Puboff Cases - Missing Cases for Midterms

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 119398 July 2, 1999

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO JR., petitioner,

vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINE CHARITYSWEEPSTAKES OFFICE and FERNANDO O.

CARRASCOSO JR., respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:

To hold public officers personally liable for moral and

exemplary damages and for attorney's fees for acts done in

the performance of official functions, the plaintiff mustprove that these officers exhibited acts characterized by

evident bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. But even if

their acts had not been so tainted, public officers may stillbe held liable for nominal damages if they had violated the

plaintiff's constitutional rights.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of theRules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision 1 of theCourt of Appeals 2 in CA-GR CV No. 39252 promulgated on

September 9, 1994. The assailed Decision reversed theRegional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 2, in Civil

Case No. 91-55873, which disposed of the controversy in

favor of herein petitioner in the following manner: 3

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of theplaintiff and against the defendants, ordering them, jointly

and severally the following:

ONTHE FIRST CAUSE

OF ACTI

ON

1. To pay P143,000.00 plus interest thereon from March

26, 1986 until complete payment thereof;

2. To pay P28,000.00 plus interest thereon [from] June 8,

1986 until complete payment thereof;

3. To pay P142,700.00 plus interest thereon from July 10,


4. To pay P70,000.00 plus interest thereon from February


5. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon from March


6. To pay P28,000.00 plus interest thereon from April 26,1987 until complete payment thereof;

7. To pay P14,000.00 plus interest thereon from May 17,


8. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon from August 9,


9. To pay P174,000.00 plus interest thereon from

December 13, 1987 until complete payment thereof;

10. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon fromSeptember 18, 1988 until complete payment thereof;

11. All income derived from the foregoing amounts.

ONTHE SECOND CAUSEOF ACTION

Ordering defendant Fernando O. Carrascoso the following:

1. To pay moral damages in the amount of One Hundred

Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00);

2. To pay exemplary damages in the amount of TwentyThousand Pesos (P20,000.00);

3. To pay attorney's fees in the amount of Thirty Thousand

Pesos (P30,000.00);

4. To pay the costs of suit.

The counterclaim is ordered dismissed, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

In a Resolution4

dated March 7, 1995, Respondent Courtdenied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The following is the Court of Appeals' undisputednarration of the facts:

Plaintiff [herein petitioner] is a known businessman-sportsman owning several racehorses which he entered inthe sweepstakes races between the periods covering

March 6, 1986 to September 18, 1989. Several of his


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horses won the races on various dates, landing first,second or third places, respectively, and winning prizes

together with the 30% due for trainer/grooms which are

itemized as follows:

ce Stake Horse Racewinning 30% Due Net Amount

ner Prize Claims Training Withheld by

ms PCSO

Hansuyen 200,000.00 57,000.00 143,000.00

Stronghold 40,000.00 12,000.00 28,000.00

Kahala 200,000.00 57,300.00 142,700.00

Devil's Brew 100,000.00 30,000.00 70,000.00

Time to Explode 200,000.00 60,000.00 140,000.00

Stormy Petril 40,000.00 12,000.00 28,000.00

Starring Role 20,000.00 6,000.00 14,000.00

Star Studded 200,000.00 60,000.00 140,000.00

Charade 250,000.00 75,000.00 174,000.00Hair Trigger 200,000.00 60,000.00 140,000.00

TOTAL 1,450,000.00 4,293,000.00 1,020,700.00

[Herein petitioner] sent letters of demand (Exhibits "A,"

dated July 3, 1986; "B" dated August 18, 1986; and "C,"dated September 11, 1990) to the defendants [herein

private respondents] for the collection of the prizes due

him. And [herein private respondents] consistentlyreplied. (Exhibits 2 and 3) that the demanded prizes are

being withheld on advice of Commissioner Ramon A. Diazof the Presidential Commission on Good Government.

Finally on January 30, 1991; this case was filed before theRegional Trial Court of Manila. But before receipt of the

summons on February 7, Presidential Commission on

Good Government advi[s]ed defendants that "ifposes nomore objection to the remittance ofthe prize winnings"(Exh. 6) to [herein petitioner]. Immediately, this was

communicated to Atty. Estelito Mendoza by [Private

Respondent Fernando] Carrascoso [Jr.]. 5

As culled from the pleadings of the parties, Atty. Estelito P.Mendoza, petitioner's counsel, refused to accept the prizes

at this point, reasoning that the matter had already beenbrought to court.

Ruling ofthe Trial Court

The trial court ruled that Respondent Philippine Charity

Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and its then chairman,

Respondent Fernando O. Carrascoso Jr., had no authorityto withhold the subject racehorse winnings of petitioner,since no writ of sequestration therefor had been issued by

the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG).It held that it was Carrascoso's unwarranted personal

initiative not to release the prizes. Having been a previouslongtime associate of petitioner in his horse racing and

breeding activities, he had supposedly been aware that

petitioner's winning horses were not ill-gotten. The trialcourt held that, by not paying the winnings, Carrascoso

had acted in bad faith amounting to the persecution and

harassment of petitioner and his family.6

It thus orderedthe PCSO and Carrascoso to pay in solidum petitioner's

claimed winnings plus interests. It further ordered

Carrascoso to pay moral and exemplary damages,attorney's fees and costs of suit.1wphi1.nt

While the case was pending with the Court of Appeals,petitioner moved for the partial execution pending appealof the RTC judgment, praying for the payment of the

principal amount of his prize winnings. Private

respondents posed no objection thereto and manifestedtheir readiness to release the amount prayed for. Hence,

the trial court issued on February 14, 1992, an Order 7 for

the issuance of a writ of execution in the amount ofP1,020,700. Accordingly, on May 20, 1992, Respondent

PCSO delivered the amount to petitioner.

Ruling ofthe Court ofAppeals

Before the appellate court, herein private respondents

assigned the following errors: 8

I

THE COURTA QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS ACTED IN BAD FAITH IN

WITHHOLDING PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE['S] PRIZE[S];

II

THE COURTA QUO ERRED [IN] AWARDING MORAL

DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S

FEES IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE.

In reversing the trial court's finding of bad faith on the part

of Carrascoso, the Court of Appeals held that the formerPCSO chairman was merely carrying out the instruction ofthe PCGG in regard to the prize winnings of petitioner. It

noted that, at the time, the scope of the sequestration ofthe properties of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos

and his cronies was not well-defined. Respondent Court

explained: 9

. . . Under those equivocalities, defendant Carrascoso could

not be faulted in asking further instructions from thePCGG, the official government agency on the matter, onwhat to do with the prize winnings of the [petitioner], and

more so, to obey the instructions subsequently given. The

actions taken may be a hard blow on [petitioner] butdefendant Carrascoso had no alternative. It was the safest


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he could do in order to protect public interest, act withinthe powers of his position and serve the public demands

then prevailing. More importantly, it was the surest way to

avoid a possible complaint for neglect of duty ormisfeasance of office or an anti-graft case against him.

The Court of Appeals also noted that the followingactuations of Carrascoso negated bad faith: (1) he

promptly replied to petitioner's demand for the release of

his prizes, citing PCGG's instruction to withhold paymentthereof; (2) upon PCGG's subsequent advice to release

petitioner's winnings, he immediately informed petitioner

thereof; and (3) he interposed no objection to the partialexecution, pending appeal, of the RTC decision.

Respondent Court finally disposed as follows: 10

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealedfrom is REVERSED and SET ASIDEand a new one entered

DISMISSING this case. No pronouncement as to costs.

On September 29, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for

Reconsideration, which was denied on March 7, 1995.

Hence, this petition. 11

Issues

Petitioner asks this Court to resolve the following issues:

a. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the

appeal of respondent Philippine Charity SweepstakesOffice (PCSO);

b. Whether the appeal of respondent Carrascoso, Jr. should

have been dismissed for his failure to file an appeal brief;

c. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to reviewand reverse the judgment on a cause of action which was

not appealed from by the respondents;

d. Whether the award for damages against respondent

Carrascoso, Jr. is warranted by evidence and the law. 12

Being related, the first two issues will be discussed jointly.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

First andSecondIssues:

Effect ofPCSO's Appeal Brief

Petitioner contends that the appeal filed by the PCSO

before Respondent Court of Appeals should have beendismissed outright. The appealed RTC decision ruled on

two causes of action: (1) a judgment againstboth PCSO andCarrascoso to jointly and severally pay petitioner his

winnings plus interest and income; and (2) a judgment

against Carrascoso alone for moral and exemplarydamages, as well as attorney's fees and costs. The PCSO,

through the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel

(OGCC), appealed only the second item: "the improprietyof the award of damages . . . ." This appealed portion,

however, condemned only Carrascoso, not the PCSO.

