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PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY: A
COMPARISON OF PRIVATE FIRMS AND U.S. DEFENSE CONTRACTORS
Andrew J. Pratt, Rene G. Rendon, and Keith F. Snider*
ABSTRACT: This paper compares the levels of Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) emphasis between defense contractors and private
firms that receive the majority of revenues from commercial sources.
Corporate websites from three major industry groups (large defense
contractors, Fortune 500 companies, and highly ranked CRS firms) were
examined and rated based on information regarding their emphases on
health and safety, environment, diversity, human rights, philanthropy, and
corporate governance. The results indicate that defense contractors place
less emphasis on those CSR categories than do private firms. The findings
are explained by stakeholder differences and may be attributed to the highly
regulated environment of public procurement.
* Andrew Pratt, Captain, U.S. Air Force, is a Project Manager for the 771st
Enterprise Sourcing Squadron at Wright Patterson Air Force Base. He
majored in Management at the U.S. Air Force Academy and served in the
base contracting office at Travis Air Force Base for three years before
obtaining an MBA in 2011 from the Naval Postgraduate School.
Rene G. Rendon, D.B.A., is Associate Professor of Acquisition Management
in the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy at the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. His teaching and research
interests are in supply management, contract management, and project
management.
Keith F. Snider, Ph.D., is Associate Professor of Public Administration and
Management in the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy at the
Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. His teaching and
research interests are in defense acquisition management and policy.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
3751
INTRODUCTION
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR; Bowen, 1953; Carroll,
1999) receives increasing attention from a variety of sources,
including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), trade unions,
consumers, shareholders, and scholars (Jenkins, 2005; McCrudden
2006), especially in light of troublesome cases such as Enron
(accounting fraud), Nike (child labor), Shell (sinking of the Brent
Spar), and British Petroleum (oil spill). CSR is now viewed as a core
competency for many companies, contributing to their competitive
advantage and long-term profits, leading them to value CSR on the
same level as financial performance (Porter & Kramer, 2006; Davis,
1960; Hurst, 2004).
CSR expectations of a different sort apply to firms that engage in
public procurement via government contracts. Because they act as
agents of public officials to promote public values and to accomplish
public purposes (McCrudden, 2007), these contractors have
obligations beyond those of firms that operate purely in the private
realm; government contractors must act responsibly on behalf of
public authorities (Cohen & Eimicke, 2009). Yet, little research
attention has been paid to the question of how the CSR of
government contractors might differ from that of firms that derive
their revenue from purely commercial and non-government sources
(hereafter, private firms).
Purpose and Scope
This paper seeks to help fill this research gap by conducting an
exploratory comparison of the CSR of firms that engage in public
procurement with the CSR of private firms. By “exploratory
comparison,” we mean a survey that will identify and document the
important features of the CSR landscape in order to provide a useful
foundation for deeper and more focused analysis of those features.
As a first step toward investigating the CSR of government
contractors, we focus on that subset of contractors—defense
contractors—to the U.S. federal (i.e., national) government whose CSR
is arguably most different from that of private firms. Weapons
Pratt, Rendon & Snider
3752
manufacturers have been characterized from a moral perspective as
socially irresponsible (Baker, 2005). Critics argue that their products
(e.g., weapons) cause human death, injury, and environmental
damage. Further, because defense contractors are for-profit
industries, they have incentives to sell weapons to non-state actors
(e.g., revolutionary militias in other countries), thereby producing
negative externalities (Byrne, 2007).
In addition to focusing on defense contractors, we focus on the
discretionary facet of CSR. Carroll (1999) has proposed a framework
of CSR orientations and behaviors in four domains: economic, ethical,
legal, and discretionary. Some, however, see Carroll’s discretionary
domain as the only truly compelling domain of CSR because it entails
those philanthropic attitudes and activities that a firm is free to
choose to pursue. The discretionary domain reaches beyond the
legal and ethical domains of CSR, which arguably represent common
obligations and expectations requiring no special corporate attention
(Davis, 1960; 1973), as well as the economic domain which some
argue should be the sole focus of corporate attention (Friedman,
1970; Steiner, 1971). Thus, the only domain of orientations and
actions upon which scholars agree is the discretionary domain; hence
our focus on that domain.
