42

44

46

43

41

45

15

11

7

9

7

10

10

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13

13

11

23

20

6

7

13

11

11

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Other (03/2018)

Other (10/2018)

Estonian (03/2018)

Estonian (10/2018)

NATIONALITY

2017/10

2018/03

2018/10

yes, certainly probably yes don't know probably not certainly not



8.2 Arguments for participation in international operations

Respondents were asked to select the three most important reasons why Estonia should participate in

international military operations from a given list. The results were fixed in sequence, i.e., the most

important reason first, followed by the second and third.

The two most important reason named most frequently were that participation in operations

provides our soldiers real combat experience (32%) and it ensures NATO’s assistance in the

event of a potential threat to Estonia (28%). These motives were also first and second

respectively as an aggregate sum of the three reasons (Figure 60).

The next most important arguments for participating in international operations highlighted by the

respondents include contributing to world peace (sum of the three reasons 34%) and protecting people

in crisis areas (34%). Estonia taking the opportunity to have a say in world politics is deemed almost as

important (33%).

Spreading democratic values in the world is seen as the least important (8%).

Figure 60. The most important reasons why Estonia should participate in international

military operations; October 2018 (%; N = all respondents)

Attitudes towards participating in international military operations differ slightly among Estonians and

respondents of other nationalities (Figure 61).

The Defence Forces gaining combat experience is the most important for both Estonian and non-

Estonian respondents (70% and 55% respectively) in the aggregate of the three choices, although the

latter mention it less frequently. Here, the difference between Estonians and non-Estonians has

decreased just like in attitudes towards participating in missions in general.

For Estonians, the second place goes to ensuring NATO’s assistance (59%), which is a concept that the

respondents of other nationalities are rather sceptical about. Thus, the importance of that answer

among non-Estonians is at only 27%.

1

3

4

3

4

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32

2

5

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11

25

5

11

11

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16

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10

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5

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24

33

34

34

49

66

Do not know

Nothing can justify participation

Helps to spread democratic values in the world

Participation in foreign missions is the

responsibility of every democratic country

Helps to prevent the spread of conflicts into

Estonia

Gives Estonia an opportunity to have say in world

politics

Protects people in crisis regions

Contributes to ensuring peace in the world

Ensures NATO's assistance in the event of

potential threats to Estonia

Gives our soldiers necessary real combat

experience

First Second Third TOTAL



For non-Estonians, the main second choice is Estonia taking the opportunity to have a say in world

politics (43%), third is protecting people in crisis areas (32%). More than Estonians, respondents of

other nationalities think that participation in international operations is the duty of every democratic

state (29%).

Compared to Estonians, there are more those among non-Estonians who believe that nothing justifies

the participation of Estonian servicemen in international operations.

Figure 61. The most important reasons why Estonia should participate in international military operations; October 2018, comparison of Estonians and non-Estonians


13

8

19

24

33

34

34

49

66

23

6

29

29

43

28

32

27

55

8

8

15

23

30

37

35

59

70

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

Nothing can justify participation

Helps to spread democratic values in the world

Participation in foreign missions is theresponsibility of every democratic country

Helps to prevent the spread of conflicts intoEstonia

Gives Estonia an opportunity to have say inworld politics

Contributes to ensuring peace in the world

Protects people in crisis regions

Ensures NATO's assistance in the event ofpotential threats to Estonia

Gives our soldiers necessary real combatexperience

Estonians Others ALL



8.3 Attitudes towards participation in NATO, EU and UN operations

Since Estonian servicemen have participated in military operations as part of NATO, EU and UN units,

we were curious about whether there is a difference in the public’s attitudes towards operations

conducted under the aegis of different organisations. The October survey also included “as part of co-

operation with allied countries”.

There are no great differences compared to the survey conducted in October 2015 when this question

was first included in the survey—participation in different missions is supported more or less equally: in

October 2018, participation as part of NATO units was supported by 71%, as part of European Union

units by 68%, and as part of UN peacekeeping forces by 71% of the respondents (Figure 62).