Technically, petitioner claims, PCSO could not haveappealed the second portion of the RTC Decision whichruled against Carrascoso only, and not against the

government corporation.

Petitioner further avers that Carrascoso failed to file his

own appeal brief; accordingly, his appeal should have,

been dismissed. The PCSO brief, he submits, could not haveinured to the benefit of Carrascoso, because the latter was

no longer chairman of that office at the time the brief was

filed and, hence, could no longer be represented by theOGCC.

On the other hand, respondents aver that the withholdingof petitioner's racehorse winnings by Respondent

Carrascoso occurred during the latter's incumbency as

PCSO chairman. According to him, he had honestlybelieved that it was within the scope of his authority not to

release said winnings, in view of then President Corazon C.

Aquino's Executive Order No. 2 (EO 2), in which she

decreed the following:

(1) Freeze all assets and properties in the Philippines in

which former President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs.Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close friends,

subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or

nominees have any interest or participation;

(2) Prohibit any person from transferring, conveying,encumbering or otherwise depleting or concealing such

assets and properties or from assisting or taking part in

their transfer, encumbrance, concealment, or dissipation,

under pain of such penalties as are prescribed by law.

Moreover, he argues that he sought the advice of the PCGGas to the nature of the subject racehorse winnings, and he

was told that they were part of petitioner's sequesteredproperties. Under these circumstances and in his beliefthat said winnings were fruits of petitioner's ill-gotten

properties, he deemed it his duty to withhold them. The

chairman of the PCSO, he adds, is empowered by law to

order the withholding of prize winnings.

The representation of the OGCC on behalf of the PCSO andMr. Carrascoso is pursuant to its basic function to "act as

the principal law office of all government-owned or

controlled corporations, their subsidiaries, other corporateoffsprings and government acquired asset corporations


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and . . . [to] exercise control and supervision over all legaldepartments or divisions maintained separately and such

powers and functions as are now or may hereafter be

provided by law." 13 The OGCC was therefore duty-boundto defend the PCSO because the latter, under its charter, 14

is a government-owned corporation. The government

counsel's representation extends to the concernedgovernment functionary's officers when the issue involves

the latter's official acts or duties. 15

Granting that upon his separation from the government,

Carrascoso ceased to be entitled to the legal services of the

government corporate counsel, this development does notautomatically revoke or render ineffective his notice ofappeal of the trial court's Decision. The filing of an

appellant's brief is not an absolute requirement for the

perfection of an appeal. 16 Besides, when noncompliancewith the Rules of Court is not intended for delay or does

not prejudice the adverse party, the dismissal of an appeal

on a mere technicality may be stayed and the court may, atits sound discretion, exercise its equity

jurisdiction. 17 The emerging trend in our jurisprudence is

to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity forthe proper and just determination of his cause, free from

the constraints of technicalities. 18

What is important is that Respondent Carrascoso filed his

notice of appeal on time and that his counsel before the

lower court, who was presumed to have continuedrepresenting him on appeal, 19 had filed an appeal brief onhis behalf. The Manifestation of Carrascoso before the

Court of Appeals that he intended to hire the services of

another counsel and to file his own brief did notipsofactoeffect a change of counsel under the existing rules of

procedure. The former counsel must first file a formal

petition withdrawing his appearance with the client'sconsent, and the newly appointed attorney should formallyenter his appearance before the appellate court with

notice to the adverse party. 20 But other than Carrascoso'smanifestation of his intention to hire a counsel of his own,

the requisites for a change of counsel were not fully

complied with. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, even aneffective change of attorney will not abrogate the

pleadings filed before the court by the former counsel.

All in all, we hold that the appellate court committed noreversible error in not dismissing the appeal, since this

matter was addressed to its sound discretion, and since

such discretion exercised reasonably in accordance withthe doctrine that cases should, as much as possible, be

decided on their merits.

ThirdIssue:

Scope ofthe Appeal

Before Respondent Court

Petitioner is correct in asserting that the entire RTCjudgment was not appealed to Respondent Court of

Appeals. The errors assigned in the appellants' Brief, as

quoted earlier, attacked only the trial court's (1)conclusion that "defendants-appellants acted in bad faith"

and (2) award of damages in favor of herein petitioner. In

short, only those parts relating to the second cause ofaction could be reviewed by the CA.

Respondent Court could not therefore reverse and setaside the RTC Decision in its entirety and dismiss the

original Complaint without trampling upon the rights that

had accrued to the petitioner from the unappealed portionof the Decision. It is well-settled that only the errorsassigned and properly argued in the brief, and those

necessarily related thereto, may be considered by the

appellate court in resolving an appeal in a civil case. 21 Theappellate court has no power to resolve unassigned errors,

except those that affect the court's jurisdiction over the

subject matter and those that are plain or clerical errors. 22

Having said that, we note, however, that Respondent Courtin its Decision effectively recognized the confines of theappeal, as it stated at the outset that "this appeal shall be

limited to the damages awarded in the [RTC] decision

other than the claims for race winning prizes." 23 Thedispositive portion of the Decision must be understood

together with the aforequoted statement that categorically

defined the scope of Respondent Court's review.Consequently, what the assailed Decision "reversed andset aside" was only that part of the appealed judgment

finding bad faith on the part of herein Private Respondent

Carrascoso and awarding damages to herein petitioner. Itdid not annul the trial court's order for Respondent PCSO

to pay Petitioner Cojuangco his racehorse winnings,

because this Order had never been assigned as an error

sought to be corrected.

On the contrary, Respondent PCSO had probably never

intended to further object to the payment, as it somanifested before the trial court24 in answer to Petitioner

Cojuangco's Motion 25 for the partial execution of thejudgment. In fact, on May 20, 1992, PCSO willingly and

readily paid the petitioner the principal amount of

P1,020,700 in accordance with the writ of execution issued

by the trial court on February 14, 1992. 26 Obviously andplainly, the RTC judgment, insofar as it related to the first

cause of action, had become final and no longer subject to

appeal.

In any event, the Court of Appeals' discussion regardingthe indispensability of the PCGG as a party-litigant to the

instant case was not pivotal to its reversal of the appealed

trial court Decision. It merely mentioned that the non-joinder of the PCGG made the Complaintvulnerable or

susceptible to dismissal. It did not rule that it was the veryground, or at least one of the legal grounds, it relied upon


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in setting aside the appealed judgment. It could not havelegally done so anyway, because the PCGG's role in the

controversy, if any, had never been an issue before the trial

court. Well-settled is the doctrine that no question, issue orargument will be entertained on appeal unless it has been

raised in the courta quo. 27

The aforementioned discussion should therefore be

construed only in light of the previous paragraphs relating

to Respondent Carrascoso's good faith which, the appellatecourt surmised, was indicated by his reliance on PCGG's

statements that the subject prize winnings of Petitioner

Cojuangco were part of the sequestered properties. Inother words, Respondent Court's view that the non-inclusion of PCGG as a party made the Complaint

dismissible was a mere aside that did not prejudice

petitioner.

Fourth Issue:

Damages

Petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erred inreversing the trial court's finding that Respondent

Carrascoso acted in bad faith in withholding his winnings.

We do not think so.

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple

negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some moral

obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of aknown duty due to some motive or interest or ill will that

partakes of the nature of fraud.28

We do not believe that the above judicially settled nature

of bad faith characterized the questioned acts of

Respondent Carrascoso. On the contrary, we believe thatthere is sufficient evidence on record to supportRespondent Court's conclusion that he did not act in bad

faith. It reasoned, and we quote with approval: 29

A close examination of the June 10, 1986 letter of

defendant Carrascoso to Jovito Salonga, then Chairman of

the Presidential Commission on Good Government, readilydisplay uncertainties in the mind of Chairman Carrascoso

as to the extent of the sequestration against the propertiesof the plaintiff. In the said letter (Exhibit "1") the first prizefor the March 16, 1986 draw and the second prize for the

June 8, 1986 draw, were, in the meantime, being withheld

to "avoidany possible violation ofyour sequestration order

on the matter" because while he is aware of the

sequestration order issued against the properties of

defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, he is not aware of theextent and coverage thereof. It was for that reason that, inthe same letter, defendant Carrascoso requested for a

clarification whether the prizes are covered by the order

and if it is in the affirmative, for instructions on the proper

disposal of the two (2) prizes taking into account the

shares of the trainer and the groom.

