PUERTO RICO TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH IS RICE’: FOOD AND POLITICS DURING REXFORD TUGWELL’S TERM AS GOVERNOR 1941-1945

Cruz M. Ortiz

“Rice continues to be the number one problem here in Puerto Rico. Day time thinking, night time dreaming, newspapers, radio, conversation, everybody seems to revolve around that one item. Until the rice supply here is adequate it will probably

be well to remember that Puerto Rico translated into English is Rice”

The preceding lines are part of a report sent to Washington by Edward J. Bash, Caribbean

director of the War Food Administration, nine months after World War II was declared. Bash’s

reductive statement that, “Puerto Rico translated into English is rice,” becomes a focal point of this

text. In order to maintain the United States’ political and military stability in Puerto Rico, it was

necessary to keep the population fed during the war, even if it meant that major importers and

wholesalers would be rendered inoperative.

In the following pages I attempt to study how the government of Puerto Rico was

able to develop and control a system of food importation and distribution so as to ensure that the lack

of provisions on the Island would not be linked to government inaction. I also propose that the

mechanisms adopted (especially the creation of the General Administration of Supplies for the

distribution of food after the summer of 1942) have strong ties to the precepts held by the governor of

Puerto Rico, Rexford Guy Tugwell, regarding the role of an active regulatory state’. Nonetheless,

Tugwell’s initiatives (with the assent of the local legislature) would not have prospered if the United

States government—and other metropolitan governments in the Caribbean—had not feared a social

crisis that threatened the geopolitical security of the United States during the war.

In the first part of this article, I attempt a description of the growing dependence on basic—or

central—imported foods, especially rice, beans, fats, corn meal and salted codfish. During the first

thirty years of the twentieth century, the extensions of land employed for agriculture were reduced

considerably.

As we shall see, once World War II was launched, shipments of basic foodstuffs to Puerto

Rico began to decrease thus provoking a rapid increase in prices and a worsening of the precarious

daily food supply of the majority.

In the second part of this article, I describe how Tugwell’s government faced the crisis. I

attempt to place into perspective the role of various agencies in the creation of an emergency program

implemented in Puerto Rico which strengthened the role of the government to the point of making it

all powerful in the area of food distribution

At the end, I reflect on the adjustment of the people to the paternalistic role of the state as

provider of food.

The measure of the crisis:

Prior to 1942, the Puerto Rican population had suffered serious food shortages. The years

between 1929 and 1932 were especially severe. The characteristics of the initial years of the

Depression, however, were different from those during the 1942-43 period in that the crisis centered

on the cost and not on the lack of food supplies. During the wartime prices would certainly increase,

but because of food shortages. Although per capita income per family continued to decline from the

mid 1930’s onward while prices for goods continued to increase, during the war period the ability to

obtain food on a daily basis reached its lowest ebb because fewer ships would reach the ports in

Puerto Rico.1 As a consequence, the tonnage of food supplies (cereals, dry vegetables, meats and

1 The figures consulted on the number of U.S. steamships arriving in Puerto Rico between the 1939-40 and 1943-44 fiscal years point to the magnitude of the situation: 1939-40, 2,222 vessels; 1940-41, 1,809 vessels; 1941-42, 1,559 vessels; 1942-43, 513 vessels; 1943-44, 503 vessels. Luis A. Izquierdo, Ideología, programas y actividades [Ideologies, Programs and Activities],San Juan, Departamento de Agricultura y Comercio, 1945, 97 pp. Appéndix I, Número y tonelaje de embarcaciones llegadas a los puertos de Puerto Rico [Number and Tonelage of Ships Arriving at Ports in Puerto Rico].

salted fish, canned goods, and fats) decreased greatly. This occurred in conjunction with spiraling

prices, few possibilities of stable employment in agriculture, and reduced wages.2

The level of dependence on basic food imports can be better understood if we consider that

between 1935-39 Puerto Rico acquired 91.8% of all its food supplies from the United States. This

subordination would have an important socio-economic impact particularly in view of the fact that the

prices of imported products in San Juan increased abruptly. It was because of the increase in costs and

not the increase in mercantile traffic that the value of the mercantile traffic from the United Sates,

which during the final years of the 1930’s averaged $82,700,000 annually, suddenly reached

$143,700,000 by 1941.3

Also, the specific value of food shipments arriving in Puerto Rico rose sharply between the

final years of the 1930’s and during the 1941-42 fiscal year. If by 1939-40 imported food and drink

products were valued at $27,864,370, by 1941-42 the value of these products had risen to

$41,257,371.4

As the history of the Puerto Rican economy has shown, although the total value of imported

food products imported between 1901 and 1935 decreased from 49.9% in 1901 to 36.6% in 1935, this

2 According t the 1940 census, 169,628 people—from the 542,322 employed in March 1940— only worked between 3 to 8 months in 1939. In 1940, total unemployment was calculated at 107,146. See, Félix Mejías, Condiciones de las clases jornaleras de Puerto Rico [Conditions of the Day Laborer Class in Puerto Rico], Río Piedras, Editorial de la Universidad de Puerto Rico, 215 pp., 1946, pp. 49-51.

3 Fundación Luis Muñoz Marín (FLMM), Sección IV, Luis Muñoz Marín, Presidente del Senado, Gobierno Federal, War Food Administration, cartapacio 1, Report of Operations of the Caribbean Emergency Program, July 1942-December 1943. This document was submitted to the office of Luis Muñoz Marín, President of theSenate, on March 2, 1944 by George E. Moore, Caribbean Director of the Food Distribution Office under the War Food Administration, based in San Juan.

4 Luis A. Izquierdo, op.cit, Appendix II, Valor de los embarque recibidos en Puerto Rico de Estados Unidos, por grupos, años fiscales 1939-40 a 1944-45 [Value of the Shipments received in Puerto Rico from the United States, by Groups, Fiscal Years.1939—40 to 1944-45

was due to an increase in the domestic production of food in response to an ever growing population.5

James L. Dietz, a historian in economics, summarizes the situation as follows:

In 1899, at least 42 percent of cultivated land was used to grow crops for local consumption; in 1929 the figure was only 28 percent. While it is true that the absolute amount of land devoted to locally consumed crops increased, the increase was only about 28 percent; population grew during the same period by more than 60 percent. Thus, the amount of land per capita devoted to food crops declined.6 (Dietz, James L. Economic History of Puerto Rico. Princeton: Princeton UP, 1986, p. 122.

The measure of the crisis during the 1942-43 war years can best be understood if we consider

the percentage of Puerto Rican rural families that at the beginning of the 1940’s consumed three of

the food products in highest demand by importers and most common in their daily diet (rice, beans

and salted codfish). Later, as we shall see, this contrasts with the reduction of these same products

during 1942-43.

According to a study published by the Department of Agriculture and Commerce in 1942,

76.8% of the Puerto Rican families accompanied the farinaceous tubers (yautía (taro), yam, sweet

potato, malanga, cassava), the vegetables (cabbage, tomato, pumpkin), and the meat and fish they

consumed, with rice and beans.7 Moreover, 100% of the families studied consumed rice and beans

during their evening meal. Furthermore, the study indicated that, at the beginning of the war, 72.7%

of Puerto Rican families ate only rice and beans at dinner. The widely sought after cereal and the

5 James L. Dietz, Economic History of Puerto Rico, Princeton, Princeton UP, 1986, 343 pp., pp. 139-141. Dietz describes the serious effort to increase the quantity of land devoted to cultivation during the last months of the First World War when shipments were postponed or their arrival was problematic. At that time, Dietz indicates, “Land planted to food crops increased from 137,000 acres to 335,000 with no reduction in the land area devoted to export crops. After the war, however, the crops grown on this land could not meet the compelling test of profitability that was coming to dominate economic decision making …” p. 123.