Method and Organization
As an exploratory study, this paper relies upon publicly available
data from corporate websites and upon existing instruments and
frameworks to measure and compare CSR. It examines three groups:
The largest defense contractors that derive at least 70% of
revenues from federal government contracts.
The highest ranked CSR companies (as ranked by Boston
College Center for Corporate Citizenship).
The largest Fortune 500 companies.
To assess and compare these firms’ CSR, we used an instrument
developed by the Institute for Supply Management (ISM), together
with Hurst’s (2004) framework for comparing CSR between European
and U.S. firms. Additional assessment factors were derived from the
best practices of the top CSR companies. Assessments and
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
3753
comparisons were obtained in six CSR categories associated with the
discretionary domain: health and safety, environment, diversity,
human rights, philanthropy, and corporate governance.
The paper is organized as follows. After a brief review of CSR-
related literature and policy pertaining to defense contractors, the
methodology is presented in more detail. The data and analysis are
then given, followed by discussion of the results and conclusions.
BACKGROUND
CSR refers to the obligations of companies to make decisions
beneficial to society (Bowen, 1953) or, alternatively, the society’s
expectations of firms regarding their behaviors in the economic, legal,
ethical, and discretionary domains of action (Carroll, 1999).
Researchers typically treat CSR behaviors as factors that affect
corporate profitability (see, for example, Aupperle, Carroll, & Hatfield,
1985; Berman, Wicks, Kotha, & Jones, 1999) rather than as
dependent variables. Others (Campbell, 2007; Hiss, 2009) call for
attention to factors, especially institutional factors (e.g., laws, rules,
norms), that may shape a firm’s CSR.
CSR Literature Related to Public Procurement
The effect of laws and regulations on firms is routinely noted in
the business ethics literature (Goodpaster, 1991: 58; Phillips,
Freeman, & Wicks, 2003: 490-491). Clearly, however, firms operate
in different legal-regulatory regimes. Some firms’ relationships with
government are passive and limited, consisting mainly of compliance
with rules that apply equally to all firms, for example, labor and
environmental laws. Other firms have extensive and close
relationships with government through, for example, supplying
products and services for public authorities. In such active
relationships, a firm has additional rules and regulations with which
to comply. These higher levels of exposure to governmental
influences create opportunities for a firm’s CSR to be shaped
differently than that of firms with lesser or no relations with
government.
Pratt, Rendon & Snider
3754
Several writers (Aaronson, 2005; Fox, Ward, & Howard, 2002;
Moon, 2004) have analyzed the role and influence of government in
CSR. Fox et al. (2002) described government’s four possible roles:
(1) mandating (establishing minimum standards for CSR actions
within a legal framework); (2) facilitating (enabling or incentivizing
firms); (3) partnering (with firms in CSR-related actions); or (4)
endorsing (providing acknowledgement or appreciation). De la Cuesta
Gonzàlez and Martinez (2004) have noted that public procurement
has been used as a tool for promoting CSR in several EU states, and
Aaronson (2005) has advocated that the U.S. government use public
procurement for similar purposes. McCrudden (2006) argued that
the influence of public procurement law depends on several factors,
including the subject matter of CSR, the level of government
authority, and even the place of performance of the public contract.
Much CSR-related scholarship in public procurement relates to
sustainability (see, for example, Brammer & Walker, 2007; Walker,
Disistro, & McBain, 2008; Walker & Brammer, 2009; Walker &
Phillips, 2009). Oldroyd, Grosvold, and Millington (2011) noted that
implementation of sustainable procurement practices in the public
sector depends on factors such as potential cost savings, while the
enhancement of reputation is the main consideration for private
firms.
To summarize, scholars have established the relevance of
governments in promoting CSR, and they have noted the role of
public procurement as a tool to that end. We found no research,
however, on specific ways in which government actions, including
public procurement-related actions, might shape or affect a firm’s
CSR.