Correspondingly, in a letter dated June 13, 1986 (Exhibit

2) PCGG Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz authorized the

payment to the trainer and the groom but instructed the

withholding of the amounts due plaintiff EduardoCojuangco. This piece of evidence should be understood

and appreciated in the light of the circumstances

prevailing at the time. PCGG was just a newly born legalcreation and "sequestration" was a novel remedy which

even legal luminaries were not sure as to the actual

procedure, the correct approach and the manner how thepowers of the said newly created office should beexercised and the remedy of sequestration properly

implemented without violating due process of law. To the

mind of their newly installed power, the immediateconcern is to take over and freeze all properties of former

President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate families,

close associates and cronies. There is no denying thatplaintiff is a very close political and business associate of

the former President. Under those equivocalities,

defendant Carrascoso could not be faulted in askingfurther instructions from the PCGG, the official

government agency on the matter, on what to do with the

prize winnings of the plaintiff, and more so, to obey theinstructions subsequently given. The actions taken may bea hard blow on plaintiff but defendant Carrascoso had no

alternative. It was the safest he could do in order to protect

public interest, act within the powers of his position andserve the public demands then prevailing. More

importantly, it was the surest way to avoid a possible

complaint for neglect of duty or misfeasance of office or ananti-graft case against him.

xxx xxx xxx

Moreover, the finding of bad faith against defendantCarrascoso is overshadowed by the evidences showing his

good faith. He was just recently appointed chairman of thePCGG when he received the first demand for the collection

of the prize for the March 16, 1986 race which he promptlyanswered saying he was under instructions by the PCGG to

withhold such payment. But the moment he received the

go signal from the PCGG that the prize winnings of plaintiff

Cojuangco could already be released, he immediatelyinformed the latter thereof, interposed no objection to the

execution pending appeal relative thereto, in fact, actually

paid off all the winnings due the plaintiff. . . .

Carrascoso's decision to withhold petitioner's winningscould not be characterized as arbitrary or whimsical, or

even the product of ill will or malice. He had particularly

sought from PCGG a clarification of the extent andcoverage of the sequestration order issued against the

properties of petitioner. 30 He had acted upon the PCGG'sstatement that the subject prizes were part of those


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covered by the sequestration order and its instruction "tohold in a proper bank deposits [sic] earning interest the

amount due Mr. Cojuangco." 31 Besides, EO 2 had just been

issued by then President Aquino," freez[ing] all assets andproperties in the Philippines [of] former President Marcos

and/or his wife, . . . their close friends, subordinates,

business associates . . ."; and enjoining the "transfer,encumbrance, concealment, or dissipation [thereof], under

pain of such penalties as prescribed by law." It cannot,

therefore, be said that Respondent Carrascoso, who reliedupon these issuances, acted with malice or bad faith.

The extant rule is that a public officer shall not be liable byway of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in theperformance of official duties, unless there is a clear

showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence. 32

Attorney's fees and expenses of litigation cannot beimposed either, in the absence of a clear showing of any of

the grounds provided therefor under the Civil Code. 33 The

trial court's award of these kinds of damages mustperforce be deleted, as ruled by the Court of Appeals.

Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the petitioner and thetrial that Respondent Carrascoso may still be held liable

under Article 32 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any privateindividual, who directly or indirectly obstruct, defeats,

violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of thefollowing rights and liberties of another person shall be

liable to the latter for damages:

xxx xxx xxx

(6) The rights against deprivation of property without due

process of law;

xxx xxx xxx

InAberca v. Ver, 34 this Court explained the nature and the

purpose of this article as follows:

It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provisionis to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and

freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message isclear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with

impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and

political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield borrowing the words of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is

necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and

liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to thetransient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power.

The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our

commitment to democratic principles and to the rule oflaw compels us to reject the view which reduces law to

nothing but the expression of the will of the predominantpower in the community. "Democracy cannot be a reign of

progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is respected

by him who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Nowthis respect implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of

idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter, we discover

that life demands of us a certain residuum of sentimentwhich is not derived from reason, but which reason

nevertheless controls." 35

Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the

public officer acted with malice or bad faith. 36 To be liable,

it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutionalrights of petitioner, even on the pretext of justifiable

motives or good faith in the performance of one's duties. 37

We hold that petitioner's right to the use of his propertywas unduly impeded. While Respondent Carrascoso may

have relied upon the PCGG's instructions, he could have

further sought the specific legal basis therefor. A littleexercise of prudence would have disclosed that there was

no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of theracehorse winnings of petitioner. There was apparently norecord of any such writ covering his racehorses either. The

issuance of a sequestration order requires the showing of a

primafacie case and due regard for the requirements ofdue process. 38 The withholding of the prize winnings of

petitioner without a properly issued sequestration order

clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without

due process of law.

Art. 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of

nominal damages to a plaintiff whose right has beenviolated or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of

vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifyingthe plaintiff for any loss suffered. 39 The court may also

award nominal damages in every case where a property

right has been invaded. 40 The amount of such damages isaddressed to the sound discretion of the court, with the

relevant circumstances taken into account. 41

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partially GRANTED.

The assailed Decision, as herein clarified, is AFFIRMEDwith the MODIFICATION that Private Respondent

Fernando O. Carrascoso Jr. is ORDERED TO PAY petitioner

nominal damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos(P50,000). No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, Purisima andGonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Romero, J., abroadon official business.

Footnotes


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1 Rollo, pp. 59-68.

2 Fourteenth Division composed of J. Conrado Vasquez Jr.(ponente), with JJ. Jorge S. Imperial (chairman) and Pacita

Caizares-Nye (member) concurring.

3 Rollo, pp. 59-60.

4 Rollo, p. 70.

5 Assailed Decision, p. 4; rollo, p. 59.

6 Rollo, pp. 63-65.

7 Ibid., p. 78.

8 Ibid., p; 61.


10 Ibid., pp. 10 & 68.

11 This case was deemed submitted for resolution onDecember 21, 1998, upon receipt by this Court of PrivateRespondent Carrascoso's Memorandum. The memos of the

other parties had been received earlier.

12 Petitioner's Memorandum, p. 10.

13 10, Chap. 3, Title III, Book IV of EO 292. Administrative

Order No. 130 dated May 19, 1994, further provides:

Sec. 1. All legal matters pertaining to government-owned

or controlled corporations, their subsidiaries, other

corporate offsprings and government acquired assetcorporations (hereinafter collectively referred to as

"GOCCs") shall be exclusively referred to and handled by

the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel . . . .

See also Confederation of Unions in Government

Corporations and Offices v. Subido, 32 SCRA 394, April 30,

1970.

14 RA 1169, as amended.

15 Cf. Alinsug v. RTC Br. 8, San Carlos City, 225 SCRA 553,August 23, 1993, in which the Court enumerated incidents

when a government official may secure the services of a

private counsel.

16 See People v. Manambit, 271 SCRA 344, April 18, 1997;

Foralan v. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 176, February 7,1995; Labitad v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 434, July 17,

1995.1wphi1.nt

17 Paraaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,

268 SCRA 727, 738, February 26, 1997.

18 Dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 444, 455,

October 10, 1997.

19 22, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

20 22 & 26, ibid. Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA413, July 14, 1997; Nacuray v. NLRC, 270 SCRA 9, March

18, 1997.

21 Solid Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 267,

July 8, 1997; Garrido v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 450,

September 14, 1994.

22 Bella v. Court of Appeals, 279 SCRA 497, September 26,

1997.


24 See Manifestations dated February 4 and May 25, 1992;

rollo, pp. 76 & 80.

25 Rollo, p. 71.

26 Ibid., p. 78.

27 Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 527, June 20,

1997.

28 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals,267 SCRA 557, February 6, 1997; Ford Philippines, Inc. v.

Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 320, February 3, 1997.

29 Assailed Decision, pp. 7-9; rollo, pp. 65-67.

30 Letter of the PCSO chairman to the PCGG dated June 10,

1986; records, p. 26.

31 Reply of the PCGG dated June 13, 1986; records, p. 28.

32 38 (1), Chap. 9, Book I, Administrative Code of 1987.

Suarez v. Commission on Audit, GR No. 131077, August 7,1998; Yulo v. Civil Service Commission, 219 SCRA 470,March 3, 1993; Orocio v. Commission on Audit, 213 SCRA

109, August 31, 1992; Chavez v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA282, January 24, 1991; Ynot v. IAC, 148 SCRA 659, March

20, 1987.

33 Art. 2208 of the Civil Code allows the recovery of

attorney's fees and expenses of litigation only in the

following instances:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;


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(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelledthe plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur

expenses to protect his interest;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the

plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or

proceeding against the plaintiff;

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad

faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just

and demandable claim;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household

helpers, laborers and skilled workers;

(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's

compensation and employer's liability laws;

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising

from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and

equitable . . . .

34 160 SCRA 590, 601, April 15, 1988; per Yap, J.

35 Ibid., quoting Joseph Charmont, French Legal

Philosophy, 1921 ed., pp.; 72-73.