6 Ibíd., op.cit., p. 1227 7 Manuel A. Pérez, Living Conditions Among Small Farmers in Puerto Rico, San Juan,

Bureau of Supplies, Printing, and Transportation, 1942, p. 97. Seea lso the study by Pablo Morales Otero y Rita Lang Health and Socio-Economic Studies in Puerto Rico, Study # 1, in : The Journal of Public Health and Tropical Medicine , vol. 12, p. 405 y vol. 14, p. 201, whch presents similar results. This study divided the sample into 2 agro-eeconomic zones (zone 1:tobacco, coffee, citric fruits; zone 2: sugar cane). The findings are similar. The evening meal consisted of rice and beans—as a main course without other complements—for 86.3% of families studied in zone 1 and for 75.7% in zone 2.

legumes, which had been declining in the peasants’ fields, finally disappeared from the daily food

portions as both imports decreased during the war years. (Table 1).

Table 1

Importation of rice and beans in Puerto Rico:

1938 and 1941-43

Products 1938 1939-40 1940-41 1941-42 1942-43

Rice 363,981,589 199,331,194 262,623,829 185,873,188 46,570,575

Beans 37,046,262 1,574,410 1,927,164 1,422,025 612,630

Sources: E.B. Hill y J.R. Norgueras, The Food Supply of Puerto Rico, Río Piedras, University of Puerto Rico, 1940, p.8; Departamento de Agricultura y Comercio, Annual Book on Statistics, 1939-40,1940-41, 1941-42 y 1942-43.

Salted codfish, which served at the time as a complement to the few complete proteins in the

Puerto Rican diet, was consumed by 89.7% of the local families during lunch.8 Although salted fish

was absent from the dining table during the evening meal (only 18.5% of families surveyed had salt fish

at dinner), its presence during the luncheon meal among the lower classes (rural and urban) may have

been reduced considerably because of the decrease of imported salted codfish during the war period.

(Table 2).

8

8 Pérez, op.cit., loc.cit.

TABLE 2Import of Codfish in Puerto Rico; 1938 and 1940 to 1943

1938 1940-41 1941-42 1942-4328,793,215 28,120,998 22,779,369 20,128,515

Source: Hill and Norgueras, op.cit; Departament of Agriculture, Annual Book on Satistics, 1939-40, 1940-41 y 1942-43.

It is possible that the absence of rice, beans and codfish may have motivated Puerto Rican

families to increase the consumption of starchy tubers such as yam, sweet potato, “yautía,” as well as

plantain bananas, in their daily meals. We know that by 1938, 20.3% of the common diet was composed

of cereals (15 % corresponded to rice) and 28.3% was composed of farinaceous tubers.9 It seems, then,

that the more frequent use of tubers combined with either home-grown or wild fruit and vegetables,

became the basis of the meals among the poorer classes in substitution of rice. Even though during the

war years farmers were motivated to cultivate food crops on government fomented farms and on lands

owned by the sugar industry, we need to consider that the crops required a period of maturation during

which time families were forced to buy provisions at the markets, at humble neighborhhood shops, or

from resellers. At these places, during the war period, minor crops began to register an increase in

prices.

It is possible to believe, on the other hand, that once the importation crisis was unleashed, the

majority of families increased the consumption of other products, especially those that could easily be

acquired in grocery stores at the lowest prices, and which increased in volume after cooking and that,

once consumed, produced a sense of satiety. Corn meal, which was consumed at a rate of 19 pounds a

year per person in the rural areas around 1938 and priced one cent below the cost of rice at 3.6 cents per

pound, well served this purpose.1010 It was easily used to prepare aggregate foods such as crullers

(“buñuelos”), corn grits, “guanimes” (boiled corn cakes wrapped in plantain leaves), and fried corn

sticks (“sorullos”) to complement the few options available in terms of meat, vegetables, and tubers.

Nonetheless, by 1938 eleven million pounds (10,569,914 millions) of cornmeal, all imported, were

9 9 Sol Luis Descartes, et.al., Food Consumption Studies in Puerto Rico; Río Piedras, University of Puerto Rico Agriculture Experiment Station, 1940, 73 pp., p. 13.

10 10 Descartes, et.al. op.cit. p. 11-12.

consumed in Puerto Rico yearly. The shipments of corn meal druing the Second World War would also

decrease, putting yet another important element in the Puerto Rican diet at risk.

Studies carried out regarding the Puerto Rican diet during the last years of the 1930’s,

specifically 1937-38-39, and published in 1940-41 by the Department of Agriculture in light of the

approaching war-time emergency, are quite eloquent in emphasizing the low consumption of fresh meat

and fish among Puerto Ricans. According to specialists in the Puerto Rican government agency, fresh

meat and fish should have appeared more often in the daily diet of the inhabitants of the rural areas,

towns and the urban areas. The researchers observed, nonetheless, that this would be possible if the cost

of living would not continue rising and the salaries in distant grographical economic zones (such as the

coffee, tobacco and sugar cane growing areas and the San Juan urban periphery) were to increase. The

ingestion of fresh meats, reported as low or occasional, since the nineteenth century, reached its lowest

point during the 30’s (due to the extensive characteristic of the sugar cane plantings), and practically

disappeared during the war period. A study carried out in 1942 among 3,069 families on small farms

showed that only 10.3% of the families had meat or fish during their lunch meal, and only 8.8% at

dinner.1111 The possibilities of having fresh meat during the main meal of the day would be reduced by

the high prices of meat sold in the butcher shops, in open markets, and by peddlars. The pork dealers

became the victims of a vicious circle: They would have a hard time feeding their pigs given their

dependence on their own leftovers to feed their animals. If, as described, the ordinary Puerto Rican diet

was based on the high consmuption of cereals (rice, corn meal), on the preference for red kidney beans,

and on an accessible protein source (salted codfish), accompanied by tubers, one can perceive the

wretched nutritional conditions experienced by the majority of the inhabitants during the first year of the

11

11 Pérez, op.cit. p. 83-84. Studies carried out before 1942 indicate even lower figures for the consumption of fresh meat and fish in rural areas. For example, research by Dr. Pablo Morales Otero in coffee tobacco, citric fruit regions reveals the following data: familes that consumed fresh meat and fish for lunch, 0%; familes that consumed fresh meat and fish for dinner, 3.5%. see Pablo Morales Otero et.al, Health and Socio-Economic Sutides in Puerto Rico. I. Health and Socio-Economic Conditions on a Sugar Cane Plantation; in The Puerto Rico Journal of Public Health and Tropical Medicine # 12, p. 405, 1937; y Health and Socio-Economic Conditions in the Tabbaco, Coffee and Fruit Regions ; in The Puerto Rico Journal of Public Health and Tropical Medicine #14, p. 201, 1939.

war. The situation was no longer one of an inadequate and scarcely nutritional diet predicted by

studies,1212 but the sudden lack of four basic components which historically constituted the largest

portion of the two main meals of the inhabitants of Puerto Rico. Notwithstanding the historical reports

by travelers and the memoirs and chronicles that lead us to believe that the food situation in Puerto Rico

was similar to that during the 30’—and without major repercussions--; we, nevertheless, need to

consider that the increase in the population without ties to agricultural production, and internal

migration to zones with a high food consumption and little agricultural activity, further affected the

availability of provisions on the Island.