While the majority of Estonians support participation in all missions, especially those of NATO (82%),

support for various operations is lower among respondents of other nationalities, especially low for

participation in NATO operations (47%). However, other missions are supported by more than a half of

people of other nationalities.

Figure 62. Attitudes towards the units of the Estonian Defence Forces participating in

international operations; October 2018 (%; N = all respondents)

11

24

19

15

24

21

12

28

23

10

33

26

45

51

49

43

48

47

45

50

48

37

49

45

16

12

14

18

15

15

18

14

15

15

7

9

13

9

10

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9

9

11

5

7

18

6

10

15

4

8

14

4

8

14

3

7

20

5

10

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Other nationalities

Estonians

ALL

EU operations

Other nationalities

Estonians

ALL

UN operations

Other nationalities

Estonians

ALL

Allied countries operations

Other nationalities

Estonians

ALL

NATO operations

certainly in favour rather in favour don't know rather against certainly against



8.4 Opinion on the defence co-operation of the European Union

In previous surveys we were curious how public opinion would react to the proposal of establishing a

common border service and joint armed forces for the European Union.

This survey presented the following question: Should the European Union increase defence co-

operation among its Member States?

The abstractly formulated defence co-operation found more public support than the unambiguously

worded proposals for establishment of a common border service and armed forces—although even they

found general support in the view of the public. In March, support for establishing a common EU border

service was at 55% and for joint EU armed force at 45% (Figure 63).

Figure 63. Attitudes towards a common border service and joint armed forces for the European Union; October 2017/ March 2018 comparison (%; N = all respondents)

However, increase of defence co-operation between EU Member States is supported by ¾ of the

respondents: by 81% of Estonians and 63% of respondents of other nationalities (Figure 64).

Figure 64. Attitude toward an increase of defence co-operation between EU Member States,


19

23

11

15

36

37

34

35

21

17

24

19

16

16

18

20

8

7

13

11

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Ühine piirivalveteenistus

2018/03

2017/10

Ühised relvajõud

2018/03

2017/10

fully support rather support don't know rather do not support do not support at all

20

37

31

43

44

44

23

12

15

8

5

6

6

2

3

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Other nationalities

Estonians

ALL

yes, certainly probably yes don't know probably not certainly not



9 Veteran policy

9.1 Primary associations with the word “veteran”

Since November 2011, the survey has included a question on whether people associate the word

“veteran” primarily with World War II, the Estonian War of Independence, or the Estonian Defence

Forces’ foreign operations. The results of the previous surveys up to March 2016 showed that more

than half of the population (55%) associates the word “veteran” primarily with World War II.

17% of all respondents associated that term with foreign operations of the Estonian Defence Forces

(23% of Estonian and 5% of Russian-speaking respondents). At the same time, many respondents

chose the option “other” and specified that they use the term “veteran” to denote participants of all

wars.

As a result, the respective option was added to ones presented to the respondents and it became the

most popular answer right away. In a survey conducted in fall 2017, it was supported by 45% of the

respondents (Figure 65).

Figure 65. What are the primary associations with the word “veteran”, October 2017


However, in the context of veteran policy the most important aspect is to know, first and foremost, how

much will people associate the term “veteran” with foreign operations of the Estonian Defence Forces,

we returned to the former wording of the question in March and excluded the answer about participants

in all wars (Figure 66).

Figure 66. What are the primary associations with the word “veteran”? March 2018


45

33

8

6

2

6

0 20 40 60

everyone who has fought for Estonia in

different wars

World War II

Estonian Defence Forces' missions

Estonian War of Independence

other

don't know

42

24

19

5

10

26

31

26

6

11

74

9

5

5

7

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

World War II


Estonian War of Independence

other

don't know




Of course, it is important to honour those who participated in the Estonian War of Independence, alas,

those who participated in it are no longer alive. Thus, under practical considerations, we left out

participants in the Estonian War of Independence from the options and replaced it with the option

“people with long time service record in the Estonian Defence Forces”. The result is the following

distribution of answers (Figure 67).