36 Arturo M. Tolentino, Civil Code of the PhilippinesCommentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. I, 1990 ed., pp. 129-

130. See also Jose C. Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and

Jurisprudence, 1993 ed., p. 22.

37 Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299, 309, August 29,

1975; citing Dean Jorge Bocobo, chairman of the CodeCommission, The Lawyers' Journal, Vol. XVI, No. 5, p. 258

(May 31, 1951). See also Better Buildings, Inc. v. NLRC, 283SCRA 242, December 15, 1997.

38 BASECO v. PCGG, 150 SCRA 181, 215-216, May 27,

1987.

39 Areola v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 643, 654,September 22, 1994; Citytrust Banking Corporation v. IAC,

232 SCRA 559, 565, May 27, 1994; Sumalpong v. Court ofAppeals, 268 SCRA 764, 775, February 26, 1997; Better

Buildings v. NLRC, supra.

40 Art, 2222, Civil Code.

41 Art. 2216, ibid.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 123045 November 16, 1999

DEMETRIO R. TECSON, petitioner,

vs.SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of theRules of Court, seeks to nullify the Decision dated June 30,

1995 and the Resolution dated December 20, 1995 of theSandiganbayan, First Division, in Criminal Case No. 18273.

Petitioner was found guilty of violating Section 3[c] of R.A.

No. 3019, in the assailed decision which reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Demetrio Tecson y Roblesguilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime defined in

Section 3[c] of Republic Act 3019 and charged in the

Information. Accordingly, the Court imposes upon him thepenalty of imprisonment of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1)

MONTH, and perpetual disqualification from public office.No civil indemnity is awarded for the reason that Tecsonand Mrs. Salvacion D. Luzana entered into a compromise

agreement waiving his/her claims against the other.

So Ordered. 1

Petitioner was, at the time of the commission of the offense

charged in the Information, the Municipal Mayor ofProsperidad, Agusan del Sur.

Private complainant before the Sandiganbayan, Mrs.

Salvacion Luzana, is a resident of Poblacion, Prosperidad,

Agusan del Sur. She is a neighbor of the petitioner. Sheclaims to be a housewife who occasionally dabbles in

farming. 2

The antecedent facts, which gave rise to the instant case,

were synthesized by the Sandiganbayan as follows:


9/41

In the last week of September 1989, upon the offer ofTecson, he and Mrs. Luzana agreed to engage in an

investment business. They would sell tickets at P100.00

each which after 30 days would earn P200.00 or more. Shewould buy appliances and cosmetics at a discount, with the

use of the proceeds of the sales of tickets, and resell them.

No other details were disclosed on how the businesswould operate, and Tecson does not appear to have

contributed any monetary consideration to the capital. On

September 27, 1989, they began selling tickets.

Tecson also acted as agent selling tickets. He got on that

day early in the morning two booklets of tickets, for whichhe signed the covers of the booklets to acknowledgereceipt. Before noon of the same day he returned after

having already sold 40 tickets in the amount of P4,000.00,

bringing with him a Mayor's Permit in the name of Mrs.Luzana for their business called "LD Assurance Privileges."

He asked for a cash advance of P4,000.00 which he would

use during the fiesta on September 29, 1989, and he wouldnot release the Mayor's Permit unless the cash advance

was given him. Mrs. Luzana reluctantly acceded, saying

that it was not the due date yet, so he was getting the cash

advances on his share. Tecson signed for the cash advance.

On October 3, 1989, Mrs. Luzana secured a BusinessPermit in accordance with the instructions of Tecson. The

permit was in her name but the same was for the

operation of "Prosperidad Investment and Sub-Dealership," the new name of the business. In the sessionof the Sangguniang Bayan of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur

on October 17, 1989 presided over by Tecson, Resolution

No. 100 was passed revoking the business permit at theinstance of the Provincial Director of the Department of

Trade and Industry. 3

With the revocation of her business permit, private

complainant below filed an administrative case againstpetitioner, for violation of Section 3 [c], R.A. No. 3019 and

Section 60 of B.P. Blg. 337 (then Local Government Code)with the Department of Interior and Local Government

(DILG). The complaint was docketed as Adm. Case No. SP-90-01 and referred to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of

Agusan del Sur for appropriate action.

Not content with having instituted administrativeproceedings, private complainant below also filed a civil

case against petitioner for damages with the Regional TrialCourt, Branch 6, of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur. This

action was docketed as Civil Case No. 716.

A complaint was likewise filed with the Ombudsman for

violation of R.A. No. 3019, otherwise known as the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." This complaint wasdocketed as OMB Case No. 3-8-02919. It was subsequently

referred to the Sandiganbayan, which took jurisdiction.

The Information filed on October 28, 1992 reads:

That on or about September 23, 1989, in the Municipalityof Prosperidad, Province of Agusan del Sur, Philippines,

and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the

above-named accused, a public officer, being then theMunicipal Mayor of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur, while in

the performance of his administrative and official

functions and committing the offense in relation to hisoffice, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and

criminally request and receive for his benefit the amount

of P4,000.00, for and in consideration of the issuance of apermit to operate an investment business, in favor of oneSalvacion Luzana, a person for whom the accused has in

fact received and obtained a mayor's permit or license.

Contrary to law. 4

On July 29, 1991, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Agusan

del Sur dismissed the administrative case.

On October 28, 1991, a compromise agreement wasreached between the litigants in Civil Case No. 716. The

trial court approved the same on December 6, 1991.

On November 3, 1992, the Sandiganbayan issued an order

for petitioner's arrest. He was immediately apprehended,but after posting a property bond on December 2, 1992,

was released on provisional liberty.

On February 23, 1993, Tecson was arraigned with the

assistance of counsel de parte. He entered a plea of "not

guilty." Trial then proceeded on the merits.

On June 30, 1995, the Sandiganbayan, First Divisionrendered the assailed decision convicting appellant of

violating R.A. No. 3019. Petitioner seasonably filed a

motion for reconsideration. The respondent court deniedthe same in its resolution dated December 20, 1995.

Hence, this instant petition. Petitioner contends that:

THE RESPONDENT COURT/SANDIGANBAYAN (1ST

DIVISION) GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION,TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION

A- IN RULING UNREASONABLY THAT THE GUILT OF THEACCUSED HAD BEEN PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE

DOUBT DESPITE THE CLEAR AND CONVINCINGTESTIMONY OF THE NBI EXPERT SHOWING THAT THE

DOCUMENTS PRESENTED BY COMPLAINANTS AND

SUBJECTED FOR EXAMINATION BY NBI ARE DIFFERENTFROM THE HANDWRITING OF THE ACCUSED, AND

THEREFORE FABRICATED.

B- IN PROCEEDING WITH THE TRIAL AND CONVICTION

DESPITE THE EXISTENCE OF JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL


10/41

RENDERED BY THE SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN

EXONERATING THE ACCUSED.

C- IN IGNORING THE DOCTRINE OF RES JUDICATA AND

THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS OF DOUBLE

JEOPARDY. 5

Otherwise stated, the issues are:

(1) Whether or not the decision of the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan exonerating the accused serves as a bar by

prior judgment to the decision of the Sandiganbayan;

(2) Whether or not there was a violation of theConstitutional right of the accused against double

jeopardy; and

(3) Whether or not the guilt of the petitioner was proven

beyond reasonable doubt.

The issues shall be discussed in seriatim.

Anent thefirstissue, petitioner contends that the dismissalof the administrative case before the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur is conclusive and binding

upon the parties. Relying on our ruling in B.F. GoodrichPhilippines, Inc. v. Workmen's Compensation Commission, 6

he theorizes that the rule, which prohibits the reopening of

matters already determined by competent judicialauthority, applies to quasi-judicialbodies or administrative

offices. Having been exonerated by the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur in the administrative case,he now submits the same is res judicata and thus bars the

Sandiganbayan from hearing his case.

Petitioner's theory has no leg to stand on. First, it must bepointed out thatres judicata is a doctrine of civil law. 7 It

thus has no bearing in the criminal proceedings before the

Sandiganbayan. Second, it is a basic principle of the law onpublic officers that a public official or employee is under a

three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a

wrongful act or omission. This simply means that a publicofficer may be held civilly, criminally, and administrativelyliable for a wrongful doing. Thus, if such violation or

wrongful act results in damages to an individual, the publicofficer may be held civillyliable to reimburse the injured

party. If the law violated attaches a penal sanction, the

erring officer may be punished criminally. Finally, suchviolation may also lead to suspension, removal from office,or other administrative sanctions. This administrative

liability is separate and distinct from the penal and civil

liabilities. Thus, the dismissal of an administrative casedoes not necessarily bar the filing of a criminal

prosecution for the same or similar acts, which were the

subject of the administrative complaint. 8 We conclude,therefore, that the decision of the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur exonerating petitioner inAdministrative Case No. SP 90-01 is no bar to the criminal

prosecution before the Sandiganbayan.