The availability of food in Puerto Rico underwent other problems during the war years that,

although they were not new, acquired new dimensions in view of the emergency. For example, the

demand by the markets located in peripheral urban areas (the first to experience the shortage of imports

12

12 The literature on nutrition during the early years of the twentieth century was generated as part of various projects initiated in the school of Public Health and Tropical Medicine with the intention of establishing a relationship between the common Puerto Rican diet and the tendency toward certain diseases and physiological conditions. This perspective in nutritional studies stemmed from the belief that certain illnesses such as anemia, beri-beri, cavities, espru, and even the height of Puerto Ricans, were the result of deficient nutrition. The studies on nutrition from the School of Public Health set the basis for future projects such as those carried out by the Puerto Rico Reconstruction Administration in 1937 by the nutritionist Rita Lang and Dr. Pablo Morales Otero. The research by Land and Otero began to inorporate economic and social factors as decisive in the characterist traits in the common food habits among Puerto Ricans. That is why their initial research centered on creating informative profiles on health and socio-economic conditions in different rural regions on the Island. As such, the work by Lang and Otero influenced the studies carried out by the Department of Agriculture and Commerce toward the end of the 1930’s which intended to detect patterns of consumption in the country and the capacity of provisions in case of a wartime emergency. All this work ended in the summer of 1943 when nutritionist Lydia Roberts was recruited to organize the first seminar on nutrition in the Department of Home Economics at the University of Puerto Rico. See, among other numerous titles, the following: J.D. Ridell et.al, “Beri-Beri at United States Army Base Hospital”; in Journal of American Medical Assoiation, #72, p. 569, 1919; B.K. Ashford, “La carencia de ciertos elementos alimenticios como causa predisponente del esprú, pelagra y beri-beri en Puerto Rico” [The Lack of Certain Nutritional Elements as Predisposing Cause of Espru, Pelagra, and Beri-Beri in Puerto Rico]; in: Boletín de la Asociación Medica de Puerto Rico [Bulletin of the Puerto Rico Medical Association] #15, p. 249, 1921; Ibid., “Observations on the Conception that Sprue is a Mycosis Superimposed Upon a State of Deficency of Certain Essential Food Elements”, American Journal of Tropical Medicine, #3, p. 517, 1927; Ibid., Rice and Beans as an Adequate Diet; in Puerto Rico Journal of Public Health and Tropical Medicine, #5, p. 16, 1929. L.A. Salivia, “Some Health Problems Concerning the Chuildren in the Public Schools of Puerto Rico:; n: Medical Record, #68, July 16, 1930; H.H. Mitchell, “A Study of Factors Associated with the Growth and Nutrition of Puerto Rican Children”; in Human Biology, #4, p. 469, 1932. R. Lang, “Health and Socio-Economic Studies in Puerto Rico: “Nutritional Studies in the Rural Regions of Puerto Rico”; in Boletín de la Asosiación Médica de Puerto Rico #31, p. 113, 1939. Lydia Roberts, The Puerto Rican Workshop: An address given before the Inter-Departmental Nutrition Coordinating Committee, Washington D.C., 1945.

during the crisis) for food produced in the rural areas provoked the flow of minor food crops from small

agricultural centers to the urban conglomerates, thus destablizing the economy of certain towns.

Also, food consumption, as any human activity, entailed more than produtivity. During the

142-45 period other factors such the capacity to acquire, store, and prepare provisions also played a role

in the crisis. The increase in prices, the black market, and the biodegradation of foodstuffs because of

speculative practices, all came together to trigger one of the worst food crises in the history of Puerto

Rico.

During the power plays throughout the war, those most affected were, without a doubt, urban

working families, farm workers, and the inhabitants of rural areas. The first depended, in general, on

the consumption of domestic produce which occassionally pivoted on the income of the family and also

on the range of prices and the availability of products in the markets, in the carts of the peddlars, and on

the shelves of the food stands. The prices in the markets of the largest cities were such that many

families were forced to opt between the occasional consumption of farinaceous tubers, involuntary

fasting, and begging. The periodic reports published by the government, to determine the prices ranges

of foods in order to regulate speculative practices, indicate the exhorbitant price hikes during the months

following the declaration of war—and during 1943—as compared to the prices in years before the

period under study. For example, in 1938 a pound of rice in the San Juan market cost four and half

cents, but in September 1942 a pound could hardly be bought at ten cents.1313 Kidney beans, the

inseperable complement of rice, cost seven cents a pound in 1938; during the summer of 1942 they cost

fourteen cents a pound. Salted codfish, by then a periphereal food, scaled the high range of twenty-two

cents a pound by July 1942. The following table (Table 3) places in perspective the extent of the crisis

13

13 Descartes et.al, Food Consumption Studies in Puerto Rico, Apéndice de Tablas, Aproximate Cost of 1,000 Calories portions of important foods in the Puerto Rican Diet, p.55. FLMN, Sección IV, Luis Muñoz Marín Presidente del Senado, Serie 2, Gobierno Insular, Sub Serie, Departamento de Agricultura y Comercio, Report Submitted by S.L. Descartes, Retail Food Prices Continue to Increase Rapidly, November 1942.

in relation to those products basic to the diet of Puerto Rican families, especialy those that needed to

consider their income at the moment of acquiring daily provisions.:1414

TABLE 3Increase in Prices of Basic Products, 1938 y 1942.

Products 1938 1942

Rice 4.6 cents 10 cents

Beans 7.0 cents 12 cents (1)(1)

Codfish 8.5 cents 20 cents (2)(2)

Corn meal 3.6 cents 6 cents

Flour ----- 5 cents

Plantain 2.2 cents 3 cents (3)(3)

Sweet potatoes 1.8 cents 3.5 cents

Yams 3.1 cents 8 cents (4)(4)

“Yautía” 2.7 cents 4 cents

Sources: Descartes, et.al. Food Consumption Studies, Aproximate Cost of 1,000 Calories Diet....pg55; FLMM, loc.cit., Descartes, Retail Food Prices Continue to Increase…; FLMM, loc.cit., Sub-Serie Boletines de Mercados, Cartapacio, 21, 1943-45.

1. Price registered in March 1942 in the San Juan market.2. Price registered in March 1942 in the San Juan market.3. Price registered in October 1942 in 20 grocery stores in San Juan.4. Price registered in July 1943 in the Rio Piedras market.

Around 1946, the nutritionist Ana Teresa Blanco recounted her experiences as part of a team that

formed the first Community Workshop on Nutrition at the University of Puerto Rico in 1943, during the

world war. Based on her first-hand experience in the field of nutrition, she indicated the following:

14 14 A study carried out among 4,999 working families between 1941 and 1942 demonstrated the the family units consumed an average of $5.33 in food per week. Of this amount, $4.61 corresponded to retail purchases from grocery stores or stands. The rest was distributed as follows: 5 cents of food paid in services; 36 cents in food crops from home gardens; 21 cents in government aid; and 10 cents in gifts. Quoted in Félix Mejías, Condiciones de Vida de las clases jornales de Puerto Rico [Living Conditions of the Day Laborer Classes in Puerto Rico], p. 130.