Figure 67. What are the primary associations with the word “veteran”?


As can be seen, the distribution of answers does not change by much: World War II is still the clear

leader with 48%. Still, the proportion of respondents who associate the term “veteran” with people who

have participated in missions of the Estonian Defence Forces is slowly increasing. It has increased from

24% to 27% among all respondents, and from 31% to 34% among Estonians. The latter indicator is

only 4% lower than the percentage of Estonians who associate veterans with World War II.

48

27

14

3

9

38

34

17

2

8

67

11

6

6

10

0 20 40 60 80

World War II


people with long time service record in theEstonian Defence Forces

other

don't know




10 National defence instruction in schools

The attitude towards the necessity of national defence instruction in schools has been almost as

positive among the Estonian population as towards compulsory conscript service for young men: about

4/5 or more of the respondents since 2008 have found it certainly necessary or probably necessary.

In autumn 2014, we made changes to the wording of the question: “Should it be possible to get

national defence instruction in all educational institutions providing secondary education?”

84% of the respondents consider the opportunity to receive national defence instruction

certainly or probably necessary (Figure 68). Estonian and Russian-speaking respondents’ support to

national defence instruction differs by more than 10%, yet clearly dominates the answers of both

respondent groups (89% for Estonians and 76% for non-Estonians). Unfortunately, it must be

acknowledged that compared to Estonian language schools , Russian language schools have less

opportunities to study national defence instruction, which also results in lesser awareness of the

content of this subject among non-Estonians. Yet, only 14% of respondents of other nationalities are

opposed to national defence instruction (7% of Estonians).

Support for national defence instruction is also prevalent among different age groups.

Figure 68. Attitude towards the necessity of national defence instruction in all educational

institutions providing secondary education; 2017–2018 comparison (%; N = all respondents)

46

45

47

37

43

39

33

48

45

45

43

39

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40

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3

3

1

6

6

2

3

3

3

60 +

50 - 59

40 - 49

30 - 39

20 - 29

15 - 19

AGE (10/2018)

Other

Estonian

NATIONALITY(10/2018)

2017/10

2018/03

2018/10




11 Media consumption

The questionnaire included a large section on media consumption with the main purpose of observing

how the population’s attitude on national defence are influenced by their contact with different media

channels. This task requires secondary data analysis, which is not the objective of the current report.

The following presents the survey results describing the respondents’ engagement with different

television channels and radio stations as well as visits to Internet portals in the form of frequency

distributions.

Figure 69. Visits to news portals and online newspapers; October 2018


The most popular news portals were Delfi and postimees.ee, whereat Delfi also has the largest Russian-

speaking audience. The web portal of the Estonian Public Broadcasting is used much more by Estonians

than non-Estonians.

26

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64

84

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80

91

58

74

74

75

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

delfi.ee; rus.delfi

ALL

Estonians

Other

uudised.err.ee; novosti.err.ee

ALL

Estonians

Other

postimees.ee; rus.postimees

ALL

Estonians

Other

Õhtuleht (õhtuleht.ee; vecherka.ee)

ALL

Estonians

Other

other Estonian Internet portals

ALL

Estonians

Other

Russian Internet portals

ALL

Estonians

Other

Internet portals of other countries

ALL

Estonians

Other

5-7 days per week 3-4 days 2 days or less not at all



Figure 70 Use of social media, October 2018 (%; N = all respondents)

As examples of other direct communication applications, respondents were presented with applications such as Skype, Messenger, Snapchat, WhatsApp, Telegram etc.)