Stakeholder Theory
In addition to stockholders, a firm’s stakeholders includes:
employees, customers, suppliers, and the community. According to
stakeholder theories of CSR (see, for example, Freeman, 2004), a
firm’s relationship with its stakeholders is defined by trade-offs
between the rights of the firm to operate in a particular realm
(provided by stakeholders) with the economic and social contributions
it provides in return. Stakeholders thus have rights to expect certain
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
3755
CSR-related actions or behaviors from a firm. Obviously, public
authorities are major stakeholders with a unique set of expectations
and demands for those firms that engage in public procurement.
Firms have several ways to inform stakeholders of their CSR, and
scholars have paid much attention to how firms use marketing for
this means (see, for example, Bronn & Vrioni, 2001; Maignan &
Ferrell, 2004). Apropos this paper, firms use corporate websites to
publicize and promote their CSR, and the question is whether the
information on these websites suggests a difference between the
CSR of firms that engage in public procurement and those that do
not.
U.S. Department of Defense Procurement Policy
CSR is embedded in U.S. procurement law as an extension of
public policy. Table 1 gives examples of how CSR objectives are
addressed in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR).
Socioeconomic
Justice
(FAR Part 19)
Small Businesses; Historically Underutilized Businesses; Service-
Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Businesses; Women-Owned Small
Businesses
Labor Rights and
Protections
(FAR Part 22)
Safety Standards; Equal Employment Opportunity; Age
Discrimination; Child Labor; Trafficking in Persons; Affirmative
Action
Environmental
Protection
(FAR Part 23)
Sustainable Acquisition; Energy and Water Efficiency; Hazardous
Materials; Recovered Materials and Biobased Products; Drug-Free
Workplace; Radioactive Materials; Ozone-Depleting Substances
Table 1. DoD Procurement Regulations
Contractors for the Department of Defense (DOD) are required by
contract clauses and through various representations and
certifications to address all such concerns. These serve to hold
contractors responsible for their actions as agents of the government.
CSR Research on Defense Firms
Pratt, Rendon & Snider
3756
Hurst (2004) compared the corporate ethics, governance and
social responsibility of European companies with those in the U.S.
Using information that was publicly available on websites, reports,
and business databases, he analyzed European and American
companies in the technology, energy, healthcare, and defense
industries using the following questions:
Has the company publicized a Code of Conduct/Ethics?
Are the company’s conflict of interest guidelines publicly
available to investors?
Does the company make it clear who the designated
Ethics/Compliance Officer is?
Does the company have a whistle-blowing process
implemented and is it easily accessible?
Does the company publish a CSR or sustainability report?
Is CSR one of the company’s core corporate principles or
business objectives?
European companies scored higher on the CSR indicators as nearly
50% of them had CSR embedded in their corporate strategies,
compared to only 20% of U.S. companies.
This study also indicated that the defense industry paid less
attention to CSR than the other industries. Hurst found that neither
Lockheed Martin nor Northrop Grumman published a CSR or
sustainability report, and that CSR was not a corporate principle or
objective. Lockheed Martin “[met] all of the ethics requirements but
failed to even mention CSR” (Hurst, 2004). However, they set the
standard by publishing the most comprehensive ethics code.
Similarly, Northrop Grumman also failed to mention CSR publicly,
though its whistle-blowing process was the best in the study.
Halpern (2008) investigated the CSR of defense firms that
manufacture command, control, communications, computer,
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance equipment. Regarding
Carroll’s (1999) four domains of CSR, Halpern found that these
defense firms have a greater emphasis on the economic and legal
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
3757
elements of CSR than firms in general. He noted that discretionary
activities of these defense firms were suppressed by FAR provisions
that restrict their ability to make charitable donations that are not
taken from their profits.
METHODOLOGY
This study uses publicly available information to compare the
emphasis placed on CSR by the following companies:
Defense Contractors: Top 5 defense contractors with over
70% of revenues from the U.S. government.
CSR Companies: Top 5 CSR companies as ranked by Boston
College Center for Corporate Citizenship.
Largest Firms: Top 5 Fortune 500 companies representing
different industries.
Each of the fifteen firms is assessed from public information in six
CSR categories (health and safety, environment, diversity, human
rights, discretionary/philanthropy, and corporate governance). The
assessment combines ISM’s CSR instrument (ISM, 2011) with Hurst’s
(2004) framework for comparing CSR between European and U.S.
firms. Additional assessment factors were derived by the authors
(shown as “authors” below) from the best practices of the top CSR
companies.