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

“In the bottom level we can consider families without apparent means of support, who do occasional jobs and are highly dependent on charity or relief for their existence. These live mostly on polished rice and starchy vegetables. In city slums where starchy vegetables are sometimes more expensive than rice, rice is increased bye the addition of wasted seeds, as for example, hedionda (sic), is available, other supplements such as beans, codfish, cornmeal, fruits, and so forth, will be added. Many times there will be no food at all unless charitable neighbors send in something. In the towns, little boys will beg left-overs from neighbor’s tables to take home to their families.”1515

The conditions of farm workers were not very different from those of urban laborers:

“Next higher up wee can consider the group that the common farm labour would typify. The day will start before dawn with coffee, which may sometimes be black, other times with milk. Some days he will also have bread, other times none. There will probably be some more black coffee. This will stimulate him going until around noon when then will probably be a big dish of boiled starchy vegetables such as green bananas or plantains, sweet potatoes, yautía, and yams, with possibly some olive oil and some flakes of salt codfish to give salazón (sic) or saltines to this dish. At times the olive oil will be blended with hot peppers or home pickled peppers and onions to be used instead of, or with the codfish, in a combination known as moho (sic).”1616

During the period in which food shortage was most severe, the differences in the levels of

access to provisions became even more critical since the government was not able to make good on its

policies to regulate prices and prevent speculation. Because of the irregularities, the intermediate sectors

also had difficulties adjusting to the shortage not only in basic foodstuffs (rice, beans, flours, and

codfish which were consumed at all social levels) but also in accessing the scarce supply of new canned

foods made available by the food industry .1717The very exclusive magazine Puerto Rico Ilustrado,

15 15 Ana Teresa Blanco, Nutrition Studies in Puerto Rico, Río Piedras, University of Puerto Rico, Social Science Research Center, 1946, 96 pp., p. 74. Blanco’s work was submitted as a thesis to the Department of Biologicial Sciences at the University of Chicago and was written under the direction of the nutritionist Dr. Lydia Roberts. Blanco’s research is governed by the precepts that the act of eating and drinking is a human activity directed at stimulating the organs and activating metabolic processes. Therefore, adequate nutrition equates a healthy, productive human being capable of sustaining a healthy civil society. In this sense, Blanco’s work (which intersects with those of the University of Puerto Rico) interprets proper nutrition as a pre-requisite necessary for the reproduction of society.

16 16 Ibid., p. 75.

* See below the segment titled “The Government on Paper.”17 17 The circulation among the classes of this culinary combination was observed by Rexford

Tugwell in the context of a semi-panic that ensued during October 1942: “It has to be admitted,” wrote the governor then, “that those who faced the possibility of starvation behaved better than many of those who only expected to be deprived of a few semiluxuries. It is true that most Puerto

which reviewed the ostentatious social acivities of certain segments of the Puerto Rican upper class,

sold entire pages for advertisements to distributors of canned goods exhorting upper class women to

consume their products for their nutritional value and durability. But the publicity always insisted on the

contingent availability of the products on the shelves of the local grocery stores. For example, frequent

refererences are made to canned Viena sausages and spam, and to Hormel brand canned products such

as tongue and chicken. Nonetheless, in pointing out the nutritional value of their products, the

advertisers were also careful to indicate the following:

No siempre es fácil comprar alimentos Hormel, ya que los embarques no son frecuentes, y grandes las cantidades que se envían a los Ejércitos de las Naciones Unidas. Sin embargo, inquiera de su proveedor de vez en cuando. Uno de estos días a él le encantará anunciarle: Sí, señora, los alimentos Hormel ya están llegando...1818

[It is not always easy to buy Hormel foods, because the shipments are not frequent, and the quantities shipped to the Army of the United Nations are great. Nonetheless, occasionally ask your provider for these. One of these days he will be glad to announce: Yes, ma’am, the Hormel products are arriving…]

An advertisement such as the following also alluded to the shortage:

-Una parte para él, una parte para usted- Este es el voto que hacen los productos de alimentos que se plantean nuevas alturas de producción a despecho de la seria escasez de mano de obra; y de los compradores que juegan limpio con sus fichas de racionamiento.Si en la abacería [tienda] escasea de vez en cuando el surtido de guisantes marca Gigante Verde o Maíz marca Niblets, es para que coman millones de muchahcos vestidos de kaki o de azul marino al toque del clarín llamándoles al rancho. Cuando falta algún alimento es que luchan por al libertad.1919

[-One part for him, one part for you-. This is the promise of the food products that are able to reach new heights of production despite the shortage of manual labor and of buyers willing to play clean with their ration cards.If in the stores there is an occasional shortage of Green Giant peas or Niblets corn, that is so that millions of boys dressed in khaki or navy blue will be able to eat when the sound of the bugle calls them to the mess hall.]

Ricans never knew how really close we were to the exhaustion of food stocks. Still, they must have been able to guess what the situation was even in the spring months; and by fall we should have a betraying exhaustion of rice, they want rice and beans first, and only afterward whatever else is available!” Rexford Tugwell, The Stricken Land: The Story of Puerto Rico, New York, Doubleday, 704 pp. p.. 242.

18 18 Revista Puerto Rico Ilustrado, August 26, 1944, # 1796, p. 73.19

19 Ibid. , December 18, 1943, p. 83.

As we indicated at the beginning, the war period saw one of the worst food shortages ever

experienced in Puerto Rico. Not only was there a price increase of the basic foods that Puerto Ricans

were accustomed to, but there was also a change in the flow of minor food crops from the regions of

production to areas of high demand with little agricultural production. This state of affairs took a more

sinister turn when the government began to ration fuel and tires during 1942. Although the government

did act to encourage domestic growing of foodstuffs, it is important to note that the distribution of seeds

and the access to animal feed among the farmers was also problematic.

Contrary to what some studies on the history and sociology of food indicate, the canned goods

that Puerto Rican families had begun to use did not become alternate safeguards to the food shortage.

The prices of these products went up considerably since they were primarily destined for use in the

mess halls for the soldiers at the front. It is important to note that a four ounce can of sausages cost

fifteen cents (two cents less than a pound of salted codfish), and a sixteen ounce can of salmon cost

around forty cents! By the same token, once the General Commission on Food and Supplies was

dissolved and replaced by the General Administration of Supplies, a disposition was reinforced

whereby all purchase orders had to privilege basic foods and not what the government considered

“semi-luxury” items (wines, licquors, and canned goods).

How was Rexford Tugwell’s government organized to face the crisis? To what extent was the

United States government responsible for averting a movement of social and political vindication that

would have endangered its political and military hegemony in Puerto Rico? Were the policies

regarding the supplies and distribution of food promoted by the United States government deliberately

encouraged by the local legislature so as to open the way for the imaginary association “Popular Party—

Better Nourishment”? These are the issues I address in the following segments.

The Government on Paper

Rexford Guy Tugwell assumed the governorship of Puerto Rico on September 19, 1941.2020

Before the attack on Pearl Harbor, he tells us, various black outs were simulated in Puerto rico that

could be observed from the roof of La Fortaleza. For several nights, the Governor delighted in the

tropical panorama sighting “El Fanguito,” Río Piedras, Guaynabo, Cataño, and Sabana Seca while

distinguishing a miminum of lights over the mountains that served as background for the northern

towns. Nonetheless, Tugwell claims that after December 7, 1941, “The practice days were over and the

serious ones had begun.”2121 On December 10, 1941, the United States had declared open war on the

powers of the axis, Italy and Germany.

The image of a proyect to tackle the acute shortage of provisions and the ensuing socal unrest

had begun to take shape between Tugwell and and his advisors since October 28, 1941. On that date,

Tugwell addressed the fifteenth session of the legislature and from the start summarized the findings of

the committee appointed by the acting governor José M. Gallardo to study the increase in the prices of

consumer goods. He began by proposing possible strategies to regulate the situation with or without the

aid of the Washington Office of Price Administration. Tugwell told the Popular and Coalition

legislators the following

“In such situations some measures of control are always taken. In this crisis the President, using the powers given him by Congress when an emergency should be declared, set up the Office of Price Administration and Civilian Supply. Its Administration has been hampered, however, by uncertainty as to his duties. Finally, finding himself ineffective, he asked for defining legislation. This is embodied in a bill now before Congress.