As to the amicable settlement in Civil Case No. 716 with

the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, of Prosperidad, Agusan

del Sur, it is settled that a complaint for misconduct,malfeasance or misfeasance against a public officer or

employee cannot just be withdrawn at any time by the

complainant. This is because there is a need to maintainthe faith and confidence of the people in the government

and its agencies and instrumentalities. 9 The inescapable

conclusion, therefore, is that the order of the trial courtdismissing Civil Case No. 716 did not bar the proceedings

before the Sandiganbayan.

Regarding the secondissue, petitioner contends that beingtried before the Sandiganbayan violated his constitutional

protection against double jeopardy since the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur had already cleared him ofall charges.

Art. III, Section 21 of the Constitution provides:

No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment forthe same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an

ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall

constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Double jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a validindictment; (2) before a competent court; (3) after

arraignment; (4) when a valid plea has been entered; and

(5) when the defendant was acquitted or convicted or thecase was dismissed or otherwise terminated without theexpress consent of the accused. 10 None of the foregoing

applies to the hearings conducted by the Sangguniang

Panlalawigan of Agusan del Sur in Adm. Case No. SP 90-01.It must be stressed that the said proceedings were not

criminal, but administrative in nature. Hence, double

jeopardy will not lie.

With respect to the thirdissue, petitioner argues that the

Sandiganbayan erred in merely relying upon the allegedpositive testimony of the prosecutions witnesses when it

rendered the judgment of conviction against him. Hetheorizes that such testimony failed to prove his guiltbeyond reasonable doubt. He further contends that it was

error for the respondent court to ignore the findings and

conclusions of the NBI handwriting expert, especially as ofthe nine standard signatures, five were not established tobe genuine signatures. He submits that the Sandiganbayan

should have applied the rule offalsus in uno,falsus in

omnibus in considering the documentary evidence against

him.

Sec. 3 of R.A. No. 3019 states:


11/41

In addition to acts or omissions of public officers alreadypenalized by existing law, the following shall constitute

corrupt practices of any public officer and hereby declared

to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

c. Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift,

present, or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himselfor for another, from any person for whom the publicofficer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained,

or will secure or obtain, any government permit or license

in consideration for the help given or to be given, without

prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.

The crime charged has four elements, namely:

(1) The accused is a public officer;

(2) That in any manner or capacity he secured or obtained,or would secure or obtain, for a person any government

permit or license;

(3) That he directly or indirectly requested or receivedfrom said person any gift, present or other pecuniary or

material benefit for himself or for another; and

(4) That he requested or received the gift, present or other

pecuniary or material benefit in consideration for the help

given or to be given.

As correctly pointed out by the Sandiganbayan, all of theaforementioned elements concur in the instant case. Its

findings on this concurrence are as follows:

First, Tecson was in September 1989 a public officer, being

then the Municipal Mayor of Prosperidad, Agusan del Sur.

Second, in his official capacity as Mayor, he signed and

issued on September 27, 1989, a Mayor's Permit to and inthe name of Mrs. Luzana for their investment business in

which he does not appear to have made any contribution

to the capital.

Third, before he released the Mayor's Permit to Mrs.

Luzana, he requested and received on that same day,September 27, 1989, at about 11:00 a.m., the amount ofP4,000.00 to be used by him in the fiesta to be held on

September 29, 1989.

And,fourth, Tecson requested and received the amount of

P4,000.00 as cash advance in consideration of the help hegaveviz, issuance of Mayor's Permit which he would not

deliver to Mrs. Luzana unless she acceded to his request.

Although Tecson expected to have a share in the profits ofthe business as partner of Mrs. Luzana, the same was not

yet due. In fact, there was as yet no profits to speak of, forthey began operating only in the morning of September 27,

1989, the very day the cash advance was requested and

received. 11

The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts 12 and the factual

findings of the Sandiganbayan are conclusive upon theSupreme Court. The exceptions are: (1) where the

conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,

surmise and conjectures; (2) where the inference made ismanifestly mistaken; (3) where there is grave abuse of

discretion; (4) where the judgment is based on

misapprehension of facts, and the findings of fact of theSandiganbayan are premised on the absence of evidenceand are contradicted by evidence on record. 13 We have

meticulously scrutinized the records of this case and find

that petitioner has shown no cause for this Court to applyany of the foregoing exceptions. We find that the evidence

on record amply supports the findings and conclusions of

the respondent court.

Petitioner's assault on the credibility of the prosecutionwitnesses is unavailing. It is a time-tested doctrine that thetrial court's assessment of the credibility of a witness is

entitled to great weight and is even conclusive and binding

upon appellate courts. 14 The Supreme Court will notinterfere with the trial court's assessment of the credibility

of the witnesses, absent any indication or showing that the

trial court has overlooked some material facts or hasgravely abused its discretion. 15 Absent a showing that theprosecution witnesses were actuated by any improper

motive, their testimony is entitled to full faith and

credit. 16 Recourse to the records shows that no error oflaw or abuse of discretion was committed by the

respondent court when it gave credence to the positive

testimony of the prosecution's witnesses as opposed topetitioner's bare denials. Denial, like alibi, is a weakdefense, which becomes even weaker in the face of

positive testimony by prosecution witnesses. 17 Denial is aself-serving negative evidence that cannot be given greater

weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who

testified on affirmative matters. 18 Time-tested is the rulethat between the positive assertions of prosecutionwitnesses and the negative averments of the accused, the

former indisputably deserves more credence and is

entitled to greater evidentiary weight. 19

With regards the NBI expert's testimony, the respondent

court found that:

[T]he function of a handwriting expert witness is "to placebefore the court data upon which the court can form its

own opinion." "The value of the opinions of experts on

handwritings depends largely upon the ground uponwhich they base their opinions and clearness with which

they can demonstrate their correctness." So that "in orderthat opinions of experts may have weight, the experts


12/41

should go into the details of their examinations of the

writings which they have compared."

In this case Cruz was not asked to testify on the grounds,

data or details on which he based his conclusion, except

generally that the questioned signatures were written in "a

slow drawn manner" while the standard signatures wereexecuted in a "free and continuous manner" and that there

is a pen stop in the questioned signatures in the letter "s."

He did not testify on other different characteristics such aspressure of the pen, loops in the strokes, general

alignment, structural formation, height of the letters,

whether the letters were standing, slanting forward orbackward, etc. His testimony is therefore not of much helpin determining the genuineness of the questioned

signatures. 20

Given these circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the

doctrine offalsus in uno,falsus in omnibus will be

unavailing. The maxim is a rule of evidence. In affirming arebuttable presumption of fact, the trier of facts, must

consider all the evidence, other than that found to be falseand it is his duty to give effect to so much of it, if any, asfound to be true. 21 The rule is merely permissive and not

mandatory. 22 It does not relieve the trier of facts from

passing on credibility of the whole testimony or evidencepresented or excuse him from weighing the whole of the

testimony or evidence. 23 In the instant case, the records

show that the Sandiganbayan, as the trier of facts,considered the entirety of the evidence against appellantand the latter's conviction was not based solely on the

genuineness of the signatures testified to by the NBI

expert. The elements of the offense charged having beenproven beyond reasonable doubt, petitioner's conviction

must therefore stand.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED, and the

assailed Decision and Resolution of the Sandiganbayan inCriminal Case No. 18273 are AFFIRMED. Costs against

petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena andDe Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Records, p. 192.

2 TSN, February 7, 1994, p. 3.

3 Rollo, pp. 36-37.

4 Records, p. 1.

5 Rollo, p. 9.

6 159 SCRA 355 (1988).

7 Epstein v. Soskin, 86 Misc. Rep. 94, 148 N.Y.S. 323, 324.

8 Paredes, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, Second Division, 252 SCRA

641, 657 (1996).

9 Estreller v. Manatad, Jr., 268 SCRA 608, 616 (1997).

10 People v. Leviste, 255 SCRA 238, 249 (1996); Dela Rosa

v. Court of Appeals, 253 SCRA 499, 506 (1996).

11 Records, pp. 189-190.

12 Macapagal v. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 110610,

October 8, 1998, p. 8; Silverio v. Court of Appeals, et al.,G.R. No. 113851, October 8, 1998, p. 8.

13 Pareo v. Sandiganbayan, 256 SCRA 242, 265 (1996).

14 People v. Barredo, G.R. No. 122850, October 7, 1998, p.

11.

15 People v. Gado, G.R. No. 129556, November 11, 1998, p.

4.

16 Amper v. Sandiganbayan, 279 SCRA 434, 441 (1997).

17 People v. Lapay, et al., G.R. No. 123072, October 14,

1998, pp. 20-21.

