Purchase How Much Phentermine People and revive your male

Bureau of Economic Geology Centennial Lecture Program

Quantifying Risks Associated with Geologic Sequestration

Ian DuncanBureau of Economic Geology

University of Texas at Austin

100 Years of Scientific Impact100 Years of Scientific Impact

Bureau of Economic Geology

100 Years of Scientific Impact

What is Risk?



Risk = Likelihood xRisk = Likelihood x Consequences



What are Stakeholders Saying about Risk of CO2about Risk of CO2

Sequestration?



“Because of the unknown risk — this could perhaps be catastrophic — you’d have to haveperhaps be catastrophic you d have to have

some sort of overlying federal layer of protection… otherwise [carbon capture and storage (CCS) operators] wouldn’t do it … they wouldn’t go forward and capture carbon and put it deep

d d l th h d th tunderground unless they had some assurance that liability issues would not come back to bite them.”

Ti P ki h lTim Peckinpaugh, lawyer



“My sense is that you run a risk if the government assumes too much of this liability…. If you insure someone against a risk, then they’re going to be

less likely to take actions to reduce that risk ”less likely to take actions to reduce that risk.”

Richard Newell, Professor of Energy andRichard Newell, Professor of Energy and Environmental Economics at Duke

UniversityUniversity.



"[Failure to deal with risk and li bilit ] ld d l th t tiliability] could delay the construction

of billions of dollars of carbon capture and storage infrastructure."

Kip Codington, lawyer Alston & BirdBird



“Liability [and risk?] concerns are overstated”

David Hawkins The Natural Resources Defense CouncilResources Defense Council



WHAT ARE STAKEHOLDERS READING ABOUT THE RISK OF CO2ABOUT THE RISK OF CO2

SEQUESTRATION?



Work on Risk Assessment for CCSWork on Risk Assessment for CCS

Stevens and van der Zwaap (2005)

“the most frightening scenario [related to risks associated with geologic CO2to risks associated with geologic CO2 sequestration] would be a large, sudden catastrophic leak”sudden, catastrophic leak .



S i lli t l (2004)Saripalli et al (2004):

“acute hazards” related to geologic CO2 sequestration are “wellhead failure [blowouts], seismic hazard during injection, accumulation

d l i i l k d iand explosion in lakes, and massive efflux in soils”.



Wilson et al (2003) “Catastrophic events [associated with CCS]

b d b l l k if h CO2 imaybe caused by slow leaks if the CO2 is temporarily confined in the near-surface environment and then suddenly released”.

“while the specific mechanism active at Lake Nyos can occur only in tropical lakes (becauseNyos can occur only in tropical lakes (because they do not turn over annually), mechanisms may exist that could confine slowly leaking CO2 in the subsurface enabling sudden releases”subsurface, enabling sudden releases .

“it is conceivable … that CO2 leaking from deep d d ld i filt t k t tunderground could infiltrate karst caverns at

shallow depths and that such CO2 could then be rapidly vented …”.



Damen et al (2006):

there is “still a lack of understanding in the physics of CO2 leakage (i.e. the processes that control leakage) through wells and faults”.



CO2 PIPELINE RISK

Snyder et al (2008):y ( )

“Transporting CO2 is the least“Transporting CO2 is the least risky aspect of CCS, both technically and economically, and it is not a barrier to CCS implementation”



Doctor et al (2005):Doctor et al, (2005):

“If CO2 is transported for significant p gdistances in densely populated regions; the number of people potentially exposed to risks from CO2 transportation facilitiesto risks from CO2 transportation facilities may be greater than the number exposed to potential risks from CO2 capture and storage facilities”storage facilities

“Public concerns about CO2 transportation pmay form a significant barrier to large-scale use of CCS”.



EXAMPLES OF INDIVUAL RISKS:

North Sea offshore oil and gas production the upper limit of tolerance for risk to personnel is 1 in 1000 or 1 xlimit of tolerance for risk to personnel is 1 in 1000 or 1 x 10-3 per year (Avena et al, 2007). Equivalent to a rate of just above 30 fatal accidents per 108 exposure hours ( l 200 )(Avena et al, 2007).

Mountain climbing: risk of 10-3 per year g p y

Driving an automobile: risk of 1 x 10-4 per year

Flying: risk of 5 x 10-5 per year.



EXAMPLES OF INDIVUAL RISKSEXAMPLES OF INDIVUAL RISKS:

Coal Mining in Appalachia versus Staying at Home

First Gulf War versus Staying at HomeFirst Gulf War versus Staying at Home



BUSINESS RISKS of CO2 SEQUESTRATIONProject Financing Issues

Regulatory Environment

Legal (pore space ownership, liability)

Technology Risksgy

Operational risks (Including Project Delays)

Leakage Risks (contamination of groundwater climate risk)Leakage Risks (contamination of groundwater, climate risk)

Induced Earthquakes and Earthquake Rupture

Contamination of Natural gas reservoirs

Injectivity Decline



ASSESSING OPERATIONAL RISKS CO2 SEQUESTRATIONRISKS CO2 SEQUESTRATION

• Pipeline Accidents• Well Blowouts• Induced Earthquakes• Seal Leakage• Earthquake Rupture of Reservoir• Groundwater Contamination



Other Risks

Brine and/or CO2 leakage through wells faults deficient sealswells, faults, deficient seals – Impact on CO2 atmospheric

i ( b di )concentration (carbon credits)– Impact on ground water

(contamination, displacement)– Impact on mineral resourcesp



Risk Assessment of a Geologic CO2 Sequestration ProjectSequestration Project

What can go wrong (what are the possible adverse )outcomes)?