It appears that, is the situation is to be met in any adequate way, certain measures will need to be taken by the Insular Government. What those may be, in view of impending legislation, is not in every respect clear. But it is clear that certain things will have to be done in any case. Because of the uncertainties of Federal control, as well as because of Puerto Rico’s situation, it would seem best to set up an organization

20

20 Enrique Lugo Silva, The Tugwell Administration in Puerto Rico, Río Piedras, S.E. , 1955, 185 pp., p. 48-49; Rexford Tugwell, Puerto Rican Public Papers, New York, Arno Press, 1975, 378 pp., p. 5-11.

21 21 Rexford Tugwell, The Stricken Land, The Story of Puerto Rico, New York, Double Day, 1946, 704 pp., p. 199.

which can meet the crisis in alternate ways and with degrees of intensity suited to development which cannot be predicted.”2222

Tugwell addressed other topics in his message on October 28th, but it is noteworthy that in the

first twenty-eight paragraphs he focused on future scenarios (inflation, high prices, scarcity of

provisions, unemployment, speculation, mistrust of mercantile interests) and on the actions he was

willing to take with the approval—divided, to be sure—of the legislature (price regulation; shiipping

controls; priority of necessary articles; and purchase, storage, and distribution of shipments). From this

moment, one could perceive the vision of a regulatory state, not one that encouraged and monitored

economic activity like an “active guarantor,” but as a participant and if possible, as the only driving

force of the country.

The legislature on the Island was willing to move in Tugwell’s direction in the days following

the message. Therefore, on November 17, 1941 the General Food and Supplies Commission was

formed by egislative Act Six. This agency had the authority to designate, with the approval of the

Governor, which articles were to be considered as priority items items; as well as the power to regulate

the prices for these items at the local market and the amount that each individual could purchase. The

law also stipulated that the determinations of the Commission be proclaimed by the Governor and all

stipulations be posted in prominent and visible places in all business establishments.2323 Governor

Tugwell’s reasoning in requesting the Legislature creation of this monitoring agency was based on the

belief that the basic foods in the Puerto Rican diet were all imported and that the price ranges of these

provisions in the local markets depended on the prices on the continental U.S.A. given the case that

products such as rice, codfish, beans, flours, lard, etc., were possibly not covered by price regulations on

the continent, it was necessary to establish controls on the Island to regulate commercial speculation.

Tugwell went further in his petition to the Legislature in order to override what he considered the

22

22 Ibid.. Puerto Rican Public Papers, p. 14-15.23 23 Boletín administrativo No. 745; Proclama del Gobernador de Puerto Rico fijando el

beneficio en la venta al por mayor y al detalle del arroz [Proclamation of the Governor Fixing the Profit Margin on Wholesale and Retail Sales], January 21, 1942; in El Mundo, January 22, 1942, p. 8.

exclusive monopoly of importers on the Island. He asked for more powers for the Commission,

specifically the authority to import goods. Obviously, his request met with the opposition of the

Chamber of Commerce and the Legislature in alliance with big business.2424 Dr. Antonio Fernós Isern

was appointed to direct the Commission.

The first measure taken by the Commission was to declare rice as a basic necessity on

December 9, 1941, exactly one day before President Roosevelt and Congress decided to enter the war.

Three days later, the Commission decided to fix the maximum price at which high quality rice could be

sold by wholesalers and retailers.2525 After the deliberations of the Commission’s section on prices,

presided by Julio G. Torres, the maximum price of rice was fixed at six dollars a hundredweight and

seven cents a pound. It seems that the important business owners questioned why the Commission fixed

a “price” and not a “benefit” on the sale of rice based on the cost of importation. The result was the

modification of the initial regulation a month later on January 14, 1942, when the price fixed in

December 1941 was repealed. In its place the Commission authorized a profit margin of seven percent

over the cost of importation for wholesalers and one cent profit margin a pound for retailers

Fresh meat was not a common staple in the Puerto Rican diet, especially among the lower

classes who occassionally consumed meat on special festive days. Nonetheless, the number of pounds

of fresh meat prepared in local slaughterhouses surpassed the amount of imported meat. For example,

24

24 Ibid. The Stricken Land... Tugwell includes the following testimony in his book: ‘With all this in view, on 28 October I called the special session of the legislature suggested in my inaugural and asked it to enact a measure providing for a Supplies Administrator who would be authorized to fix prices, if that seemed feasible, or to procure and import supplies Administrator who would be found. The legislature acceded, though its members balked at giving a Governor’s appointees such powers as tasked. They provided for a Commission whose members must be confirmed by the Senate, thereby assuring themselves the control of any jobs there might be.” Ibid., op.cit. pg. 170.

25

25 The rice considered of highest quality was the variety know as Japanese rice, today known as “pearl” or short-grained rice. This polished rice reached consumers with very little thiamine (vitamin B1). The polishing process increased producton costs and as a result increased the retail price of rice. The Stricken Land...p. 215; Lydia S. Roberts, Mejor arroz, major salud [Better Rice, Better Health], Río Piedras, Editorial del Departamento de Instrucción de Puerto Rico, 1951, 30 pp. pp. 4-6

Asked?Verificar

before the war period there were 16, 025,326 pounds of local beef available annually whereas

wholesalers imported 591,250 pounds.2626

The Commission also regulated the sale of beef to prevent un precedented fluctuations in

distribution which could ensue because of the shortage of and the price increase in other products. The

cheapest cuts of beef (lacking in meat and composed mostly of bone and fat) had always been present in

the preparations used to feed the sick in hospitals and charity houses. The meatier cuts became part of

the meals in the homes of the well-to-do or were served in expensive hotels and restaurants. But, in

general terms, the scarcity of other products could lead to an increase in the consumption of beef and

open the opportunity to speculation.2727

It is possible that, because of the situation described above, the Commission, on March 10,

1942, declared all meat a basic necessity whether produced locally or imported. According to the

proclamation signed by Governor Tugwell, after March 20, 1942, prices for meat sold by retailers in

butcher shops were set at a fixed rate: filet at 50 cents a pound, boneless cuts at 30 cents a pound, stew

meat at 25 cents a pound, and meat for soup at 12 cents a pound.2828

After the first weeks in March, Dr. Antonio Fernós Isern, president of the Commission,

initiated a campaign to disseminate information, through local newspapers, about the new objectives

adopted by the organism in order to intensify the production of crops on the Island. He indicated that

the ideal would be to,

26 26 Contraty to what occurs today, Puerto Rican consumed less pork than beef. Consumption of pork was calculated at 5.9 pounds per person annually and of beef at 8.9 pounds. Hill y Noguera, The Food Supply of Puerto Rico, pp. 24-25.

27 27 The most critical year in terms of speculation and the black market seems to have been 1945 judging from the campaign designed between May and July of that year by the president of the Senate, Luis Muñoz Marín. The Fundación Luis Muñoz Marín [Luis Muñoz Marín Foundation] has a sub-series which merits some study perhaps in conjunction with the books Querellas y Novedades de la Policia en el Archivo General de Puerto Rico [Complaints and Novelties of the Police in the Puerto Rico General Archive]. Vid, FLMM, Section IV, Luis Muñoz Marín Presidente de Senado, Sub-Series Mercado Negro [Black Market], Folder 3.