18 People v. Carizo, 233 SCRA 687, 701 (1994).

19 Abadilla v. Tabiliran, Jr., 249 SCRA 447, 464 (1995).

20 Records, pp. 186-187.

21 Levine Bros, v. Mantell, 30 W.Va. 156, 111 SE 501;

Shecil v. United States, 226 F. 184.

22 Banker's Health & Life Ins. Co. v. Nichols, 44 Ga. App.

536, 162 SE 161.

23 Stale v. Willard, 346 Mo. 773, 142 SW2d 1046, 1047.

EN BANC


13/41

[G.R. No. 131012. April 21, 1999]

HON. RICARDO T. GLORIA, in his capacity as Secretary ofthe Department of Education, Culture, and Sports,

petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AMPARO A. ABAD,

VIRGILIA M. BANDIGAS, ELIZABETH A. SOMEBANG and

NICANOR MARGALLO, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA,J.:

This case arose out of the unfortunate strikes and walk-

outs staged by public school teachers on different dates inSeptember and October 1990. The illegality of the strikes

was declared in our 1991 decision in Manila Public SchoolTeachers Association v. Laguio, Jr., but many incidents ofthose strikes are still to be resolved. At issue in this case isthe right to back salaries of teachers who were either

dismissed or suspended because they did not report for

work but who were eventually ordered reinstated becausethey had not been shown to have taken part in the strike,

although reprimanded for being absent without leave.

The facts are as follows:

Private respondents are public school teachers. Onvarious dates in September and October 1990, during the

teachers strikes, they did not report for work. For this

reason, they were administratively charged with (1)grave misconduct, (2) gross neglect of duty, (3) gross

violation of Civil Service Law Rules and Regulations andreasonable office regulations, (4) refusal to perform officialduty, (5) gross insubordination, (6) conduct prejudicial to

the best interest of the service, and (7) absence without

leave (AWOL), and placed under preventive suspension.The investigation was concluded before the lapse of their90-day suspension and private respondents were found

guilty as charged. Respondent Nicanor Margallo was

ordered dismissed from the service effective October 29,1990, while respondents Amparo Abad, Virgilia Bandigas,

and Elizabeth Somebang were ordered suspended for six

months effective December 4, 1990.

Respondent Margallo appealed to the Merit Systems andProtection Board (MSPB) which found him guilty ofconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and

imposed on him a six-month suspension. The other

respondents also appealed to the MSPB, but their appealwas dismissed because of their failure to file their appeal

memorandum on time.

On appeal, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) affirmed the

decision of the MSPB with respect to Margallo, but found

the other three (Abad, Bandigas, and Somebang) guiltyonly of violation of reasonable office rules and regulations

by failing to file applications for leave of absence and,therefore, reduced the penalty imposed on them to

reprimand and ordered them reinstated to their former

positions.

Respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 in

this Court. Pursuant to Revised Administrative Circular No.1-95, the case was referred to the Court of Appeals which,

on September 3, 1996, rendered a decision (1) affirming

the decision of the CSC with respect to Amparo Abad,Virgilia Bandigas, and Elizabeth Somebang but (2)

reversing it insofar as the CSC ordered the suspension of

Nicanor Margallo. The appellate court found him guilty ofviolation of reasonable office rules and regulations only

and imposed on him the penalty of reprimand.

Private respondents moved for a reconsideration,contending that they should be exonerated of all charges

against them and that they be paid salaries during their

suspension. In its resolution, dated July 15, 1997, theCourt of Appeals, while maintaining its finding that private

respondents were guilty of violation of reasonable officerules and regulations for which they should bereprimanded, ruled that private respondents were entitled

to the payment of salaries during their suspension beyond

ninety (90) days. Accordingly, the appellate courtamended the dispositive portion of its decision to read as

follows:

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petition is

hereby DENIED. CSC Resolution Nos. 93-2302 dated June

24, 1993 and 93-3124 dated August 10, 1993 (In re:

Amparo Abad), CSC Resolution Nos. 93-2304 dated June24, 1993 and 93-3227 dated August 17, 1993 (In re:

Virgilia Bandigas) and CSC Resolution Nos. 93-2301undated and 93-3125 dated August 10, 1993 (In re:

Elizabeth Somebang) are hereby AFFIRMED while CSC

Resolution Nos. 93-2211 dated June 21, 1993 are herebyMODIFIED finding petitioner Nicanor Margallo guilty of a

lesser offense of violation of reasonable office rules andregulations and meting upon him the penalty of

reprimand. Respondent DECS is ordered to paypetitioners Amparo Abad, Virgilia Bandigas, Elizabeth

Somebang and Nicanor Margallo their salaries, allowances

and other benefits during the period of their

suspension/dismissal beyond the ninety (90) daypreventive suspension. No pronouncement as to costs.

Petitioner Ricardo T. Gloria, then Secretary of Education,

Culture, and Sports, moved for a reconsideration insofar asthe resolution of the Court of Appeals ordered the paymentof private respondents salaries during the period of their

appeal. His motion was, however, denied by the appellate

court in its resolution of October 6, 1997. Hence, this

petition for review on certiorari.


14/41

Petitioner contends that the administrative investigationof respondents was concluded within the 90-day period of

preventive suspension, implying that the continued

suspension of private respondents is due to their appeal,hence, the government should not be held answerable for

payment of their salaries. Moreover, petitioner lays so

much store by the fact that, under the law, privaterespondents are considered under preventive suspension

during the period of their appeal and, for this reason, are

not entitled to the payment of their salaries during theirsuspension.

Petitioners contentions have no merit.

I. Preventive Suspension and the Right to Compensation in Case of Exoneration

The present Civil Service Law is found in Book V, Title I,

Subtitle A of the Administrative Code of 1987 (E.O. 292).So far as pertinent to the questions in this case, the law

provides:

SEC. 47. Disciplinary Jurisdiction. -

. . . .

(2) The Secretaries and heads of agencies and

instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities shallhave jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters

involving disciplinary action against officers and

employees under their jurisdiction. Their decisions shallbe final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not

more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceedingthirty days salary. In case the decision rendered by abureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the

same may be initially appealed to the department and

finally to the Commission and pending appeal, the sameshall be executory except when the penalty is removal, inwhich case the same shall be executory only after

confirmation by the Secretary concerned.

. . . .

(4) An appeal shall not stop the decision from beingexecutory, and in case the penalty is suspension or

removal, the respondent shall be considered as havingbeen under preventive suspension during the pendency of

the appeal in the event he wins an appeal.

SEC. 51. Preventive Suspension. - The proper disciplining

authority may preventively suspend any subordinate

officer or employee under his authority pending aninvestigation, if the charge against such officer oremployee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave

misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if

there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of

charges which would warrant his removal from the

service.

SEC. 52. Lifting ofPreventive Suspension. Pending

Administrative Investigation. - When the administrative

case against the officer or employee under preventive

suspension is not finally decided by the discipliningauthority within the period of ninety (90) days after the

date of suspension of the respondent who is not a

presidential appointee, the respondent shall beautomatically reinstated in the service: Provided, That

when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the

fault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the periodof delay shall not be counted in computing the period of

suspension herein provided.

There are thus two kinds of preventive suspension of civilservice employees who are charged with offenses

punishable by removal or suspension: (1) preventive

suspension pending investigation (51) and (2)preventive suspension pending appeal if the penalty

imposed by the disciplining authority is suspension ordismissal and, after review, the respondent is exonerated

(47(4)).

Preventive suspension pending investigation is not a

penalty. It is a measure intended to enable the discipliningauthority to investigate charges against respondent by

preventing the latter from intimidating or in any wayinfluencing witnesses against him. If the investigation is

not finished and a decision is not rendered within that

period, the suspension will be lifted and the respondent

will automatically be reinstated. If after investigationrespondent is found innocent of the charges and is

exonerated, he should be reinstated.

A. No Right to Compensation for Preventive Suspension Pending Investigation Even if

Employee is Exonerated

Is he entitled to the payment of salaries during the periodof suspension? As already stated, the Court of Appealsordered the DECS to pay private respondents their

salaries, allowances, and other benefits beyond the ninety

(90) day preventive suspension. In other words, nocompensation was due for the period of the preventive

suspension pending investigation but only for the periodof preventive suspension pending appeal in the event the

employee is exonerated.

The separate opinion of Justice Panganiban argues that theemployee concerned should be paid his salaries after his

suspension.

The Civil Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) provided for

the payment of such salaries in case of exoneration. Sec.