41

45

32

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36

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0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

Facebook

ALL

Estonians

Other

Youtube

ALL

Estonians

Other

Instagram

ALL

Estonians

Other

Twitter

ALL

Estonians

Other

Odnoklasniki

ALL

Estonians

Other

Vkontakte

ALL

Estonians

Other

Different blogs

ALL

Estonians

Other

Other applications…

ALL

Estonians

Other

5-7 days per week 3-4 days 2 days or less



Figure 71. Engagement with television channels; October 2018 (%; N = all respondents)

46

63

11

12

7

21

35

48

7

34

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80

20

50

55

43

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

ETV broadcast in Estonian

ALL

Estonians

Other

ETV broadcast in Russian

ALL

Estonians

Other

Kanal 2

ALL

Estonians

Other

TV3

ALL

Estonians

Other

TV Tallinn

ALL

Estonians

Other

3+

ALL

Estonians

Other

Pervõi Baltiiski Kanal

ALL

Estonians

Other

Russian TV-channels

ALL

Estonians

Other

TV of other countries

KÕIK

eestikeelsed

venekeelsed

5-7 päeval 3-4 päeval 2 päeval või harvemini üldse mitte



The following figure shows the attitudes of Russian-speaking respondents towards Estonia’s

membership in NATO depending on exposure to different TV channels (Figure 72).

We see that those Russian-speaking respondents who watch Estonian language programs on Eesti

Televisioon at least once a week perceive Estonia’s NATO membership more favorably than those who

view Russian TV channels or the programs on Pervyi Baltiiski Kanal. Viewing or non-viewing of Estonian

Russian language channel ETV+ does not influence attitudes toward NATO.

Of course, the figure below only indicates the general distribution of factors measuring the

viewing/non-viewing of TV channels, a more precise effect of media consumption would require a

typological analysis.

Figure 72. Attitudes towards Estonia’s membership in NATO depending on exposure to TV-

channels; October 2018 (%; N = all respondents)

62

52

33

54

59

31

46

41

47

34

52

77

19

30

51

28

21

52

33

42

46

44

35

17

0 20 40 60 80 100

do not watch

watch less often

watch every day

Russian TV

do not watch

watch less often

watch every day

PBK

do not watch

watch less often

watch every day

ETV+

do not watch

watch less often

watch every day

ETV, ETV2




Figure 73. Engagement with radio stations; October 2018 (%; N = all respondents)

39

54

10

11

1

31

3

1

6

13

16

7

8

1

21

4

3

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14

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6

36

17

72

74

94

34

88

92

81

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Radio broadcast in Estonian

ALL

Estonians

Other

Estonian radio broadcast in Russian

ALL

Estonians

Other

Radio broadcast of other countries

ALL

Estonians

Other

5-7 päeval 3-4 päeval 2 päeval või harvemini üldse mitte



Figure 74. Reading newspapers—on the basis of six most recent issues; October 2018

(%; N = Estonian-speaking respondents)

Figure 75. Reading newspapers—on the basis of six most recent issues; October 2018

(%; N = Russian-speaking respondents)

3

4

5

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11

4

3

6

9

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0 5 10 15 20 25

Äripäev

Pealinn

Eesti Päevaleht

Linnaleht

Eesti Ekspress

Õhtuleht

Postimees

Maaleht

4-6 issues 1-3 issues

1

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0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40

Maaleht

Äripäev

Eesti Ekspress

Eesti Päevaleht

Õhtuleht

Postimees

МК Эстония

Linnaleht

Stolitsa

4-6 issues 1-3 issues



12 Importance of information channels

To assess the impact of different print and web channels, TV and radio stations, and social media

channels to people’s attitudes, an add itional typological analysis would be required. In this survey, we

asked the respondents themselves to assess which information channels are important to them in

obtaining information related to national defence.

The most important ones are, predictably, television and radio, more than half of the respondents

deem news portals and newspapers as very or rather important. However, direct communication with

other people fits right between these two, being below TV, but almost as important as information

obtained via radio.

Print ads, street advertisements, and electronic news letters are deemed the least important.

Figure 76. How important is this channel in regard to information on national defence,


7

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45

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0 20 40 60 80 100

Print ads

Street advertisements

Electronic newsletters

Web-pages

Social media

Newspapers

News portals

Direct communication with other people

Radio

Televison

very important rather important don't know rather not important not important at all

Documents

PUBLIC OPINION AND NATIONAL DEFENCE · Research Company Turu-uuringute AS conducted a public opinion survey on national defence during which 1,215 residents of Estonia from the age