28

28 Boletín Administrativo No. 761, Proclama declarando artículo de primera necesidad toda clase de carnes producidos localmente o importadas destinadas al consumo del público; en: El Día, miércoles 25 de marzo de 1942, p. 3

…direct our activities towards strengthening the production of foodstuffs on the Island, including the distribution of seeds as needed. One of the measures to consider in stimulating the planting of food crops will be the guarantee of remunerative prices for these products on the local markets and the establishment of suitable storage and distribution facilities...2929

On the other hand, the information provided by Isern to the local papers also made it clear that

the Commission would also make efforts “to ensure transportation facilities for the importation of

consumer goods not produced on the Island in keeping with the buying capacity of the people…”3030

Through this statement Isern was subtly announcing an imminent change in the organization and

functions of the Commission, especially in the powers of the administrators, the influence of the

governor on the Commission, and—what was of most relevance for mercantile interests and consumers

—the Commission’s adoption of the role of sole importer and distributer of foodstuffs thus usurping the

role of local importers and wholesalers. This situation generated great oposition, in Puerto Rico as well

as in the U.S. Congress, to Tugwell’s gubernatorial mission during the remaining months of 1942 and

throughout 1943..

Towards Government Control of Food Commerce

To understand this situation, we need to review the deliberations towards the end of 1940, at

whch time President Franklin D. Roosevelt, concerned about the defense strategy to be designed for the

Caribbean, appointed a preliminary Commission to study the physical, economic and social conditions

of the island possessions under U.S. rule. Roosevelt appointed Charles Taussig to chair the Caribbean

Commission. Rexford Tugwell, with no thought of having to address war issues in Puerto Rico,

received the results of the Commission.

According to Tugwell’s writings, the Caribbean Commission focused its analysis on the

geographical possibilities of the islands in terms of establishing air bases and beach heads for the

29 29 Intensificación de la producción de alimentos. Será objetivo de la Comisión de Aliimentos. Dice que deben eliminarse las cargas contributivas [Intensification in the production of food crops. Will be the objective of the Food Commission. It is said taxes should be eliminated] in El Mundo, March 3, 1942, p 1.

30 30 Ibid.

defense of the Panama Canal. Tugwell, it seems, thought that military constructions without economic

security could lead, in case of a naval blockade, to falterning economies on the islands. The islands, in

general, exported single crops and lacked self-sufficient agricultural economies. Tugwell believed that

the situation could provoke great social unrest, thus endangering the political, economic, and military

stability of the United States in the region.3131

Tugwell’s thoughts on the reports from the Commission ventured further. He believed that the

construction of military bases would only alleviate part of the unemployment problem on the islands

since the wages earned by the construction workers would not suffice to maintain the sustenance of the

majority of the population since they depended, almost exclusively, on imported foodstuffs. Tugwell

understood at that moment that the difficulties caused by the war in areas related to the flow of imports

would exacerbate the unrest already on the rise on some islands because of the association made by

marginalized groups between their precarious social and economic conditions and the small group of

importers allied with the government. Tugwell expressed the idea in the following terms:

“In each island there was a small group of businessmen whose members monopolized the import and export trades, taking a cruel profit on food and other supplies coming in and exports going out.”3232

From on-site examinations and from the discussions between Tugwell and Charles Taussig, the

determination arose that it would be better to establish a system of public aid. The Commission began

to understand that it would be dangerous for the stability of the colonial governments on the islands to

give the impression that they were in alliance with the minority merchant classes. Thus, it was necessary

to design a legal mechanism which would give the metropolitan governments some control over the

economic activity in the Caribbean. At that time attention was directed at what Tugwell referred to as “a

31

31 Tugwell, The Stricken Land, pg. 96-97 32

32 Ibid. Loc.cit.

general Carribbean government of some sort,” that would include the European powers that had

colonial possessions in the Caribbean.3333

The Commission’s plan was promoted by Charles Taussig in the Department of the Interior

during 1941. Nonetheless, the preparations for the eventual declaration of war focused atttention on the

European front so that during 1941 the possibilities of creating an international Caribbean commission

were lost among the memoranda that crossed between high officials in the Department of the Interior

and the Office of the President. It would not be until the end of 1941 that Roosevelt would reconsider

the idea of an international commision.

While memoranda crossed among the offices of the U.S. government, Tugwell, who had been

appointed governor of Puerto Rico in September 1941, began conversations with the Department of the

Interior to determine the possibilities of creating an emergency plan for Puerto Rico and the Virgin

Islands. It seems that during the last few months in 1941 or the first few months in 1942,

representatives from the Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico met to study the viability of a plan for growing

produce to promote an inter-Caribbean self-sufficiency. After all, that is what Dr. Antonio Fernós Isern,

president of the General Food and Supplies Commission, spoke about in the first week of March 1942..

But on-site observations, the predictible opposition of azócares to the inter-Caribbean plan for

growing produce, the changes that were beginning to take place in the cold war on the western front,

and the fear in the Department of the Interior of a shortage of food and ships, led the United States in

1942 to assign $15,000,000 to create a food reserve for its island possessions.3434

According to a report submitted to the U.S. House of Representatives by Congressman C.

Jasper Bell, chairman of the Committee on Insular Affairs, a subcommittee was appointed in June 1943

to study the reigning conditions in Puerto Rico going into the second year of the war.3535 The

33 33 Ibid. 34 TH34 FLMM, Section IV, Luis Muñoz Marín Presidente del Senado, Series 2, House of

Representatives, Conditions in Puerto Rico, Report Pursuant to the House Resolution 159, 78TH

Congress, 2nd Session, April 27th , 1944.

35

35 Ibid. pg. 1

subcommittee, chaired by Jasper Bell himself, began public hearings in Puerto Rico during the summer

of 1943 he and initiated his study of the state of affairs in Puerto Rico during the following months.

According to the report, during March and April the subcommittee carried out public hearings in

Washington regarding this issue.

From the reports submitted to the House by Bell in April 1944, we learn that the $15,000,000

fund was assigned by the U.S. government as cautionary measure in response to the situation created by

submarine warfare and to the possibility of the dismantling of maritime commerce. The Department of

the Interior, under the authority of Harold Ikes, took on the responsibility of managing the funds.

During the month of January 1942, shipments meant for the Islands--drawn against the

$15,000,000 “stock-pile”—were delayed and postponed, according to Bell, because of the indecision of

the Government regarding the administration of the program.3636 In light of this situation, Bell indicates

in his report, commercial interests in the U.S. and in Puerto Rico came to an agreement with the

Department of the Interior to establish priorities and control mechanisms regarding cargo space on the

ships and the flow of shipments to the Caribbean. The agreement was coordinated through Paul

Gordon, the administrator of the Food Reserve Program of the Department of the Interior.

As we can see, from 1940 until 1944, there was a conflicting vision on how to adminster the

flow of imports to the U.S. island possessions in the Caribbean. On the one hand, we have the view of

Charles Taussig and Rexford Tugwell who espoused government control over the import and

distribution of supplies on the islands with minimal intervention of big business interests.. Taussing’s

and Tugwell’s original proposal did not consider the total exclusion of large importers and wholesale

suppliers from the government-controlled commercial activity. Nonetheless, as the shipments began to

36 36 Ibid. pg. 2 El congresista Bell lo proponía así a la Cámara de Representantes “When the enemy submarine warfare early in 1942 assumed threatening proportions, the United States very Wisely, as a matter of precaution, provided a revolving fund of $15,000,000 to set up foods reserves in territories and island possessions to protect those residents against the possibilities of food shortages…

In the months that followed there were delays resultant from governmental indecision as to what course should be followed in administration of the program. In the meantime, stocks of foods which has comprised their diets. Those diets, traditionally conductive to malnutrition, found many unable to withstand the ravages of even the most temporary starvation.”

decrease during the first months in 1942 and the the lack of supplies in the markets became more

critical, there was the possibility that the population, feeling the pangs of the food shortage and

beginning to panic, would understand that the lack of basic food supplies and the increase in prices was

the result of the speculative practices of merchants who, in the absence of government regulations, took

advantage of the crisis to enrich themselves. It is this scenario that motivates Tugwell, at the beginning

of March 1942, to persuade Dr. Fernós Isern, administrator of the General Food and Supplies

Commission, to make serious changes in the objectives of the agency. Later on, as we shall see, the

General Food and Supplies Commission was replaced by the General Administration of Supplies with

the authority beyond declaring which products were to be classified as basic necessities and setting price

limits on these products.