What is the probability or likelihood of these p youtcomes?

What would the consequences (or damages) be ofWhat would the consequences (or damages) be of each of the possible outcomes at this site?

I i f h i i h d d hIn view of the uncertainty in the data used, how confident are we about the answers to these first three questions?



q

Risk Assessment of a Geologic CO2 Sequestration ProjectSequestration Project

At the present time we lack a quantitative p qunderstanding of the likelihood of leakage through the seal; up old wells or up faults….

These topics are the focus of ongoing research….

S h d k ?So… what do we know?



What is the CO2-EOR Record?

0.6 Gigatons of CO2 transported since 1973

1.2 Gigatons of CO2 injected

Estimated less than 1% loss of CO2 currently

No deaths or significant injuries



What Can We Learn Fromthe CO2 EOR Record?

(1) The operational risks of capturing, compressing,

the CO2-EOR Record?

( ) p p g, p g,transporting and injecting CO2

(2) The risk of blowouts or very rapid CO2 release from(2) The risk of blowouts or very rapid CO2 release from wells

(3) Th i k th t CO2 ill l k i t h ll if(3) The risk that CO2 will leak into shallow aquifers and contaminate potable water

(4) That sequestered CO2 (and possibly associated methane gas) will leak into the atmosphere



CO2 Pipelines Incidentsp

From 1986 through 2006

• 12 leaks from CO2 pipelines

• No injuries or fatalities









CO2 pipelines risk of leaks:CO2 pipelines risk of leaks:

For large (50-150 mm) breaches as 3.3 ×10-7 per meter of pipe length per year10 per meter of pipe length per year

[Reference: DNV][ e e e ce ]



Case Study: Denbury Pipeline Complexy y p p

Five accidental releases of CO2 have occurred since the pipeline operations resumed

NEJD pipeline 11.5 MMT/yr capacity, 293 km in length

J k D CO2Jackson Dome CO2 source

Built by Shell in1986y



Case Study: Denbury Pipeline Complex

Free State Pipeline 6.7 MMT/yr 138 Kms in lengthp /y g

Built in 2005

Jackson Dome CO2 source

t l k i id t d ft i i thtwo leak incidents occurred soon after pressurizing the line, caused by manufacturing imperfections in welds

Each leak caused minimal release but a controlled release of ~75 MMCF (each) was required to depressurize the pipeline segment for repair



depressurize the pipeline segment for repair.

Case Study: Denbury Pipeline Complexy y p p

Incident on the Tinsley 8” line, occurred when an t id t ll t th liexcavator accidentally cut the line





CO2 Well Blowouts

Blowouts are temporary loss of control of wells

1) Blowouts of production wells drilled into natural CO2 reservoirs

2) Blowouts of CO2 injection wells

3) Blowouts of active oil production wells that are an integral part of the CO2-EOR project

4) Blowouts of inactive or plugged and abandoned ll i hi h f i d i dwells within the area of increased pressure associated

with CO2 injection wells



CO2 Well Blowouts



From Skinner (2003)

Case Study One: Blowouts CO2-EOROperations of Company AOperations of Company A

1. CO2 production well, coiled tubing packing failed during well work.

2. CO2 injection well, caused by leaking gasket at a well head. 3 CO2 i j i ll h i l l bl HP b3. CO2 injection well, mechanical seal blown on HP booster

pump. 4. Production well, casing valve was accidentally left open

during work over operationsduring work-over operations 5. Production well unexpectedly started to flow CO2 before it

was converted to EOR producer6 Production well problem occurred during the installation of6. Production well, problem occurred during the installation of

a Blow-Out-Preventer stack during workover operations. There were no deaths or injuries associated with any of these events.



Monitoring Data from Well Blowoutsg

CO2 measurements were conducted during the accidental release at one of the producers was monitored b portable sensorsmonitored by portable sensors

Two hundred feet from the release maximum CO2 concentrations recorded were approximately 4750 ppm (0.475%)

The elevated concentrations dissipated quickly (within 30 minutes)



Case Study Two: Blowouts CO2-EORyOperations of Company B

Four of these incidents were apparently caused by the failure of mechanical components (two due to valve failures two due to failure of nipples)valve failures, two due to failure of nipples)

The fifth failure was not related to the well itself but th d b f il f trather was caused by failure of a pump component

related to corrosion

None of the five incidents appear to have been caused by human error



Case Study Three: Blowouts CO2-EORyOperations of Company C

One blowout occurred during the installation of a blowout preventer.

O i id t th t l l l t d t hOne incident that was clearly related to human error was caused by a truck ran over an injection well.

Another blowout occurred when CO2 reached a plannedAnother blowout occurred when CO2 reached a planned production well before a well work over could be completed.