Framework
Table 2 shows the four factors in each of six CSR categories to be
examined for each company, as well as the source (i.e., ISM, Hurst, or
Authors) for each of the factors.
Category Factors Source
Health and Safety
Publishes safety program/policies. ISM
Trains employees and suppliers ISM
Publishes safety goals. Authors
Has processes to measure/document safety
performance. ISM
Environment
Has environmental goals in place. Authors
Recycles and minimizes waste and environmental
impact. ISM
Pratt, Rendon & Snider
3758
Reports environmental efforts. ISM
Pursues discretionary initiatives. ISM
Diversity
Has programs/processes to promote. ISM
Trains employees and suppliers. ISM
Promotes equal access to employment opportunities. ISM
Pursues discretionary diversity initiatives. Authors
Human Rights
Has program and/or processes to promote. ISM
Trains employees on human rights. ISM
Promotes enforcement to suppliers. ISM
Has initiatives to promote human rights. Authors
Discretionary
Activities demonstrate commitment to the community. ISM
Encourages employees to volunteer ISM
Efforts include charitable donations ISM
Partners with others for community projects. Authors
Corporate
Publishes a Code of Conduct or Standards of Business. ISM/Hurst
Core principles/values reflect CSR. Hurst
Publishes CSR/Sustainability Report. Hurst
Reports CSR efforts to higher authority or governance Authors
Table 2. CSR Factors
Selection of Firms
The selected defense contractors (Table 3) had the highest
percentage of public revenue, with annual revenues exceeding $10
billion. All five of the companies earned over 70% of revenue from
the government. (In Tables 3, 4, and 5 below, revenues are as
reported from 2010 annual reports, and percentages of revenue from
the U.S. government were found at www.usaspending.gov).
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
3759
Table 3. Defense Contractors
The second group (Table 4) includes five Fortune 500 companies,
which earn the majority of revenues from commercial sources. These
companies represent a diverse industry-base and earn less than 20%
of their revenues from the U.S. government.
Table 4. Largest Companies
The final group (Table 5) represents the companies ranked as the
top five CSR companies according to Boston College’s Center for
Corporate Citizenship. These companies set the standard for CSR in
large companies whose revenue exceeds $10 billion.
Defense Contractors Industry Revenue Government %
Lockheed Martin Aerospace and Defense $45.8B 76%
Northrop Grumman Aerospace and Defense $34.7B 92%
General Dynamics Aerospace and Defense $32.4B 72%
Raytheon Company Aerospace and Defense $25.1B 88%
L-3 Communications Aerospace and Defense $15.7B 83%
Fortune 500 Companies Industry Revenues Government %
Walmart General Merchandizer $421B 0.00024%
Exxon Petroleum Refining $354B 2.06%
GM Motor Vehicles $135B 2.07%
Bank of America Commercial Banking $134B 0.13%
Hewlett Packard Computers $126B 18.89%
Pratt, Rendon & Snider
3760
Table 5. Top 5 CSR Companies
Rating Scheme
Each company was assessed in order to judge the extent to which
it addressed the six CSR categories. Each of the factors in the six
categories elicits a yes or no response, which is given the
corresponding value of “1” and “0,” respectively, based on a review of
information on the firm’s website. The sum of the factor values in
each category will thus range from 0 to 4, with the corresponding
adjectival ratings for CSR emphasis in each category: 0=No, 1=Low,
2=Moderate, 3=High, 4=Very High.
PRESENTATION OF RESULTS
Tables 6, 7, and 8 show the assessments for each group of firms.