On the other hand, there was the vision of free enterprise held by Bell and U.S. big business

interests united in a congressional lobby group called the Trade Advisory Committee. In Puerto Rico,

the “libre cambista” (free trade) vision was represented by the Chamber of Commerce and its president

Filipo de Hostos. Those in favor of free enterprise declared that government control would stem the

flow of merchandise because of the increase in bureaucratic red tape. They also alleged that, to meet

the costs of the multiple agencies involved in regulating business activity, the government would have

to raise taxes that would affect the U.S. mainland population. Moreover, they argued that the

governments in the U.S. or in Puerto Rico did not have the experience nor the facilities to store and

distribute goods. This last point would prove to be true during the first months after the General

Administration of Supplies began its functions.

The Dissolution of the General Food and Supplies Commission

The first sudden increases in the prices of almost all food products took place between February

and April 1942. The largest increase was registered between February and March, especially in

imported foodstuffs which went up by 8.1% over the price in January. Food produced in Puerto Rico

also increased, but at a lesser rate: 3.3%.3737

37

Meanwhile, at the beginning of March, Washington was organizing a program of internal

collaboration for the Caribbean. On March 9th, Tugwell received a message from Taussing describing

the creation of a Caribbean Advisory Committee to which Judge Martín Travieso and Tugwell himself

were to be appointed. At the end of the month the Committee met for the first time in Trinidad since the

British government was also collaborating. During the following weeks the Committee met with the

governments of British Guyana, Barbados and St. Lucia. The on-site observations of the measures

designed by the British to control commercial activity, convinced Tugwell as he returned to Puerto Rico

in April 1942, that government intervention in the import business was the solution to ensure better

distribution and prices of food products on the Island.3838

The month of May began with the implementation in Puerto Rico of the order by the Office of

Price Administration in Washington which forbade merchants from selling food at prices higher than

those at which food was sold in March.3939 On the Island, the scarcity of food, fraudulent stock-piling,

over-priced articles, and the complaints of merchants regarding the order regulating prices, became

more and more frequent. Around May 19th, the merchants protested against the order by suspending

the sale of more than one hundred articles.4040 At the beginning of June, the Health Commissioner, Dr.

R. Berríos Berdecía, encouraged the people to denounce before the Food and Supplies Commission the

fraudulent storage of food articles which were beginning to spoil, since “some merchants resort to

infinite tricks to hide the merchandise with the hope of obtaining greater benefits when their

competitors exhaust their stores of merchandise, and in the hope, also, of dominating the business in

37 “Considerable aumento en los precios al por menor de los alimentos de febrero a marzo de 1942 [Considerable increase In the price of food from February to March, 1942].”; en: El Día, April 23, 1943, pg. 6. It is interesting to note that from January 29, 1942, Governor Tugwell had declared that Fridays by Native Foods Day. According to the declaration, all Puerto Ricans were urged, as their patriotic duty, to consume native products only every Friday. The declaration, without a doubt, was based on the reasoning that generating demand for local products would stimulate the growing of food crops on the Island.. “Día de Productos Alimenticios Nativos”; El Día, January 30, 1942, p. 8.

3838 Tugwell, The Stricken Land... pp. 271-291.39 39 “Orden nacional imponiendo a mayo como base para los precios de los alimentos” [National

Order Imposing May as the Basis for Food Prices; El Día, May 2, 1942, p. 2.40 40 “Alegan no pueden venderlos a los precios fijados por orden federal” [Allegedly Cannot Sell

Products at Prices Fixed by Federal Order].”; en: El Mundo, May 19, 1942. p. 1.

their neighborhoods by offering articles at the legal price, but charging extra in an underhanded

manner.”4141

As this situation developed, the Puerto Rican legislature discussed the creation of an agency

with greater powers that could function as an importer (leaving aside the powerful wholesale business

organizations), a distributor (thereby ensuring fair prices for consumers), and a wholesale supplier.

These deliberations culminated in the approval of Act 228 on May 12, 1942, which created the General

Administration of Supplies and substituted the General Administration of Food and Provisions three

months later.4242

During the last few days of operations, the General Administration of Food and Provisions

adopted various resolutions regulating prices, imposing fines for overpricing, seizing food merchandise

from merchants who sold above the established prices or sold quantities below those established as

obligatory by the agency.4343 Around July 17, 1942, the agency adopted its last resolution (an

indication of the operations soon to be taken over by the General Administration of Supplies) assigning

itself $100,0000 to purchase rice.4444

The Caribbean Emergency Program

In order to understand the role and the structure of the General Administration of Supplies—

which began operations on 10 August 1942—we need to consider Washington’s design of an inter-

agency emergency plan that began to take shape in May at a meeting in Kingston, Jamaica where high

government officials from the U.S. and Puerto Rico (Rexford Tugwell, Antonio Fernós Isern and

Teodora Moscoso) decided that the U.S. government and the provisions agencies in Puerto Rico had to

41

41 “Medidas para evitar el deterioro de alimentos” [Measures to Avoid Deterioration of Foods] ; in: El Mundo, June 5, 1942. p. 6

42 42 “La Administración General de Suministro sustituye a la Comisión de Alimentos” [General Administration of Provisions substitutes the Food Commission; en: El Día, August 18, 1942, p. 6.

43 43 “Importante información de la Comisión de Alimentos Sobre Arroz” [Important Information on Rice from the Food Commission; in El Día, July 10, 1942, p. 4.

44 44 Boletín Administrativo no. 802. Proclama [Declaration], in El Día, Friday, July 17, 1942, p. 1.

adopt a more active role in controlling the importation and distribution of foodstuffs on the island

possessions.

Two days after the Puerto Rico legislature approved the law creating the General

Administration of Supplies, on 12 May 1942, Governor Tugwell, Fernós Isern, and Moscoso boarded a

plane to Guantánamo Bay in Cuba, and from there flew to Kingston, Jamaica.4545 They met with Sir

Arthur Richards, Governor of Jamaica, , for two weeks. Here they formulated the idea to convince

various U.S. agencies and departments4646 to generate documentation and support (through

memoranda, resolutions, and declarations) because the plan for purchasing and marketing food agreed

upon by the Department of the Interior and the top merchants on the islands since February (stimulated

by the $15,000,000 fund for the creation of food reserves) would not be able to function to full

capacity.4747 The support applied for by the island delegation was granted in the hope that it would help

create an environment (among big business, the sugar industry, and the Republican politicians) that

would foster a complete change in the manner in which foodstuffs were distributed in Puerto Rico.

After the meetings in Jamaica, Tugwell went to Washington to begin lobbying for support from other

agencies since he was convinced that imports by volume (and not a reserve fund) administered

exclusively by the government was the most effective means to reduce to the utmost the possibility of

social unrest that would ensue due to the shortage of food. Fernós Isern took on the difficult task of

convincing the various business sectors on the Island.