35 read:


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Sec. 35. Lifting ofPreventive Suspension Pending

Administrative Investigation. - When the administrative

case against the officer or employee under preventive

suspension is not finally decided by the Commissioner ofCivil Service within the period of sixty (60) days after the

date of suspension of the respondent, the respondent shall

be reinstated in the service. If the respondent officer oremployee is exonerated, he shall be restored to his

position with full pay for the period of suspension.

However, the law was revised in 1975 and the provision

on the payment of salaries during suspension was deleted.

Sec. 42 of the Civil Service Decree (P.D. No. 807) read:

Sec. 42. Lifting ofPreventive Suspension Pending

Administrative Investigation. - When the administrativecase against the officer or employee under preventivesuspension is not finally decided by the disciplining

authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the

date of suspension of the respondent who is not apresidential appointee, the respondent shall be

automatically reinstated in the service; Provided, Thatwhen the delay in the disposition of the case is due to thefault, negligence or petition of the respondent, the period

of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of

suspension herein provided.

This provision was reproduced in 52 of the present Civil

Service Law. It is noteworthy that the Ombudsman Act of1989 (R.A. No. 6770) categorically provides that

preventive suspension shall be without pay. Sec. 24

reads:

Sec. 24. Preventive Suspension. The Ombudsman or hisDeputy may preventively suspend any officer or employee

under his authority pending an investigation, if in hisjudgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and (a) the charge

against such officer or employee involves dishonesty,oppression or grave misconduct or neglect in the

performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant

removal from the service; or (c) the respondentscontinued stay in office may prejudice the case filed

against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is

terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not morethan six months, without pay, except when the delay in thedisposition of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is

due to the fault, negligence or petition of the respondent,

in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted

in computing the period of suspension herein provided.

It is clear that the purpose of the amendment is to disallowthe payment of salaries for the period of suspension. This

conclusion is in accord with the rule of statutory

construction that -

As a rule, the amendment by deletion of certain words orphrases in a statute indicates that the legislature intended

to change the meaning of the statute, for the presumption

is that the legislature would not have made the deletionhad the intention been not in effect a change in its

meaning. The amended statute should accordingly be

given a construction different from that previous to itsamendment.

The separate opinion of Justice Panganiban pays no heedto the evident legislative intent to deny payment of salaries

for the preventive suspension pending investigation.

First, it says that to deny compensation for the period of

preventive suspension would be to reverse the course of

decisions ordering the payment of salaries for suchperiod. However, the cases cited are based either on theformer rule which expressly provided that if the

respondent officer or employee is exonerated, he shall be

restored to his position with full pay for the period ofsuspension or that upon subsequent reinstatement of the

suspended person or upon his exoneration, if death shouldrender reinstatement impossible, any salary so withheldshall be paid, or on cases which do not really support the

proposition advanced.

Second, it is contended that the exoneration of employeeswho have been preventively suspended is proof that there

was no reason at all to suspend them and thus makes their

preventive suspension a penalty.

The principle governing entitlement to salary during

suspension is cogently stated in Floyd R. MechemsA

Treatise on the Law ofPublic Offices andOfficers as follows:

864. Officer not entitled to Salary during Suspension

from Office. - An officer who has been lawfully suspendedfrom his office is not entitled to compensation for the

period during which he was so suspended, even though it

be subsequently determined that the cause for which hewas suspended was insufficient. The reason given is thatsalary and perquisites are the reward of express or implied

services, and therefore cannot belong to one who could not

lawfully perform such services.

Thus, it is not enough that an employee is exonerated ofthe charges against him. In addition, his suspension must

be unjustified. The case ofBangalisan v. Court ofAppeals

itself similarly states that payment of salariescorresponding to the period [1] when an employee is notallowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of

the charges which caused his suspension and [2] when the

suspension is unjustified.

The preventive suspension of civil service employees

charged with dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct,


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or neglect of duty is authorized by the Civil Service Law. Itcannot, therefore, be considered unjustified, even if later

the charges are dismissed so as to justify the payment of

salaries to the employee concerned. It is one of thosesacrifices which holding a public office requires for the

public good. For this reason, it is limited to ninety (90)

days unless the delay in the conclusion of the investigationis due to the employee concerned. After that period, even

if the investigation is not finished, the law provides that

the employee shall be automatically reinstated.

Third, it is argued in the separate opinion that to deny

employees salaries on the frivolous ground that the lawdoes not provide for their payment would be to provide atool for the oppression of civil servants who, though

innocent, may be falsely charged of grave or less grave

administrative offenses. Indeed, the possibility of abuse isnot an argument against the recognition of the existence of

power. As Justice Story aptly put it, It is always a doubtful

course, to argue against the use or existence of a power,from the possibility of its abuse. . . . [For] from the very

nature of things, the absolute right of decision, in the last

resort, must rest somewhere - wherever it may be vested itis susceptible of abuse. It may be added that if and when

such abuse occurs, that would be the time for the courts to

exercise their nay-saying function. Until then, however,the public interest in an upright civil service must be

upheld.

Finally, it is argued that even in the private sector, the lawprovides that employees who are unjustly dismissed are

entitled to reinstatement with full pay. But that is because

R.A. No. 6715 expressly provides for the payment to suchemployees of full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and

. . . other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed

from the time his compensation was withheld from him upto the time of his actual reinstatement. In the case of thepublic sector, as has been noted, the provision for payment

of salaries during the preventive suspension pending

investigation has been deleted.

B. Right to Compensation for Preventive Suspension Pending Appeal if Employee is

Exonerated

But although we hold that employees who are preventively

suspended pending investigation are not entitled to thepayment of their salaries even if they are exonerated, we

do not agree with the government that they are notentitled to compensation for the period of their suspension

pending appeal if eventually they are found innocent.

Preventive suspension pending investigation, as already

discussed, is not a penalty but only a means of enabling thedisciplining authority to conduct an unhamperedinvestigation. On the other hand, preventive suspension

pending appeal is actually punitive although it is in effect

subsequently considered illegal if respondent is

exonerated and the administrative decision finding himguilty is reversed. Hence, he should be reinstated with full

pay for the period of the suspension. Thus, 47(4) states

that respondent shall be considered as under preventivesuspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event

he wins. On the other hand, if his conviction is affirmed,

i.e., if he is not exonerated, the period of his suspensionbecomes part of the final penalty of suspension or

dismissal.

It is precisely because respondent is penalized before his

sentence is confirmed that he should be paid his salaries in

the event he is exonerated. It would be unjust to deprivehim of his pay as a result of the immediate execution of thedecision against him and continue to do so even after it is

shown that he is innocent of the charges for which he was

suspended. Indeed, to sustain the governments theorywould be to make the administrative decision not only

executory but final and executory. The fact is that 47(2)

and (4) are similar to the execution of judgment pendingappeal under Rule 39, 2 of the Rules of Court. Rule 39, 5

provides that in the event the executed judgment is

reversed, there shall be restitution or reparation of

damages as equity and justice may require.

Sec. 47 of the present law providing that an administrativedecision meting out the penalty of suspension or dismissal

shall be immediately executory and that if the respondent

appeals he shall be considered as being merely underpreventive suspension if eventually he prevails is takenfrom 37 of the Civil Service Decree of 1975 (P.D. No. 807).

There was no similar provision in the Civil Service Act of

1959 (R.A. No. 2260), although under it the Commissionerof Civil Service could order the immediate execution of an

administrative decision in the interest of the public

service. Nor was there provision for immediate executionof administrative decisions ordering dismissal orsuspension in 695 of the Administrative Code of 1917, as

amended by C.A. No. 598, 1. Nonetheless, under R.A. No.2260 the payment of salaries was ordered in cases in

which employees were found to be innocent of the charges

or their suspension was held to be unjustified, because thepenalty of suspension or dismissal was executed without afinding by the Civil Service Commissioner that it was

necessary in the interest of the public service. On the

other hand, payment of back salaries was denied where itwas shown that the employee concerned was guilty as

charged and the immediate execution of the decision was

ordered by the Civil Service Commissioner in the interest

of the public service.

Nothing in what has thus far been said is inconsistent with

the reason for denying salaries for the period of preventivesuspension. We have said that an employee who is

exonerated is not entitled to the payment of his salariesbecause his suspension, being authorized by law, cannot

be unjustified. To be entitled to such compensation, the


17/41

employee must not only be found innocent of the chargesbut his suspension must likewise be unjustified. But

though an employee is considered under preventive

suspension during the pendency of his appeal in the eventhe wins, his suspension is unjustified because what the

law authorizes is preventive suspension for a period not

exceeding 90 days. Beyond that period the suspension isillegal. Hence, the employee concerned is entitled to

reinstatement with full pay. Under existing jurisprudence,

such award should not exceed the equivalent of five yearspay at the rate last received before the suspension was

imposed.