Again one of the “blowout” incidents was caused by the failureAgain one of the blowout incidents was caused by the failure of a pump component.



CONCLUSIONS

The thirty seven plus years of history of CO2 i j ti i l d i CO2 b dCO2 injection involved in CO2 based Enhanced Oil Recovery in the US represent the most tangible evidence available for understanding the risks of CO2 sequestration in deep brine reservoirs.



In the case of both pipeline incidents andIn the case of both pipeline incidents and blowouts; component failure rather than corrosion or human errors have resulted in th l k f CO2the leakage of CO2.

The rarity of corrosion related incidentsThe rarity of corrosion related incidents reflects the industries success in implementing anti-corrosion measures.



Installation of blowoutInstallation of blowout preventers is the most common cause of blowouts in CO2 wellscause of blowouts in CO2 wells



The CO2-EOR industry has an excellent safety record.

Unfortunately it is difficult to calculate probabilities from null data.p



DOES CO2 INJECTION CAUSEDOES CO2 INJECTION CAUSE EARTHQUAKES?

“estimating damages from potential i i h li biliseismic events, where no liability

litigation currently exists, is l ti t thi i t” (Wil t lspeculative at this point” (Wilson et al,

2007)



Myth

Bauer (2005) PhD dissertation, quotingBauer (2005) PhD dissertation, quoting Sminchak et al. (2001), asserts that of 20 seismic events caused by injection20 seismic events caused by injection of fluids 13 were “caused by the injection of CO2 for the enhancementinjection of CO2 for the enhancement of oil recovery”.



Reality

This assertion is not supported by the f t Th 13 ibl i d dfacts. The 13 possible induced earthquakes (10 in Texas) in Table One

f S i h k t l (2001) ti llof Sminchak et al (2001) were spatially related to water flooding operations at

il fi ldoil fields.



Thousands of injection sites within TexasThousands of injection sites within Texas are aseismic even though the injection pressures are in theory sufficiently highpressures are in theory sufficiently high to induce an earthquake (Davis and Pennington 1989)Pennington,1989)



O l i f h th kOnly in a few cases have earthquakes been sufficiently monitored “to d t t l i l ti hidemonstrate a conclusive relationship between earthquakes and deep well i j ti ” S i h k t l (2001)injection” Sminchak et al (2001)



In over 200 cases of inducedIn over 200 cases of induced earthquakes :

56% are related to mining activity (coal potash and gold mining)(coal, potash and gold mining), 30% to water reservoirs (dams)11% oil and gas extraction11% oil and gas extraction3% are possibly related to fluid injection (Klose 2007)injection. (Klose, 2007)



SO DOES CO2 INJECTION CAUSE EARTHQUAKES?EARTHQUAKES?

It could, but its highly unlikely.

Site specific evaluations are needed.



COULD CO2 SEQUESTRATION BE DISRUPTED BY A MAJOR EARTHQUAKE?DISRUPTED BY A MAJOR EARTHQUAKE?

It could, but its even more highly unlikely.

D t i il bl t l l t th lik lih dData is available to calculate the likelihood.



COULD CO2 SEQUESTRATION BE DISRUPTED BY A MAJOR EARTHQUAKE?DISRUPTED BY A MAJOR EARTHQUAKE?

Likelihood (in stable mid-continent) for an earthquake Magnitude 6 or greater with an epicenter within 10 km of a CO2 plume with a radius 1 km is 0.004[Pi (10 + 1)2/106] = 1.5 x 106106

Probability is 4 times as large for a 20 kmProbability is 4 times as large for a 20 km radius or 6.0 x 106



IS CO2-EOR A GOOD PROXY FOR CO2 SEQUESTRATION?SEQUESTRATION?

Yes, but there are some caveats:,

1) CO2 captured from power plants ) p p pand industrial sources may be more impure than natural CO2 used in pEOR

2) Typically CCS activities will be in more populated areas



p p

CONCLUSIONS

• Most risks associated with CCS can be quantified and are acceptablebe quantified and are acceptable

• Risks that are difficult to establish• Risks that are difficult to establish probabilities for generally have manageable bounded consequencesmanageable, bounded consequences

• Risk assessment ultimately is site• Risk assessment ultimately is site specific



AcknowledgementAcknowledgement• SECARB‐Ed is supported by the U.S. Department of Energy’s (DOE) National Energy Technologyof Energy’s (DOE) National Energy Technology Laboratory as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 under DE‐FE0001930. – www.netl.doe.gov/technologies/carbon_seq/arra/training htmlining.html

• The Southern States Energy Board is the Principal Contractor of SECARB‐Ed to DOE.– http://www.secarb‐ed.org/

DisclaimerDisclaimer

“This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an f th U it d St t G t N ith th U it d St tagency of the United States Government. Neither the United States

Government nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any p y y, p , yinformation, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name trademark manufacturer or otherwise does nottrade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not

il fl h f h U i d S Gnecessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof.”

Thanks!Thanks!

For more information: www beg utexas edu



For more information: www.beg.utexas.edu

Documents

Purchase How Much Phentermine People and revive your male