During the month of June, the Caribbean Commission held meetings in Washington in the

offices of the Sub-Secretary of War and the Sub-Secretary of State with attendance of representatives of 45 45 Tugwell, The Stricken Land, pg. 30446

46 Among them the War Department, the Navy and the War Shipping Administration. Ibid. p. 308.47

47 We need to reiterate that Tugwell’s idea was not an invention. Since April 23, the War Shipping Administration had decided that all ships destined for Puerto Rico should leave from ports in the Gulf of Mexico. This created a difficult problem for importers on the Island since many had large quantities of foodstuffs in warehouses in eastern ports and had to move their stock on trains to the southern part of the U.S. Much of the food spoiled leading to thousands of dollars in losses for the importers. At least on this issue, there was a point in favor of Tugwell. FLMM, Caribbean Emergency Program, 1942-1943, p. 29.

the Department of the Interior, the Department of Agriculture, the War Department, the Navy, and the

War Shipping Administration. As a result of these meetings, the Caribbean Commission was able to

seek the support of the General Administration of Supplies.4848 Finally, on August 19th, President

Roosevelt established that all the agencies concerned were to provide support for the proposed plan.

This led to the creation of the Caribbean Emergency Program which gave the government absolute

control over the movement of food and merchandise in the Caribbean. In Puerto Rico the General

Administration of Supplies would have exclusive rights to receive and distribute the shipments

programmed by the Caribbean Emergency Program.4949

Merchants at the Margins: the Monopoly of the General Administration of Supplies

As indicated above, the General Administration of Provisions was created by law in May 1942.

Nonetheless, the law did not go into effect until August 10th. No doubt the delay was a result of

Tugwell’s need to have Washington’s backing so that the General Administration could exercise

absolute control over the shipping and distribution of foodstuffs.

Antonio Vicéns Ríos, a businessman from the town of Ciales, was appointed to preside over the

General Administration. He was the honorary president of the Puerto Rico Federation of Commerce.

His appointment brought into power a man with no ties to the most powerful business organization on

the Island, the Puerto Rico Chamber of Commerce.5050 The Administration was responsible for

stabilizing prices to control inflation; determining whom to sell to, what to sell, and the quantities of

foodstuffs that could be sold; prohibiting and preventing the practice of “cornering”; granting loans and

establishing production cooperatives; preparing a plan for planting; and transferring remaining funds

48 48 Ibid. p.3 The Administration of Agricultural Markets was created in 1938 and from that time was in charge of acquiring farming surplus and distributing it free of charge among the indigent population. During the war, the agency bought foodstuffs to sell to businesses on the Island. This agency also became the supplier for the General Administration of Provisions after its inception. In November 1942 it became the Administration of Food Distribution. Vid. Luis A. Izquierdo, op.

49 49 FLMM, Caribbean Emergency Program Division, p. 3 50

50 “La Administración General de Suministros sustituye a la Comisión de Alimentos” [The General Administration of Supplies Subsstitutes the Food Commission], in El Nuevo Día, August 18, 1942, p. 6 Vid. also, El Día, August 11,1942, p. 8.

from the Food Commission to create an operations account. The Administration would also have the

authority to fine the violators of the regulations.

The General Administration of Supplies (AGS for its Spanish acronym) designated Dr.

Antonio Fernós Isern as the official liaison with the related agencies in Washington. Fernós would be in

charge of receiving from the business sectors on the Island the information related to their requisition

from among 21 articles considered as basic necessities. The orders would be grouped and submitted to

Dr. Paul Gordon, the administrator of the Washington Food Reserve for Civilians in Puerto Rico.

Once the orders were approved by Gordon’s office, they were submitted to the Administration

of Agricultural Markets, agency in charge of purchasing the articles through the Department of the

Interior. The foodstuffs would be shipped by the Administration of Agricultural Markets to the ports in

Puerto Rico and delivered to Dr. Fernós Isern, Supplies Administrator. Once the supplies arrived on the

Island, the AGS would deliver the foodstuffs among the wholesalers and other merchants at prices that

were not to exceed the cost at which the Administration of Agricultural Markets had acquired them in

the United States.5151

The AGS collaborated closely with the Administration of Agricultural Markets even after the

latter agency became the Administration of Food Distribution in 1942. From the inception of the AGS,

the distribution plan on the Island excluded the merchants from the process which originated in the

United States and ended at the municipal food stands. In Puerto Rico, the AGS established warehouses

in Arecibo, Aguadilla, Mayagüez, Caguas, Ponce and San Juan, for a total of six. From these

warehouses, merchandise was delivered to 14 distribution centers throughout the Island and from these

centers the merchandise went out to the municipalities.

Although we will not consider here the impact on commercial interests of this state controlled

distribution by the AGS of other food programs (such as the Infant Feeding Program, the Milk Station

directed by the Civil Defense, the Nursery School Feeding Program, and the Community School Lunch

51 51 “Sobre el embarque de ciertos alimentos a Puerto Rico” [On the Shipment of Certain Foods to Puerto Rico], in El Día, July 22, 1942, p. 1.

Program),5252 the fact is that around 1944, the business sectors on the Island were demanding in

Washington a return to the regular distribution of foodstuffs exclusively through commercial

channels.5353

Conclusion

There are other angles to study the relationship between the food crisis that ensued during the

Second World War and the state-centered policies on provisions, and the eating habits or patterns of the

majority of Puerto Ricans after the 1940’s. Our intent here has focused on describing the shortages and

the rise in prices during the worst years of the war, 1942-43; on bringing to light some of the eating

patterns of the population; and on describing the role of the government in tackling the crisis. .

Nonetheless, we need to ask to what degree did the crisis provoke a preventive government

action that in the long run created the conditions for food consumption practices—why not culinary

practices—which combined produce which helped stave off famine (tubers and the most humble of

vegetables such as pumpkin, okra, watercress, cabbage) with “industrial” foods (Vienna sausages,

tomato sauce, evaporated milk, dehydrated soup, (Vienna sausages, tomato sauce, evaporated milk,

dehydrated soup, vegetable shortening, oleomargarine, spam) and which the state began to disseminate

through innumerable nutrition and free food programs. The following figures attest to this. Between

1943 and 1944, fourteen million pounds of food were donated to the Department of Education by the

War Food Administration. These millions of pounds fed 184,000 students in 1,600 school lunch rooms

throughout the Island.5454 Is it possible that the cooks applied at home what they experimented with in

the schools? This is an angle that is being explored at present in works in progress.

52 52 FLMM, Presidencia del Senado, Gobierno Federal, War Food Administration, folder 1, Outline of Operations of the Children’s Free Feeding Programs in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Island, September 30, 1943.

53

53 Ibid. House of Representatives, Conditions in Puerto Rico, Report Presuant to House Resolution 159, April 27, 1944.

54

54 FLMM, Presidencia del Senado, Gobierno Federal, Outline of Oparations of the Children’s Free Feeding Program in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, September 30, 1943, p.4

On the other hand, it is true that the Popular Democratic Party`s legislature aligned itself with

the proposed plans of development to modernize the country. But, to what extent were the votes that the

Popular Party obtained in the 1944 elections a result of how the food crisis that originated in

Washington was managed?

There is no doubt that the management of the precarious food situation on the Island was based,

at one point, on reasons of nutrition. It is no coincidence that the well-known nutritionist, Lydia

Roberts, was recruited to carry out the first nutrition seminars at the university level. Most likely, the

reformist mentality of the governing powers on the Island, viewed the nutrition related problems not

only in terms of “quantity” but also of “quality.” During the war, however, the political and military

stability of the United States depended on quantity. The people accommodated themselves to that

mentality.

The problem of provisions in the following years was not completely solved. The solution

would depend upon the stability of food production in the United States after the war, and upon the new

concept of food marketing through supermarket chains as proposed by government planners in Puerto

Rico under the Commonwealth.