II. Private Respondents Entitled to Back Salaries Although Found Guilty of Violation of

Office Rules and Regulations and Reprimanded

Private respondents were exonerated of all chargesagainst them for acts connected with the teachers strike of

September and October 1990. Although they were absent

from work, it was not because of the strike. For beingabsent without leave, they were held liable for violation of

reasonable office rules and regulations for which thepenalty is a reprimand. Their case thus falls squarelywithin ruling in Bangalisan,which likewise involved a

teacher found guilty of having violated reasonable office

rules and regulations. Explaining the grant of salariesduring their suspension despite the fact that they were

meted out reprimand, this Court stated:

With respect to petitioner Rodolfo Mariano, payment of his

backwages is in order. A reading of the resolution of the

Civil Service Commission will show that he was exonerated

of the charges which formed the basis for his suspension.The Secretary of the DECS charged him with and he was

later found guilty of grave misconduct, gross neglect ofduty, gross violation of the Civil Service Law, rules and

regulations and reasonable office regulations, refusal to

perform official duty, gross insubordination, conductprejudicial to the best interest of the service, and absence

without official leave, for his participation in the massactions on September 18, 20 and 21, 1990. It was his

alleged participation in the mass actions that was the basisof his preventive suspension and, later, his dismissal from

the service.

However, the Civil Service Commission, in the questionedresolution, made a finding that Mariano was not involved

in the mass actions but was absent because he was inIlocos Sur to attend the wake and interment of his

grandmother. Although the CSC imposed upon him thepenalty of reprimand, the same was for his violation ofreasonable office rules and regulations because he failed to

inform the school of his intended absence and neither did

he file an application for leave covering such absences.

Under Section 23 of the Rules Implementing Book V of

Executive Order No. 292 and other pertinent civil service

laws, in violations of reasonable office rules andregulations, the first offense is punishable by reprimand.

To deny petitioner Mariano his back wages during his

suspension would be tantamount to punishing him afterhis exoneration from the charges which caused his

dismissal from the service.

InJacinto v. Court ofAppeals, a public school teacher who

was found guilty of violation of reasonable office rules and

regulations for having been absent without leave andreprimanded was given back salaries after she was

exonerated of the charge of having taken part in the

strikes.

Petitioner Secretary of Education contends, however, that

respondents Abad, Bandigas, and Somebang signed a letterin which they admitted having taken part in the massaction. This question cannot be raised now. The Civil

Service Commission gave no weight to this letter in view of

individual letters written by the three citing reasons fortheir absences, to wit: Abad, because she decided to stay

home to correct student papers; Bandigas, because she hadto accompany her brother to the Commission onImmigration, and Somebang because of economic

reasons. Petitioner did not appeal from this ruling. Hence,

he is bound by the factual findings of the CSC and the

appellate court.

WHEREFORE, the decision, dated September 3, 1996, asamended by the resolutions, dated July 15, 1997 and

October 6, 1997, of the Court of Appeals, is hereby

AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the award of

salaries to private respondents shall be computed from thetime of their dismissal/suspension by the Department of

Education, Culture, and Sports until their actual

reinstatement, for a period not exceeding five years.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Bellosillo, Vitug, Kapunan, Quisumbing, Purisima,and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Davide, C.J., concurs in the result and subject to themodification expressed in the separate opinion of Justice

Panganiban.

Panganiban, J., please see separate opinion.

Puno, Pardo, Buena, and Ynares-Santiago, join Justice

Panganiban's separate opinion.

Melo, J., in the result.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 128559. October 4, 2000]


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THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS,and the CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS; ABENIS, ERLINDA; ACHACON,

JULIAN; ACOL, SOCORRO; AFAN, MA. ANA; AGULTO,ANGELITA; ALE, JANET; ALETA, NORMA; ALFISAR, VILMA;

ALPINO, ANITA; AMAROSO, MILANDRO; AMBROSIO,

CAINA; ANAZARIO, RICARDO; ANDRES, MILAGROS;ATENDIDO, ROSITA; ANTONIO, MARCELLANA; APOSTOL,

HERMINIA; ARCEO, RAON; ARCILLA, ROSALINDA;

ARGAMOZA, ROGELIA; ARRIAGA, EULALIA; ASUNCION,CORAZON; BALATBAT, ANITA; BANAWA, MARIA;BANGALISAN, MA. PAZ; BANIGUED, ZENAIDA; BARCELON,

TEOFILO; BARTOLOME, DIVINA; BARTOLOME, PURITA;

BATERNA, LUZ; BUSTILLOS, JOSE; CARANDANG, SOFIA;CARPIO, REMEDIOS; CAYTON, LUCILA; CERDENA,

ZENAIDA; CLEMENTE, PROSPERINA; CONSTANTINO,

VIVIEN; CRUZ, LUISA DELA; DABANDAN, ILUMINADA;DAVID, ENCARNACION; DAVID, VERONICA; DAYNITA, MA.BEATA; DAYRIT, VILLAFLOR; DECELLA, ROLANDO;

DEDACE, ANGELITO; DE GUZMAN, VIRGINIA; DELANTOR,TERESITA; DE LUNA, FELICITAS; DE PEDRO, MARCELINA;

DELA PAZ, ROSALINDA; DIAZ, IRENE; DIAZ, ROSARIO;

DIMACALI, ROSARIA; DIONISIO, WILLIAM; DIZON,NENITA; DOLORES, CYNTHIA; DOMANTAY, FLORENCIA;DOMINGO, DIVINA; ECHALAS, TERESITA; ENRIQUEZ,

LILIAN; ENRIQUEZ, LORNA; ERNI, LYDIA; ESPINA,

ERLINDA; ESPINOZA, GLORIA; ESPIRITU, ALFREDO;ESPIRITU, LUZ; ESPIRITU, PETRONILA; ESQUERRA,

LUZVIMINDA; ESTRADA, ELSA; ESTRADA, MARILYN;

ESTRADA, VITA; EUGENIO, ELEANOR; EUGENIO, TERESA;EUSTAQUIO, ISABELITA; FARINAS, LITA; FELIX, EMELITA;FERIA, EVA; FIEDACAN, EMILIE; FUERTES, ARSENIA;

HAGOS, JOSE; HALOG, ESTRELLA; HAMID, EDELWISSA;IBLOQUIN, ROMEO; IDOS, REBECCA; JOLOC, CHARITA;KIMPO, AMELIA; LABIRAN, MARINA; LAPUT, ESTELA;

LAYOSO, BEN; LEON, JULITA DE; LIWAG, MILAGROS;

MADEJA, WILFREDO; MALILAY, SEVERA; MANUBA,ISABELA; MARTINEZ, LIBERTAD; MEJIA, TERESITA;

NATIVIDAD, EVELYN; ORDINARIO, DOLORES; ORTALIZA,

JUAN; PACLEB, VICTORIA; PAGDANGANAN, GREGORIA;PALISOC, JOSEFINA; PAREJA, ADELINA; PASTRANA,

MARCOSA; PELAYO, LUCITA; PROTON, JULITA; RAMOS,

BELEN; RAMONES, CARMELITA; RED, ERLINDA; REJAN0,VIOLETA; REVILLA, LOURDES; RIVER, ALEX; RODRIN,VIOLETA; RONGCALES, SOLEDAD; ROQUE, MILAGROS;

ROXAS, LOURDES; ROYOLA, ELINITA; RUTGER, ANGEL;

SACDAL, NATIVDAD; SADANG, MARCELA; SADIE,REBECCA; SANCHEZ, FE; SANCHEZ, OFELIA; SANCHEZ,

REBECCA; SANDOGON, YOLANDA; SANTOS, ASUCENA;

SANTOS, CYNTHIA; SANTOS, JESSIEBEL; SANTOS, MA.VICTORIA; SANTOS, ROSA; SANTOS, TRINIDAD; SANGABRIEL, ASUNCION; SIENNA, ARTHUR; SISALIN, MA.

LINDA; SISON, NORMA; SORIANO, EVA; SORIANO,

MARINA; SOSA, ARISTON; STO. DOMINGO, MARILYN;SUAN, ELVIRA; SUNSA, EDITH; SY, BERNADETTE;

TABIANDO, HELEN; TALLION, LETICIA; TAN,

EVANGELINE; TAN, NENITA; TAVIOS, BLANCHE; TECSON,ESPERANZA; TEODORO, JOSEFINA; TERRADO, TORIBIO;

TOGUENO, NORMA; TOLENTINO, LETICIA; TRINIDAD,HEREDITA; UMALI, SERGIA; VALENCIA, PRISCA; VARGAS,

LOURDES; VELASCO, LOLITA; VELASCO, MILAGROS;

VELASQUEZ, MARIA; VIADOR, PENNSYLVANIA; VICENTE,SHIRLEY; VI

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