CSR Category Lockheed
Martin
Northrop
Grumman
General
Dynamics
Raytheon L-3
Health and
Safety
4 3 4 4 1
Environment 4 4 4 4 1
Diversity 4 4 3 4 2
Human Rights 3 3 0 2 0
Discretionary 4 4 4 4 2
Corporate 2 4 3 3 1
Table 6. Ratings for Defense Companies
Top 5 CSR Companies Industry Revenue Government %
Johnson & Johnson Pharmaceuticals $61.6B 1.64%
Walt Disney Entertainment $38.1B 0%
Kraft Foods Food Consumer Products $49.2B 6.12%
Microsoft Computer Software $69.9B 1.01%
PepsiCo Food Consumer Products $57.8B 3.22%
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
3761
CSR Category WalMart Exxon Bank of
America
GM Hewlett
Packard
Health and
Safety
4 4 4 3 4
Environment 4 4 4 4 4
Diversity 4 4 4 4 4
Human Rights 3 4 2 0 4
Discretionary 4 4 4 4 4
Corporate 3 4 4 2 4
Table 7. Ratings for Largest Companies
CSR Category Johnson &
Johnson
Walt Disney Kraft
Foods
Microsoft PepsiCo
Health and
Safety
4 4 4 3 4
Environment 4 4 4 4 4
Diversity 4 4 4 4 4
Human Rights 4 4 4 4 4
Discretionary 4 4 4 4 4
Corporate 4 4 4 4 4
Table 8. Ratings for Top CSR Companies
The data indicate that the emphasis on CSR by defense
contractors is different than that of other companies, to the extent
that emphasis is evident on corporate websites. Figure 1 shows that
defense contractors show less emphasis on CSR than the companies
that receive the majority of their revenues from commercial sources.
Pratt, Rendon & Snider
3762
405060708090
100110120
DefenseContractors
CSR Companies Largest Companies
Total of Ratings
Group of Companies
Figure 1. Total Ratings by Group of Companies for All CSR
Categories.
Of the 120 factors assessed (5 companies*6 CSR categories*4
factors), defense contractors had a ratings total of 89 (74.17%), CSR
companies had a ratings total of 119 (99.17%), and the largest
companies had a ratings total of 109 (90.83%).
Figure 2 shows that L-3 Communications scored significantly
lower than other defense contractors, heavily influencing the group
totals.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
3763
468
1012141618202224
LockheedMartin
NorthropGrumman
GeneralDynamics
Raytheon L-3
Total Ratings
Defense Contractors
Figure 2. Total Number of Questions Addressed By Each Defense
Contractor
Figure 3 gives a comparison of the ratings of each group of
companies in the six CSR categories.
Pratt, Rendon & Snider
3764
68
101214161820
Ratings
CSR Category
Defense Contractors
CSR Companies
Largest Companies
Figure 3. Ratings by Group for Each CSR Category
Figure 4 consolidates the data for all of the companies to
illustrate these least emphasized categories. All three groups of
companies were rated as having a “High” and “Very High” emphasis
on the discretionary, diversity, environmental, and health and safety
categories.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
3765
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
Total Ratings
CSR Category
Figure 4. Ratings for all Companies in Each CSR Category
DISCUSSION
Differences between defense contractors and other firms in levels
of CSR emphasis may be explained in several ways, most of which are
related to the unique features of the very different “markets” in which
they operate.
Stakeholder theory calls attention to the particular demands that
influential stakeholders place on a firm regarding CSR. For private
firms, the most influential stakeholders are those that contribute
most to profitability, such as individual consumers, corporate
customers, and supply chain partners. To the extent that a strong
CSR emphasis makes a firm more attractive to these stakeholders,
CSR enhances profitability. Thus, private firms have strong incentives
to promote their CSR strengths as a way of advertising, especially
through means such as corporate websites that can reach many
Pratt, Rendon & Snider
3766
potential stakeholders.
These incentives are not so strong for defense firms that operate
under a monopsony (i.e., one buyer, many sellers). The main
stakeholders to which defense contractors must promote themselves
are federal agencies that buy their products. Clearly, corporate
websites are not important as means for promoting CSR in such
cases. Indeed, whether or not a particular firm is selected for a
defense contract will depend almost exclusively on information that
the firm provides only in its proposal. Thus, a more appropriate way
to judge a defense firm’s CSR would be to include an evaluation of
the CSR-related representations and certifications which it is required
to make in its proposals.
The focus on the government as their main source of revenue
forces defense contractors to have different views of CSR than those
held by private firms. Defense firms operate under and comply with
the provisions of the FAR, which creates a complex set of intricate
and arcane rules that are of no concern to private firms. Defense
firms have a compliance orientation towards CSR, because the risks
of noncompliance (e.g., being disqualified from a contracting action;
unfavorable media attention) are so severe. Essentially, a firm
wishing to sell to the government derives profit by winning contracts,
which means playing by the rules. Public procurement results in a
defense firm’s profit motives becoming inextricably linked to its
adherence to norms and governmental expectations. Risk-averse
attitudes and approaches thus prevail among defense firms, while
private firms have incentives to “push the envelope” on discretionary
CSR-related actions and initiatives.
The FAR also reinforces an orientation towards ethics as an
essential CSR domain for defense contractors. The FAR intends
explicitly to promote ethical practices in federal contracting; it
contains ninety-five references to either “ethics” or “ethical.” Many of
its requirements (e.g., process transparency) contribute to an
environment that helps curb wrongdoing and promotes ethical
behaviors. Defense firms that are focused on complying with the FAR
will naturally perceive such compliance as inherently constituting
ethical behavior in the CSR realm.
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
3767
Many aspects of federal contracting under the FAR contain
features that purely commercial firms may consider discretionary.
Policy provisions concerning small and disadvantaged businesses are
a good example. While a commercial firm might decide, as a
discretionary “goodwill” action, to sponsor minority scholarships, the
FAR promotes such actions as matters of public policy. As noted
above, socioeconomic policies are promoted through, for example,
the Historically Underutilized Business Zone (HUBZone) program,
small businesses owned and controlled by service-disabled veterans,
and women-owned small business. Thus, the FAR includes
something of an implicit CSR framework. Operating within that
framework, defense firms naturally see compliance with the FAR as
accomplishing at least some of their discretionary CSR.
CONCLUSION
This study suggests that differences exist in discretionary CSR
orientations of defense contractors and private firms, and further,
that these differences may be due to the extent to which these firms
engage in public procurement. In particular, the myriad rules of the
public procurement marketplace appear to divert a defense firm’s
attention away from discretionary CSR orientations (e.g., human
rights, philanthropy) and toward legal compliance and ethical
behavior. Further, unlike private firms, defense contractors have little
profit incentive to advertise their CSR broadly, because one main
stakeholder – the government – influences their profitability.
.
Pratt, Rendon & Snider
3768
NOTES - Web sites used in this study:
Bank of America. (2011, October 31). Retrieved from Bank of
America website: https://www.bankofamerica.com/
Exxon Mobil. (2011, October 31). Retrieved from Exxon Mobil
website: http://www.exxonmobil.com/Corporate/
General Dynamics. (2011, October 31). Retrieved from General
Dynamics website: http://www.generaldynamics.com/
General Motors. (2011, October 31). Retrieved from General Motors
website: http://www.gm.com/
Hewlett Packard. (2011, October 31). Retrieved from Hewlett Packard
website: http://www.hp.com/
Johnson and Johnson. (2011, October 31). Retrieved from Johnson
and Johnson website: http://www.jnj.com/connect/
Kraft Foods. (2011, October 31). Retrieved from Kraft Foods website:
http://www.kraftfoodscompany.com/home/index. aspx
L-3 Communications. (2011, October 31). Retrieved from L-3
Communications website: http://www.l-3com.com/
Lockheed Martin. (2011, October 31). Retrieved from Lockheed
Martin website: http://www.lockheedmartin.com/
Microsoft. (2011, October 31). Retrieved from Microsoft website:
http://www.microsoft.com/about/companyinformation/en/us
/default.aspx
Northrop Grumman. (2011, October 31). Retrieved from Northrup
Grumman website: http://www.northropgrumman.com/
PepsiCo. (2011, October 31). Retrieved from PepsiCo website:
http://www.pepsico.com/
Raytheon. (2011, October 31). Retrieved from Raytheon website:
http://www. raytheon.com/
WalMart. (2011, October 31). Retrieved from WalMart website:
http://walmartstores.com/
PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY
3769
Walt Disney. (2011, October 31). Retrieved from Walt Disney website:
http://corporate.disney.go.com
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